by Dennis Crouch
The Federal Circuit’s 2023 decision in Axonics, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc. marked an important change in inter partes review procedure, ensuring petitioners have an opportunity to respond patentee’s newly proposed arguments, with the hope of discouraging patent owners from holding-back (“sandbagging”) at the institution stage. Case-in-point is the Federal Circuit’s recent Apple v. Omni MedSci decision authored by Judge Alan D. Albright sitting by designation.
by Dennis Crouch
The Supreme Court recently decided Moore v. United States, — U.S. — (June 20, 2024), a case focusing on the constitutionality of the Mandatory Repatriation Tax (MRT). While the majority opinion, authored by Justice Kavanaugh, upheld the MRT, Justice Thomas published a strong dissent relying upon an invention metaphor in a decidedly negative light, something that he has done in several other recent opinions. For Thomas, judicial invention is a synonym to judicial activism and antithetical to his approach that looks primarily to historic preservation, especially when interpreting the U.S. Constitution.
In Moore, the majority held that the MRT, which attributes the realized and undistributed income of an American-controlled foreign corporation to the entity’s American shareholders and then taxes those shareholders, “falls squarely within Congress’s constitutional authority to tax.” The Court reached this holding by relying on its “longstanding precedents” that allow Congress to attribute the undistributed income of an entity to the entity’s shareholders or partners for tax purposes.
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, dissented. He argued that the Sixteenth Amendment requires realization for income to be taxed without apportionment. His main complaint against the majority opinion is that it “invent[ed]” a new attribution doctrine to reach its conclusion.
Justice Thomas’ negative invocation of “invention” in Moore is part of a broader trend in his recent opinions. Just a week before Moore, in FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U.S. — (June 13, 2024), Justice Thomas refused to “invent a new doctrine of doctor standing,” concluding that “there would be no principled way to cabin such a sweeping doctrinal change to doctors or other healthcare providers.” Similarly, in a recent concurring opinion, Justice Thomas argued that “Federal courts have the power to grant only the equitable relief ‘traditionally accorded by courts of equity,’ not the flexible power to invent whatever new remedies may seem useful at the time.” Alexander v. S.C. State Conf. of the NAACP, 144 S. Ct. 1221 (2024) (Thomas, J., concurring). And in his dissent in US v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. — (June 21, 2024), Justice Thomas complained that “At argument, the Government invented yet another position.”
Justice Thomas is not alone in his negative view of judicial invention. In a recent dissent, Justice Gorsuch lamented that “Despite [a] settled rule, the Court today doubles down on a new tort of its own recent invention.” Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, Ohio, 602 U.S. — (June 20, 2024) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
This antipathy to judicial invention truthfully in line with the stated approach of all judges today. Claiming judicial restraint, “calling balls and strikes,” avoiding judicial activism. In Moore, for instance, the majority opinion also tied its holding to history. Although what caught my attention in the case is that the majority opinion does also reference invention — applauding the taxpayers’ attorneys for being inventive, even if ultimately unpersuasive on a particular point. The Court wrote, “Moores’ effort to thread that needle, although inventive, is unavailing.” The concept of invention also appeared in Justice Barrett’s concurring opinion in Moore, but in a different context. She wrote, “A patent is an inventor’s property, and royalties are the income she receives from licensing it. A capital fund is a banker’s property, and interest is the income she receives from lending it.” Here, Justice Barrett was distinguishing between a “seed” (property) and its “fruit” (income), not commenting on judicial invention.
Showing that it is not only the conservative Justices, in a recent majority opinion, Justice Jackson also used the term “invention” pejoratively, arguing that “the dissent invents new arguments to arrive at its favored outcome.” Office of U.S. Tr. v. John Q. Hammons Fall 2006, LLC, 602 U.S. — (U.S. June 14, 2024). Justice Jackson noted that the dissent’s purported inventiveness was two-fold problematic: (1) it went beyond the arguments of the parties, and (2) it went beyond controlling precedent.
I have been delving into mythology recent as part of an academic project, and Justice Thomas’ approach calls to mind the many ancient myths that warn against hubris that often leads to folly. To escape from the labyrinth, the great inventor Daedalus created wings for himself and his son Icarus using feathers and wax. Daedalus warned Icarus not to fly too close to the sun, as the heat would melt the wax. But, Icarus could not listen: The wax melted and Icarus plummeted into the sea and drowned. Thomas views “judicial invention” as a dangerous flight too close to the sun – risking the integrity of the legal system that has stood for so many years. But, this analysis is a bit too quick because the myth does not condemn invention itself, but rather reckless and unrestrained use of it. Daedalus, after all, successfully used his invention to escape, demonstrating that innovation, when applied with restraint, can be beneficial. In the context of jurisprudence, this suggests to me that there might be a middle ground for judicial invention – one that provides due respect to established precedents and historic traditions while allowing for thoughtful adaptation to new societal challenges. Just as Daedalus found the right balance in his flight, perhaps there’s a path for judicial reasoning that innovates responsibly.
You might think that Justice Thomas believes that invention is best left to those seeking patents, not those wearing judicial robes. But, Justice Thomas is also no friend to patents or patent owners. Rather, he is author of key opinions that have greatly weakened patent rights over the past two decades, including eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Intern., 573 U.S. 208 (2014); and Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, 584 U.S. 325 (2018). Hate is a strong word, but perhaps the answer is that Justice Thomas does not favor invention.
by Dennis Crouch
The Federal Circuit has affirmed a D.N.J. court’s dismissal of patentee Beteiro’s infringement complaints against DraftKings, et al., agreeing that the asserted claims are directed to patent ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Beteiro, LLC v. DraftKings Inc., No. 2022-2275 (Fed. Cir. June 21, 2024). The patents at issue were directed to methods of facilitating remote gambling activity using devises equipped with GPS. (more…)
by Dennis Crouch
A second amicus brief has been filed – this one from the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) – encouraging the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in Cellect, LLC v. Vidal, No. 23-1231. The case concerns the interplay between the Patent Term Adjustment (PTA) statute, 35 U.S.C. § 154(b), and the judicially-created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting (ODP). (more…)
by Dennis Crouch
The pending petition for certiorari in Chestek v. Vidal focuses on the extend that the APA requires the USPTO to follow notice-and-comment requirements when promulgating regulations under 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2). In its decision below, the Federal Circuit held that the USPTO is exempt from these requirements because the types of rules it is authorized to issue under Section 2(b)(2) are procedural in nature, and the APA excuses “rules of agency … procedure” from the requirements. There are two ways that the Federal Circuit potentially erred:
The Federal Circuit agreed that 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) requires USPTO regulations to be “made in accordance with” the APA — but disagreed that this requires notice-and-comment for all new regulations. The court concluded that the APA inherently includes an exception for procedural requirements and so the USPTO was not required to follow notice-and-comment rulemaking when promulgating the trademark applicant home-address rule, because the court deemed it to be a procedural rather than substantive rule exempt from those APA requirements.
Five amicus briefs were recently filed in support of the petitioner, arguing that Supreme Court review is warranted to correct the Federal Circuit’s erroneous decision, arguing that the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of Section 2(b)(2) is flawed and undermines important principles of administrative law. (more…)
by Dennis Crouch
The Federal Circuit (CAFC) recently affirmed a USPTO enablement rejection — holding that the patentee did not enable the “full scope” of the claimed invention. In re Pen, 23-2282 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (non-precedential). As an aside, the listed inventor’s legal name is “The Pen;” first and last name respectively, with no middle initial. Based upon Pen’s address, he is related to “The People’s Email Network.” In the case, Pen represented himself pro se.
Pen’s patent claimed “polycyclic metallole heteroatom rich conductive long chain polymers” comprised of certain repeating units. The idea here is to create a conductive polymer for use in new battery technology. Key limitations in the claims at issue here are that the metallole heteroatom is nitrogen, there are more than eight repeating units (n>8), and a substituent R can be any substituent.
In affirming the PTO’s refusal, the Federal Circuit found that substantial evidence supported the Board’s factual findings on the Wands factors and found no legal error in its enablement analysis.
As the Supreme Court did in Amgen, the Federal Circuit focused on the breadth of the claims compared to the teachings of the specification and the along with the state of the prior art. The court noted that the claims allow R to be any substituent and also permitted any number of repeating units n to be over 8.
The state of the prior art also weighed against enablement, as the closest prior art polymers only had n=8 repeating units. The court rejected the appellant’s argument that this reasoning was illogical because it would require the invention to already exist in the prior art. Rather, the proper analysis looks at the gap between the scope of the claims and what the prior art already enables. That gap must be filled by the specification.
Additionally, the court found that the field of conductive metallole polymers is unpredictable, further weighing against enablement. While the appellant argued that a skilled artisan could polymerize the monomers and carry out the claimed reactions based on the specification, the court emphasized that this does not necessarily enable the full scope of n values and R substituents covered by the claims.
Regarding the amount of guidance and examples in the specification, as well as the quantity of experimentation required, the court agreed with the Board that the specification did not provide sufficient guidance to enable the full claim scope without undue experimentation. Even if the specification enables some n values and R substituents, that is inadequate when the claims have open-ended ranges tat are much broader.
Throughout its opinion, the Federal Circuit stressed the breadth of the claims compared to the more limited disclosure. “The specification must enable the full scope of the invention as defined by the claims. . . . In short, the more you claim, the more you must explain.” Citing Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, 143 S. Ct. 1243 (2023).
The appellant made several arguments that the Federal Circuit rejected. First, the appellant argued that the choice of R substituent does not affect the conductivity or synthesis of the polymer. The idea here is that comprising-style claims are always extremely broad in areas of less importance, and that reality should not spoil the validity of those patents. Instead of fully engaging, the court noted this argument was made for the first time on appeal and was therefore forfeited.
Second, the appellant challenged the Board’s reliance on references not cited by the Examiner when discussing the closest prior art. The court disagreed that this constituted a new ground of rejection, finding the Board merely further explained the Examiner’s reasoning and the underlying legal standards.
Finally, the appellant argued that the Examiner’s analysis on some of the Wands factors was conclusory and irrelevant included boilerplate language, and that the Board had improperly relied upon that analysis. While the court agreed some of the Examiner’s language was “less than exemplary,” it found no reversible error in the Board’s ultimate conclusions on the Wands factors.
This case again includes strong language surrounding the enablement requirement. However, the case arises in the “unpredictable arts” of chemistry that appears continue to be a key feature of enablement rejections that stick.
by Dennis Crouch
The Federal Circuit recently decided the en banc design patent case of LKQ v. GM, but the court has not issued an en banc decision in a utility patent case since 2018. There are currently four interesting petitions pending before the court.
Brumfield – Consistency and Proving International Damages: The Federal Circuit panel affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment that the asserted claims of the two asserted patents are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Brumfield v. IBG LLC, No. 2022-1630 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 27, 2024). Although the Federal Circuit had previously held that the claimed invention was “technological,” the court here concluded that it was not bound by that prior non-precedential decision. In the petition for rehearing, Brumfield argues the improperly disregarded the Federal Circuit’s prior finding that the patents claim technological improvements. The contention here is that “the interest of consistency would be ‘ill served'” by allowing different panels to make contradictory findings about the same patent claims.” See, Burke, Inc. v. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc., 183 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Id.
The panel also affirmed the district court’s exclusion of Brumfield’s damages expert’s testimony on obtaining foreign damages based on IBG’s domestic making of the accused product. The panel held that although the Supreme Court’s WesternGeco decision permits awarding damages based on foreign conduct in cases involving domestic infringement, the expert had failed to establish the required causal relationship between the domestic infringement and the foreign conduct. In the rehearing petition, Brumfield argues the improperly decided this fact-intensive causation issue sua sponte, depriving Brumfield of the opportunity to present evidence on an issue that IBG never disputed below or on appeal. [Note: I was involved in litigating patents from this patent family when owned by the predecessor-in-interest. I am no longer involved the litigation. DC]
Edwards Lifesciences – Expanded 271(e)(1) Safe Harbor: In Edwards Lifesciences Corp. v. Meril Life Sciences Pvt., a split Federal Circuit panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment that Meril’s importation of its transcatheter heart valve fell within the safe harbor provision of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) and thus, did not infringe Edwards’ patent. No. 2022-1877 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 25, 2024). The majority held that the safe harbor applied because Meril’s importation was “reasonably related to submitting information to the FDA,” even though there was evidence of other commercial uses. The dissent argued that the majority perpetuated the court’s failure to give meaning to the word “solely” in the statute, which cabins the safe harbor to uses solely related to the federal regulatory process. Section 271(e)(1) states that it “shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States or import into the United States a patented invention … solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.”
Edwards has now petitioned for en banc rehearing, arguing that the panel decision vastly expands § 271(e)(1)’s safe harbor by reading the term “solely” out of the statute, in contravention of the provision’s plain text, history, and purpose. According to Edwards, any non-regulatory use is disqualifying under the correct reading of “solely.” Edwards contends the panel was bound by circuit precedent incorrectly holding that once a defendant identifies any use reasonably related to FDA approval, the safe harbor applies regardless of other non-regulatory uses. (citing AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
Edwards argues this precedent flouts the statutory text and history showing Congress struck a “careful balance” in § 271(e)(1) to allow infringement only for the singular purpose of seeking regulatory approval. By judicially rewriting this compromise to protect non-regulatory and commercial conduct, Edwards claims the Federal Circuit has distorted the market for patented products, undermined the patent bargain, and created a powerful statutory immunity ripe for abuse.
Salix Pharms – Improper Appellate Obviousness Fact Finding: The Federal Circuit recently affirmed the district court’s judgment that several claims of Salix’s patents covering methods of treating irritable bowel syndrome with diarrhea (IBS-D) using rifaximin were invalid as obvious. Salix Pharms., Ltd. v. Norwich Pharms. Inc., 2022-2153 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 11, 2024). Salix has petitioned for rehearing en banc, arguing that the panel majority improperly found facts in the first instance rather than reviewing and analyzing the district court’s fact-finding as required by precedent. See Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709 (1986); Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 5 F.3d 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
The petition contends that after correctly determining the district court erred in its obviousness analysis by misapplying the prior-art range precedent, the CAFC panel majority should have reversed or remanded for further fact-finding by the district court. Instead, Salix argues, the majority improperly made its own findings on key disputed factual issues never resolved by the district court, such as whether skilled artisans would have viewed small intestinal bacterial overgrowth (SIBO) as a cause of IBS-D or as a separate disorder. The majority relied on prior art references and made factual findings that the district court never made to conclude there was a reasonable expectation of success in using the claimed rifaximin dosage to treat IBS-D.
Additionally, Salix asserts the panel majority applied the wrong standard in determining that the district court’s erroneous reliance on a non-prior art reference (the “RFIB 2001 Press Release”) was harmless error. Rather than considering whether that reference induced the district court to make findings it otherwise would not have made, the majority simply concluded other evidence “established” the relevant fact. But as Judge Cunningham noted in dissent in the original panel decision, the district court heavily relied on the press release to discount evidence of skepticism in the art. The press release factored significantly into the court’s analysis.
Luv N’ Care – Scope of Unclean Hands Defense: The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s application of the unclean hands doctrine to bar Eazy-PZ’s patent and trade dress claims against Luv N’ Care due to Eazy-PZ’s litigation misconduct. Luv N’ Care, Ltd. v. Laurain, 2022-1905 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 12, 2024). In its petition for rehearing, Eazy-PZ argues that the panel majority departed from Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent requiring that unclean hands be based on misconduct having an “immediate and necessary relation to the equity that he seeks.” Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1933); see also Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Merck & Co., 888 F.3d 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
The district court concluded that the patentee Eazy-PZ had engaged in litigation misconduct—all of which was associated with the asserted utility patent. However, the resulting unclean hands penalty was to dismiss the entire case, including the design patent and trade dress claims. The petition argues this was an improper extension without analyzing how the alleged misconduct related to or provided Eazy-PZ an unfair advantage regarding those claims. The petition asserts that withholding information relevant to utility claim construction could not have advantaged the design and trade dress claims. Eazy-PZ argues this expansive application of unclean hands, untethered to the specific relief sought, vitiates the Supreme Court’s “immediate and necessary” relation requirement.
Regarding the ‘903 utility patent itself, Eazy-PZ argues the panel affirmed based on factual findings the district court never made about how any false or evasive testimony impacted Luv N’ Care, violating the rule that appellate courts cannot make factual findings in the first instance.
Ten years ago – 2014 – the Supreme Court decided Alice Corp v. CLS Bank, holding that – yes indeed – the expansive language of Mayo v. Prometheus (2012) applies equally to software and technology patents. A few weeks later, the USPTO began a dramatic transformation – pulling back notices of allowance and issuing thousands of supplemental office actions. The Federal Circuit’s May 2024 en banc decision in LKQ v. GM is perhaps as dramatic a change for the design patent arena as Alice was for utility patents. The old Rosen-Durling test made it almost impossible to reject a design patent as obvious except for extreme cases involving either direct copying or extremely broad claims. The key difficulty was that precedent required the obviousness inquiry to begin with a single prior art reference that is “basically the same” as the claimed design – a roughly 1-to-1 relationship. Further, any secondary references had to be ‘so related’ to the primary reference that features in one would suggest application of those features to the other.” In LKQ, the court found those requirements “improperly rigid” under principles of KSR which require a flexible obviousness inquiry. The overall effect is to make it easier to find a design patent obvious.
Immediate Reaction: The decision was released May 21, 2024, and Dir. Vidal released examination guidance to the design corps the next day. The guidance indicated that additional training will be coming soon -“in the short term.” However, it does not appear that Dir. Vidal has, thus far, asked examiners to take a second look at the applications waiting allowance. Design patents continue to issue at a steady rate of about 1,000 per week, with most of those issuing today having received their notice-of-allowances back in Jan/Feb 2024.
Examination Outcomes: Interestingly, I could not find any design patent obviousness rejections coming out of the USPTO since May 22, 2024.* For the same period in 2023, I found a much larger number of cases with obviousness rejections. What I take from this is that it appears that there will likely be an examination slowdown as the USPTO develops its new examination process — understanding what obviousness search and rejection looks like under the new approach.
Note, one difficulty with studying design patent examination is that design applications are generally not published prior to issuance — and abandoned cases are never published. One caveat to this general rule is that design applications claiming priority to Hague Convention filings are open to the public. For my study here, I looked only at those Hague filings.
PTAB: So far we also have no PTAB decisions interpreting LKQ.
The US Supreme Court’s October 2023 term will come to a close later this month. The patent side has not seen much action in terms of new cases. 27 IP-related petitions for writ of certiorari have been filed during this time. Of those 23 have been denied. Four recently filed petitions are still pending. In each of the remaining cases, respondent has indicated that it will be filing a brief.
I’ve listed these in what I see as the most to least likely grant. Cellect is of particular interest as debates over double patenting continue. Based upon the timing of the briefs, a certiorari decision won’t come until the Fall.
by Dennis Crouch
Neuropublic S.A., a Greek technology company, has filed a federal lawsuit against the law firm Ladas & Parry LLP, with several claims stemming from the firm’s alleged mishandling of Neuropublic’s confidential invention disclosure — sending it out to a third party (“PatentManiac”) for a preliminary novelty search which then (again allegedly) further leaked the disclosure. Although the case does not involve submission to AI algorithms, some of the questions here are similar to those many IP attorneys are considering when onboarding new AI tools. (more…)
USPTO Patent News:
Recent Job Postings on Patently-O Jobs:
Guest post by Ashton Woods, a JD candidate and member of the Juelsgaard Intellectual Property and Innovation Clinic at Stanford Law School. This post is part of a series by the Diversity Pilots Initiative, which advances inclusive innovation through rigorous research. DPI will be hosting its second conference at Emory University Law School in Atlanta on Friday, September 20, 2024. Indicate your interest by signing up here.
On February 21, the USPTO issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Expanding Opportunities to Appear Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), and DPI filed one of seven comments on the proposal. DPI’s full comment can be found here.
Currently, parties appearing before the PTAB who are represented by counsel must designate lead and backup counsel. Lead counsel must be a USPTO-registered practitioner, meaning that they have technical training and have passed the registration exam (commonly known as the “patent bar” exam). Backup counsel may be non-registered if they are recognized pro hac vice. Under the Proposed Rule, counsel can switch roles, with a non-registered practitioner acting as lead counsel and a registered practitioner acting as backup counsel. Additionally, parties who can show good cause, including financial hardship, can waive the backup counsel requirement, though the party’s sole counsel must still be a registered practitioner. Finally, the Proposed Rule streamlines the pro hac vice recognition process for non-registered practitioners, though they still must be accompanied by a registered practitioner in the lead or backup role.
As explained in more detail in the full comment, DPI views the Proposed Rule as a modest step toward reducing the accessibility gap for potential patentees, patent practitioners, and patent challengers. The goal of the Proposed Rule is laudable, and it may provide a solid foundation for future efforts to diversify the Patent Bar and the patent system more broadly—if it can effectively expand the pool of eligible practitioners in proceedings before the PTAB, the Proposed Rule may support wider USPTO efforts to increase the participation of underrepresented communities in the innovation ecosystem.
Still, the Proposed Rule does not address all of the structural barriers within the patent system that continue to burden diversification efforts at the USPTO. Existing barriers, such as the technical training requirement and the patent bar exam, substantially narrow the class of patent practitioners. This is particularly troublesome considering that federal courts do not subject litigators to these standards—they impose no registration requirement or backup counsel requirement. Currently, there is no rigorous evidence to support these restrictions as necessary, rather than overly burdensome, in promoting competent, or even fantastic, representation before the PTAB.
DPI urges the USPTO to collect the empirical evidence necessary to ensure that USPTO initiatives are well-suited to promoting the goals of the Proposed Rule and the USPTO more broadly. The comment sets out exemplary data collection methods and key data points on PTAB filings and proceedings for the USPTO’s consideration. The comment urges the USPTO to affirmatively collect this data to rigorously assess the impact of the Proposed Rule, and other diversity initiatives, on inclusivity and accessibility at the USPTO.
DPI’s full comment on the USPTO’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Expanding Opportunities to Appear Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board can be found here. To stay informed about related work, sign up for DPI research updates by emailing diversitypilots@gmail.com.
[I have substantially updated this post – correcting a couple of issues from the original and also added info from the letter from former USPTO leaders. – DC 6/1/24]
by Dennis Crouch
As I have previously discussed on Patently-O, the USPTO recently issued a notice of proposed rulemaking that could significantly impact patent practice, particularly in the realm of terminal disclaimers filed to overcome non-statutory double patenting rejections. Dennis Crouch, Major Proposed Changes to Terminal Disclaimer Practice (and You are Not Going to Like it), Patently-O (May 9, 2024). Under the proposed rule, a terminal disclaimer will only be accepted by the USPTO if it includes an agreement that the patent will be unenforceable if tied (directly or indirectly) to another patent that has any claim invalidated or canceled based on prior art (anticipation or obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 102 or 103). This proposal has generated significant debate among patent practitioners, with many expressing concerns about its potential impact on innovation and patent rights. It is a dramatic change in practice because the typical rule required by statute is that the validity of each patent claim must be separately adjudged. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(a).
The comment period is open until early July, but a number of comments have already been submitted. And I looked through them in order to get some early feedback. You can read the comments here (more…)
by Dennis Crouch
The Federal Circuit’s 2023 decision in In re Cellect, LLC, 81 F.4th 1216 (Fed. Cir. 2023) has set the stage for a potentially significant Supreme Court case on the interplay between the Patent Term Adjustment (PTA) statute, 35 U.S.C. § 154(b), and the judicially-created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting (ODP). Cellect is now seeking certiorari, and the New York Intellectual Property Law Association (NYIPLA) has stepped in with an amicus brief supporting the petition, arguing that the case presents “questions of exceptional importance.” Brief for New York Intellectual Property Law Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 23, Cellect, LLC v. Vidal, No. 23-1231 (U.S. May 28, 2024). (more…)
by Dennis Crouch
Although not expressly an IP case, the Federal Circuit’s new decision in The Portland Mint v. United States does focus on counterfeiting coins as well as implied contracts with the Federal Government.
The key facts are as follows: (more…)
by Dennis Crouch
Speck v. Bates, No. 23-1147 (Fed. Cir. May 23, 2024)
In likely one of the last interference proceeding appeals, the Federal Circuit has applied a “two-way test” to determine whether pre-critical date claims and post-critical date claims are “materially different” under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 135(b)(1). The court found that Bates’ post-critical date claims in its U.S. Patent Application No. 14/013,591 were time-barred because they were materially different from Bates’ pre-critical date claims.
Although the decision is based upon an interference proceeding, the same provision is found within the new version of 135(b) that covers (more…)
by Dennis Crouch
In a recent decision, the Federal Circuit vacated a district court’s grant of summary judgment that an inventor, Dr. Mark Core, had automatically assigned a patent associated with his PhD thesis to his then-employer and education funder TRW. Core Optical Techs., LLC v. Nokia Corp., Nos. 23-1001 (Fed. Cir. May 21, 2024). The key issue was whether Dr. Core developed the patented invention “entirely on [his] own time” under his employment agreement. The majority opinion written by Judge Taranto and joined by Judge Dyk held the contract language was ambiguous on this point and remanded for further factual development to determine the parties’ intent. Judge Mayer dissented.
Although not discussed in the court’s decision, the appellant brief includes a suggestion that the Federal Circuit should “narrow or overrule” the automatic assignment law seen in FilmTec Corp. v. Allied Signal, Inc., 939 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1991), and its progeny (more…)
by Dennis Crouch
In its new petition for certiorari in Cellect LLC v. Vidal, No. __ (U.S. May 20, 2024), Cellect argues that the Federal Circuit erred in upholding the PTAB’s (PTAB) invalidation of Cellect’s four patents based on the judicially-created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting (ODP). The key issue is whether ODP can cut short the patent term extension provided by the Patent Term Adjustment (PTA) statute, 35 U.S.C. § 154(b). Meanwhile, Dir. Vidal is looking to extend the power of ODP via rulemaking. This is an important case coming at an important time. (more…)
By Dennis Crouch
Two people cannot wear the same sock (at least at the same time) but they can think the same thought, sing the same song, or undergo the same medical procedure. As Thomas Jefferson famously put it, part of the ‘peculiar character’ of an idea is that ‘no one possesses the less, because every other possesses the whole of it.’
This quote from Professor James Stern’s new article introduces the conventional view that ideas and information are nonrivalrous, in contrast to the rivalrous nature of tangible goods. As an idea based creation, intellectual property’s nonrivalrous nature has always placed it on airy ground as a statutory creation rather than a natural law. The rivalrous nature of real and personal property has justified property regimes, but for IP we have always needed additional justification and additional limits because propertization creates artificial scarcity. But Stern’s new article bucks the conventional wisdom and instead argues that the nonrivalry of IP is a myth. James Y. Stern, Intellectual Property and the Myth of Nonrivalry, 99 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1163 (2024). Although many economists assume that more information is better, Stern makes clear that is not always true. He writes “it seems a safe bet that there are substantial numbers of people who would prefer the human race had never come up with such novelties as land mines, cigarettes, cargo shorts, Jet Skis, genetically modified foods, anabolic steroids, robocallers, date-rape drugs, subwoofers, Ponzi schemes, and crystal meth, to name just a few.”
Stern’s article challenges the widely held belief that information goods are inherently nonrivalrous, and that this characteristic distinguishes them from tangible property. He argues that the concept of rivalry, properly understood, encompasses not just conflicts between two active uses of a resource, but also conflicts where one person wants to use a resource and another simply wants that person to refrain from doing so. This broader conception of rivalry in terms of wants and desires, Stern contends, is relevant to many situations involving intellectual property. One Stern’s key insights is that preferences to control and restrict access to ideas and information are ubiquitous, extending well beyond the domain of intellectual property law. He points to examples such as privacy laws, testimonial privileges, classified information and state secrets laws, and the Federal Witness Protection Program as evidence that conflicts over controlling access to information are common and demonstrate the potential for rivalrousness when it comes to ideas and information. This insight serves to challenge the notion that the nonrivalrous nature of information goods necessarily means that granting exclusive rights over them is unjustified or socially harmful.
The article also examines how the characterization of intellectual property rights as “monopolies” has shaped legal doctrine, such as the Supreme Court’s reliance on the “public rights doctrine” to uphold adjudication of patent validity in administrative proceedings. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018). Stern suggests that this rhetoric traces partly to the view that information goods differ fundamentally from physical property due to their supposed nonrivalry.
Although the article is not patent focused, Stern’s arguments have significant implications for patent law by undermining a key justification for limiting the scope and strength of patent protection. If rivalrousness is possible for patented inventions, then the case for treating patents as a form of property is stronger. An example application here could be eBay and the role of damages and injunctions in patent cases. Similarly, with respect to patent term, Stern’s article raises questions about the appropriate duration of patent rights. If the justification for time-limited patent rights rests partly on the assumption that inventions are nonrivalrous and therefore do not require permanent exclusivity, then recognizing the potential for rivalrousness in the use of inventions may suggest a need to reconsider the optimal term length. At the same time, concerns about dynamic efficiency and the importance of promoting follow-on innovation may still counsel in favor of limiting the duration of patent rights, even if some degree of rivalrousness is present. Consider also double patenting, that is designed to ensure that the public should have access to the invention upon expiration of the patent. See In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
Although I have not fully bought into his ideas, professor Stern has done a great job challenging us to rethink core aspects of intellectual property law. Many courts, especially members of the Supreme Court, have long seen intellectual property as inherently suspect without any inherent value other than the incentive to innovate. Stern’s article grapples with this argument that and highlights the need for a more nuanced understanding of the interests at stake.
by Dennis Crouch
In a new Appeals Review Panel (ARP), the USPTO has clarified the Office’s position on means plus function claims — explaining that the specification need not describe statutory equivalents to satisfy the written description requirement. The outcome here shows value for the intentional use of means-plus-function limitations as a mechanism for expanding patent scope when genus claims are otherwise unavailable.
Still the court maintained the written description rejection on other grounds — finding that the broad preamble “method of treating a patient” to be limiting and not adequately supported by the specification. Perhaps on remand the patentee will amend the preamble to instead claim a “means of treating a patient.” (more…)
