PTAB Strategy: Balancing the Sandbagging

by Dennis Crouch

The Federal Circuit’s recent Axonics decision reflects an ongoing tension between IPR petitioners and patent owners concerning litigation strategies and procedural fairness. A prevalent patentee strategy aims to force the petitioner to lock in specific arguments, only to provide a game-changing response later on.

In Axonics, the patentee offered a new claim construction proposal in its post-institution response. On appeal, the Federal Circuit determined that it was only just, and mandated by the APA, for the petitioner to present new responsive arguments and evidence in its reply briefing. Additionally, the court suggested that the patentee should then have the opportunity to submit further evidence in a sur-reply. The PTAB had adopted the patentee’s claim construction proposal and refused to consider Axonics reply arguments and evidence — finding them to represent improper new arguments.  The Federal Circuit vacated that decision and sent the case back down for reconsideration.

Sandbagging Risk and the Need for Balance

In his opinion for the court, Judge Dyk quotes from the oral argument transcript after getting an admission from Medtronic’s attorney (Naveen Modi from Paul Hastings) that the PTAB approach risks sandbagging by the patentee:

The Court: “But isn’t there a risk here of sandbagging, that you realize there’s a good claim construction argument, [and] you leave it out of your preliminary response. If you argued it in your preliminary response, then maybe institution would be denied and there would
be no estoppel. But if you hold back on the argument and wait to make it until the response, then you get the estoppel. Isn’t there a risk of that?”

Medtronic’s counsel: “Certainly, your honor, there is a risk of that . . . .”

Oral Arg. at 14:24–51.  Modi went on to explain that the risk could also affect the petitioner. The new rule permits the petitioner to provide an unreasonable initial claim construction, then present new evidence later if challenged. Here, the court explicitly concluded that petitioners are not bound to preemptively address all potential reasonable claim interpretations.

Important Caveats and Ongoing Questions

The case has some important caveats regarding what argument/evidence can be provided in reply.  The court made clear that a petitioner cannot raise entirely new prior art references in a reply to a patent owner’s response: “a petitioner may not in reply rely on new prior art to teach a claim limitation.”  And, the court refused to decide an intermediary question of whether the petitioner can rely upon “new embodiments” from the already presented prior art in order to counter a new claim construction proposal. “We leave for another day the question of whether, when presented with a new claim construction, a petitioner can rely in its reply on new embodiments from the prior art references that were relied on in the petition.”  That particular situation was not at issue because “Axonics, in the reply, relied on the same embodiments as it relied on in the petition.”

In essence, while a petitioner cannot introduce entirely new prior art references in a reply, it remains an open question whether new portions or embodiments from the same preexisting references can be cited to address a new claim construction proposed post-institution.

Striking a Middle Course

In this frame, the decision shows the Federal Circuit steering a middle course – allowing petitioners to respond to changed claim constructions with arguments tied to the same prior art, while prohibiting entirely new prior art in replies. Ongoing cases will likely continue to shape the precise boundaries between fair response and improper new arguments in this contentious field.

Citation: Axonics, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 2022-1532 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 7, 2023) (opinion by Judge Dyk, joined by Judges Lourie and Taranto).

In July 2023, the same panel released a separate decision involving the same parties and also siding with the petitioner Axonics in holding that Board erred in its obviousness analysis by improperly framing the motivation-to-combine inquiry. [LINK]

The result: Although the Board sided with the patentee on the four challenged patents, the Federal Circuit vacated those holdings and given the petitioner another chance to prove its case. and See U.S. Patent Nos. 8,036,756, 8,457,758, 8,626,314, and 8,738,148.  As with most Medtronic patents, the inventions are super interesting. One set relates to implanting a neurostimulation lead and the second set relates to transcutaneous charging of implanted medical devices.

10 thoughts on “PTAB Strategy: Balancing the Sandbagging

  1. 2

    “In Axonics, the patentee offered a new claim construction proposal in its post-institution response. ”

    Why is this permitted at all? Not saying there could never be circumstances where it’s permitted but why should the patentee be allowed in any context (IPR, prosecution, reissue, litigation) to change a definition of a claim term that the patentee itself provided under oath earlier in a proceeding? The patentee — the owner of the right — should have a belief about what its own claims mean. That belief may turn out to be wrong but it shouldn’t be the case that the patentee can just switch horses like a religion, simply because it feels like it needs a change.

    1. 2.1

      I think you are being too harsh on the patentee (shockers).

      There are easily plenty or reasons why a particular assertion might no longer be valid (including situations in which the patent holder may no longer be allowed to maintain an earlier assertion.

      One can easily envisage a finding of facts/law by a tribunal (for example) that would dictate that an earlier assertion being wrong simply cannot be maintained.

      But hey, this is Malcolm, who insists (in the best gaslighting mode) that he is not anti-patent….

      1. 2.1.1

        There’s always going to be estoppel and similar phenomena any time a party, either a patentee or a defendant/petitioner tries to walk back an earlier argument. Nothing new there.

        Also, in this case (Axionics/Medtronic), I think it’s important to note that Medtronic was offer CC arguments in the IPR for the first time in the POR. So it wasn’t like they were backtracking from arguments made earlier in a POPR. Had the latter been true, then I would tend to agree they shouldn’t be allowed to disown the initial set of arguments so easily.

        1. 2.1.1.1

          Sure – I don’t see a problem with sometimes having it difficult for a party to disown their position.

          But that is just not the tone that Malcolm strikes out here with.

        2. 2.1.1.2

          koto “ I think it’s important to note that Medtronic was offer CC arguments in the IPR for the first time in the POR. So it wasn’t like they were backtracking from arguments made earlier in a POPR.”

          Thanks for clarifying. The post was confusing when it referred to a “new” claim construction presented by Medtronics after institution.

          I will say that it seems odd to allow the patentee to oppose institution (which I assume Medtronics did) without the patentee construing ALL claim terms that were construed by the petitioner in the request for IPR and any constructions of elements that the petitioner intends to rely on to avoid the art cited in the request.

          1. 2.1.1.2.2

            Why would that seem odd to you?

            You seem to want to try the case prior to the case even being instituted.

            … unless you are changing your view of when an IPR ‘starts’…

  2. 1

    Here, the court explicitly concluded that petitioners are not bound to preemptively address all potential reasonable claim interpretations.

    Excuse me, but I do believe that Congress fully intended otherwise.

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