This one, Nova Chemicals Corp. v. Dow Chemical Co., __ F.3d __ (Fed. Cir. May 11, 2017) (here) is interesting because of the issue it doesn’t raise, but more on that in a moment. Patentee Dow sues and obtains a judgment against Nova. Years later, the defendant believes that the judgment had been obtained by fraud, and brings an independent action in equity (as allowed by FRCP 60) to set aside that earlier judgment. Basically, Nova asserted that Dow had lacked standing, basing its argument on some later testimony in an unrelated case, and that the infringement proofs had been misleading.
To set aside a judgment under these circumstances, through an independent action, requires proof of fraud on the court or a truly grave miscarriage of justice. The district court dismissed the complaint and the CAFC affirmed that dismissal under Rule 36, without any opinion.
Then Dow moved in the district court for fees. The district court granted them under Section 285, which of course allows a court in patent cases which are “exceptional” to award fees. Nova never argued 285 did not apply, and the CAFC noted that on appeal.
The CAFC affirmed the district court’s findings, and it’s an odd case not likely to recur, so the substance of the panel’s 285 analysis isn’t too revealing.
But what is interesting to me are two things. First, the apparent concession by Nova that 285 applies to equitable actions to set aside judgments. I’m not sure that is so clear but presumably they looked at that. But it is also interesting to me, and is related to that, that this appeal (and the earlier appeal) was taken to the Federal Circuit, not to a regional circuit. The Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction is limited to civil actions arising under the patent laws, which an independent action to set aside a judgment is not, one would think…