What is the Steady-State Patent Allowance Rate?

PatentGrantRate

by Dennis Crouch

This post continues from two prior data-posts:

Adding-in data from the USPTO Chief Economist (Alan Marco), I have updated my chart of the USPTO utility patent grant rate. The chart shows my verson of patent grant rate calculated as the number of patents issued (allowed) divided by the number of disposed-of-applications where the disposed-of-applications includes serialized utility applications either (1) abandoned or (2) issued as patents (allowed) during the given period and does not give any consideration to RCE filing.

In the chart above, you’ll find in allowance rate that I calculated using the USPTO Chief Economist disposal data that stretches back to 1985.  Overlaid in blue is my data previously presented.  You’ll notice substantial similarity between the data sets during the period of overlap, but some differences.  You’ll note that – on average – the rate calculated from my data is greater than that calculated from USPTO data.  Although I cannot entirely exclude a counting error, I expect that the differences can be explained primarily by the fact that the USPTO data includes all utility applications while my figures are limited to published applications.  Others have shown that non-published applications tend to have a lower allowance rate (these are, for the most part, applicants that have chosen not to file globally and tend to include a higher proportion of software and business method inventions).   In addition, I believe that the USPTO counts the patenting as of the allowance date rather than the issue date, which is why I put “allowed” in parenthesis above.  A further explanation for the differences that my data relies upon only a sample of around 30,000 published applications rather than the entire population.

In my estimation, the chart fails to reveal any ‘natural’ or steady-state allowance rate. It is also difficult to correlate the allowance rate with particular changes in the law or court decisions.  Rather, best guess is that the primary impact on the overall allowance rate stems from USPTO Policy as set by its Director.

33 thoughts on “What is the Steady-State Patent Allowance Rate?

  1. 7

    I think the higher rate from using the published data comes primarily from: all grants are published, but some abandonments are not published.

    Also, see our 2013 report where we find that the allowance rate is highly correlated with expected pendency (pending applications & examiner capacity). In other words, higher expected delay causes greater abandonment, which lowers the allowance rate. The report can be found here: link to gov.uk

  2. 6

    Does the link provided by the Office confirm (in any chosen metric) the data shown in the second graph linked below?

    I believe that the 42.5% dropped to a low of 38% – but that does not seem to appear in the graphs here.

    link to ipwatchdog.com

  3. 5

    “Show everyone the terrible patents that Kappos allowed oh-so-unfairly.”

    “C’mon. It should be easy for you. Just pull ten of them at random and let’s have a look.”

    There. Fixed. Yet again.

    1. 5.1

      Better would be to invite Malcolm to share ten software patents that he feels have been properly granted.

      1. 5.2.1

        Better would be to invite Malcolm to share ten software patents that he feels have been properly granted.

        Go ahead and scratch the surface.

      2. 5.2.2

        Wrong. All 12 easily pass 101/Mayo/Alice.

        You’re scratching the wrong surface.

        Try again.

        1. 5.2.2.1

          Nobody could have predicted your response.

          I do appreciate the hard work it takes, however, to not only be wrong but also to move the goalpost. Keep the laughs coming! Kappos will send your cookie after the remote server processes your request (it shouldn’t take long — distributed architecture is like a freekin’ miracle!).

          1. 5.2.2.1.1

            Nobody could have predicted your response.

            More lovely
            A
            O
            O
            T
            W
            M
            D

            “Go figure Folks”

  4. 3

    Dennis,

    “Others have shown that non-published applications tend to have a lower allowance rate (these are, for the most part, applicants that have chosen not to file globally and tend to include a higher proportion of software and business method inventions).”

    If one chooses to file globally, does one have a choice about publication?

    Did others actually show the higher proportion of software patents. Filling globally takes deep pockets. I would expect there is a correlation between non-publication and lack of resources to continue prosecution. Also, more pro ses.

    1. 3.1

      Troubled, the patent statute severely punishes filing foreign equivalent applications [most of which will publish] and requesting [and maintaining] U.S. application non-publication.
      The last I recall hearing only something like 10%? or so of U.S. applications are not published? [Does that include those already issued by 18 months?]
      I would agree with your proposed correlation between non-publication and lack of resources [especially since foreign filing, prosecution and maintenance costs are usually much higher] as well as greater use of non-publication requests by individual inventors.

  5. 2

    The allowance rate seems to (very broadly) correlate with economic growth and decline. Why that might be I’m not sure, but it seems worth investigating.

  6. 1

    DC best guess is that the primary impact on the overall allowance rate stems from USPTO Policy as set by its Director.

    It’d be a nice touch to show the terms of the various Directors along the top of the graph, along with the dates of State Street (1998) and KSR (2007).

    The PTO data seems to suggest a steady downward trending slope beginning as early as 1999 (the year of Peak Allowance). And the dip in 2009 would be perfectly consistent with KSR, a broadly applicable decision that would be expected to have a big impact on pending cases that were filed with the expectation that 103 could be swatted away like a fly.

    1. 1.1

      Everything in this graph is completely consistent with Kappos behaving like a complete hack at the public’s expense.

      Of course, that’s entirely consistent with his career both before and after his stint at PTO. How long until his mess is cleaned up, I wonder?

      1. 1.1.1

        An exemplary presentation of ad hominem from Malcolm.

        Yay!

        Prof. Crouch, what happens if you take your “blue” all the way back?

        1. 1.1.1.1

          Anon – My data regarding published applications has a hard limit at 2001 because that was the year that the USPTO started publishing applications. However, I get some boundary-condition skew if I attempt to look at allowance in those early years of publications.

        2. 1.1.1.2

          If you like, “anon”, I’m happy to provide more examples of Kappos’ hackitudinous tenure and his steady post-tenure hackulocity. We all know why you and c0h0rts adore the man. That’s part of the picture, too.

          1. 1.1.1.2.1

            Yay “cohorts” and stick our head deeply somewhere as to the fact of the Reject-Reject-Reject era.

            1. 1.1.1.2.1.1

              Here’s some more facts for you:

              link to patentlyo.com

              Since you’re all about the facts.

              The system was imploding under the weight of endless reams of “do it on a computer” junk and Kappos’ brilliant idea was to turn the spigot up to 11. Maybe he just wanted to see what would happen? Because nobody could have predicted, right?

              1. 1.1.1.2.1.1.1

                There was a more recent post than that Malcolm. Funny how you did not link to that.

                Oh wait, that’s the one with you trying to kick up dust about the Reject Reject Reject era.

                No wonder then why you did not want to link to that.

              2. 1.1.1.2.1.1.2

                Maybe he just wanted to see what would happen?

                Nah.

                More likely, that’s just the realization that quality does not equal reject.

                You do know that, right?

                1. I mean, supposedly you are an attorney and would appreciate the law actually being applied during the examination process (even the law that you have volunteered admissions as to knowing and understanding involving the exceptions to the judicial doctrine of printed matter), eh?

      2. 1.1.2

        “Everything in this graph is completely consistent with Dudas behaving like a complete hack at inventors, jobs, and the economy’s expense.”

        There. Fixed. Again.

        1. 1.1.2.2

          LOL

          Show everyone the awesome patents that Dudas rejected oh-so-unfairly.

          C’mon. It should be easy for you. Just pull ten of them at random and let’s have a look.

          1. 1.1.2.2.1

            See my post to Apotu – it would be interesting to see how many in the “bubble” under Kappos resulted in finally being free of artificial suppression.

          2. 1.1.2.2.2

            “Show everyone the terrible patents that Kappos allowed oh-so-unfairly.”

            “C’mon. It should be easy for you. Just pull ten of them at random and let’s have a look.”

            There. Fixed. Yet again.

            1. 1.1.2.2.3.1

              Sure Ned, that is a factor to take into consideration (as would be any lag or overall DROP in efficiency to accommodate a large influx of low skill, mostly English as a second language job-desperate new examiners.

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