Tag Archives: Damages

Eye-Opening Verdict: Lashify’s Patent Win Curls Industry Expectations

by Dennis Crouch

This week a unanimous jury in Judge Albright’s W.D.Tex. courtroom filled out a very simple verdict form that favored the patentee Lashify over the accused infringer Worldbeauty, who sells drugstore lashes:

Q: Did Lashify prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Worldbeauty has directly infringed the asserted claims of the asserted patents?

A: Yes, Yes, Yes (all 3 claims).

Q: Did Lashify prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Worldbeauty’s infringement was willful?

A: Yes

Q: Did Worldbeauty prove, by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted claims are invalid as obvious in light of the prior art?

A: No, No, No.

Q: What amount did Lashify prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, it is entitled to as damages for Worldbeauty’s infringement?

A: $30.5 million in lost profits.

There will certainly be some post-verdict motions, including the adjudged infringer’s motion for JMOL as well as the patentee’s request for treble damages and attorney fees.  The $90 million potential is certainly enough to blink your eyes at.  (more…)

EcoFactor Responds: Defending the Federal Circuit’s Damages Ruling Allowing Qualitative Apportionment

by Dennis Crouch

This is my third post focusing on Google’s en banc challenge to ‘loose’ damages testimony. The patentee, EcoFactor, has now filed a responsive brief in the ongoing smart thermostat patent dispute which resulted in a $20 million jury verdict against Google.  A 2-1 Federal Circuit panel affirmed the verdict and, as you might expect, EcoFactor’s en banc response defends the decision, arguing that the case presents a straightforward application of established precedent.  At core, EcoFactor argues that Google and amici are seeking to impose new, rigid rules that go beyond existing Federal Circuit precedent.  Although some say that hindsight is 20/20, anyone who has undergone a hypothetical damages analysis will understand that the process always involves some degree of guestimation and uncertainty — adding additional precision and calculation is unlikely to provide any true certainty or predictability.

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Defense Side Amici Support for Tighter Reins on Damages Expert Testimony

by Dennis Crouch

Google’s pending en banc petition in EcoFactor v. Google has drawn significant  support from some tech giants, focusing on the application of Daubert standards to patent damages expert testimony. Five amicus briefs supporting Google’s position have been filed with the Federal Circuit, each arguing for stricter scrutiny of damages calculations and expert reliability in patent cases.  This post discusses the case and the issues presented by the amici army. (more…)

Degrees of Disagreement: Google Petitions En Banc on Smart Thermostat Patent Damages

by Dennis Crouch

Google recently petitioned for en banc review a Federal Circuit split decision in EcoFactor v. Google. The case focuses on when a damages expert testimony satisfies Daubert.  The original opinion also highlights an interesting debate regarding the appeal of pre-trial eligibility rulings.

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Dewberry Group: Structuring the Firm to Avoid Trademark Liability

by Dennis Crouch

The U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Dewberry Group, Inc. v. Dewberry Engineers Inc., a trademark damages case focused on how corporate separateness principles apply to disgorgement remedies under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). The Fourth Circuit’s decision affirmed a $43 million disgorgement award against petitioner Dewberry Group (DG) for trademark infringement, an amount that included profits earned by DG’s “legally separate” corporate affiliates. Apparently, the affiliates were “single-purpose entities,” also privately owned by John Dewberry, whose sole function was to own commercial properties serviced by DG.

Pierce the Veil: In its literal sense, a veil is a delicate fabric that separates the visible from the concealed, a barrier that can be easily lifted or parted. However, the phrase has a history of extending beyond the material world, with a veil often serving as a boundary between the physical and spiritual realms in our universe. Many of us go through life, only occasionally glimpsing beyond this veil into the hidden spiritual dimensions that, according to story tellers, lie alongside our own. In the corporate world, the veil of corporate personhood serves to shield the owners from personal liability, creating a legal fiction that separates the actions of the company from those of its shareholders. This veil of protection is not impenetrable, however, and can be pierced by the courts in cases of serious misconduct or wrongdoing, exposing the owners to personal responsibility. Although the truth of owner identity may already be known, piercing the corporate veil removes the protection against responsibility  by attempting to holding accountable those who would misuse its protections. But, the legal doctrine of corporate separateness is quite strong and I might venture that it is easier to pierce the veil of our spiritual realms than the corporate analogue. (more…)

Pending En Banc Petitions at the Federal Circuit

by Dennis Crouch

The Federal Circuit recently decided the en banc design patent case of LKQ v. GM, but the court has not issued an en banc decision in a utility patent case since 2018.  There are currently four interesting petitions pending before the court.

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Discussing Stern’s “Myth of Nonrivalry” for Patent Law

By Dennis Crouch

Two people cannot wear the same sock (at least at the same time) but they can think the same thought, sing the same song, or undergo the same medical procedure. As Thomas Jefferson famously put it, part of the ‘peculiar character’ of an idea is that ‘no one possesses the less, because every other possesses the whole of it.’

This quote from Professor James Stern’s new article introduces the conventional view that ideas and information are nonrivalrous, in contrast to the rivalrous nature  of tangible goods.  As an idea based creation, intellectual property’s nonrivalrous nature has always placed it on airy ground as a statutory creation rather than a natural law.  The rivalrous nature of real and personal property has justified property regimes, but for IP we have always needed additional justification and additional limits because propertization creates artificial scarcity.  But Stern’s new article bucks the conventional wisdom and instead argues that the nonrivalry of IP is a myth. James Y. Stern, Intellectual Property and the Myth of Nonrivalry, 99 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1163 (2024).  Although many economists assume that more information is better, Stern makes clear that is not always true. He writes “it seems a safe bet that there are substantial numbers of people who would prefer the human race had never come up with such novelties as land mines, cigarettes, cargo shorts, Jet Skis, genetically modified foods, anabolic steroids, robocallers, date-rape drugs, subwoofers, Ponzi schemes, and crystal meth, to name just a few.”

Stern’s article challenges the widely held belief that information goods are inherently nonrivalrous, and that this characteristic distinguishes them from tangible property. He argues that the concept of rivalry, properly understood, encompasses not just conflicts between two active uses of a resource, but also conflicts where one person wants to use a resource and another simply wants that person to refrain from doing so. This broader conception of rivalry in terms of wants and desires, Stern contends, is relevant to many situations involving intellectual property.  One Stern’s key insights is that preferences to control and restrict access to ideas and information are ubiquitous, extending well beyond the domain of intellectual property law. He points to examples such as privacy laws, testimonial privileges, classified information and state secrets laws, and the Federal Witness Protection Program as evidence that conflicts over controlling access to information are common and demonstrate the potential for rivalrousness when it comes to ideas and information.  This insight serves to challenge the notion that the nonrivalrous nature of information goods necessarily means that granting exclusive rights over them is unjustified or socially harmful.

The article also examines how the characterization of intellectual property rights as “monopolies” has shaped legal doctrine, such as the Supreme Court’s reliance on the “public rights doctrine” to uphold adjudication of patent validity in administrative proceedings. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018). Stern suggests that this rhetoric traces partly to the view that information goods differ fundamentally from physical property due to their supposed nonrivalry.

Although the article is not patent focused, Stern’s arguments have significant implications for patent law by undermining a key justification for limiting the scope and strength of patent protection. If rivalrousness is possible for patented inventions, then the case for treating patents as a form of property is stronger.  An example application here could be eBay and the role of damages and injunctions in patent cases.  Similarly, with respect to patent term, Stern’s article raises questions about the appropriate duration of patent rights. If the justification for time-limited patent rights rests partly on the assumption that inventions are nonrivalrous and therefore do not require permanent exclusivity, then recognizing the potential for rivalrousness in the use of inventions may suggest a need to reconsider the optimal term length. At the same time, concerns about dynamic efficiency and the importance of promoting follow-on innovation may still counsel in favor of limiting the duration of patent rights, even if some degree of rivalrousness is present.  Consider also double patenting, that is designed to ensure that the public should have access to the invention upon expiration of the patent. See In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

Although I have not fully bought into his ideas, professor Stern has done a great job challenging us to rethink core aspects of intellectual property law.  Many courts, especially members of the Supreme Court, have long seen intellectual property as inherently suspect without any inherent value other than the incentive to innovate.  Stern’s article grapples with this argument that and highlights the need for a more nuanced understanding of the interests at stake.

Supreme Court Affirms Availability of Back-Damages Under Copyright Discovery Rule

By Dennis Crouch and Timothy Knight

On May 9, 2024, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Warner Chappell Music v. Nealy, No. 22-1078, 601 U.S. ___ (2024), resolving a circuit split over the availability of back-damages in copyright infringement cases. In a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Kagan, the Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling, permitting recovery of damages for acts that occurred more than three years before the filing of the lawsuit under the “discovery accrual rule.”

For those of you who have not been following the case, the Plaintiff Sherman Nealy, a music producer, helped create musical works in the 1980s with his collaborator, Tony Butler.  Nealy was incarcerated from 1989 to 2008 and again from 2012 to 2015 (more…)

Without Undue Experimentation vs Without Any Experiments

by Dennis Crouch

I was rereading the Supreme Court’s recent enablement decision of Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, 598 U.S. 594 (2023) and was struck by the Supreme Court’s statement that its 19th Century decision of Wood v. Underhill, 46 U.S. 1 (1847) “establish[ed] that a specification may call for a reasonable amount of experimentation to make and use a patented invention.”  This statement from Amgen is surprising because Chief Justice Taney’s decision in Wood includes a seemingly contrary statement that bars any experimentation (more…)

Guest post by Prof. Holbrook: Extraterritoriality and Patent Damages Under § 271(a)

Guest post by Tim Holbrook. Robert B. Yegge Endowed Distinguished Professor of Law and Provost’s Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.

United States patents are generally territorial.  Their exclusive rights only operate within the United States and its territories.  Or so one may think reading the Patent Act.  Moreover, in a global marketplace, the territorial nature of intellectual property rights can create challenges. It would be simpler for a patent holder to just use the U.S. patent to cover foreign activity. This is especially true if a domestic act of infringement has spillover effects into other countries.

So, when – if ever – can a patent owner receive damages for foreign activity that may flow from acts of domestic infringement?

The Supreme Court answered that question   (more…)

Attorney Fees on Undecided Inequitable Conduct Issues

by Dennis Crouch

United Cannabis Corp (UCANN) vs. Pure Hemp Collective, — F.4th — (Fed. Cir. 2023)

The UCANN vs. Pure Hemp patent case has come to a close with the Federal Circuit affirming the district court’s decision to deny attorney fees to Pure Hemp. The original infringement lawsuit was filed in 2018, with UCANN suing Pure Hemp for infringing US Patent No. 9,730,911, covering various high concentration cannabis and CBD extract formulations. During the litigation, UCANN filed for bankruptcy, causing the case to be stayed, and eventually, the parties stipulated to a dismissal of the infringement claims with prejudice. However, the stipulated dismissal did not include any discussion of attorney fees — leading to the current appeal.

Following the dismissal, Pure Hemp moved for attorney fees and sanctions, arguing that UCANN’s counsel committed inequitable conduct during patent prosecution and that UCANN’s litigation counsel had a conflict of interest. The district court sided with UCANN and denied attorney fees, stating (1) that Pure Hemp was not the prevailing party and (2) that Pure Hemp did not prove that the case was exceptional. The Federal Circuit has now affirmed the decision, finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the case unexceptional. Although district court the district court erred in not finding Pure Hemp to be the prevailing party, the error was harmless.

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Establishing Guidelines for Patent Damages: The Garretson v. Clark Case of 1884

by Dennis Crouch

Calculating damages for patent infringement can be a complex task, particularly when the invention is an improvement to an existing machine or product.  The Supreme Court’s 1884 decision in Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, helped establish a rule requiring apportionment in cases involving improvement patents.

The plaintiff, Garretson held two patents covering improved mop heads and sued the defendants for infringement.  The lower court sided with the patentee — finding the claims valid and infringed and also issued an injunction to halt ongoing infringement.  However, the court balked at awarding the requested back-damages for past infringement.

The patentee had offered a simple lost-profit damage calculation.  In particular the court was presented with evidence showing how much profit the patentee made from the sale of each mop, and the patentee asked the court to force the defendant to pay that amount for each of infringing mop.  The circuit court judge Samuel Blatchford appointed NY patent attorney George J. Sicard to conduct an accounting.  Sicard came back with a recommendation of $0 in damages, and Blatchford agreed.

The issue here is that the patent covered an improvement to a mop, but the patentee was seeking damages for the entire profits associated with the mop — not just the value of the improvement.  In his opinion, Blatchford wrote:

The patentee must in every case give evidence tending to separate or apportion the defendant’s profits and the patentee’s damages between the patented feature and the unpatented features, and such evidence must be reliable and tangible, and not conjectural or speculative; or he must show, by equally reliable and satisfactory evidence, that the profits and damages are to be calculated on the whole machine, for the reason that the entire value of the whole machine, as a marketable article, is properly and legally attributable to the patented feature.

Garretson v. Clark, 10 F. Cas. 40, 44 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1878).  The plaintiff has the burden of proving damages, but its theory of damages utterly failed. And, no other damages evidence was presented. The effective result was no damages.

At the time of the decision, Blatchfort was a circuit court judge. In 1882, he was nominated by President Chester Arthur to the U.S. Supreme Court.  Because of the long backlog at the time, Blatchfort reached the court before the case was heard (even though it was directly appealed).  The Supreme Court finally got around to hearing the appeal in 1886 and affirmed in an opinion by Justice Field.

The high court quoted Blatfort’s decision as I have done above and  also remarked that for improvement patents, “the patentee must show in what particulars his improvement has added to the usefulness of the machine or contrivance. He must separate its results distinctly from those of the other parts, so that the benefits derived from it may be distinctly seen and appreciated.” Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120 (1884).

The decision helped establish a clear rule for patentees to follow when claiming damages for improvements in existing machines or contrivances. It emphasized the presentation reliable and tangible evidence to apportion profits and damages between patented and unpatented features or evidence to demonstrate that the entire value of the product is attributable to the patented feature.

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An interesting aside from this case is that the defendant – Charles B. Clark – is also co-inventor of one of the two asserted patents.  Clark had transferred his rights to a third party, and Garretson bought them up.  The case involves sales of 100,000+ mops.

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Note here that this case was brought in equity rather than at law and so that raises a major difference between current cases, and we had different statutory language under the 1870 Act.  A lot of our 1800s patent cases have quirks that leave them not susceptible to direct application to today’s cases.  Still, I believe they provide some amount of foundational guidance and gives a chance to observe the evolution of the legal principles we know today.

Amgen Scores Partial Victory in Efforts to Maintain OTEZLA Exclusivity

By Chris Holman

Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 2023 WL 2994166, — 4th —   (Fed. Cir. Apr. 19, 2023)

In 2019, Amgen acquired worldwide rights to apremilast (OTEZLA) from Celgene $13.4 billion in cash, in connection with Celgene’s merger with Bristol-Myers Squibb. Apremilast was the only oral, non-biologic treatment for psoriasis and psoriatic arthritis, and in 2020 apremilast generated $2.2 billion for Amgen.

At the time Amgen’s acquired apremilast, Celgene was involved in Hatch-Waxman litigation with numerous generic challengers, including Sandoz. Celgene had asserted three of its 11 Orange Book-listed patents against Sandoz, and in 2020 Amgen was substituted as plaintiff.

The primary patent asserted is U. S. Patent 7,427,638, which is directed to pharmaceutical compositions comprising stereochemically pure apremilast. The original expiration date of this patent was in 2024, but the patent received a patent term extension of more than three years, resulting in an effective patent expiration date of February 16, 2028, according to the Orange Book.

Celgene also asserted U. S. Patent 7,893,101, which is directed to enantiomerically pure solid forms (e.g., crystalline polymorphic forms) of apremilast. This patent is due to expire December 9, 2023.

The third patent asserted by Celgene was U. S. Patent 10,092,541, directed to methods for treating a patient using dose titration of apremilast. According to the Orange Book, this patent was set to expire on May 29, 2034.

The district court found the claims of the ‘638 and ‘101 patents to be infringed and not invalid, and enjoined generic apremilast until the expiration of the ‘638 patent in February 2028. On appeal the Federal Circuit affirmed, an outcome that Amgen characterizes as a win.

On the other hand, the district court found the asserted claims of the ‘541 patent to be invalid for obviousness, which reportedly “pleased” Sandoz because the ruling “enables Sandoz to launch [its] generic apremilast product in the U. S. in 2028, six years prior to the expiry date of the latest-expiring Amgen patent asserted in litigation.”  On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed with respect to the obviousness of the ‘541 patent.

Here is a brief overview of the court’s decision regarding the asserted obviousness of these patents.

The ‘638 patent claims apremilast, which is the stereochemically pure (+) enantiomer of a compound falls that within a class of molecules referred to as phosphodiesterase-4 (“PDE4”) inhibitors.  Sandoz’s obviousness argument was based primarily upon a prior art Celgene patent, U. S. Patent 6,020,058, which includes an Example 12 that describes a racemic mixture containing apremilast, but that does not disclose the purified (+) enantiomer. The Federal Circuit found that the district court had not erred in holding that Sandoz had not proven that a skilled artisan would have had sufficient motivation to purify the (+) enantiomer from the racemic mixture disclosed in Example 12, nor that a skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in resolving that mixture into its enantiomeric components, given the unpredictable nature of resolving racemic mixtures.

The Federal Circuit further found that the district court had not erred in its finding of strong objective indicia of nonobviousness, particularly given the unexpected potency of apremilast relative to the apremilast-containing racemic mixture disclosed in Example 12. The court credited testimony from a Celgene researcher listed as an inventor on the ‘638 patent, who noted a 20-fold difference in potency between apremilast alone and the racemic mixture, and stated that the inventors “didn’t expect a 20-fold difference in potency… Normally, if a racemate is a 50/50 mixture of two enantiomers, you might expect a two-fold difference in potency, all things being equal.” The district court also did not err in determining that apremilast satisfied a long felt need for an improved psoriasis treatment suitable for oral administration, that others in the field had tried and failed to develop other PDE4 inhibitors as drugs, and that there had been a degree of skepticism about the safety of apremilast because of its structural similarity to thalidomide, a drug notorious for its teratogenic effects in fetuses leading to severe and debilitating birth defects.

The issue with respect to the ‘101 patent was whether it could rely upon the filing date of a provisional application to which it claims priority. The ‘101 patent claims crystalline Form B of apremilast, and the provisional application includes an Example 2 which discloses a synthetic procedure for preparing apremilast. Although Example 2 does not explicitly disclose that the resulting apremilast has the Form B crystalline structure, Amgen provided the court with the results of over a dozen experiments following the procedure of Example 2, all of which resulted in crystalline Form B of apremilast, while Sandoz had provided no evidence to establish that Example 2 was capable of producing a crystalline Form other than Form B. Although the district court had based its holding on its conclusion that the provisional application inherently disclose crystalline Form B of apremilast, the Federal Circuit found that it did not need to reach the issue of inherent disclosure because the evidence established that Example 2 actually disclosed crystalline Form B of apremilast, albeit without specifically disclosing the crystal structure of the resulting product.

The ‘541 patent claimed a method of treating a patient with apremilast that basically involves starting with a relatively low dose and, over a course of days, gradually increasing the dosage to arrive at a full dosage which is significantly higher than the initial dosage, i.e., a dose-titration schedule. The court found this to be an obvious method, in view of prior art disclosing a similar dosage schedule. The Federal Circuit observed that, as a general matter, varying doses in response to the occurrence of side effects is well-known and obvious to the skilled artisan.

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$469 Million: There and Gone

ClearPlay v. Dish Network (D.Utah 2023)

Earlier in March 2023, a Utah jury sided with the patentee ClearPlay – find that Dish Network infringed two “clean movie” patents used to to skip the naughty bits of a video program. US7577970 (Claims 28 and 33); and US6898799 (Claim 12).  The jury went on to award a “reasonable royalty” of $469 million.

Hold that pause button.  This week, Judge Nutter rejected the jury verdict and instead granted the defendant’s motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law.  Nutter concluded that the patentee had not shown either literal infringement or infringement by equivalents.  The court ordered DISH to prepare a draft order for his signature that adopts the rational from its briefing.

The draft order will contain support, citations, and consistent rationale from its briefing; transcript references from DISHs appendix (which should be used extensively in the draft order); and references to contrary positions taken by ClearPlay to illustrate the conflicts that this ruling resolves.

Minute Entry of March 21.   The case has been pending since 2014.

Federal Circuit: eBay creates a four-element test (not “four-factors”)

Nichia Corp v. Everlight Americas (Fed. Cir. 2017)

Nichia is the world’s largest supplier of LEDs.   The defendant here also sells LEDs and was accused of infringing three Nichia patents. U.S. Patent Nos. 8,530,250, 7,432,589, and 7,462,870.

In a bench trial, the district court judge sided with the patentee – finding that it had proven infringement and the defendant had not proven the asserted claims invalid.  However, the district court refused to issue a permanent injunction – finding that the patentee had failed to show that it suffered irreparable harm due to the infringement or that the remedies available “at law” were inadequate.   On appeal, the Federal Circuit has affirmed — holding that the proof of irreparable harm is a necessary threshold test for permanent injunctive relief, regardless of whether the patentee is left with an adequate remedy at law.  The decision is important (and quite problematic) because it allows for the possibility of no remedy for the patentee.

The baseline comes from the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay v. Mercexchange that established a four-factor test for determining whether to grant permanant injunctive relief.  The patentee must prove: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.

Prior to this decision, my conception of the four-factors were that the balance of the four must weigh in favor of injunctive relief and that the patentee must prove either (1) irreparable harm or (2) lack of remedy at law.  The decision here rejects both of my prior-conceptions.  Taking them in reverse order, the court holds that irreparable harm must be proven before relief can be granted.  In addition, the court wrote (likely dicta) that each factor must be individually proven for injunctive relief to issue.

The movant must prove that it meets all four equitable factors. i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 861 (Fed. Cir. 2010). And it must do so on the merits of its particular case. eBay. . . . Because Nichia failed to establish one of the four equitable factors, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Nichia’s request for an injunction.

The court here appears to shift this from a four-factor test to a four-element test.  The result of this decision is that it becomes incrementally even more difficult for a patentee to obtain injunctive relief even after winning its infringement lawsuit and defending against validity challenges.   I also expect that any analysis of the historical equitable factors (the approach suggested by eBay) will recognize that this holding is incorrect.

Licensee Marking Requirement

PezPatentRembrandt Wireless v. Samsung (Fed. Cir. 2017)

A jury found for Rembrandt and awarded $15.7 million in damages. On appeal, the Federal Circuit has affirmed on infringement and validity – but rejected the lower court’s finding that the patent had been properly marked.

Back-damages for patent infringement is a bit interesting. The marking statute creates a constructive notice regime for sales of ‘patented articles’ and then cuts-off damages for failure to mark those articles: 

In the event of failure so to mark, no damages shall be recovered by the patentee in any action for infringement, except on proof that the infringer was notified of the infringement and continued to infringe thereafter, in which event damages may be recovered only for infringement occurring after such notice. Filing of an action for infringement shall constitute such notice.

35 U.S.C. § 287.  The marking requirement does not apply only to patentees, but also to “any persons” making or selling the invention “for or under” the patentee.  The courts have interpreted this requirement then as applying to a patent licensee — “thereby limiting the patentee’s damage recovery when the patented article is not marked” by the licensee.  Quoting Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 185 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

Here, Rembrandt had previously licensed the patent at-issue (U.S. Patent No. 8,023,580) to Zhone Tech who sold unmarked products allegedly embodying claim 40 of the patent.  (Zhone was not required to mark under the license agreement).

As soon as Samsung sought to limit its potential damages to the date of actual-notice, Rembrandt dropped its allegations that Samsung infringed claim 40 and also filed a statutory disclaimer with the USPTO disclaiming claim 40.  Samsung was later found to infringe other remaining claims of the patent – and the district court ruled that the disclaimer was sufficient to cure the marking problem.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit disagrees:

Rembrandt’s position, adopted by the district court, effectively provides an end-run around the marking statute and is irreconcilable with the statute’s purpose. Allowing Rembrandt to use disclaimer to avoid the consequence of its failure to mark undermines the marking statute’s public notice function. . . .

The marking statute protects the public’s ability to exploit an unmarked product’s features without liability for damages until a patentee provides either constructive notice through marking or actual notice.

 

Disclaiming a patent claim does not later erase the fact that the claim was previously in effect and had not been properly marked.

The Court suggested a potential question of whether the focus should be claim-by-claim rather than patent-by-patent, but declined to rule on that issue because it had not been properly raised on appeal.   On remand, the district court will be asked to look into that question and – if needed – recalculated the damage award.

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The case here offers an important distinction – in my mind – between a patent license and a covenant-not-to-sue. Any reasonable license that covers an ‘article’ would include the marking requirement.   In my mind (although perhaps not the court’s) a mere covenant-not-to-sue should not fall under the marking requirement.

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Typical Marking License Language: Licensee mark all Licensed Products made or sold in the United States with an appropriate patent marking. All Licensed Products shipped to or sold in other countries must be marked in such a manner as to provide notice to potential infringers pursuant to the patent laws and practice of the country of manufacture or sale.  Licensor shall have the right to inspect Licensee’s Licensed Products to determine if Licensee is marking in accordance with this paragraph.

 

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Unwired Planet v. Huawei: An English Perspective on FRAND Royalties

FRONDGuest Post by Professor Jorge L. Contreras

In the latest decision by the UK High Court of Justice (Patents) in Unwired Planet v. Huawei ([2017] EWHC 711 (Pat), 5 Apr. 2017], Mister Justice Colin Birss has issued a detailed and illuminating opinion regarding the assessment of royalties on standards-essential patents (SEPs) that are subject to FRAND (fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory) licensing commitments.  Among the important and potentially controversial rulings in the case are:

  1. Single Royalty: there is but a single FRAND royalty rate applicable to any given set of SEPs and circumstances,
  2. Significance of Overstep: neither a breach of contract nor a competition claim for abuse of dominance will succeed unless a SEP holder’s offer is significantly above the true FRAND rate,
  3. Global License: FRAND licenses for global market players are necessarily global licenses and should not be limited to a single jurisdiction, and
  4. Soft-Edge: the “non-discrimination” (ND) prong of the FRAND commitment does not imply a “hard-edged” test in which a licensee may challenge the FRAND license that it has been granted on the basis that another similarly situated licensee has been granted a lower rate, so long as the difference does not distort competition between the two licensees.

Background

This case began in 2014 when Unwired Planet, a U.S.-based patent assertion entity, sued Google, Samsung and Huawei for infringement under six UK patents (corresponding actions were filed in Germany).  Unwired Planet claimed that five of the asserted patents, which it acquired from Ericsson in 2013 as part of a portfolio comprising approximately 2000 patents, were essential to the 2G, 3G and 4G wireless telecommunications standards developed under the auspices of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI).  Because Ericsson participated in development of the standards at ETSI, any patents shown to be SEPs would necessarily be encumbered by Ericsson’s FRAND commitment to ETSI.

The UK proceedings involved numerous stages, including five scheduled “technical trials” which would determine whether each of the asserted patents was valid, infringed and essential to the ETSI standards.  During these proceedings Google and Samsung settled with Unwired Planet and Ericsson (which receives a portion of the licensing and settlement revenue earned by Unwired Planet from the patents), leaving Huawei as the sole UK defendant.  By April 2016 three of the technical trials had been completed, resulting in findings that two of the asserted patents were invalid and that two were both valid and essential to the standards.  These findings are currently under appeal. The parties then agreed to suspend further technical trials.  In October 2016 a “non-technical” trial began regarding issues of competition law, FRAND, injunction and damages.  Hearings were concluded in December 2016, and the court’s opinion and judgment were issued on April 5, 2017.

A. The High Court’s Decision – Overview

The principal questions before the court were (1) the level of the FRAND royalty for Unwired Planet’s SEPs, (2) whether Unwired Planet abused a dominant position in violation of Section 102 of the Treaty for the Formation of the European Union (TFEU) by failing to adhere to the procedural requirements for FRAND negotiations outlined by the European Court of Justice (CJEU) in Huawei v. ZTE (2014), and (3) whether an injunction should issue in the case.  In the below discussion, Paragraph numbers (¶) correspond to the numbered paragraphs in the High Court’s April 2017 opinion.

B. FRAND Commitments – General Observations

Justice Birss begins his opinion with some general observations and background about the standard-setting process and FRAND commitments.  A few notable points emerge from this discussion. (more…)

Modified Opinion: Federal Circuit Won’t Enjoin Non-Party

Asetek Danmark v. CMI USA (“Cooler Master”) (Fed. Cir. 2017)

The Federal Circuit has updated its original decision in Asetek, with Judge Prost deleting her dissent and her points being incorporated into the majority opinion.  The change here relates to the injunction pending remand.

Asetek sued CMI/Cooler-Master for infringing its computer fan patents. U.S. Patent Nos. 8,240,362 and 8,245,764 (“cooling systems”).  A jury sided with Asetek and the patentee was awarded damages as well as an injunction against specific Cooler Master products.  The problem – is that the injunction was awarded against CMI USA as well as “Cooler Master Co., Ltd.”, a Taiwanese company who was no longer a party to the lawsuit.   On appeal, the Federal Circuit substantially affirmed but remanded on the injunction since it applied to a non-party and went beyond that non-party’s ‘abetting a new violation’ by the adjudged infringer.

The oddity of the original Judge Taranto opinion was that it did not actually vacate the injunction but kept it in-force until modified by the lower court. “We do not think it appropriate to vacate the injunction at present.”  Writing in dissent, Chief Judge Prost argued that “The correct course of action would be to vacate the portions of the injunction that improperly reach Cooler Master.”

Following the original opinion, CMI filed for rehearing and that has been partially granted today with a new opinion from the original panel.  The new opinion here adopts Chief Judge Prost’s position and her partial dissent is deleted as is the panel’s non-vacatur.  The new opinion now partially vacates the injunction so that it no longer applies to the non-party (except for aiding and abetting).  The new paragraph:

Two final, related points. First, the need for further proceedings to determine the proper reach of the injunction in this case leads us to vacate the injunction, effective upon issuance of our mandate, insofar as the injunction reaches conduct by Cooler Master that does not abet new violations by CMI. The district court is to conduct those proceedings in as reasonably prompt a fashion as possible. Our partial vacatur of the injunction does not foreclose Asetek from pursuing reinstatement of the vacated portion of the injunction should there be unjustifiable delay by Cooler Master in completing the proceedings, or from pursuing any other remedies against Cooler Master, if otherwise authorized by law.

The en banc court simultaneously released its denial of rehearing after noting that the panel had revised its opinion.  CMI’s en banc petition began as follows:

The Panel Majority’s precedential opinion has promulgated a new rule that a pre-liability permanent injunction against a non-party is permissible pending a determination of liability under the “legally identified with” theory. There are three issues with this opinion. First, it violates the rule that everyone has a right to his day in court. Second, it violates the rule that actual success on the merits must precede entry of a permanent injunction. Third, its remand of further proceedings to determine the “legal identity” issue is an impermissible advisory opinion.

I believe that the revised decision here is legally correct, but it always gives me pause to watch companies and owners divide-up the structure of their firms without substantially dividing management and control — and then use that division to partially avoid legal liability.  The end result is that the potential corporate complexity can substantially raise the costs of enforcement without providing any social benefit.  In this case, Asetek writes that “the precise historical and corporate relationship between CMI and Cooler Master is murky; not even their counsel is sure of it.”  The parties always had the same attorneys, and CMI distributes all of Cooler Master’s products in the US, and assists with US marketing.