Amicus Brief in Novartis v. Accord

Ethics

By David Hricik, Mercer Law School

Dennis on the main page had written a couple months back about the opinion of Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Accord Healthcare, Inc., 38 F.4th 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2022), and the “strange” way the result flipped from a 2-1 panel decision affirming a factual finding by a district court (which had been consistent with prior findings by the PTAB and others) that there had been written description, to a new panel issuing a 2-1 decision on re-hearing reversing the district court.  A group of us filed an amicus brief, not about the merits and “negative limitations” and written description doctrine, but about, to use Dennis’ word, that strange procedure. It is here.  (And of course, after I posted this, I saw Dennis had covered both the “merits” brief and amicus brief, and the “procedural” issue!). So, to quote SNL, “never mind.”

Disqualification due to Foreseeable Conflict Leads to $32m Malpractice Judgment

Ethics, Patent

By David Hricik, Mercer Law School

Ordinarily, a conflict of interest leads to disqualification, but they can lead to fee disgorgement (an attorney is supposed to be loyal, and like any other agent, is not entitled to keep a fee earned while being disloyal) and, on occasion, damages.  In a case affirmed by the Ohio Court of Appeals, those damages were $32 million.

In RevoLaze LLC v. Dentons US LLP, 2022-Ohio-1392 (Ohio App. Apr. 28, 2022), requires understanding what a “verein” is. It is a legal entity recognized under Swiss law somewhat similar to an association. A few law firms are organized this way, including Dentons.

In RevoLaze, Dentons US (part of a verein of many Dentons “entities”) had represented a patentee, RevoLaze, in an ITC proceeding and 17 related infringement suits. At the start of the matter, Revolaze received funding from a litigation funding group, and Dentons US agreed to reduce and cap its fees but had the right to a percentage of any recovery. Dentons had indicated to the litigation funding group that the recovery indicated potential damages of around a billion dollars, and so it vetted the patents and the case and after that agreed to fund the proceeding and related litigation, in phases, for up to $8 million.

But, Dentons US knew the ITC proceeding would be adverse to The Gap, and that Dentons Canada represented The Gap. Thus, if Dentons US was part of the same firm as Dentons Canada, then Dentons US’ representation of the patentee in the ITC proceeding was adverse to one of Dentons US’s clients, and it would be subject to disqualification.  There was no evidence that Dentons had advised RevoLaze of the risk of disqualification or of steps to reduce the impact if it happened.

Of course, The Gap moved to disqualify, and the ITC granted that motion. By that time, Dentons US had billed a significant amount, RevoLaze was struggling, and disqualification caused it to pay an additional $1 million to get replacement counsel up to speed.  The litigation funding group agreed to move up some funding to help, but RevoLaze settled the infringement cases and eventually dismissed the ITC proceeding while appeal of the disqualification order was pending there.

RevoLaze then sued Dentons, arguing the conflict had been foreseeable and that it had been damaged by, among other things, failing to obtain an ITC exclusion order and lost licensing revenue, with the total damages between $23 and $39 million.

To support breach — that disqualification had been foreseeable and so a reasonable lawyer would have either obtained informed consent or not taken the case — RevoLaze’s lawyers showed that Dentons US had been concerned about a conflict caused by the ITC proceeding with a client of a different “part” of Dentons (and so had not named that client in the ITC proceeding), it had a single conflicts database, Dentons’ own expert had written an article discussing the risk that a court would consider different “parts” of a verein to be one big law firm, and other facts

To support causation and proximate cause, RevoLaze had experts opine that but-for disqualification, the litigation funding costs would have been lower, RevoLaze would have obtained an exclusion order, and it would have obtained better settlements (i.e., better licensing and so had incurred lose profits).

The jury awarded $32 million. Then, the appellate court held the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict and the amount of damages.

This case, of course, is odd in that breach turned on whether Dentons was “one law firm” or separate firms, not on whether there was a conflict with a client. But the same logic would apply where a law firm undertakes a representation where it is foreseeable that it would be deemed to be adverse to a client, and so subject it to disqualification.

It appears from this June 2022 filing Dentons is seeking review by the Ohio Supreme Court, and it looks like on the issue of causation, so stay tuned.

Update:  A reader sent a link to an interesting student-authored article on the ITC decision that explains the verein (which auto-corrects to “vermin”) structure.

Inbound Important Emails that go Unread due to Technology Fails: Another Case

Ethics

By David Hricik, Mercer Law School

This is not a patent case, but I have seen similar problems in prosecution, patent litigation, and related contexts over the years: an important email goes to a spam filter, or some other place, and gets left unread.

In a recent Fifth Circuit case, Rollins v. Home Depot (Here), plaintiff’s counsel was trying to settle a case when defense counsel filed and so e-served a motion for summary judgment — with a 14 day response deadline. For whatever reason, it did not get seen by the plaintiff’s lawyer.  The time for response came and went, and the district court granted the defense motion.  When plaintiff’s lawyer a short time later reached out to defense counsel again about settlement, defense counsel informed plaintiff’s counsel final judgment had already been entered.

Plaintiff’s counsel moved for relief from judgment under Rule 59, which was denied. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found no abuse of discretion. Two points it made are wroth emphasizing: (1) it emphasized that plaintiff’s “counsel was plainly in the best position to ensure that his own email was working” and (2) plaintiff’s  “counsel could have checked the docket after the agreed deadline for dispositive motions had already passed.”

Ouch.

With all of us working at home more, clearly we need to be more vigilant about email traffic and deadlines. Firms need to consider ways, not only to assist with remote workers’ efforts in that regard, but to help capture emails that indicate decisions by clients (as to filing, or not, for example), and other important information.

A September CLE in Salt Lake City with Dennis, Me, and Other Important People!

Ethics

By David Hricik, Mercer Law School

I’m happy to announce, and hope to attend in-person, the CLE described below in Salt Lake City.  While virtual CLEs have their benefits, I miss seeing and interacting with folks, and hope we can get close to normal soon. But, it’s also available virtually and looks to be a good mix of practical and conceptual work! Here’s their announcement:

The Elevate Your Prosecution 2021 conference on patent prosecution will be held in the Murano room of the Grand America in Salt Lake City on Friday, September 24 – Saturday, September 25.

We are expecting and pending for 14 hours of Utah CLE. The roster of speakers includes Dennis Crouch, John Duffy, David Hricik, and John White. The full agenda follows below, and more details are at www.elevateyourprosecution.com.

We invite you to register at your earliest convenience for the in person event (about 40 spaces remaining), the speakers dinner Friday night (about 8 spaces remaining), or the webcast.

You can register at www.elevateyourprosecution.com/registration/

The agenda:

Friday, September 24, 2021:

1.1    Michael Spector and Julie Burke (Petition.ai LLC): Deep Dive into Strategies for Successful Petitions at the USPTO

1.2.   Dan Tucker (Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP): Realities of Succeeding in PTAB Trials 1

1.3.   Mike Bohn (VLP Law Group LLP): Surviving, Pivoting, and Thriving in the Changing Global IP Marketplace

1.4.   Dan Tanner (Tanner IP PLLC): The Ethics of Educating Clients about Patent Vulnerabilities – a Litigator’s Perspective

1.5.   James Long (Li & Cai IP Group, PTAB.US): A Memory Palace Approach to PTAB Case Citations and Holding Statistics

1.6.   Andrew Godsey (Global Technology Transfer Group) and Clarke Nelson (InFact Experts LLC): Comprehensive Overview of Modern Patent Valuation

1.7.   Margaret Polson (Polson Intellectual Property Law PC): Overview of Design Patents for Software-Related Inventions

1.8.   Travis Banta (former USPTO) and Kip Werking (FisherBroyles, LLP): Using Persuasion and the USPTO Count System for Successful Examiner Interviews – an Examiner’s Perspective

Saturday, September 25, 2021:

2.1.    Scott McKeown (Ropes & Gray LLP): Realities of Succeeding in PTAB Trials 2: Prosecuting for the PTAB

2.2.    David Hricik (Mercer Law School): Academic Perspective on Patent Valuation 1: Recent Legal and Technological Changes Reducing Patent Value

2.3.    John Duffy (University of Virginia School of Law): Academic Perspective on Patent Valuation 2: Historical Overview of File Wrappers for Famous Patents

2.4.    Adam Mossoff (George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School): Academic Perspective on Patent Valuation 3: Implications of the New Paradigm of Patents as Public Rights in the Administrative State

2.5     Ron Katznelson (President at Bi-Level Technologies): Pecuniary Interests of PTAB Judges – Empirical Analysis Relating Bonus Awards to Decisions in AIA Trials

2.6.    Robert Greenspoon (Flachsbart & Greenspoon, LLC): Past and Future Constitutional Challenges in Patent Law

2.7.    John White (CEO & Managing Director at PCT Learning Center): Overview of the Benefits Today of Relying More Heavily on the PCT

2.8.    Dennis Crouch (University of Missouri School of Law): To Be Determined

Deadlines: Thoughts for Good and Bad Practices?

Ethics

By David Hricik, Mercer Law School

Over the decades (sigh) I’ve been involved in various capacities in cases where practitioners have missed deadlines.  Sometimes, the client’s partly to blame. For example, imagine a client at the last minute dumping a lot of information they expect to be included in an application or any claim is barred (say by a prior publication).  At other times, the lawyer misses the date. For example, imagine key docketing personnel leave and that leaves a knowledge gap, or an unanswered email box, allowing a deadline to pass by.

Obviously, having dual docketing systems is important. Ensuring dates are entered correctly is important. Ensuring that there is a person responsible for the deadline, likewise important. And, of course, much of this is now automated.

I would be curious to rad what you believe to be “best practices” or mandatory minimum standards in this area. For example, I’ve seen some firms send notices to clients that in essence say “we’re not going to foreign file unless you tell us” while others insist on an affirmative “I don’t want foreign filings” written message from the client, and hound the client until they get it.

If you have “war stories” or thoughts or concerns, please share them in the comments. Obviously, everyone understands you’ll be telling us about someone else’s mistake, not yours!  :-).

FYI I am writing a short article on this topic and would love to share with other practitioners what you have learned. I’m thinking “where the landmines are” might be a good title for this one.

Section 285: When Lawyer Blames Client

Ethics

By David Hricik, Mercer Law School

A long time ago, I posted here about the potential for conflict when fee shifting is in play and the opposing party is seeking an award of fees and asserts that the opposing party may be liable instead of, or in addition to, opposing counsel.  In other contexts, courts have found this can create a conflict between the targeted lawyer and client.

For example, in In re Marriage of Wixom & Wixom, 182 Wash. App. 881, 332 P.3d 1063 (2014), after a bitter and long custody dispute in which both the husband and his lawyer took ridiculous positions, the trial court imposed $55,000 in sanctions  jointly against husband and his lawyer. On appeal, the lawyer argued that the sanctions should only be imposed against the husband.  The appellate court, on its own motion disqualified the lawyer from representing the client and limited the lawyer’s ability to represent only himself. Later, the appellate court held sanctions could be imposed jointly. See, e.g., U.S. v. Emigration Improvement Dist., 14–CV–701, 2016 WL 4148251, at *6 (D. Utah Aug. 4, 2016) (reasoning that attorneys were conflicted when they tried to shift liability for fee awards from themselves to their client); Exp. Dev. Canada v. ESE Elecs. Inc., CV1602967BRORAOX, 2017 WL 3122157, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 10, 2017) (“The circumstances indicate a conflict of interest between Counsel and their clients with respect to fault for evidentiary complications related to Bright Light’s payments and the Euler insurance claim.”).

I haven’t looked at whether this issue has cropped up in the precise context of Section 285, but lawyers should be thoughtful when Section 285 is raised and the issue of fault, or liability, as between lawyer and client is implicated. (If you know of cases, let me know!). It may be the conflict is waivable. In addition, it may be that courts should use the principle, recognized under Rule 11, that only the lawyer should be liable for legal errors, to reduce conflicts of interest and to also allocate fault where it makes the most sense to place it.

ABA Ethics Opinion on Virtual Law Practice:

Ethics

By David Hricik, Mercer Law School

The American Bar Association committee on professional ethics issues opinions on issues which, while not binding on any jurisdiction, often have sway over courts and bar associations in malpractice or disciplinary matters.  If you follow their guidance, you, in a sense, start off in safe harbor.  Most state rules are similar to the Model Rules, and the USPTO’s disciplinary rules are similar, but not identical, and the USPTO did not adopt the comments to the model rules. Thus, the OED is not bound by ABA ethics opinions but they hold sway.

In ABA Formal Ethics Opinion 498 (March 10, 2021) (here), the ABA provided guidance on the ethical issues that we all have done a lot of the last year, and which I am guessing we will continue to do for a while: practice law outside the confines of a typical brick-and-mortar, or steel-and-glass, law office.  The abstract of the opinion states:

The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct permit virtual practice, which is technologically enabled law practice beyond the traditional brick-and-mortar law firm.1 When practicing virtually, lawyers must particularly consider ethical duties regarding competence, diligence, and communication, especially when using technology. In compliance with the duty of confidentiality, lawyers must make reasonable efforts to prevent inadvertent or unauthorized disclosures of information relating to the representation and take reasonable precautions when transmitting such information. Additionally, the duty of supervision requires that lawyers make reasonable efforts to ensure compliance by subordinate lawyers and nonlawyer assistants with the Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically regarding virtual practice policies.

I have probably given six or so CLEs this past year on ethical issues in law practice, and the need for technological competence is a critical factor, as is the related need to ensure good document retention: lawyers should use reasonable care and memorialize a client’s important decision in something other than a text or phone call.  Also, in-house counsel who are employed by a company in a state where they are not licensed — and so who practice under a state “registration” rule or statute — need to very carefully read the likely applicable rule or statute to avoid, among other things, the unauthorized practice of law.  I would also add that, based upon the traffic on listservs I’m on, being careful to ensure things get filed timely with the USPTO is important (PAIR seems to be having a lot of issues lately!).

Employee Inventors, Client Identity, and Assignments

Ethics,

By David Hricik, Mercer Law School

Over the years (sigh, decades) of being involved with ethical issues in patent practice, one set of problems that recurs involves assignments from employee-inventors.  I was reminded of some of them by a recent article in Landslide Magazine by Fred Carbone (of my old firm, Baker Botts), entitled “Employee Inventors and Patent Ownership: Whose Rights are They Anyway?” (available, I hope not behind a paywall, here).

The article does a good job of laying out some of the thorns in the bramble bush of choice of law in interpreting contracts of assignment (which, of course, arises only when the assignor was an inventor, and inventorship can be its own thorny issue).  The article points out some common law gap filling obligations that may require an assignment where no written agreement, or an ineffective one, is in place.  Apparently, Mr. Carbone is going to give a talk on April 20, 2021 on other ways to obtain assignment (as explained on page 23 of the magazine).

One related issue that I’ve discussed more than a few times and seen arise repeatedly over the years is when, after a dispute arises between a former employee and former employer, the former employee asserts that he had believed that the lawyer who had represented the employer also represented the employee and that the employee had been an inventor and either was left off or was included as an inventor but did not owe an obligation of assignment.  Sometimes that implicates Model Rule 4.3, which can require a lawyer to correct a non-client’s misunderstanding as to who the lawyer represents.

As a best practice, even if not required, including a written statement that the lawyer does not (or does) represent the inventor, or advising the inventor to obtain her own counsel, or both, may often be a good idea to avoid either misunderstanding or strategic behavior.

Intentional Over-billing of Clients Leads to 2-year Suspension

Ethics, Patent

by David Hricik, Mercer Law School

A partner at a major firm had been suspended initially for six months for intentionally over-billing certain clients for 450 hours of work she and other lawyers had not performed.  (Apparently, one justice initially decides the penalty in a bar proceeding there.). Bar counsel then argued to the entire court that six months was insufficient, and the Massachusetts Supreme Court agreed.  In its opening paragraph, the court stated:

The single justice acknowledged the respondent’s “admittedly cavalier attitude toward client billing,” but concluded that “the large number of hours she reported in 2015 is not substantial evidence that all or even most of the 450 hours at issue in this case were fraudulently billed.” Our focus, however, is not on the quantum of excessive fees that were billed, but on the fundamental dishonesty inherent in the respondent’s client billings themselves. It is not the sheer number of unworked hours that establishes the misconduct but, rather, the dishonesty manifested by billing for them at all.

The case, In the Matter of Zankowski (Mass. March 25, 2021) is here.

Yes, it’s a state case. But, consistent with this, over the years I’ve heard various speeches by attorneys from the OED say that they’re forgiving of many things — mistakes happen, hindsight is often 20-20 — but intentional misconduct is not one of those things I’ve heard them mention. As the Massachusetts court wrote, billing for them at all is what indicates a serious violation. And, related to that, many state disciplinary rules, like the USPTO Rules, require certain members of firms to have in place policies to ensure compliance with the ethical rules, and so one lawyer’s misconduct could cause ripple effects.

Enforceability of Clauses Requiring Arbitration of Malpractice Claims: Plummer v. McSweeney

Ethics

By David Hricik, Mercer Law School

In Plummer v. McSweeney, the plaintiff, Plummer, sued a law firm for legal malpractice. The firm moved to compel arbitration.  The district court denied that motion because, among other things, the clause required that the client pay a pro rata share of the arbitration fees and that rendered it substantively unconscionable since she could not afford it and that amount plainly exceeded the ordinary filing costs of a lawsuit. It also held that the firm’s post-dispute offer to pay her costs did not change that result. The firm appealed.

The Eighth Circuit reversed.  It held that under D.C. law the post-dispute offer to pay mooted the substantive unconscionability.  It also rejected procedural unconscionability because she could have chosen another firm and the agreement made clear its terms were negotiable.

Finally, it rejected, as not controlling, the requirements that an ABA ethics opinion had imposed on arbitration clauses.  In part it stated:

Plummer also points out that, since Haynes [a case applying D.C. law in this context] the American Bar Association released an ethics opinion on the effect of its Model Rule 1.4(b) (on which D.C. Rule 1.4(b) is based) on the use of arbitration provisions in retainer agreements. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 02-425 (2002). The ABA opined that “the lawyer should make clear that arbitration typically results in the client’s waiver of significant rights, such as the waiver of the right to a jury trial, the possible waiver of broad discovery, and the loss of the right to appeal.” It also notes other effects that an attorney “might explain” as well. Some courts have even expanded on this opinion, requiring attorneys to discuss with clients a wide assortment of the potential consequences that could attend agreeing to arbitrate disputes with an attorney. See, e.g., Hodges v. Reasonover, 103 So. 3d 1069, 1077 (La. 2012).

The case has some facts that make the result even harsher, but the incentive it creates — to allow a lawyer to impose an unconscionable agreement on a client but then obviate that later — plainly undermines the goal of full and fair disclosure to clients.  Lawyers should be careful, despite the case, to comply with ethical rules:  a lawyer may set herself up to compel arbitration and lose her license.

Informing Clients and Former Clients of Data Breaches

Ethics

By David Hricik, Mercer Law School

Law firms are targets of hackers, and patent firms in particular are so. Why? Because hackers know they have the “wheat” separated from the chaff, and hackers believe firms also have less robust security than their clients.  See Am. B. Ass’n. Formal Eth. Op. 483 (here). That is likely more so in disbursed work forces caused by the pandemic.

In that opinion, the ABA explained the duties of a firm to use reasonable care to avoid hacking.  If a hacking occurred, the opinion concluded that a firm had to notify current clients and provide sufficient information to them to respond.  The ABA refused to say that lawyers owed such an obligation to former clients.

In Maine Opinion 220 (here), the Maine committee reasoned that a lawyer had an obligation to inform both current and former clients of breaches affecting their data.  The issue remains open in many states.

Firms should consider addressing the issue in engagement letters:  once the relationship ends, so too does the duty to advise on hacking.  Of course, returning the files at the end of a representation and destroying remaining ESI is also a good risk management tool.

Interesting Case on Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Bench Trials: A Circuit Split

Ethics

By David Hricik, Mercer Law School

I serve on occasion as an expert witness in patent-related trials, on inequitable conduct and the standard of care in malpractice.  Of interest to me for that reason and because I still do lawyering work is UGI Sunbury LLC v. A Permanent Easement for 1.757 Acres (here) a 2019 Third Circuit decision holding that the same standard under Daubert/Kumho Tire governing admissibility of expert testimony in jury trials applies to bench trials where the trial court is the fact-finder. Specifically, while the court recognized trial courts have discretion as to how to admit expert testimony and use it, the court cannot admit unreliable expert testimony in the first instance, even when it is a bench trial.  This presents a circuit split (note 4 of the opinion collects some of the contrary opinions).

Of course, the case should be of interest to patent litigators, since for example inequitable conduct may present only issues for the court.  In that context, I have seen opposing experts use “methodologies” that they would never apply practice or defend in public, and use “methodologies” that — at least in my experience, education, and training — are unverifiable and unreliable.

A more rigorous approach to expert witness testimony may help to avoid needless confusion and wasted time — even in bench trials.

USPTO Issues Report on Artificial Intelligence

Ethics,

By David Hricik, Mercer Law School

I haven’t yet had the chance to read this, but officials at the USPTO and EPO, as well as working groups at AIPLA, WIPO, and others, have been struggling with AI as inventors, including who to name as an inventor (not AI, says the USPTO, UKIPO, and EPO), as well as what does 103/inventiveness mean when AI is involved.  The report is here.

I’ll be reading it, and your comments.

ABA Issues Opinion Addressing Conflicts Arising out of Relationships with Opposing Counsel

Ethics

By David Hricik, Mercer Law School

The ABA issues formal ethics opinions that often influence how state and federal judges decide motions to disqualify, as well, of course, as matters of discipline. Thus, ABA Formal Opinion 494 (July 2020) (here) should be of interest. A comment to the Model Rules had explained that a “lawyer related to another lawyer, e.g., as parent, child, sibling or spouse, ordinarily may not represent a client in a matter where that lawyer is representing another party, unless each client gives informed consent.”(For patent practitioners, the USPTO has adopted the 2003 version of the ABA Model Rules, but not its comments, but has stated that the commentary and opinions construing the ABA Model Rules are informative.)

The opinion examined that principle in a broader array of personal relationships. The summary of the opinion states:

Model Rule 1.7(a)(2) prohibits a lawyer from representing a client without informed consent if there is a significant risk that the representation of the client will be materially limited by a personal interest of the lawyer. A personal interest conflict may arise out of a lawyer’s relationship with opposing counsel. Lawyers must examine the nature of the relationship to determine if it creates a Rule 1.7(a)(2) conflict and, if so, whether the lawyer reasonably believes the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client who must then give informed consent, confirmed in writing.

To assist lawyers in applying Rule 1.7(a)(2), this opinion identifies three categories of personal relationships that might affect a lawyer’s representation of a client: (i) intimate relationships, (ii) friendships, and (iii) acquaintances. Intimate relationships with opposing counsel involve, e.g. cohabiting, engagement to, or an exclusive intimate relationship. These relationships must be disclosed to clients, and the lawyers ordinarily may not represent opposing clients in the matter, unless each client gives informed consent confirmed in writing. Because friendships exist in a wide variety of contexts, friendships need to be examined carefully. Close friendships with opposing counsel should be disclosed to clients, and, where required as described in this opinion, their informed consent obtained. By contrast, some friendships and most relationships that fall into the category of acquaintances need not be disclosed, nor must clients’ informed consent be obtained. Regardless of whether disclosure is required, however, the lawyer may choose to disclose the relationship to maintain good client relations.

Given the close-knit nature of the patent bar in some places, the opinion may spur the need for disclosure and in some instances consent.

The OED Takes a Literal View of Earning Nunc Pro Tunc Suspension

Ethics

By David Hricik, Mercer Law School.

In In the Matter of Gitler (Proc. No. D2019-48), a patent lawyer was suspended for 90 days by Virginia on May 8, 2019. The District of Columbia and New York also suspended the practitioner. The practitioner notified the OED of his Virginia suspension on May 29, 2019, and, while agreeing reciprocal suspension by the USPTO was proper, requested it be ordered nunc pro tunc — so it would have run with the Virginia suspension.  The OED declined that request.

Significantly, the OED took a very technical and literal reading of the provisions governing nunc pro tunc orders.

First, the rule requires practitioners to withdraw from pending cases. He had told his clients he was not representing them but his name was still associated with a customer number and so they were handling the matters. The OED stated this did not excuse his failure to withdraw.

Second, the rule requires the practitioner to notify other states where the practitioner is licensed of suspension:  while he had notified D.C., of the Virginia suspension, he had not notified New York: it had received notice.  Thus, the Office seemed to require the practitioner to give notice to a jurisdiction already aware of the facts!

Finally, third, the rule requires practitioners who want nunc pro tunc suspension to take “necessary and appropriate steps” to remove attorney advertising, but he mistakenly had left his bio on the firm’s web page, and it stated that he was registered before the Office. The court stated that leaving this up indicated an unreasonable failure.

 

Voluntary CLE for Patent Attorneys and Patent Agents: What are the Issues?

Ethics

By David Hricik, Mercer Law School

Curious for your comments on this.

The USPTO has promulgated a final rule. Originally, it was going to charge a fee every two years for practitioners to register, but it has backed off of that.  However, instead of having a fee and allowing a deduction for those who take 6 hours of CLE every two years — one hour of ethics, and 5 hours of CLE related to “patent law and practice” and one on “ethics” — it is going to create an on-line directory where practitioners who certify compliance with that CLE requirement will be listed by the Office.

The USPTO explained:

As noted in response to Comment 81 above, the USPTO has elected not to implement the proposed annual active patent practitioner fee at this time. In addition, under the Final Rule, completion of CLE remains voluntary. However, practitioners may be recognized in the online practitioner directory if they certify completion of six credit hours of CLE (five in patent law and practice; one in legal ethics) in the preceding 24 months

The rule implementing this final rule states in pertinent part:

(2) Biennially, registered practitioners and persons granted limited recognition may be required to file a registration statement with the OED director for the purpose of ascertaining whether such practitioner desires to remain in an active status. Any registered practitioner, or person granted limited recognition under § 11.9(b), failing to file the registration statement or give any information requested by the OED director within a time limit specified shall be subject to administrative suspension under paragraph (b) of this section.

(3)(i) A registered practitioner, or person granted limited recognition under § 11.9(b), who has completed, in the past 24 months, five hours of continuing legal education credits in patent law and practice and one hour of continuing legal education credit in ethics, may certify such completion to the OED director.

(ii) A registered practitioner, or person granted limited recognition under § 11.9(b), may earn up to two of the five hours of continuing legal education credit in patent law and practice by providing patent pro bono legal services through the USPTO Patent Pro Bono Program. One hour of continuing legal education credit in patent law and practice may be earned for every three hours of patent pro bono legal service.

The USPTO is to release “guidelines” to implement the rule in the near future “with a request for public comment on them.”  Those guidelines “will address the types of CLE courses that may qualify for recognition and the form of recognition for patent practitioners who certify that they have completed the CLE.”  (The Rule and comments to the proposed rule are here.). Some guidance is given, however:

Generally, the same types of courses and activities that qualify for CLE credit for a state bar will qualify for credit for purposes of the CLE recognition in the online practitioner directory, so long as it covers the appropriate topics. It is expected that these CLE reporting periods will not align with all state bar reporting periods, as they vary from state to state. Each CLE certification for the purposes of recognition in USPTO’s online practitioner directory should be supported by the completion of different CLE courses. In other words, practitioners may not use the same courses to certify to the USPTO more than once that they have completed the six credits of CLE.

So, given that if you take 6 hours of CLE over two years, you get to be listed on this registry, what issues do you see?

To me, putting aside the definitional issues of what is “patent law and practice,” the proposal creates an odd thing: it will cause only patent lawyers to be listed in this directory, not patent agents, unless patent agents think it’s worthwhile to do CLE to be listed on this registry.  That is, because all but two states (I think) require CLE for lawyers (but none do for patent agents), patent lawyers will get listed, but my instinct is that patent agents aren’t likely to pay a couple hundred dollars in CLE fees to be listed, one would think.

In that regard, though, others had raised a concern about the original proposal — a $100 discount off the now-rejected bi-annual registration fee would make no sense for patent agents — and in response the USPTO stated in the final rule announcement that it was going to provide free CLE courses, “thus alleviating the financial burden of obtaining CLE credits.”

That helps, obviously, but still means six hours of time over two years for patent agents.  Does that create a disincentive strong enough to not be on this registry?  Do patent agents get business that way anyway?

What other issues do you see? (Yes, it’s another sign of the destruction of American democracy, but in the comments address more mundane things, please!). Will insurance companies likely ask about compliance?  What about lawyers in states without CLE requirements — is this registry an incentive?

Webcast (self-study CLE?) on the Impact of AI, IoT, and 3D Printing on Patenting

Ethics

By David Hricik, Mercer Law School

I did a 65 minute conversation with Shubha Ghosh of Syracuse University College of Law on that topic, and you can find the YouTube video here.  I have had several conversations with practitioners recently where these issues, as well as the Supreme Court’s 20 year march toward less patent protection and the current 101 miasma, have made patents less valuable.  This discusses why that may be so and ways to speed up patenting to help with some of the issues that faster time-to-market and shorter time-on-market create.

What if AI Invents Some or All Claimed Inventions?

Ethics

By David Hricik, Mercer Law School

I’ve written a few posts about how I used specif.io to draft a patent application: I submitted a claim I’d found in a published application and the service drafted a 15-page spec, and created two figures.  Plainly, I invented nothing but assume for a moment I’d invented what had been claimed and that there was more disclosed in the spec than what I’d invented — the latter I think is fact but let’s assume it. Let’s also assume that I add claim 2 once I see the machine has conceived of something more than I had thought of.  So: claim 1 is my invention; claim 2 is not. I hire you to represent me.

The USPTO, the EPO, and the UKIPO have all stated (here, here, and here in respective orders) that only natural people can be inventors. Fair enough. The USPTO has stated that a person who is not an inventor cannot be named. Also fair enough, because of the statute and 102(f).  So… what do you do?

With my hypo, I think you have to name me since I invented what was in claim one.  I guess you don’t have non-joinder because the machine invented whatever else is in the spec and you can’t name it.

Now let’s turn to the facts of the application the USPTO rejected: the inventor took the position that only a machine was the inventor. So, let’s assume that fact pattern: AI invented what was in claim 1 and also what was in claim 2.

Now what?  That may explain why the EPO and UKIPO, at least, are studying this further and WIPO and AIPLA committees are, too.  Thoughts?

Patent Agent Privilege: Another Case Recognizes its Limited Scope

Ethics

by David Hricik, Mercer Law School

In Luv N’ Care, Ltd. v. Williams Intellectual Prop., Civil Action No. 18-mc-00212-WJM-KLM, 6-7 (D. Colo. Jun. 12, 2019) (here) the court addressed a claim of privilege over communications between client and a patent agent. The case is a reminder that, while the privilege exists, its scope is limited.

Specifically, the court stated that, although federal courts had uniformly followed the Federal Circuit’s 2-1 decision recognizing the privilege exists, they had also recognized it had substantial limitations. The court stated that the scope of the privilege was limited to communications within the concept of “practice before the Office,” which it then defined:

Practice before the Office in patent matters includes, but is not limited to, preparing and prosecuting any patent application, consulting with or giving advice to a client in contemplation of filing a patent application or other document with the Office, drafting the specification or claims of a patent application; drafting an amendment or reply to a communication from the Office that may require written argument to establish the patentability of a claimed invention; drafting a reply to a communication from the Office regarding a patent application; and drafting a communication for a public use, interference, reexamination proceeding, petition, appeal to or any other proceeding before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, or other proceeding. Registration to practice before the Office in patent cases sanctions the performance of those services which are reasonably necessary and incident to the preparation and prosecution of patent applications or other proceeding
before the Office involving a patent application or patent in which the practitioner is authorized to participate.

Thus, the court reasoned, “communications which are not ‘reasonably necessary and incident to the preparation and prosecution’ of patent proceedings before the USPTO are not protected by the patent-agent privilege. For example, communications with a patent agent who is offering an opinion on the validity of another party’s patent in contemplation of litigation or for the sale or purchase of a patent, or on infringement, are not reasonably necessary and incident to the preparation and prosecution of patent applications, and thus are not protected by the privilege.” Id. 

In my experience, the limitations on “practice before the Office” that often get overlooked include: (1) non-infringement or validity opinions — as the court recognized — but also (2) assignments. Another limitation is that a state court may not follow the Federal Circuit’s lead and the Luv N’ Care court even suggested that regional circuit law, not Federal Circuit law, would control.

New Article “Avoiding Responsibility: The Case for Amending the Duty to Disclose Prior Art in Patent Law”

Ethics

By David Hricik, Mercer Law School

The student comment, by John O. Curry, appears at 95 Wash. L. Rev. 1031 and is available here. The abstract states:

Federal regulation requires patent applicants in the United States to disclose to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) a wide range of references that might be material to their invention’s patentability. Applicant disclosure of prior art currently plays a large role in the prosecution and litigation of patents. The effects are quite deleterious, resulting in the filing of unnecessary references that go unreviewed in the USPTO and providing plausible grounds for the assertion of inequitable conduct defenses in patent infringement actions. This Comment looks at the history of the laws that evolved into the codified duty to disclose prior art and finds that the historical rationales no longer justify such an imposition. It also examines several foreign jurisdictions that differ from the United States in their mandates to disclose prior art, ultimately recommending the adoption of the standard used by the European Patent Office as a way to resolve both the administrative and legal challenges posed by the current standard.