As expected, the USPTO issued just under 300,000 utility patents in calendar year 2015. The new number represents a drop from 2014 – the first drop since President Obama took office and appointed David Kappos as USPTO Director. Barring a new radical transformation of the Office, I expect that the grant numbers will hover around this mark for the next several years.
by Dennis Crouch
In this decision, the Federal Circuit has affirmed that the IPR procedure allowing the same PTAB panel to both institute an IPR and issue the final decision cancelling the claims is proper. In the process, the divided court rejected both a constitutional and statutory challenge.
In Ethicon Endo-Surgery v. Covidien (Fed. Cir. 2016)[1], a divided Federal Circuit has affirmed the PTAB’s final judgment that all of Ethicon’s challenged patent claims are invalid as obvious. The court also confirmed that the PTAB’s procedure of having the same panel decide both the IPR initiation petition and the final decision is proper. “Neither the statute nor the Constitution precludes the same panel of the Board that made the decision to institute inter partes review from making the final determination.”
Ethicon’s U.S. Patent No. 8,317,070 is directed to a surgical stapling device used in endoscopic surgery. The purported novelty of the stapler is that it uses (a) two sets of staples (with different heights) and (b) staples with non-parallel legs. The prior art included surgical staplers with each of these features, but no prior art teaches the combination of the two. “Thus, the purported inventive aspect of the ’070 patent is the combination of these two features in a surgical stapler.”
From the majority’s perspective, the case involves a straightforward application of KSR’s holding that a “combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.” Here, the court noted that the patent itself “discloses no particular synergy resulting from the combination.” Ethicon did present evidence of commercial success of Covidien’s infringing product. However, that argument failed because, according to the court, Ethicon provided no evidence of nexus between the particular inventive combination of features and the proven commercial success.
Nowhere does Ethicon demonstrate, or even argue, that the commercial success of the Covidien products is attributable to the combination of the two prior art features—varied staple heights and non-parallel staple legs—that is the purportedly inventive aspect of the ’070 patent.
I’ll pause here to note that that the court’s nexus requirement here appears to be doctrinally different than the more traditional requirement that the commercial-success be linked to the claimed invention (as a whole) rather than the clearly more stringent inventive features of the claimed invention. See Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“the patentee must establish a nexus between the evidence of commercial success and the patented invention.”).
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Ethicon also argued (unsuccessfully) that the PTAB’s procedure violated Ethicon’s procedural due process rights. In particular, Ethicon argued that the final decision was invalid because it was “made by the same panel that instituted the inter partes review.” The appellate panel rejected that argument- finding that “[t]he inter partes review procedure is directly analogous to a district court determining whether there is ‘a likelihood of success on the merits’ and then later deciding the merits of a case” and that the initial decision to grant a petition did not create any presumption of prejudice or bias against the patentee.
Ethicon’s best (but still weak) argument was that the AIA does not permit the PTAB to make the institution determination. In particular, the statute gives the PTAB power and authority to make final determinations regarding an IPR, but assigns the USPTO Director the power to institute IPRs. The statutory scheme, according to Ethicon, requires separation of these two functions. On appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected that argument as well – finding that the USPTO director has implicit authority to delegate her authority to officials within the agency.
Ethicon argues that because Congress (1) specifically gave the Director the power to institute, see, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), (2) did not explicitly give the Director authority to delegate the institution decision to the Board, and (3) gave the Board the power to make the final determination, Congress intended to keep the functions of institution and final decision separate.
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The majority opinion was penned by Judge Dyk and joined by Judge Taranto. Judge Newman wrote in dissent arguing that the statutory scheme created a clear distinction:
At the first stage, the Director determines whether the review is to be instituted. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (“The Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition.”). (Of course, the Director may designate an examiner or solicitor to conduct this initial review.)
If instituted by the Director, the Board then conducts a trial on the merits. 35 U.S.C. § 316(c). . . .
The bifurcated design of post-grant review is clear not only from the language of §§ 314(a) and 316(c), but pervades the structure of these post-grant proceedings. Congress unambiguously placed these separate determinations in different decision-makers, applying different criteria. The majority’s endorsement of the PTO’s statutory violation departs not only from the statute, but also from the due process guarantee of a “fair and impartial decision-maker.”
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Phil Johnson (President of the Intellectual Property Owners Association) argued the case on behalf of Ethicon while Kathleen Daley of Finnegan argued for Covidien and Katherine Twomey Allen of the DOJ represented the USPTO as an intervenor.
The parties relied upon Supreme Court for support and the case has some chance of heading up.
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[1] Federal Circuit Appeal No. 14-1771, appeal of PTAB IPR 2013-00209. [EthiconDecision]
by Dennis Crouch
As of January 12, the Supreme Court has granted two petitions for certiorari for this term. Both Halo and Stryker cover the same topic of enhanced damages, a.k.a. willfulness. Another 17 petitions remain pending. Following its latest conference, the Court denied two low-quality petitions (Arunachalam and Morgan) and also the SpeedTrack case which had focused on interesting but esoteric preclusion issues involving the “Kessler doctrine.”
The important inter partes review case Cuozzo survived its first conference and is up on the blocks for a second round this week. This type of immediate “relisting” occurs in almost all cases where certiorari is granted and raises the odds of grant to >50%. Because the US Patent Office is a party in the case, there would be no call for the views of the Solicitor General before granting / denying certiorari. Nine amici briefs were also filed at the petition stage – a factor that also raises the likelihood that certiorari will be granted.
1. Petitions Granted:
2. Petitions for Writ of Certiorari Pending:
3. Petitions for Writ of Certiorari Denied:
4. Prior versions of this report:
Get a Job doing Patent Law
My friends at MBHB’s Patent Docs blog are running their 8th annual patent law year-in-review Webinar via WebEx.
In this presentation, Patent Docs co-authors Dr. Donald Zuhn and Dr. Kevin Noonan and Patent Docs contributor Dr. Michael Borella will take a look back at the top patent stories of 2015, many of which will likely impact patent applicants and practitioners in the coming year.
The webinar is Thursday, January 21, 2016 10:00 am (Central Standard). No fee to participate, but participants must register in advance for CLE.
By Jason Rantanen
Wi-Lan, Inc v. Apple Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2016) Download Opinion
Panel: Reyna (author), Wallach, Hughes
Although precedential, this case doesn’t really break new patent-law ground. Instead, it offers a data point in the tricky issue of whether a post-verdict modification to the construction of a claim constitutes a permissible “clarification” or an impermissible “reconstruction.” The opinion also provides an example of how claim construction can operate at multiple levels, in this case by applying to both the meaning of a given term and the meaning of that term in the broader context of the claim.
Wi-Lan, the owner of RE37,802, a patent relating to wireless data communication, sued Apple and others for infringement based on their manufacture and sale of standards-compliant products. Claim 1 of the ‘802 patent reads:
1. A transceiver for transmitting a first stream of data symbols, the transceiver comprising:
a converter for converting the first stream of data symbols into plural sets of N data symbols each;
first computing means for operating on the plural sets of N data symbols to produce modulated data symbols corresponding to an invertible randomized spreading of the first stream of data symbols; and
means to combine the modulated data symbols for transmission.
(emphasis added). The critical claim constructions related to “modulated data symbols,” which the district court construed to mean “data symbols that have been spread apart by spreading code” and “first computing means,” which the district court construed to be a means-plus-function element linked to particular structure disclosed in the specification. Applying these constructions, a jury found that Apple did not infringe and that the ‘802 patent was invalid as anticipated. Following trial, the district judge denied Wi-Lan’s request for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on infringement but granted its request for JMOL of no invalidity based on a modified construction of the structure to which “first computing means” corresponded.
The Interdependent Text and Claim Construction
On appeal, Wi-Lan challenged the district court’s denial of JMOL on infringement (effectively challenging the jury verdict of no infringement). This issue largely turned on an issue of claim construction: whether the district court’s constructions precluded Apple’s noninfringement defense, a defense premised on the argument that the claims required that data symbols be randomized before combining them, while Apple’s products combined the symbols before randomizing them.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with Apple. The text of the claim indicated that the modulated data symbols had to be randomized before combining them. The “first computing means” produces “modulated data symbols corresponding to an invertible randomized spreading of the first stream of data symbols.'” The second means then combines “the modulated data symbols for transmission.” Since “[s]ubsequent uses of the definite articles ‘the’ or ‘said’ in a claim refers back to the same term recited earlier in the claim,” slip op. at 10, quoting Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2008), the term “the modulated symbols” in the second means element referred back to the randomized modulated symbols produced by the first means element, thus requiring randomization-before-combination. This construction was consistent with the specification.
Wi-Lan’s principal contention was that during its pre-trial construction of “modulated data symbols,” the district court rejected Apple’s argument that the term requires randomization. But, the Federal Circuit held, the district court’s construction only involved the unmodified, generic term “modulated data symbols.” Apple’s argument involved the intersection of the full language in the first means element with the use of “modulated data symbols” in the second means element: “Even though generic ‘modulated data symbols’ do not have to be randomized, the recited ‘modulated data symbols corresponding to an invertible randomized spreading‘ do have to be randomized.” Slip Op. at 11. Through its use of “the,” the second means element referred back to those randomized data symbols. Since Apple’s products combined then randomized, there was no direct infringement. (The Federal Circuit also disposed of Wi-Lan’s argument of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.)
Post-verdict claim construction
Prior to trial, the district court construed the means-plus-function element “first computing means” as “element 12 of Figures 1 and 4, columns 2:6–10, 2:36–40, 2:58–62, 4:2–12, and 4:35–44, and equivalents thereof.” Using this construction, the jury found the claims to be anticipated by a prior art reference that used real multipliers to randomize the “modulated data symbols” rather than complex multipliers. In granting Wi-Lan’s motion for JMOL of no invalidity, however, the district court “determined that, although its construction of computing means ‘does
not specifically provide for a complex multiplier,’ a complex multiplier was nevertheless necessary because ‘expert witnesses from both sides agreed that complex multipliers are part of the structure of the ‘first computing means’ as taught by the ’802 patent.'” Slip Op. at 8.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit concluded that this was an instance of impermissible post-verdict reconstruction. “‘[I]t is too late at the JMOL stage to argue for or
adopt a new and more detailed interpretation of the claim language and test the jury verdict by that new and more detailed interpretation.’ Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Mustek Sys., Inc., 340 F.3d 1314, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2003).” Slip Op. at 16. None of the corresponding structure in the court’s pre-trial construction mentioned complex multipliers or referred to the patent figure involving complex multipliers.
While a district judge may “adjust constructions post-trial if the court merely elaborates on a meaning inherent in the previous construction,” Mformation
Techs., Inc. v. Research in Motion Ltd., 764 F.3d 1392, 1397 (Fed. Cir. 2014), this was not such a case. Such “clarification” is allowed because it only makes “plain . . . what should have been obvious to the jury.” Slip Op. at 17, quoting Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific, 658 F.3d 1347, 1355–57 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Here, the implicit requirement of a complex randomizers was not obvious to the jury, particularly given conflicting testimony over whether the claims actually did require the use of a complex randomizer. The result was that the district court did not simply elaborate on the meaning of its prior claim construction in the post-verdict opinion, but altered that construction, something that it could not do.
by Dennis Crouch
Many have talked about “raising the bar” in patent cases. In his most recent article, Professor Hubbard (Baltimore) argues for “Razing the Bar.” In particular, Hubbard argues that the current structure of limiting the patent bar to only those with technical educations “is doing more harm than good.” Hubbard also notes the “paucity of critical debate” in this area. As a first step, he proposes that any U.S. attorney, regardless of their technical background, should be permitted to sit for the registration examination.
Hubbard holds a degree mathematics from Dartmouth and a J.D. from Yale; has litigated patent cases; teaches patent law courses; has written extensively on the patenting system; … but is apparently not qualified to become a patent attorney himself.
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A benefit of shift brought about by both the Courts (Alice/Mayo/Nautilus/KSR) and Congress/USPTO (administrative post grant challenges) is that there is a greater incentive to focus patents on the detailed technological improvement rather than some abstracted notion of the invention that was more the norm for past generation.* My experience is that a technology-savvy patent attorney will be better able to cost-effectively understand the important technological details. The technological-education requirement of the patent bar places one hurdle in that framework, but the market continues to operate in this area as well. For instance, many companies only hire patent attorneys with relevant experience in the appropriate technological area and don’t simply rely upon the “patent attorney” status as a total qualifier.
* I see that I’m making a claim here and will look into researching whether there is evidence to back that up. Are patents being drafted today qualitatively different than those written a decade-ago?
The pending Federal Circuit mandamus action of In re TC Heartland involves an interesting legal question that has now been fully briefed. The Federal Circuit has not yet announced whether it will hold oral arguments in the patent venue debate.
In the dispute, Heartland has asked the court to reconsider its interpretation of the patent venue statute 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) and order that the limiting elements of the provision be given effect. Under the proposed interpretation, a patent infringement case could only be filed in districts either (1) the defendant resides or (2) the defendant has both committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business. This proposal stems directly from the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) which requires either (1) residency or (2) a combination of infringing acts plus a regular-place-of-business as a prerequisite to proper patent venue.[1] For the past several decades the limits of § 1400(b) have been given essentially no weight after being undermined by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). This broadened provision undermines § 1400(b) by providing a very broad definition of the term “resides” — indicating that that “except as otherwise provided by law,” a defendant will be deemed to “reside” in any venue where the defendant is subject to that court’s personal jurisdiction in the action at hand.[2] When § 1400(b) and § 1391(c) are read together, it appears that patent cases can be filed in any venue with personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The point of the TC Heartland mandamus action is that those two provisions should not be read together, but instead, the more traditional and limited definition of “residency” should apply when interpreting 1400(b). If the Federal Circuit (or Supreme Court) were to flip on this, we would see a major impact on the current concentration of venue in the Eastern District of Texas.
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Party Briefs:
Briefs Amici:
Discussions of the Case.
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The history of the issues here have gone back-and-forth. The key Supreme Court case is Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957). In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that “28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) is the sole and exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringement actions, and that it is not to be supplemented by the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).” This statement was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Brunette Mach. Works Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., Inc., 406 U.S. 706 (1972) (“Congress placed patent infringement cases in a class by them-selves, outside the scope of general venue legislation.”) However, in 1988 Section § 1391(c) was amended to greatly expand the residency definition to the limits of personal jurisdiction and included a statement that its residency definition in § 1391(c) was “for purposes of venue under this chapter.” Subsequently, the Federal Circuit ruled in VE Holdings that the 1988 statutory amendments overruled Fourco and that the expanded residency definition §1391(c) now applies in patent cases. (§ 1400 (the patent jurisdiction provision) is in the same chapter as §1391.) In 2011, Congress again changed its statute – this time repealing the “for purposes of venue under this chapter” and instead added in that the statute applies in all civil cases “except as otherwise provided by law.”
The petition also argues for a recognition of limits on personal jurisdiction. In particular, the petition argues that a court should not automatically have jurisdiction to rule on acts of infringement that occurred in another state when the court’s personal jurisdiction over the defendant is derived from the specific alleged acts of infringement in the forum state (specific jurisdiction vs general jurisdiction). The logical key to the argument here is the legal fiction that each infringing act is a separate and distinct infringement – as such, sales in Delaware should not automatically give the Delaware courts jurisdiction to rule on whether sales in New York or California were infringing.
This case is certainly one to watch.
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[1] Section 1400(b) states that “Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.”
[2] Section 1391(c) states that “an entity … shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.”
The USPTO needs to hire a new Chief Administrative Patent Judge — head of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. Apply here https://www.usajobs.gov/GetJob/ViewDetails/425567200.
The Chief Administrative Patent Judge (Chief Judge) is a full voting member of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) as provided by Title 35 U.S. Code, Section 6, and is the immediate supervisor of the Deputy Chief Administrative Judge and second-line supervisor for all of the lead Administrative Patent Judges (Judges) assigned to the Board. The Director, the Deputy Director, the Commissioner for Patents, the Commissioner for Trademarks, and the several administrative patent judges (including the Chief Judge, Deputy Chief Judge, Vice Chief Judges, and Lead Judges) constitute the membership of the Board. Any three or more of these individuals may constitute a legal panel of the Board to render a decision in a patent appeal, an interference proceeding, a post grant review proceeding, an inter partes review proceeding, a derivation proceeding, or a proceeding under the Transitional Program for Covered Business Methods Patents (TPCBMP). The Board has the sole authority to hear and adjudicate patent appeals from decisions of Primary Patent Examiners. The Board also holds oral hearings when requested, and has the authority to grant rehearings.With respect to patent appeals, final decisions of the Board, if unfavorable to an applicant, may be appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 141. Alternatively, dissatisfied applicants may elect to bring a civil action in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 145. With respect to interferences, final decisions of the Board, if unfavorable to a party, may be appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 141. Alternatively, dissatisfied parties may elect to bring a civil action in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 146. With respect to inter partes reviews, post grant reviews, and proceedings under the TPCBMP, final decisions of the Board, if unfavorable to a party, may be appealed only to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 141. With respect to derivation proceedings, final decisions of the Board, if unfavorable to a party, may be appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 141. Alternatively, dissatisfied parties may elect to bring a civil action in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 146.
The Chief Judge is responsible for developing and implementing the USPTO rules associated with patent appeals, interferences, post grant reviews, inter partes reviews, derivations, and TPCBMP. … The Chief Judge is also responsible for developing and implementing the Standard Operating Procedures necessary for the internal operation of the Board. Furthermore, the Chief Judge is responsible for adjudicating petitions for the Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the USPTO.
The Chief Judge is responsible for the oversight and management of all Board operations. This requires performing the comprehensive executive management, strategic planning, and financial functions essential to effective Board operations. The Chief Judge is also responsible for the assignment of panels of administrative patent judges to adjudicate all patent appeals and interference proceedings, on which panels the Chief Judge periodically serves. The Chief Judge further develops and implements quality, timeliness, and productivity performance standards for the Judges to appropriately address filing and backlog issues.
For qualifications, the USPTO requires senior level management and technical experience in the areas of patent law and management. This includes both a technical degree and a law degree and must be an attorney in good-standing.
By Sarah Burstein, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Oklahoma College of Law
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc. (on petition for a writ of certiorari)
In its recently-filed cert petition, Samsung makes some particularly interesting arguments about design patent claim construction. Specifically, Samsung argues “that district courts have a duty to construe [design] patent claims and eliminate unprotected features” under Markman and that the Federal Circuit has erred in “allow[ing] district courts . . . to decline to provide any meaningful claim construction.” To put these arguments in context, a bit of background is in order.
Twenty years ago, the Federal Circuit held that Markman applies to design patents. Since then, it has struggled to decide and describe how, exactly, it applies in the design context. This difficulty isn’t particularly surprising. Markman (and later Supreme Court cases about claim construction) only dealt with utility patent claims. And utility patent claims are fundamentally different from design patent claims. Unlike utility patents, design patents can contain only one claim. The verbal portion of this claim must (in general) read as follows: “The ornamental design for [the article which embodies the design or to which it is applied] as shown.” The phrase “as shown” refers to the drawings or photographs submitted by the applicant. Therefore, design patent claims consist mainly of images, not words.
The Federal revisited the issue of Markman and design patents in 2007. When it granted en banc review in Egyptian Goddess, the court asked for briefing on the issue of whether claim construction should apply to design patents and, if so, what role that construction should play in the infringement analysis. The court received numerous amicus briefs on this issue, expressing a wide range of opinions. When the court issued its decision in 2008, it ruled that district courts do not have to—and ordinarily, should not—construe a design patent claim by providing a detailed verbal description of the design. It suggested that district courts could, nonetheless, “usefully guide the finder of fact by addressing a number of other issues that bear on the scope of the claim” by, for example, describing any relevant drawing conventions, describing the effect of any relevant matters in the prosecution history, and “distinguishing between those features of the claimed design that are ornamental and those that are purely functional.”
Then, in its 2010 decision in Richardson, the Federal Circuit indicated that district courts should “factor out” functional elements in construing design patent claims. This “factoring out” approach proved to be both unworkable and unnecessary, as Chris Carani explained in this recent LANDSLIDE article. (I think of this whole line of cases as the “FUBAR cases,” in reference to the product at issue in that case.)
When Apple v. Samsung was before the Federal Circuit, Samsung argued the district court erred in “fail[ing] to instruct the jury to ‘factor out’ the unprotectable structural and functional elements of Apple’s designs,” relying on Richardson and related cases. The Federal Circuit disagreed. In its May 2015 decision in Apple v. Samsung, the court ruled that its case law did not support Samsung’s “structural” argument. It also seemed to back away from Richardson, insisting that case “did not establish a rule to eliminate entire elements from the claim scope.” A few months later, the Federal Circuit backed even further away from Richardson in Ethicon.
In its cert petition, Samsung does not rely on—or even mention—Richardson. Instead, Samsung advocates a new approach to design patent claim construction.
Samsung’s approach is based in requirement that a patentable design be “ornamental.” Samsung argues that certain features (or aspects) of a design cannot be “ornamental” as a matter of law and that district courts must “eliminate” these “unprotected features” during claim construction.
So what are the “unprotected features” that Samsung wants courts to “eliminate”? Samsung argues that an ornamental design “cannot include ‘functional’ features, for those are the proper domain of utility patent law,” citing Bonito Boats. In this respect, Samsung’s approach sounds similar to one taken in the FUBAR cases. But Samsung would apparently go further, arguing that an ornamental design “cannot include concepts, shapes or colors,” likening them to “abstract ideas” or “physical phenomenon” under Bilski.
Samsung argues that “[a] district court can easily . . . identify to a jury a design patent’s conceptual, functional and ornamental aspects, and instruct a jury not to find infringement based on conceptual or functional similarities.” Whether or not this would actually be easy may be a matter of some debate, especially in light of past experience with the FUBAR cases. It’s also not clear what would qualify as a “conceptual” aspect (or feature) of a design.
And as a larger policy issue, it’s questionable whether verbal claim dissection is either desirable or appropriate in the context of design patents. The better approach may be, as Chris Carani argued in the LANDSLIDE article mentioned above, to simply instruct juries “that design patents only protect the appearance of the overall design depicted in the drawings, and not any functional attributes, purposes or characteristics embodied in the claimed design.”
It’s also worth noting that under Egyptian Goddess, the prior art may be used to narrow the scope of a claimed design—not through formal claim construction but as part of the infringement analysis. But in Apple v. Samsung, prior art that could have been used to narrow the scope of the claimed designs was not admitted at trial. So, if anything, this case represents a failure to make full use of the Egyptian Goddess framework, not a failure of the framework itself.
by Dennis Crouch
Welcome to 2016! As of January 1, only two petitions for certiorari have been granted this term — both covering the same topic of enhanced damages, a.k.a. willfulness. Another 20 petitions remain pending, a few of which may have legs.
New petitions from the past fortnight include Achates v. Apple (reviewability of IPR institution decision) and Vermont v. MPHJ (federal court jurisdiction in anti-troll consumer protection case).
1. Petitions Granted:
2. Petitions for Writ of Certiorari Pending:
3. Petitions for Writ of Certiorari Denied: