In 2018, the Supreme Court's 7-2 decision in Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene's Energy Group, LLC, 584 U.S. 325 (2018) affirmed the constitutionality of inter partes review (IPR) proceedings. The Court held that patents are "public rights" and thus may be canceled through congressionally authorized administrative proceedings without violating Article III or the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. This decision was a significant win for proponents of the America Invents Act (AIA) and those seeking to use the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) as an efficient mechanism to cancel issued patents.
Fast forward to 2024, and a number of us were watching the non-patent case of SEC v. Jarkesy, 144 S. Ct. 2117 (2024), wondering if it might destabilize Oil States. Jarkesy indeed narrowed the scope of what qualifies as a "public right," potentially reopening the debate on the constitutionality of IPRs.
In Neonode Smartphone LLC v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., the Federal Circuit has reversed Judge Albright's holding that claims of Neonode's US8095879 are invalid as indefinite. No. 2023-2304 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 20, 2024) (non-precedential). The appellate panel concluded that Albright failed to properly consider the full context of the intrinsic record, particularly the prosecution history.
I have written several times about the Chestek case regarding notice-and-comment requirements under the APA. A second notice-and-comment case is also pending before the Federal Circuit, potentially having a much greater impact on patent practice. The case, Apple v. Vidal, focuses on IPR discretionary denials, which the USPTO implemented as policy without any formal rulemaking notice-and-comment.
The recent Federal Circuit decision in Platinum Optics v. Viavi Solutions focuses attention once again on the case-and-controversy requirement derived from Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which extends federal judicial power to "Cases" and "Controversies."
The seemingly simple phrase has been the subject of extensive judicial jockeying in the development of the doctrine we know as "standing."
Voice Tech Corp. v. Unified Patents, LLC, No. 2022-2163 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 1, 2024)
Unified Patents is paid by its members to fight against non-practicing entity (NPE) patent assertions -- often by challenge patent validity via inter partes review. In this case, Unified challenged Voice Tech's U.S. Patent No. 10,491,679 which covers technology for controlling a computer via a mobile device using voice commands. At the conclusion of the IPR, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) sided with Unified - finding all challenged claims (1-8) of the '679 patent unpatentable as obvious over the combination of two prior art references, Wong and Beauregard. The PTAB also denied Voice Tech's request for rehearing. On appeal, the patentee won a minor battle on waiver, but ultimately lost on the merits.
This is our second discussion of collateral estoppel in as many days. Yesterday I wrote about Koss v. Bose, a case where the Federal Circuit concluded that a district court's final judgment of invalidity had a preclusive effect on USPTO IPR analysis -- rendering the patentee Koss's appeal moot. Today's focus is on SoftView v. Apple, and a focus on the USPTO's estoppel regulations as they apply between an IPR and reexamination proceeding. Case No 23-1005 (Fed. Cir. July 26, 2024).
The Federal Circuit's 2023 decision in Axonics, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc. marked an important change in inter partes review procedure, ensuring petitioners have an opportunity to respond patentee's newly proposed arguments, with the hope of discouraging patent owners from holding-back ("sandbagging") at the institution stage. Case-in-point is the Federal Circuit's recent Apple v. Omni MedSci decision authored by Judge Alan D. Albright sitting by designation.
The USPTO recently released yet another Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) -- this one focusing on codification of IPR/PGR rules associated with non-merits based "discretionary denials" of institution as well as termination due to settlement. This is a controversial area because of that word 'discretion.' Unrestricted discretion by government officials is concerning because of the potential for arbitrary or biased decisions, lacking transparency and accountability. In that frame, these rules are beneficial because they structure and limit discretion - hopefully making the outcomes more predictable and justifiable. A key note - the rules here focus primarily on procedure (separate briefing for discretionary denials) and substantive issues relating to parallel, serial, and cumulative petitions. Although this is an important step, they do not address discretionary denials associated with parallel litigation (or other outside factors) under Fintiv and subsequent director guidance. This is likely the most controversial area of discretionary denials that is being left out for now.
Congress clearly intended the USPTO to have substantial discretion
Douglas Dynamics v. Meyer Prods (W.D. Wisc 2017) [2017-04-18 (68) Order re post IPR invalidity defenses].After Douglas sued Meyer for infringing its U.S. Patent No. 6,928,757 (Snowplow mounting assembly), Meyer petition for inter partes review -- alleging that several of the claims were invalid. Although the "director" iniated the review, the PTAB eventually sided with the patentee - reaffirming the validity of the claims.
Back at the district court, Douglass asked the court to apply the estoppel provisions that of Section 315(e)(e):
The petitioner in an inter partes review ... that results in a final written decision under section 318(a) . . . may not assert . . . in a civil action arising [under the patent laws] . . . that the claim is invalid on any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during that inter partes review.
35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2). The question for the district court here, was the scope of estoppel - what constitutes grounds that were "raised or reasonably could have [been] raised" during the IPR. Here, the court took a position for fairly strong estoppel:
If the defendant pursues the IPR option, it cannot expect to hold a second-string invalidity case in reserve in case the IPR does not go defendant’s way. In many patent cases, particularly those involving well-developed arts, there is an abundance of prior art with which to make out an arguable invalidity case, so it would be easy to have a secondary set of invalidity contentions ready to go. The court will interpret the estoppel provision in § 315(e)(2) to preclude this defense strategy. Accordingly, the court will construe the statutory language “any ground that the petitioner . . . reasonably could have raised during that inter partes review” to include non-petitioned grounds that the defendant chose not to present in its petition to PTAB.
In Shaw Industries Group, Inc. v. Automated Creel Systems, Inc., 817 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir.), the Federal Circuit wrote in dicta that no estoppel should apply to grounds that were petitioned, but not instituted. The Wisconsin court here suggested some potential problems with that outcome, but decided to follow the CAFC's lead, writing:
So until Shaw is limited or reconsidered, this court will not apply § 315(e)(2) estoppel to [petitioned but] non-instituted grounds, but it will apply § 315(e)(2) estoppel to grounds not asserted in the IPR petition, so long as they are based on prior art that could have been found by a skilled searcher's diligent search.
What this means for the defendant here is that the only 102/103 arguments that it gets to raise are ones already deemed total failures by the PTAB - and thus are unlikely winners before a district court.
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Of some importance, the PTAB's final written decision was released in November 2016. For estoppel purposes, that final decision is all that is required for estoppel to kick-in. However, the case currently on appeal to the Federal Circuit -- already giving the defendant its second bite at the apple.
After Douglas sued Meyer for infringing its