Tag Archives: inventorship

Democracy on Trial: Chestek and the Future of USPTO Accountability

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by Dennis Crouch

The pending petition for certiorari in Chestek v. Vidal focuses on the extend that the APA requires the USPTO to follow notice-and-comment requirements when promulgating regulations under 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2). In its decision below, the Federal Circuit held that the USPTO is exempt from these requirements because the types of rules it is authorized to issue under Section 2(b)(2) are procedural in nature, and the APA excuses "rules of agency ... procedure" from the requirements.  There are two ways that the Federal Circuit potentially erred:

  1. The TM applicant home-address requirement being challenged here is not the type of procedural rule exempted under the APA; and
  2. Even if it is procedural, the particular requirements of the Patent Act's section 2(b)(2) requires following the notice and comment requirements.

The Federal Circuit agreed that 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) requires USPTO regulations to be "made in accordance with" the APA -- but disagreed that this requires notice-and-comment for all new regulations. The court concluded that the APA inherently includes an exception for procedural requirements and so the USPTO was not required to follow notice-and-comment rulemaking when promulgating the trademark applicant home-address rule, because the court deemed it to be a procedural rather than substantive rule exempt from those APA requirements.

Five amicus briefs were recently filed in support of the petitioner, arguing that Supreme Court review is warranted to correct the Federal Circuit's erroneous decision, arguing that the Federal Circuit's interpretation of Section 2(b)(2) is flawed and undermines important principles of administrative law.

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Decoding Patent Ownership beginning with Core Principles

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by Dennis Crouch

In a recent decision, the Federal Circuit vacated a district court's grant of summary judgment that an inventor, Dr. Mark Core, had automatically assigned a patent associated with his PhD thesis to his then-employer and education funder TRW.  Core Optical Techs., LLC v. Nokia Corp., Nos. 23-1001 (Fed. Cir. May 21, 2024). The key issue was whether Dr. Core developed the patented invention "entirely on [his] own time" under his employment agreement. The majority opinion written by Judge Taranto and joined by Judge Dyk held the contract language was ambiguous on this point and remanded for further factual development to determine the parties' intent.  Judge Mayer dissented.

Although not discussed in the court's decision, the appellant brief includes a suggestion that the Federal Circuit should "narrow or overrule" the automatic assignment law seen in FilmTec Corp. v. Allied Signal, Inc., 939 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1991), and its progeny

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False Patent Marking as False Advertising: Overcoming Dastar

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by Dennis Crouch

The Federal Circuit is set to consider the use of terms like "patented," "proprietary," and "exclusive" in commercial advertising can be actionable under § 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act when their use is not entirely accurate. The key issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Crocs on Double Diamond Distribution and U.S.A. Dawgs' ("Dawgs") counterclaim for false advertising under the Lanham Act.

This case began back in 2006

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The Quest for a Meaningful Threshold of Invention: Atlantic Works v. Brady (1883)

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by Dennis Crouch

My recent discussion of Vanda v. Teva references the landmark Supreme Court case of Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192 (1883).  I thought I would write a more complete discussion of this important historic patent case.

Atlantic Works has had a profound impact on the development of patent law, particularly in shaping the doctrine of obviousness, but more generally providing theoretical frameworks for attacking "bad patents."  As discussed below, I believe the case also provides some early insight into the new AI inventorship dilemma.

The case addressed the validity of a patent granted to Edwin L. Brady for an improved dredge boat design.  The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the lower court's decision upholding the patent and found instead that Brady's claimed invention lacked novelty and did not constitute a patentable advance over the prior art.

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Inventorship Correction Affirmed for Patent on Intermodal Container for Transporting Gaseous Fluids

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by Dennis Crouch

In a recent nonprecedential decision, the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court ruling ordering the correction of inventorship for U.S. Patent No. 9,376,049. Tube-Mac Indus., Inc. v. Campbell, No. 2022-2170 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 15, 2024). The patent at issue, originally naming a single inventor (Steve Campbell), claims a lightweight intermodal container system for transporting refrigerated gaseous fluids.

This post examines the reasoning behind the Federal Circuit's affirmance as well as the potential applicability of the equitable defense of laches in cases brought under 35 U.S.C. § 256 to correct inventorship on an issued patent.

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Joint Inventorship: AI-Human Style

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by Dennis Crouch

The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) recently published examination guidance and a request for comments on the treatment of inventorship for inventions created with the assistance of artificial intelligence (AI) systems.  Inventorship Guidance for AI-Assisted Inventions.

The key takeaway here is that the USPTO believes that an AI-developed invention is patentable so long as a human satisfies the joint-inventorship standard of "significantly contributing to the invention." A human who provides a significant contribution may be the sole inventor and original owner, even in situations where the AI provided the greater contribution.

The PTO's approach here is fairly broad and will likely serve current AI use cases in most situations because most AI invention models of today are tightly controlled and managed by humans rather than simply arising from AI autogeneration or broad prompting. Thus, from a practical effect, there will likely be at least one natural person who satisfies the joint inventorship standard in the vast majority of cases. (Recognizing here that mere control of an AI is insufficient. Rather, the human must provide significant inventive contribution).

Although I am very sympathetic to recognizing human contributions, I also want a patent system that broadly encourages innovation without either prescribing or proscribing particular approaches. The flexibility of this guidance allows room for both human and machine intelligence to intersect in the creative process. But, we should continue monitoring the effects the policy to ensure it does not unduly constrain AI's eventual capacity to autonomously formulate inventive concepts. But for now, the USPTO's basic framework reasonably balances competing interests.

But, the USPTO's approach is not fully grounded in the law because it allows for patenting of an invention in a situation where no human or combination of humans fully conceived of and originated the invention. Rather, we are simply looking for at least one human who provided a significant contribution. The guidance does not particularly address this issue and, by declining to specifically justify the legal grounds why human "significant contributions" suffice even without complete conception, the USPTO leaves the door open to contrary arguments. Opponents could contend that full conception remains legally required for inventorship and that this expansion of the inventorship doctrine exceeds the statutory language.  It is not clear who will have standing to make this particular argument.

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A present assignment of future continuation applications

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by Dennis Crouch

In Roku, Inc. v. ITC, the Federal Circuit has affirmed determinations by the International Trade Commission (“ITC”) favoring the patent holder Universal Electronics, Inc. (“Universal”). The most interesting part of the case for me is the assignment issue - whether the patents had been properly assigned at the appropriate time. This can become in cases like this because Universal has created a large patent portfolio that all claim back to original priority documents from more than a decade ago. While most of patents are attributable to both joint-inventors, some are only attributable to one or the other.  Here, though the Federal Circuit supported the simple approach of a "hereby assigns" transfer of rights that includes future continuations.  The decision is lacking though because the court does not ground its decision in any particular contract or property tradition.

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No Patent for Robot Inventions: UK Supreme Court Rules on AI Inventorship in Thaler v. Comptroller-General

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by Dennis Crouch

Thaler v. Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks, [2023] UKSC 49. 

In a December 20, 2023 decision, the UK Supreme Court has agreed with American courts that an inventive machine is not deserving of patent rights.  The underlying case will be familiar to many with Dr. Stephen Thaler of St. Louis seeking to patent a thermal-mug designed by an artificial intelligence machine that he created.  Thaler has argued that the AI (called DABUS) conceived of the particular invention in question and also identified its practical utility.  The UK Supreme court based its holding upon the text of the UK Patents Act of 1977 as it reached the same ultimate conclusion as the Federal Circuit in Thaler v. Vidal, 43 F.4th 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 1783 (2023).

These Thaler cases showcase that under the current patent law regime, autonomous AI systems cannot qualify as inventors entitled to patent rights, irrespective of their creativity. For AI-generated inventions to become patentable, intervention by policymakers to amend inventorship laws would likely be necessary. However, the arguably bigger questions of immediate importance surround collaborative human-AI inventions where both human and machine contribute in creation of a new invention. Thaler expressly disclaimed any human input into DABUS’s inventions, but going forward mixed human-AI inventor teams seem inevitable. Neither the UK Supreme Court’s decision nor the parallel US rulings provide direct guidance on the requisite threshold quality or quantity of human participation in such collaborative inventions to satisfy legal inventorship requirements. Thus, for instance, an open issue remains whether token perfunctory human approval of an AI-devised invention would suffice, or if substantive intellectual contribution is needed. And for primarily AI-driven inventions, are minor tweaks by a human collaborator enough? Or must the human contributor objectively supply the novel concept?

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Double Patenting and Patent Term Adjustment

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by Dennis Crouch

The Federal Circuit recently issued an important decision in In re: Cellect, LLC (Fed. Cir. Aug. 28, 2023) regarding how Patent Term Adjustment (PTA) interacts with terminal disclaimers and obviousness-type double patenting (ODP). This case establishes binding precedent that a terminal disclaimer cuts off any extended patent term granted through PTA.

This holding contrasts with the court's prior rulings regarding Patent Term Extension (PTE), where the extended term is calculated from the disclaimed expiration date, not the original expiration date. Thus, PTE extends beyond a disclaimed term, while PTA does not.

This result was expected by many patent experts, although some in the pharmaceutical industry had pushed for PTA to extend beyond disclaimed terms similarly to PTE. In the end, the statutory language expressly addressing disclaimers in the context of PTA proved decisive. This precedent will apply to all patents already in-force as well as those issued in the future.  Thus, applicants will want to carefully consider PTA and terminal disclaimer strategy for patent families.

If I were the judge, I would

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Guest Post: Diversity Pledge: Boosting Innovation and Competitiveness

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By: Suzanne Harrison, Chair of the Patent Public Advisory Committee (PPAC) at the USPTO.  This post is part of a series by the Diversity Pilots Initiative, which advances inclusive innovation through rigorous research. The first blog in the series is here and resources from the first conference of the initiative are available here.

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Inventorship; Ownership; and NDAs

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Take the 1-question survey on LinkedIn.

The basic underlying question has to do with whether an NDA or other agreement can effectively limit an inventor's ability to pursue patent protection -- even in circumstances where the inventor has not transferred patent rights.

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