Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co. (Fed. Cir. 2010) (En Banc Decision).
In a 9-2 decision, an en banc Federal Circuit has confirmed that 35 USC § 112 ¶1 includes separate written description and enablement requirements. “If Congress had intended enablement to be the sole description requirement of § 112, first paragraph, the statute would have been written differently.” The court also clearly confirmed the prospect that originally filed claims can violate the written description requirement:
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Although many original claims will satisfy the written description requirement, certain claims may not. For example, a generic claim may define the boundaries of a vast genus of chemical compounds, and yet the question may still remain whether the specification, including original claim language, demonstrates that the applicant has invented species sufficient to support a claim to a genus. The problem is especially acute with genus claims that use functional language to define the boundaries of a claimed genus. In such a case, the functional claim may simply claim a desired result, and may do so without describing species that achieve that result. But the specification must demonstrate that the applicant has made a generic invention that achieves the claimed result and do so by showing that the applicant has invented species sufficient to support a claim to the functionally-defined genus. |
Possession vs Disclosure: The court did step away from “possession” as the hallmark of the written description requirement. Rather, the court wrote that “the hallmark of written description is disclosure. . . . [T]he test requires an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Based on that inquiry, the specification must describe an invention understandable to that skilled artisan and show that the inventor actually invented the invention claimed.”
General Principles: The court presented “a few broad principles that hold true across all cases”: “the written description requirement does not demand either examples or an actual reduction to practice”; however “actual ‘possession’ or reduction to practice outside of the specification is not enough; and a “description that merely renders the invention obvious does not satisfy the requirement.”
Basic Research – Tough Luck: The court recognized that the written description requirement makes it more difficult to patent “basic research” that has not yet been fully reduced to a practical implementation. The court’s reaction to that problem was tough luck. “That is no failure of the law’s interpretation, but its intention. Patents are not awarded for academic theories, no matter how groundbreaking or necessary to the later patentable inventions of others.”
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That research hypotheses do not qualify for patent protection possibly results in some loss of incentive, although Ariad presents no evidence of any discernable impact on the pace of innovation or the number of patents obtained by universities. But claims to research plans also impose costs on downstream research, discouraging later invention. The goal is to get the right balance, and the written description doctrine does so by giving the incentive to actual invention and not “attempt[s] to preempt the future before it has arrived.” Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1171. |
Holding: For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the asserted claims of the ‘516 patent are invalid for lack of written description, and we do not address the other validity issues that were before the panel. We also reinstate Part II of the panel decision reported at 560 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009), affirming the district court’s finding of no inequitable conduct. The majority opinion was written by Judge LOURIE and joined by Chief Judge MICHEL and Circuit Judges NEWMAN, MAYER, BRYSON, GAJARSA, DYK, PROST, and MOORE. Judges NEWMAN and GAJARSA filed concurring opinions.
Judges RADER and LINN each filed opinions in dissent. [I will write more on this later]