By Jason Rantanen
Earlier this month, I posed a question relating to the patent eligibility of the following claim:
- A method for guiding the selection of a therapeutic treatment regimen for a patient with a known disease or medical condition, said method comprising:
(a) providing patient information to a computing device comprising:
a first knowledge base comprising a plurality of different therapeutic treatment regimens for said disease or medical condition;
a second knowledge base comprising a plurality of expert rules for evaluating and selecting a therapeutic treatment regimen for said disease or medical condition;
a third knowledge base comprising advisory information useful for the treatment of a patient with different constituents of said different therapeutic treatment regimens; and
(b) generating in said computing device a ranked listing of available therapeutic treatment regimens for said patient; and
(c) generating in said computing device advisory information for one or more therapeutic treatment regimens in said ranked listing based on said patient information and said expert rules.
This claim was a real one, from a real case. It’s Claim 1 from U.S. Patent No. 6,081,786, and in a January 2014 nonprecedential opinion the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s ruling that it and claims from related patent No. 6,188,988 were ineligible for patent protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Here’s the core of the court’s reasoning:
The district court correctly held that the claim 1 method falls outside the eligibility standards of section 101 as that provision has been construed. This conclusion follows from CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., where, based on earlier precedents, this court held that section 101 did not embrace a process defined simply as using a computer to perform a series of mental steps that people, aware of each step, can and regularly do perform in their heads. 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see also In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 840-41 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 794-95 (C.C.P.A. 1982). As CyberSource explains, those precedents rest on Supreme Court decisions indicating that section 101 covers neither “mental processes”—associated with or as part of a category of “abstract ideas”—nor processes that merely invoke a computer and its basic functionality for implementing such mental processes, without specifying even arguably new physical components or specifying processes defined other than by the mentally performable steps. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67-68 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978).
***
The Supreme Court’s post-CyberSource decision in Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012), reinforces the application of Cyber-Source to decide the present case. The Supreme Court in Mayo, though addressing a case involving the “law of nature” exclusion from section 101, recognized that “mental processes” and “abstract ideas” (whatever may be the precise definition and relation of those concepts) are excluded from section 101. See 132 S. Ct. at 1289, 1293, 1297-98 (quotation marks omitted). Whatever the boundaries of the “abstract ideas” category, the claim at issue here involves a mental process excluded from section 101: the mental steps of comparing new and stored information and using rules to identify medical options. Mayo demanded that, when a claim involves an abstract idea (or, in Mayo itself, a law of nature), eligibility under section 101 requires that the claim involve “enough” else—applying the idea in the realm of tangible physical objects (for product claims) or physical actions (for process claims)—that is beyond “well-understood, routine, conventional activity.” 132 S. Ct. at 1294, 1298, 1299. The claim here does not do so. It calls on a computer to do nothing that is even arguably an advance in physical implementations of routine mental information comparison and rule-application processes. In this context, the concern about preempting public use of certain kinds of knowledge, emphasized in Mayo, is a grave one. See id. at 1301-02.
Our decisions since Mayo do not undermine Cyber-Source or its application here…..
You can read the entire opinion here: SmartGene v ABL.
ABL has since filed a petition for certiorari, as well as an amicus brief in Alice v. CLS. Its position is that SmartGene should be GVR’d regardless of the outcome in Alice v. CLS (which might issue as soon as tomorrow). From the introduction:
Judge Pauline Newman recently characterized the Federal Circuit as being in a state of jurisprudential “deadlock,” making patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 a question “whose result will depend on the random selection of the panel.” CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (hereinafter CLS Bank) (en banc) (Newman, J., dissenting), cert granted, Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S.Ct. 734 (2013) (hereinafter Alice). No better case illustrates the panel-dependent crapshoot that Section 101 jurisprudence has become than this one. Although it is impossible to predict the Court’s forthcoming opinion in Alice, there is little doubt that it will significantly impact the law in this area and break the deadlock in the Federal Circuit.
The decision below is a prime example of the
current dysfunctional state of the law in the Federal Circuit.
You can read the petition here: ABL v. SmartGene petition for writ of certiorari.
simply as using a computer to perform a series of mental steps that people, aware of each step, can and regularly do perform in their heads. 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see also In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 840-41 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 794-95 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
This is an unbelievably ignorant statement. Would a tractor be invalid under 101 because it merely performs physical steps that a person can easily perform with their body? The ignorance of the above quote is epic. How any intellectual honest person can say that a machine that automates human thought processes is per se ineligible is beyond any rational discussion.
And gee, Tarantula, I suppose an invention to write opinions for the Fed. Cir. should per se be ineligble under 101, eh? Again, how does it make sense to appoint a person that has never taken an interest in science and a slight interest in patent law (probably just to get their appointment)? What sense does that make?
From what I have read of the opinion–and I have not yet read it in its entirety–it is, once again, woefully inarticulate.
Regulars may have noticed that I no longer contribute to discussions on this board. That is so, not due to any defect of the board itself, but instead to what I see as the woefully inarticulate mistreatment and misunderstanding of patent law by jurists, academics, and administrators (but especially jurists of the CAFC).
I won’t even enter upon an analysis of this opinion, I have fatigued of this exercise.
These people are overburdened, and are doing a terrible job in an absolute sense–HOWEVER the fact that they are overburdened can be the result of either one or a combination of 2 factors:
1) too great a workload
2) too little capacity.
These things depend on administrative structure, individual ability, etc.. For whatever reason, the capacity is out of balance with the workload.
I would not reduce this phenomenon to (1), while assuming reasonable capacity, for there is no particularly good reason to assume that political appointees will have any such reasonable capacity, especially considering the quality of the individuals who appoint them, and the committees that recommend them. I have had, I continue to have, and I have expressed, my doubts as to both the work ethic and the cognitive and/or communicative abilities of particular jurists on the CAFC.
This system is a real disaster, and in the past few years I have been busy with other matters. To return to the fold at this time, and find the system to be the same as, or worse than, it was, is incredibly disappointing. Worse than that, it is vexing.
Good luck. My recommendation at this time is that Judge Taranto return to school and audit some classes in argumentation, logic, and reasoning, and that he take other members of the CAFC with him.
This may change things, I expect for the worse.
So long Judge Rader.
link to blogs.wsj.com
Marty,
Pray why do you expect a change for the worse ( and whatever does that mean)?
Principle in the abstract: the distinction here is “useful” vs. “used.”
The problem with these claims more than anything else is that they stop at “generating information.” Information is useful, but is not used in the claim.
Principle in the abstract typically is a problem under 112, is it not? Enablement, breadth, etc. But it that always true if the means for generating the information is novel?
Can someone explain why this post is held up for moderation?
Ned,
My guess is that particular “reply to” posts have triggers for moderation.
anon, it was not a reply, it was a new post on protecting information, where everything in the claim was old and the only thing new was information.
I think the Supreme Court cases on 101, other than law of nature or product of nature, can be reduced to this observation, that if the final step in a process or system is a number, and the process is otherwise old, or the computer hardware is otherwise old, then the claim protects information. As such, the claim provides something that is useful, but not used. That is what Benson identified as the problem with the claims in that case, and Flook in its case, and with the claims in Mayo. Simply ending in a number is not enough.
But the post was deleted.
Don’t know then Ned.
Saw another blog that actually highlighted the “error” that prevented a post – would be a nice addition here…
There appears to be no rational or objective standard for things being caught in moderation.
I have a post in moderation that does no more than reference a link to this very blog that cannot get through, and another that does no more than consolidate three replies already on the thread.
It also appears that RandomExaminer’s posts on at least one older thread are newly released.
Maybe it’s because you have plagiarized my comments to this board, made years ago. Nice to know that you agree with my reasoning, however, although you seem to lack a more substantial appreciation of the concept described.
IBP, I’m sorry for plagiarizing your comments made years ago. Perhaps if I had read them at the time, I would have remembered to quote you.
Ned,
We waited for…
…”principle in the abstract”…?
we’ve talked about this in the past – how this simply became gobbledygook in the hands of too many judges twisting it to mean too many different things such that Congress stepped in and said “No mas – we are taking the tool of common law evolution away from the judiciary.”
anon, it is good to remind the judges and the folks who read this blog what “abstract” means, where it comes from in the original English cases. It simply means that an idea must be applied to produce a practical result.
Take the Rubber-Tip Pencil case cited in Benson for the “idea” exception. The problem was that the claim was functional, devoid of details of structure or process — exactly like in Morse’s claim 8.
This is not a 101 problem, but a 112 problem.
Ned,
The Court (your favorite Royal Nine, remember) have explicitly chosen where they have tied down their implicit writings of law.
Are you saying they chose incorrectly? Are you saying that they should have done something else? Are you saying that they have (or should have had) violated the separation of powers doctrine by explicitly writing patent law in one or more other sections of the law?
And what happened to 4 and 5? Has 4 become 5?
Ned,
On another thread you blandly repeat your old mantra about how the Supreme Court is not to be blamed.
Respectfully, I would like you to attempt answers to the questions I put to you, as they have direct bearing on your stated views.
Anon, blamed for “what?”
Bilski, I agree, was unclear.
I will further agree in principle with Rich and Rader that the judicial exceptions must end. Ground any and all rejections/invalidity doctrines in the statutes.
“blamed for what”
See: link to patentlyo.com
Would recitation of the insignificant post solution activity of displaying the generated information address the problem you perceive Ned?
I’m not sure why generating information is deemed not to be useful. Of course it is useful.
Moreover, I don’t understand what policy goal is served by burdening claims with aspects such as post solution displaying, or printing or even using the generated information. All that does is let an infringer claim they are not infringing because they don’t do the displaying or printing, they merely generate the information according to the invented method….
Keys, please, Les.
In case you didn’t notice, I wasn’t talking to you.
In case you didn’t notice, the taking of keys is not limited to whom you are slurring your words to – anyone can and should step in, including friends or the bartender.
Not one mention of Bilski, and yet the decision mapped well to that opinion in noting that “The district court concluded that the claim does “no more than describe . . . an abstract mental process engaged in routinely, either entirely
within a physician’s mind, or potentially aided by other resources in the treatment of patients.” Later in the opinion, the Federal Circuit made this observation, “The claim does not purport to identify new computer hardware: it assumes the availability of physical components for input, memory, look-up, comparison, and output. Nor does it purport to identify any steps beyond those which doctors routinely and consciously perform. Our ruling is limited to the circumstances presented here, in which every step is a familiar part of the conscious process that doctors can and do perform in their heads.”
One can get sidetracked on the “mental steps” aspect of the opinion. But the really important aspect was the finding that the “mental steps” were notoriously old (“familiar”), and that the computer steps added nothing (“Benson”). This analysis is straight out of Bilski, that there held the claims ineligible because the hedging process being claimed was notoriously old and fundamental.
It seems that the Bilski case is not understood. Part of the problem is that Bilski and this case both sound in prior art – not really a 101 cases at all.
Part of the problem in relying on Benson’s “mental steps” aspect is that the Supreme Court in Flook stated that the problem identified in Benson was “math,” not mental steps.
An even bigger problem: you have to actually use what the claim is – not disassociate the claim for some “gist” and the mental steps doctrine is a FAIL because machines really do not think (anthropomorphication).
“One can get sidetracked on the “mental steps” aspect of the opinion. But the really important aspect was the finding that the “mental steps” were notoriously old (“familiar”), and that the computer steps added nothing (“Benson”). This analysis is straight out of Bilski, that there held the claims ineligible because the hedging process being claimed was notoriously old and fundamental.”
Once again “notoriously old” is a 102 issue and should ave not bearing in a 101 inquiry.
Alas, the flaws in our court system appear to be notoriously old and unrepairable.
Les, absolutely agree. If something is not patentable on the basis that it is notoriously old, then this is a matter for 102/103.
Or, 112, if the claims are functional.
LOL – still denying what happened in 1952 (and the quote that I used, from your own beloved source of Frederico)?
Ned (again) injects a plain error in his recounting of Bilski – there was no computer in the claims at issue in Bilski.
The error is a type of over-read/run-on: “and that the computer steps added nothing (“Benson”). This analysis is straight out of Bilski,”
This has been noted – and corrected – before.
anon,
Bilski: notoriously old. Benson: The addition of a GP computer not enough.
Smartgene: method is “familiar.” The addition of a GP computer not enough.
Bilski and Smartgene sound in 102/103, not 101.
(sigh)
Once again Ned- there was no GP computer in the claims of Bilski, and you are over-reading Benson (need I supply the quote from that decision yet again?)
“Are you out of your Vulcan mind?”
Where’s my pretty gifs to go along with your cute sayings, Grumpy Cat?
I also like how they’re starting to question the competency of the judges at the appellate level to make factual findings on 0 record before them. I like that the softiewafties are finally getting around to this position after having benefited from that behavior from the courts for 20 years or so now.
NWPA et al. likes to talk about nuclear bomb arguments. Man they just handed us a nice one on a silver plater at the bottom of page 14 of the cert petition.
LOL —
“Finally, if patent eligibility excludes a computer system or program that replaces the logical or mathematical reasoning of a human, then it logically
follows that no computer program that performs any logical or mathematical task that a human could do is patent eligible.”
They’re crying like this is a bad thing? Hilarious.
What is even more hilarious is that you think that such removal of an entire innovation sector from patent eligibility is a good thing.
It boggles the mind if you were to understand what the world of innovation entails and how you seem to be perfectly clueless in that regard.
Your penchant for excluding this area based solely on the koolaid you have drunk is more than a little frightening.
How can you infer Dobu’s reason from excluding mental process from patents? There is no way to know from his post.
You may politely ask him to develop his arguments, if you are interested. There are arguments to both sides, and there is a balance to be reached between excluding useful patent fields and obvious / general patents getting monopolies for contributing nothing to the society.
I find the mental process test a useful line to be drawn, but you may suggest another. Or you may think thare is no line to be drawn, and then I would disagree.
Anon73,
Dobu’s post (here) is not taken in a vacuum.
He has – in previous conversations – elucidated his source material and what he says is understood – just disagreed upon.
As to “mental process,” two things to refresh your recollection: machines do not think (anthropomorphication) and no one (except strawman Malcolm and take-the-keys-away Les) are talking about claims COMPLETELY in the mind.
Pay attention. Especially if you deign to attempt to correct someone else who needs not the correction you offer.
I find the mental process test a useful line to be drawn, but you may suggest another. Or you may think thare is no line to be drawn, and then I would disagree.
The bl 0g tr0ll called “anon” doesn’t like to talk about or explain his beliefs as to whether mental processes should be protectable with patents under existing laws or future laws. He also despises policy discussions because then people who aren’t directly invested in the system might dare to point out that the system wasn’t designed as an entitlement program solely for his benefit.
Basically the guy just likes to insult people who don’t love patents as much as he does. Once you understand this, everything he does or says is very easy to understand (at least when it’s written in regular English and not some parody of the ridiculously turgid prose of 19th century legal opinions).
“Basically the guy just likes to insult people”
LOL – says the guy spinning out of control and into yet another apoplectic fit of rage.
Remove the insults and the others items off of your short script and what remains of your posts?
Absolutely nothing.
entire innovation sector
That needn’t be the case, of course. There are all kinds of reasonable compromises that could be made. And it’s likely that some will be made before the plug is pulled for good.
But you will have the same hysterical fit regardless. That much is guaranteed.
Cert bout to be DENIED.
Never let your opponent — whether it be an infringer or the patent office — get away with characterizing one (or 2-3) of your claims as being “representative.”
Never.
Always argue for the separate eligibility and patentability of each and every one your claims. From first OA all the way through the completion of litigation.
Always.
The system claims could have won this case for ABL.
The system claims aren’t going to be more valid under 101 or 103.
Always argue for the separate eligibility and patentability of each and every one your claims. From first OA all the way through the completion of litigation.
Because nothing ridiculous that you say under oath will ever come back to bite you.
Grow up, man.
LOL – Malcolm admonishing anyone about saying things that come back to bite and telling anyone to grow up….
KA-BLOOEY! – there goes an entire parallel universe of irony factories.
(hmmm, he even throws in there the ‘distinction’ of “under oath” – as if his writings here need not have the same intellectual honesty, as if his advocacy on this modern social media mechanism is somehow not guided by the ethical constraints that real attorneys are obliged to follow)
“Mayo demanded that, when a claim involves an abstract idea (or, in Mayo itself, a law of nature), eligibility under section 101 requires that the claim involve “enough” else—applying the idea in the realm of tangible physical objects (for product claims) or physical actions (for process claims)—that is beyond “well-understood, routine, conventional activity.””
One of the things the court discussed in oral arguments this past session was whether the state of the art had any bearing on 101. It does, and this statement shows that at least Taranto understands.
When the art contains a machine (most commonly nowadays a computer) and the specification does not distinguish over the machine except by a general application of an abstract idea or law of nature, the proper characterization of the claim is that it is being drawn toward claiming the abstract idea or natural law.
A lazy view of the foregoing would be an argument that one is improperly letting a 102/103 analysis bleed into a 101 analysis. This is incorrect and would ignore the quoted “well understood, routine conventional activity” language. A 101 analysis requires one accurately determine what the applicant consider to be their invention. Sometimes the conclusion is that the applicant isn’t attempting to claim a new processor, or a new memory (though they might be necessary limitations), or even particular instructions (as they are rarely claimed), but is rather attempting to “improve” upon the known computer by generally applying the idea that it be used for a particular type of information processing. This “improvement” is likely both obvious and a claim toward an abstract idea.
“One of the things the court discussed in oral arguments this past session “…
…was the massive backpedaling from Breyer, who all but said “oops – you guys took me too seriously, I did not really mean that”
Random, identifying the invention is one thing and a reason to discount the GP Computer limitations for patentability purposes, but it is quite another to then say that a claimed computer process are “mental steps.” Any child in the street knows the difference between a computer and the human brain. To the extent the courts continue to embarrass themselves with such tripe, they do a discredit to the judiciary.
(not to mention Malcolm, who has explicitly said that machines really do think)
Ned: it is quite another to then say that a claimed computer process are “mental steps.”
Let’s call them “information processing steps” then. Happy?
Any child in the street knows the difference between a computer and the human brain.
That’s nice. Does the typical softie woftie claim drafter know the difference? Because other than the use of the word “computer” and a few other “magic words”, it doesn’t seem like they have a clue.
Why would anyone want to be happy that you seek to conflate things and not read a claim correctly?
Do you understand what PHOSITA means?
No better case illustrates the panel-dependent crapshoot that Section 101 jurisprudence has become than this one.
In fact, 99% of the time there is no “crapshoot” whatsover and it’s incredibly easy to predict eligibility, regardless of the panel that is drawn. Indeed, the outcome in Prometheus v. Mayo was predictable and necessary for reasons that were widely publicized prior the decision. In fact, it was predicted, by myself and others. It doesn’t take a degree in patent law to figure out that you can’t turn an ineligible process (thinking about a “new” correlation) into an eligible process merely by taking on some old conventional step prior to the new mental process. That would be absurd.
Was anyone surprised by the result in SmartGene other than the attorneys who argued on behalf of an apparently misinformed and deeply confused patentee? I’m not aware of anybody who would be surprised. You can’t patent old information about medical therapies, even if it’s organized in a new way. Why would anyone be surprised to learn that it doesn’t help if you stick in some “magic words” about an old computer doing nothing more than what an old computer does (store information for retrieval)? What rational policy argument is there that would justify the patenting of such gxrbxge?
We all know that certain people (e.g., the author of the quoted text) love the idea of a patent system that coddles the lowest form of inventing, i.e., the functionally-claimed “computer implemented” storage, receipt and transfer of otherwise ineligible data. This microsocopic class of invariably well-heeled and deeply invested people see 101 jurisprudence as an attack on their livelihoods or those of their friends/clients (apparently they can’t find anything better to do with their intellects, which are always somehow deemed — by them — to be vastly superior to those of any of their critics).
These same people, of course, when asked whether “new” information should be protectable by patents merely because, as claimed, that information is described as (surprise!) being accessible by ancient technology or because it appears after an old, conventional step of gathering data related to that information, will suddenly stick their fingers in their ears or their heads in the sand and pretend that they were born yesterday.
The other game they will play is to pretend that if their claims aren’t granted then nobody should be entitled to patents on anything and we should all join the Amish. Nobody believes that silly empty threat, of course, but we see it here all the time.
Here’s the question I would ask: if gxrbxge like the patent at issue in ABL v. SmartGene is eligible for patenting, is there anything “on a computer” that isn’t eligible for patenting? Recognize that we aren’t talking about a “new machine” in the traditional sense. We are talking about an old machine that, in most instances, has never been made or tested but is “made new” merely by the description in the claim of some new (or old) information stored or “processed” by the old machine — an old machine that everyone knows (and has known for a long, long time) can store and process any kind of information that it is instructed to store and process.
There are no novel structures recited for these “machine” or “system” claims, unless you consider “structure” to include “logical structure” or “data structure” which zero people (other than a few invested patent attorneys) seriously believe. All that the typical computer-implemented claim is doing is protecting the information that the public can access and process using a computer. Since when is information eligible for patenting?
The other inevitable complaint is that all this should be dealt with using 103 instead of 101. There’s two problems with that, as everyone knows. First, the Federal Circuit long ago incorporated 101 considerations into its jurisprudence to deal with the very same issues we are presented with in cases like SmartGene: the attempt to protect ineligible subject matter such as “non-obvious” information with patents. Second, the same “judicial activism” which resulted in this sleight-of-hand with respect to 103 also injected into 103 a list of “secondary” evidentiary considerations — some with a very tenuous link to reality — which turned 103 into a very expensive “crapshoot”, one that is at least as unpredictable as 101 but which are much more prone to manipulation by patentees, in their favor. Is anyone surprised that people who seek to control what sort of information is accessible on computers would favor 103 over 101? If so, I’ve got a bridge to sell you…
“some “magic words” about an old computer doing nothing more than what an old computer does”
zzzz – pay no attention to the man behind the curtain…
That was a good-quality post. Hopefully, some of the low-quality posters will take the opportunity to read and learn from it.
It’s opposite day in the land of Oz…
Maybe Memorial Day is opposite day for you, but the rest of us proudly honor the sacrifice and courage of our men and women in uniform.
Nice Grumpy Cat, and as typical your latest reply is a complete non-sequitur to the conversation, so even though the sentiment is noble, the mismatch makes the post of low quality.
Try to stay on topic.
Of course, the practical reason for rejecting these claims under Section 101 andnot Section 103 is because that would result in a USPTO crapshoot. To reject these kinds of methods under 103, an examiner would have to do something like:
Step 1: Determine the claim portions to ignore under 101 ineligibility (Can you think of something that would result in more appeals?).
Step 2: Examine the remaining portions of the Claim (which will be claimed with silly functional language, designed to be difficult to find in the prior art, or just not talked about in older patents because they are really quite dumb).
Step 3: Cobble together a 103 rejection based on combining silly steps like “providing patient information” with “outputting…” (another avenue for appeal).
It would be a huge mess, and bear in mind that most of these examiners are not also lawyers (and if you want that, LOL, prepare for Quintupled fees at the USPTO).
“claim portions to ignore”
Stop right there – Do not pass Go. Do not collect $200.
>“claim portions to ignore”
“Stop right there – Do not pass Go. Do not collect $200.”
Ugh you have me agreeing with anon.
LOL – If you were to stop and think Random Examiner, you would recognize that such is not a bad thing – at all.
Which is why I said 103 is unworkable for these issues. Which is what a huge swath of people who oppose Prometheus etc, said the court should have used.
The problem is, under 103, its impossible to weed out broad claims to laws of nature/abstract ideas/phenomenon/ etc.
I was simply pointing out that its nearly impossible to protect those classes using 103 from the uspto, which is a bigger issue than if you agree with the substance of Prometheus.
Chicago, not impossible. The courts have been applying the printed matter doctrine during 102/103 for some time without any problem.
The problem is the statute — it teaches us to look at the prior art and compare differences. It provides no guidance when limitations are not functionally incorporated, or not new, or not useful; or neither a machine, manufacture nor a composition. Theses issues have to be dealt with elsewhere – as in 112, or in 101.