Enhanced Damages: The Seagate Objectively Reckless Standard is Now a Question of Law to be Decided by a Judge and Reviewed De Novo on Appeal

By Dennis Crouch

Bard Peripheral v. W.L.Gore (Fed. Cir. 2012) (on rehearing)

In an important decision, the Federal Circuit has ruled that the “objective prong” of the test for willful patent infringement is a separate question of law. Moving forward, it will be the trial court’s duty to determine whether the defendant’s actions were objectively reckless. Further, the objective prong will now be subject to de novo review on appeal.

This new system somewhat parallels the judge-determined claim construction that must occur before a jury can determine infringement. As with claim construction, this new judge-focused sub-test will likely drive results in most cases. Because it will be prior-in-time, the judicial decision on objective recklessness will filter-out many willfulness allegations before they reach the jury. And the jury, once it is told that the judge has determined the behavior objectively reckless, is likely to find any infringed patent to be willfully infringed.

Right to Jury: The right to a jury decision on the issue of willfulness already stood on shaky foundation because, by statute, the judge decides the monetary award. The changes in the law brought about here in Bard coupled with those outlined in Seagate suggest that right may now be fully eroded. Further, the decision suggests that it may be proper to treat the entire issue of willfulness as a question of law.

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Treble Damages: The text of the Patent Act appears to provide courts with broad power to treble any damages awarded. The statute reads that “the court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.” Although the text offers no limitation on that power, the Federal Circuit has limited the use of enhanced damages to only apply when the adjudged infringement is found to be willful. In Seagate, the Federal Circuit defined a two-prong test for willfulness that requires clear and convincing evidence (1) “that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent” and (2) that the infringer had knowledge (or should have known) of this risk.

Willfulness is a question of fact that has been traditionally decided by a jury. However, as the statute suggests, it is the judge who determines the extent of any enhanced damages (with the limit of three-times the compensatory damage award). Here, the infringer argued that a court (rather than a jury) should first decide the sub-question of whether there existed (at the time of the infringement) an objectively high-likelihood that the infringer’s action’s constituted infringement. The appellate court agreed:

After reviewing the Supreme Court’s precedent in similar contexts, as well as our own, we conclude that simply stating that willfulness is a question of fact over-simplifies the issue. While the ultimate question of willfulness based on an assessment of the second prong of Seagate may be a question of fact, Seagate also requires a threshold determination of objective recklessness. That determination entails an objective assessment of potential defenses based on the risk presented by the patent. Those defenses may include questions of infringement but also can be expected in almost every case to entail questions of validity that are not necessarily dependent on the factual circumstances of the particular party accused of infringement.

In considering the standard applicable to the objective prong of Seagate, it can be appreciated that “the decision to label an issue a ‘question of law,’ a ‘question of fact,’ or a ‘mixed question of law and fact’ is sometimes as much a matter of allocation as it is of analysis.” Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1985). When an “issue falls some-where between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact, the fact/law distinction at times has turned on a determination that, as a matter of sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in question.” Id. at 114; see also Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996) (applying this test to determine that claim construction is best left to the judge). We believe that the court is in the best position for making the determination of reasonableness. This court therefore holds that the objective determination of recklessness, even though predicated on underlying mixed questions of law and fact, is best decided by the judge as a question of law subject to de novo review.

On remand, the district court will be required to specifically consider the question of objective recklessness.

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Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard for a Question of Law?: Seagate requires that objective recklessness be proven with clear and convincing evidence. As the en banc court wrote in 2007 “to establish willful infringement, a patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent.” Normally, clear-and-convincing evidence is a standard for proving facts. Here in Bard, however, the court now holds that the objective recklessness prong is a question of law. Since the panel here has no power to modify Seagate, the odd joining of these decisions is that the issue of law must still be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In a concurring opinion to the i4i decision, Supreme Court Justice Breyer wrote on this topic – noting that the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof “applies to questions of fact and not to questions of law.” The panel opinion here in Bard either did not recognize this problem or chose to ignore it. The tension here between Seagate and Bard is genuine.

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The majority opinion was written Judge Gajarsa (Senior Judge) and joined by Judge Linn. Judge Newman wrote in dissent and argued that there was no need for a remand because the jury willfulness determination was clearly wrong.

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This case has been brewing for 38 years! Initially it was an inventorship dispute that took 28 years to settle at the PTO, followed by a litigation battle for the past 8 years. The patent covers a prosthetic vascular graft used in bypass surgeries and was originally filed as an application in 1974. U.S. Patent No. 6,436,135.

529 thoughts on “Enhanced Damages: The Seagate Objectively Reckless Standard is Now a Question of Law to be Decided by a Judge and Reviewed De Novo on Appeal

  1. 528

    What arrogance that you make demands of others

    I’m pretty sure that I have less arrogance than you who makes questions of others and still as of yet, now greater than a month out has FAILED to provide answers (read that as not merely responses, but answers) to Anon’s questions.

    He had even politely called you out on it and said point blank that what you did was not enough and that he was still expecting answers.

    It’s pretty arrogant of you to say that you will answer each and every question, and then hide behind fallacious responses.

    So Ned, prove your “non-arrogance” and finally deliver the answers you promised so long ago.

  2. 527

    ” I will not repeat post I’ve made to generic-term, moniker posters again and again and again and again for your amusement.”

    Mr. I post under my real Name:

    The only post you have repeated “again and again” is a post saying you have already made the post. Pathetic!!! In the time it took to claim you made the post you could have simply provided the citation to the “holding”! And even if you claim you have already made it in this thread you could have simply posted the date and time link so all could look it up. But nooooooo…you can’t and you won’t because you are a dishonest lying , shillling, charlatan, POS, that can’t back up what you say.

    The FACT is the Prometheus Court NEVER held that conflating 101, 102, 103, and 112, or ANY combination thereof was now the law of the land.

    Debate over.

    You lose.

    EVERYONE ELSE WINS!

  3. 525

    See from this very thread:

    On Jun 19, 2012 at 08:31 AM:

    Duplicity, thy name is Ned said in reply to Ned Heller…

    Why is it that Ned Heller clings so tightly to this imagined distinction between holding and dicta in Chakrabarty and yet ignores that very difference and places strict measure on the dicta from Bilski on the exact turn of phrase regarding eligibility?

    The holding in Bilski was clear and unequivocal: what Bilski claimed was abstract. Any discussion there on business method eligibility of that particular claim, any “carefully chosen wording,” was dicta, as once the holding of “abstract” was in place, all else could fall away.

    And yet Ned repeatedly demands an unholy allegiance to the exact turn of phrase in Bilski (and further, conflates the phrase from the singular to the entire group category; but that’s a tale already well told).

    And yet, here concerning Chakrabarty, where the turn of phrase is far less convoluted, Ned wants to clench his eyes tight, stick his fingers in his ears, and chant at the top of his lungs “Holding Holding Holding.”

    Admitting to the Court holding the very belief that dismisses his point of view, he clamors for a holding, as if what the Court clearly and steadfastly believed is somehow not good enough.

    and then in reply on Jun 19, 2012 at 10:03 AM

    Ned Heller said in reply to Duplicity, thy name is Ned…

    Mr. duplicity, good point there about Bilski. The actual holding the case was that the claims were abstract. The discussion about a business method exclusion was in response to the Stevens “dissent”.

    Shock and dismay what the holding was. Unless of course you have known all along that your arguments to the contrary for the past two and a half years were based entirely on less-than-dicta (being as it is mostly based on Steven’s “dissent” which does not even qualify as dicta)….

    So which is it Ned? Fool or Liar? Your choice.

  4. 524

    Tranlation:

    Ned finds it more than annoying when his posts receive scrutiny that reveals that he his making things up.

    He thinks it is ridiculous that he would have to actually check things out before he posts. He thinks it is ridiculous that reality should get in the way of his version of how things “are.”

    btw, have you even read the Sweet decision yet? Are you even a lawyer?

  5. 522

    Mr. Hold, I think you know where to get off, and you know where to shove it.  

    What arrogance that you make demands of others but never, not once, support your own views with any authority.

    Take a flying leap.

  6. 520

    Reminds me of the time that Ned had no clue that the CAFC version of Tafas had been vacated and he thought it was still good law.

    It was only the top patent news story of the time. How was Ned to know what was going on?

  7. 519

    do not win arguments with grandiose proclamations backed up with nothing but insults and evasion

    Good enough for Malcolm. He is not about actually winning arguments. He is only about winning arguments in his own mind.

    You forgot about the part of him being a self-centered pr1ck (and the related over-compensation factors).

  8. 518

    What is the holding in Benson?

    Does this help:

    We do not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements of our prior precedents. It is said that the decision precludes a patent for any program servicing a computer. We do not so hold.

  9. 517

    WHEN ONE BREAKS THE LAW AND IS CANNED BECAUSE HE WAS TRYING TO STEAL HER PATENT CLAIMS, THE CLIENT SHOULD BE TOLD THAT ANOTHER LOLOLOL ATTY.. BUT NOW TRULY A REAL LIFE AGENT( NOT ONE THAT TELLS HER HE IS HER ATTY BUT REALLY ISN’T) BUT NOW ONE THAT DOESN’T TELL HER HE IS NOW HER AGENT BECAUSE OF WHAT THE OTHER DID. AND NOW HE TOO MADE HER LIFE AN EVEN BIGGER H@LL. TOO BAD YOU DIDN’T DO IT CORRECTLY. MM/MCCRACKIN. IF I WAS TOLD I WOULD HAVE REALIZED WHAT WAS GOING ON. NOW THE FILES WILL HAVE TO BE RETURNED TO ME BY BOTH OF YOU.. AND FINALLY THE TRADEMARK FILE WILL BE MINE AND YOU WILL NOW BE IN A BOX! PUFFFFFFFFFFFFFF!

  10. 516

    I think that you are right. Ned is playing the dance all over the place game instead of simply giving the holding. A sure sign that he either does not know what the holding is or has been caught in yet another L I E about case law in his attempted crusade against computers and the software arts.

  11. 515

    quoted the opinion

    Great. Wonderful. Excellent.

    Only thing is no one is asking you to quote the opinion. People are asking you to give the holding.

    Do you recognize the difference between an opinion and the holding?

    Are you even a lawyer?

  12. 514

    Why should I respond to people who don’t even know what prior art is?

    Easy. To prove you know what the holding is.

    After two and half years of your prolific arguing on Bilski, you just recently realized what the holdin was in that case.

    Let’s save two and a half years of additional prolific posting by making sure you know what the holding is in Benson before you concoct some wild-@ss theories based on nothing more than Ned-created dicta.

    Sounds like a win for all involved.

  13. 513

    Have you even seen his decision?

    Look at Section V, pages 94-124.

  14. 512

    you are annoyingly stu **pid.

    So says the guy who employs a legal argument of defining the answer he wants to prove.

    If such were allowed, no one would ever lose any arguments. “I define that I am right.”

  15. 511

    difference in kind” was established in Parke-Davis by Learned Hand to distinguish purified adrenaline from the prior art extracted adrenaline.

    Close but a small error: it was to distinguish the claimed invention from the Product of Nature. The fact that other extracted adrenaline existed is a red herring.

  16. 510

    I hear people saying the same thing about Ned Heller. There is no way that guy is even an attorney.

  17. 509

    They are certainly part of the equation.

    No, they are not. No one on either side has that item as an issue. The court treats it as a non-issue. Only you in your grasping at straws have introduced it as an issue. You are trying to kick dust while standing in a swamp.

    It looks downright foolish.

  18. 508

    Mr. sock puppet, since you are a know it all, one as you tell us how Sweet viewed Parke-Davis?  Quote the language that supports your view.

  19. 507

    Mr. Mr. good advice, "difference in kind" was established in Parke-Davis by Learned Hand to distinguish purified adrenaline from the prior art extracted adrenaline.

  20. 501

    Mr. sock puppet, I have quoted the relevant passages of Prometheus a number of times to generic-term, moniker posters.  Since I cannot tell who you are I will assume that every one of you is the same person.  I will not repeat post I've made to generic-term, moniker posters again and again and again and again for your amusement.

  21. 500

    Mr.'s Annihilation, your notion of what constitutes prior art is so ludicrous and bizarre that it is more than obvious that not only are you not an patent attorney or patent agent, you are more probably a rascally urchin trolling this for them for your amusement.

  22. 498

    since the “doctrine” exists only in your tiny mind.

    Another prediction MM? That the Product of Nature doctrine is not real?

    Chakrbarty wants a word with you.

  23. 497

    What Ned won’t tell you: the holding was that themathematical equation pre-empted all uses of themath ans was therefore a claim onthe math itself. A claim on math is abstract, and thus not patant eligible.

    That’s it.

    There is no HOLDING on computers. Ned’s view that Rich challenged the holding of Benson is pure hornswaggle.

  24. 496

    Even Sweet recognized it as such.

    Twice in on eday an absolutely cllueless comment. which only goes to show that you have not read teh Sweet decision at all. For if you had, you kow tha tyou could not have made the statement you just have.

  25. 495

    Mr. day, with all due respect, “a difference in kind” is required when considering whether a claim compositions patentable over the prior art

    No Ned. A difference is needed for patentability over prior art. Difference in kind is a term of art. You have been misusing the term of art all day today. It shows a vast ignorance of the entire subject matter.

    I suggest you retire from posting until you can learn just what it is that you are posting about.

  26. 494

    by definition.

    What a schmuck. Trying to define the very thing to be proven.

  27. 493

    Do you want me to re-quote the opinion?

    Why would you think I want that when you have been asked several times strictly for the holding without you radditional frolics.

    Give the holding and ONLY the holding.

  28. 492

    And what part of that was the holding. Rmember holding is only tha twhich is necesary (hint no computer was invoved in the holding).

  29. 491

    The extracted adrenaline was HELD not be known or prior art based on the fact that it was different in kind.

    Are you seriously having brain lessions?

    Your statemetn proves my point. Held = different in kind = NOT product of nature. Product of natuer was known. ergo, prior art is meaningless and the holding is that the item was allowed to be patented over the PRoduct of Nature because it was differetn in kind.

  30. 490

    How are these well known bacteria having well known properties not prior art to the claimed invention?

    It’s not the right question. No one has ever said the “atarting materials” is part of the equation.

  31. 489

    starting materials

    You do realize that the claimed invention, the nonstarting materials was different in kind as was NOT prior art.

    The converstaion has never been about “starting materials”.

    YOu are not even in the right ballpark on this conversation.

    Are you even a lawyer?

  32. 488
    Let me off at "I already cited the exact passage in Prometheus and that's why I cant cite it right right now." says:

    “I read you chapter and verse from Prometheus where that theory was rejected.”

    LOL. No you did not.

    Funny how you always have time to say you already did though. lol 🙂

    “Where do you get off?”

    The same imaginary place you and MM go when asked to cite the holding in Prometheus.

  33. 487

    Ms.  Ann N. Hilarious, 

    We will agree that the inventor created something new FROM the starting materials which we should also agree were well known bacteria having specific well known properties.

    How are these well known bacteria having well known properties not prior art to the claimed invention?

    I believe that Parke-Davis established the proposition that to be patentable over known prior art compositions, the claimed compositions must be different in kind for novelty purposes.

    Why wasn't then Chakrabarty about prior art?  Why was it converted into a case about a previously non existent product of nature exception?  It appears that the Supreme Court may have made a serious error.

     

  34. 486

    Rich separate doors doctrine?  

    I read you chapter and verse from Prometheus where that theory was rejected.  Where do you get off?

  35. 485

    Mr. Hand, you truly are a strange animal.  Your skill is green and you have antennas.  What planet do you hail from?

    Your post here is so off the wall as to be beyond humorous:

    "The extracted adrenaline was HELD not be known or prior art based on the fact that it was different in kind. Adrenaline of a different kind was known. You are confusing yourself."

  36. 484

    Mr. Planet, Alright, cite the case, any Art. III court case other than Myriad, where a claimed invention was held unpatentable because it was directed to a product of nature.  It should be easy, as you say the exception exists.

    Do not cite dicta, or any case citing another case for authority.  Cite a case that makes the holding.

    Please.

  37. 483

    Chakrabarty’s invention involved new bacteria and plasmid combinations that may have had known strating materials but the invention was not the starting materials. It was what he did with the oold starting materials that created something different in kind that was not known or prior art.

    You are 0-2 on these cases.

  38. 482

    Mr. Heller:

    The Prometheus Court has already ruled and you have lost.

    And there is no petition to the Supreme Court for any case arguing 101 and 112 should be combined or conflated.

    So you have no opportunity for future victories.

    Couple the above facts with the Congress not making any changes to the Rich separate doors doctrine in the AIA, and it’s clear this battle is over before the war could even begin

  39. 481

    The extracted adrenaline was HELD not be known or prior art based on the fact that it was different in kind. Adrenaline of a different kind was known. You are confusing yourself.

    Get the case right.

  40. 480

    there is no product of nature exception. There is no 101 issue

    The courts say differently.

  41. 478

    Only you would know, suckie, since the “doctrine” exists only in your tiny mind.

  42. 477

    Test?

    The markedly different test was required historically because the starting material we prior art.  They were also in Chakrabarty.

    Test?

    The dicta I point to is the statement by the court that the claims defined over any product of nature.  How did they know that?  All they knew that they defined over the specific known bacteria, which were products of nature.

    This is the problem with Chakrabarty, everything they said about products of nature, everything, is dicta.

    As Hand said in Parke-Davis, the purified adrenalin there was markedly different from the known extracted adrenaline.  This was a novelty issue.  Even Sweet recognized it as such.

    The problem with Chakrabarty was that they converted a prior art issue under 102 into a statutory subject matter issue under 101.  They simply assumed there was a product of nature exception when there was no prior authority anywhere for such an exception — except, of course, In re Latimer.

  43. 476

    Parke-Davis, the inventor was invited to assist in purifying adrenaline from extracted adrenaline, something the extractors had been unable to accomplish for years.  He did so.  Extracted adrenaline was known.  That is why it was prior art.  

    Chakrabarty involved man made incorporations of existing materials from known bacteria into a new bacteria.

    In both cases, the starting materials were publicly known and prior art.

    You statements that they are not prior art are ridiculous.

  44. 475

    I am sorry, you are still pretending not to get it.  

    The point is, there is no product of nature exception.  There is no 101 issue.

  45. 473

    Holding: I've quoted it many times.  In essence, mathematical are like laws of nature, unpatentable subject matter.  To be patentable, they must be applied to a new and useful end…  The claims in Benson were not so limited, but could be applied to any end use, and were not limited to a specific machine.

    Do you want me to re-quote the opinion?

  46. 472

    Ned, It was critical to the result, because it was the very test that gave the result.

    It was not dicta. It was holding.

  47. 471

    Parke-Davis — extracted adrenaline was known.

    Um, no. The extracted adrenaline was different in kind and thus was not known or considered prior art.

    Chakrabarty — the prior art bacteria were known

    Um, no. Ditto, Chakrabarty was cosniders soemthing new and not known of considerd prior art.

    For at least these two cases the HOLDING was that the Product of Nature and the invention were different in kind and that the prior art argument was inapposite, since the the one was not prior art to the other.

    Each time you lean back to “prior art” you lean back in error.

    You are applying the wrong doctrine.

  48. 470

    a) You can’t get a patent on the red soil because it is a product of nature, A.K.A. God. You, nor any other man made the red soil, thus it is product of nature and an exception to patentable subject matter

    b) You can get a patent on the pots, jugs, and dishes as articles of manufacture providing they are novel and non obvious. You can also get a design patent if the shape and look is truly unique.

    c) Yes you can get a patent for making the pots, jugs and dishes out of the red soil providing the process is novel and non obvious. For example a manufacturing process would be as follows

    1. Putting the red soil in a mold

    2. Placing the mold with the soil in an oven

    3. Monitoring the temperature

    4. Determining when the temperature in the oven has reached a certain degree

    5. Removing the mold from the oven

    6. Allowing the mode to cool for a specified amount of time before removing the pots, jugs, and dishes.

    You can even get the above process patent if all the steps are old but step number 4 is a new thought.

    Now, a composition process is not as easy to get. For example simply taking the red dirt made by nature and mixing it with brown dirt and water made by nature would run a foul of the products by nature exception. The red dirt, brown dirt and water is part of the warehouse of nature and must remain accessible to all men. The composition itself is not enough. Just like the correlation in Prometheus is not enough. The composition, like the correlation is still a product of nature. Although you could still get a patent on the product made with the composition of red dirt, brown dirt, and water, using a product by process claim, providing that the finished product is novel and non obvious.

    Most important to remember is the reason you can’t get a patent on the composition itself in this case is because all the elements are made by God, A.K.A. Nature.

    Thomas Miller Ph.D Harvard
    Product of Nature Expert

  49. 469

    MM,

    You realize of course that you have not addressed the “real point” that you cannot differentiate the man-made from the Product of Nature, right?

    Such a simple thing and it sinks anyone trying to patent Products of Nature…

  50. 468

    what if the old composition isn’t actually discovered prior to the application being filed?

    Then it’s patentable.

    How do you enforce it?

  51. 467

    Ned,

    I agree with Try Again. Let’s take this a step at a time. What is the holding in Benson?

  52. 466

    MM, Are you the king of pouncing on typos and basking in the adulation of spambots?

    I looked back at found the questions you never answered. Great questions. Outstanding questions even. Why, they are by me.

    I put the questions to you after you made a typical grand proclamation of What Must Be at June 19, 10:30 PM.

    My questions in response at 3:04 PM on the 20th:

    For argument’s sake, let’s say the caveat that MM wants is in play and the patent for composition X is not invalidated under 101 grounds.

    How do you enforce the patent for composition X, keeping in mind that there is a fully legal alternative to the patent holder’s version of composition X?

    A corollary question: What does it mean to have exclusive rights that are not exclusive? That cannot be exclusive?

    Further corollary questions:Does the patent for composition X become a de facto product-by-process patent? What if no process was provided? What if the provided process was not patentable (for example, itself old in the art or obvious)?

    All of your typical BS aside, do you have answers for these?

  53. 465

    Mr. Self, you always seems to restate my arguments to mean exactly the opposite of what they actually mean. I have no idea why you do this on such a consistent basis, but you do.

    I suggest then, that you state the opposite of what you intend, so that you will be stating the law correctly.

    You yourself have pointed out that the case is a 101 issue. Not sure why you keep gravitating to 102/103… must be some destructive impulse of yours.

  54. 462

    The very same effective sequence that had always been there or had been effectively a Product of Nature.

    Makes no difference to the Whut-Ev doctrine.

  55. 461

    “where the new composition doesn’t read on the old composition, you could get a patent on that new composition.”

    This sounds just like the Products of Nature doctrine.

    Only you would know, suckie, since the “doctrine” exists only in your tiny mind.

    I suspect to most of the rest of the world, it looks more like 102 than any “product of nature doctrine”.

    what if the old composition isn’t actually discovered prior to the application being filed?

    Then it’s patentable.

  56. 460

    suckie If the decision comes back that Myriad’s claims are not patent eligible

    That’s not going to happen, suckie.

    What’s next, suckie? Must I state on what page of the decision the “actual” holding will appear lest I will be accused of “failing to answer your question”?

    Get a life, r-tard.

    Man, this blog has the d-mbest trolls.

  57. 459

    No I mean the 7:17 questions that were not the questions concerned with my well publicized flailing and failing caveat. And yes, the same answers that were mere dust kicking.

    Corrected.

  58. 458

    Apparently, the only discovery of Myriad was the specific sequence.

    i.e., the completely unpredictable structure with enormous patent-worthy utility.

  59. 457

    Maybe if I started using rxtard pseudoynms like

    Whew, man am I glad the really rxtarded ones like Malcolm Mooney or even MM weren’t listed, that would be really apeshtt rxtarded.

  60. 456

    where the new composition doesn’t read on the old composition, you could get a patent on that new composition.

    This sounds just like the Products of Nature doctrine.

    But what if the old composition isn’t actually discovered prior to the application being filed? What if the old composition isn’t actually discovers until year 15 of the patent on the new composition?

    Oh dear.

  61. 455

    suckie You mean the 12:36 questions

    No I mean the 7:17 questions that I answered at 12:36.

    Man, this blog has the d-mbest trolls.

  62. 454

    Read the lower court opinion.

    This says NOTHING of the holding of Benson.

    C’mon Ned, that was a SIMPLE question. There is no reason to go off on a frolic to a lower court decision or a subsequent decision to highlight your inability to actually identify a holding. There is plenty of time for you to screw up other cases after you have screwed up the Aupreme Court Benson case.

    Try again.

  63. 453

    Nothing like an equivocal escape hatch of an answer.

    If the decision comes back that Myriad’s claims are not patent eligible, the whining of “But they did not use an ” viable “product of nature” theory ”

    Whatever that means.

  64. 452

    Mr. Self, you always seems to restate my arguments to mean exactly the opposite of what they actually mean.  I have no idea why you do this on such a consistent basis, but you do.

    The CCPA in Bergstrom rejected the notion that newly discovered products of nature were prior art to the claimed isolated compositions.  The PTO argued that "new" in 101 required that the claimed compositions found in nature by the inventor were nevertheless prior art to the inventor.  Bergstrom rejected that notion entirely, and held that new in 101 was to be determined under 102.  There was no product of nature listed in 102.  To be prior art, the compounds must be publicly known, etc.

    In the end, there is no product of nature exception.  The law has always been based upon prior art, i.e., the specific product of nature was know and therefor prior art to the claimed invention.

    Wood-Paper — cellulose was known.
    Parke-Davis — extracted adrenaline was known.
    Funk Bros. (actually a law of nature case) — the prior art bacteria were known
    Chakrabarty — the prior art bacteria were known
    Merck — B12 was known, but not in its purified form

    and the beat goes on.  All cases are prior art cases but one, Bergstrom.  Bergstrom held the fact that the products came from nature did not make them prior art to the claimed invention.  They have to instead be prior art under 102.

  65. 451

    Read the lower court opinion.  He thought he was right that a programmed computer was a machine and therefor patent eligible without a specific end use, and for that reason method claims that called for programming a computer were patentable for the same reason.

    After Benson, he advocated that programmed computers were special machines within the MOT of Benson.  See, e.g., his dicta to that effect in Alappat.

  66. 450

    6 is a no-show, IANAE quit too early, so while MM is pwned in massive ways, Ned is pwned on a steady, albeit lower intensity.

    The vote is to Ned based on volume.

  67. 449

    application of Bergstrom, where the CCPA rejected a contention that products of nature were prior art

    Ned’s up to his self-annihilating tricks again.

    Do you realze that you keep giving quotes that prove your version of reality is wrong?

    The “prior art” angle is dead and has been dead. Difference in kind has to do with the claimed item not being the item that is the Product of Nature. It was the prior art argument that was buried in In re Bergstrom. It was not the Supreme Court judicial exception.

    They noted in that case that all that was required for patentability of compositions of matter where the compositions were unknown is that they be isolated.

    For this, I need a pincite. Not a citation to the case, but a pincite of this. And if you want to be consistent with your own rules, that pincite must show that this is the holding of the case.

    they did not know this to be true

    Doesn’t sound very much like your own rules that the Supreme Court carefully selected its words with purpose and intent.

    Sounds more like you are making up a very strained interpretation of the actual words, the ones that were oh so carefully chosen.

    Diggiing faster is not an answer to getting out of that hole.

  68. 448

    Which holding was that?

    (this is actually a serious question, given that after two and half years you just recently realized what the holding of Bilski was)

  69. 447

    Malcolm, Bryson mentioned in his dissent that prior to the Myriad's claimed invention, the BRCA gene itself, but not its sequence, was known; and further that its location in specific chromosomes was known.  Apparently, the only discovery of Myriad was the specific sequence.

    Strictly from a 102/103, how would this play out in the PTO?  Can the person who works out the structure of a known gene obtain a patent on isolated versions of it under 102/103?

  70. 445

    Mr. day, with all due respect, "a difference in kind" is required when considering whether a claim compositions patentable over the prior art.  I would like to reference you to application of Bergstrom, where the CCPA rejected a contention that products of nature were prior art simply because they were of nature.  They noted in that case that all that was required for patentability of compositions of matter where the compositions were unknown is that they be isolated.

    That is the law!  

    Nothing in Chakrabarty is truly inconsistent except the dicta about products of nature.    The issue in that case was whether living organisms could be patented.  In the end, the Supreme Court held that they could, as manufactures, and because they were markedly different from what?  While they said, "any found in nature" they did not know this to be true because the only thing they knew about for sure were the specific bacteria that formed the source material for their creation. In other words, to the extent they discussed products of nature beyond the specific starting materials they knew about, their opinion was pure dicta.

     

  71. 443

    You mean the 12:36 questions that were not the questions concerned with your well publicized flailing and failing caveat? The same answers that were mere dust kicking?

    If you mean failing at dissembling and flailing even as you accuse others of flailing, when you say “that’s how it is done,” then I would agreee that you are the master of that trick.

    Well done.

  72. 442

    had the clay naturally existed on the mountainside when the fire came through and baked it such is now ineligible, or rather, it was ineligible in the first place

    What if the fire was started by a homeless person (e.g., suckie)?

  73. 441

    "So says the man trying to force the 101 of Myriad to be a prior art issue."

    You do have to be joking.

    All prior Supreme Court cases in involving products of nature involved products that were known and therefore prior art.  I am not trying to convert a section 101 issue into a prior art issue.  I am trying to point out that all prior cases on point did not involve patentable subject matter considerations at all, but were rather cases cconcerning known products that were prior art because they were known.

  74. 440

    In your hypo the man made the fire hardened red clay because he put it on the mountainside, thus a patent still may issue. However, had the clay naturally existed on the mountainside when the fire came through and baked it such is now ineligible, or rather, it was ineligible in the first place but now we know about it being ineligible.

    So, no, yes, no, more difficult.

  75. 439

    Check your meds, suckie.

    Your final comment of Myriad’s compositions will surive 101 is also hardly an answer

    LOL.

    you have not stated why those composoitions will survive, have you

    Yes, I have suckie. They will survive 101 because they are eligible subject matter under any viable “product of nature” theory. If you believe there is a viable theory for finding Myriad’s claims ineligible under 101, please explain the theory and explain how such a theory avoids the obvious pitfalls I’ve previously identified with all of the simple-minded “product of nature” exclusion theories that trolls like you have been spouting on about.

    Thanks, suckie.

    LOL.

    Man, this blog has the d-mbest trolls.

  76. 438

    See how I answered the questions at 12:36 pm, suckie? That’s how it’s done. You should try answering the questions I asked. We can all laugh at your flailing.

    I hear that your caveat is withering.

    Check your meds, suckie.

  77. 437

    To make it official, I cast my vote for MM.

    Who is not to love the evermore eplectic rants of rambling rage?

  78. 436

    Is it condescending when you haven’t shown didly about where you are on this topic, and yet put on airs like you know so much?

    Further, the glib comment is not really an answer to my question that you recognize the major differences, is it? And calling the “carefully chosen words” of the Supreme Court “meaningless drivel” is just an evasion, isn’t it?

    It’s hard to show where you are at when all of your posts are comprised of questions, insults, and evasions.

    To paraphrase “Prometheus” you need to do something more.

    Your reply of “That would certainly prove me right, suckie” is not quite an answer, is it?

    I could assume that you are implying that that is your prediction, but I generally leave the assumptions to others. If that is your prediction, why not just come right out and say it?

    Y/N : Do you predict that the GVR CAFC will answer that 101 does not apply and that the issue is settled under 102/103?

    Your response of “might be possible to develop a Product of Nature exception but it would hardly be distinguishable from 102/103, for the reasons I’ve provided here numerous times” is likewise, not quite an answer, is it?

    Mainly because the reason you’ve provided numerous times has fallen short numerous times and the numerous questions needed to be answered to have that reason make any sense have been evaded numerous times. Why don’t you do something constructive about that?

    Your final comment of Myriad’s compositions will surive 101 is also hardly an answer, as you have not stated why those composoitions will survive, have you?

    All in all, you have thrown out a lot of hot air and made a fifty-fifty toin coss guess of “claims will survive.” Can’t a three year old do just as much?

    Normally I don’t allow myself to get sucked into a long discourse like this, but it is kind of fun joining in on the pummel-MM parade. Can you guess who gets my vote for most pwned?

  79. 435

    If you feel like you’re being unfairly maligned, don’t blame me… Find a better pseudonym and stick with it.

    More assumptions. I do stick with “simple questions”

    I ask simple questions because the reaction, rather than any actual answers, tells me if the person I am asking questions of has any real clue or is just spouting BS.

    If the person groups all questions under some conspiracy-laden “suckie,” or avoids answering the questions, or “accuses other of that which they do,” I know that person has donned his tinfoil helmet, is a dissembler, or both. So far, it looks like you are both.

    As for calling out those who spout bullshxx, I do as I want, I call out whom I want, and I called out you. If you don’t like it, you can leave. No one is stopping you.

    Thanks for showing off your shiny helmet. Now instead of asking more questions, don’t you have a few questions to answer? I hear that your caveat is withering.

  80. 434

    In any case, Myriads claims are going down and at the end of the day it’s going to be a landslide. If you

    LOL – Should be the ACLU’s case that is going down; Myriads compositions will survive 101.

  81. 432

    suckie Do you recognize the major differences (and that there are major differences) between these questions?

    I’m pretty far ahead of you on this topic, suckie, and most other patent law topics. Don’t condescend.

  82. 431

    Or does “proven right again” mean that there is a Product of Nature exception under 101, and the Myriad claims pass muster because the claims are sufficient to effectively be different in kind?”

    That’s meaningless drivel, suckie.

    does “proven right again” mean that the court is going to “simply rely on 102/103 to deal with

    That would certainly prove me right, suckie.

    does “proven right again” mean that there is no Product of Nature exception under 101?

    It might be possible to develop a Product of Nature exception but it would hardly be distinguishable from 102/103, for the reasons I’ve provided here numerous times. Will the Supremes go there? I don’t know why they would bother.

    In any case, Myriads claims are going down and at the end of the day it’s going to be a landslide. If you disagree, suckie, let me know.

  83. 430

    you are a “suckie” too.

    Sorry, suckie.

    Maybe if I started using rxtard pseudoynms like
    “Simple Questions Needs to Sit in A Corner with A Dunce Cap” or “Not-So-Simple Questions” or “Low Hanging Fruit”, I’d be a “suckie.”

    If you feel like you’re being unfairly maligned, don’t blame me. Blame suckie. Find a better pseudonym and stick with it. And when suckie spouts bullshxx and does its daily drive-by drivel, call suckie out for a change instead of sitting on the sidelines. Otherwise, rest assured: you and suckie are indistinguishable.

  84. 429

    I’m going to be proven right again

    Just to be clear (since it’s not), does “proven right again” mean that the court is going to “simply rely on 102/103 to deal with the issue“?

    Or does “proven right again” mean that there is no Product of Nature exception under 101?

    Or does “proven right again” mean that there is a Product of Nature exception under 101, and the Myriad claims pass muster because the claims are sufficient to effectively be different in kind?

    Do you recognize the major differences (and that there are major differences) between these questions?

  85. 428

    You never understood why Prometheus was going to come back 9-0, although I tried to explain it to you a hundred times.

    You have the wrong “suckie.”

    Just to keep things real, don’t assume all of us “suckies” are the same, because you are a “suckie” too.

  86. 427

    It’s okay, suckie. You never understood why Prometheus was going to come back 9-0, although I tried to explain it to you a hundred times. You still don’t get it. The key issues in Myriad are just as straightforward so it’s just as likely that you’ll never understand.

    Sxcks to be you, suckie.

  87. 426

    I suggest the only course of action is for the Federal Circuit to take on Chakrabarty directly.

    Do you mean like Judge Rich directly took on Benson? *

    *caveat – I stole this idea from upthread

  88. 425

    suckie: the 9-0 nature of Prometheus all but guarantees that the composition equivalent of the method “Nature’s warehouse” exception will hold fast?

    OMG, suckie actually make a prediction about how Myriad is going to play out. This is going to be fun.

    Ned: Regardless of the differences, the differences may be immaterial from the point of view of section 101

    If structural differences between prior art compositions and new compositions are “immaterial” from the point of view of section 101, how could they possibly be considered “material” from the point of view of 102/103 … in which case why not simply rely on 102/103 to deal with the issue? Note that in stark, glaring contrast to the mental step-reciting process claims in Prometheus, the legal framework for dealing with structural differences between a claimed invention and the prior art is very well established.

    This is the way it’s going to play out, friends. I’m going to be proven right again and it’s going to be a landslide.

  89. 423

    isolated Y is different from that found in nature by definition

    That’s the point. It isn’t legally sufficient unless the difference is ALSO different in kind.

    “Different” alone is not enough.
    “Isolation” alone is not enough.

    You are still proving the point that Product of Nature is excluded.

  90. 422

    That’s easy. As set forth in your hypothetical, you can’t get a patent on “the red soil” because it’s an old composition that you did not invent.

    If you identified the components responsible for the desirable features you discovered and claimed a *new* composition consisting of those components, where the new composition doesn’t read on the old composition, you could get a patent on that new composition.

    The pots, jugs and dishes made from the red soil are likely patentable.

    The process for making the pots, jugs and dishes is likely patentable, depending on the prior art and how the process is claimed.

    Here’s the more interesting question: let’s say you properly claim (i.e., structurally; not a product-by-process claim) the red soil composition obtained after it’s been fire-hardened but not limited to any particular shape. As soon as he sees your published patent, Mr. D obtains some of the red soil and sets it on the mountainside near his uncle’s ranch. Two years later a firestorm burns through the mountainside, as a result of a lightning storm. Mr. D goes to retrieve the soil and discovers that its hardened and in fact the granted claims read directly on the hardened composition.

    Q1: Is the patent now directed to ineligible subject matter because it’s a “product of nature”?

    Q2: With respect to Q1, would the answer change if the soil had not been moved from its original location and the fire occurred there instead?

    Q3: With respect to Q2, would it matter if it was the first fire in recorded history at that location?

    Q4: With respect to questions Q1-Q3, does the legal theory used to obtain the answer make it easier or more difficult for defendants to obtain and/or identify “products of nature” that render newly described compositions ineligible for patenting?

  91. 420

    As long as your isolated Y is different in kind, then you have no problem.

    But that is exactly what the Product of Nature exclusion is.

    If your isolated Y is not different in kind, then it effectively does exist in nature, and you are right back at the question that cannot be evaded.

    You are proving the opposite of your position.

  92. 419

    Question 1) Why do you think the doctrine of the Product of Nature exception to patentability is now history?
    Answer: History?  That is a not right connotation.  It is not the law.  Prior to Chakrabarty, no Supreme Court case considered there to be a product of nature exception.  All prior cases involving products of nature were known products.  The issue was not about a product of nature exception but about prior art.
     
    Question 2) Are you forgetting that this GVR is stemming from Prometheus or that Prometheus fully embraces the judicial exceptions, including, most pertinently, the so-called "Nature's warehouse" doctrine? Do you not recognize that the GVR is for reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s entire decision in Prometheus, including both holding and dicta, or that that embrace was endorsed by every single member of the Court?
    Answer: of course.  Which is why I believe the Federal Circuit must tackle the issue directly and not avoid it by pointing out that the chemical structures are different.  Regardless of the differences, the differences may be immaterial from the point of view of section 101 if there is a product of nature exception.
     
    Question 3) Are you forgetting that the CAFC is very sensitive to the repeated smackdowns from the Supreme Court, and that the 9-0 nature of Prometheus all but guarantees that the composition equivalent of the method "Nature's warehouse" exception will hold fast? (so even if, as you propose, the entire doctrine is "dicta," you have a 9-0 Supreme Court backing of that "dicate.")
    Answer: Of course.  Which is why I suggest the only course of action is for the Federal Circuit to take on Chakrabarty directly.

  93. 417

    No, the point has not be made to me.  Perhaps to MM, but not to me.
     
    Hypo, X patents isolated (man made) Y.  Z sells isolated Y.  Is Z and infringer?  Of course.
     
    Note, isolated Y does not exist in nature. 
     
    How is nature impacted?  Not. 
     
    How is society impacted?  The first to discover Y and its use has a small period of exclusivity.  That benefits society by rewarding discovery.

  94. 415

    Prometheus made it clear that issues of patentable subject matter are not to be decided under any other statute but 101.

    So says the man trying to force the 101 of Myriad to be a prior art issue.

  95. 414

    Ned,

    Your reply Wordplay yesterday morning at 3:14 AM is non-responsive. Wordplay is asking you to use the Court’s carefully chosen wording instead of your slanted version.

    I strongly advocate that you comply and stop using “assume” and use instead “The Court has long HELD that this provision contains an important IMPLICIT exception”

  96. 413

    Ned,

    The district court decision of Judge Sweet is opposite your view.

    Judge sweet ruled in effect that there was no difference in kind and that the claimed invention was effectively a claim against the product of nature.

    Are you even a lawyer?

  97. 412

    On point and devastating to Ned’s position.

    A guarantee that Ned will NOT answer this.

    Just ask Anon.

  98. 411

    I vote for Ned and MM.

    It is with ironic satisfaction to see that the two who most celebrated Prometheus are the two fighting the hardest to see that decision’s rationale to be not applied across all enumerated categories.

    For both, it will be a hard task to take a firm stand and soft-pedal away from the Supreme Court view.

    As commented on IPWatchdog, it will take Rader being a Judge Rich power analogous to the post-Benson jurisprudence to tell the Supreme Court that their view is not law.

    Since both Ned and MM are also against software patents, I enjoy seeing them embrace the rationale they despised.

  99. 410

    Time and again in this thread we have subjected to statements

    Time and again we have been subjected to statements that make no sense in their absolute eradication of the highest level of jurisprudence in the pursuit of a result-based decision.

    Time and again we have seen questions evaded, the answers to which illuminate, rather than cloud the legal path most likely ahead.

    I put to you (again) Ned, questions that you have chosen to ignore in the (some small but futile?) hope that your explanation provides some basis of understanding of why you are in such a dogmatic pursuit of that result that you believe in.

    Can you give straight answers? No dodging. No weaving. No restatement of my questions. Can you? Will you? Please.

    Question 1) Why do you think the doctrine of the Product of Nature exception to patentability is now history? You go on and on about holding and dicta, turning over every rock and no doubt searching for any literature to support your argument that what the Supreme Court has put forth for at least the last three decades should be considered anethma and that the courts have miraculously and completely changed overnight. What else do you have besides your desire that makes you think that that will be, must be, the result?

    Question 2) Are you forgetting that this GVR is stemming from Prometheus or that Prometheus fully embraces the judicial exceptions, including, most pertinently, the so-called “Nature’s warehouse” doctrine? Do you not recognize that the GVR is for reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s entire decision in Prometheus, including both holding and dicta, or that that embrace was endorsed by every single member of the Court?

    Question 3) Are you forgetting that the CAFC is very sensitive to the repeated smackdowns from the Supreme Court, and that the 9-0 nature of Prometheus all but guarantees that the composition equivalent of the method “Nature’s warehouse” exception will hold fast? (so even if, as you propose, the entire doctrine is “dicta,” you have a 9-0 Supreme Court backing of that “dicate.”)

    Integrating these three questions, WHY do you think that anything you have supplied overcomes the immediacy and strength of the 9-0 Supreme Court decision in the fullness of the Court’s embrace of the Product of Nature exception to patentability?

    As has been commented on by the larger number of posters, the doctrine is in fact well established and there is little to no impetus to overturn that doctrine. One only has to look at the original CAFC decision to see that the doctrine was not debated, but rather, whether the claims in question passed the existing “different in kind” test of the doctrine. The same “different in kind” test that you try to conflate into a 102/103 test (a smokescreen that is directly tied to MM’s time-caveat and for which both are blown away with the hurricane enforcement rebuttal). In fact, even if Myriad’s claims survive, the Product of Nature as judicial exception will stay in place. There is nothing anywhere to indicate that the court will rule otherwise. Nothing.

    While I understand, at least in theory, some of what you are saying, it baffles me why you think your view will be ascendant. It is the height of irrationality and wishful thinking. If you think you must portray confidence in order to give weight to your view, I have to tell you, it is having the opposite effect. It paints you as simply out of touch with how the Court views the law.

    For in the end it matters not whether it is dicta or holding, the court will not change its stance.

  100. 409

    Your post contains no straight answers to my post of 10:27 PM.

    I clearly address man-made. In fact, even if you have “man-made” in your claim, such does not distinguish (unless you have a product-by-process, but even then, all you really have is a patent on the process, don’t you?) All the “clues” you list of making, using and selling are captured under the term “exclusive control.”

    Answer, don’t evade.

  101. 408

    We all know MM is a bio attorney

    Actually, we do not.

    Sure, he has a bio background. But the attorney part is clearly NOT evident from his (lack of) legal argument skills. You simply do not win arguments with grandiose proclamations backed up with nothing but insults and evasion. He acts like a spoiled bully and expects others to kowtow (most likely because Daddy was an abusive power figure, and he could never measure up).

  102. 407

    It clearly is, in my view, because the statement was not necessary to the result. That is the common way to identify dicta.

    The problem for you Ned is that you are confusing a successful passing of the test provided with a notion that the test was unnecessary.

    You clearly don’t understand even your own offered article. You have no business discussing holding and dicta. At all.

  103. 405

    Does anyone else find that Dicta-Bilski Rampager Ned Heller is preaching the dangers of dicta?

    Can Ned get the last two and a half years of his life back?

  104. 404

    Really? Is that really what we have? Or does the Lilly brief indicate that there is at least one bio attorney which is leading some other bio attorneys on an issue which he may have been leading for quite some time?

  105. 403

    Did A New Light or Max Kennerly give you that link?

    It sounds close to their “the judiciary is running amuck” line of thought.

  106. 402

    Let’s say in the desert of New Mexico I discover a new type of red soil that when harden through fire is more durable than any other clay. In fact it is virtually unbreakable. Plus it keeps water and other liquids naturally cool. So I decide to make ceramic pots and jugs and other dish ware and sell them to the public. So my question is what all can I get a patent on?

    a) The red soil

    b) The pots, jugs, and dishes made from the red soil

    c) The process for making the pots, jugs and dishes out of the red soil

    d) None of the above

  107. 401

    No Ned, even for argument sake, no such assumption required – going directly off your post at 2:23 PM: “the problem of claiming nature per se is that it is not subject to law

    Company X has a patent on man-made Y which is also available in nature.

    Company Z sells Y.

    How do you enforce? You are trying to enforce a patent on a composition. IF (and that’s a major IF) you even claim “man-made Y”, you as given by your own premise, do not have an exclusive right on Y, since Y from nature is the same thing.

    This point has been put to you already at least one. You continue to ignore the point.

  108. 399

    “Morse in Prometheus, the Court’s most recent case on 101 and the direct rejection of the proposition you propose here?”

    First Mr. Heller, you must know that when making the determination of whether something is abstract, or not, one must read the specification to see what the applicant has actually described as the invention. If the claims appear vague and the specification is equally murky you will have 101 and 112 problems. Morse is referenced in Prometheus for it’s historical significance as a case with that type of problem that is now solved by looking at 101 and 112 with Judge Rich’s separate doors doctrine.

    Second, your reference of the Governments brief has no force of law. The arguments were rejected and do not even rise to the level of Court dicta.

    Finally, there is no holding in Prometheus that 101 and 112 should be combined and conflated. Nor did the Prometheus Court reinterpret Morse to be an antebellum case turned ad hoc into modern day 101 juris prudence.

  109. 394

    Ned,

    You realize of course that you have not addressed the “real point” that you cannot differentiate the man-made from the Product of Nature, right?

    Such a simple thing and it sinks anyone trying to patent Products of Nature…

  110. 393

    It remains that there is no case, not one, ever, at least none that I’m aware of, that is held a claim unpatentable based upon a law of nature theory.

    Prometheus.

    Try again.

  111. 392

    The Court sets out a standard and judges to that standard.

    Ned thinks that because the judgment is affirmative, that the standard de facto becomes dicta.

    Are you even a lawyer?

  112. 391

    Ned ask yourself whether or not you really think there are two people in the world with this same viewpoint? We all know MM is a bio attorney. How many bio attorneys are there? How many do you think just so happen to have the same view as MM does?

  113. 390

    Time and again in this thread we have subjected to statements by quite a few posters that Chakrabarty held that there is a products of nature exception and that such an exception is the law. However, since Chakrabarty actually held the claims there to be patentable regardless of a product of nature exception, the question really is whether the statement in Chakrabarty about products of nature is dicta.

    It clearly is, in my view, because the statement was not necessary to the result. That is the common way to identify dicta. The court should have said, in order to not confuse the issue, “Assuming arguendo that there is a product of nature exception, these claimed compositions are nevertheless patentable because they are man-made.” But the Supreme Court did not do that, and thus have created confusion and uncertainty in whole industries whose products come from nature in one form or another, and who have now written the government expressing their dire concerns about the Myriad GVR.

    The question of dicta has now emerged as critical in the analysis of what the law is. We need a discussion on this point, because the courts need to address the issue. I would start by linking a law review article by a judge discussing dicta, and why in his opinion, treating dicta as law is unconstitutional.

    Pierre N. Leval, “Judging under the Constitution: Dicta about Dicta,” New York University Law Review, Volume 80, Number 4, October 2006, at 1249.

    link to law.nyu.edu

  114. 389

    Mr. Lesson, I'm not quite certain I understand what you just said in your post, but dicta is not law.  In order to win your point, you're going to have to find one case, anywhere, that held a claim unpatentable because of a law of nature exception.  Just one.

  115. 388

    Mr. shovel, it's not a holding of the Court unless the point was critical to the judgment.  In Chakrabarty, the statement about products of nature was not critical to result because the court held the claimed compositions patentable nevertheless.  The judgment of the court was along the lines of "assuming there is a product of nature exception, these claims are nevertheless patentable as they are man-made and not found in nature."

    In other words, the discussion of product of nature in the relevant paragraph by the court was not a holding.  It was dicta.

  116. 387

    Mr. Clue, I am sure you are aware that the problem of claiming nature per se is that it is not subject to law.  Man-made versions though are, and that is the point.

    In the discussion about Monsanto's Roundup ready patent on the improved soybean plant, we had a good discussion on whether you could control by law nature, because control is required by the law for ownership of things of nature including plants and animals.  If you cannot control them, you can not own them.  Thus the law seems to recognize that if you are going to grant patents on things of nature, such as a plant that sexually reproduces, you can only do so by requiring that the plant be man-made in some fashion.  That after all was the holding, was it not, in Chakrabarty?

    But once you pass a threshold of being man-made, I think even that Chakrabarty provides authority that such as patentable subject matter.

    Now you would say, that isolated versions of naturally occurring compositions are not sufficiently man-made.  And I would ask you why?

  117. 386

    Mr. Actual, the argument is not dead.  Law is not made by dicta; and until the SC or the Federal Circuit holds a claim to be unpatentable because of a law of nature exception, it is not law.
     
    It remains that there is no case, not one, ever, at least none that I'm aware of, that is held a claim unpatentable based upon a law of nature theory.

    If you disagree with that, all I ask you to do is cite the case.

  118. 385

    Mr. Legal,
     
    Then, how do you deal with the extensive reliance on Morse in Prometheus, the Court's most recent case on 101 and the direct rejection of the proposition you propose here?   Here are a few clips,
     
    "35 U. S. C. §101.
    The Court has long held that this provision contains an important implicit exception. "[L]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas" are not patentable. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U. S. 175, 185 (1981); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 5); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 303, 309 (1980); Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 175 (1853); O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62, 112-120 (1854); cf. Neilson v. Harford, Webster's Patent Cases 295, 371 (1841) (English case discussing same).
     

     
    "They warn us against upholding patents that claim processes that too broadly preempt the use of a natural law. Morse, supra, at 112-120;
     

    "The Court has repeatedly emphasized this last mentioned concern, a concern that patent law not inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of laws of nature. Thus, in Morse the Court set aside as unpatentable Samuel Morse's general claim for "`the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current … however developed, for making or printing intelligible characters, letters, or signs, at any distances,'" 15 How., at 86. The Court explained:
    "For aught that we now know some future inventor, in the onward march of science, may discover a mode of writing or printing at a distance by means of the electric or galvanic current, without using any part of the process or combination set forth in the plaintiff's specification. His invention may be less complicated—less liable to get out of order—less expensive in construction, and in its operation. But yet if it is covered by this patent the inventor could not use it, nor the public have the benefit of it without the permission of this patentee." Id., at 113.

     
    "These statements reflect the fact that, even though rewarding with patents those who discover new laws of nature and the like might well encourage their discovery, those laws and principles, considered generally, are "the basic tools of scientific and technological work." Benson, supra, at 67. And so there is a danger that the grant of patents that tie up their use will inhibit future innovation premised upon them, a danger that becomes acute when a patented process amounts to no more than an instruction to "apply the natural law," or otherwise forecloses more future invention than the underlying discovery could reasonably justify.
     
    Next, Mr. Scholar, the court directly addressed your point, 112.
     
    "
    Third, the Government argues that virtually any step beyond a statement of a law of nature itself should transform an unpatentable law of nature into a potentially patentable application sufficient to satisfy §101's demands. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae. The Government does not necessarily believe that claims that (like the claims before us) extend just minimally beyond a law of nature should receive patents. But in its view, other statutory provisions—those that insist that a claimed process be novel, 35 U. S. C. §102, that it not be "obvious in light of prior art," §103, and that it be "full[y], clear[ly], concise[ly], and exact[ly]" described, §112—can perform this screening function. In particular, it argues that these claims likely fail for lack of novelty under §102.
    This approach, however, would make the "law of nature" exception to §101 patentability a dead letter. The approach is therefore not consistent with prior law. The relevant cases rest their holdings upon section 101, not later sections."
     

     
    "Section 112 requires only a "written description of the invention … in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art … to make and use the same." It does not focus on the possibility that a law of nature (or its equivalent) that meets these conditions will nonetheless create the kind of risk that underlies the law of nature exception, namely the risk that a patent on the law would significantly impede future innovation. See Lemley 1329-1332 (outlining differences between §§101 and 112); Eisenberg, supra, at ___ (manuscript, at 92-96) (similar). Compare Risch, Everything is Patentable, 75 Tenn. L. Rev. 591 (2008) (defending a minimalist approach to §101) with Lemley (reflecting Risch's change of mind).
    These considerations lead us to decline the Government's invitation to substitute §§102, 103, and 112 inquiries for the better established inquiry under §101."
     
     
     
     

     

  119. 382

    So HAS it BEEN written. So SHALL it be done.

    Products of Nature are included in the judicial exceptions to patent eligible subject matter.

  120. 381

    Prometheus 9-0

    Products of Nature are not patent eligible.

    Learn the lesson.

  121. 380

    To make the legal case void solely on a desired outcome that otherwise violates the law is the EPITOME of Lochnerian Judicial Activism. And make no mistake, the Product of Nature exception is the law (see above).

    To paraphrase Prometheus, you need more.

  122. 379

    Again, Congress, informed by the PTO, thought there was a product of nature exclusion.  The SC twice went through this.

    And at least twice has indicated that the HOLDING of the Court is that the “Warehouse of Nature” doctrine includes Products of Nature.

    Your own Freudian slip betrays you: you are depending TOO much on the early cases. Clearly as the wisdom of understanding has evolved over time and the understanding of how nature itself works becam more evident to the Supreme Court Justices they were better able to articulate the implicit law that Congress had written. You are showing either a deliberate (or unconscious) ignorance of the very nature of the Court created judicial exceptions. Each (and every) judicial exception was made at some later time that Congress wrote the actual law. There is no legal basis whatsoever that says the judicial exceptions all had to be created at the same time. Further, the judicial exception that includes Products of Nature was well understood by all since at least Chakrabarty and if Congress, who also clearly understood that the Court included Products of Nature in their judicial exception disagreed with that HOLDING, then Congress could have acted.

    The plain and unassailable fact is that Congress has not done so. Even and especially given the America Invents Act, Congress has given its imprompteu (sp?) authoritative stamp on the well-understood Product of Nature exception.

    Ned, the legal terrain is quite clear. It is quite clear that there IS a Product of Nature exception, and that exception has ALL the authority it needs.

    Your argument to the contrary fails. It’s time to put down that shovel.

  123. 378

    Your post immediately above is clueless as you have not answered the critical point of enforcement when the item of the claimed invention (yes, the MAN-MADE claimed invention) is effectively the same as a product of nature, for which patent law may not reach and control.

    Merely repeating “B-b-b-b-it it’s man-made” has no LEGAL significance, no LEGAL ability to differentiate that which is man-made from that which is (effectively) not man-made. If you cannot make this legal differentiation on the claimed invention, you have no invention. The only alternative is to force even that which the inventor did not invent to be captured by the claimed invention. And you have provided NO legal authority for such effect, and you CANNOT provide such legal authority, because there is NO such legal authority.

  124. 377

    This circular tail chasing is not authority.  You cannot cite one single Supreme Court case that held a claim invalid because it read on a product of nature.  EVERY SINGLE CASE, EVERY ONE, involving products of nature involved products that were known and therefor prior art.  Every single case.”

    The “it’s prior art” line is a non-sequitur, so please stop kicking up that dust cloud. If the Court wanted to depend on the “prior art” effect, they would have chosen words to show that they thought the controlling aspect was something other than 101.

    They did not. Your position has no merit given the actual words chosen and used by the Court. The “prior art” argument is dead.

    And I’m pretty sure that that pinnacle of 101 jurisprudence Prometheus IS authority when, with it’s carefully chosen words of “we have long held… implicit… Product of Nature”.

    Stop ignoring the actual words used by the Court.

  125. 376

    “The court is of opinion that the claim is too broad, and not warranted by law.”

    There it is, 112 breadth issue. Any reference to abstract is because the specification was not enabled, still 112.

    Debate Over!

  126. 375

    I have read Morse, the patent, and the appeal. And what you need to learn is that the Prometheus holding is not an issue here. The fact that you are trying to overlay an antebellum patent law case with the thinking and logic of modern day patent law shows the flaw in your logic and lack of legal scholarship.

    Looking at Morse from a historical perspective shows that conflation of what we now know as 112, 101, 102, and 103, was the common practice of the Court, pre Civil War.

    The genius of Judge Rich was to bring an objective analysis to patent law that made it flexible for the on rush of new technologies well into the 21st century and eliminated the murky waters of conflation.

    And even though it can be argued that Morse did mix what is now known as 112 and 101, the modern day relevance to 101 is marginal at best. The over all case is about enablement, written description and use. Clearly 112 issues. Most important, Morse serves as no basis for bringing 112 issues into 101.

  127. 374

    And, sir, read Morse and read Prometheus.  The latter clearly holds that issues of patentable subject matter are to be decided under 101.
     
    Now, go read Morse again.  I quoted the pertinent portions here earlier.  It was concerning with a lot more than simple breadth.  The claim before it, claim 8, was an example of what it called claiming a principle in the abstract.  Such a claim, they suggested, wouldn't even require a specification.  So, just how would that raise a 112 issue?
     
    Read the case, please.

  128. 373

    Jim, A New Light makes a good case in the abstract. The problem is, he may not understand the full ramifications of his position. See my rejoinder, to which Mr. Light has yet to respond.

    Regardless, he assumes that everyone has a right to products of nature; when in fact, it is the inventor who discovered the product and its utility. The question is whether this inventor who made the discovery should be limited to a patent on the use only, or should he be able to obtain a patent on isolated versions of the chemical?

    The PTO directly address this question in In re Latimer and held that they could not. However, every court case to consider the topic has found in favor of patentability over a hypothectical product of nature exception. See, Parke-Davis, Merck and In re Bergstrom.

    Myriad is the only datapoint to the contrary, and it based its holding off of dicta in Chakrabarty. All one can say to this, is that Charkrabarty was FUBAR and needs to be reconsidered by the Court.

  129. 372

    Morse predated Prometheus. Some things have changed since then, like the 1952 Patent Act and the America Invents Act of 2011. I highly suggest you read both.

    In today’s context of modern patent law Morse claim 8 is clearly a ruling that a claim is invalid if it does not teach the public how to make and use the invention.

    This is a U.S.C. 112 Specification issue:

    “The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.”

    Again, read the statute. It’s not a joke at all. It’s the law.

  130. 371

    Excellent post. Thank you for contributing some thought provoking legal scholarship to the blog. Especially at a time when the vocal minority threatens to do to Patently O what the Jersey Shore has done to TV

  131. 370

    This post is a joke.
     
    Prometheus made it clear that issues of patentable subject matter are not to be decided under any other statute but 101.

  132. 369

    Argument?
     
    I have provided case after case to prove my point.  You, in contrast, have yet to provide one case that has held a claimed composition invalid due to a product of nature exception — that is, prior to Myriad itself.

  133. 366

     I don't know if you actually read what I said.
     
    Read it again.
     
    There is something in there about "man made."
     
    Making, using and selling is another clue.

  134. 365

    And, the Court made it clear in Chak. and later in JEM Ag that Congress was operating under a belief that there was an exception.  They were apparently being advised by the PTO, who, since Latimer, believed there was an exception as well. 
     
    This circular tail chasing is not authority.  You cannot cite one single Supreme Court case that held a claim invalid because it read on a product of nature.  EVERY SINGLE CASE, EVERY ONE, involving products of nature involved products that were known and therefor prior art.  Every single case.

     

  135. 364

    Having been eclipsed the last 2/12 years by Ned’s post Bilski anti business method crusade, Malcolm is back in the in the center ring under the big top as bio gets ready for a scorching! Though some say Tiger Woods will regain his former dominance before MM ever regains the playground he had before Ned arrived.

    The former notorious EK 6, once a promising young court jester in his own right, remains feckless and relegated to the margins, most likely as a result of failing the LSAT 6 years in a row, and losing his first appeals at the PTO. Oh and the recent brutal beating by non Actual Inventors in another thread didn’t help matters much.

    INANE, the under appreciated Shemp of the Anti-Patent Crowd, remains as clueless as ever, all alone in his ivory tower.

    But collectively they still make over 50% of the post on Patently 0, keeping Dennis in business, and the the patent community highly entertained!

  136. 363

    Mr. Play, There is not one single mention of a product of nature exception in any SC case prior to Chakrabarty.  If you disagree, cite the case.

  137. 362

    Simple, I can get a patent on a new and useful way to make a T-shirt.

    That’s called a process.

    But I can’t get a patent on the art or words printed on the shirt.

    That’s covered under copyright.

  138. 361

    If the Morse case was before the Court today, the claim at issue would be reviewed under 112, not 101. I am sure Judge Rich, who knew better than you, would say the same thing. Which brings us back to the fact that you have failed to cite holdings that say coverage of all useful results retards progress in the science and useful arts. Ergo, you LOSE the debate.

  139. 360

    It therefore becomes necessary to attack the very premise of the argument to guarantee a win here.

    Your attack is not working.

    Repeating your argument over and over again and again is not working.

    I see no…

    It helps if you open your eyes. It also helps if your “becomes necessary” is not permitted to blind you from the obvious.

    You are attempting to fight a battle that cannot be won.

  140. 359

    What-

    Ev

    is on the filter?

    Fn seriously Dennis?

    Turn your eyes children:

    MM – the odds on favorite, seeing as his gleefully empty and ignorant Whxt_Ev “victory” of Prometheus now about to scorch his own neighborhood, and he blasts out in evermore eplectic rants of rambling rage

  141. 358

    MM, the odds on favorite, seeing as his gleefully empty and ______ Whxt_Ev “victory” of Prometheus now is about to ____ his own neighborhood, and he ______ out in evermore eplectic _____ of rambling _____

  142. 357

    MM, the odds on favorite, [caught in filter]

    Ned, trying hard to catchup to MM, the addled oldster has been forced to admit his entire two and a half year Crusade against business method eligibility is built on dicta (not holding), and further forced to sacrifice that Crusade in order to preach for patent eligibility of “products of nature,” and yet makes the sacrifice for naught, as it is a hopeless cause, thus losing two of his prime reasons for prolific posting

    IANAE, who sets about playing Calvinball with his face (again), this time sticking up for a type of patent that should not be allowed and is schooled on remedies (oh wait, that’s a different thread)

    6, well, also not really on this thread, but was B_slapped so hard on a previous thread that he is too timid to show up again, even when physics impaired Ned wants a “clean and tidy” set of laws of nature, divorced from reality, just to be pretty.

  143. 356

    The usual suspects, members of the vocal m1nority (this very short list make up nearly 50% of all comments on this thread), have been p_ummeled v1ciously.

    Vote for who you think has been pwned the most:

  144. 355

    or if it’s confined to minerals as stated by Congress

    No Ned, you truncated the quote from Congress, and you are misrepresenting what is included as products of nature (for example, the list of examples was not inclusive, and included new plants as well). Ned, there are posts on this thread addressed to you that already point this out.

    You are taking giant steps backwards in your confusion.

    Stop.

    Put the shovel down.

    You cannot dig yourself out of this hole.

  145. 354

    The first discoverer of a new product of nature and its utility should have a right not only for the use of that product of nature, but for man-made versions of it.

    Your answer here places you in the direct path of my post at 6:18 PM below.

    Now that you have stated this, now that you have signed up fo rthis, you are just as liable for providing an answer to the question that MM refuses to address.

    Let’s say you do have a patent on the product of nature. How do you enforce it? You say that your patent is for “man-made” versions. But that man-made version is the same (or effectively the same) as the version found in nature. The infringer claims his is from nature. What are you to do?

    An even more fundamental question: your actual patent right is the exclusive control. With nature able to supply the same thing (or an effective version of the same thing), you do not have exclusive control. You have no right to exclude anyone with the CLAIMED patent. Do you really have a patent?

    What you actually have is a patent for a method of making the man-made version.

    And nobody would ever fight you about THAT patent. There is no violation of the Supreme Court’s judicial exceptions with THAT patent. STOP being greedy and trying to own nature. The Court has been clear on that: Nature’s warehouse is free to all men.

  146. 353

    The first discoverer of a new product of nature and its utility should have a right not only for the use of that product of nature, but for man-made versions of it.

    You say it with no authority, in contradiciton to the authority of the U.S. Supreme Court and Congress.

    Have you not been paying attention? The Court has made it plain what was IMPLICIT in the law passed by Congress.

    Two sets of authority to your none.

  147. 352

    Congress said,
     
    "… certain inanimate things, such, for example, as a new and useful natural mineral."
     
    Is this what the Supreme Court means by "product of nature?"

    I would also just like to point out that once a sexually reproduced plant or animal is created in a laboratory by whatever means it is created, it thereafter reproduces sexually and becomes part of nature especially when it is exposed to the wild and its genome spreads across the planet.  These things are quite different from minerals which are created by the hand of God when he created the universe, or by whatever natural process resulted from the Big Bang. 

    If a product of nature exception exists and that exception includes plants that are sexually reproduced and are found in nature, then we cannot realistically patent sexually reproduced plants, or must recognize that once exposed to nature they become part of nature.  However, if there is no exception related to product of nature or if it's confined to minerals as stated by Congress, then what becomes critical for patentability purposes is whether that product of nature was known and whether it utility was known.

    The first discoverer of a new product of nature and its utility should have a right not only for the use of that product of nature, but for man-made versions of it.
     
     
     

  148. 351

    Bryson discusses Chakrabarty and assumes that one cannot patent a human gene even in isolated form because one cannot patent a newly discovered mineral, or by extension, any product of nature.  I do not disagree assuming the premise, which is why I so strongly advocate reconsideration of the premise.

    How about instead of using the word “assume,” you instead use the language that the Court used (you being all big on using language of the Court)?

    So use “The Court has long HELD that this provision contains an important IMPLICIT exception” Prometheus, 566 U.S. ___ (2012) at 1.

    This way, you won’t be as tempted to screw up the law.

  149. 349

    A question for you NH, since you are the one proclaiming how strict the words of the Supreme Court are chosen and should be heeded, and let’s couple actual Supreme Court authority with the authority of the Congress:

    “There is a clear and logical distinction between the discovery of a new variety of plant and of certain inanimate things, such, for example, as a new and useful natural mineral. The mineral is created wholly by nature unassisted by man. . . . On the other hand, a plant discovery resulting from cultivation is UNIQUE, ISOLATED, AND IS NOT REPEATED BY NATURE, NOR CAN IT BE REPRODUCED BY NATURE UNAIDED BY MAN. . . .”

    S.Rep. No. 315, supra at 6; H.R.Rep. No. 1129, supra at 7 (emphasis added). Congress thus recognized that the relevant distinction was not between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made inventions”

    Emphasis added.

    I know you have seen this before, but you keep on ignoring what it says. Why do you choose to ignore these careful words? On what authority do you choose to ignore them? On an academics?

    You keep on asking for things already given to you.

    Authority? Already there.
    What happens when something slips the control of man and NATURE by herself makes the claimed item? Already there.

    You ignore what is in front of you in a vain effort to find fault where no fault lies.

    There is something wrong, alright. What is wrong is that you are on your witch hunt, your attempted dismissal of the Products of Nature doctrine, a doctrine called out by name, made a holding by its necessity to the decision and in clear reference to the words of Congress.

    STOP ignoring everything that does not fit through your filter of how you want to see the world.

    As “sexually reproduced plant or animal is exposed nature sets that it’s man-made genome becomes part of nature” clearly fails the Court’s teachings, it is clear that such fail to have any patent protection.

    If you think about it, the isolation and ability to propagate outside of the direct control of man is a clean clear and simple dividing line.

  150. 348

    running up that (Sam) Hill: NAL

    LOLZ.

    I think I have that thread saved. I’ll have to look for it and repost for auld lang syne

  151. 347

    Why does MM continue to accuse others of what he does?

    Why does MM continue to ask questions of others when his caveat lies withering?

    Why does MM continue to respond with evasive schlock?

    Does MM realize that by doing so he is effectively giving up and being a “clueless mxrxn” ?

  152. 346

    That is now history

    Um, why?

    Why do you think the tide is turning, when all indications are that it is not?

    Are you forgetting that this GVR is stemming from Prometheus?

    Are you forgetting that Prometheus fully embraces the judicial exceptions, including, most pertinently, the so-called “Nature’s warehouse” doctrine?

    Are you forgetting that the CAFC is very sensitive to the repeated smackdowns from the Supreme Court, and that the 9-0 nature of Prometheus all but guarantees that the composition equivalent of the method “Nature’s warehouse” exception will hold fast?

    In fact, even if Myriad’s claims survive, the Product of Nature as judicial exception will stay in place. There is nothing anywhere to indicate that the court will rule otherwise. Nothing.

    While I understand, at least in theory, some of what you are saying, it baffles me why you think your view will be ascendant. It is the height of irrationality and wishful thinking. If you think you must portray confidence in order to give weight to your view, I have to tell you, it is having the opposite effect. It paints you as simply out of touch with how the Court views the law.

    To repeat: there is absolutely NO indication in any Court decision that the sanctity of nature is going to be overturned in this case.

    All of the above applies with full generosity that gives, for argument’s sake, your position some credence.

    But to be clear, your position does not have any credence. Your Freuedian slip posted on this very thread at Jun 19, 2012 at 08:02 PM says it all:

    You assume too much from the early cases.

    However, this post is not intended to discuss that as there are so many other posts onthis thead that already discuss that.

    Rather, this post is geared to the (obviously delusional) assuredness that you think the Product Of Nature exception is “now history in [its] current form.”

    For in the end it matters not whether it is dicta or holding…

    (and I note that you are still playing fast and loose with the actual words of the Supreme Court, even as it was you that in your pre-oops-favorite-critical-actual-words-from-Bilski mode made such a big deal out of the actual words)

    … the court will not change its stance.

    Finally, if you so choose (and I know it is not your mess that was made), I would be interested in your view (or attempt to defend) the MM time-caveat.

    Malcolm seems most unwilling to defend the very position he put forth. If you choose not to defend it, perhaps you can comment on why you so choose.

  153. 345

    but doesn’t man need to be able to make a gene in order to create a different kind of gene?

    Easy.

    No.

    Not sure why you think everything has to be from scratch…

    Also, “different in kind” while similar, is not the same as “different kind of.” It’s nuanced and subtle, but nonetheless real.

  154. 344

    But, they all assumed the exception.
     
    Dicta, all.  Just like that portion of Diehr about "novelty" having nothing to do with 101.  That is now history, and so will the product of nature exception, at least in current form.
     

     

  155. 343

    “What can you say about a person who injects “assumes” into a Supreme Court quote of “This Court has long HELD” in order to twist the plain and direct meaning of the carefully chosen words when those words do not support his view of what the law should be?

    Is dishonest enough? Unscrupulous? Conniving? Deceiptful? Disgraceful? Disingenuous? Duplicitous?

    All of the above?”

    None of the above.

    You just say, Oh, that’s Ned Heller.

    Yawn, and move on to the next comment.

  156. 342

    A new light, since you see the product of nature exception being so fundamental and argue that if the claimed composition compound or product is in nature that all must be free to use it, then please tell us what is your position when a patented sexually reproduced plant or animal is exposed nature sets that it's man-made genome becomes part of nature?  Does your exception now apply, rendering the patent invalid?  Is that your position.  If that is not your position, then there is something wrong with your statement of the exception and what it provides, i.e., that all may have access to products of nature.

  157. 341

    “If isolation creates a difference in kind, the patent lives.”

    Hmmmm..but doesn’t man need to be able to make a gene in order to create a different kind of gene?

    Just dont see how you escape that question, unless you are God, or maybe Larry Ellision

  158. 340

    What can you say about a person who injects “assumes” into a Supreme Court quote of “This Court has long HELD” in order to twist the plain and direct meaning of the carefully chosen words when those words do not support his view of what the law should be?

    Is dishonest enough? Unscrupulous? Conniving? Deceiptful? Disgraceful? Disingenuous? Duplicitous?

    All of the above?

  159. 339

    but you provide no quotations and no authority for your proposition.

    Except for the authority of the Supreme Court cases of at least Prometheus, Bilski and Chakrabarty, you mean?

    Oh.

    Never mind.

  160. 338

    It is interesting is it not, the judge suite in the District Court viewed Parke-Davis in the same way that does John Harkness.  This case about prior art.  Was not a case about section 101.  The District Court also viewed judge Learned Hand's statement about extracted adrenaline being patentable as dicta and inconsistent with Chakrabarty.  Not even did the Supreme Court rely on Parke-Davis for its assumption that there was a product of nature exception.  It traced authority not to Parke-Davis, but the In re Latimer, a decision of the Commissioner of patents and not by court.

    To this point, the least the learned Judge Sweet, Harkness and I all agree on Parke-Davis.  You state that the holding is to the contrary, but you provide no quotations and no authority for your proposition. 

  161. 337

    The report of my death is an exaggeration.

    Manipulation may or may not suffice.
    Isolation may or may not suffice.

    It is not MOT that dictates. That has been knwon for a while.

    It is not even a change in structure that dictates. This is the new realization, as Prometheus was to methods, Myriad will be to compositions.

    It is difference in kind from the product of nature that dictates.

    If isolation creates a difference in kind, the patent lives.

  162. 336
    On a bet of authority between and an academic and the Supreme Court, my money is on the Supreme Court says:

    And by the way, the researcher was wrong.

    He jumped over one line of dicta in the case and ignored the express holding.

    It’s a good thing that law in the real world is not run by academics.

  163. 335
    On a bet of authority between and an academic and the Supreme Court, my money is on the Supreme Court says:

    Must be nice to declare the Supreme Court wrong (and their view of what Congress explicitly said also wrong) on the authority of an academic paper, especially when the Court is referencing a line of cases.

    Let me know how that works out for you in the real world.

  164. 333

    Mr. starting, you are making the same error that the Commissioner did in In re Latimer.

    Furthermore, if you consistently ignore the facts in a case, you are not going to understand the holding of the Court.  At times the language of a court decision can be confusing when taken out of context.  That is why knowing the facts in Parke-Davis is so critically important.  In fact there was a recent post of a JPTOS article by a researcher who had investigated the case thoroughly and demonstrated that the case had nothing to do with a product of nature exception.

    I will agree though, that the Supreme Court in Chakrabarty seem to think that there was an exception and that in order to patently define over products of nature, one's claimed invention must be "markedly different."  However, the Supreme Court's assumption that there was a product of nature exception was wrong. 

    What I am suggesting is that rather than accept the mistake, we must correct it.  A broad product of nature exception has serious consequences to patent law as exhibited by the letter of industry to the government discussing the adverse consequences of a broad product of nature exception. 
     
    It is high time that the error of the Supreme Court in Chakrabarty be corrected — if not by the courts than certainly by Congress.

  165. 332

    “Products of nature can’t be made by man”

    This appears to beg the question(s):

    Did man make it?

    Or did nature make ?

    There may be overlapping answers as to what is and is not an exception.

    Isolating a gene certainly seems like a product of nature and not something made by man.

    If you apply Prometheus, who could not get a patent from drawing and analyzing blood, then it seems fair to say most bio patents should not be eligible either.

    For example, if all a researcher is doing is manipulating a gene and not actually creating a gene, then according to Prometheus, gene isolation is not patentable eligible subject matter. And since the MOT could not save Prometheus it looks like most Bio Patents are dead on arrival.

  166. 330

    suckie the same thing as a product of nature.

    What is a “product of nature” suckie?

    Please define it coherently and provide specific examples so we can begin to understand what is and what isn’t a “product of nature” in your deeply confused mind.

    For example, consider hypothetical composition X, an isolated chemical, claimed as such in your patent filed in Year 1, which you are asserting against Defendant. Defendant states that X is ineligible for patenting because he has discovered X “in nature” last year. How do you respond? What questions to you ask Defendant in deposition? Or do you just give up, suckie, because you are a clueless mxrxn?

  167. 329

    Please be forewarned, this is a long post.

    I have contemplated in-depth the discussions on this thread and many other threads, across this blog, and across many other blogs, integrated the substance, distilled the higher level application of law, and I have come to the following takeaway conclusions.

    I lead in with a rebuttal to Ned Heller and his statement of “in order to determine what invention is being claimed, one really has to know what is new.

    Actually you do not.

    Much like the case in Chakrabarty, in which the Court did not have to decide which class the invention actually fit in, the aspect of knowing whether something is new or not is not material to the application of any judicial exception.

    This is evident because the judicial exception applies no matter what the result of the “newness” determination ends up being.

    If a result is the same no matter the test result, the test is simply not required. The test may be meaningful in other contexts, but in the context of the decision at hand, it becomes quite insignificant and thus, quite unnecessary.

    Since the test is not required, the whole avenue of discussion based on that test is likewise meaningless.

    It is understood that Ned is lobbying for the viewpoint that the judicial exception does not exist at all for products of nature. But Ned is the only one, it seems, to be arguing for that position. And it is doubtful that any court would embrace such a radical departure, as it will be seen that such a departure makes the Court’s judicial exceptions into a dead letter, and would allow the craft of the lawyer to evade the Court’s exceptions, so it is safe to simply place that argument aside and not address it at all.

    The only other view that has been proposed is that some sort of caveat must exist for those inventions that otherwise would be ineligible, but were discovered and shared prior to a time that the claimed invention was found to be an item of nature. But this position is flawed as has been shown by the lack of cogent answer (by the lack really of any answer) to the dilemma of enforcement, and thus has removed itself from any serious consideration.

    It must be accepted that the judicial exception overrides any time related sense.

    The remaining issue then resolves itself as to distinguishing between something that is a product of nature and something that is not a product of nature. It seems that this point would be clear enough, but is muddied (purposefully?) by those who want to consider that if man can make the claimed invention (whether or not nature too can make the claimed invention), then the claimed invention must not be a product of nature. The water is muddied by pretending that something m,ust be one or the other, that the designation must be mutually exclusive.

    This is not so.

    And this belies the importance the Court has ascribed to its judicial exceptions. This would, to mirror Promethues make the exception a dead letter, and the Court was very clear in how it feels about its exceptions being made a dead letter. Processes are about application. Compositions are about things. And while there is a difference, the Court has made clear that artful drafting from one category to another will not and cannot evade its judicial exceptions. In no category will the Court’s judicial exceptions be allowed to become “dead letters.”

    In fact, the judicial exceptions have worked the other way around, removing from consideration even those things that can rightfully be called inventions, but that share a nexus with things the Court has held to be implicitly barred. As recently as Prometheus, the Court has told us that there must be something “more.” So, if in fact the claimed invention is nothing more than what nature itself can do, then ipso facto there is no invention in the patent sense. Regardless of timing, and yes, even for patents “in their fifteenth year,” if it becomes known that in fact, the claimed invention is not something more, the claimed invention ceases to be patent eligible.

    This is not to say that there is no “invention” (as clearly the invention itself by man is not wiped away as if it never happened), but it is to say that there is no patentable invention. The Court’s judicial exceptions have always been grounded in the Court’s view that not all inventions are covered by the Patent Clause. So while there may exist the hand of man, there may exist some discovery, that alone is not enough.

    In the instant case the court has been directed to reconsider its decision in light of the Court reasoning (and this includes both holding and dicta) in Prometheus. There is a parallel between the “something more” in the process sense of Prometheus, in which the Court made no attempt to clarify how much is enough (while sating that that particular application was note enough), and the “something more” in the composition sense of the present case. In fact, this is not a new concept and is covered by the difference in kind doctrine.

    With all due respect to Mr. Heller, this doctrine is not about timing. Timing alone is clearly insufficient to address the important concerns that the Court has identified. Timing alone is insufficient to address the identified ability of all man to pick up, have, and use freely that which nature provides. Timing alone lacks the “something more.” No, it is clear that the difference in kind means that the claimed item cannot be the product of nature. The hand of man must do something more than what nature does.

    But how much more?

    Therein is the rub. Just as in Prometheus That question does not have an objective and clear cut answer. That question is answered with the non-bright line answer of “effectively” different.

    The effectively different must be something more.

    And that something more must be something meaningfully more.

    In Prometheus, the court acknowledged the transformation steps, which under MOT would have indicated patentability (and it is important to note that the Court did not say the CAFC was in error in their MOT analysis). Rather, the Court said “Yes, there is transformation, and No, there must be more.” So too, in the instant case, the court may in fact come back and say “Yes, there are structural differences, and No, there must be more.”

    The Court in Prometheus has re-awakened the need for a clear inventive gist that is something more than the mere categories that Congress has put forth in the words of 101. What started in the eligibility question of the category of process is not contained within that category. The Court believes that “clever drafting” would only too easily defeat such a specific category “containment” and have spread their “something more required” to all of the enumerated categories. And just as in Prometheus for a process patent application in which a step of the process is admitted to involved transformation, for those patent applications in the composition category mere lip service to “structure,” or rather, to a difference in structure, will not be enough.

    Does the structural differences in Myriad cross that threshold?

    I do not know. The court may very well conclude that the claimed invention does cross that threshold. On the other hand, the court may hold that the claimed invention does not cross that threshold, that the claimed invention is only effectively the same as the product of nature, that there is not enough difference to merit a designation of a difference in kind.

    But make no mistake, there is a threshold to cross. There is a product of nature exclusion.

    And that product of nature exclusion is not, and cannot be time-constrained. What can be, and what should be, taken from this case and remembered and applied to all future cases is that the Court has been consistent that there is an implicit if unstated constraint on patent eligibility and that anything, any process or any composition that is effectively not different enough does not merit a patent.

  168. 328

    Now that’s a meaningless platitude.

    I do what I can with the time I have.

    You excuse yourself from common courtesy by invoking some notion of time constraint, and yet you are the most prolific poster thread after thread.

    It appears that you have nothing but time. IF you will all of this time to post cannot be bothered with something as small as common courtesy, you should find a different hobby, one that does not involve interacting with other people.

  169. 327

    “Probably human beings. ”

    Probably? LMAO! What else can build laboratories and factories? Did you think super intelligent monkeys did it? You know the kind slightly smarter than you.
    Look you jerk wad, Products of nature can’t be made by man, and thus can’t be invented.

  170. 326

    Sir, you have a very odd way of closing your eyes and imagining what the law means.

    That has to be the most twistest view of “This Court has long held” that I have ever seen.

  171. 325

    More of Ned’s “Kill the patient in order to save him” philosophy…?

    Why not jump from the thought that a claim ENTIRELY performed in the mind lends legal support to eliminating ALL claims that have ANY mental steps in them — what kind of logic is this?

    Didn’t anyone at Lilly tell Armitage that he was naked that day?

  172. 324

    I don’t think it’s a problem with plants and animals per se.

    After all, the ever-wise Supreme Court carefully chose the words that said that the critical difference was not between living and unliving things… (so unless the Supreme Court was out of line and MAKING new law, their view merely expresses the law as already passed by Congress).

    The problem is with the offspring. The simpler thing to do (and the likely thing that should happen in the Monsanto case) is to rule that the first sale exhausts the patent, offspring and all.

  173. 323

    What’s pitiful is that you think the spam-bot is an independent source (are you really that much of an intellectually dishonest degenerate?), or do you always glory in self-adulation (because no one else will?

    Well, no one outside of Ned that is. And you see how keen his grasp is on reality.

    [eye roll]

  174. 322

    Different in kind from the item in nature, Ned. That is the holding.

    You are reading WAY too much into the decision and missing the basics.

    You are seeing what you want to see, and nothing else.

  175. 321

    Your lack of an answer obviously leaves the caveat undefended.

    Or in your “great mind” things happen because you “think about it” but don’t share those thoughts with the rest of the community?

    It’s opposite day with the make-believe world stuff isn’t it? More of the same from you, accusing others of what you do.

    It’s very transparent, and more than just a little sad.

  176. 320

    Why do you keep on asking such (loaded) questions and keep on avoiding giving answers to questions already asked of you?

    And yet you never ever have anyhing of substance to say

    I see you are back at accusing others of what you do, as you have said nothing of substance to any of the questions put to you. You make a grand statement, decalre it obvious to anyone, and yet cannot defend even the simplest of probes.

    Why is that?

    To answer your question, answer this: Is the composition X as claimed, effectively the same compostion X found in nature? Why or why not?

    Then answer the question of why do you go to such great lengths to contrive such a loaded question when a simple and direct question so readily shows the flaw in your dear beloved caveat? Why do you not fix the caveat so plainly in error?

  177. 319

    Baby, they held that the claimed subject matter was made by man and not found in nature.  In other words, assuming aguendo that a product of nature exception exists, this claim is not to a product of nature, but to a product of man.

    Chakrabarty did not hold anything unpatentable on a product of nature theory.  That is what is material to this discussion.

  178. 318

    Starting, did you know that extracted adrenalin and its use was long known and the prior inventors of that process/producte were trying to figure out how to purify the active hormone from everything else.  The inventors were consulted and they used a process developed in Japan for a similar use and it worked to produce pure adrenalin.  The inventors then applied for a patent on the purified product.

    Thus in point of material fact the extracted adrenalin was KNOWN and prior art.  The inventorss had to establish patentability over this KNOWN but impure product.

    During the course of his opinion, Hand then opined that he thought that even the extracted product was patentable.  This, my friend, eliminates any theory whatsoever that Hand was talking about whether purified adrenalin was only patentable over nature when it was different in kind from nature.  It had to be different, he ultimately held the claimed compound to be, different in kind from the KNOWN PRIOR ART!!!!!!!!

  179. 317

    No.

    And this is more of the same “strawman” type of discussion I asked you to desist from.

    One more time: what Abe and I ae discussing is not law. The Supreme Court reacts to what the law is (and was). The Supreme Court would not venture an opinion on what a possible law would be, IF there was such a possible law contemplated by Congress. The US has this thing against such future prospective things (look up case or controversy doctrines).

  180. 316

    suckie Celebrating the repetition of your post by a spam-bot (while leaving critical questions unanswered) is pretty pitiful.

    What’s pitiful, suckie, is that the “spambot” makes so much more sense than you.

  181. 315

    suckie: Now different in kind is gobbledygook?

    Really?

    Suckie, consider composition X, claimed in a patent granted in year 1 as a solution consisting of water and a protein 29 amino acids in length, with a protein concentration not less than 0.1 M, shown to cure cancer in children. Is this composition “different in kind” from the contents of the gall bladder of a newly described mouse species, demonstrated in year 15 to contain less than 0.001 micromole of the identical amino acid (purpose unknown), in a mixture of mostly toxic compounds? Why or why not? What if composition X comprises 200 R groups and one of those R groups differs from the “natural” version in the gall bladder of the mouse, albeit in an easily engineered way? Does the answer change? Why or why not?

    Please please tell us what is written in the wall of the bathroom stall in the Church of Learned Hand. You seem to know everything, suckie. And yet you never ever have anyhing of substance to say, nor do you keep the same pseudoynm long enough for anyone to keep up with your relentless horses**t.

  182. 314

    The carefully chosen word of “hold” says otherwise.

    Unless you now wish to “re-interpret” the very same direct words to mean something else…

    (put the shovel down – the hole you are in just keeps getting deeper)

  183. 313

    Obviously you don’t. This is at least the second time you tried to use something expressly different in kind to be the same thing as a product of nature.

    It boggles the mind to think why or how you think the case supports an allowability to claim prodcuts of nature. You could not ask for a more incongruent case.

  184. 312

    Mr. Baby, and then go read the cases.  There is no product of nature exclusion in any of them.  The court appears to have been extending the law of nature and natural phenomena language to include product of nature.  Indeed.  I will concede that much.  Which is why I have asked you, or perhaps some other poster that uses descriptive monikers, to tell us whether in your opinion Chakrabarty could be viewed has holding that the prior law extended to products of nature.

  185. 311

    Mr. Not, According to every SC case on patentable subject matter, O'Reilly v. Morse is a patentable subject matter case.  That its discussion includes a discussion of breadth does not mean that that was the only thing it discussed.

    But it does raise an interesting issue post-Prometheus, if a claim is unduly broad, is the problem properly one of 112, or one of 101?

  186. 310

    Mr. Douglas, OK.  

    If Congress could authorize the patenting of a principle, explain why the Supreme Court's discussion of such a patent in Morse was wrong.  All the specification would have to do is state the principle, and perhaps provide a few illustrations and descriptions.  No working embodiment would have to be described.  Do you agree?

  187. 309

    the caveat was exposed as pure malarky

    That never happened, suckie. At least it didn’t happen outside of your sad mind and the make-believe world you inhabit.

    Keep shrimping, suckie.

  188. 307

    IANAE, ugh.

    The statutes do not cover sexually reproduced plants and animals.  They cover making, using and selling the invention.  If the invention is a plant, the seed is the plant in a certain state.  Selling the seed sells the plant.  

    Obviously, congress needs to put its foot down and stop the courts and the pto from allowing utility patents on plants and animals.  This is getting ridiculous.

  189. 306

    Celebrating the repetition of your post by a spam-bot (while leaving critical questions unanswered) is pretty pitiful.

  190. 304

    The point was a subtle one, so I am not surprised that you missed it.

    First, it was a slap at your view that Prometheus was the end all and be all of 101 jurisprudence.

    Second, you seem to have this crazy notion that only holdings make law, and that there has never been a holding concerning the prohibition of products of nature yet, you miss the carefully chosen words of the Supreme Court in your pinnacle of 101 (which reinforces the precedent you wish to ignore):

    The Court has long held that this provision contains an important implicit exception.

    Pay attention to the carefully chosen word: held.

    The rest of the passage has been explained in enough detail already.

    So when is the due date?

  191. 303

    Mr. Know it all, from Benson

    "He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there is to be invention from such a discovery, it must come from the application of the law of nature to a new and useful end." We dealt there with a "product" claim, while the 68*68 present case deals with a "process" claim. But we think the same principle applies.

    "Here the "process" claim is so abstract and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of the BCD to pure binary conversion. The end use may (1) vary from the operation of a train to verification of drivers' licenses to researching the law books for precedents and (2) be performed through any existing machinery or future-devised machinery or without any apparatus."

    and from the very case that both rely upon for the principle of law:

    Le Roy v. Tatham,
    "The word principle is used by elementary writers on patent subjects, and sometimes in adjudications of courts, with such a want of precision in its application, as to mislead. It is admitted, 175*175 that a principle is not patentable. A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right. Nor can an exclusive right exist to a new power, should one be discovered in addition to those already known. Through the agency of machinery a new steam power may be said to have been generated. But no one can appropriate this power exclusively to himself, under the patent laws. The same may be said of electricity, and of any other power in nature, which is alike open to all, and may be applied to useful purposes by the use of machinery.In all such cases, the processes used to extract, modify, and concentrate natural agencies, constitute the invention. The elements of the power exist; the invention is not in discovering them, but in applying them to useful objects. Whether the machinery used be novel, or consist of a new combination of parts known, the right of the inventor is secured against all who use the same mechanical power, or one that shall be substantially the same.A patent is not good for an effect, or the result of a certain process, as that would prohibit all other persons from making the same thing by any means whatsoever. This, by creating monopolies, would discourage arts and manufactures, against the avowed policy of the patent laws."
    http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9195622383669422745&q=benson&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5

  192. 302

    the claim is too broad

    Breadth is a 112 issue, not a 101 issue.

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