by Dennis Crouch
My recent discussion of Vanda v. Teva references the landmark Supreme Court case of Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192 (1883). I thought I would write a more complete discussion of this important historic patent case.
Atlantic Works has had a profound impact on the development of patent law, particularly in shaping the doctrine of obviousness, but more generally providing theoretical frameworks for attacking “bad patents.” As discussed below, I believe the case also provides some early insight into the new AI inventorship dilemma.
The case addressed the validity of a patent granted to Edwin L. Brady for an improved dredge boat design. The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the lower court’s decision upholding the patent and found instead that Brady’s claimed invention lacked novelty and did not constitute a patentable advance over the prior art.
The technology at issue involved a dredge boat equipped with water-tight compartments that could be filled to sink the boat to a desired depth while maintaining an even keel, as well as a “mud-fan” at the bow, consisting of sharp revolving blades designed to stir up mud and sand from the river bottom, allowing it to be carried away by the current. Brady’s patent claimed this combination of features, asserting that it represented a novel and non-obvious improvement over existing dredging technology.
Claims:
1. A dredging-boat constructed with a series of water-tight compartments, so proportioned and arranged that, as they are filled with water, the boat shall preserve an even keel, and the dredging-mechanism be brought into action without any adjusting-devices, substantially as set forth.
2 The combination of the mud-fan A, attached-to a rigid shaft, and a boat containing a series of watertight compartments, E, so adjusted as to cause the boat to settle on an even keel, as the compartments are filled with water, and a pump, B, for exhausting the water from all the compartments, substantially as set forth.
Procedurally, Brady had filed a bill in equity against the major Boston-based ship builder, Atlantic Works, alleging infringement and seeking both an injunction and an accounting of profits. The circuit court initially ruled in Brady’s favor, sustaining the patent and referring the case to a master for an accounting. Both parties appealed the final decree entered in accordance with the master’s report.
In reviewing the case, the Supreme Court focused its analysis on the key question of the patent’s validity. The Court examined the prior art in detail, finding that the individual components of Brady’s claimed invention had been known and used in various combinations well before his alleged date of invention. Water-tight compartments for adjusting a vessel’s depth while maintaining an even keel had long been employed in dry docks and light-draft monitors, while the use of revolving screws to stir up and remove sediment had been practiced by French steamers and the dredging vessel apparently named after Enoch Train. Moreover, the idea of placing the revolving screws at the bow of a dredging vessel had been implemented in the Wiggins Ferry, a boat fitted with an apparatus invented by Ephraim Bishop in 1858, which Brady himself had been involved in operating for a government dredging contract in 1866 before claiming to have invented his own improved design.
The Court emphasized that the mere combination of known elements, each performing its expected function, did not rise to the level of patentable invention unless some new and useful result was achieved. It found that Brady’s claimed arrangement would have been obvious to any skilled engineer tasked with designing a dredge boat, given the existing knowledge in the field.
In a oft-cited passage, the Court cautioned against granting patents for minor improvements that would naturally occur to skilled artisans:
The design of the patent laws is to reward those who make some substantial discovery or invention, which adds to our knowledge and makes a step in advance in the useful arts. Such inventors are worthy of all favor.
It was never the object of those laws to grant a monopoly for every trifling device, every shadow of a shade of an idea, which would naturally and spontaneously occur to any skilled mechanic or operator in the ordinary progress of manufactures. Such an indiscriminate creation of exclusive privileges tends rather to obstruct than to stimulate invention.
It creates a class of speculative schemers who make it their business to watch the advancing wave of improvement, and gather its foam in the form of patented monopolies, which enable them to lay a heavy tax upon the industry of the country, without contributing anything to the real advancement of the art.
Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1883) (paragraphs added).
The Court’s reasoning drew upon well-established precedent regarding the standard for patentability. In Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850), the Court had previously held that an improvement consisting of substituting one known material for another in a known product was not patentable, absent some new and useful result. The Atlantic Works decision built upon this principle, emphasizing that the combination of known elements must produce a new and unexpected result to warrant patent protection.
A recent article by Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña and Ryan Whalen delved into the reasoning of Atlantic Works and note the opinion as an early example of the Court’s recognition of both economic and cognitive rationales for determining patentability, setting the stage for future discussions on the constitutional foundations of intellectual property law and the role of market forces and inventive skill in driving innovation. Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña & Ryan Whalen, A Network Theory of Patentability, 87 U. Chi. L. Rev. 63, 67 (2020).
The pair write that Atlantic Works “emphasized that a patent is unnecessary, and an invention is therefore obvious, when ‘[t]he process of development in manufactures creates a constant demand for new appliances, which the skill of ordinary head-workmen and engineers is generally adequate to devise, and which, indeed, are the natural and proper outgrowth of such development.'” This passage highlights the Court’s recognition of an economic view of patent law, suggesting that patents are not required for inventions that would naturally arise in response to market demand, without the need for additional incentives.
Simultaneously, Atlantic Works also advanced a cognitive approach to nonobviousness, focusing on the level of creativity and skill demonstrated by the invention. The Court held that a nonobvious technical advance is one that evinces “the exercise of invention somewhat above ordinary mechanical or engineering skill.” This cognitive view assesses the inventiveness of a claimed invention based on the capabilities of an average practitioner in the relevant field.
The interplay between economic and cognitive rationales in Atlantic Works has had a lasting influence on the development of the nonobviousness doctrine. Pedraza-Fariña and Whalen argue that the blending of these two approaches in the decision and subsequent cases can be interpreted as using cognitive tests as proxies for identifying inventions that require the economic inducement of a patent. However, they also point out that this proxy rationale is not explicitly stated, and the cognitive and economic rationales are often treated as one and the same, despite their underlying normative differences. The authors go on to suggest the cognitive test may not always serve as an accurate proxy for determining whether an invention requires the economic incentives provided by a patent. “Some creative inventions may not need the economic inducement of a patent. Conversely, some uncreative but time- and labor-intensive inventions may not come to be absent such patent inducement.”
Atlantic Works has been influential and was highly cited for many years in the early 20th century. Based upon his study of citation networks, Joseph Miller ranks the case as one of the most important 19th-century intellectual property cases. Joseph Scott Miller, United States Supreme Court Ip Cases, 1810-2019: Measuring & Mapping the Citation Networks, 69 Cath. U.L. Rev. 537, 581 (2020). Although it is highly cited, the Federal Circuit has never cited the case. The most recent Supreme Court reliance on the case is found in Justice Stevens’s powerful anti-business-method concurring opinion in Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 654–55 (2010). Justice Stevens explained
[W]e have long explained, patents should not “embarras[s] the honest pursuit of business with fears and apprehensions of concealed liens and unknown liabilities to lawsuits and vexatious accountings for profits made in good faith.” Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200, 2 S.Ct. 225, 27 L.Ed. 438 (1883). . . .
The breadth of business methods, their omnipresence in our society, and their potential vagueness also invite a particularly pernicious use of patents that we have long criticized. As early as the 19th century, we explained that the patent laws are not intended to “creat[e] a class of speculative schemers who make it their business to watch the advancing wave of improvement, and gather its foam in the form of patented monopolies, which enable them to lay a heavy tax upon the industry of the country, without contributing anything to the real advancement of the arts.” Atlantic Works, 107 U.S., at 200, 2 S.Ct. 225. Yet business method patents may have begun to do exactly that.
Bilski. In his article on the interplay between IP rights and the US Constitution, former leading patent attorney, Kenneth Burchfiel took a negative stance on the decision — concluding that “Justice Bradley’s antimonopolist credo from Atlantic Works v. Brady [does not] rest[] on a constitutional basis.” This claim is important though because future courts did, in fact, conclude that their obviousness doctrine was demanded by the Constitutional promise of promoting the progress.
One notable aspect of Atlantic Works, highlighted in a 2014 article by Daniel Leo is that “the patentee had derived his whole idea from suggestions of another person. Plans, specifications, and recommendations developed through the another’s own study, observations, and experience were communicated to the applicant who then sought patent protection for the idea. Derivation was established since a full and accurate description of the useful improvement was conveyed to applicant who attempted to appropriate it to himself.” Daniel M. Leo, Guideline for Patent Eligibility of DNA and Cdna, 96 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Socy. 184, 201 (2014). This aspect of the ruling emphasizes the importance of original contribution in the inventive process and the need for inventors to demonstrate that they have not merely appropriated the ideas of others. The case is thus provides an early focus on on the level of independent contribution needed for invention and would likely be foundational for any future Supreme Court case on AI-generated inventions.
In the end, Atlantic Works continues to stand as a seminal case whose language will likely continue to be relied upon as the patent system continues to grapple with today’s challenges. What I like about the case is that it asks for meaning — a meaningful threshold of inventiveness to justify the grant of exclusive rights. For me, this is less about patents becoming a hinderance and more about patents being part of the positive solution that our society needs.
Not exactly relevant to ‘Atlantic Works’ but:
I think the modern defense of “It’s patentable because I do it on a computer” has its origins in “It’s patentable because I do it on a boat.”
Disgusting snail John Eastman disbarred by the State Bar of California. Yay! Time for some champagne!
link to s3.documentcloud.org
They slammed him mainly because he would not bow down to them and say he was wrong.
“Eastman’s complete denial of wrongdoing, coupled with his attempts to discredit legitimate disciplinary proceedings are concerning. While Eastman is entitled to defend himself, his conduct goes beyond this, revealing a complete failure to understand the wrongfulness of his
actions. His unwillingness to consider the impropriety of his conduct goes “beyond tenacity to truculence.” (In re Morse (1995) 11 Cal.4th 184, 209 [unwillingness to consider appropriateness of legal challenge or acknowledge its lack of merit is aggravating].) Accordingly, the court
assigns substantial weight in aggravation under this factor. (In the Matter of Layton (Review Dept. 1993) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 366, 380-381 [ongoing failure to acknowledge wrongdoing instills concern that attorney may commit future misconduct].)”
They are completely wrong on the PA Supreme Court interpretation in their decision. They are majority democrat and went against the PA law. You may not know this, but the US Constitution grants control over elections to the state LEGISLATURES, not the executive OR judicial branches.
The PA Secretary of State changed several election laws the last minute IN 2020, including allowing the counting of mail-in ballots that were received UP TO THREE DAYS after the close of the polls on election day. That is against the PA election law. She did not have the power to change the law. She is not a legislator. The PA Supreme Court upheld her unlawful action.
This California court has no right to interpret PA laws.
“ They slammed him mainly because he would not bow down to them and say he was wrong.”
LOL
This is going to be a long and rough year for you, you rancid f a s c i s t-loving c r e ep.
Fascism is controlling what attorneys for your political opponent can challenge in zealously representing their clients. As you are not a US lawyer, you have no understanding of our ethics rules, or our election laws.
Stacey Abrams challenged her election loss. Al Gore did. Dems objected to certification in 2016 and other years. Dems are planning to vote against certification if Trump wins this year. The same things this lawyer was disbarred for doing.
FYI, surprisingly, the PA Supreme Court found some integrity and upheld the requirement for dating the outer envelope for mail-in ballots. After what they did in 2020, I am encouraged by this. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals just upheld the requirement as well.
Don’t you know? Malcolm’s a firm believer in the Ends Justify the Means.
As you are not a US lawyer…
So you do not think that the Prophet is a lawyer? Interesting. I confess that I am uncertain about the Prophet. He says all sorts of weird things that make much more sense according to the hypothesis that he is not a lawyer, so I can hardly fault you for drawing this conclusion.
“I confess that I am uncertain about the Prophet. He says all sorts of weird things “
LOL
“Fascism is controlling what attorneys for your political opponent can challenge in zealously representing their clients.”
First they came for the bar licenses of miserable l y i n g s c u m b a g s conspiring to attempt a coup and incite a riot which resulted in injury and death to innocent people. Watch out, lawyers! Cancel culture!
LOL
If you are not a US lawyer, your comments are not based upon actual knowledge.
He did not lie. And the judge kept much of his evidence out.
Hunter Biden lied on an application for a gun, lied before Congress, did drugs, and still has his law license.
Comparing John Eastman and Hunter Biden here is a bit of an apples-&-oranges. Hunter Biden is not a member of the California bar, so it is not possible for the California authorities to disbar Hunter Biden. Meanwhile, it would be a bit silly to say that the lax enforcement of rules in D.C. precludes California from enforcing its rules.
Cure – the parallel is not exact on the particulars.
But get over yourself and see the larger point.
LOL.
What the judge did in Cali is wrong. Period.
Are you an attorney? Because if you think what California did is okay, THAT is scary.
“ Comparing John Eastman and Hunter Biden here is a bit of an apples-&-oranges.”
LOL. That’s an understatement. It’s a non-sequitur and an attempt to change the subject.
What the judge did in Cali is wrong. Period. [I]f you think what California did is okay, THAT is scary.
I am admitted to the bars of both Pennsylvania and California, so I feel a personal urgency that the courts of these states get the law right. That is my duty as an officer of the court in both CA and PA—to be committed to and assist in the correct and orderly administration of the law.
The whole reason that we have bar authorities is that it is possible to abuse the orderly administration of the law and to bend it to socially evil ends, instead of the socially good ends that it is intended to serve. When a lawyer shows himself or herself willing to assist in such abuse, it is the duty of the bar authorities to protect the legal system and the rest of society by removing that lawyer from the profession, so that s/he will no longer have the power to abuse the system.
Prof. Eastman engaged in some of the worst sort of abuse of the system that is possible. He tried to use the legal system to destroy the legal system. I consider it a sane and salutary outcome that the California authorities are moving to strip him of his California law license.
You complain of the injustice of an outcome where Prof. Eastman is disbarred but Hunter Biden retains his DC law license. I am not a DC lawyer and cannot speak for the DC bar authorities. Just as an informed observer, however, I can say that Hunter Biden is not a credit to our profession. His misdeeds are not nearly so grave as Prof. Eastman’s, but it would be better for our profession and for society as a whole if Hunter Biden were not a lawyer. If the DC bar were to initiate discipline proceedings against Hunter Biden, I would not complain.
The Kool-Aid continues…
“His misdeeds are not nearly so grave as Prof. Eastman’s”
BTW, the main issue is that the attorney dared to challenge the Constitutional interpretation that the judge and others prefer.
You know who challenged decades of Constitutional interpretation? Thurgood Marshall, in Brown V. Board of Education of Topeka. Thirteen years later he was appointed as the first Black Supreme Court Justice.
Challenging precedent is not cause for disbarment. Never has been. Until now.
Ends, no matter the Means.
What could go wrong with that?
It is explained in this link, although in a biased manner.
link to businessinsider.com
“Clarifying that the vice president’s status overseeing the joint session of Congress is purely ceremonial.”
thanks
While word choices do reflect a certain desired narrative, it is not clear to me that this was more than clearing up ambiguities.
That being said, it should be noted that this could NOT pass on its own, but could only pass under thre@t of shutdown (gov budget).
I would love to disabuse Congress of the ability to piggyback things together. Each item should rise or fall on its own merits.
I agree. And, if the language was ambiguous, then it is definitely subject to challenge.
Regardless, one can always challenge. To disbar a lawyer for doing so is abominable.
That entirely depends (for some) on whether or not a narrative is challenged.
The Ends of stifling any challenge to narratives (a la “Don’t Question The Science”), is (again, for some), justified for any Means.
I am referring to TP’s gratuitous name calling untethered to the commentary, i.e., calling someone a scumbag or fascist or imbecile when he cannot refute what was said.
But, he does spread out the letters to avoid automatic detection/bouncing.
TP is Malcolm.
He has been doing this stretching back 18 years (outside of a spell of just over a year after he hit his 15 year mark).
“ Challenging precedent is not cause for disbarment”
That’s not why Eastman was disbarred, you f a s c I s t imbecile.
In top of that, any number of ridiculous willful l i es can be interpreted as “challenging precedent” if the interpreter is willing to lick the t o i l e t bowl with vigor, which disgraced former attorney John Eastman is clearly very willing to do. And you obviously enjoy doing that, too. You’re a s c u m b a g.
You mad bro?
You know what proves Eastman was right about the Vice President’s power? Congress changed the law to make sure it does not happen.
PM – sorry – not following. Can you flesh that out?
I cannot believe Dennis allows your comments to post.
You clearly have some anger issues and should seek help.
He did not lie. There was testimony in Jeff Clark’s disbarment hearing that Fulton County did not do any signature verification in 2020, and did not comply with chain of custody requirements. Such acts not only violate the election laws, but allow for cheating.
They did not verify the signatures on 147,000 mail-in ballots. Biden won GA by fewer than 12,000.
The testimony was by Mark Wingate, a Fulton County Election Board member who refused to vote to certify the 2020 election because of all the problems.
But, even when you search his name with Jeff Clark’s name, you will find few reports of the testimony. Because, that is what the media does. They only report things that hurt Trump.
Such acts did not only happen in Georgia.
I suggest you start doing some research and breathe into a paper bag while doing so. Because, you will not like what you learn.
I am NOT for squelching anyone’s views (short of say, those that reflect cyber-stalking).
Even Malcolm’s.
I have suggested though tactics that would make this ‘ecosystem’ a better place, including placing those comments that are repeatedly made and that do not bother to try to take into account counter points provided.
Those – such as a substantial portion of Malcolm’s, Greg’s, Paul’s, marty’s, MaxDrie’s, and the like – amount to no more than vapid propaganda.
On occassion, some of Greg’s and Paul’s do touch on issues in an intelligent manner.
But the propaganda style posts could be shuttled off to another part of the blog, kept track of, and reflected in a manner such as:
Malcolm’s post – repeating his typical item #4 – has been relocated.
And I KNOW that such tracking is possible, as it was a default in the DISQUS days (and I had pointed out Malcolm’s tendencies expressly along these lines, until he decided to opt for a higher level of “privacy” for his banal posts.
Also I wonder if MM heard that probably the most prominent fe mc el came out as l esbia n (after she came off her me ds for the first time in her adult life)? Spoiler, later on she’ll tell us about how she tried to date white women of britain, but they’s all ra c ist. So no luck yet.
link to youtube.com
Bros is it true that under joey b the us is now considered by many leftists to be genocidal?
link to youtube.com
Good luck 6 – since October 7th I have been trying to get the usual commentators (that freely engage on most all other things political) to actually provide their stance in the Israel/Hamas debacle.
Not a one has done so.
The ‘best’ was one of Greg’s fetid ‘easter eggs,’ but even that was not a statement of his views.
Is it true? Well, there are ~330 million Americans, and of course the internet is not limited to America. There are several billion additional internet commenters in the world. So, yes, it is true that there are “leftists” who consider the U.S. to be “genocidal.”
Are they “many” leftists? I guess that depends on what you mean by “many.” In a colloquial sense, 100k people counts as “many” people. On the other hand, 100k people is ~0.0014% of the world population, and in a colloquial sense 0.0014 is “few,” which is the opposite of “many.” That is a long way of saying that you can look at it one way in which there are “many leftists” saying this, and another way in which only a “few leftists” are saying this.
I think it is safe to say that “the U.S. is complicit in genocide” is not a consensus position on either the political left or the political right in the U.S. It is not hard to find people saying this on the internet, however, and most of those people would code as “left” in the U.S. political context.
You going to take 100K and then put that to the world population?
Sure, Greg is “serious”.
” So, yes, it is true that there are “leftists” who consider the U.S. to be “genocidal.””
That’s good bro. How can we get them all to see joey b as the true genocider?
Not sure that much convincing is necessary for that lot. The leftier-than-thou folks were never likely to vote for Biden. I am not even sure how many of them are eligible and registered.
LOL – “were never likely to vote for Biden.”
W O W
This California court has no right to interpret PA laws.
This is obvious nonsense. First, California courts not only have the right, but frequently the obligation to interpret Pennsylvania laws in the course of deciding cases brought in California. See, e.g., People v. Blair, 25 Cal.3d 640 (1979). Anyone who takes “Choice of Law” in law school will spend most of the semester learning laws about how and when the court of one state is supposed to act when interpreting another the laws of another state. Similarly, I took Missouri Civ Pro in law school and much of the class was spent learning the rules for how Missouri courts were supposed to apply the laws of other states when you had a Missouri business in (e.g.) a contract dispute with a non-Missouri counter-party.
Second—as you note—the California court here is just giving effect to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court‘s interpretation of Pennsylvania law. Surely you do not contend that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has no right to interpret Pennsylvania law.
This California court has no right to interpret PA laws.
Two points. First, California courts not only have the right, but frequently the obligation to interpret Pennsylvania laws in the course of deciding cases brought in California. See, e.g., People v. Blair, 25 Cal.3d 640 (1979). Anyone who takes “Choice of Law” in law school will spend most of the semester learning laws about how and when the court of one state is supposed to act when interpreting another the laws of another state.
Second—as you note—the California court here is just giving effect to decisions about Pennsylvania law handed down by Pennsylvania courts. Surely you do not contend that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has no right to interpret Pennsylvania law.
This was not a choice of law issue. This was California deciding the PA court was right without knowing anything else.
The Supreme Court CANNOT RE-WRITE PA law. The PA law did not allow mail-in ballots received after the close of the polls to be counted. The Supreme Court of PA did.
Now I am done arguing with someone who clearly has no knowledge of the facts.
“ Now I am done arguing with someone who clearly has no knowledge of the facts.”
You don’t have any “arguments”. You’re just reciting a script of b.s. that your f a s c i s t cult handed to you because you are a f a s c i s t-living c r e e p.
Like I said, it’s going to be a long rough year for you and your christo-f a s c I s t heroes.
Your one-bucketing is off the deep end here Malcolm.
Clearly, a concise legal argument has been provided.
Constitution: power is with State Legislature
The Court of PA: screw that, we choose something different.
Your “Ends justifies the Means” is satisfied here, because the Ends is alignment with what you want.
You would be ranting nonstop if the shoe were on the other foot.
That you insist on being blind to this renders your credibility to remain at that sub-zero mark that it is.
Literally nobody except a tiny tiny handful of deluded cult members believes the nonsense your barfing out in defense of this disbarred pile of trash.
Maybe try to read.
It’s not a novel thing.
Are you a US lawyer?
If not, you are speaking out of ignorance.
He is a (professed) attorney, and he is still speaking out of 1gn0rance.
This was California deciding the PA court was right without knowing anything else.
How much else does one need to know? As everyone knows, “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court is the judicial department for Pennsylvania law. There is no higher authority about what Pennsylvania law is. If the PA Supreme Court says “Pennsylvania law is XYZ,” then—by definition—Pennsylvania law is XYZ.
You misconstrue Marbury – and in so doing effectively eliminate both any sense of Separation of Powers/Checks and Balances, as well as the explicit designation in our Constitution.
That you do so seemingly unaware is more than a bit frightening.
… but above Greg wants to boast how he is an agent of the court and takes his responsibilities “seriously.”
They did not interpret law. They support actions of the SOS that were contrary to the law.
Your point is not going to be discussed on its merits.
It simply will not be.
The Supreme Court CANNOT RE-WRITE PA law. The PA law did not allow mail-in ballots received after the close of the polls to be counted.
PA law definitely did allow as much. The PA constitution trumps the PA elections code, which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court thoroughly explained in Penn. Democratic Party v. Boockvar, 238 A. 3d 345, 371 (Penn. 2020). The Secretary of State was merely following the law, not flouting it.
I wrote this late last night. With fresh morning eyes, I worry that “trump” might be misunderstood. I do not mean that the 25 P.S. §3146.6(c) requirement that ballots to be returned to Boards no later than 8:00 p.m. on Election day is unconstitutional. The PA Supreme Court is quite clear that there is no constitutional infirmity with that provision, and it remains in force.
Rather, the court explains that the PA constitution embues the courts with powers of equity, and that those equitable powers have historically been used in furtherance of the PA constitution’s “Free & Equal Elections” clause (art. I, § 5) to extend ballot deadlines in times of emergency or natural disaster. In other words, the provisions of 25 P.S. §3146.6(c) must be interpreted against the backdrop of other PA constitutional provisions.
There was nothing unlawful about invoking these equitable powers in the exigent circumstances of the pandemic to extend the deadline. This was perfectly consistent with past practice and application of § 3146.6(c). This is not “re-writing” the statute. The statute remains written as it is written. Our justice system has always made equitable provision for relaxation of deadlines as circumstances require.
Oh please – counting absentee ballots – well in hand – cannot be traced in any reasonable manner to the existence of the pandemic.
“The PA Supreme Court upheld her unlawful action.”
LOL
Thanks for the hotlink to the John Eastman disbarment trial which has dragged on so long.
I doubt if many will read it, but a key item is his documented admission on p23 that he never had any actual evidence of election fraud,* much less in all needed states.
*[On which the whole scheme of preparing and submitting fraudulent state electoral vote certificates that would allegedly enable the V.P. to flip the election results was based.]
Not only did he not have any evidence but he decided to pretend that he had it anyway and attempted to rely on “experts” who were nothing but hacks, incompetent mental defects, and/or charlatans.
Anybody who bothers to defend this disgraced worm is just exposing their membership in the diseased authoritarian cult that was formerly a rightwing political party.
Your one bucketing is missing the point.
This is simply not about any old “defend this disgraced worm” and instead is about a specific legal point.
That YOU want this to be merely an Ends in complete disregard for the Means is what is directly on point here.
Nice try, Billy! You, too, are a f a s c i s t s c u m b a g but we all knew that already.
You still miss the point.
Being driven by your apoplectic rants all the time must
s
u
c
k
for you.
There were alternate electors from seven states — Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Nevada, New Mexico, Arizona, and Georgia. You can label them false if you like, but several states had competing slates of electors, because they challenged the procedures in their states.
Actually, because the Constitution gives the power to determine electors to the legislatures, the Electoral Count Act seems to be in violation of the Constitution by giving the power to certify to the Executive branch of the states.
But I just noticed something — after the recent amendment, the text of 3 USC 1 specifies that the electors for President and Vice President “shall be appointed in each State on election day…” Previously, states were allowed to appoint them later (and thus count later). Maybe the repubs sneaked a poison pill in there. It appears election day can only be extended if voting is extended for a force majeure event that is extraordinary and catastrophic.
Hmmmm
If it was a “bad patent”, was there not a “bad examiner” or “bad examination”? Is an applicant legally entitled to a “good examination” and/or “good examiner”? If so, shouldn’t the issuance of a “bad patent” require the USPTO to refund the applicant for their fees and legal expenses when the applicant relied to their detriment on the USPTO’s issuance of a “bad patent”?
Whoever was President when the applicant was forced to file should pay the applicant back for the money and time spent plus interest, out of their own pocket.
“If it was a “bad patent”, was there not a “bad examiner” or “bad examination”? Is an applicant legally entitled to a “good examination” and/or “good examiner”? If so, shouldn’t the issuance of a “bad patent” require the USPTO to refund the applicant for their fees and legal expenses when the applicant relied to their detriment on the USPTO’s issuance of a “bad patent”?”
No, no and no. Thx.
You bring up excellent considerations in view of Greg’s penchant for the Oil States angle of ‘public license’ still being a matter of personal property in that ANY license agreement necessitates duties of a LicensOR to a LicensEE.
Please Pardon Potential re(P)eat…
Your comment is awaiting moderation.
March 27, 2024 at 10:41 am
You bring up excellent considerations in view of Greg’s penchant for the Oil States angle of ‘public license’ still being a matter of personal property in that ANY license agreement necessitates duties of a LicensOR to a LicensEE.
ANY license agreement necessitates duties of a LicensOR to a LicensEE
Ummm not when the grant is from the sovereign.
In that instance, you get what you get.
You are missing the point of what License entails.
There are no “duties of a licensor to a licensee,” except for those contractual duties set out in the license agreement.* I have filed a mountain of patent applications over the years, and never once did any of my clients have to sign a license agreement between themselves and the U.S. government. So much for those “duties”…
* Unless the licensor is an auto manufacturer and the licensee is a car dealership. In that case, many state statutes imply duties between the parties. That point, however, is obviously irrelevant to any present discussion.