By Jason Rantanen
Sciele Pharma Inc. v. Andrx Corporation (Fed. Cir. 2012) Download 12-1228
Panel: Moore (author), Lourie, Prost
Lupin sought permission to market a generic version of Fortamet, an extended-release tablet of metaformin hydrochloride. In response, Shionogi filed a lawsuit asserting infringement of Patent No. 6,866,866, thus triggering a 30-month stay of FDA approval. The stay expired while the litigation was still ongoing and Lupin attempted an at risk launch of its generic product. Shionogi obtained a preliminary injunction to prevent Lupin from selling its product that Lupin appealed.
This opinion is noteworthy largely for its discussion of the presumption of validity. Lupin argued that the presumption of validity should not apply because of errors committed by the patent office during prosecution: the patent office erroneously issued the patent with claims that had been both rejected by the examiner and cancelled by the applicant. Shionogi argued that there should be a heightened presumption of validity because the prior art references relied on by Lupin were before the PTO during prosecution.
The Federal Circuit rejected both arguments, although it acknowledged that the specific circumstances could carry some weight in the overall determination. "Whether a reference was previously considered by the PTO, the burden of proof is the same: clear and convincing evidence of invalidity…The burden does not suddenly change to some-thing higher–“extremely clear and convincing evidence” or “crystal clear and convincing evidence”–simply because the prior art references were considered by the PTO." Slip Op. at 10-11. However, the fact that references were previously before the PTO could impact the weight the court or jury assigns to the evidence: "For example, it could be reasonable to give more weight to new arguments or references that were not explicitly considered by the PTO when determining whether a defendant met its burden of providing clear and convincing evidence of invalidity." Id.
Likewise, while the court rejected the argument that the presumption of validity did not apply because of the PTO's errors during prosecution, it allowed those errors to be considered: "We can take it all into account, including both the fact that the Cheng and Timmins references were before the Patent Office and the bizarre circumstances surrounding the issuance of the claims in this patent." Id. at 12.
Against this backdrop, the CAFC concluded that the district court's obviousness analysis was flawed because it overstated the fact that the references were not before the PTO in KSR and incorrectly rejected Lupin's substantive arguments on disclosure and motivation to combine.
Although the standard for determining whether the patentholder has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits is a significant issue in some preliminary injunction appeals, this does not appear to be one where the outcome would have turned out differently if the CAFC had applied a standard other than whether the applicant raised a substantial question as to validity.' The Federal Circuit judges were clearly persuaded that there was a strong obviousness challenge to the patent.
You are unfamiliar with the chain o command bro. The CAFC does not have the authority to naysay the USSC.
“I agree that is the holding of the case, but it is not law.”
Didn’t you read Ned’s memo that holdings (and only holdings) are law?
You post elsewhere about an oath to follow the law. Well, whether you like it or not, today, now, this is indeed law.
You are duty bound to follow.
“This is the HOLDING of the case.
This is law.”
I agree that is the holding of the case, but it is not law. Their made up “safety portal” or whatever Prost calls it cannot supercede the abstract idea analysis as set forth by the USSC. They cannot shirk their responsibility to kill on claims that preempt on an abstract idea just because someone drafted it well enough that the abstractness is not “manifest” SUBJECTIVELY to them. It is a simple factual inquiry, and it has no basis in how the judges feel about the abstractness. The manifestness, or not, of the abstractness is of no object.
Look for this to be overturned immediately.
The words of Bilski said that they could establish OTHER LIMITING CRITERIA. And they didn’t mean limiting criteria on when their judicial exceptions applied, they mean other criteria by which to smack claims down with under 101. If you guys would learn to read in context then you would know this. The MOT was never a test about saving claims, it was a test to determine when they FAILED, that is it was a limiting criteria on what was to be deemed patentable. Which is yet another fundamental thing idiots who can’t read have been somewhat ignorant about for a few years.
I only skipped to the end because my lunch hour was over ya tard.
“Rather than be dismissive, you need to read with an open mind. ”
I did read with an open mind. The arguments presented were the exact same ones presented for the last 3 or 4 mo on this very board. I’m very familiar with them, and I’m very familiar with how certain ones of them deviate from the law and how others are the law. Indeed, I’ve been championing the position that Prost has finally been man handled by the supremes into taking. Now the rest of the court must get their understandings in order.
“Why would you say that? Is there any estimation of my own abilities in the posts that we have traded? Do you realize how odd your comment comes across?”
I find it Odd that Mr. Heller is obsessed with debating you when all you are doing is asking simple questions. Yet I am the one that is directly challenging his agenda, beliefs, and abilities on the emerging “integration standard”. I am the one that has posted definite opinions, cited case law and provided concrete examples of the “integration analysis” based on Prometheus and the USPTO Guidelines, yet Mr. Heller has yet to engaged.
He directly attacks, you, Simple Questions, for asking simple questions, yet when it comes to responding to the case law and examples of integration analysis he can only make excuses, play silly games, and evade the debate.
How Odd indeed.
You want Ned Heller to do anything but his chosen shilling? He cannot step outside of robotic script. Thats all he has.
Mr. Heller: I fiind it quite dubious that you have the time and means to banter about in a meaning game of who is and who is not a troll, yet you can’t step up to the challenge and analyze Ultramercials claims according to the USPTO Integrations guidelines.
Mr. Heller: ” is this abstract concept applied to a process or machine that is itself otherwise patentable? This is the integration test of Prometheus….”
Oh really? Can you provide that exact citation in Prometheus. this? I need that exact quote right now!
:: Crickets Chirping::
How is asking objectively neutral questions trolling?
Do you realize just how much you project?
There you go again, troll.
Max, on further consideration, that whole section about 101/102/103/112 appears to have no place in the actual resolution of the issues in this case. Pure dicta, and in major conflict with Prometheus that laid great emphasis that the steps in the process that otherwise passed the MOT were “conventional.” What is this but a statement that they were old and that the inventive step lay in the correlations, the “new” element.
Why would the Federal Circuit go so far? Why are they deliberately poking their fingers in the eyes of a 9-0 Supreme Court?
It must be pointed out that 101 stemmed from the first patent act in substantially the same form. As originally passed it read,
“…he, she, or they hath or have invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein not before known or used.”
In 1793, “new” was added and “discovered” dropped:
“…he or they have invented any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, not known or
used before the application,”
In 1836, the prior acts were replaced by
“…any person or persons, having discovered or invented any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, not known or used by others before his or their discovery or invention thereof…”
The ’52 Act divided 100 from 101, and 101 from 102, adding 103 and 112.
But the language of 101 was in critical measure retained from the first patent Act.
Rich believed that by the division, Congress intended to cabin novelty from the issue of patentable subject matter, totally reading out the words “new” and “invention” from 101, if not “useful”. He said so in Bergy. That dicta discussed by Diehr; but clearly Prometheus was not at all consistent with Rich’s views.
What Linn has written here is indeed a revolt, at least in that dicta.
“You assume that you are a know-it-all, are superior, and have a right to look down your repugnant nose at others”
Isn’t it a projection of your feelings to say that I assume anything with objectively neutral questions?
Do you think that repeating your errant statement makes it any less errant?
Do you enjoy being made sport of so easily?
Mr. Simple, when you make snide remarks about me personally, there is only one way to take it. You assume that you are a know-it-all, are superior, and have a right to look down your repugnant nose at others.
Are you sure it is my remarks that assume anything in relation to my own positions/skills/knowledge?
Wouldn’t it be more true to say that you are projecting such an assumption?
Wouldn’t it be more true to actually read my questions and see that they are in no way associated with anyone’s level of position/skill/knowledge, that in fact they are objectively neutral?
Aren’t you in fact trying just a little bit too hard to find fault where none exists?
Mr. Simple, when your posts consist derogatory remarks that assumes superiority in your own positions/skill/knowledge, then your arrogance is self evident.
Sent from iPhone
“Mr. Simple, you are a glory in your own mind.”
Why would you say that? Is there any estimation of my own abilities in the posts that we have traded?
Do you realize how odd your comment comes across? Is there perhaps another of the famous email mixups, and you are actually posting an answer to somebody else?
Mr. Simple, you are a glory in your own mind.
Sent from iPhone
Chevron provides deference for statutory interpretations pursuant to notice and comment rulemaking. Patent examination does not involve statutory interpretation and certainly is not notice and comment rulemaking. I’m not even sure where you’re going with that quote.
Would it be too much to note that such has already been done?
Do you consider your day already made?
(Yes that last one is rhetorical)
Simple, make my day!
Do you want people to point out that you do not understand what you quote?
Do you want me to once again quote Diehr?
Sent from iPhone
Rebellious lot?
No.
They are just following the words of Bilski:
“In disapproving an exclusive machine-or-transformation test, we by no means foreclose the Federal Circuit’s development of other limiting criteria that further the purposes of the Patent Act and are not inconsistent with its text.”
The Supreme Court in Bilski purposely provided a very narrow holding in the case and directed the CAFC to rethink its view on 101.
It has.
The limiting criteria that furthers the purposes of the Patent Act are: “[T]his court holds that when-after taking all of the claim recitations into consideration-it is not manifestly evident that a claim is directed to a patent ineligible abstract idea, that claim must not be deemed for that reason to be inadequate under § 101.”
This is the HOLDING of the case.
This is law.
“the intellectual power of the CAFC”
Oh God, it hurts!
“Skipping to the end”
No wonder you have such hard times with the LSATs 6, you skip to the end and read the conclusion that you want to read.
You need to learn to apply logic and critical thinking to all that stuff you skipped and merely labeled “f’s it up.”
Rather than be dismissive, you need to read with an open mind. Your chain of comments above screams out that you are closed-minded and there is no way that you are going to actually learn about law that way.
Ned asks, “Where is the dividing line? What in the fricken world is the difference?”
These are the wrong questions.
It is apparent that Ned wants to take a categorical approach to the exceptions and that is just not how the exceptions work. Ned wants to be able to draw a brightline around the enumerated categories and say: on this side of the line you are not in an enumerated category therefore you are not eligible and on that side of the line you are in an enumerated category therefore you are eligible.
The problem with this attempt is that it misrepresents what it means by judicial exception. The judicial exceptions apply no matter what the enumerated category is, no matter if the claimed invention falls into one or not.
This is evident in Ned’s longstanding bias against process patents and baseless bias for composition patents.
It is no wonder that Ned cannot wrap his head around the concept and demands that the Court must be confused.
It is very much like a 2-Dimensional person trying to understand a 3-Dimensional object.
Skipping to the end, looks like the CAFC f’s it up with only Prost deciding that she should follow the law.
“CLS Bank responds that “”
CLS responds that the court should follow the law.
“(3) focusing on the “preemptive force” of the claims as an independent test for eligibility when “[n]either the Supreme Court nor this [c]ourt has ever suggested that ‘preemption’ of a method or idea that is not CLS BANK v. ALICE CORPORATION 10
a fundamental principle renders a patent claim invalid under section 101, nor that preemption is a separate step of the section 101 analysis if a claim has been determined not to be abstract,””
Actually incorrect, but continue. You’re making good argument to set yourself up for the ultimate in USSC smackdowns which I’ve been waiting for for years now.
“So the question is, is this abstract concept applied to a process or machine that is itself otherwise patentable?”
Is that the question? Or is it rather that the concept and the claim as written must be looked at as a whole in order to judge patent eligibility?
Is it too subtle to recognize the use of “otherwise” is a misnomer that artifically cleaves any attempt at real integration?
“id. 26; (2) determining that “computers that are programmable with software—so-called ‘general purpose’ computers—should be analyzed differently from other machines under section 101,” id. 31;”
Lulz, nope.
“According to Alice, the district court erred by: (1) identifying and considering only the “heart” of Alice’s invention—which it found to be an abstract concept—instead of the claims “as a whole, with all of [their] limitations given effect,””
No, I think they actually did give effect to your field of use limitations. They gave them the effect of a field of use limitation.
“Appellant Br. 23, and “[n]either this [c]ourt nor the Supreme Court has ever invalidated a claim to a computer system under 35 U.S.C. § 101,””
They haven’t gotten around to it just yet that is true.
“With respect to its computer system and media claims, Alice argues that “computer systems are concrete machines, not abstract ideas,”
Lulz, obviously your field of use limitations are concrete machines. You have limited the claim to the field of computing. Wow.
“Appellant Br. 42; and (2) not directed to an abstract idea, but rather “are limited to a particular practical and technological implementation,” which requires a particular series of concrete steps performed by an intermediary,”
Alright I’m listening.
“(1) “tied to a particular machine or apparatus—i.e., they are to be performed on a computer,””
Lulz. Irrelevant.
“Similarly, with respect to the product claims, the court concluded that they “are also directed to the same abstract concept, despite the fact they nominally recite a different category of invention under § 101 than the other claims.” Id. at 255.”
The DC BURNT DOWN THE HIZZOUSE!
“the court concluded that “[t]he system claims . . . represent merely the incarnation of this abstract idea on a computer, without any further exposition or meaningful limitation.””
Man the DC was on FIRE!
“The district court assumed that these claims were directed to machines or manufactures, and thus analyzed these claims only to see whether they nonetheless represented nothing more than an abstract idea. Id. at 250.”
Well done DC! At least they know sup.
“Under this analysis, the district court found the methods to be invalid under § 101 as directed to the “fundamental idea of employing a neutral intermediary to ensure that parties to an exchange can honor a proposed transaction, to consummate the exchange simultaneously to minimize the risk that one party does not gain the fruits of the exchange, and then irrevocably to direct the parties, or their value holders, to adjust their accounts or records to reflect the concluded transaction.””
Beautifully written out. Not quite what I would have said, but close.
Well at least the DC got the right result. Reading further.
“but never letting the amount of total debits to exceed a prerecorded credit limit.”
Because that isn’t abstract. /facepalm. The USSC has cleanup duty on aisle 3.
I’ll read the decision, but if what you say is true is true then the USSC has its work cut out for it getting the feds to comply with the lawl.
“What this actually means is never clearly explained.”
I was about to say…
“There is a lot of dicta about Diehr and Bergy that is flat out inconsistent with Prometheus.”
That is the only way what you said was happening in this case could have happened. They’re a rebellious lot at the CAFC.
“ find the Majority and the Dissent both somewhat straining to caricature two opposed lines of legal thinking.”
That’s because Prometheus cannot be squared with the precedents it says it depends on.
The Supreme Court has made a Charley-Foxtrot of 101 and punted it down to the CAFC for them to try to integrate the disparaties.
The doctrine of judicial efficiency (and not solving the hard questions if easier questions are available to solve the instant dilemma) is well known in US jurisprudence at all levels, including (especially) the Supreme Court level.
The CAFC is attempting to integrate the
broadness of the patent system as mandated by Congress with the extra-legal effects of the Supreme Court “jury-rigged” exceptions that the Supreme Court “implicitly” wrote into the law.
A most impressive tightrope act between two very big dogs that that the CAFC lacks power over.
In reality, this is a gem of an attempt at something next to impossible. Kudos to Linn and O’Malley (and even to Prost for the counter view).
Max, either the court is massively confused by Bilski and Prometheus, or it pretends to be.
An interesting point:
“the Section 101 abstract idea preemption inquiry can lead to subjectively-derived, arbitrary and unpredictable results. This uncertainty does substantial harm to the effective operation of the patent system.”). In Bilski, the Supreme Court offered some guidance by observing that “[a] principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.” Bilski II, 130 S. Ct. at 3230 (quoting Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852)). This court has also attempted to define “abstract ideas,” explaining that “abstract ideas constitute disembodied concepts or truths which are not ‘useful’ from a practical standpoint standing alone, i.e., they are not ‘useful’ until reduced to some practical application.” Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1542 n.18 (Fed. Cir. 1994). More recently, this court explained that the “disqualifying characteristic” of abstractness must exhibit itself “manifestly” “to override the broad statutory categories of patent eligible subject matter.” Research Corp., 627 F.3d at 868. Notwithstanding these well-intentioned efforts and the great volume of pages in the Federal Reporters treating the abstract ideas exception, the dividing line between inventions that are directed to patent ineligible abstract ideas and those that are not remains elusive. “Put simply, the problem is that no one understands what makes an idea ‘abstract.’” Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 1315, 1316 (2011).”
I think the cause of the problem is that “abstract” is being used in two different ways in by the courts. In the first sense, the Le Roy v. Tatham sense, the law of nature or principle is applied at a too high a level of abstraction such that it covers essentially all practical applications of the law of nature or principle. It becomes essentially a patent on the law of nature or principle itself.
In the second sense, the claimed subject matter may be well-defined, as it was in Bilski, and not abstract at all in the sense that it claims all practical applications. Rather, what is being manipulated is itself abstract in the sense that it is not physical. For example, in Bilski, what was being manipulated was risk. Hedging risk is a form of manipulation of risk. But risk itself is only a “mathematical” relationship between two different possible outcomes. In other words, what is being manipulated is a mathematical relationship, which when speaking of physical things, can be a law of nature as we saw in Prometheus, or in connection with financial things is the manipulation of purely mental abstractions.
In the present case, the court itself identifies the abstraction being manipulated as financial risk. The whole objective is to reduce financial risk. So the question is, is this abstract concept applied to a process or machine that is itself otherwise patentable?
This is the integration test of Prometheus, which essentially also was described in Flook and Diehr. The court here does not do a good job in describing what the test is. Rather it seems to punt on the whole idea of identifying the abstract concept in the first place.
In CLS v Alice, I’m intrigued how the majority chastises SCOTUS for failing to keep 103 separate from 101 but then offers “obvious” as a touchstone of eligibility in computer-implemented inventions. See page 18, where we are told that where the computer imposes a meaningful limit on the claim scope, that claim is eligible, but where the computer is the “obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved” that claim isn’t eligible. Later on that page: a claim to the “idea” of running some process on a computer isn’t eligible but a “specific way” of running some concept on a computer is eligible. Not sure where that leaves the eligibility of the idea of running a specific algorithm on a computer. But then, neither are the members of this CAFC panel, are they?
The majority seems to be consigning 101-eligibility to the “Too Dificult” desk tray. And there was me, thinking that a court with the intellectual power of the CAFC couldn’t possibly choose to shrink away from hard questions.
I find the Majority and the Dissent both somewhat straining to caricature two opposed lines of legal thinking. Again, I see here a conspiracy between Majority and Dissent. Methinks, yet again, the conspiracy is to foster open debate, to bring about the invention of the best legal line useful for the future.
“So, what is the basis of saying that this light is not eligible for a patent?”
Check ur In re Nuijten for sig claims bro.
“”Overbroad” claim–definition: a fact finder decides it is too broad and conjures up language that has no basis in fact or law to justify the conclusion.”
In this case it is actually: “Overbroad” claim–definition: a group of United States Justices decides it is too broad because of the nature of the subject matter being claimed and conjures up language that has a basis in fact and law to justify the conclusion.
Dorothy,
Reading is for others. The Teacher is too tired from running up and down the tower steps to bother with reading before spewing his comments.
“You might want to go back and read the case more carefully.”
Says the teacher who does not do the very thing he “teaches.”
That’s Rich.
Back to the Tower with you, IANAE.
A machine that does something like identify tumors? Something like that.
Not exactly like that, no. You might want to go back and read the case more carefully.
“Even when the claims don’t recite a computer at all”
Beautiful straw. Read the decision before making a comment as off-base as your post at 9:18.
You mean a machine? A machine that does something like identify tumors? Something like that. But, gee, your machine has captured abstract concepts and can’t be eligible for patentability.
You are like Justice Stevens who simply has no understanding of modern computation science which includes psychology, computer science, and electrical engineering.
OK. Pope. The sun spins around the earth.
You are frightening. Go back to college and either take more ethics classes if that is why you are saying these things or take science classes if ignorance is your excuse.
can’t you see how ridiculous your side is? Seriously?!
According to the majority:
Just having a computer isn’t enough to pass 101. There needs to be a… ooh, a computer! Okay, you pass.
Yup. Makes perfect sense to me. Even when the claims don’t recite a computer at all.
You need to put up a post on CLS v. Alice. This opinion at least shows there is some sense left in the world. But, really, all you patent burners out there, can’t you see how ridiculous your side is? Seriously?! Don’t you care about the morality at all?
It should be self-evident that each of these four statutory provisions—§§ 101, 102, 103, and 112—serves a different purpose and plays a distinctly different role. No one section is more important than any other. Together, they evince the intent of Congress in furthering the constitutional objective of promoting the progress of the useful arts. Because each of these sections serves a different purpose and plays a different role, invalidity, patentability, and patent eligibility challenges under these sections present distinctly different questions. See Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1303-04. CLS BANK v. ALICE CORPORATION 13
Mr. Heller:
Wasn’t you that was recently crowing about how Prometheus over ruled the Rich separate doors doctrine, and effectively overturned that part of Diehr? Seems like you and MM just can’t win for losing.
“Malcolm, a major 101 case today:
CLS Bank v. Alice Corp., link to cafc.uscourts.gov“
Mr. Heller:
I find it interesting how you can find the most recent CAFC court case opinion but have no clue how to find the Ultramecial claims so you can engage in a discussion about the USPTO’s Integration guidelines for 101 statutory subject matter.
Oh it’s really sweet how you go running to MM at the first sign of trouble for your anti patent agenda.
There’s little Malcolm can do for you though. It’s been a long tough year since last August, the greatest month of his life.
“the resurrection of Bergy”
Newsflash: Bergy never died.
“confuses when it says that a programmed computer is a particular machine under the MOT”
Not confusing at all.
“also that using a GP computer by programming it is not sufficient”
Likwise, not confusing at all.
It’s only confusing if you bought into the anti-software patent crowd rhetoric.
Facts is facts, any of the enumerated categories can violate the judicial exceptions and be not patent eligible. There’s nothing special about any process, manufacutre, machine or composition in and of itself.
If you don’t know that, then you really don’t understand the judicial exceptions in the first place.
“resurrection of Bergy, and the careful cabining of 101, 102/103, and 112, into different slots, basically trashes Prometheus.”
Not at all. You are either reading too much, too little or both into the case. It’s actually funny seeing you say that others have a fundamental lack of understanding AND be confused at the same time.
Egyption, I think the case illustrates that Prometheus did little to clarify the law.
Moreover, the case confuses when it says that a programmed computer is a particular machine under the MOT and also that using a GP computer by programming it is not sufficient. Where is the dividing line? What in the fricken world is the difference?
I think I know, but it seems clear the Court does not.
Also the resurrection of Bergy, and the careful cabining of 101, 102/103, and 112, into different slots, basically trashes Prometheus. It demonstrates a fundamental lack of understanding of that case.
“On the whole, the case massively confuses.”
Lolz
It is only confusing when you live in a state of denial.
But it an interesting exposé on the integration of the post Bilski 101 cases, and sheds an interesting (fire)light on how several members of the CAFC feel about the level of weight to give the spate of SC’s own “confusing” and downright conflicting “guidance” on the matter.
Malcolm, a major 101 case today:
CLS Bank v. Alice Corp., link to cafc.uscourts.gov
The case discussed a series of related patent applications that all reduced risk by recording transactions in chronological order, but never letting the amount of total debits to exceed a prerecorded credit limit.
Reduction of risk itself is abstract. But the recording of the transactions in a chronological order ultimately is what prevailed.
There is a lot of dicta about Diehr and Bergy that is flat out inconsistent with Prometheus. The courts also give credence to Alappat that simply programming a computer is sufficient to create a particular machine, while emphasizing that simply using a computer by programming it is not enough. What this actually means is never clearly explained.
But in the end, I think I might might agree with the result, which held that the requirement to record transactions in specific chronological order was among the listed elements that render the claims non abstract.
On the whole, the case massively confuses.
“Chevron has absolutely nothing to do with patent examination. Nothing.”
Rather misses the point.
By a mile. The case itself need not have anything to do withpatent examination in order for judicial deference to agency action to be in play.
From the wiki:
A two-part analysis was born from the Chevron decision (called the “Chevron two-step test”), where a reviewing court determines:
(1) “First, always, is the question whether Congress has spoken directly to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court as well as the agency must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”
“If the Court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction of the statute . . . Rather,
(2) [I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific question, the issue for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–843 (1984).
Chevron has absolutely nothing to do with patent examination. Nothing.
Ned,
Would you say that the foundations of US law (the declaration of independence and the constitution) exhibit the sense of rights existing outside of law as Wordplay has posted July 7, 1:53 PM and to which you respond at July 9, 1:03 PM in your point 2)?
Would you also say that your point 1) at July 9, 1:03 PM is in direct conflict with this sense?
History is not an argument. It is a fact.
Mr. Word, I think I have.
1.) Rights need remedies, that requires law, law requires government.
2.) Those that believe in god believe in higher law, where one ends in either heaven or hades depending. Only in that sense are there rights.
SO WHY DID MY CASE AGAINST THE USPS GET CLOSED TOO? MUST BE THE SAME KIND OF EVIL FROM THE POLICE
And if you think about it… none of the fraud committed with the two party bankrucptcy would have ever happened. Neither would any of this I have been put through! That’s why Allen ran! That’s why Burroughs Ran!
And Robin stated I NEVER DELIVER TO YOUR BOX WHEN IT IS THE STREET ADDRESS. I SEND IT BACK! And if he did what he was supposed to, my Mail from Dave Winters would have been delivered back to him. But instead Robin sent it to HH, TVS, or LW… Or he delivered it to the other person that has a KEY to my PO BOX! OR whoever else hired them to split up Assets I knew nothing about. Not only while I was growing up, but also while I was in bankruptcy. All on a lie. And you know of course I am married … RIGHT?
Typo alert, Jason: you’ve styled the case Sciele Pharma Inc. v. Andrx Corporation just under the headline, but Andrx was on the same side as Sciele.
“Overbroad” claim–definition: a fact finder decides it is too broad and conjures up language that has no basis in fact or law to justify the conclusion.
So, what is the basis of saying that this light is not eligible for a patent?
I guess what you made me state.. is the Two which were current.. After all you did to me. I can’t wait.
A-coxcombry
B- anchors aweigh
C- Family sucks
Hmm, all of the above.
I wonder just how much anyone else could have taken what I was subjected to. From the time I spoke with Karl and still today. Seventeen years. Wow. seventeen years it took you to TRY to destroy what I had left. And you just didn’t ruin my life. August 26, 1997, August 26, 1998. August 26, 2000.
D0(/)VER. B NOT!
To the Devils Mick, Sue, Ray and dead Lou,
Time would have been better spent writing a novel, instead of trying to take the rest of my life with your lies. You could have been rich with the story you unfolded.
And when I think about all those Real Estate Contracts for 4446 that were there then puff…. Conspiracy central! Give your soul to God! But he won’t have it!
So when we were asked what we owned and what we owed… And she put what I owned into whtr we owed that was FRAUD! And when we were asked the same thing in Court.. and the reason for the Bell.. was because we didn’t know about what belonged to me but they did! so he stepped in. GAME OVER
A+B=C C+A=B B+C=A =(ABC)
These arguments remind me of the patent shills Gene Quinn and Dale Halling.
Nice.
But still waiting for you to present the one single example of an intelligent modern advanced society that has recognized the benefit and charged ahead without a patent and copyright system.
Until you have such an example, the only mindless one is you Art.
You want to talk about mindless parroting…? Check out “Against Intellectual Monopoly” by Boldrin and Levine. Oh wait, you already have.
Yummy Kool-Aid there, lap it up comrade.
You guys apparently have not read the book: “Against Intellectual Monopoly”. You guys are still mindlessly parroting these misguided and inaccurate goofball arguments in support of patents. These arguments remind me of the patent shills Gene Quinn and Dale Halling.
If you would stop flitting about and say something substantive either about patent law, or about the larger scope of certain rights being unalienable, I might have something further to say.
Your move.