Tag Archives: paid

Can Money Talk? Latest IPR Mandamus Petitions Seek Workarounds to § 314(d) Bar

by Dennis Crouch

Three new mandamus petitions recently arrived at the Federal Circuit, each attempting to navigate around the court's November 6 decisions that rejected challenges to the USPTO's expanded use of discretionary denials.

The new petitions raise arguments their counsel contend are distinct from those already rejected in In re Motorola Solutions, Inc., No. 2025-134 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 6, 2025) (precedential). The petitions challenge both the "settled expectations" rule and parallel proceeding denials, while advancing novel theories designed to overcome the § 314(d) bar that has proved insurmountable for prior petitioners. Whether these distinctions carry legal weight remains to be seen, but the filings reflect a coordinated effort to keep pressure on the Federal Circuit as Director John Squires continues to deny IPR institution at a 0% rate.

Since assuming personal control of all IPR institution decisions in October 2025, Director Squires has denied every petition reaching his desk, now totaling 91 consecutive denials. These summary notices contain no reasoning or analysis, listing only IPR numbers alongside the statement institution "is denied." The practice stands in stark contrast to the PTAB's historic institution rate of approximately 67%. Meanwhile, the USPTO's proposed rulemaking (comments due December 2, 2025) would codify categorical bars to IPR institution without addressing the "settled expectations" doctrine or the practice of no-explanation denials. (Note that these  new petitions are all based upon actions by Acting Dir. Stewart, the Squires-prompted petitioners are coming next month).


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Should American Trademark Law Speak English

by Dennis Crouch

The Solicitor General has urged the Supreme Court to deny certiorari in Vetements Group v. Squires, defending the PTO's practice of translating foreign-language marks into English to assess their protectability. The French fashion company petitioned SCOTUS for review after the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB's refusal to register VETEMENTS (the French word for "clothing") as a trademark for clothing and clothing-related retail services. The government's opposition crystallizes a fundamental dispute about whose understanding of the marketplace should control trademark registration: Should marks be evaluated as encountered by American consumers in their linguistic diversity, or should they be systematically translated into English to prevent monopolization of generic terms?

Beneath the doctrinal arguments lies a deeper tension between two competing visions of American identity. One tradition emphasizes English as the baseline language of American commerce, treating foreign terms as American consumers actually encounter them (often without understanding their meaning). The opposing tradition recognizes America's multilingual reality, where millions speak French, Spanish, and Chinese; and insists their understanding must count in the marketplace. The case asks the Court to choose: is there an "ordinary American consumer" who processes commerce in English, or are we a polyglot nation where linguistic diversity shapes how brands communicate meaning?

The focus here is the continued vitality of the "doctrine of foreign equivalents," a judicially created guideline that requires translation of foreign words from common modern languages to determine whether they are generic or merely descriptive. The Federal Circuit applied this doctrine to conclude that an "appreciable number" of American consumers would "stop and translate" VETEMENTS into "clothing," rendering it generic and thus ineligible for federal registration. Vetements Group argues this translation-first approach conflicts with 19th Century Supreme Court precedent treating foreign terms as inherently protectable and with the consumer-perception principle that the Court reaffirmed in USPTO v. Booking.com, 591 U.S. 549 (2020). The government responds that the doctrine reflects sound policy, has deep historical roots predating the Lanham Act, and was implicitly ratified by Congress in 1946.


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Time to Merge the Copyright Office with the USPTO

by Dennis Crouch

In May 2025, President Trump terminated Copyright Register Shira Perlmutter from office, one day after she released a report concluding that in some situations AI training on copyrighted works scraped from the internet does not qualify as fair use.  But, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeal put her back in office pending resolution of the lawsuit.  Most recently, the Trump Administration has asked the Supreme Court to vacate that injunction in Blanche v. Perlmutter, No. 25A478, arguing that Article II empowers the President to remove executive officers regardless of their organizational placement within the government.  The crux of the dispute centers on the odd structure of the Copyright Office -- designated as part of the Library of Congress and under Congressional control rather than as an executive branch.

A new bill introduced by Rep. Morgan Griffith would restructure the Copyright Office entirely, severing it from the Library of Congress and reconstituting it as a standalone executive branch agency under direct presidential control. H.R. 6028. The Legislative Branch Agencies Clarification Act, represents one approach to resolving the separation of powers problems now before the Court.

I believe there is a better path forward: Consolidating the Copyright Office with the United States Patent and Trademark Office to create a unified United States Intellectual Property Office (USIPO).


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0% Institution Rate Holds, but Shows Signs of Potential Rise

by Dennis Crouch

Director John Squires has released a new set of IPR institution decisions. The third grouping since taking personal charge of the institution decision making process in October 2025. Once again, the institution rate remains 0%, but the newest batch include some ray of hope for petitioners.

Let me explain. By mid-November, Dir Squires had decided 34 institution decisions - denying each and resulting in my 0% institution rate post.  The newest batch includes three groupings:

  • 56 new cases discretionarily denied;
  • 31 new cases that were not denied, but that still need to "be reviewed for
    merits and non-discretionary considerations;"
  • 1 new case denied on the merits; and
  • 0 new cases instituted.

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Federalism on Trial: Idaho’s Attempt to Regulate Patent Litigation

by Dennis Crouch

Micron v. Longhorn IP, Appeal No. 2023-2007 (Fed. Cir. 2025)

This interesting pending case focuses on an Idaho state law  regulating patent trolls. Idaho Code § 48-1703(1).

"It is unlawful for a person to make a bad faith assertion of patent infringement in a demand letter, a complaint or any other communication."

Back in 2022, Katana, an affiliate Longhorn, sued Micron for patent infringement in the W.D.Tex. Micron responded in two ways: it asserted a counterclaim under Idaho's statute in the Texas case and, one month later, filed a separate Idaho action against Longhorn under the same theory. The cases were later consolidated in Idaho, and Judge David Nye ordered Longhorn or Katana to post an $8 million bond under the Idaho law before the case could move forward.  In the process, Judge Nye upheld the Idaho law against preemption and First Amendment (petition the government) challenges and also found a "reasonable likelihood" of bad faith assertion by Katana. The case is now on appeal before the Federal Circuit with oral arguments held recently before Judges Lourie, Schall, and Stoll.

Idaho is the only state whose anti-troll statute expressly regulates complaints filed in federal court. Most states, including Vermont, explicitly exclude litigation conduct from their statutes. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 4197(a). Idaho's statute also authorizes an uncapped bond when a target shows "reasonable likelihood" of bad faith, without requiring findings equivalent to either the Federal Circuit's established standard for bad faith assertion liability which requires objective baselessness plus subjective bad faith.  See also, Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, 508 U.S. 49 (1993) (sham litigation test).


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Smartrend and the Stretching of Markman: When Specification Parsing Becomes a Question of Law

by Dennis Crouch

This post gets a bit into the weeds of the doctrine of equivalents -- focusing on how courts identify the "function" of a claimed element when analyzing infringement under the doctrine of equivalents (DoE).  In this post, I use the court's new SMG decision to help frame the discussion. Smartrend Manufacturing Group (SMG), Inc. v. Opti-Luxx Inc., No. 2024-1616 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 13, 2025).  Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Dyk reversed a jury verdict finding that Opti-Luxx's illuminated school bus sign infringed SMG's U.S. Patent No. 11,348,491 under the doctrine of equivalents. The appellate court held that no reasonable jury could find the accused product's frame performed the same function as that claimed.

The basic rule here is that the fact finder should first look to the patent's written description and specification to determine the function of a claimed element. But, if (only if) the patent is silent or ambiguous on the function, then turn to the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art via extrinsic evidence such as expert testimony.

Almost everyone is a bit uncomfortable with the DoE. Almost by definition, the doctrine only arises when the infringer is doing something different than what is claimed in the patent. I.e., they don't literally infringe what has been claimed. With the DoE, they might be tagged for doing something close enough - but where is that fuzzy threshold?  The discomfort with this fuzziness has led the courts to develop various mechanisms to cabin-in the DoE to avoid overreach. And, the court's approach here in Smartrend is one such example.  Most often, mechanisms operate as tools for  a district court to take the decision out of the hands of the jury via summary judgment or JMOL.

The leading test for DoE requires an element-by-element function-way-result test.  To infringe, the accused product must perform each and every element of the claim in substantially the same function, in substantially the same way, to achieve the same result. If any element fails this three-part test then there is no infringement.

For the first part of this test - same function - we really have a two step algorithm: (1) first figure out the function of the claimed element; then (2) determine whether the accused activity achieves that same function. Although these two steps are both questions of fact for the jury, Smartrend largely transforms step-1 into a claim construction exercise that seems to hand authority to the Judge as another tool for avoiding the jury.


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Lost Profits: Market Reconstruction and Noninfringing Substitutes

by Dennis Crouch

The Federal Circuit has reversed a lost profits award in a patent infringement case involving self-balancing unicycles, holding that the district court applied the wrong legal standard when it excluded evidence of noninfringing substitutes that were not actually "on sale during period of infringement." In Inventist Inc. v. Ninebot Inc. (USA), No. 2024-1010 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 14, 2025) (nonprecedential), the court reaffirmed the principle from Grain Processing Corp. v. American Maize-Products Co., 185 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 1999), that available alternatives (even if not on the market) may preclude lost profits damages if the accused infringer shows they were readily available and acceptable to consumers.

This decision has some parallels to Masimo v. Apple, where Apple argues that damages should account for its prior noninfringing Apple Watch version that already included heart rate notifications before adding the patented double-check refinement. See Dennis Crouch, Masimo v. Apple: Does "Patient Monitor" Cover Apple's Consumer Wearable, Patently-O (Nov. 17, 2025).


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Masimo v. Apple: Does “Patient Monitor” Cover Apple’s Consumer Wearable

by Dennis Crouch

Last week a California jury gave a big win to Masimo with a $634 million verdict against Apple Watch patent infringement.  I'm confident that additional post-verdict motions will be coming, but these are foreshadowed by Apple's JMOL motion and objection to jury instructions.

Apple's Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law (made before the verdict) argues that no reasonable jury could find the Apple Watch satisfies the "patient monitor" claim limitation of the asserted US10433776 which claims high and low heart rate notification.  Apple's basic argument is that the patent appears to be focused on hospital-grade clinical devices.  But the claims themselves are not so limited.  But, Apple's hook is the the claim term "patient monitor" -- where Apple watch users are not even patients.  The patent expired in 2022.


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Cutting the Gordian Knot of Prior-Art Enablement

by Dennis Crouch

Agilent Technologies has petitioned the Supreme Court to review the Federal Circuit's June 2025 decision affirming PTAB invalidation of two pioneering CRISPR gene-editing patents.  The case turned on a prior art abandoned patent application containing prophetic examples that were never reduced to practice.  Citing prior precedent, the Federal Circuit held that the reference was presumed to be enabling and required no additional proof of efficacy.  The petition challenges these holdings, asking:

1. Should printed publications be presumed to be enabling when a party challenging the validity of issued patent claims asserts that a printed publication is anticipatory prior art, such that the burden of proving that the printed publication is nonenabling lies with the patentee?

2. Should the holding in Rasmusson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 413 F.3d 1318, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2005), that “proof of efficacy is not required in order for a reference to be enabled for purposes of anticipation,” be vacated or significantly narrowed?

Agilent Petition. See also, Dennis Crouch, Federal Circuit Clarifies Enablement Standards: Amgen Doesn’t Control Anticipatory Prior Art, Patently-O (June 11, 2025).

The petition arrives at this important moment as AI systems threaten to flood the patent system with billions of speculative disclosures. As most of us have experienced, the difficulty with GenAI outputs is that the technical hypotheses often seem reasonable on the surface and are presented with confident, authoritative language, but they typically suffer from the major defect of having little grounding in reality. With billions of new AI-generated documents published over the past few years, separating the wheat from the chaff ex ante becomes practically impossible.  But after-the-fact, patent challengers will be able to identify the winners in hindsight. The result is a prior art landscape increasingly populated with plausible-sounding but potentially non-operative disclosures that the current legal framework treats as equivalent to genuine inventions.


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Shutting the Patent Office Door: YMTC and the Entity List

By Dennis Crouch

USPTO Director John Squires is increasingly positioning the patent system as an instrument of both national and international technology policy.  In October 2025, Dir.  Squires foreshadowed an anti-China approach within the U.S. patent system.  That endeavor appears to now be taking its first steps with a Show Cause order requiring Yangtze Memory Technologies Company (YMTC) to justify why its IPR petitions against Micron patents should proceed despite being named on the Department of Commerce's Entity List as an organization "reasonably believed to be involved, or to pose a significant risk of being or becoming involved, in activities contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States."  Yangtze Memory Technologies Co. v. Micron Technology, Inc., IPR2025-00098, IPR2025-00099, Paper 33 (USPTO Nov. 10, 2025).  YMTC's Ropes & Gray attorneys have until the 24th of November to reply.

To be clear, YMTC is not an ordinary China-based company.  YMTC reached the Entity List after first being placed on the Unverified List in October 2022 when BIS was unable to complete end-use checks to verify that exported technology was being used as declared. Under President Biden, YMTC was added to the Entity List based on findings that the company creates a major risk of diversion (sharing key technology) with other parties on the entities list, including Huawei and Hangzhou Hikvision.  In January 2024, the Department of Defense also designated YMTC as a "Chinese Military Company Operating in the United States." The company was founded in 2016 by partially state-owned Tsinghua Unigroup with approximately $24 billion in initial investment including substantial funding from the Hubei provincial government and the state-owned China Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund, and later received billions more in government capital infusions. Congressional correspondence has highlighted YMTC's alleged ties to the Chinese Communist Party and People's Liberation Army, and noted that some YMTC executives previously worked for Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation, another Entity List designee.

So, the idea here is that YMTC is a potential quiet saboteur.  Micron has been ringing this bell loudly for years.  Of course, Micron also has an enormous financial interest in villainizing YMTC.  In addition to its Entity status, Micron has also argued that the Chinese Government is a Real-Party-in-Interest that should have been named in the IPR petition. And, in the background is a legalistic argument that Return Mail should be extended to preclude IPR petitions where a any national government is petitioner or RPI.  Although this post is focused on YMTC, I also want to note that the Entity List has become a principal tool of U.S. economic and technology policy toward China, with hundreds of Chinese entities now listed.

One question here is whether USPTO actions against YMTC can be reconciled with U.S. commitments under international patent treaties.

Paris Convention National Treatment Obligations


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The Power and Limits of Judicial Claim Correction

by Dennis Crouch

The Federal Circuit reversed a district court's indefiniteness holding, ruling that courts have authority to correct an obvious claim error through claim construction where the error is evident on the face of the patent and only one reasonable correction exists. Canatex Completion Solutions, Inc. v. Wellmatics, LLC, No. 2024-1466 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 12, 2025).  The court relied upon its own prior precedent and referred back to the foundational case of I.T.S. Rubber Co. v. Essex Rubber Co., 272 U.S. 429 (1926) that permits judicial correction -- while distinguishes Chef America, Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (declining to correct).

Canatex owns U.S. Patent No. 10,794,122, which claims a releasable connection device used in oil and gas wells. The device included two parts ("first part" and "second part") that lock together during normal operations but can be separated. All three asserted independent claims (1, 7, and 13) contain language stating that a locking piston moves "to release the connection profile of the second part." The problem is that the phrase "the connection profile of the second part" had no antecedent basis in the claim.  Rather, the prior portion of the claim identified "a connection profile of the first part."

When defendants challenged the claims as indefinite for lack of antecedent basis, Canatex argued that "second" was an obvious error that should be construed as "first," pointing to the claim language and specification showing that only the first part has a connection profile and that this is what gets released when the two parts disconnect. The S.D. Tex. Judge Alfred Bennett rejected the patentee's argument and instead found the claims invalid as indefinite.

While the appeal was pending, the patentee sought a certificate of correction from the USPTO to change "second" to "first." But the office rejected the petition, finding that the requested correction was "more than a clerical or typographical mistake."

The I.T.S. Rubber Foundation for Judicial Correction


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An Era of No: The USPTO’s New 0% Institution Rate

by Dennis Crouch

USPTO Dir John Squires has now issued 34 decisions on IPR institution since assuming personal control of the institution process in October 2025, with all 34 petitions denied. The Director's November 6, 2025 notice denies institution in 21 additional IPRs, following an October 31 notice denying 13 others. These summary orders provide no reasoning or analysis, listing only the denied IPR numbers and stating that "institution of inter partes review is denied." The Director appears to be using institutional silence as a policy instrument to strengthen patent rights by avoiding substantive review. The current 0% institution rate stands in sharp contrast to the PTAB's historic institution rate of approximately 67%.  This raises questions in my mind about whether the IPR system can continue to function as the alternative to district court litigation that Congress envisioned in the America Invents Act.

The statute grants the Director authority to determine whether to institute inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), but assigns the PTAB responsibility to conduct the trial and issue a final written decision under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a). Since the AIA's enactment in 2011, every USPTO Director delegated the institution determination to three-judge PTAB panels. Director David Kappos, who lobbied for the AIA's passage and oversaw its implementation, established this delegation framework. The practice continued for over a decade, with PTAB judges spending hours reviewing each petition, considering the substantive patentability showing and discretionary factors, and drafting reasoned institution decisions that provided guidance to the patent bar.

Acting Director Stewart began reclaiming institution decision authority in early 2025, personally reviewing selected cases where Patent Owners requested discretionary denial. Director Squires has now taken full personal control over all institution decisions. The shift creates a practical problem: PTAB judges previously devoted substantial time to evaluating each petition's technical merits and legal arguments before reaching institution decisions. Director Squires, while simultaneously managing a multi-billion dollar agency with over 10,000 employees, obviously lacks the available time of a cadre of specialized PTAB judges. This resource constraint, combined with the practice of issuing summary notices without written analysis, leads me to infer that petitions are receiving only cursory review. The no-opinion denial format permits this superficial examination while obscuring whether the Director has meaningfully evaluated the substantive patentability showing or merely applied categorical rules based on Patent Owner discretionary denial requests.


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Algorithmic Recommendations and Section 230: Planet Green v. Amazon

by Dennis Crouch

I am teaching internet law this semester, and one of the cases I'm following involves Amazon's so far successful claims of Section 230 safe harbor for (allegedly) actively promoting and recommending third-party provided content that knowingly misrepresents products sold on Amazon.

  1. Does Section 230 confer immunity on internet platforms when they knowingly permit, facilitate, and profit from third-party promotion and sale of misrepresented products on their websites?
  2. Does Section 230 immunize internet platforms from civil claims based on their own conduct, including using algorithms to generate targeted advertising and product recommendations for their users?

Planet Green Cartridges, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 24-1299.  The Supreme Court will consider whether to grant certiorari at its November 14, 2025 conference.


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Todd Blanche asks Supreme Court to Hand Over the Copyright Office

by Dennis Crouch

In an emergency shadow docket application filed late last month, the Solicitor General asked the Supreme Court to stay a D.C. Circuit injunction that allows Register of Copyrights Shira Perlmutter to continue serving in her position. The dispute centers on the separation of powers question:

Is the Library of Congress an "Executive agency" subject to the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA), or did Congress deliberately exclude it from that category (and does Congress even have that power)?

The answer will determine whether President Trump install an acting Librarian who can then remove the Register—or whether only a Senate-confirmed Librarian possesses that authority. Blanche v. Perlmutter, No. 25A478 (Supreme Court Application filed Oct. 2025).  For me, the case boils down to a question of whether we are ready to further enlarge our unitary executive scheme that is currently playing out.  If the answer is yes, then it is probably also time to unite the agencies, creating the United States Intellectual Property Office (USIPO).


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Rulemaking as Backdoor Reform: Can the USPTO Bar Whole Classes of IPR Petitions?

by Dennis Crouch

The USPTO has extended the deadline for public comments on its proposed rulemaking that would dramatically restrict access to inter partes review (IPR) proceedings. The comment period, originally set to close on November 17, 2025, has been extended by 15 days to December 2, 2025, following requests from a coalition of industry organizations who argued that 30 days was insufficient time to analyze the extensive proposed changes to PTAB practice.

  • Original NPRM (Oct. 17, 2025): Revision to Rules of Practice Before the PTAB; docket PTO-P-2025-0025. (Federal Register)
  • Extension of comment deadline (Nov. 7, 2025): Federal Register notice extending the comment period to December 2, 2025 (15-day extension), with PDF. (Federal Register)
  • Patently-O analysis (Oct. 16, 2025): All Quiet on the PTAB Front: USPTO Proposes More Restrictions on IPR Institution. (patentlyo.com)

The proposed amendments would create three categories of mandatory bars to IPR institution: when claims have previously been found valid in other proceedings, where parallel litigation will likely reach a validity decision first, and where petitioners refuse to stipulate against raising any anticipation or obviousness challenges in other venues.  These changes are part of an overall dramatic shift against IPR institution under President Trump's patent office leadership that began with Dir. Stewart and continues with Dir. Squires.  But, the proposed rules do not include some of the most dramatic changes, including the "settled expectations" standard and the new process of issuing IPR institution rulings without any accompanying explanation.


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Section 314(d)’s Bar Holds: Federal Circuit Rejects Constitutional and APA Challenges to IPR Institution Denials

by Dennis Crouch

In 2025, the USPTO has dramatically shifted its IPR institution practice -- resulting in an almost incredible uptick in institution denials.  One response has been a series of mandamus petitions to the Federal Circuit.  The first three of those have now been denied by a three judge panel.

These three focused on the USPTO's February 2025 rescission of Sotera stipulation guidance offered a safe harbor against discretionary denial for petitioners involved in parallel district court litigation over the patent.

The three-judge panel was almost the same of Judges Dyk, Linn (opinion author), and Cunningham (with Stoll replacing Cunningham on the Google decision) rejected constitutional and Administrative Procedure Act (APA) challenges to the policy change, holding that 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) renders institution decisions "final and nonappealable" and that mandamus is ordinarily unavailable to review such discretionary determinations.

The petitioners in all three cases argued that Acting Director Stewart violated due process and the APA by rescinding the Vidal Memorandum and applying that rescission to pending IPR petitions. Motorola Solutions faced the most dramatic procedural harm: the PTAB had initially instituted eight IPRs based on Motorola's Sotera stipulations, but the Acting Director later vacated those institution decisions after rescinding the guidance. Google and Samsung jointly challenged denials of IPR petitions despite Samsung's stipulation, while SAP similarly contested discretionary denials after it had stipulated not to pursue district court invalidity grounds. Each petitioner contended that the policy reversal after they had filed their petitions violated constitutional protections and administrative law principles. The Federal Circuit rejected these arguments across the board, finding no colorable constitutional claim and holding that most APA challenges to institution decisions fall outside the narrow exceptions to § 314(d)'s bar on judicial review.

Several other petitions are pending, but (in my opinion) none of them raise substantially more compelling claims and so are also very likely to be denied.

The decisions carry troubling implications for an even more recent development in IPR practice. In October, 2025 Director John Squires took personal control over all IPR institution decisions (reversing the longstanding practice of delegating that responsibility to PTAB panels) and began issuing summary denial of institutions without any explanation or justification (again, reversing longstanding practice that IPR institution decisions have always offered a reasoned analysis).

The Federal Circuit's treatment of the arbitrary-and-capricious challenge in Motorola suggests that the court may see complaints about summary denials equally unreviewable. In Motorola, the court held that arguments challenging the Acting Director's failure to "offer any reasons for the change" in policy are "the kinds of arguments that we have said are not reviewable in light of § 314(d)" because they ultimately challenge the Director's weighing of factors. The result is what I have called an "unexplained and unreviewable" regime where the Director can deny institution without providing any grounds and courts cannot (or will not) intervene.


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Final But Not Final: Federal Circuit Rejects PornHub Litigation Request

by Dennis Crouch

The Federal Circuit on November 3, 2025 denied a mandamus petition from Aylo Holdings (Pornhub's parent company) seeking to compel the Eastern District of Texas to stay patent litigation pending completion of an ex parte reexamination (EPR). In re Aylo Holdings S.à r.l., No. 26-103 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 3, 2025). The decision is noteworthy not for breaking new ground, but for what it signals about institutional deference in an era of declining stay rates and evolving post-grant practice.  Aylo challenged Judge Gilstrap's "universal practice" of categorically disfavoring EPR stays as an abuse of discretion that substitutes rigid rules for individualized analysis. The Federal Circuit's refusal to second-guess that approach may preview how the court will respond to challenges against the USPTO's recent shift toward categorical, parametric frameworks for denying IPR institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).

WellcomeMat LLC sued Aylo in 2023 for infringing U.S. Patent No. 8,307,286, which covers a system for applying chapters to online videos. The PTAB cancelled several of the claims via IPR.  Aylo then requested ex parte reexamination of these surviving claims. On August 22, 2025, the USPTO issued a final office action rejecting all eight remaining asserted claims. Aylo immediately moved to stay the litigation pending completion of the EPR. The district court denied the motion, and Aylo sought mandamus relief. With trial set for November 17, 2025, the Federal Circuit denied the petition, citing "the proximity to the trial date and the substantial investment of resources by the court and the parties," along with the fact that "ex parte reexamination proceedings over the claims at issue are not yet final."

As patent prosecutors know, a "final" rejection is not really final. Although reexamination has some streamlining, there is still time for a PTAB appeal or other office maneuvering.


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Secret Springing Prior Art and Joint Research: Lessons from Merck v. Hopewell

by Dennis Crouch

The Federal Circuit's recent decision in Merck Serono S.A. v. Hopewell Pharma Ventures, Inc. provides important clarification on when a patent reference qualifies as prior art "by another" under pre-AIA law 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).  It also highlights ways that the AIA has subtly changed this category of "secret springing prior art" that is now codified under § 102(a)(2) and the special exceptions found in § 102(b)(2) and §102(c).

The case comes as we also have a pending Supreme Court petition in Lynk Labs challenging whether this secret prior art qualifies as a "printed publication" that can serve as the foundation for an inter partes review (IPR) challenge.  That petition is set for consideration by the Court later this week.


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Director Squires Denies 13 IPRs With No Explanation: A New Era of Opacity

by Dennis Crouch

On October 31, 2025, USPTO Director John Squires issued a one-page Notice of Decisions on Institution denying institution in thirteen pending inter partes review proceedings without a single word of explanation. The notice, signed solely by Squires, lists only the IPR docket numbers and concludes: "Petitions are denied, and no trial is instituted," citing 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). No panel composition, no reasoning, no indication of PTAB participation appears on the face of the order, which denied institution petitions filed by Apple, Snap, Amazon, AT&T, and others.

This marks the first wave of Director-level institution decisions since Squires’s October 17 memorandum reclaiming full control of AIA-trial institution from the Board and promising “summary notices” for routine outcomes. He has now made good on that promise. For the first time since the AIA’s enactment, an entire slate of IPR petitions was denied with no public reasoning.  This departs from traditional PTAB practice and even from Acting Director Coke Morgan Stewart’s centralized, expanded discretionary-denial process, which still produced reasoned written analyses.


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PTAB Responds to Director Squires with 101 Reversals

by Dennis Crouch

The PTAB has demonstrated a striking pivot in its treatment of Section 101 eligibility rejections during October 2025 -- the first month following newly confirmed USPTO Director John Squires' immediate policy interventions on patent eligibility. New data reveal that the PTAB has dramatically reduced its issuance of new grounds for rejection under Section 101 while simultaneously increasing reversals of examiner 101 rejections at unprecedented rates.  ​

The chart below looks at PTAB decisions involving Section 101 eligibility from the same one-month period across four consecutive years.


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