No idea if this is correct, but figured it deserved a post. The article asserts that if a provisional was filed in the name of the assignee (applicant), it cannot serve as the basis for a priority claim because the statute says only that a provisional filed by “an inventor” can serve that purpose. Anyone have insight? Further, the article portrays this as affecting only universities, but one would think a broader impact more likely?
Lawyer sends over a 30(b)(6) request trying to get the deposition of the corporation as to why certain prior art had not been submitted during prosecution. Rather than have an employee investigate and figure out why the art wasn’t disclosed, or object to the notice, the recipient produces an employee who basically says, “I didn’t investigate but we’re an honest company and so if we didn’t disclose it, it’s because we didn’t know about it or it wasn’t material.”
The judge wasn’t amused, and the decision in Raytheon v. Cray (E.D. Tex. Payne, J., June 6, 2017), is here. “The rules don’t give Ratheon the right to ignore” the 30(b)(6) notice is about as simple as it gets. Boy, there are days I don’t miss litigation!
We live in interesting times. Specficio (here) allows registered practitioners to submit a claim set (one independent with as many dependent as desired), and the software drafts a specification for review before submission. Currently, it supports only software-related inventions. The biographies of the founders reveal a lawyer, a venture capitalist, a linguistic expert, and more.
AI is going to affect everything in the law, and it happened already and will increase in speed exponentially (literally) over the next few years. Beyond the basic question of the quality of the value-add the service provides, I had these questions:
First, what about conflicts? This entity is going to provide a specification to anyone who submits a claims set. So, imagine two competitors, and a lawyer for Company A and a lawyer for Company B submit claim sets, and submit them. This company provides specs for claims that interfere. Conflict of interest? If it’s not, why not? In this regard, the TOS says that it is not providing legal advice, and so any ethical rules about conflicts would not apply, presumably.
Privilege and Confidentiality.
You are engaging Specifio to provide the Site and Services in order to assist you in providing provision of legal advice to your client.
It is understood that only you and your client have the right to assert or waive the attorney-client privilege, not Specifio.
To the extent permitted by law, it is intended and agreed that any communications made to Specifio by you or your client in connection with your use of the Site and Services shall be privileged and that any such communications shall be made to facilitate communications between you and your client and to aid you in rendering legal advice to your client. We, therefore, shall not divulge to anyone any communication (or part or substance thereof) received from you or your client in connection with the Site and Services.
Definition of Confidential Information
For the purposes of this paragraph 1, “Confidential Information” means patent claims, and any resultant draft patent application specifications and/or drawing figures generated by the Services, that you e-mail to us or that we e-mail back to you in accordance with the intended use of the Services.
Restrictions on Use and Disclosure
We may keep and use obscured content-stripped versions of your Confidential Information; however, the content words will be removed from the documents and replaced with nonspecific symbols so that the meaning of the text cannot be ascertained. For example:
The present disclosure relates to systems and methods for facilitating review of a confidential document by a non-privileged person by stripping away content and meaning from the document without human intervention such that only structural and/or grammatical information of the document are conveyed to the non-privileged person
would look something like this:
the p0018 d0017 r0019s to systems and methods for f0000ing r0001 of a c0002 d0003 by a n0004 p0005 by s0006ing a0007 c0008 and m0009 from the d0003 without h0010 i0011 such that only s0012 and/or g0013 i0014 of the d0003 are c0015ed to the n0004 p0005.
We use these obscured content-stripped versions for limited internal purposes only, such as to analyze document structures and word forms, which helps use do things like provide you with better support services and improve the Services.
In addition, Specifio does not train its machine-learning models on the content of any Confidential Information. This helps ensures there is never “cross pollination” between patent applications.
We will not disclose to anyone that you are a Specifio customer or that you are using the Services, without your prior written consent in each instance.
The restrictions set forth in paragraph 1 will not apply with respect to any Confidential Information that: (i) was or becomes publicly known through no fault of ours; (ii) was rightfully known or becomes rightfully known to us without confidential or proprietary restriction from a source other than you who has a right to disclose it; (iii) is approved by you for disclosure without restriction in a written document which is signed by you; or (iv) we independently develop without access to or use of your Confidential Information. The restrictions set forth in paragraph 1 will not restrict us from disclosing Confidential Information pursuant to the order or requirement of a court, administrative agency, or other governmental body, provided that we give you reasonable notice to enable you to contest such order or requirement
The restrictions set forth in this paragraph 1 will survive the termination or expiration of your use of the Site and Services.
You agree to reimburse us for reasonable legal fees and expenses incurred in connection with any litigation or administrative proceeding resulting from: (i) our failure or refusal of to comply with any attempt to compel us to disclose any communication described in described in this paragraph 1 (or part or substance thereof) or to produce documents or (ii) the obtaining of, or attempt to obtain, a court order compelling us to disclose any communication described in this paragraph 1 (or part or substance thereof) or to produce documents.
Next, despite saying that it’s not providing legal services, drafting a specification is — at least as the term is now understood — the practice of law. If that is so, then we have a corporation providing legal services. Can you use a corporation to provide legal services to your client in your state? That might be the unauthorized practice of law, so check. Further, the founders, presumably sharing the fees, do not appear to all be lawyers, or registered practitioners. Lawyers cannot let non-lawyers control representations. Lawyers cannot share legal fees with non-lawyers. It all could be perfectly fine, but those facts gave me pause. Again, it’s a new world.
Further, the TOS says the services can be performed anywhere in the world. That could create a need for disclosure to a client, and, potentially at least, some other issues if the information in the claims is particularly sensitive.
Please note: I’m not saying this is unethical, illegal, or a bad idea. I have no informed opinion. I see issues. I am a big fan of reducing legal costs and speeding up patenting (that’s going to be critical in the near future). But, despite looking at the entity’s web page, I have questions that, if I were you, I’d investigate first.
Someone reached out to me and pointed out that Gene Quinn over on ipwatchdog is quite upset by the fact that there is no code of judicial ethics specific to PTAB judges and the like. His latest article, of many, is here. That’s a good idea.
There should be a specific and distinct set of ethical rules applicable to them. I’m not sure there isn’t one already. 28 USC 455 applies to all federal judges, including somewhat analogous magistrates, and could be interpreted to extend to them. (I doubt it, but I haven’t researched it.) If it doesn’t, the USPTO could by regulation (or internal operating procedure, perhaps) simply adopt the language of Section 455 and get this done. And it should.
Mr. Quinn goes on at length about alleged personal unethical conduct, and makes some sharp accusations and personal attacks that I don’t want to leave any impression that I agree with.
But some of his accusations arise from his belief about legal ethics or federal law that go directly to the idea of the substance of a code and so I’ll touch on those limited ones, and only some of those. For example, Mr. Quinn writes “there is no time limit on a duty to a former client, at least if you are a patent practitioner. So the 1-year recusal period is wholly without precedent and inappropriate for PTAB judges.” Likewise, Mr. Quinn states that federal law governing Article III judges “has specific provisions that would seem to absolutely prohibit a judge from handling a case where a litigant is a former client.”
Neither argument should be taken seriously in crafting a PTAB code.
With respect to lawyers, pretty much every jurisdiction recognizes there is a “time limit” (as he puts it). It works this way: I can be adverse to a former client if information I learned from the former representation has become generally known or has become “stale.” So there is a “time limit” of sorts, by rule in most jurisdictions and in case law in others so far as I know.
As for judges, there is no prohibition against a judge ever adjudicating a dispute involving even a former client the lawyer personally represented. No, the federal statute regulating Article III judges (and magistrates) (28 USC 455) and the Code of Judicial Conduct don’t state some minimum amount of time that must pass after a lawyer represents a client before she can judge a dispute involving that former client. But, with the federal judiciary, two years seems to be the outside long “norm” for a judge to wait before adjudicating cases involving former clients the judge actually and personally represented. See, e.g., Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Life Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 617, 621-22 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The norm among new appointees to the bench is that once two years pass, perhaps even earlier, a judge is free to sit in controversies involving former clients”) (emph. added)).
My point is that having a set of rules specific to adjudicative officials is probably a good idea. I do hope the USPTO takes the idea to adopt a set of rules applicable to adjudicative officials seriously, both to encourage confidence in the system and to avoid subjecting officials to criticism unanchored to a well-known standard like Section 455.
Perhaps there are other entities like this, but if so they haven’t made the boom that this one has. Blackbird Technologies was founded by former big-firm (WilmerHale, Kirkland Ellis) patent litigators. It buys (or somehow obtains rights to assert) patents and asserts them with its own in-house staff of litigators. Its “news” page reports a number of suits — at least 100 in its short life — and reports that it settled many.
It came onto my radar because of an interesting case involving a prosecution bar. A defendant pointed out that because Blackbird’s business is buying patents to assert, no lawyer at it should see the defendant’s highly confidential information because those lawyers could then go acquire patents that covered the defendant’s planned products. The court resolved the issue by requiring the company to covenant not to sue with respect to future products, an interesting resolution of the problem. A pertinent part of the order in Blackbird Tech LLC v. Service Lighting and Electrical Supplies, Inc., et al., C.A. No. 15-53-RGA (D. Del. May 18, 2016) (Andrew, J.) provides:
the Court will require that Blackbird agree to a covenant not to sue any of these Defendants for infringement of patents involving lighting technology that are acquired during the time between the entry of the protective order and one year after the conclusion of the litigation. To be clear, if Blackbird acquires a patent on any lighting technology6 during the restricted time period, it may never assert that specific patent against these Defendants.
(As an aside, I would love to see how it acquires patents, since some interesting ethical issues could arise from its acquisition practices, since it’s a corporation but it’s practicing law, it seems. There are some very odd issues that arise sometimes.)
Then I read that Blackbird has sued Cloudflare (Blackbird Tech LLC v. Cloudflare, Inc., which it seems is an Internet security company. In response, Cloudfare put a “bounty” on every Blackbird patent. That story is reported widely, including here and here, for example.
Blackbird states that it is designed to help small inventors overcome the obstacles of patent litigation, including the obstinate, more powerful defendant. I am know that small inventors, and small companies, sometimes face the 800 pound gorilla defendant who refuses to deal fairly, and so the benefit that something like Blackbird can bring is real. It will be interesting, however, to see if that is what Blackbird is, or if it is going to bring a bunch of nuisance suits, which Cloudflare believes it has done, as it has stated here.
This one, Nova Chemicals Corp. v. Dow Chemical Co., __ F.3d __ (Fed. Cir. May 11, 2017) (here) is interesting because of the issue it doesn’t raise, but more on that in a moment. Patentee Dow sues and obtains a judgment against Nova. Years later, the defendant believes that the judgment had been obtained by fraud, and brings an independent action in equity (as allowed by FRCP 60) to set aside that earlier judgment. Basically, Nova asserted that Dow had lacked standing, basing its argument on some later testimony in an unrelated case, and that the infringement proofs had been misleading.
To set aside a judgment under these circumstances, through an independent action, requires proof of fraud on the court or a truly grave miscarriage of justice. The district court dismissed the complaint and the CAFC affirmed that dismissal under Rule 36, without any opinion.
Then Dow moved in the district court for fees. The district court granted them under Section 285, which of course allows a court in patent cases which are “exceptional” to award fees. Nova never argued 285 did not apply, and the CAFC noted that on appeal.
The CAFC affirmed the district court’s findings, and it’s an odd case not likely to recur, so the substance of the panel’s 285 analysis isn’t too revealing.
But what is interesting to me are two things. First, the apparent concession by Nova that 285 applies to equitable actions to set aside judgments. I’m not sure that is so clear but presumably they looked at that. But it is also interesting to me, and is related to that, that this appeal (and the earlier appeal) was taken to the Federal Circuit, not to a regional circuit. The Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction is limited to civil actions arising under the patent laws, which an independent action to set aside a judgment is not, one would think…
I’ve discussed a few times this fight over whether a patent assertion entity should be required to pay full hourly fees, or anything, to a firm that dumped it after losing the case on summary judgment, when the client hired another firm, got the case reversed on appeal by paying hourly rates to the new firm, and later settled the case for significant money. The last post on it was here, and, full disclosure: I was an expert opposed to Jenner & Block, which was awarded money in the arbitration and prevailed in the state court fight over confirmation of that award.
Generally, the question before the Supreme Court is whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts a state from setting aside an award if it violates a state public policy.
An amicus brief in support of cert was just filed by the Eagle Forum (yes, Phyllis Schafly’s outfit), which is interesting in and of itself. A link to that brief is here. According to it, there is a circuit split on this issue. If, as apparently the courts below held, an arbitration award cannot be challenged even if it requires enforcement of an unethical fee agreement, it’d be nice to have the Supreme Court make that point, so the rest of us can take corrective action in legislatures. Can you imagine the holding, if the allegations are true: “an unreasonable fee can be enforced in arbitration because that’s what Congress intended when it adopted the FAA in 1925…”
It seems to me that if this is the law, maybe every lawyer-client arbitration clause will need to say: “In addition to losing your right to trial by jury, any ethical limitation on our fees will not apply…”
Think on that one.
I serve as an expert witness, and there are a variety of difficult ethical issues that being one presents, but whether you can say you’re not being paid when you are isn’t one of the difficult issues.
The case where experts allegedly were being paid when the jury was told they weren’t isn’t a patent case, but it’s interesting. At trial, the plaintiff’s lawyer allegedly told the jury that his experts weren’t being paid, but had volunteered out of concern for people injured by the product, a hip replacement device made by the defendant, J&J.
J&J loses, and it’s not just any loss, but a “bellwether” case — the first case in a series of cases, and so its outcome will affect the value of the rest of the cases. And it’s not just a loss, it’s a $500m judgment, reduced to “only” $150m under tort reform caps. And it’s not just a series of cases: there apparently 9,000 similar cases pending.
J&J has moved under 60(b) to set aside the judgment because, it asserts, in fact the experts knew they were going to be paid and were paid after trial, and a charitable donation was made. The case is on appeal in the Fifth Circuit, and there’s a longer story about it, here.
Lawyers leaving a firm are often tempted to try to persuade clients to go with them, to make copies of files that may not be their property, and to engage other activity that may constitute breach of fiduciary duty to their current firm. Some of that — and more allegedly happened in Houston, resulting in the filing of JL Salazar Firm v. Friedrich. An article about the case is here.
I’ve walked lawyers through departures many times, and most states have bar opinions providing step-by-step “instructions” for what can, and cannot be done. Often lost in the desire to leave, and to make a new start, is the fact that the clients don’t “belong” to anyone.
In patent litigation, as in all civil litigation, district courts have various means to impose sanctions for litigation misconduct. Rule 11, Rule 37, Section 1927, and, of course, Section 285 are rule- or statutorily-based means to impose costs on those who litigate improperly.
Federal courts also have the “inherent power” to impose sanctions even if one of those rules or statutes is not violated. But, because it is judicial in nature and cannot be used to swallow the rule, inherent power has long been somewhat cabined. Among other things, the Court has always held that any sanctions imposed must be causally related to the misconduct.
The Court affirmed that requirement in a non-patent case, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger (Apr. 18, 2017). In that case, Goodyear engaged in a years-long effort to hide key documents from the plaintiffs, who, not knowing of them, settled the case. When they sought sanctions, the district court awarded all of the litigation fees the plaintiff had incurred from the time when the scheme had begun: $2.7 million. It also held, conditionally, that $2 million was caused directly by the shenanigans.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, but the Court reversed, unanimously. It reiterated that in some cases — such as when the entire defense or entire claim are brought in bad faith — a shifting of all fees is proper, but found that was not the case here. Instead, unable to discern if the $2 million conditional award was appropriate, it remanded for the courts below to decide what amount had actually been caused by Goodyear’s misconduct.
Section 285 is often the myopic focus of patent litigators. While the Goodyear opinion confirms the causation requirement of inherent power, it also should remind litigators to think of all available means to seek compensation for improper litigation conduct.
Many employers allow employees to use email, but have policies that state that the employer is free to monitor email. Many cases have held that, depending on the facts, the employee cannot assert privilege under those circumstances: both in claims between employee and the employer and between the employee and a third party.
This doctrine bit another employee recently, in a New York Appellate Division case, Peerenboom v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, (N.Y. App. Div. March 16, 2017), available here. The court found spousal privilege and attorney client privilege waived because the employee (the chair of the company) lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy based upon application of the four factors from the leading case.
Any time a lawyer is aware that his client is sending emails from an employer, he should consider whether privilege will be deemed waived, and, conversely, lawyers should look to see if the opponents are doing this, and so waiving privilege.
This is not a new body of law, but it continues to bite people.
As you know, it used to be you could file a complaint for patent infringement using Form 18, which barely said anything beyond “Plaintiff owns a patent, and you infringe it.” Nowadays, patent infringement complaints, like all others, must comply with Iqbal and Twombly, which require pleading factual material that, if taken as true, plausibly states a claim upon which relief can be granted.
A while back, I wrote about how this is going to be difficult to do in some cases: how do you gather a Rule 11 basis to plead plausible facts when, for example, the claimed method is practiced by a corporation inside its well-guarded factory?
A recent decision, Harvard v. Micron (17-11249, D. Mass. Jan. 31, 2017) (available here), gives a real world example of this. The original complaint alleged that the patented method was commonly used to perform the accused process. The defendant moved to dismiss, asserting that this was not enough to make it “plausible” that, in fact, the defendant used the method.
The district court granted the motion, and the plaintiff re-pled. The defendant moved to dismiss again, saying the amendment was futile because it still failed to show plausibility. The judge denied the motion:
Harvard admitted there are multiple methods of achieving the film found on Micron’s chips, and Harvard had no way of demonstrating Micron used the patented “common” method and not one of the other procedures. Tr. Mot. Dismiss 5:13-6:16. Hence, all Harvard plausibly could argue with regard to Micron is that Micron’s chips possessed a film (which itself is not patented), and Harvard’s patented method is one of a number of possible ways to create that film. That is, Harvard suggested that it is possible that Micron uses Harvard’s patented precursors without rendering it plausible that Micron does so.
A complaint that merely argues it is possible the defendant infringes is insufficient under the Twombly standard. See Garcia-Catalan 734 F.3d at 104-05. In its amended complaint, however, Harvard does more than simply state that Micron might use the patented method because it is common. Harvard alleges that Micron has publicly contemplated using the patented precursors, as evidenced by Micron’s own patents. Am. Compl. ~ 44. In the ‘725 Patent, Micron suggests using alkylamides as an ALD precursor. Def.’s Opp’n, Ex. B, ‘725 Patent col.S, 11.24-30, ECF No. 39-3. Alkylamides are amongst the precursors encompassed by claim 24 of Harvard’s ‘539 Patent. Compl., Ex. B, ‘539 Patent col.32, 11.17-22. This explicit identification of a patented precursor makes it plausible to believe that Micron infringed upon the ‘539 Patent, and that plausibility is all that is needed to survive a motion to dismiss, see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559-60. Because the amended complaint survives the Twombly standard, its filing would not be futile.
While all well and good, the problem is that often this evidence will not be available, allowing infringement to go unchecked. Further, this pleading problem means that patent drafters should think of ways to claim the method in such was as to avoid the problem. That may not always be possible, of course.
I wrote about this issue below: a Texas appellate court held that the Federal Circuit’s law on privilege did not apply to a claim involving a breach of contract, and so communications that (might?) be privileged under federal law were discoverable in state court. There’s a ton of briefing between the parties and other amicus on whether, or not, Texas state courts should recognize a patent agent-client privilege.
I chimed in and said that under existing choice of law principles in Texas, it should defer to federal law. My brief is here.
No clue how the Court will rule, but for the sake of certainty and expense, I hope they agree with my views.
It’s available here.
Of course, most of you are using good docketing software. Please do. And use redundant systems and verification of data entry. Missing a deadline is one of those “easy targets” that will get you sued.
Although I understand why it is so, I often joke that patent prosecutors seem to miss only deadlines for the very valuable patents….
It is common for different entities to have input into prosecution, as where a licensee has input into prosecution of pending applications. In such circumstances, the parties likely can assert a “common interest” privilege so that third parties cannot access their communications. However, courts continue to conflate the existence of a common interest with implied joint attorney client relationships.
In the most recent example (others are in our book), DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. (“DePuy”) entered into a research agreement with Orthopaedic Hospital (“OH”). OH would develop products and DePuy would pay a royalty if any were commercialized. Some patent applications were filed. OH later contended that DePuy had developed products that required it pay OH a royalty; DePuy refused, and OH brought a declaratory judgment. See DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. v. Orthopaedic Hosp., 2016 WL 7030400 (Dec. 1, 2016).
In the course of the lawsuit, OH moved to compel all documents from DePuy related to prosecution of the patent applications. DePuy refused to provide the documents. In doing so, it conceded that the parties shared a common interest with respect to the patent applications, but contended that DePuy’s in-house attorney did not jointly represent both OH and DePuy when doing so.
The court held that as a matter of law DePuy’s in-house lawyer represented both it and OH. In doing so, it applied the test for determining whether a lawyer represents a client. Thus, because the lawyer jointly represented both OH and DePuy, nothing was privileged between them in this dispute.
As I’ve written, this is legally incorrect. The issue isn’t whether DePuy’s in-house lawyer represented one client, but whether she represented two. When that is the issue, courts that appropriately analyze this issue recognize that a different analysis is required. For example, implying a joint-client relationship can create conflicts of interest. Further still, with respect to in-house counsel, this could create the unauthorized practice of law (for example, if she were not licensed in the state where the activities occurred, but registered by the state, and the “representation” went beyond that necessary to practice before the USPTO. It could also result in liability by in-house counsel to third parties, and in-house counsel typically don’t have malpractice insurance.
This same fact pattern has bitten several outside firms and in-house counsel before. Any time a lawyer is prosecuting patents where there is some agreement where a “non-client” has input — a joint venture agreement, a license, a joint development agreement — the lawyer should be extremely careful to ensure that the “non-client” knows it is not a client.
This is probably obvious, but while nonpayment of fees (or expenses) may under some circumstances permit a lawyer to withdraw from a case, it does not permit the lawyer to reveal confidential information. What does a lawyer do if (as sometimes happens) the client objects to withdrawal?
The ABA in ABA Formal Ethics Op. 476 (Dec. 19, 2016) (here), said that the lawyer should (a) in the initial motion say nothing more than “professional considerations” or the like; (b) if pressed by the court, point out that the court should rule without requiring disclosure; and (c) only if pressed or in the alternative, offer to provide the information for in camera review.
I’d written about the potential for 285 to be used to shift fees, not onto the losing party, but onto the losing party’s lawyer, here. Ya’ll told me I was nuts.
In an unusual order dated January 25, 2017 in Iris Connex v. Dell (E.D. Tex 2:15-cv-1915-JRGJ) (here), after finding no infringement, Judge Gilstrap allowed post-judgment discovery and concluded that the case was exceptional. Stripping it way down, because the infringement contention was frivolous (and other things), Judge Gilstrap imposed joint and several liability among the corporate plaintiff, its parent company and the plaintiff’s sole officer (a lawyer) (in effective, piercing the corporate veil) for the fees awarded under 285.
The case may, as a result, be useful tool to combat shell patentees run by lawyers to shake down legitimate businesses through nuisance settlements. This is of course, when claims are frivolous, in need of policing. Then-Chief Judge Rader, Professor Chien and I, wrote about that a while back, and I wrote about the need to police this, and also to watch out for strategic behavior by defense lawyers, well before then!
This is interesting and the case name (wait for it) sort of ironic. The district judge ordered the parties to disclose to each other whether they had done a mock trial, to keep a list of participants, and to cross-check participants against potential jurors and notify the other side if there was a match. In addition, the judge ordered the parties to disclose in camera a list of participants.
Obviously, I think, a lawyer who knows that a potential juror participated in a mock trial has to disclose that fact, but this goes beyond that and is not something I’d seen before.
The case is 3rd Eye Surveillance, LLC v. City of Ft. Worth (E.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 2017), here.
Yeah, shameless self-promotion, but it’s a good resource focused on ethical issues that affect all litigation, but taking into account the oddities of patent suits.
Orders yours today here
Patent lawyers who are not licensed should register or should be extremely careful to limit their practice to “practice before the patent office” or various unauthorized practice of law issues, privilege waiver, and other problems can result. In-house lawyers have to be really careful to ensure the state registration includes advice to affiliates, and not just the corporate employers, and any kind of charge by the employer for the lawyer’s services can raise lots of issues. (Fun times.)
So, I’m writing a paper on privilege (patent agent, and patent lawyers who are in-house but not licensed in the state they practice in). In the course of doing so , I’ve been reading these state statutes and also thinking about them. I compiled a list and thought I’d share it. The ABA’s first, since it compiles them, but many links are broken and so the correct ones follow. So, if you don’t see your state, go to the ABA site. If you see your state, use this link.
If you haven’t thought through the privilege issues, you should give your in-house friends a heads up. You can also use lack of authority to attack many things, like opinions of counsel, privilege…
- AL: https://www.alabar.org/assets/uploads/2014/08/Auth.-House-Counsel-ruleVIII.pdf
- CA: http://www.courts.ca.gov/cms/rules/index.cfm?title=nine&linkid=rule9_46
- DE: http://courts.delaware.gov/rules/pdf/SupremeCourtRules.pdf RULE 55.2
- ID: https://isb.idaho.gov/pdf/rules/ibcr.pdf RULE 225
- IA: https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/ACO/CourtRulesChapter/06-14-2012.31.pdf RULE 31.16
- KS: http://www.kscourts.org/rules/Rule-List.asp?r1=Rules+Relating+to+Admission+of+Attorneys RULE 712
- KY: https://govt.westlaw.com/kyrules/Document/NC4429FD0A91C11DA8F5EE32367A250AE?viewType=FullText&originationContext=documenttoc&transitionType=CategoryPageItem&contextData=(sc.Default)
- MI:http://courts.mi.gov/courts/michigansupremecourt/rules/documents/rules%20for%20the%20board%20of%20law%20examiners.pdf RULE 5
- MN: https://www.revisor.mn.gov/court_rules/rule.php?type=pr&subtype=admi&id=9
- NE: https://supremecourt.nebraska.gov/supreme-court-rules/ch3/art12
- OH: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/LegalResources/Rules/govbar/govbar.pdf RULE VI SECTION 6
- OK: http://www.okbar.org/Portals/13/PDF/Governance/Rules-Creating-Control.pdf ART II SECTION 5
- RI: https://www.courts.ri.gov/Courts/SupremeCourt/Supreme%20Court%20Rules/AdmissionBar-ArticleII.pdf RULE 9
- TN: http://tncourts.gov/rules/supreme-court/7 SECTION 10.01
- VA: http://www.vsb.org/pro-guidelines/index.php/corp-council/