November 2010

Guest Post: What Ultimately Matters In Deciding the “Gene Patenting” Issue?

By Jacqueline Wright Bonilla, PhD, JD. Ms. Bonilla is a partner at Foley & Lardner and filed an amicus brief supporting Myriad's position.

In entering the fray of this discussion, I note that I, along with two of my colleagues at Foley & Lardner LLP, submitted an amicus brief in the AMP v. PTO (a/k/a ACLU v. Myriad) "gene patenting" case on behalf of our clients Rosetta Genomics and George Mason University. In addition to our brief, other colleagues at our firm submitted a different amicus brief on behalf of a different client, Alnylam Pharmaceuticals. Both briefs, along with Myriad's brief and a number of other amicus briefs filed last week, support a reversal of the district court opinion as it pertains to "isolated DNA" composition claims. These briefs agree that such claims are patent eligible under current law, and should continue to meet the threshold of 35 U.S.C. § 101 as a matter of policy and social considerations. We are sensitive to dire consequence to biotech innovation in the face of a possible alternative outcome.

As it turns out, however, while such briefs agree on patent eligibility of "isolated DNA" claims, a number of briefs differ in viewpoints regarding applicable law, and even which cases are relevant versus not. As such, a reading of just the briefs filed with the Federal Circuit so far—even without considering the ACLU brief yet to be filed, much less amicus briefs filed in support of the ACLU's position—underscores a point worth mentioning.

The point is this: reasonable minds can differ on an interpretation of what constitutes relevant case law and how it should be interpreted in this case. This point is often missed in the hubbub we see in the press. For instance, many have commented on the amicus brief filed by the Department of Justice last week. Some have accused the DOJ of misreading the law entirely and attempting to eviscerate biotechnology innovation altogether. Such viewpoints misread the point of the DOJ brief, in my opinion.

Look what the DOJ brief actually says. It argues that the district court got it wrong in certain important respects. As stated in the DOJ brief:

… the district court erroneously cast doubt on the patent-eligibility of a broad range of manmade compositions of matter whose value derives from the information encoding capacity of DNA. Such compositions—e.g., cDNAs, vectors, recombinant plasmids, and chimeric proteins, as well as countless industrial products, such as vaccines and genetically modified crops, created with the aid of such molecules—are in every meaningful sense the fruits of human ingenuity and thus qualify as "'human-made inventions'" eligible for patent protection under section 101. [] The district court therefore erred in invalidating the challenged composition claims, such as claim 2 of the '282 patent, that are directed solely to cDNAs.

DOJ brief, pages 9-10 (citations omitted). As part of this discussion, the DOJ likewise agrees with our position that claims directed to recombinant vectors comprising any isolated DNA—even DNA having a sequence exactly as it exists in nature—constitutes patentable subject matter. See DOJ brief, page 16, discussing claim 8 of the '282 patent. Thus, unlike the district court opinion, the DOJ proposal does not throw the entire biotech baby out with the bath water.

That said, it appears that the DOJ may cut off a hand of the biotech baby. It argues that "isolated DNA" comprising a sequence from genomic DNA as it exists in a body does not constitute patentable subject matter. The DOJ brief (pages 10-11) argues that the "chemical structure of native human genes is a product of nature," even "when that structure is 'isolated' from its natural environment."

This position presents a slippery slope of considerable concern to those affiliated with biotech innovators responsible for actually getting medical products to patients. For example, the DOJ sidesteps an important scientific fact: all isolated nucleotide compositions—regardless of sequence—are, in fact, engineered DNA molecules. Such DNA molecules are necessarily, by definition of their existence in an isolated form, "human made" inventions. These products simply do not exist without human intervention. Thus, how does one successfully distinguish what is really "human made"? Moreover, human involvement is needed to identify valuable isolated nucleic acid molecules, such as DNA vaccines, PCR probes, interfering or micro RNA, etc., and then isolate them. When exactly is the human involvement sufficient to meet § 101? An additional slippery slope in the DOJ position is that many non-nucleotide compositions also exist as "products of nature" in a human body or other natural physical state. These compositions include many valuable small molecule pharmaceuticals, proteins, antibodies, just to name a few. Such compositions could likewise be subject to the same legal reasoning propagated in the DOJ brief. In other words, the fallout of the DOJ's position has wide-sweeping implications, even if not as flabbergastingly debilitating as the district court opinion.

This all said, I propose that it does no good to simply assert that the DOJ (or any party or judge for that matter) incorrectly reads relevant case law and/or misunderstands the science wholesale. As mentioned already, reasonable minds can differ on case law interpretation in this case, and how to apply scientific facts to the law. The sheer number of briefs and differences in positions—see DOJ versus USPTO as just one example—indicates this phenomenon in vivid color.

Thus, at the end of the day, the Federal Circuit and/or Supreme Court may ultimately decide the outcome of this case based on policy and social/economic considerations. The courts will consider case law, of course, but in reality may only apply it after the fact. I also believe that any precedential decision issued here, either way, will necessarily have at least some negative fallout. In fact, the patent system itself intends negative fallout to some people by virtue of granting a right to exclude others for a limited time. Thus, keeping the ideals of patent law in mind, it will be critical for courts to choose a course of action that provides the most amount of good, while causing the least amount of collateral damage. In other words, forget all the clever legal mumbo-jumbo—what do we want to happen here for the better collective good?

My understanding of the patent system is that it exists for the very purpose of stimulating innovation, as well as public disclosure of that innovation. As discussed at length in our amicus brief (and by others), abolishing patent eligibility of genetic inventions—not to mention inventions in other areas of health and medicine potentially impacted by a decision here—will have more of a dampening effect on research, development and innovation than any patent right could ever have.

My hope is that courts will remain ever conscious of slippery slopes created by any one interpretation of the law and application of science. No one wins if we inappropriately dampen incentives for innovators to discover, apply and provide innovation to the benefit of humans.

Documents:

AstraZeneca v Apotex: Affirmance of a Preliminary Injunction

By Jason Rantanen

AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2010)
Panel: Rader, Bryson (dissenting in part), Linn (majority author),

Contrary to popular opinion, it's still possible to obtain a preliminary injunction in a patent case – it's just very difficult.  Astrazeneca v. Apotex provides an example of an affirmed preliminary injunction, and is significant for that reason alone.  It also raises some interesting inducement issues relating to intent that I'll discuss in a separate post.

Background
This case revolved around AstraZeneca's budesonide inhalation suspension drug product, which consists of a vial containing a single dose of budesonide suspended in a sterile liquid.  The drug is administered by squeezing the entire contents of the vial into a jet neubulizer, then inhaling the resulting mist through a mask attached to the nebulizer.  Because budesonide is an inhaled corticosteroid, the FDA requires that the label include a warning instructing patients to "titrate down" to the lowest effective dose of the medication to avoid any adverse effects from excessive use of the medication. 

The two patents at issue, Nos. 6,598,603 and 6,899,099, both contain method claims covering the once-daily use of the nebulized dose of a budesonide composition and product claims covering AstraZeneca's drug product kit.

Apotex sought approval to market a generic version of AstraZeneca's drug product.  As an ANDA applicant, it was well aware of AstraZeneca's patents, and sought to avoid the once-daily method claims by removing any mention of once-daily dosing from its labels.  While it succeeded in part, the FDA nevertheless required Apotex to keep the titration warning language in the generic product's label.

During the preliminary injunction proceedings, Apotex raised two principal arguments in response to the method claims.  First, it contended that they were anticipated; second, it contended that its distribution of the generic version of the drug would not induce infringement of AstraZeneca's method claims.  The district court rejected Apotex's arguments, and granted a preliminary injunction enjoining Apotex from marketing its product.

Note: The district court agreed with Apotex that the kit claims were invalid.  On appeal, the panel affirmed that determination. 

Anticipation
Apotex's first anticipation argument, involving a prior art patent, turned on a question of claim construction: whether the term "budesonide composition" encompassed budesonide encapsulated in liposomes (the '603 patent teaches dispersing budesonide in a solvent, either as a solution or a suspension that may include liposomes as an excipient).  The majority agreed with AstraZeneca's position, focusing on the discussion contained within the specification and buttressing its conclusions with extrinsic evidence (in this case, expert testimony).  Judge Bryson, dissenting on this point, reached the opposite conclusion: the claim term is not limited to budesonide directly dispresed in solvent, and thus the method claims are anticipated.

Apotex's also argued that a prior art British advertisement for AstraZeneca's product describing it as a twice-daily product anticipated the patents.  The majority again agreed with AstraZeneca that this reference did not anticipate the once-daily method claims, both because it did not disclose once daily dosing and because it was not enabled with respect to that type of dosing.  (Obviousness was apparently not in dispute, as at the time of the earlier reference no one recognized that the product could be administered once per day and still be effective).  Judge Bryson again disagreed, reading the prior art advertisement to suggest the administration of the drug once a day.

Inducement of Infringement
In challenging the district court's finding of inducement of infringement, Apotex focused on the subject of intent, arguing that its instructions did not demonstrate intent to cause the users of its product to engage in once-daily dosing and that it lacked specific intent to cause infringement of Apotex's patent.  The Federal Circuit rejected these arguments, affirming the district court's conclusion that the downward-titration instructions would necessarily result in some users engaging in once-daily dosing and noting that Apotex was well aware of the infringement problems raised by once-daily dosing, yet chose to proceed nonetheless.

Preliminary Injunction "Substantial Question of Invalidity" Standard
Although not playing a major role in the ultimate outcome of this appeal, the court's articulation of the "likelihood of success" standard, along with the subsidiary "substantial question of invalidity" element, is noteworthy given the divergent views on this subject, such as those expressed by Judges Newman and Gajarsa in Abbott Laboratories v. Sandoz, 544 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  AstraZeneca v. Apotex follows the approach of requiring a seemingly high threshold for patentees/low threshold for defendants on this issue:

For a patentee to establish that it is likely to succeed on the merits, it “must demonstrate that it will likely prove infringement of one or more claims of the patents-in-suit, and that at least one of those same allegedly infringed claims will also likely withstand the validity challenges presented by the accused infringer.” Ama-zon.com, 239 F.3d at 1351. When reviewing the grant of a preliminary injunction, this court “views the matter in light of the burdens and presumptions that will inhere at trial.” Titan Tire Corp., 566 F.3d at 1376 (citation omitted). A preliminary injunction should not issue if an alleged infringer raises a substantial question regarding either infringement or validity, i.e., the alleged infringer asserts an infringement or invalidity defense that the patentee has not shown lacks substantial merit. Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

Constitutional Inventors, First-Possession, and the Confusion of Bayh-Dole

Property law courses generally begin with the concept of first-possession as an originator of property rights. In patent law, the first-possession principle leads to a rule that potential patent rights are owned by the inventors unless and until they are assigned to another entity. See Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Machine Works, 261 U.S. 24, 35-37 (1923). The legal basis for inventor rights is derived from constitutional principles that give Congress power to enact patent laws that grant exclusive rights "to inventors." US Constitution, Article I, § 8, cl. 8.

In Stanford v. Roche, Both Stanford and the US Government argue that that the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 alters this original formula in the special case where an invention was either "conceived or first actually reduced to practice" with the use of US federal funding received by a university, non-profit, or small business. In that situation, the Bayh-Dole Act suggests that the funded-entity, the "contractor", automatically holds patent rights with a right to "elect to retain title to any subject invention." 35 U.S.C. § 202(a). If the contractor decides not to retain title, then, the funding federal agency "may receive title" or "may … grant requests for retention of rights by the inventor." 35 U.S.C. § 202(d). The Bayh-Dole Act includes a comparative-law clause making its provisions superior to those found in any other Act. "This chapter shall take precedence over any other Act which would require a disposition of rights in subject inventions of small business firms or nonprofit organizations contractors in a manner that is inconsistent with this chapter."

The Bayh-Dole language is somewhat confusing when examined through a first-possession framework. Namely, the statute indicates that the university might "retain title" and also that inventors can request "retention of rights." It is unclear from these provisions whether it is the university or the inventor that first holds rights. The US Constitution helps break this seeming conflict by focusing on inventors as the original recipient of rights. With this Constitutional backstop, there is no way that the university can be the original rights-holder. Rather, that designation must remain with the inventors.

This result may be important for the Stanford v. Roche case that was recently granted a writ of certiorari. Under a Constitutionally limited Bayh-Dole Act, Stanford cannot automatically claim first-possession rights to every invention & first reduction-to-practice that was materially supported by federal funding obtained by Stanford. At most, the Bayh-Dole law requires a transfer of rights from the inventor to the university. In the property framework, the question then focuses on the timing of the Bayh-Dole transfer (is it immediate or does it only occur upon the university's election of rights?) and on its impact on a prior transfer of patent rights to a third party.

Split Court Denies Rehearing En Banc in Sun Pharmaceuticals v. Eli Lilly

By Jason Rantanen

Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd. v. Eli Lilly and Company (Fed. Cir. 2010) (denial of rehearing and rehearing en banc)

In Sun Pharmaceutical, a Federal Circuit panel affirmed a district court determination that Eli Lilly's patent for a method of using gemcitabine to treat cancer was invalid due for obviousness-type double patenting based on another application, filed the same day, claiming the compound gemcitabine and disclosing its use for treating cancer.  (The previous Patently-O write-up is here).  This morning the Federal Circuit issued an order denying Eli Lilly's petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc.  The court was closely split on the latter, with four of the nine currently sitting judges dissenting on the decision not to rehear the decision en banc.

The dissent's principal concern was that, in its view, the panel opinion involved a departure from precedent, thus creating an intra-circuit split.  According to the dissent,

the panel held the claims to the anticancer use to be invalid for double patenting because the anticancer use was mentioned (but not claimed) in the continuation-in-part specification that is not prior art, stating that “[t]he asserted claims of the later ’826 patent simply claim the anticancer use disclosed in the specification of the ’614 patent,” reported at 611 F.3d at 1389.

The dissent pointed out that this approach, which focused on the disclosure of the simultaneously filed patent, not its claims, was contrary to precedent:

Uniformly, unlike examination for obviousness based on prior art, the issue of obviousness-type double patenting is directed to whether the invention claimed in a later patent is an obvious variant of the invention claimed in an earlier patent. The panel opinion violates a vast body of precedent.

Furthermore, according to the dissent, expanding the doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting to the facts of this case serves no good policy purpose and creates a schism in the law – a schism that should be addressed by the court en banc:

A change of law “in ways that negatively impact the patentability of important later-discovered uses” serves no public purpose in areas in which commercial development requires patent protection. Id. If the majority of the court now believes, as a matter of policy, that the law should be changed in this new direction, en banc treatment is particu-larly appropriate, for the court’s rule is that the earlier precedent prevails unless overruled en banc. A situation in which the court ignores this rule, and applies whatever law the panel prefers, is an indictment of the ability of this court to provide stable law in the areas entrusted to us.

Comment: Given that there are currently only nine sitting Federal Circuit judges, it seems unlikely that the court will grant a rehearing en banc absent extraordinary circumstances – especially in cases where the panel decision was unanimous.  In that situation, in order for an appeal to be reheard en banc, at least five of the six judges who did not participate on the panel would need to vote to rehear the decision en banc.  Of course, there are instances when this would not apply, as senior judges and visiting judges frequently participate in panel determinations, but it is something to keep in mind for the near future.

Supreme Court to hear Bayh-Dole Patent Ownership Dispute: Stanford v. Roche

Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. University v. Roche Molecular Systems, 09-1159 (Supreme Court 2010)

The Supreme Court has granted Stanford's petition for a writ of certiorari in Stanford v. Roche on an issue of patent ownership. Although the case may turn on federal patent law statutes, it looks substantially like derivative title issues considered in the law of property. The rule of derivative title generally bars a property owner from transferring rights greater than his own. One exception to the rule of derivative title is that, in certain situations, a bona fide purchaser can take title free of prior claims to the property.

The patents in this case involve methods for using PCR techniques to measure HIV concentration in blood plasma. Stanford scientists first created the invention while subject to a contractual duty to assign any inventions to Stanford. After agreeing to assign rights, but prior to the invention, one of the inventors (Holodniy) assigned his rights in his future inventions to Cetus (who later became Roche). Rather than a promise-to-assign, the assignment to Roche was an actual assignment of future inventions. Thus, on the contracts, Holodniy first promised-to-assign rights to Stanford but first actually-assigned rights to Cetus. Stanford later filed for patent protection and then demanded a royalty from Roche. The Federal Circuit held that Roche could not be liable for infringement because it held ownership rights based on the Holodniy assignment.

On appeal to the Supreme Court, Stanford has argued that its receipt of federal funding for the research somehow results in a superior claim to title. Stanford framed the question as follows:

Whether a federal contractor university's statutory right under the Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212, in inventions arising from federally funded research can be terminated unilaterally by an individual inventor through a separate agreement purporting to assign the inventor's rights to a third party.

The US Department of Justice filed a brief supporting the petition and argues that the Bayh-Dole Act does indeed establish a "framework for determining ownership interests in federally funded inventions." The Government brief argues that the Bayh-Dole Act flips the normal statutory rule that patent rights first vest with the inventor. Instead, in their view, by virtue of receiving federal funding, the university or federal contractor automatically receives title to the invention and then may "elect" to not "retain title." Under that interpretation of the law, Stanford retains full title because it received federal funding for the research and elected to pursue patent protection. The Government frames the question as follows:

Whether an inventor who is employed by a [federal] contractor that elects to retain rights in an invention may defeat the contractor's right to retain title under the Bayh-Dole Act by contractually assigning his putative rights in the invention to a third party.

The Federal Circuit rejected these questions – holding instead that the Bayh-Dole Act was not designed to automatically void contractual transfers made by an inventor simply because the research received federal funded.

In addition to the Government Brief, additional petitions-stage briefs were filed by a number of universities and university-controlled organizations that all supported the petition.

Comment: The cause of Stanford's plight is the University's failure to negotiate a tight assignment agreement with its researchers and scientists. If it has not done so yet, Stanford could fix the issue by forcing its students and employees to agree to a new assignment agreement. Thus, this particular issue is solved by contract law. A real ongoing question that the Supreme Court should focus-on with this decision involves the rights of third-party inventors who are not under any contractual duty to assign rights to a university or federal contractor. Does that third party retain rights when the University can show that the invention process was at last partially federally funded. This issue arises in collaborative projects where the work of a subset of inventors receives federal funding.