Kelley Drye & Warren, LLP v. Orbusneich Med. Co. Ltd., BVI, 2014 WL 1814204 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 2014). 
ANTHONY D. TRUGLIA, JR., J.
FACTS
This case places before the court a long history of facts, claims and defenses whose resolution turns squarely on the issue of the reasonableness of counsel fees, and the proper way to collect them. The plaintiff seeks a prejudgment remedy of attachment and/or garnishment in accordance with General Statutes § 52–278a et seq. to secure payment of counsel fees and costs in the amount of $14,560,000.00 for services rendered to the defendants. The plaintiff also requests orders from the court temporarily enjoining the defendants from transferring or otherwise dissipating $14,535,000.00 of a certain settlement amount recently received by the defendants to ensure its availability for the payment of the plaintiff’s fees. The defendants vigorously contest the form and substance of the plaintiff’s claim and ask the court to deny all of the prejudgment relief requested by plaintiff.
 
The court heard testimony and oral argument on the plaintiff’s application and defendants’ responses on December 23, 2013, February 25, 2014, and March 19, 2014. After three days of testimony and argument by both sides, the court finds the following facts:
 
The plaintiff, Kelley Drye & Warren, LLP (“KDW”), is a large and well-regarded firm serving individuals and corporations in many areas of the law, including litigation involving intellectual property rights. The defendants, Orbusneich Medical Company Limited, BVI and Orbusneich Medical, Inc. (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Orbus”), are foreign corporations engaged in the design, manufacturing and worldwide sale of advanced biomedical technology. Orbus first became a client of KDW in July of 2005. At that time, the parties entered into KDW’s standard attorney-client fee agreement by which the firm rendered legal services for Orbus at the firm’s prevailing customary hourly rates. During this initial phase of their attorney-client relationship, KDW’s partners, associates and other personnel kept contemporaneous time records and sent periodic statements to Orbus in the ordinary course of business. This attorney-client agreement was memorialized in a letter agreement dated July 22, 2005; Plaintiff’s Ex. 1; signed by Stephen J. Moore on behalf of KDW. According to the letter agreement, Attorney Stephen J. Moore had primary responsibility for all services rendered by KDW on behalf of Orbus.
 
In late 2008, Orbus officials approached Attorney Moore to discuss the possibility of KDW representing Orbus in an action for patent infringement and other causes of action against Boston Scientific Corporation (“Boston Scientific”), which was one of Orbus’ competitors in the field of biomedical technology. At the time, Orbus was the holder of three U.S. patents for the design of a certain type of intravascular stent used to treat arterial diseases. Orbus believed Boston Scientific had misappropriated proprietary information on certain stent designs which were covered by their patents. Two of the patents were for a stent design called the “Liberte” stent, and the other covered a slightly different design known as the “Ion” stent. For some time prior to 2008 Orbus had met with representatives of Boston Scientific to explore possible business arrangements between the two companies involving these stent designs. Orbus and Boston Scientific had in 2000 executed a Confidential Disclosure Agreement (“CDA”) prohibiting the parties from using trade secrets and other shared proprietary information for purposes other than their dealings with each other.
 
Notwithstanding the terms of the CDA, Orbus claimed that Boston Scientific had intentionally and wrongfully misappropriated its trade secrets, including its highly confidential (and patented) stent design technology. In response, in late 2008 Orbus representatives consulted Attorney Moore on the propriety of commencing an action against Boston Scientific for patent infringement and common law causes of action including misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of contract and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act.
 
Both KDW and Orbus realized that the litigation contemplated against Boston Scientific would require a substantial commitment of time and resources by both attorney and client. Boston Scientific, at the time a much larger and financially stronger multinational corporation, had a reputation for “scorched earth” litigation tactics designed to wear out and outlast their adversaries. Attorney Moore, who was highly experienced in these types of intellectual property matters, investigated and researched the matter. After consultation with his colleagues at KDW, and review of three opinions of counsel verifying the infringements claimed, Attorney Moore recommended that Orbus proceed with filing a complaint against Boston Scientific for “patent infringement, trade secret and unfair competition.” Plaintiff’s Ex. 2.
 
Understanding the very significant costs involved and Orbus’ inability or unwillingness to fund protracted litigation with Boston Scientific on a traditional hourly arrangement, KDW and Orbus agreed to depart from their straight hourly-billing agreement and entered into a “hybrid” attorney-client fee agreement which included provisions for flat fees, hourly billing and a contingent “success fee” premium. This superseding fee agreement was memorialized in a letter from Attorney Moore dated February 23, 2009. Plaintiff’s Ex. 2.
 
The parties agreed in the new fee agreement that Orbus would make certain initial fixed payments that guaranteed that KDW would receive at least $375,000.00 during the initial pleading and discovery phases of the litigation, plus an additional $325,000.00 to be paid just before trial if necessary. Thus, KDW’s out-of-pocket fees would be capped at $700,000.00 if the matter went to trial and judgment. But in the event of a settlement of its claims prior to trial, KDW would be paid a percentage success fee based on the amount of the settlement. KDW would continue to keep time records in the ordinary course that would act as a “guide value,” which KDW would be paid (less the fixed payments made to date) plus the success fee at time of settlement.
 
The parties also agreed in the superseding fee agreement that KDW would keep a separate account for legal services that KDW might render for patent reexamination, if necessary. Fees and costs for patent reexaminations, if required as a result of the litigation, would be billed and paid separately from the guide value of the litigation timekeeping accounts.
 
Finally, the fee agreement for this new litigation provided that in the event of a “business arrangement” that terminates the litigation prior to trial, such as sale of the patents in question to Boston Scientific or acquisition of the entire company by Boston Scientific, KDW’s compensation would be calculated in a different formula, i.e., KDW’s Guide Value plus $2,000,000.00.
 
Attorney Moore recommended that Orbus file the patent infringement and breach of contract action in the Eastern District of Virginia. This recommendation was based on Attorney Moore’s understanding of this venue as a “rocket docket,” where patent cases moved so quickly that a resolution might be had as soon as a year after filing. Attorney Moore filed the action for patent infringement of the Liberte stent design plus the common law counts of breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in federal court for the Eastern District of Virginia in March 2009.
 
Rather than see the matter resolved within a year or so of filing, Boston Scientific quickly moved to transfer venue of the case to Minnesota, the state where Boston Scientific maintains a principal office. KDW on behalf of Orbus vigorously contested this motion to transfer, but the court immediately granted the motion for a change of venue, although it transferred the case to Massachusetts instead of Minnesota. The court reasoned that, inter alia, the “center of accused activity” did not take place in Virginia, but in Massachusetts. By order dated June 5, 2009, the court transferred the matter to federal court in Massachusetts.
 
In early 2011 Boston Scientific began selling its Ion stent, and in August of that year, KDW filed a Fourth Amended Complaint on behalf of Orbus; Plaintiff’s Ex. 3; adding a claim that Boston Scientific had also breached the CDA with respect to the Ion stent design.
 
In June of 2011, Attorney James E. Nealon of KDW, who shared responsibility for the file with Attorney Moore, mailed a “cumulative billing statement” to in-house counsel for Orbus, setting forth Guide Value services rendered by KDW from May 28, 2009, through May 31, 2011, in the total amount of $2,747,776.12. Plaintiff’s Ex. 7. The statement included time records from KDW counsel verifying the amount of time spent during this period. No one from Orbus responded to this statement, either by objecting to it or by paying all or any portion of it. Orbus representatives asked at this time that no further billing statements be sent to them, and as a result of this request, no other statements were sent to Orbus other than bills for the reexaminations starting in the summer of 2012. Plaintiff’s Exhibits 9–15, 25.
 
Sometime between the fall of 2011 and the spring of 2012 (the evidentiary record is not clear on the precise dates) Boston Scientific requested that the U.S. Patent Office conduct inter partes reexaminations of Orbus’ Liberte and Ion patents. Boston Scientific also moved to stay Orbus’ patent infringement cases pending the results of the inter partes reexaminations. Although again vigorously opposed by KDW on behalf of Orbus, the federal court stayed the proceedings as to the patent claims pending completion of the reexaminations. By agreement of the parties dated June 4, 2012, all of Orbus’ causes of action including the common law claims in the federal court were stayed.
 
The decision to agree to the stay of all proceedings was made by Orbus, in consultation with KDW counsel. This decision was made primarily for financial reasons, in that it was not cost effective for Orbus to continue to litigate the common law claims while decisions in the reexaminations were still pending. The decision to stay the state law claims after the patent claims had been stayed was also made in order to avoid the duplication of fees and costs that might occur after the reexaminations were completed.
 
At this point the exchange of correspondence between the parties (Defendants’ Exhibits B, C & D) make clear that: (1) the U.S. litigation begun by KDW on behalf of Orbus was stayed for possibly several more years; (2) no leverage whatsoever of the kind envisioned in Attorney Moore’s engagement letter (Plaintiff’s Ex. 2) had been brought to bear on Boston Scientific; (3) the settlement value of the U.S. litigation had minimal or no cash value at all; and (4) Orbus’ patents had possibly been placed in jeopardy by the continuing reexaminations. In reviewing the results obtained by counsel when determining the reasonableness of fees charged, the court cannot find on these facts that KDW added substantial value to Orbus’ legal interests as of July of 2012, after three years of litigation and millions of dollars of time expended.
 
Prior to June of 2012, Orbus retained and began consulting in earnest with other counsel regarding its ongoing litigation with Boston Scientific. Orbus and its new counsel tentatively agreed that similar patent infringement actions should be commenced in some (but not all) European markets where Boston Scientific might be vulnerable to such claims.1 Orbus held a meeting in October of 2012 in Florida, which was attended by members of its new team of intellectual property advisors that was led by Attorney Bert Oosting of the Netherlands. The minutes of this meeting indicate that Attorney Oosting discussed all aspects of the continuing litigation with Boston Scientific, including the status of the U.S. litigation heretofore handled by KDW, and the possibility of bringing similar patent infringement actions against Boston Scientific in Europe. Attorney Nealon of KDW attended the meeting, but the court finds credible Attorney Oosting’s testimony that Attorney Nealon’s participation was limited to answering procedural questions about the U.S. litigation.2
 
The court finds that KDW had a minimal role in development of the European litigation strategy. This finding is also supported by the lack of KDW time entries verifying its participation during this vital time.3
 
In the fall of 2012, Orbus replaced Attorney Oosting with Attorney Keith Hummel, of the New York office of Cravath, Swain & Moore, as lead counsel of its new legal team. Starting in December of 2012 Attorney Hummel assembled a team of international patent attorneys and others who devised and executed a new legal strategy against Boston Scientific. Having made the decision to move forward at the October 2012 meeting, Orbus, acting through its new team of attorneys, filed patent infringement actions against Boston Scientific in Germany, the Netherlands and Ireland. Boston Scientific responded by filing a patent infringement action against Orbus in the United Kingdom and, in early 2013, by requesting that the European Patent Office conduct the equivalent of inter partes reexaminations of Orbus’ patents in the European market. Orbus and its new team of attorneys defeated Boston Scientific’s challenges to the European patents in Germany. With this victory in hand, Orbus moved ahead with its patent litigation in Germany, and on or about April 30, 2013, Orbus obtained preliminary injunctions prohibiting Boston Scientific from selling the disputed stents in that country. Orbus did not obtain preliminary injunctions in the Netherlands or in Ireland, but did have a trial date set for the Netherlands in December of 2013. In short, by mid-September of 2013, with court orders in hand preventing Boston Scientific from selling in the German market, threatening a similar result in the Netherlands, and slowing the U.K. litigation, Orbus and its new team of attorneys had exerted sufficient leverage to force Boston Scientific to finally offer favorable settlement terms on all of the stent-related litigation that started in the spring of 2009.
 
By late September 2013, Orbus and Boston Scientific had come to a settlement agreement that included withdrawal of all patent litigation worldwide, including voluntary dismissal of the U.S. litigation still being handled by KDW, a license from Orbus to Boston Scientific for the disputed patent designs and a one-time payment to Orbus by Boston Scientific of a certain amount. Plaintiff’s Ex. 19.
 
Aside from a few emails on which KDW counsel were copied after the European strategy was commenced; Plaintiff’s Exhibits 27–30; there is no evidence that KDW had substantial involvement in the European litigation.
 
Orbus representatives notified Attorney Moore of the impending settlement in late September of 2013. After final discussions between KDW and its client relating to Orbus’ obligation to withdraw the pending U.S. litigation, Attorney Moore and Attorney Kinzler of KDW contacted Mr. Christophe Lee, Orbus’ Chief Financial Officer, to discuss payment of KDW’s fees. KDW on this occasion demanded full payment of fees calculated at more than $14,000,000.00. The court finds that this demand was made prior to KDW providing Orbus with detailed time records or other supporting documentation (other than those contained in Plaintiff’s Ex. 7). Mr. Lee refused KDW’s demand and this litigation ensued.

DISCUSSION
General Statutes § 52–278d(a)(1) authorizes the grant of a prejudgment remedy of attachment when “there is probable cause that a judgment in the amount of the prejudgment remedy sought, or in an amount greater than the amount of the prejudgment remedy sought, taking into account any defenses, counterclaims or setoffs, will be rendered in the matter in favor of the plaintiff ...” The “probable cause” standard has been defined more than once by the Connecticut courts as “a bona fide belief in the existence of the facts essential under the law for the action and such as would warrant a [person] of ordinary caution, prudence and judgment, under the circumstances, in entertaining it ... Probable cause is a flexible common sense standard. It does not demand that a belief be correct or more likely true than false.” (Citation omitted; internal quotations omitted.) TES Franchising, LLC v. Feldman, 286 Conn. 132, 137, 943 A.2d 406 (2008); see also Ledgebrook Condominium Association, Inc. v. Lusk Corporation, 172 Conn. 577, 584, 376 A.2d 60 (1977); Wall v. Toomey, 52 Conn. 35, 36 (1884). “Proof of probable cause as a condition of obtaining a prejudgment remedy is not as demanding as proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) CC Cromwell, LP v.. Adames, 124 Conn.App. 191, 194, 3 A.3d. 1041 (2010).
 
The court acknowledges that a prejudgment remedy hearing is not intended to be a full-scale trial on the merits of the plaintiff’s claims, and the evidence is not likely to be as well developed as at trial. TES Franchising, LLC v. Feldman, supra, 286 Conn. at 143. “[I]n an application for a prejudgment remedy, the amount of damages need not be determined with mathematical precision ... A ‘fair and reasonable estimate’ of the likely potential damages is sufficient to support the entry of a prejudgment remedy attachment ... Nevertheless, the plaintiff bears the burden of presenting evidence which affords a reasonable basis for measuring her loss.” (Citations omitted; internal quotations omitted.) Rafferty v. Noto Bros. Construction, LLC, 68 Conn.App. 685, 693, 795 A.2d 1274 (2002). The plaintiff also bears the burden of affording the court a reasonable basis both as to the merits of the case, and as to the amount of the remedy sought. CC Cromwell, LP v. Adames, supra, 124 Conn.App. at 196.
 
As stated earlier, KDW claims that the superseding fee agreement for the U.S. patent litigation entitles it to a portion of the lump sum payment included in the Settlement Agreement. KDW argues that it was intimately involved at every stage and in every aspect of planning and executing the European strategy, which was actually nothing more than a continuation of the U.S. litigation. KDW also argues that conditions were not favorable to begin the European strategy until the spring or summer of 2012, and therefore that delay in starting it should not be attributed to its efforts. KDW calculates the amount due as $14,379,455.21 (Plaintiff’s Ex. 22). KDW argues that the record is clear that the settlement amount received by Orbus was paid in consideration of withdrawal of the U.S. action that it handled, and thus the full amount of the settlement payment must be included when calculating KDW’s fee. In addition, KDW claims that the sum of $62,173.22 is justly owed to it for the reexamination work that was separately accounted for and billed.
 
Finally, KDW asserts that Orbus was habitually slow in paying its bills, and that after the settlement its representatives were evasive (if not outright deceptive) when presented with demand for payment. Therefore, KDW argues, a prejudgment remedy securing their claims before final judgment is entirely appropriate.
 
Orbus argues in response that the cash proceeds which it received from Boston Scientific were paid in consideration of settlement of all actions and proceedings pending between them, not just the U.S. litigation, and also partially in consideration of the worldwide license Boston Scientific received. Thus, KDW would receive a substantial unearned windfall if its fee for the U.S. litigation were based on the amount received in settlement of the European litigation, which was primarily, if not solely, the result of the other team of lawyers representing Orbus. Furthermore, if KDW receives the success fee premium that it seeks, the net effect would be forcing Orbus to pay twice for the same legal services.
 
Orbus, through counsel, denies that it was a slow payer and argued that it paid statements that were properly presented.4 Orbus also argues that KDW’s claim is premature, in that it brought suit prior to verifying to Orbus that all fees and costs demanded were reasonable. Orbus argues that KDW’s motion for a temporary injunction and other relief requires that it establish a likelihood of success on the merits of its claim, proof of irreparable injury and no adequate remedy at law, which it has failed to do. Thus, Orbus argues, prejudgment relief of any kind should be denied.
 
Rule 1.5(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct states in relevant part as follows: “A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee includes the following: (1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; ... (3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) The amount of time involved and the results obtained ...” The official commentary to Rule 1.5 states that “[c]ontingent fees, like any other fees, are subject to the reasonableness standard of subsection (a) of this Rule. In determining whether a particular contingent fee is reasonable, or whether it is reasonable to charge any form of contingent fee, a lawyer must consider the factors that are relevant under the circumstances.” In other words, regardless of the oral or written agreement of the parties, the fee ultimately charged to the client must be reasonable in light of all of the circumstances of each individual case. See, e.g., Simms v. Chaisson, 277 Conn. 319, 332, 890 A.2d 548 (2006) (holding that when determining an award of counsel fees, the trial court’s first inquiry is whether the fee agreement is reasonable in the first instance, applying the factors set forth in Rule 1.5); Schoonmaker v. Lawrence Brunoli, Inc., 265 Conn. 210, 259, 828 A.2d 64 (2003) (same); Sorrentino v. All Seasons Services, Inc., 245 Conn. 756, 774–75, 717 A.2d 150 (1998) (same). In fee dispute cases such as this, “the need to present expert testimony ... is best decided ... by careful examination of the circumstances of [the] particular case.” St. Onge, Stewart, Johnson, & Reens, LLC v. Media Group, Inc., 84 Conn .App. 88, 96, 851 A.2d 1242, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 918, 859 A.2d 570 (2004).5
 
In the present case therefore, even if the court were to find that KDW had met its burden of proof on all of the allegations of its verified complaint, i.e., that it is likely to succeed on the merits on every element of its fee agreement with Orbus, the court’s ability to award fees is still limited by the rule that all fees must be reasonable. This is true even at the prejudgment remedy stage.
 
Applying these standards to the facts as set forth above, the court is unable to find even a reasonable suspicion that KDW would prevail on the merits at trial, and that the trier of fact would find the superseding contingent fee agreement enforceable in the full amount of $14,560,000.00.
 
In support of this conclusion, the court further finds as follows:
 
(1) It is not clear that the superseding hybrid fee agreement even covers the European litigation. By its terms it covers only the U.S. litigation. The court agrees with the defendants that ambiguities and uncertainties in a retainer agreement must be construed in favor of the client.
 
(2) There is insufficient evidence that KDW’s services resulted in the final, worldwide settlement. As stated earlier, by June of 2012 it was clear that the U.S. litigation had negligible settlement value, while the work performed by the new team resulted in a favorable (or at least acceptable) resolution by the late summer of 2013. Therefore, to the extent that the court considers value added when determining the reasonableness of fees charged and collected, without expert testimony the court is unable to find on these facts what portion of the $14,350,000.00 demanded, if any, is reasonable.
 
(3) The court cannot conclude that KDW acted reasonably in demanding full payment of the $14,379,455.21 without first providing its client with full verification of amounts claimed to be due under its guide value and allowing the client a reasonable time to respond with questions and concerns. Presenting the client with full documentation only after commencement of a collection action is inherently unreasonable under Rule 1.5; the court agrees with defendants that plaintiff’s application is premature,6 except as to the reexamination fees.
 
With respect to the success fee portion of the demand, KDW did present evidence of several drafts of the Settlement Agreement; Plaintiff’s Exhibits 31 and 32; which indicate the probability that Orbus changed the original terms to allocate the settlement payment entirely to the European litigation rather than to settlement of all of the litigation, thereby making it harder for KDW to claim a portion of the settlement as a basis for their success fee. The court can and does draw an adverse inference from Orbus’ reliance on its attorney-client privilege not to testify regarding how these changes came to be made. However, even if the court assumes that language was changed to make it more difficult for KDW to claim credit for a portion of the settlement amount, the evidence is still overwhelming (at least on the evidence thus far) that KDW’s multi-year efforts were ineffective while the European strategy was highly effective. It is also impossible for the court (at least on the evidence thus far) to make a fair allocation of how much of the settlement amount, if any, should be credited to KDW and how much to the European team, without expert analysis and testimony.
 
Second, with respect to the guide value portion of the demand, the court concedes that litigation is unpredictable, and gives the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt that the quality of the services rendered at all times met or exceeded levels of skill and sophistication demanded for this type of specialized work (at least for purposes of this application). But the court is unable to accept at face value the time records submitted by plaintiff due to the errors in timekeeping that were pointed out during the hearing and evidence of complaints registered by Orbus. The court finds that expert testimony is required for the court to make even a probable cause determination as to the reasonableness of the guide value because of the size of the fees demanded, the complexity of the underlying issues and highly specialized nature of the services involved.7
 
With respect to both portions of the fee demand, KDW asks the court to take judicial notice of the size of the U.S. market for stents as compared to other markets as evidence that the real value of the settlement should be allocated to the U.S. market, and therefore allocated to the U.S. litigation. Plaintiff’s Exhibits 33 and 34. The court declines to make this extrapolation for two reasons: (1) it is too speculative and imprecise; and (2) it still does not address the contract issue or the causation issue. Based on the record before it, the court can only conclude that the settlement was due solely to the efforts of the European team.
 
(4) The court does not find that KDW is entitled to no compensation at all for its services on the U.S. litigation; the court finds only that with respect to the application for prejudgment remedy, it has failed to carry its burden of proof as to the likelihood of success as to the $14,350,000.00 claim, and has further failed to establish probable cause as to what a reasonable fee should be, should the court choose to award some other amount. The only portion of the fees and costs that defendants appear to accept is $36,916.85 billed and outstanding for reexamination work; Defendants’ Exhibits I and J. The court finds that this amount was properly billed to defendants and that the plaintiff is likely to succeed on this claim.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the plaintiff’s application for a prejudgment remedy of Attachment in accordance with General Statutes §§ 52–278a et seq. is granted in the amount of $36,916.85.
 
The court reserves decision on the plaintiff’s motion for a temporary injunction.
 
The court, in accordance with General Statutes § 52–278n, subsection (c), orders the defendants to disclose assets located in this state sufficient to satisfy the prejudgment remedy in the amount of $36,916.85 within ten days of this order. If defendants do not disclose sufficient assets by said date, the plaintiff may reclaim its motion for a temporary injunction.

 Footnotes
	
1
	Attorney Moore testified that KDW was actively involved in the strategic planning of the European litigation now contemplated by Orbus, but the court finds little evidence of his involvement or involvement by other KDW attorneys at this early stage.
	
2
	The extent of Attorney Nealon’s participation at the meeting is also verified by Plaintiff’s Ex. 26.
	
3
	The court also finds credible the testimony of Attorney Keith Hummel on this point, that the communications between KDW and the European litigation team were limited to making sure that positions taken in the U.S. Litigation and U.S. re-examinations were consistent with those taken by the European team in their proceedings.
	
4
	The court finds credible evidence on both sides of this issue.
	
5
	For example, in St. Onge, Stewart, Johnson, & Reens, LLC v. Media Group, Inc., supra, 84 Conn.App. at 96–100, the court found that, due to the complexity of the fee dispute involving patent and trademark litigation, expert testimony regarding the reasonableness of the fee was required.
	
6
	In reaching this conclusion the court does not reach the question of whether KDW’s statements are correct Attorneys Moore and Nealon admitted on cross-examination (and without adequate explanation) that the figures provided to Orbus’ representatives just before commencing this action were not entirely correct. Both admitted that time that should have been recorded to the reexamination account was applied to the litigation matter, and that the wrong hourly rate for the litigation might have been used for some entries.
	
7
	The need for expert testimony is especially true with regard to KDW’s claim that the European strategy could not have been commenced earlier than the summer or fall of 2012, which was contradicted by Attorney Hummel. The court finds credible evidence on both sides of this issue as well but is unable to find that plaintiff has carried its burden on this important point.