Prometheus Laboratories v. Mayo: The Broad Scope of Statutory Subject Matter

By Jason Rantanen

Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services (Fed. Cir. 2010)
Panel: Rader, Lourie (author), Bryson

Last Friday, the Federal Circuit released its second noteworthy post-Bilski decision (the first being Research Corp v. Microsoft).  The opinion, Prometheus v. Mayo, issued following a grant-vacate-remand order from the Supreme Court instructing the CAFC to revisit its original decision in light of Bilski.  Despite this procedural posture, however, the new opinion is quite similar to the old, arriving at the same conclusion through essentially the same reasoning.   

Prometheus initially came to the Federal Circuit following a district court grant of summary judgment of invalidity under § 101 (lack of patentable subject matter).  After the CAFC reversed the ruling of invalidity using its "machine-or-transformation" test, Mayo sought review by the Supreme Court.  The Court granted certiorari, vacated the CAFC decision, and remanded for consideration in light of its Bilski opinion.  Earlier Patently-O commentary includes a summary of the original Federal Circuit opinion and a discussion of the remand.

The patents-in-suit claim a method for determining whether a patient has received a therapeutically efficacious amount of drugs such as 6-mercaptopurine ("6-MP") and azthiopurine ("AZA"), which are used to treat inflammatory bowel diseases but can produce toxic side effects.  In the human body, these drugs metabolize into 6-MP metabolites, including 6-methylmercaptopurine ("6-MMP") and 6-thioguanine ("6-TG").  By administering the drug, measuring the subject's levels of 6-MMP and 6-TG and comparing them to pre-determined levels, toxicity can be minimized and efficacy maximized. 

Claim 1 of Patent No. 6,355,623 is representative:

1. A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising:
    (a) administering a drug providing 6-thioguanine to a subject having said im-mune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder; and
    (b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder,
    wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol per 8×108 red blood cells indicates a need to increase the amount of said drug subsequently administered to said subject and
    wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 8×108 red blood cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of said drug subsequently administered to said subject.

Although similar in most respects, some claims of the second patent-in-suit, No. 6,680,302, dispense with the "administering" step.

The Patents Do Not Claim a Physical Phenomena
On remand, the CAFC again rejected Mayo's argument that the '623 and '302 patents claim a "natural phenomenon."  In seeking a judgment of invalidity under Section 101, Mayo contended (and the district court agreed) that the "administering" and "determining" steps are merely necessary data-gathering steps for the use of the correlations between 6-TG and 6-MMP and therapeutic efficacy or toxicity in patients.  Because these correlations are simply natural phenomena, Mayo reasoned, they were unpatentable.

As before, the Federal Circuit disagreed, noting that Bilski provides a broad – although not unlimited – scope for patent protection, and “an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”  Slip. Op. at 12, quoting Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3230.  Furthermore, the court stated, neither the Supreme Court's order to vacate and remand the original Prometheus decision nor Bilski dictates a wholly different analysis or different result.  

The crux of the CAFC's determination that the asserted claims recite a patent-eligible application of naturally occurring correlations between metabolite levels and efficacy or toxicity as opposed to the natural correlation itself rests on the specific treatment steps recited by the claims: the "administering" step and the "determining" step.  "The inventive nature of the claimed methods stems not from preemption of all use of these natural processes, but from the application of a natural phenomenon in a series of steps comprising particular methods of treatment." Slip. Op. at 15-16.

In support of its conclusion, the court reiterated its earlier determination that the treatment methods in Prometheus's patents satisfy the "machine-or-transformation test.  Although this is not the exclusive test, post-Bilski, it nevertheless provides important clues to subject matter patentabilty.  In applying the machine-or-transformation framework, the court specifically rejected Mayo's argument that the disputed claims simply claim natural correlations and the associated data-gathering steps, broadly stating that the asserted claims are "claims to methods of treatment, which are always transformative when one of a defined group of drugs is administered to the body to ameliorate the effects of an undesired condition."  Slip Op. at 17.  Even leaving out the administration step does not make the claims unpatentable, as the CAFC also found the "determining" step to be transformative because it involves "[s]ome form of manipulation, such as the high pressure liquid chromatography method specified in several of the asserted dependent claims or some other modification of the substances to be measured, [which] is necessary to extract the metabolites from a bodily sample and determine their concentration."  Id. at 18.

In reaching this conclusion, however, the court was forced to distinguish its earlier decision In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989), which similarly claimed a process that involved "(1) performing a clinical test on individuals and (2) based on the data from that test, determining if an abnormality existed and determining possible causes of any abnormality by using an algorithm."  Id. at 20.   Unlike the claims in Grams – which the CAFC found unpatentable "because the tests were just to 'obtain data'" (Slip Op. at 20) – the claims of the Prometheus patents "require the performing of clinical tests on individuals that were transformative." 

Mental Steps
In addition to its overarching analysis of the subject matter issue, the opinion also includes an interesting discussion of the use of mental steps in patent claims.  Although the CAFC agreed that the final "wherein" clauses are mental steps, "A subsequent mental step does not, by itself, negate the transformative nature of prior steps. Thus, when viewed in the proper context, the final step of providing a warning based on the results of the prior steps does not detract from the patentability of Prometheus’s claimed methods as a whole." Slip Op. at 21. Because no claim in the Prometheus patents claims only mental steps, "contrary to Mayo’s assertions, a physician who only evaluates the result of the claimed methods, without carrying out the administering and/or determining steps that are present in all the claims, cannot infringe any claim that requires such steps." Id.

Additional Commentary
In addition to an extensive discussion about the decision in response to Dennis's post on Sunday, other sites commenting on the decision include:

  • Patent Docs
  • patents4life
  • IP Watchdog
  • Chris Holman's IP Blog
  • Hal Weger of Foley has suggested that another grant of certiorari may be down the road, given the opinion's refusal to discuss a three-Justice dissent from the dismissal of certiorari in Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. 124, that was cited with approval by five Justices in two concurrences in Bilski.

231 thoughts on “Prometheus Laboratories v. Mayo: The Broad Scope of Statutory Subject Matter

  1. 231

    Wilton: Therefore, it is entirely appropriate to ask the question “what’s new about this method?”

    AI: That’s been asked and answered. A new use for detecting, preventing, and curing cancer.

    Wilton you are now just running around in circles like Malcolm.

  2. 230

    NWPA,

    Bein added to the list aint no big thang. Don’t forget that this person is the same one who believes his be otchin and windmill chasin on a mere comment section of a patent blog will bring abouts real change.

    The loafers aint the only things be light about that one.

    Hey Sunshine, you be the same one “shot” down and dissed over at the Patent Docs? There cant be two such fools chasin 102/103 arguement in a 101 decision, can there?

  3. 229

    Being added to your short list is the greatest honor one could have on patentlyo.

    Although, I think having a word banned that became your name is a close second.

  4. 227

    That be obvious.

    Maybe he should talk with Ned, Ned’s got some great meds, even if he gets the colors messed up on occasion.

  5. 226

    >>It be pathological to the point of bringin >>chuckles.

    You have to forgive poor MM. He lost his mind when Bilski was decided by the SCOTUS. He hasn’t recovered.

  6. 225

    I’m not the one who drafted the claim, pingaling.

    And what the H does that got ta do with anything, Sunshine? Your conflation is in your analysis – in case ya didn’t notice, ya keep bouncin around the 102/103 back to 101 issh.

    It be like ya got 101 on the head. Too many windmill blades come smackin down on ya, no doubt.

    It be pathological to the point of bringin chuckles.

  7. 224

    pingalingadingdong “for 102/103 analysis,…in which case the claim is effectively a claim to ineligible subject matter”

    Major lulz there Sunshine – Conflate much?

    I’m not the one who drafted the claim, pingaling.

    We already know that you and your buddy AI and at least one sockpuppet (can’t remember the stupe name offhand) believe that claims in the form “A new method, comprising an old transformative method followed by a ‘new, non-obvious’ step of thinking about the old method” are eligible and valid as a matter of law.

    It’s sort of sad that you can’t defend such claims reasonably, but it’s certainly not unexpected given your past history.

  8. 223

    for 102/103 analysis,…in which case the claim is effectively a claim to ineligible subject matter

    Major lulz there Sunshine – Conflate much?

  9. 222

    If anyone knows of a logical, legal way out of this conundrum, I’d love to hear it.”

    Sure, they did not concern themselves with 102/103 just yet.

    If you want to change your direction
    If you’re time of life is at hand
    Well don’t be the rule — be the exception
    A good way to start is to stand.

  10. 221

    6, with all due respect, whether or not “they’ve concerned themselves” with 102/103 is irrelevant to the existence of the legal conundrum.

    Here’s where we are at:

    1) you aren’t allowed to “dissect” claims for 101 purposes to identify a claim as an abstraction (except possibly when the only transformative step is insubstantial and/or unrelated to the purpose of the method)

    2) for 102/103 analysis, you must dissect claims to determine if the invention resides purely in subsequent mental steps added to old, transformative methods, in which case the claim is effectively a claim to ineligible subject matter (i.e., the only new step recited in the claims is a purely mental process, i.e., an abstraction)

    Thus, there is simply no way for a claim reciting “A new method, comprising an old transformation followed by a new way of thinking about the transformation” to be a valid claim under 102/103 (or 101, if the Federal Circuit’s reasoning is held to be incorrect by the Supreme Court).

    This is why I’ve been saying: what difference does it make whether such claims are obliterated under 101 or 102/103? My question is: is there a *logical*, legal way for the Federal Circuit to find Prometheus’ claims valid under 102/103, where the only transformative step is admitted in the specification to be old (or, to put it another way, where the only new step in the claim is a subsequent and purely mental step)?

    I can certainly imagine policy reasons (“without such claims, medical treatment will slow to crawl and the human race will quickly disappear from earth”) to justify someone (ideally not a court) to simply “say that it is so.” But other than, it’s mystifying and so obviously mystifying that I’m shocked that the Federal Circuit didn’t bring the problem up (they usually do, after all).

  11. 220

    I think this was a good first instance decision for the wrong reasons.

    The first instance judge, IMHO, was correct that the asserted claims are unenforceable and should go no further. Very possibly there is a good underlying invention, but the way that it is claimed is unlikely to stand up under 35 USC 112 for indefiniteness and failure to distinctly point out and claim the invention. The claims relate to a method claim without any method steps. Further they assert an aesthetically pleasing result without any anchor in terms of an objective test to show how that relative term should be judged. The CAFC has already pronounced adversely on just this indefinite language in a recent decision on another case, and in the European equivalent of the patent in issue the term was objected to as indefinite and removed.

    As Max Drei has indicated, there would be no problem with this subject matter before the EPO, and the equivalent European patent has in fact issued without any patent elegibility objection during examination. I suspect Judge Rader was right in his decision as to elegibility under 35 USC 101. But his observations about 35 USC 112 may not have been directed just at the Supreme Court: the plaintiffs would do well to heed them.

    There are better things that these patentees could usefully do than contest the case up to the Supremes. Discontinue the present proceedings, draft better claims, reissue the patent and start again with a decent set of claims. Unfortunately the patentees in this case may demonstrate the same level of insight as the Bilski parties, in which case the claims will go to the Supremes and there will be tears.

  12. 219

    “If anyone knows of a logical, legal way out of this conundrum, I’d love to hear it.”

    Sure, they did not concern themselves with 102/103 just yet.

  13. 218

    IANAE If someone comes up with a non-transformative way of obtaining the data, which is clearly covered by the claim, does that invalidate the claim? What if you could obtain the necessary data by non-invasively measuring dimensions of the patient, e.g. blood pressure, or pupil dilation?

    If Prometheus were to assert the claim against such a test, the claim would almost certainly be found invalid — at least if the Federal Circuit wished to be consistent in its application of 101.

    But CAFC went out of its way to distinguish this hypothetical set of circumstances from the actual facts (the necessarily transformative nature of the “determining” step was admitted by both parties, as I recall) in the first opinion.

    so how long before we see Bilski’s claim again but with a zeroth step of “driving to work”? Internal combustion is inherently transformative, right?

    Indeed, but I think the CAFC has also given itself wiggle room in its opinion to ignore transformative steps that are unrelated to achieving the purpose of the claimed method (never mind that Prometheus’ invention as claimed achieves nothing tangible that was not achieved by the prior art). Of course, this wiggle room implicitly and unambiguously requires that the Diehrbot Credo be violated.

    The real problem is not the facile 101 test that the Federal Circuit has set forth in Prometheus. The real problem is how to reconcile that test with the Federal Circuit’s admission in the same opinion that the purely mental step recited in Prometheus’ claims (i.e., the wherein clause) is, by itself, not eligible for patenting.

    Why is this a big problem? Because if you do not ignore that final mental step when analyzing the claims under 102/103, you are liable to end up validating a claim that is indistinguishable from the prior art *except* for the mental step. And it doesn’t take a rocket scientist to appreciate that such a claim is, for all practical purposes, a claim to a new mental step, at least as far as it concerns those who were and are practicing the old, transformative prior art method and who have the misfortune of being “educated” about the significance of the results obtained by those old methods.

    And I certainly don’t mean to say that “inventions” such as Prometheus’ can not or should not be protectable by current US patent law. But, as they are presently claimed, I don’t see a way for the claims to survive unless the Federal Circuit buries its head far deeper into the sand than was heretofore thought possible. If anyone knows of a logical, legal way out of this conundrum, I’d love to hear it.

  14. 217

    the test is not JUST to obtain data,

    The test for the level of metabolite in the patient is not just to obtain data?

    and that transformation was critical to the claim

    The transformation isn’t even in the claim. And it’s certainly not critical to the “invention”, which is looking at a number and (in some of the narrower claims) deciding what to do about it.

  15. 216

    It’s pretty clear that the Prometheus test is done just to obtain data

    Actually, the whole point of this lesson is that the test is not JUST to obtain data, and that transformation was critical to the claim – that is why In re Grams is distinguished. The path of red herrings (what if…) simply smells.

    Although I think I see what you are trying to say – the court should have grown a pair and simply overturned In re Grams, instead of trying to dance around as they have. The law has indeed evolved since 1989.

  16. 215

    Since when are “tests that were transformative” and “tests just to ‘obtain data'” mutually exclusive?

    It’s pretty clear that the Prometheus test is done just to obtain data, since it’s the data that is needed for the subsequent mental step, and the test only coincidentally happens to be transformative. If someone comes up with a non-transformative way of obtaining the data, which is clearly covered by the claim, does that invalidate the claim? What if you could obtain the necessary data by non-invasively measuring dimensions of the patient, e.g. blood pressure, or pupil dilation?

    It’s equally clear that Grams positively recited “performing said plurality of clinical laboratory tests on the individual to measure the values of the set of parameters”, some of which tests require one to “measure the levels of chemical and biological constituents of the individual”. You’ll find it hard to distinguish Prometheus on the grounds that Prometheus requires clinical tests on individuals that are transformative.

    And anyway, isn’t it a bit ridiculous to hinge patentability of a method of dosing medication on how easy or hard it is to test the patient for over/under-dosage?

  17. 214

    Unlike the claims in Grams – which the CAFC found unpatentable “because the tests were just to ‘obtain data'” (Slip Op. at 20) – the claims of the Prometheus patents “require the performing of clinical tests on individuals that were transformative.

    The decision nullifies the attempted strawman of “driving to work.”

  18. 213

    AI: !!! Bilski 14 !!!

    “[He] had a mind that ticked like a clock and, like a clock, it regularly went cuckoo.”

    Malcolm: According to the “rationale” in Prometheus, the presence of the transformative “immunizing” step would clearly suffice for 101 subject matter eligibility.

    Great, so how long before we see Bilski’s claim again but with a zeroth step of “driving to work”?

    Internal combustion is inherently transformative, right?

  19. 212

    Malcolm wises up and admits defeat on the 101 issue.

    Welcome into the light.

    Which by the way Willton is precisely the question at hand. It is the contribution of AI everywhere. And Inviting Body Punches, sometimes truth is just not flashy or provocative. It appears that you are addicted to the provocation and do not have your eye on the ball. No wonder then that you enjoy the likes of Malcolm and wonder where “the contribution” of AI is.

    !!! Bilski 14 !!!

  20. 211

    Seems like the Classen decision is a done deal at this point, unless the CAFC is inclined to spit in its own face.

    A method of determining whether an immunization schedule affects the incidence or severity of a chronic immune-mediated disorder in a treatment group of mammals, relative to a control group of mammals, which comprises:

    immunizing mammals in the treatment group of mammals with one or more doses of one or more immunogens, according to said immunization schedule, and

    comparing the incidence, prevalence, frequency or severity of said chronic immune-mediated disorder or the level of a marker of such a disorder, in the treatment group, with that in the control group.

    According to the “rationale” in Prometheus, the presence of the transformative “immunizing” step would clearly suffice for 101 subject matter eligibility.

    Unless the judges want to get into the utility issue (and they were certainly not inclined to do so in Prometheus), it’s on to 102/103.

  21. 210

    To me that doesn’t resolve this question: Suppose a patent describes a process that would, if performed by a human being, be bloody obvious (for example, there would be plenty of prior art one could dredge up of people doing this same basic thing by hand–if you see what I mean), and the patent really just adds in the further specification that all this should be performed with a computer (where the specifics of the implementation are not innovative in any way). So, what authorities tell us that something like this should NOT satisfy the nonobviousness criterion for patentability? One might suppose that a patent examiner would see this instantly, but yet I (inventor, not a lawyer) read lots of granted patents that amount to nothing more than this. Can one be assured that none of them would stand up?

  22. 209

    AI: “It is inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements and then to ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis. This is particularly true in a process claim because a new combination of steps in a process may be patentable even though all the constituents of the combination were well known and in common use before the combination was made.”

    It just can’t get any clearer than this. Diehr goes even further and says:

    “The “novelty” of any element or steps in a process, or even of the <450 U.S. 189> process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the §101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.”

    All of which is irrelevant to the question at hand. In your hypo, not only are all of the elements of the process disclosed in the prior art, but they are disclosed in ONE PIECE of prior art: the prior art method of diagnosing and treating the common cold. Therefore, it is entirely appropriate to ask the question “what’s new about this method?” If you can’t answer that question, then your hypothetical method is anticipated, and reciting a bunch of non-limiting mental or result-oriented steps will not save your claim.

  23. 208

    AI–

    Not only was that post uninteresting, it wasn’t even provocative.

    yawn.

  24. 206

    Inviting Body Punches,

    AI has contributed more than Malcolm. Easily.

    Sure, he is not a lawyer and strays from the perfect legal world on occasion (but much less than the other non-lawyers that frequently post here – your mention of 6 and the I would throw in MaxDrei).

    And for a non-lawyer, he seems to understand the patent law much better than Malcolm. He understands what Diehr stands for and what Bilksi confirms. You ask what he has contributed, and I will tell you – He has contributed the plain truth about 101. This is soomething that Malcolm has completely failed at.

    !!! Bilski 14 !!!

    Come to think of it Inviting Body Punches, what have you EVER contributed to this forum? The world has enough naysayers. Stand up and do something positive. Invent something.

  25. 205

    Please, why does anybody entertain AI seriously?

    What has he EVER contributed to this forum that had any value other than the comic?

    It’s just as easy to ignore AI as it is to ignore 6.

  26. 204

    Actual Inventard…(Red Herring Fallacy Omitted)

    Once again, the resident Diehrbot crosses over into self-parody. Can anyone really be this stoopit?

    Posted by: Malcolm Mooney | Jan 02, 2011 at 12:53 AM

    _________________________

    So Malcolm, let me see if I understand you.

    Having failed to supply for the record and with specificity sufficient to support a prima facie case of claim dissection at 101, 102, or 103, the factual and legal basis on which said dissection of claims are allowed, your only rebuttal is…

    Anyone agreeing with the Supreme Courts ruling in Diehr and In Re Bilski is either an “Actual Inventard” “Diehrbot” and/or “stoopit?”

    I suppose your name calling includes the majorities on the Supreme Court as well. Seriously Malcolm, is that the best you can do?

  27. 203

    Thank you MM. When I read your AI quote I did not believe it, till I had found it for myself. AI really did write that every process requires at least one mental step. Whatever could he be thinking there? That “invention” = “conception” = “patentable subject matter”, but, equally, “patentable subject matter” = “process” and so, inevitably, “subject matter” = “mental”?

  28. 202

    Actual Inventard: every process requires at least one or more mental steps.

    Once again, the resident Diehrbot crosses over into self-parody. Can anyone really be this stoopit?

  29. 201

    Wilton: “Well, is such objective physical treatment and/or use of instrumentalities the same as that of the old method? ”

    It my hypothetical the doctor could use any combination of known methods and instrumentalities because treating the common cold is not confined to one sequence of steps. But It doesn’t matter and here’s why,

    Diehr says:

    “It is inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements and then to ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis. This is particularly true in a process claim because a new combination of steps in a process may be patentable even though all the constituents of the combination were well known and in common use before the combination was made.”

    It just can’t get any clearer than this. Diehr goes even further and says:

    “The “novelty” of any element or steps in a process, or even of the <450 U.S. 189> process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the §101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.”

    Now for years Mooney said this section of Diehr was c r a p. He was betting the Steven’s approach in Flook that made it permissible to dissect claims would control.

    But Mooney and the rest of you dissectionist were shocked when the Supreme Court said the following in Bilski:

    ““Finally, in Diehr, the Court established a limitation on the principles articulated in Benson and Flook.”

    And that with that the Supreme Court put the final nail in the coffin for the anti patent crowds hopes and dreams.

    And thats the law.

    Happy New Years!!!

  30. 200

    AI: To extrapolate on the hypothetical I offered yes, there is going to be some type of objective physical treatment and instrumentalities used to treat and cure the cancer. The doctor is not going to cure cancer just by thinking about it.

    Well, is such objective physical treatment and/or use of instrumentalities the same as that of the old method? Because based on your original phrasing of the hypo, it sounded like there was nothing different about the new method compared to the old method, outside of the disease to be treated.

  31. 199

    I would expect the same of the claim in AI’s hypothetical. But, in my view, AI’s claim leaves out the testing step, and focuses solely on interpreting the test result as indicative of cancer and taking some objectively observable action indicative of that correlation.
    Posted by: TINLA IANYL | Dec 30, 2010 at 11:12 AM

    ____________

    To extrapolate on the hypothetical I offered yes, there is going to be some type of objective physical treatment and instrumentalities used to treat and cure the cancer. The doctor is not going to cure cancer just by thinking about it.

    And yes, as previously stated people will be free to think about this process, and talk about it. In fact the good doctor will most likely get the nobel prize for his brilliant objective, applied, scientific process that no one in the history of the world had ever thought of before, but Malcolm would deny him his patent, if he could.

    Something is seriously wrong with this.

  32. 198

    But, assuming the novelty and non-obvious of the mental step, are such claims patentable under 102/103, pingaling? Under current case law?

    You say yes, and so does AI. Anyone else?

    Posted by: Malcolm Mooney | Dec 30, 2010 at 02:03 PM

    Malcolm inventors are not awarded patents for an individual step in a process, nor are they denied patents for such. The claims are considered as a whole under 112, 101, 102, and finally 103.

    If all these requirements are met the inventor receives his/her patent. Then the marketplace determines the value of the patent. So even if you do not value or respect it the inventor still gets his patent and then you are free to not license, purchase or use the invention. You can even express your opinion about how it suxs or whatever. But the patent is issued according to the law and not your opinions. The sooner you accept that fact the happier you will be .

  33. 197

    AI’s claim leaves out the testing step, and focuses solely on interpreting the test result as indicative of cancer and taking some objectively observable action indicative of that correlation.

    In other words, telling someone what you’re thinking is now patentable. Wow.

    Posted by: Malcolm Mooney | Dec 30, 2010 at 11:29 AM

    ___

    In the hypothetical I proposed, merely telling someone what you are thinking does not cure cancer. And even if it did, that would not be eligible subject matter under 101.

    However for reasons previously stated , a process for curing cancer, that involves more than just whispering you’re cured in someones ear is eligible subject matter under 101.

    Yes, Mooney if you dissect the claims you can prevent patents for the cure for cancer. In fact you can prevent all process patents since every process requires at least one or more mental steps.

    That’s why the law says not to dissect claims into eligible and non eligible subject matter so please do not ask me to violate the law, hypothetically or otherwise.

  34. 196

    Okay let’s end this.

    Malcolm Mooney, please cite the case law that states the Supreme Courts ruling in Diehr to take the claims as a whole, does NOT apply for 102 0r 103.

    PERIOD.

    ::SILENCE::

  35. 195

    Exactly Malcolm. Exactly.

    You think the USA is the only jurisdiction in which such questions arise? Some US Applicants do file foreign. And when they do, the EPO has to examine their claims.

    The EPO used to reject many of them with a 101 eligibility bludgeon. Then Applicants got wise to that and claimed their subject matter more imaginatively. So the EPO sharpened the edge on its 103 battle-axe. To survive a sweep with that fearsome weapon, your claimed subject matter has to use technical features to solve an objective technical problem. Applicant needs to be more imaginative still. Merely thinking about something isn’t (by any stretch of the imagination) technology. Goodbye claim.

    It is all very well for the CAFC to follow the EPO’s 101 relative/absolute path if it has a 103 battle-axe like the EPO’s. But it hasn’t.

  36. 194

    MD could it be that these CAFC judges have been infected by EPO philosophy on the crucial difference between eligibility and patentability?

    Don’t know and don’t care really. The issue here is whether you can do an end-around 101 and patent thinking about or communicating an unpatentable idea to a person merely by reciting some old, transformative steps before the mental ones.

  37. 193

    Just a thought (because I can’t be bothered to read the decision or follow the thread rigorously) but could it be that these CAFC judges have been infected by EPO philosophy on the crucial difference between eligibility and patentability?

    What I mean is this. In Europe, you ignore the state of the art (and what is old) when doing 101.

    Thus, in Europe, claim “A computer” and you get over 101, whatever words (if any) follow “computer”. But claim something barred by the EPC from patenting, like a mathematical process, and you don’t.

    Whereas 102 and 103 are “relative” tests, that is, relative to the prior art, 101 is an “absolute” test in which the prior art plays no part.

    I get the feeling that these CAFC judges find this relative/ absolute distinction attractive.

    Or will you tell me that Europe got the relative/absolute idea from the USA?

  38. 192

    Sunshine, patentable subject matter is a 101 concern.

    Wrong – patentable subject matter is a 101, 102, and a 103 concern. In order for a claim to be considered patentable, it must overcome all three hurdles. I thought you knew this?

  39. 191

    For example, non-lawyers can’t go around giving legal advice.

    Sure they can. They just can’t represent that they’re authorized by the state to do it. Are you seriously suggesting that it’s illegal to say “You should sue those b@stards!” if you’re not a lawyer?

  40. 190

    MM, I think you need to clarify what you mean by “mental step” if you want people to answer the question.

    Mental step means a step performed in the brain. I know you’ve mentioned the possibility that the district court or the Federal Circuit was interpreting the wherein clause(s) in the claims to be more than merely mental, but that’s simply not the case. The Federal Circuit both pre- and post-Bilski is basically applying a very strict and simple transformation test to find the claims eligible, i.e., if there is a physical transformation in the claim that yields information that is relevant to the “purpose” of the claim, you pass 101. Period. End of analysis. No treatment necessary (that’s claim 46). This is the whole point of Lourie’s discussion about the added mental step not “negating” the 101 eligibility of the claim.

    That’s all fine and dandy, as I’ve stated. It’s a very simple rule for drafting a diagnostic claim to meet 101 eligibility.

    I know you are upset at the thought that people might be prohibted from saying what they think.

    Or thinking what they think. But yes, prohibiting people from saying what they think about a fact without obtaining prior consent from such people is a very serious problem. It was a problem recognized by the framers of the Constitution, as I recall, in one of the earlier amendments.

    Does that include making a diagnosis, referring the patient to a specialist, treating the the patient, etc.?

    The last issue is somewhat different as a properly claimed method of treatment which recites only non-mental steps is certainly patentable in the United States.

    We all agree (even Judge Lourie agrees!) that a method consisting of a single step of thinking about or communicating to a patient that a patient should receive treatment X is not eligible for patenting under 101 under existing law, regardless of the novelty of the treatment. How is it possible, then, to take that ineligible subject matter and stick it to the tail end of an old and unpatentable method and voila! get a claim that is patentable under 102/103? If such a claim is deemed both eligible and novel or non-obvious, the effect on those who are practicing the prior art is to preclude them from communicating their thoughts about a fact relating to their trade (note that the fact is NOT a trade secret, but a publically known fact). This is a problem.

    there are all kinds of things that people aren’t permitted to say. For example, non-lawyers can’t go around giving legal advice.

    Statutes were passed to protect the public.

    Artists can’t publicly perform copyrighted works without a royalty being paid by the venue, or distribute copies of recordings of cover songs without taking a mechanical license.

    Artistic expression and public facts are distinct and recognized as such by the law. There’s a completely different set of policy issues at stake and many exceptions to enforcement, both judicial and statutory. Moreover, while I can’t legally copy and sell Nicholas Cage’s new movie, I can certainly talk about it ad nauseum.

    Why is it such a stretch that doctor’s would be prohibited from making diagnoses without taking a license?

    “Well, I saw a new report published five years ago that suggests a treatment for you based on our tests, Ms. Vogel, but I can’t even tell you what that treatment is until I talk to our lawyers. Making the recommendation might be patented and we can’t afford another lawsuit this year. I know you are critically ill and can’t really afford to wait, but think of all the children that might die if we didn’t allow such patents.”

  41. 189

    MM, I think you need to clarify what you mean by “mental step” if you want people to answer the question.

    Does that include making a diagnosis, referring the patient to a specialist, treating the the patient, etc.?

    I know you are upset at the thought that people might be prohibted from saying what they think. It does seem to implicate first amendment concerns of free speech, but there are all kinds of things that people aren’t permitted to say. For example, non-lawyers can’t go around giving legal advice. Artists can’t publicly perform copyrighted works without a royalty being paid by the venue, or distribute copies of recordings of cover songs without taking a mechanical license. Why is it such a stretch that doctor’s would be prohibited from making diagnoses without taking a license?

  42. 188

    Welcome, sockpuppets!

    We’ll put another “Yes” next to looking glass’ nym. That makes three: ping, AI, and “looking glass”.

    Anyone else think that you can create a patentable claim (under 102/103, as if that wasn’t to clear to anyone except for pingaling and co.) by adding a subsequent “novel” mental step to an old method?

  43. 187

    “(let me know if I’m misrepresented your positions — you’re… notorious for flip-flopping when the light gets bright”

    Cite me a sample Sunshine – show mees where Iza flip-flopped. Betcha cant, cause I be consistent as the Northern Star.

    You be just trollin for comments and jus dont have much ta say, do ya?

    cf

    we be talkin 101 here Sunshine.

    No, I’m asking you about 102 or 103, pingaling, and you keep trying to change the subject.

    That much was very clear the first time I asked.

    Posted by: Malcolm Mooney | Dec 30, 2010 at 01:18 PM

    “Can that be patentable subject matter?

    What are your views, ping?

    Still waiting, ping.

    Let me know if you are having difficulty understanding the question.

    Posted by: Malcolm Mooney | Dec 26, 2010 at 11:34 AM

    And

    Sunshine, patentable subject matter is a 101 concern.

    W

    T

    F

    Malcolm, there are two things abundantly clear:

    1) You do not understand the difference between 101, and 102 or 103.

    2) You have been pwned by Ping.

  44. 186

    Sunshine, patentable subject matter is a 101 concern.

    If you want to get technical about it, pingaling, it’s eligible subject matter that’s a 101 concern. The same subject matter could be eligible for patenting under 101 but not patentable under 102/103.

    But you’re only trying to change the subject … again.

    If all of the limitations in a claim are present in the prior art except for an additional “novel” mental step and/or a step of stating what you are thinking, is that claim patentable?

    Easy stuff, pingaling. And better yet it’s not even a “hypothetical.” Claims of precisely that nature are at issue in Prometheus (well, not precisely because the mental step in Prometheus is so broadly claimed that it, too, is likely inherently anticipated or obvious — but let’s ignore that for now). The bottom line is that if we take the CAFC decision at face value, we now know that such claims are “eligible” for patenting under 101, at least as long as at least one of the old steps include some transformation of human tissue.

    But, assuming the novelty and non-obvious of the mental step, are such claims patentable under 102/103, pingaling? Under current case law?

    You say yes, and so does AI. Anyone else?

  45. 185

    Can that be patentable subject matter?

    What are your views, ping?

    Still waiting, ping.

    Let me know if you are having difficulty understanding the question.

    Posted by: Malcolm Mooney | Dec 26, 2010 at 11:34 AM

    Sunshine, patentable subject matter is a 101 concern.

    That much was very clear the first time I asked.

    Bring the chuckles, baby, bring ’em.

  46. 184

    we be talkin 101 here Sunshine.

    No, I’m asking you about 102 or 103, pingaling, and you keep trying to change the subject.

    That much was very clear the first time I asked.

  47. 183

    As has been explained to you many times, the analysis of a claim under 102 or 103 requires

    Talk about sophistry – we be talkin 101 here Sunshine.

    Ya do know the difference between 101 and 102 or 103, dontcha?

  48. 182

    pingaling “In other words, telling someone what you’re thinking is now patentable. Wow.”

    Sunshine, just an observation: Don’t parse – take the claim as a whole.

    pingaling, your sophistry is repetitive and non-responsive. As has been explained to you many times, the analysis of a claim under 102 or 103 requires comparing the limitations recited in the claim with the methods known in the prior art.

    If all of the limitations in a claim are present in the prior art except for an additional mental step and a step of stating what you are thinking, is that claim patentable?

    Your repeated invocation of this “read the claim as a whole” “rule” (in quotes because it applies in all situations, except when it doesn’t) strongly suggests that you believe the answer to the question is “yes.” So we’ll put you down for that, right next to your bud AI.

    Maybe Dennis should take a poll.

  49. 181

    In other words, telling someone what you’re thinking is now patentable. Wow.

    Sunshine, just an observation: Don’t parse – take the claim as a whole. Your statement above parses a single element and you are pronouncing “patentable” on an element.

    Ya gonna get the Diehrists aroused here with their Bilski 18’s, 24’s or whateva’s.

  50. 180

    TINLA it appears that they may haved actually read the specification and the prosecution history, and determined that a warning step was recited.

    Right, just like Chef America: the plain language of the claim can be ignored on certain days of the week.

    So the holding of Prometheus is that you can patent a claim that recites old steps plus an additional subsequent “novel” mental step and a step of telling someone what you are thinking? I think that’s just as interesting (and wrong) of a result as the “novel-mental-step-added-to-old-method-is-patentable” result.

    AI’s claim leaves out the testing step, and focuses solely on interpreting the test result as indicative of cancer and taking some objectively observable action indicative of that correlation.

    In other words, telling someone what you’re thinking is now patentable. Wow.

  51. 179

    MM, in my view, it depends on whether the claim limitation really is just a mental step, or if there is some objectively observable activity like reporting the level under a column reserved for the range indicative of the other condition, or issuing a diagnosis.

    I’ve already said that the court did not appear to interpret “correlating” in the examiner preferred manner of the broadest unreasonable interpretation. Rather, it appears that they may haved actually read the specification and the prosecution history, and determined that a warning step was recited.

    I would expect the same of the claim in AI’s hypothetical. But, in my view, AI’s claim leaves out the testing step, and focuses solely on interpreting the test result as indicative of cancer and taking some objectively observable action indicative of that correlation.

  52. 178

    pingaling, can one patent a method with steps that are identical to the steps of an old method except for the addition of a subsequent and “novel” mental step? It’s a yes or no question.

    What’s your position? I’m not interested in your “explanation” of your non-position on the question. I don’t think anyone is interersted in hearing that … again.

    Same for AI and TINLA. Simple yes or no.

    In fact, everyone should feel free to respond to this poll, drawn directly from the very straightforward facts of Prometheus. Let’s see who responds and who somehow can’t bring themselves to answer (due to shame, presumably) and therefore makes a desperate bid to change the subject.

  53. 176

    You know, for laughs.

    Sunshine, the right phrase is “for chuckles” Pay attention.

    keep track of the future losers

    Wassa matta? you want losers to join you? And your keeping track is like what, your latest change-the-world windmill project?

    we have ping… asserting that…

    Wrongo bucko – read my observations more closely. Iza either just sayin ya need to read the claim as a whole (tell me ya gonna disagree with that Sunshine), or Iza be commentin on what others be assertin (like TINLA’s offerin of the actual definitions which done show up policywank Willie-boy).

    (let me know if I’m misrepresented your positions — you’re… notorious for flip-flopping when the light gets bright

    Cite me a sample Sunshine – show mees where Iza flip-flopped. Betcha cant, cause I be consistent as the Northern Star.

    You be just trollin for comments and jus dont have much ta say, do ya?

  54. 175

    “I don’t know what you are getting on about regarding May. They were using something to effect analgesia that was already used to effect analgesia. They wanted to take that use out of the public domain by claiming its use a non-additictive analgesic, based on their discovery that it was non-addicting. That’s about like trying to patent using previously known lead free house paint to paint houses because you discovered lead is dangerous. ”

    Well Broje I’m not going to dig into the facts again, but I think it enough that you said “anal” huh huh huh huhhuhhuh huh. Although I will also note that you’re the one going on and on about how new uses for old things are totally patentable. I’m not sure what changed your mind in the last few seconds, but whatever it was I’m glad it did. Maybe all this time you’ve meant that they were totally patentable under 101 but nearly always not under 102/103?

    “Discovering a new property of the compund does not make the old use of that compound a new use”

    Oh but broje! They said it a different way in the claimzor! You can’t ignore limitations! lol

    I don’t pay attention to AI or his hypos but thanks for the welcome, I assume you had a good trip wherever you were headed?

    “How is any of that at all like AI’s hypothetical, in which the raw results from the test for the common cold, if they fall in a previously unappreciated range, can be used to detect cancer very early and prevent it?”

    Because all you did was use the test in an old fashion? And then look at it and make a prediction? Depending on the claim of course.

    “That’s not forseeable at all, and the claim does not take using the test to diagnose the common cold out of the public domain.”

    O rly? Because it sure seems to depending on your training and on whatever range of values that happens to pop out of the old test. You infringe as soon as you did the old steps the later being looking at the results and thinking about them.

    But, of course, this is all a consequence of the nonsensical inclusion of mental steps etc. into patentably weighted subject matter. The lows the patent system are currently bound up with boggle the mind.

    “Wilton has to resort to twisted extrapolations of unrelated lawl, because the policy arguments are all on AI’s side, ”

    I lulzed. Policy? On AI’s side? lulololoulululululululuzlzuzluoluouoluuoluouluoululz.

    The only “policy” that AI has or knows about is $$$ from ripping off some company.

  55. 174

    So we have ping and AI both asserting that one can patent a method with steps that are identical to the steps of an old method except for the addition of a subsequent and “novel” mental step (let me know if I’m misrepresented your positions — you’re both notorious for flip-flopping when the light gets bright). TINLA, you want to sign on to that proposition as well?

    I just want to keep track of the future losers. You know, for laughs.

  56. 173

    Hi, 6, welcome back! 😛

    I don’t know what you are getting on about regarding May. They were using something to effect analgesia that was already used to effect analgesia. They wanted to take that use out of the public domain by claiming its use a non-additictive analgesic, based on their discovery that it was non-addicting. That’s about like trying to patent using previously known lead free house paint to paint houses because you discovered lead is dangerous.

    Discovering a new property of the compund does not make the old use of that compound a new use. Duh. How does that impact anything we were talking about regarding Tomlinson or AI’s hypothetical?

    And Tomlinson is basically about not being able to patent using house paint to paint cars, where the property of the paint to, you know, be paint and paint stuff is already known. The “new” use of the paint isn’t really new. It’s obvious to the point of anticipation.

    How is any of that at all like AI’s hypothetical, in which the raw results from the test for the common cold, if they fall in a previously unappreciated range, can be used to detect cancer very early and prevent it? That’s not forseeable at all, and the claim does not take using the test to diagnose the common cold out of the public domain.

    Are these not fair questions?

  57. 171

    subject old = treating a cold
    subject new = treating cancer

    Do you read what you write?

    By subject, I meant the person on whom the method is performed. The subject is a person in each instance.

  58. 170

    In this case, ping, Wilton has to resort to twisted extrapolations of unrelated lawl, because the policy arguments are all on AI’s side, and even he can see it. It’s hard to blame him for wanting to win this challenging, for his side, argument. Looks like Wilton likes a challenge.

  59. 168

    Willie-boy,

    I admire your “bravery” for so willingly jumping at the chance to show your ignorance.

    Bravo.

    ps. I see why you usually stick to policy-only arguments. You svck at making factual or legal ones.

  60. 167

    The EPO looked at “novelty of purpose” almost immediately after it opened its doors for business in 1978. Exxon wanted a patent for its fuel additive because, said Exxon, it reduced friction within the engine. The Examiner raised no 101 objection. but did raise a 102 objection because the prior art had the same fuel and the same additive, in the same proportions. The only difference was that the prior art advocated using the additive to inhibit corrosion in the engine. It said nothing about any friction-reducing capability in the fuel additive.

    Outcome? Exxon got its patent. Its “use claim” was found to be eligible, new and not obvious. Right result, no? Indisputably, Exxon made a valuable contribution to the technical field of fuel additives, revealing to the PHOSITA teaching of which, up till then, the PHOSITA was ignorant.

    On that basis, “use claims” are by now ubiquitous in Europe. I guess the CAFC did not want to miss out, or disadvantage US-based industry relative to Europe. You see, these days, there is competition amongst nations, to be more “patent-friendly” than the next nation.

  61. 166

    the subject of the method is the same

    but

    an old method of treating a cold can be used to treat cancer does not mean that the new use

    W

    T

    F

    subject old = treating a cold
    subject new = treating cancer

    Do you read what you write?

  62. 165

    AI: As pointed out above the case law does say you must take the claims as a whole. So there is no way for you to start eliminating these claims without dissecting them into patentable and non patentable subject matter, and that is not allowed.

    The case law says that the claim must be taken as a whole in order to determine if the claim meets 101 subject matter scrutiny and 103(a) obviousness scrutiny. The case law does not, however, say that every recitation in a claim must be treated as limiting. The USPTO routinely disregards “adapted for” and “whereby” clauses when such clauses do not recite a structural limitation of a claimed apparatus or a manipulative limitation of a claimed process. The same is true for process limitations in product-by-process claims. See In re Thorpe.

    Just because an old method of treating a cold can be used to treat cancer does not mean that the new use is performed any differently than the old use. If the method is the same, the subject of the method is the same, and the process limitations of the method are the same, then what is objectively different about the new use compared to the old use? Only one thing is different: how one interprets the results. Sorry, but in my view, that’s not claim limiting.

    But if a Medical Doctor discovers and invents a process for the cure for cancer, and God forbid it involves a mental step you suddenly say it has no patentable weight.

    No patentable weight!?!?!?!?

    The frekin cure for cancer, a medical and scientific breakthrough has no patentable weight, but a new shaped cookie does?!?

    That’s Homer Simpson logic!

    It’s Fd up.

    Save your moral outrage for those lunatics in the PIAUSA.

  63. 164

    Maybe now I’ll get my “Day” in Court. And they may not care as you say. But they will understand that Lobbyists don’t exist inside the Rotunda.

    *Day
    Him too

  64. 162

    A compilation of a persons Civil Rights.

    And it was all over a fender. I hope you are all proud of what you have done to me.
    Whether you believe it or not. I was once a very gentle soul. That cried if you looked at me wrong. So getting away from what sucked it out of me was neccessary for my mental health. But it seems there is no getting away from it.
    So when I pushed up against a wall, the onlt thing to do is push back

  65. 161

    “misstates the MPEP and the facts of May and Tomlinson. The ruling is that a new use of a known property of a compound or structure is not patentable, but that a new use of a previously unappreciated property of the known compound or structure is patentable. Characterizing that as making unpatentable a new use of a known method producing results with previously unappreciated meaning seems quite a stretch, and essentially incorrect.

    Your “result” limitations will be dealt with in due course. The director stated that he doesn’t have a problem with them, but of course he doesn’t, he’s a lawlyer. The courts on the other hand may have one very soon, especially in light of how courts have viewed them before. They seem to a new fad of late just begging to be beatdown. I’ve already discussed them with more than a few lawlyers and all agree that they’d rather turn those result limitstions into straightforward step limitations. Flip a coin at your own risk.

    Btw, citing nonsense about 101 has no relevance to 102 and 103. By the by, the court specifically addressed your nonsense argument in May.

    “Appellants contend that May is not an anticipation since claim 1 is limited to a method for effecting nonaddictive analgesia, whereas May only discloses a method for effecting analgesia. Relying on 35 U.S.C. § 100(b), viz., “[t]he term `process’ . . . includes a new use of a known 1090*1090 . . . composition of matter,” appellants conclude that they have discovered a new use for the species disclosed by May. We disagree.”

    link to scholar.google.com

    And see where this comes from:

    “We likewise must affirm the rejection of process claims 18-20, notwithstanding appellants’ urgings that those claims “stand in a different position regarding obviousness” than the composition claims by setting forth “a use and the means whereby such new use is obtained,” thus coming “within the definition of a process set forth in 35 U.S.C. 100(b)” and that this “new use of the nickel and cobalt dithiocarbamates as an ultraviolet stabilizer for polypropylene constitutes one of the fundamental aspects of appellants’ invention.” As indicated, Tholstrup shows the combination of polypropylene with nickel dithiocarbamates to be old. While the method of combining is not clear, we thing it conventional, and therefore obvious, to do so by “admixing,” as claimed. We therefore find process claims 18-20 unpatentable by reason of their reading on an obvious process, the admixing of polypropylene and a nickel dithiocarbamate, an old mixture.”

    where claim 18 is:

    “18. A process of inhibiting degradation of polypropylene caused by exposure to light which comprises admixing solid, isotactic, substantially crystalline polypropylene and a stabilizing quantity of dithiocarbamate having the general formula:
    wherein each of R, R1, R2, and R3 is a hydrocarbon radical containing 1 to about 18 carbon atoms and M is selected from the group consisting of nickel and cobalt.”

    link to scholar.google.com

  66. 160

    I didn’t interpret AI’s hypothetical in that light. It seems to me that he was proposing interpreting the result in a new way with respect to a previously unappreciated range of measured values indicative of a different condition. So basically, something analogous to the invention in Prometheus. We are making different assumptions about what AI is thinking.

    Posted by: TINLA IANYL | Dec 28, 2010 at 05:10 PM

    _______

    You are right and Willie is wrong. It just so happens that I agree with the Supreme Courts intepretation of broad scope of patentable subject matter and apparently so does the CAFC.

  67. 159

    We are making different assumptions about what AI is thinking.

    Apparently. AI is not very clear about what he is thinking, aside from his belief that anything and everything should be potentially patentable subject matter, including methods of thinking.

    Posted by: Willton | Dec 28, 2010 at 05:57 PM:

    When have I ever made such a statement? You lie like Malcolm. Hmmmm. New alias for Christmas?

  68. 158

    In addition I would say that the conditions for 101, 102, and 103 are successive steps that once met establishes a platform for the next.

    Once you meet the requirements for 101 you have met them and its not logical that your accomplishments can be stripped from you in 102 and 103.

    Otherwise what is the point of having separate steps, or as Rich would say, doors to be unlocked?

  69. 157

    Willton: There’s also nothing in the case law that says a new use of a known process MUST be patentable.

    AI: As pointed out above the case law does say you must take the claims as a whole. So there is no way for you to start eliminating these claims without dissecting them into patentable and non patentable subject matter, and that is not allowed.

    You still lose.

    Bilski 14 baby!

  70. 156

    Willton: Well, then I would continue to hold my stance that the claim should be rejected under 102, except my reasoning would be that the recited “mental step” indicating the new use would not have any patentable weight.

    AI: Whoa there Willie! Just how do you expect to arrive at that conclusion without dissecting the claims? And please don’t quote Steven’s Dissent(s) like Ned does. The old man ( Stevens) is gone and his views have no force of law.

    And for all you iron age thinking, horse and buggy whip factory working peeps that say the law should be changed to what Wille wants. Please consider the following:

    If a housewife creates a new cookie sheet/pan that can bake 3D shape cookies, no one is going to say it’s not 101. Nor will there be any issues under 102 and 103, providing its never been done before.

    But if a Medical Doctor discovers and invents a process for the cure for cancer, and God forbid it involves a mental step you suddenly say it has no patentable weight.

    No patentable weight!?!?!?!?

    The frekin cure for cancer, a medical and scientific breakthrough has no patentable weight, but a new shaped cookie does?!?

    That’s Homer Simpson logic!

    It’s Fd up.

    It’s Inane.

    Its IANAE EVEN!

  71. 155

    In the hypothetical there was no process known or used by others for curing cancer…PERIOD. And there is nothing in the statute thats say a new use of a known process is not patentable under 102.

    There’s also nothing in the case law that says a new use of a known process MUST be patentable. If the recitation of the new use does not provide a manipulative limitation to the claimed method or process, then it does not carry any patentable weight. In this case, the same method is being performed the same way on the same subject. The only thing that is different is what results the doctor is looking for. The mental steps of a doctor looking at or considering the result differently is not claim limiting, and thus does not distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art.

  72. 154

    Methinks “homey don’t do answers” because he’s a coward.

    Ouch.

    Posted by: Cy Nical | Dec 28, 2010 at 04:47 PM

    Cy, ya be sittin on a stick again I see. I thinks I need ta swat ya side the head for ya to recognize an “ouch.”

    Well, no accounts of tastes.

    Willton – don’t confuse “takes a position” with “doing answers.”

    I done take plenty O stands – just checkout my brilliant observations all up and down these here threads. My position be clear enough for those with any level O brains. In fact, plenty O stands be against your lame policy-only-table-poundin (If ya got the law, pound the law; if ya got the facts, pound the facts, if ya got neither, pound the table). Go ahead Willton-boy, pound that table some more.

    As for answers, I done already stole Ol Maxie’s lines once before – for answers, ya gotta pay me, and you aint payin.

  73. 153

    Willton: Using the hypothetical method for the purpose of detecting cancer had always been available to the public.

    AI: Really? So why hadn’t anyone cured cancer until the invention of the good doctors method? You use the the word “available” like a weasel word to avoid a losing position. But the fact is every process is “available” to everyone in the public to be used and applied in any manner the public can invent. That’s why the term used in the case law is “application” NOT “availability”. ( See Diehr) Its the innovative , new and non obvious application of real world technology to an industrial process that makes the hypothetical method a patentable invention.

    Willton: The fact that the method had not yet been appreciated for this purpose does not make it patentable.

    AI: Again you make up another non legal term ( weasel word) to support a losing legal position. It does not matter if it’s been “appreciated” or not for 101. Thats just an opinion. The correct legal term according to the statute is “use”. The fact that the method had not been “used” for the purpose of detecting, preventing, and curing cancer is what makes it a new “use” and therefore statutory under 101. Read 35 U.S.C. 100 (b) or see TINLA IANYL post @ | Dec 28, 2010 at 03:30 PM

    (b) The term “process” means process, art, or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.

    Willton: You lose.

    AI: Not according to the statute. But of course you are free to keep saying that if it makes you feel better.

    Wilton: TINLA, perhaps you assumed that I was arguing that AI’s hypo was not patentable based on 101. I did not. I’m saying that it’s not patentable under 102, and that the recitation of this particular new use does not carry any patentable weight.

    AI: So you admit you lose the first round 101 and concede. Good. Now let’s go to round two 102.

    35 U.S.C. 102 Conditions for patentability; “novelty and loss of right to patent. A person shall be entitled to a patent unless -the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for a patent.”

    In the hypothetical there was no process known or used by others for curing cancer…PERIOD. And there is nothing in the statute thats say a new use of a known process is not patentable under 102. And as previously stated, since it’s an unexpected and surprising result, its also non obvious under 103. Therefore our hypothetical good doctor gets his patent for curing cancer, and Wilton goes down for the count!

    Referee, “1,2,3,………”

  74. 152

    I didn’t interpret AI’s hypothetical in that light. It seems to me that he was proposing interpreting the result in a new way with respect to a previously unappreciated range of measured values indicative of a different condition. So basically, something analogous to the invention in Prometheus.

    Well, then I would continue to hold my stance that the claim should be rejected under 102, except my reasoning would be that the recited “mental step” indicating the new use would not have any patentable weight. The mental step of interpretting results differently does not provide a manipulative limitation to the claimed method, and thus cannot provide the basis for patentability.

  75. 151

    We are making different assumptions about what AI is thinking.

    Apparently. AI is not very clear about what he is thinking, aside from his belief that anything and everything should be potentially patentable subject matter, including methods of thinking.

  76. 148

    Perhaps you did not see the “Cf.” there. I’m using May and Tomlinson by analogy. It’s persuasive case law, not binding in this case. The main problem is that there is not much case law specific to processes regarding when a claimed new use or purpose is not patentable.

    Fair enough.

    perhaps you assumed that I was arguing that AI’s hypo was not patentable based on 101. I did not. I’m saying that it’s not patentable under 102, and that the recitation of this particular new use does not carry any patentable weight

    OK. But we have been discussing 101 and the related cases, and AI did specify a “novel and nonobvious” new use even in the part that you quoted above. So I hope you can see why there might be a mixup.

    In any event, AI is essentially taking the position that a method claim is patentable where the only difference between the claimed subject matter and the prior art is a recitation of the different disease in the preamble. I do not see how that presents a manipulative limitation that patentably distinguishes it from the prior art.

    I didn’t interpret AI’s hypothetical in that light. It seems to me that he was proposing interpreting the result in a new way with respect to a previously unappreciated range of measured values indicative of a different condition. So basically, something analogous to the invention in Prometheus. We are making different assumptions about what AI is thinking.

  77. 146

    Come ta think of it, my boy Willton is quite the one-track pony.

    Says the guy who never takes a position on anything. Methinks “homey don’t do answers” because he’s a coward.

  78. 145

    misstates the MPEP and the facts of May and Tomlinson. The ruling is that a new use of a known property of a compound or structure is not patentable, but that a new use of a previously unappreciated property of the known compound or structure is patentable. Characterizing that as making unpatentable a new use of a known method producing results with previously unappreciated meaning seems quite a stretch, and essentially incorrect.

    Perhaps you did not see the “Cf.” there. I’m using May and Tomlinson by analogy. It’s persuasive case law, not binding in this case. The main problem is that there is not much case law specific to processes regarding when a claimed new use or purpose is not patentable. Most method claims are drafted as new methods, rather than new uses of old methods.

    In any event, AI is essentially taking the position that a method claim is patentable where the only difference between the claimed subject matter and the prior art is a recitation of the different disease in the preamble. I do not see how that presents a manipulative limitation that patentably distinguishes it from the prior art.

    TINLA, perhaps you assumed that I was arguing that AI’s hypo was not patentable based on 101. I did not. I’m saying that it’s not patentable under 102, and that the recitation of this particular new use does not carry any patentable weight.

  79. 144

    TINLA,

    It be those policy glasses me boy wears – jus like the ones on ponies that keep the pony straight on the one track.

    Come ta think of it, my boy Willton is quite the one-track pony.

  80. 143

    Also, this:

    When a claim recites the use of an old method and the “use” is directed to an unappreciated result of that method (e.g., a diagnosis of cancer), then the claim is anticipated. Cf. In re May, 574 F.2d 1082, 1090, 197 USPQ 601, 607 (CCPA 1978); In re Tomlinson, 363 F.2d 928, 150 USPQ 623 (CCPA 1966). See also MPEP Section 2112.02.

    misstates the MPEP and the facts of May and Tomlinson. The ruling is that a new use of a known property of a compound or structure is not patentable, but that a new use of a previously unappreciated property of the known compound or structure is patentable. Characterizing that as making unpatentable a new use of a known method producing results with previously unappreciated meaning seems quite a stretch, and essentially incorrect.

  81. 142

    Oh dear,

    My boy Willton goes beyond his usaul just-policy type O post and provides case citations, and TINLA blows him away with the basic definitions.

    Ouch.

    Hey IANAE, hurry up and grade those papers already – the chuckle factor here has been really low, and Iza needs ya to stir the pot.

  82. 141

    Dear Wilton,

    Please see below:

    35 U.S.C. 100 Definitions.
    When used in this title unless the context otherwise indicates
    (a) The term “invention” means invention or discovery.
    (b) The term “process” means process, art, or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.

    35 U.S.C. 101 Inventions patentable.
    Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.

  83. 140

    AI: Oh really? I looked up the term inventor in the dictionary and it says: “a person who invented a particular process or device or who invents things as an occupation.”
    So Willton, why is this person that invents a new, novel and non obvious use for a a known process and technology that cures cancer not an inventor?

    Because the person did not invent the method; he merely applied the method for a different purpose. When a claim recites the use of an old method and the “use” is directed to an unappreciated result of that method (e.g., a diagnosis of cancer), then the claim is anticipated. Cf. In re May, 574 F.2d 1082, 1090, 197 USPQ 601, 607 (CCPA 1978); In re Tomlinson, 363 F.2d 928, 150 USPQ 623 (CCPA 1966). See also MPEP Section 2112.02.

    So I ask you Willton, what exactly is the granting of this hypothetical patent taking out of the public domain?

    See above. Using the hypothetical method for the purpose of detecting cancer had always been available to the public. The fact that the method had not yet been appreciated for this purpose does not make it patentable.

    You lose.

  84. 138

    Snark is the only weapon left for the nonbelievers.

    Try as they might to spin, spin, spin, they cannot undo what the Supremes have unleashed.

    !!! BILSKI 14!!!

    The Supremes have spoken and the echo from the CAFC is “Welcome in”

    Those who wish to deny based on general category of invention must retire their old and tired arguments. Those arguments died with Stevens. All good lawyers will recognize the difference between a majority and a dissent, no matter if that dissent is labeled a concurrence. Look at the trilogy of cases. Look at Bilski. Where does Stevens end up?

    On the losing side.

    The Supremes have spoken and the CAFC have heard.

    !!! BILSKI 14!!!

    Take comfort in your empty snark but don’t let yourself suffocate in it. Come up for the clean air.

  85. 137

    Still, I’m glad that you found it “hillarious” rather than hilarious.

    Posted by: Inviting Body Punches | Dec 28, 2010 at 12:43 AM

    ________

    Touche.

    You win the snarkfest and Actual Inventors win the debate based on the law.

    As usual.

  86. 136

    Yes, the 101/102 mixup was pretty good–and there it is in print!

    Still, I’m glad that you found it “hillarious” rather than hilarious.

  87. 135

    IBP: AI–If I “think” I can invalidate the claim on 102, using prior art Hilarious!

    AI: Not as funny as IBP–“CLASSEN’S CLAIM FAILS 101 FOR A LACK OF NOVELTY.”

    Maybe its time to change your name from “Inviting Body Punches” to “Just Got Gut Checked.”

    Fixed..Still hillarious.

  88. 134

    IBP: AI–If I “think” I can invalidate the claim on 102, using prior art?

    Hilarious!

    AI: Not as funny as IBP–“CLASSEN’S CLAIM FAILS 101 FOR A LACK OF NOVELTY.”

    Maybe its time to change your name from “Inviting Body Punches” to “Just Got Cut Checked.”

  89. 132

    AI–

    If I “think” I can invalidate the claim on 102, using prior art?

    Hilarious!

    In case you’re unfamiliar with rational reasoning premised upon the idea of causality, here’s a place for you to start your odyssey into the modern world…

    link to en.wikipedia.org

  90. 131

    CLASSEN’S CLAIM FAILS 101 FOR A LACK OF NOVELTY.

    Posted by: Inviting Body Punches | Dec 27, 2010 at 10:35 PM

    _________

    Novelty is a 102 issue, not 101.

    Now If you think you can invalidate the claim on 102 show the prior art that anticipates the claim.

    Otherwise it sailing on to 103.

    Seriously people, there is a reason we have these “separate” categories. If you are confused I suggest reading Rich.

  91. 130

    Further to my belief that Prometheus’ claims fail the utility requirement of 101, Classen’s claim 1 fails the novelty requirement of 101, again using a very basic analysis.

    Claim 1: “A method of determining whether an immunization schedule affects the incidence or severity of a chronic immune-mediated disorder in a treatment group of mammals, relative to a control group of mammals, which comprises:

    immunizing mammals in the treatment group of mammals with one or more doses of one or more immunogens, according to said immunization schedule, and

    comparing the incidence, prevalence, frequency or severity of said chronic immune-mediated disorder or the level of a marker of such a disorder, in the treatment group, with that in the control group.”

    The product of the method claim is knowledge, ergo the method is a method of gaining knowledge. As other posters have doubtless pointed out on other threads, when the substance of this method is investigated, it turns out to be “the scientific method”, which is old.

    CLASSEN’S CLAIM FAILS 101 FOR A LACK OF NOVELTY.

  92. 129

    AI: So I ask you TINLA IANYL, or anyone on this blog brave enough to jump in, would you deny the inventor of the cure for cancer his patent simply because all the physical steps are old and the only thing new is a mental step?

    Willton : Yes, because he is not an inventor…..

    AI: Oh really? I looked up the term inventor in the dictionary and it says: “a person who invented a particular process or device or who invents things as an occupation.”
    So Willton, why is this person that invents a new, novel and non obvious use for a a known process and technology that cures cancer not an inventor?

    Willton : and granting this patent impermissibly takes something out of the public domain.

    AI: Oh? Let’s see..

    a) The old test still can be used for the old use and any other new use.

    b) The technology or instrumentation can still be used for the old use, and any other new use.

    c) The mental or thinking step is still of use to anyone. For example, the mental step can be discussed in books, lectures and even talked about on the this blog.

    d) No natural law, assuming knowledge of such a law is required is being patented for exclusive use.

    So I ask you Willton, what exactly is the granting of this hypothetical patent taking out of the public domain?

  93. 128

    AI: So I ask you TINLA IANYL, or anyone on this blog brave enough to jump in, would you deny the inventor of the cure for cancer his patent simply because all the physical steps are old and the only thing new is a mental step?

    Yes, because he is not an inventor, and granting this patent impermissibly takes something out of the public domain.

  94. 127

    Actual Inventor, please go back to looking for Obama’s “real” birth certificate and leave the intelligent discussions to “Actual Sane People.”

  95. 126

    TINLA IANYL: unless you guys think that ordering and interpreting results of a prior art test and issuing a new dignosis is patentable subject matter.

    _______

    Well, lets analyze it, hypothetically of course. Assuming the test is a medical test we know its not abstract. Medical science is science after all. So right there this puts the invention in the realm of statutory subject matter.

    Second since this type of work can’t be carried out by mental telepathy there are going to be some physical acts and instrumentation involved. So we probably have met MOT as well which is another clue to 101 statutory subject matter.

    Now presuming the terms ordering, interpreting, and diagnosis are defined in the spec and adequately described then we have nailed 101 and wrapped up the 112 requirement as well. Which just leaves us to 102 and 103.

    So say this test is known and all the instrumentalities used in the conjunction with the test are Known. In fact let’s make it really known and say this test has been used in medicine for the last 150 years to diagnose and treat say, the common cold. And its the first test taught in medical school.

    Now let’s say some newly minted MD fresh out of med school comes along and breaks all the rules and looks at the test in an entirely different way. He decides to use it for something that would have flunked him out of med school, like to diagnose and treat cancer.

    And through this brilliant insight and innovative action it turns out that when the old test is used in this new way, cancer can be prevented and cured before it even develops!

    The world now has the cure for cancer. Sure, all the old Docs out there can say well we used the test for 150 years so the young Doc didn’t invent anything. Or in hindsight say yeah, its common sense blah blah blah.

    But the truth is the old Docs never used the test this way so the New Docs invention is novel.

    Not only that but based on the surprising result of curing cancer its non obvious since a cure for cancer is highly desired and sought after and no one in medical history has been able to cure it.

    So I ask you TINLA IANYL, or anyone on this blog brave enough to jump in, would you deny the inventor of the cure for cancer his patent simply because all the physical steps are old and the only thing new is a mental step?

  96. 125

    MM: It’s called “better claim drafting.” An invention that would reasonable be “transformative” in a 101-eligible manner would be a method of administering certain specified doses of drugs to certain specified patients.

    IANAE: What if we construe/define “determining the level” to include receipt of a test result indicating the level, or alternatively explicitly claim receiving information indicative of the level?
    I still think you’d need to positively recite administering a higher or lower dosage next time to make the claim valid, but at least you’d capture the doctor as a direct infringer.
    So, what Malcolm said I guess.

    I’ve thought about that too, and I still don’t see a way to get a direct infringer if the doctor just orders the test, the test does not report anything except raw levels, the doctor then interprets the test results, and then refers the patient to another professional for treatment with the diagnosis.

    I mean, unless you guys think that ordering and interpreting results of a prior art test and issuing a new dignosis is patentable subject matter.

    Even with the claim that was allowed, if the lab does the testing step, but not the correlating step, how do you find a direct infringer? I think the lab would have to report the result in a certain way in order to infringe that claim, and that’s all that claim really covers. And if the lab tech looks at the results and makes a mental correlation without reporting the results any differently, how do you prove infringement? I think there really must be a warning step in that claim, and not just a mental step. The “correlating” must be observable in order for the claim to be asserted at all. And while i have not read the specification or the file history, I bet that they support the Court’s view that the correlating step is a warning step.

  97. 124

    That’s quite a love-fest IANAE and MM have got going there. With 6 desperately hoping someone will notice him, too. What more could one ask for?

    Posted by: Cy Nical | Dec 23, 2010 at 09:55 PM

    __________

    Ned calling MM a super genius, or something like that. Those two need to get a room.

  98. 123

    AI, could I ask you to do something for me? Read the dissent in Diehr, particularly the discussion about mental processes. To help, I extracted the most relevant passages below.

    __________

    What for? I used this very case to beat the likes of Mooney, 6, and IANAE senseless for years. They foolishly hung in there taking the beating, rather than going down for the count in hopes that the SCOTUS would jump in during the last round and deliver a knock out blow with Steven’s dissent leading the way.

    But as we all know now it was Steven’s that went down, taking all the hopes and dreams of the three stooges with him. Now what was once an antipatent crowd is just a cult hoping against hope that their main man Stevens, or at least his antipatent views will somehow rise from the grave.

    But that wont be happening anytime soon. Not with the old man gone and and a relative healthy and young conservative majority holding stewardship over the progress of the useful arts. All that’s left for you Ned and your new friends the is the wise Latina and her girls.

    But let’s face it. They just don’t have the votes or the cojones to make a difference.

    So let be said once again while we still can in 2010 Actual Inventors Win!

  99. 122

    Trying to force feed precedence from the losing side is simply BAD LAW
    Posted by: Smoke and Mirrors | Dec 22, 2010 at 09:26 AM

    ______

    Try telling that to Ned who had the audacity to post Steven’s losing dissent in Diehr as controlling law for his sides anti patent views.

  100. 121

    mmm : I personally think that this opinion goes out of its way to make such treatment claims patent eligible. And, I think it tees up the case pretty well for the SCOTUS to slap down the Fed. Cir., again.

    AI: Thats an illogical opinion. Since the CAFC was smacked down by the SCOTUS In re Bilski, for not adhering to Diehr’s concept and application analysis as controlling precedent and using the MOT as the sole test, and in Prometheus v. Mayo the CAFC has applied Diehr, especially considering the claims as a whole, along with MOT as a clue, and not the sole test, there is no logical or legal reason to expect the SCOTUS to over rule this case. In short, the CAFC did everything right and the claims are statutory.

    mmm : I wonder whether there is really anything that could not be found to be patent eligible under the post-hoc reasoning that is found in this quote:
    “Viewing the treatment methods as a whole, Prometheus has claimed therapeutic methods that determine the optimal dosage level for a course of treatment. In other words, when asked the critical question, “What did the applicant invent?,” Grams, 888 F.2d at 839 (citation omitted), the answer is a series of transformative steps that optimizes efficacy and reduces toxicity of a method of treatment for particular diseases using particular drugs.”

    AI: Sure there is. Any claim comprised soley of a process of mental steps and/or acts of verbal communication are legally abstract. That’s why Bilski did not get his patent. The only people that are having a hard time understanding this law are anti patent types with not so hidden agendas to eliminate software, so called business methods, and basically anything you can’t drop on your foot as patentable subject matter.

    Thank God we still have a majority of forward thinking conservative judges that want to keep us moving into the quantum age of science and technology.

  101. 120

    till waiting, ping.

    I done give my observation. Doncha know Homey don’t do answers?

    C’mon Sunshine – the eggnog got to your brain?

    Let me know” – feelin lonely are ya?

    Nedo,

    Ya quote the majority, but miss the point abouts how in the instant case the judges done said that the actual transformation was integral to the claim (as a whole) and just wasn’t “insignificant post-solution activity“.

    So ya know how to type law, do ya know how to understand whatcha type?

  102. 119

    dd a mental step to an old process? Can that be patentable subject matter?

    What are your views, ping?

    Still waiting, ping.

    Let me know if you are having difficulty understanding the question.

  103. 118

    Alright ping, from the Diehr majority — what does Prometheus seek to patent — a process of testing blood, or the mental step of appreciating the results. Now consider the answer to that question when reading the following from the majority opinion:

    “In contrast, the respondents here do not seek to patent a mathematical formula. Instead, they seek patent protection for a process of curing synthetic rubber. Their process admittedly employs a well-known mathematical equation, but they do not seek to preempt the use of that equation. Rather, they seek only to foreclose from others the use of that equation in conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed process.

    Our earlier opinions lend support to our present conclusion that a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula, computer program, or digital computer. In Gottschalk v. Benson, we noted: “It is said that the decision precludes a patent for any program servicing a computer. We do not s0 hold.” 409 U.S. at 409 U. S. 71. Similarly, in Parker v. Flook, we stated that “a process is not unpatentable simply because it contains a law of nature or a mathematical algorithm.” 437 U.S. at 437 U. S. 590. It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.

    “While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not a patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be.”
    Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 306 U. S. 86, 306 U. S. 94 (1939). [Footnote 11]
    We think this statement in Mackay takes us a long way toward the correct answer in this case. Arrhenius’ equation is not patentable in isolation, but when a process for curing rubber is devised which incorporates in it a more efficient solution of the equation, that process is, at the very least, not barred at the threshold by § 101.
    In determining the eligibility of respondents’ claimed process for patent protection under § 101, their claims must be considered as a whole. It is inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements and then to ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis. This is particularly true in a process claim, because a new combination of steps in a process may be patentable even though all the constituents of the combination were well known and in common use before the combination was made. The “novelty” of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.

    IV
    We have before us today only the question of whether respondents’ claims fall within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter. We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products, and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula. We recognize, of course, that, when a claim recites a mathematical formula (or scientific principle or phenomenon of nature), an inquiry must be made into whether the claim is seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract. A mathematical formula, as such, is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U. S. 63 (1972), and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment. Parker v. Flook, 437 U. S. 584 (1978). Similarly, insignificant post-solution activity will not transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process. Ibid. [Footnote 14] To hold otherwise would allow a competent draftsman to evade the recognized limitations on the type of subject matter eligible for patent protection. On the other hand, when a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or applies that formula in a structure or process which, when considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing), then the claim satisfies the requirements of § 101.

      Because we do not view respondents’ claims as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula, but rather to be drawn to an industrial process for the molding of rubber products, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.
  104. 117

    Hey, dey matches your pretty skirt very nicely there Sunshine.

    Cepts, they aint the windmill chasin brand, but Momma always told me not to bad mouth gifts, so I won’t even mention to poor Ol Ned that law cannot come from Dissents (not even from Supreme Court dissents) – but I figured that Iza let you break that news to him, since ya know it so well.

  105. 114

    sane to you, ping.

    Dissents matter, they just do not control.

    However, I was citing the dissent for its discussion of the mental steps doctrine. That really is what this case is all about. Really, Malcolm had it figured out. Add a mental step to an old process? Can that be patentable subject matter?

    What are your views, ping?

  106. 113

    “did get a law degree though. As i didn’t”

    Shockers – jus plain shockers I tells ya.

    not.

    Ned, didn’t anyone tell ya that DISSENTS DONT MATTA !

    Maybe in the alternate universe IMHO-Ned Law land….

    Happy holidays to all my favorite chuckleheads.

  107. 112

    AI, could I ask you to do something for me? Read the dissent in Diehr, particularly the discussion about mental processes. To help, I extracted the most relevant passages below.

    It used to be well understood that one could not re-patent an old process by adding a mental step. (Malcolm’s posts in this thread have brilliantly demonstrated why this must be so.) Even so, the CCPA overruled doctrine in In re Prater.

    Prediction: the Supremes will once again be forced to overrule the Federal Circuit.

    From the dissent in Diehr:

    link to supreme.justia.com

    “Prior to 1968, well-established principles of patent law probably would have prevented the issuance of a valid patent on almost any conceivable computer program. Under the “mental steps” doctrine, processes involving mental operations were considered unpatentable. See, e.g., In re Heritage, 32 C.C.P.A. (Pat.) 1170, 1173-1177, 150 F.2d 554, 556-558 (1945); In re Shao Wen Yuan, 38 C.C.P.A. (Pat.) 967, 972-976, 188 F.2d 377, 380-383 (1951). The mental steps doctrine was based upon the familiar principle that a scientific concept or mere idea cannot be the subject of a valid patent. See In re Bolongaro, 20 C.C.P.A. (Pat.) 845, 846-847, 62 F.2d 1059, 1060 (1933). [Footnote 2/5] The doctrine was regularly invoked to deny patents to inventions consisting primarily of mathematical formulae or methods of computation. [Footnote 2/6] It was also applied against patent claims in which a mental operation or mathematical computation was the sole novel element or inventive contribution; it was clear that patentability could not be predicated upon a mental step. [Footnote 2/7]

    “Beginning with two decisions in 1968, a dramatic change in the law as understood by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals took place. By repudiating the well-settled “function of a machine” and “mental steps” doctrines, that court reinterpreted § 101 of the Patent Code to enlarge drastically the categories of patentable subject matter.

    “In In re Prater, 56 C.C.P.A. (Pat.) 1360, 415 F.2d 1378 (1968), modified on rehearing, 56 C.C.A.P. (Pat.) 1381, 415 F.2d 1393 (1969), the court found that the precedents on which that doctrine was based either were poorly reasoned or had been misinterpreted over the years. 56 C.C.P.A. (Pat.) at 1366-1372, 415 F.2d 1382-1387. The court concluded that the fact that a process may be performed mentally should not foreclose patentability if the claims reveal that the process also may be performed without mental operations. Id. at 1374-1375, 415 F.2d 1389. [Footnote 2/13]

    “The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals turned its attention to process claims encompassing computer programs in In re Musgrave, 57 C.C.P.A. (Pat.) 1352, 431 F.2d 882 (1970). In that case, the court emphasized the fact that Prater had done away with the mental steps doctrine; in particular, the court rejected the Patent Office’s continued reliance upon the “point of novelty” approach to claim analysis. Id. at 1362, 431 F.2d 889. [Footnote 2/15] The court also announced a new standard for evaluating process claims under § 101: any sequence of operational steps was a patentable process under § 101 as long as it was within the “technological arts.” Id. at 1366-1367, 431 F.2d 893. This standard effectively disposed of any vestiges of the mental steps doctrine remaining after Prater and Bernhart. [Footnote 2/16] The “technological arts” standard was refined in In re Benson, 58 C.C.P.A. (Pat.) 1134, 441 F.2d 682 (1971), in which the court held that computers, regardless of the uses to which they are put, are within the technological arts for purposes of § 101. Id. at 1142, 441 F.2d 688.
    In re Benson, of course, was reversed by this Court in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U. S. 63 (1972). [Footnote 2/17] Justice Douglas’ opinion for a unanimous Court made no reference to the lower court’s rejection of the mental steps doctrine or to the new technological arts standard. [Footnote 2/18] Rather, the Court clearly held that new mathematical procedures that can be conducted in old computers, like mental processes and abstract intellectual concepts, see id. at 409 U. S. 67, are not patentable processes within the meaning of § 101.”

  108. 111

    Maxie: Not sure about your logic there AI. You assert that any new process under the sun that eventually succeeds commercially must be recognised as patentable because it cannot have been obvious.

    AI: I make no such assertion. Commercial success is simply one of the secondary factors used when determining if a claim is non obvious. Look up a series of cases from the 1960’s under the name John Deere, if I am not mistaken.

    Maxie: All dogs have tails. That animal has a tail. Therefore it is a dog?

    AI: You are not making sense.

    Maxie: I thought that the patent system was to promote useful arts, rather than the art of shopping?

    AI: What??? Again you are not making sense.

    Maxie: Is there a difference in your mind between i) innovation that strikes a businessman as obviously (or not) capable of commercially profitable exploitation, and ii) what is obvious in the onward march of technology?

    AI: Okay totally lost me now. Lay off the Eggnog?

    Maxie: What does “process” mean? What does “obvious” mean. I think we should be told.

    AI: Ummm..go to law school in the USA? Or at least read US law cases.

  109. 109

    Oh and the biggest Red Herring to boot that you all knew about was being charged approx, 4.000.00 for a Design Patent that I still to this day have not seen. Anybody want to send me a copy. Well GOLLY I paid for it didn’t I?

  110. 108

    Well thanks IANAE. I suppose ping did get a law degree though. As i didn’t, that might be why suggests that i cease to “spew” all over him and do it instead over some Europeans.

    IANAE, I have a question. Thinking about who to “spew” over reminds me of a joke that was popular in the days when Jeremy Beadle was the most annoying man on UK TV. The joke was something like:

    You are marooned on a tiny desert atoll, with Muammar Ghaddafi, Saddam Hussein and Jeremy Beadle. You have a gun, but only two bullets. Who would you shoot?

    (You see, this is not quite on the “spewing” point, but not far off)

    Answer: Jeremy Beadle. Twice. Just to make sure.

    Did the joke originate not in Europe but, rather, with the most annoying broadcaster in the USA, perhaps?

  111. 107

    PATENT LAWYER ROFLMFAO You must be kidding? That is why I am where I am. And the BLUE BABY was where I was put. How did i know that some scum bag would make me a fakeone just special for me. Just like the worm oh so special. Hiding the dates of the Trademark case in the Court. say just about everything! Don’tyou agree?

  112. 106

    Max: You assert that any new process under the sun that eventually succeeds commercially must be recognised as patentable

    That’s right, even though every patent is for a “method of doing business”, any business that ensues is an “unexpected result”.

    Unless you operate your business out of a cabin surrounded by deer. Or something.

    Look, it’s complicated, okay? That’s why it takes a law degree from … wherever AI didn’t go to law school … to explain it.

  113. 105

    Not sure about your logic there AI. You assert that any new process under the sun that eventually succeeds commercially must be recognised as patentable because it cannot have been obvious. All dogs have tails. That animal has a tail. Therefore it is a dog?

    I thought that the patent system was to promote useful arts, rather than the art of shopping? Is there a difference in your mind between i) innovation that strikes a businessman as obviously (or not) capable of commercially profitable exploitation, and ii) what is obvious in the onward march of technology?

    What does “process” mean? What does “obvious” mean. I think we should be told.

  114. 104

    Ned Helle: A step, in my view, must itself pass the MOT test in that it must actually DO something physical.

    AI: Only someone from the 17th century would have such a view. By the fact that its a step means its doing something physical.

    Ned: A mental process or the understanding of the meaning of test results does nothing by itself and for this reason is not itself a step in a process.

    AI: If you feel that way then don’t judge the step by itself. Maybe this is why the law says take the claims as a whole.

    Ned: Agreed?

    AI: I agree with Diehr, take the claims as whole. When people like you are given the power to dissect claims into steps or parts that you like or dislike then you can pretty much prevent anything you don’t like from getting a patent. And that sets the stage for a lot of abuse and unfairness.

    Now maybe you feel you can be trusted with such power and won’t abuse it. But what about the likes of an extremist like MM, a flaming socialist and anti patent idealog, or just as a worse an incompetent Gov worker with a 6 IQ?

    Then we are talking disaster to the US economy and innovation. No, I do not agree. I am sticking to the system we have. Take the claims as a whole. If a process has never been practiced or known in the history of the world then its new, and novel and deserves to sail right thru to 103.

    And if it provides unexpected and surprising results, provides commercial success and/or is taught away by the prior art, then at least for these reasons its non obvious, and thus is deserving of patent protection.

  115. 103

    IANAE: saying it is a better argument than Benson is not supporting the argument. And, it is definitely a better argument than Benson.

    I’ll give you a hint: in Benson the central lie is that anything that can be expressed as an equation is a natural law.

  116. 102

    Wow. I’ve been out all day. That’s quite a love-fest IANAE and MM have got going there. With 6 desperately hoping someone will notice him, too. What more could one ask for?

  117. 101

    “A step, in my view, must itself pass the MOT test in that it must actually DO something physical. A mental process or the understanding of the meaning of test results does nothing by itself and for this reason is not itself a step in a process.”

    I have considered using that in 103/102 before. Thoughts ain’t steps. And neither are wherein clauses for that matter. They merely modify the step to which they are directed or to the method as a whole depending on the drafting and should be evaluated as such.

  118. 100

    “And furthermore, If an examiner rejects a claim for being abstract and that claim has one or more steps that are not mental steps, the examiner has set him/herself up for a major traversal.”

    I lulzed. A traversal! O noserskates!

    “You don’t have a moral compass from what I can see from your arguments.”

    Yeah well, Kev. actively advocates for murder (in a round about way) so I figure he’s still worse than me.

  119. 98

    Mooney, you have outdone yourself in this thread. Thinking about an old process cannot be patentable subject matter as a matter of law.

    Clear.

    It circles back to the question the Supremes asked in Diehr — what did the inventor claim he invented? Here, he invented the mental step regarding the results of an old process. That, per se, is not and never has been patentable subject matter. Read the dissent in Diehr for more on the history of the mental steps doctrine.

    AI, the series of steps set forth in the Prometheus claims (the one’s that do not have the final step of the doctor actually using the information to adjust the dosage) are all old. The mental step is not a step in a process in any traditional or non traditional sense. A step, in my view, must itself pass the MOT test in that it must actually DO something physical. A mental process or the understanding of the meaning of test results does nothing by itself and for this reason is not itself a step in a process.

    Agreed?

  120. 97

    Bottom line if an AI can perform the steps clearly demonstrating its not merely a mental process or form of communication, then the claim is not an abstract idea.

    Deal With It!

    1. A method of optimizing a determination that a car’s speed is accurate, comprising (1) consuming oxygen and (2) determining the speed of said car, wherein said determining comprises using prior experience and knowledge and comparing said experience and knowledge to the observed motion of said car.

    2. A method of optimizing a determination that a car’s speed is accurate, comprising (1) consuming oxygen, wherein said oxygen is consumed at a rate that is between 1% and 100% above normal resting rate of oxygen consumption and (2) watching said car and determining the speed of said car, wherein said determining comprises using prior experience and knowledge and comparing said experience and knowledge to the observed motion of said car.

    So each of these claims are eligible under 101, correct? Or just one of them? Step up, AI. Prove to us that you can … breathe. ROTFLMFAO.

  121. 96

    Either it’s dead under 101 or it’s dead under 102/103. I don’t see a way around this and I don’t see why there is any need to pussyfoot around the issue or to pretend that the claimed method achieves something remarkable which, as claimed, it certainly does not.

    Posted by: Malcolm Mooney | Dec 23, 2010 at 01:08 PM

    ___________

    No, no no no! Mooney you can’t merge 101, 102, and 103 together!!! If the claim passes 101 its statutory and that’s done. And for entirely different reasons it will pass or fail 102. If no one has ever practiced the steps of the invention in the exact way it’s claimed then guess what? It passes 102! And 103 is an entirely different standard than 101, and 102. Among others if the claim produces unexpected results or the prior art teaches away it passes 103.

    The Supreme Cult of this blog is going to have to learn to accept the fact that the Supreme Court of the United states has allowed process inventions including business methods and software. Many more such patents will be issued in the years to come to the benefit of our country.

  122. 95

    Maybe you haven’t been keeping up with the hypothetical here.

    The theory is that old steps plus new thinking is unpatentable somehow, we just can’t decide (or don’t care) how.

    Posted by: IANAE | Dec 23, 2010 at 02:54 PM

    ________

    Who cares! Your little online anti patent cult can play fantasy Supreme Court all day long. All that matters is what the law says.

    As the law stands now there is no dissection of claims for 101 purposes..period. And NO you can’t do it at 102 or 103 either.

    Swallow it or choke on it but thats the law.

  123. 94

    For the record, an Actual Judge can tell him to go pound sand if the inventor doesn’t know how to properly “say what his/her invention is” immediately following the word “claims”.

    ______________

    The learned judge will adhere to the testimony of a PHOSITA or other Subject Matter Expert. Judges are not expected be experts in the art. Their job is to simply apply the law.

    If a judge asks me to demonstrate an invention, and that judge better be asking if they are trying to decide if the invention is merely an abstract idea, I certainly can demonstrate right there in real time, in the real world. And its a guaranteed pass through the 101 gate!

  124. 93

    IANAE: like asking travelers at the airport whether they’re terrorists or whether they have bombs in their luggage. Of course they’re all going to say they don’t, and it’s a completely pointless test for catching the ones who actually do (and who need to be stopped at the threshold, not sorted out after the fact in litigation).

    Posted by: IANAE | Dec 23, 2010 at 03:47 PM

    ________

    Your example is not analogous to the fact that a process, comprising a series of steps that applies real world technology to a specific industrial process is not an abstract idea.

    As I stated before, and you so conveniently left off because you did not have the intellectual chops to deal with it, “And Actual Inventor is going to be able to perform those steps in a concrete way that is the opposite of abstract.”

    Bottom line if an AI can perform the steps clearly demonstrating its not merely a mental process or form of communication, then the claim is not an abstract idea.

    Deal With It!

  125. 92

    An Actual Inventor is going to say I invented a process, a series of steps that applies real world technology to a specific industrial process.

    Right. That’s why I’ve been saying for quite some time that cosmetic machines or transformations that are tangential to the actual subject matter of the claim should not redeem that claim under 101.

    Your rule is like asking travelers at the airport whether they’re terrorists or whether they have bombs in their luggage. Of course they’re all going to say they don’t, and it’s a completely pointless test for catching the ones who actually do (and who need to be stopped at the threshold, not sorted out after the fact in litigation).

  126. 91

    NED: What did he invent? That is the question. Decorating a claim with largely tangential but statutory subject matter should not change the result.

    ___________

    Any Actual Inventor can answer that question and pass 101. You think an AI is really gonna say , oh I invented a method of thinking/imagining..you know an abstract idea. Or say oh I did not invent anything, I just discovered this really cool natural phenomenon or law of nature and want to claim it my own for 20 years.

    An Actual Inventor is going to say I invented a process, a series of steps that applies real world technology to a specific industrial process. And of course be able to perform those steps in a concrete way that is the opposite of abstract.

  127. 90

    For the record only an Actual Inventor can say what his/her invention is.

    For the record, an Actual Judge can tell him to go pound sand if the inventor doesn’t know how to properly “say what his/her invention is” immediately following the word “claims”.

    Have you ever considered taking a few mental steps yourself? I’d recommend at least one, but perhaps as many as twelve.

  128. 89

    For the record only an Actual Inventor can say what his/her invention is.

    And furthermore, If an examiner rejects a claim for being abstract and that claim has one or more steps that are not mental steps, the examiner has set him/herself up for a major traversal.

    All the AI has to do is ask one question………

    Where is the abstraction?

    If the examiner starts pointing out certain steps, whether they be mental, old, or something else, the examiner has violated the Diehr claims as a whole doctrine .

    So AI’s be smart! And PE’s beware, of this trap. Better yet just be honest and efficient when examining claims for 101, and you will won’t have anything to worry about.

  129. 88

    “Patent Law 101”

    IANAE and Phillies Sweep are heading in the right direction.

    Phillies Sweep: “…you can shoot this claim down on 102, 103 and possibly 112 (for failing to clearly recite an optimization process as alleged in the preamble).”

    IANAE: “No method step is ever performed based on the noticing (unlike Diehr).”

    Method steps require ACTIONS to have an effect in the real world. At some point, the “wave function” of abstracted steps MUST collapse into an ACTION step in order to avoid the fatal quality of abstraction. The claims never recite any ACTION that “optimizes therapeutic efficacy”.

    Claim 1 can effectively be re-written to read: A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder by maintaining the 6-TG level at between 230 and 400 pmol per 8.times.10.sup.8 red blood cells, comprising: a) administering… b) determining…

    There is never any action taken that furthers the stated goal of maintaining the 6-TG level and thereby optimizing therapeutic efficacy—that is, therapeutic efficacy is never optimized.

    THE CLAIM FAILS 101 FOR A LACK OF UTILITY.

    It is the worst kind of utility failure, too—an invention that is wholly inoperative.

    THAT is why the court’s analysis is junk.

    I’m sorry, but to me, this analysis is simplicity itself, and paints this CAFC decision as a joke.

    Please tell me if I’m missing something critical—I’m really busy these days, and am willing to entertain the fact that I have massively erred.

    Other than that, the CAFC has just failed Patent Law 101.

  130. 87

    So if the claim is rejected only under 101, the agent should do what? Traverse the 101 rejection, and then additionally explain why it’s patentable under 102 and 103? Over what prior art?

    Maybe you haven’t been keeping up with the hypothetical here.

    The theory is that old steps plus new thinking is unpatentable somehow, we just can’t decide (or don’t care) how.

    If you get an equally hypothetical 101 rejection based on your machine-or-transformative steps being known, the “over what prior art” is the same prior art that renders those steps old, and which the examiner will have to have cited. And yes, you might as well argue 102/103 over that art, because if you succeed in your nitpick that “this is a 102/103 issue, not a 101 issue” you know you’re getting a 102/103 rejection next anyway.

    Is that what you do?

    No, because this is a counterfactual hypothetical.

  131. 86

    “It matters when only one of the two grounds is argued in court (as in Bilski), and it matters when examiners reject such claims in prosecution because some agents like to take examiners to task for citing the wrong section or form paragraph instead of addressing the merits of whether the claim is actually allowable.”

    So if the claim is rejected only under 101, the agent should do what? Traverse the 101 rejection, and then additionally explain why it’s patentable under 102 and 103? Over what prior art?

    Is that what you do?

    Please go back to preparing next semester’s syllabus.

    Lulz

  132. 85

    What I don’t understand is why there is so much concern about whether it falls under 101 or 102/103. Why does it matter?

    It matters when only one of the two grounds is argued in court (as in Bilski), and it matters when examiners reject such claims in prosecution because some agents like to take examiners to task for citing the wrong section or form paragraph instead of addressing the merits of whether the claim is actually allowable.

    What awesome technology is going to be blocked by doing this?

    Computer-readable media wherein the stored instructions indicate a need for a computer to do whatever the invention really is when the medium is subsequently administered to a computer.

  133. 84

    you also keep going off the deep end on mixing up 101 and 102/103/112

    No, it’s you that are confused. I’m saying that it doesn’t matter whether a claim such as Prometheus fails under 101 or 102/103, as long as it falls. What I don’t understand is why there is so much concern about whether it falls under 101 or 102/103. Why does it matter? If a court holds that “Adding a “new” mental step subsequent to an admittedly or incontrovertibly old step or series of steps is no different for all practical purposes than claiming the mental step itself and thus fails under 101 as a claim to an abstraction, i.e., a mere thought about a fact,” why is this a problem? What awesome technology is going to be blocked by doing this?

  134. 83

    Terrel: Prometheus (CAFC Dec. 17, 2010) (Precedential) says transformation test OK, but now you don’t need to have the actual transformation in the claim

    Actually the case says exactly the opposite.

  135. 82

    If two main steps in the independent claim result in electron spit swapping, then Prometheus says that is not merely an insignificant 101 activity.

    Tell it to Benson (Precedential) and Flook (Precedential), which both involved electrons doing the horizontal tango and which are both still good law under Bilski (Precedential).

  136. 81

    In Research Corp. v. Microsoft (CAFC Dec 8, 2010), a claimed process subject matter qualifies under both the categorical language of 35 USC section 101 and the process definition in section 100, unless it is a law of nature, physical phenomena, or abstract idea. Inventions with specific applications or improvements to technologies in the marketplace are not likely to be so abstract that they override the statutory language and framework of the Patent Act.

    Since just about all claims have specific applications to marketplace technologies (why else would you be seeking a patent? Method to swing on a swing?), Research Corp brought 101 back to where it used to be – a rarely cited statute.

    Prometheus (CAFC Dec. 17, 2010) (Precedential) says transformation test OK, but now you don’t need to have the actual transformation in the claim and there doesn’t need to be a whole lot a transformation going on to pass 101. If you put something into a blood sample and test that blood sample, that blood sample will be transformed, but you don’t need to have that in the claim.

    All this is much better than the USPTO’s recent factor analysis approach to 101 and it is good to see the courts ignoring that.

    In regards to computer software, Internet, etc. there would seem to be a point where you add electrons to an electron sample (e.g., tag a web page of electrons with meta data electrons, auto adjust the quality of a scanned image of electrons) so that electron sample changes. If two main steps in the independent claim result in electron spit swapping, then Prometheus says that is not merely an insignificant 101 activity.

  137. 79

    and it turns out that 103 got its start as a non-statutory judicial exception.

    But to NWPA’s point, it did not have the effect it does today until, well, it was codified by Congress.

    I think that is what NWPA is asking for here – nothing more.

    As I’ve said before… that’s fine with me

    But it’s not, because you also keep going off the deep end on mixing up 101 and 102/103/112.

    If it were fine, you would stop tilting at this windmill.

    Maybe it is a habit-thing for you.

  138. 78

    NWPA you are simply going to have to get used to letting everyone in and then throwing them out with 102, 103, or 112.

    As I’ve said before (including within the comment that you are responding to!), that’s fine with me. It’s particularly fine with me if they get thrown out by the USPTO before they ever issue. In this case, that should have been extremely easy because nobody has explained to me how these claims could possibly be patentable under 102/103 in view of the admitted prior art. Again, what I find troubling is that the court seemed unwilling to point this out plainly, as they tend to do in many other cases (e.g., the claim construction cases where the claim is broadened to capture an infringing device/method and the court approves, but sends it back down with a glib comment about the claim’s likely fate).

    Adding a subsequent mental step or a “wherein a need is indicated” clause to an otherwise old method can not turn that old method into a patentable method, as a matter of law. Either it’s dead under 101 or it’s dead under 102/103. I don’t see a way around this and I don’t see why there is any need to pussyfoot around the issue or to pretend that the claimed method achieves something remarkable which, as claimed, it certainly does not.

  139. 77

    NWPA: you are simply going to have to get used to letting everyone in and then throwing them out with 102, 103, or 112.

    Except that the claims are actually novel (stored information in one’s brain doesn’t invoke the printed matter doctrine, does it?), they’re perfectly definite and clear, and it turns out that 103 got its start as a non-statutory judicial exception.

    101 is the perfect tool for dealing with thought processes and other abstractions, because it’s the only rule that says you can’t patent a thought process no matter what you’re thinking about, how new or original the thought is, or where you write it down (silicon-based media excepted, of course).

  140. 76

    Why do you keep trying to push this opinion off on me when I’ve never said this?

    You said the 101 argument is stronger against gene claims than it was in Benson. You “can’t rule out” a “judicial exception” (you used to love those, remember?) for genes, even though you very adamantly refuse to explain the glaring logical insconsistency that they’re somehow different from stored software in that respect. You even stood by a District Court decision (while also taking care to loudly not necessarily agree with it) when you knew that (1) it was on appeal, and (2) courts of appeal tend to be a higher authority on such things. And that’s just from one thread.

    Why are you always so careful to not disagree with such a logically untenable position, and then quickly change the subject, while at the same time insisting on being the only person in the country without an opinion on gene patents?

    It would be as simple as applying whatever principles you have about Beauregard claims to gene claims (assuming you have principles other than “they should be patentable, rust-brain!”), and seeing what that implies. Let yourself see the similarities, and the answer will come to you.

  141. 75

    MM said: >> It’s rather disgusting.

    MM, MM, MM, MM, silly ole MM, why can’t you just get that 101 isn’t the right tool? You want a big mean guard at the door, but you are simply going to have to get used to letting everyone in and then throwing them out with 102, 103, or 112.

  142. 74

    >>dislike structural claims to quaternary code – >>even if you can’t come up with a “judicial >>exception” to justify the distinction yet.

    Why do you keep trying to push this opinion off on me when I’ve never said this?

  143. 73

    Tragic, really, that they could have avoided all of this nonsense by simply outputting the level of 6-TG on an OCR-able sheet of paper.

    Posted by: IANAE | Dec 23, 2010 at 10:51 AM

    cf

    You don’t have a moral compass from what I can see from your arguments.

    IANAE, are you that bored that you must troll this thread too with your hackneyed computer arguments?

    W

    T

    F

  144. 72

    Bob Hodges: Yes, a key form of the discovery may just be a thought in a doctor’s mind, but that still leads to a useful, and previously unobtainable goal. Justice Breyer (and other is the debate) clearly views this as rent-seeking and an improvident toll on the use of knowledge. Again, this is an expression of a policy opinion, not of what the law actually is.

    I’m not aware of a law that permits one person to sue another person for thinking about something, or even advising someone regarding a fact that is in the public domain and can not be owned. Yet, some claims cover such activities. Sure, there may some additional “transformative” step preceding the thought, but if that transformative step is old, the effect of the claim on the accused infringer is the same: the accused is prevented from thinking or advising another about a public and non-proprietary fact, while having committed no other acts that could infringe a patent.

    If the courts wish to use a kindergarten-level test to enable virtually any claim to qualify as 101 eligible subect matter, that’s fine as long as it’s made clear that the 102/103 issues are almost certain to invalidate the claim. What baffles is the sloppiness of the Federal Circuit (e.g., misrepresenting the claims and pretending they include steps that are not present) and the failure of the Federal Circuit to recognize and seriously address the relationship of the claimed subject matter to the prior art and how the claims impact those practicing the art. Instead, the Federal Circuit seems to go out of its way to champion the awesomeness of claims such as Prometheus’. It’s rather disgusting.

  145. 71

    So you’re saying you haven’t decided yet about gene claims?

    NWPA: I have no hidden agenda.

    No, you don’t. 6 was right about that. You’re a social conservative and software used to pay your rent, so obviously you like functional claims to binary code and you dislike structural claims to quaternary code – even if you can’t come up with a “judicial exception” to justify the distinction yet.

    So of course you go back to your old standby that your interlocutor lacks a “moral compass”, as if it means anything and as if it’s relevant to a reasoned application of Benson/Flook/Diehr/Bilski to a well-defined type of claim.

    Because it takes real moral compass to say that distasteful (to you) Supreme Court precedent isn’t really the law because it’s statutory interpretation rather than statutory language. I wonder if the Supreme Court would agree.

    NWPA: I told you that Rader would take some of the 101 and do exactly what he has done.

    Rader did exactly what he’s been doing with 101 cases all his life. He read the spec, decided whether the invention seemed clever, and let the applicant have whatever claims happened to be in the patent. We’ve seen it done so many times that your “prediction” is more of a 103 issue than a 101 one.

    Just because the Supremes adopted his approach in Bilski, that doesn’t make him the final authority on the matter, nor does that make Rader’s test the correct one.

    NWPA: (G*d help us if Moore ever takes over. We can only hope that she decides to cash in and goes to a law firm before Rader’s term expires.)

    Does that mean you forgot that Rader gets exactly as many votes as Moore? He doesn’t benefit from a judicial exception, you know.

  146. 70

    By the way, boys, I told you that Rader would take some of the 101 and do exactly what he has done. You see focus on substance and understanding patent law. (G*d help us if Moore ever takes over. We can only hope that she decides to cash in and goes to a law firm before Rader’s term expires.)

  147. 69

    >>within the useful arts which they fought hard >against having included from the get go.

    This is really an issue for Congress not the SCOTUS.

  148. 68

    Boy, I’ve worked the two of you into a snit.

    IANAE: I have no hidden agenda. I am not trying to create a judicial exception to a statute passed by Congress as in Benson. The hidden agenda wasn’t even so hidden as the PTO’s position was that it was too hard to examine information processing inventions so please SCOTUS help out. Stern came up with a way to try with a hidden agenda.

    IANAE: Cute the way you sum up my arguments incorrectly and then dismiss them.

    You don’t have a moral compass from what I can see from your arguments.

  149. 66

    “And no morals.”

    Well NWPA nobody with the misfortune to touch patents in any way, or to be hanging around here, has any of those so I took that as a given.

    “If other disagree, I suggest that changing the statute is the proper way to pursue that view, not by torturing patent law as it exists.”

    We others that might disagree, (although I do not on the natural phenomena prong) suggest the same to you. There is no reason to torture the word process into including anything and everything outside of the Useful Arts. There never was, and never shall be. The courts have simply been erring for years upon decades leading to this latest mindset of “anything goes”.

    “Tragic, really, that they could have avoided all of this nonsense by simply outputting the level of 6-TG on an OCR-able sheet of paper.”

    I kno right? lol.

    “Well, you know, of course those are correct, and at the heart of this is Benson that started this mess. Richard Stern and Justice Douglas started the war by trying to fabricate a judicial exception to exclude informatino processing and electrical engineering patent eligibility. ”

    They’re going to need a lot more than the mere exceptions set forth to prevent real EE patent eligibility.

    “So, thank the two of them for starting a war that has lasted 35 years and cost billions of dollars. The lesson is if you want to exclude a board class of subject matter from 101 go to Congress.”

    Thank you guys.

    “On the other hand, if you imagine (as did the Federal Circuit panel in Prometheus) the claim is limited to the use of that one drug and that other drugs and means are possible for affecting the natural phenomenon then the claim should not be considered to preempt the natural phenomenon.”

    So basically you’re telling me that they made that part up and that there is no factual basis, or reasonable technical basis at the least, for their statement regarding that in this case? Doesn’t surprise me, leave it to some english majors to just make sh it up.

    “A claim to using the drug clearly should not be held patent-ineligible for preempting the natural phenomenon.”

    Why not? I refuse to hold that erroneous thought in my mind for more than a second lest it pervert my thinking.

    ” Later, another inventor develops a second drug or means to affect the natural phenomenon. Clearly, the claim did not in fact preempt the natural phenomenon. Should the result of patent-eligibility depend on arbitrary conditions? I do not think so. ”

    This is called “collateral damage” and they should have presented some technical reasoning in the first instance leading one to believe that it be likely that someone could develope some other drug that would also affect the natural phen. Although, from the point of view of the moment the first claim was invalidated, it really shouldn’t matter. The claim was, at that time, effectively a patent on the concept, that someone came along afterwards and saved it from being so is lucky for everyone but does not excuse the drafter of the first claim for doing his best to capture the abstract idea etc. from the get go.

    The fact is, guys, all of these cases are about claim drafting. There is no reason, none, to include nature phen, abstract ideas, etc. or anything leading one to believe that it might possibly involve one, in your claims. Ever. Period. End of story. Just leave that sh it the fu ck out and you’re golden. Every. Single. Time.

    “Related to this, inventors should be allowed patent claims to what they have invented and what they have contributed to the art. Here, the inventor provides (let us assume) the first drug or means for affecting a natural phenomenon. If the inventor claims this use limited to the drug or means invented (a result required by section 112), the patent grant comports with patent law (and preemption doctrine really should not disturb this). If instead the inventor attempts to claim every means of affecting the natural phenomenon, this might be considered to preempt the natural phenomenon (it also would likely violate 112—thus, this is another case where the other bases for patentability better solve the alleged problems that patent-eligibility is advocated to be needed to solve). Of course, the claims in Prometheus do not attempt to cover every means of affecting the natural phenomenon, so preemption is not a valid issue.”

    Nah really that’s just a problem with us allowing people to claim more than what they really invented. According to you, all they really invented was a drug. The rest of it was just things which naturally flow from the invention of such. You get so caught up in handing out government sponsered welfare state entitlements to exclusive rights that I know it is hard for you to tell that. But, even so, your suggestion that them merely limiting themselves to the one drug rather than all drugs is sufficient to give them a patent in all cases is preposterous as there will obviously be some cases where you will be handing them the rights to the natural phenomena or abstract idea etc.

    And be clear, the 3 judicial exclusions are already us being overly generous. The people that made up patent lawl would be appalled by our currently stretching it to cover things blatantly not within the useful arts which they fought hard against having included from the get go. We spit in their eye every time such a patent issues.

  150. 65

    NWPA: What have you prepared all your bullets and are just waiting for someone to try them out on?

    No hidden bullets. You know exactly where I stand on the issue. I mostly want to see what you come up with, and how you reconcile it with (1) drug claims, (2) Beauregard claims, and (3) your hidden agenda.

    NWPA: You and others continue to apply a judical exception as if it is a matter of statutory construction.

    That’s exactly what it is. That’s what the judiciary does. Also, claim construction. If the court says a device doesn’t infringe a claim, is that run-of-the-mill claim construction or a narrow “judicial exception”? Or is determining what is within the statute/claim pretty much the same thing as determining what isn’t?

    NWPA: That means, fo rone thing, that if the argument is close, that the judicial exception shouldn’t be applied.

    That’s my favorite rhetorical fallacy of all – “You’re wrong because you are being disagreed with”.

    Here, you’ll love this exchange:

    A: “Say it leaves some important questions unanswered, that much of the evidence is inconclusive, that the figures are open to other interpretations, that certain findings are contradictory and that some of the main conclusions have been questioned.”
    B: “Suppose they haven’t?”
    A: “Then question them. Then they have.”
    B: “But to make accusations like that you’d have to go through it with a fine-toothed comb.”
    A: “Nonsense – you can say all that without reading it. There are always some questions unanswered.”
    B: “Such as?”
    A: “The ones that weren’t asked.”

  151. 64

    >>By the way, have you decided yet how to apply >>this very narrow judicially created exception >>to gene claims without regard to your hidden >>agenda?

    You seem to want me to take a position on this. What have you prepared all your bullets and are just waiting for someone to try them out on? Tempting.

    And, by the way, the facts are present in each case that is discussed. You and others continue to apply a judical exception as if it is a matter of statutory construction. That means, fo rone thing, that if the argument is close, that the judicial exception shouldn’t be applied.

  152. 63

    Tragic, really, that they could have avoided all of this nonsense by simply outputting the level of 6-TG on an OCR-able sheet of paper.

  153. 62

    The Supremes stated it this way in Diehr (under the claims as a whole approach): What is it that the inventor claims to have discovered? If that is otherwise statutory under Section 101, it is patentable subject matter.

    Even in Diehr, the Supremes noted that subject matter only tangentially related to the invention is “token” and may be discounted. The problem with panel decision here it seems to me is that the MOT test was used on the token parts of the claim. Testing blood for metabolites always was and still is patentable subject matter. No one seriously disputes this. But the invention is not in testing blood for metabolites, but in the discovery of an association between certain metabolite ranges and a need to increase or descrease drug dosage levels.

    What did he invent? That is the question. Decorating a claim with largely tangential but statutory subject matter should not change the result.

    As I noted above, the central divided between Breyer and Lourie is whether the otherwise statutory blood test is central or token. That question is answered by asking, what does the inventor claimed to have invented? This question is central to any Section 101 analysis, and was ignored by the panel.

  154. 61

    NWPA: A judicially created exception should be applied as narrow as possible.

    You keep saying that, but since it is actually the law it still has to be applied wherever it applies.

    If there happen to be half a million patents out there with claims that fit the narrow scope of the exception, the exception must apply to all of them. Which is why you’ll need to come up with something a little more fact-specific.

    By the way, have you decided yet how to apply this very narrow judicially created exception to gene claims without regard to your hidden agenda? Take all the time you need. It’s not easy for attorneys to form opinions on legal issues.

    Incidentally…

    Phil: These claims pass 101 – they’re directed to a process. That’s not where the difficulty is.

    That actually is where the difficulty is. Benson was directed to an apparatus (some sort of cabin, I think?), Bilski was directed to a process, and some people even think Flook was directed to a process. Really, everybody’s claims are directed to a product or a process. Nobody’s claim is ever “The following equation:”. And yet, there will be some claims that fail 101, as there should be because we don’t want people skirting and mooting legal rules by clever wordplay that doesn’t affect the scope of the claims.

    We need to view these claims at the appropriate level of abstraction (not to be confused with subject matter abstraction) that we can see what the (claimed) invention really is. In Prometheus, the invention is directed to receiving data and noticing something interesting – pretty much exactly like in Flook. No method step is ever performed based on the noticing (unlike Diehr). That is as abstract as a real-life claim will ever get, and if any claim should fail the 101 test (in other words for NWPA, if we narrow it just shy of the point where it’s no use at all) it’s this one.

  155. 60

    If old previously known steps/elements were discounted for 101 purposes, then all claims invalid under 102 would also be invalid under 101. Also, a question would arise as to whether new and non-obvious combinations of previously known elements would be patentable according to 101.

  156. 59

    “Maybe under 102 or 103, but not 101.”

    With respect, I actually said that EPO practice would nix this under 103, not 101, and that “one way or another … must be invalid”. 103 is fine with me.

    To me that’s a simple matter of logic following on from statute and precedent, not a question of having an agenda. If you can’t infringe by doing X and Y and observing the result, because that belong to the prior art, how can you suddenly infringe as a consequence inferring fact Z from the result of doing X and Y?

  157. 58

    And I am sorry, boys, but there is a right and wrong here, and guess what? I am in the right and you are in the wrong. And, guess what else? You are morally wrong to try to use the law to exclude subject matter for your own hidden agenda.

  158. 57

    >>visceral felling we each have to certain types >>of claims

    >>so preemption is not a valid issue.

    Well, you know, of course those are correct, and at the heart of this is Benson that started this mess. Richard Stern and Justice Douglas started the war by trying to fabricate a judicial exception to exclude informatino processing and electrical engineering patent eligibility.

    So, thank the two of them for starting a war that has lasted 35 years and cost billions of dollars. The lesson is if you want to exclude a board class of subject matter from 101 go to Congress.

  159. 56

    The discussion above clearly illustrates a main battleground in patent law. It is not really patent-eligibility under section 101 or novelty or nonobviousness under sections 102 and 103. Rather it is the visceral felling we each have to certain types of claims we think should not be patentable. The whole debate is fueled by this rather than what the law is, how the law should be applied, etc. The ultimate example of this is the dissent from denial of cert. in Lab Corp. Trying to twist the law to achieve the result (patentable or not) is not good for patent law and not the best forum for agreeing/deciding whether these claims should or should not be patented.

    Regarding this proper, policy view of this issue, I think it is clear that methods such as those in Prometheus are valuable and useful to society. Before the discovery of the “natural correlation,” we could test metabolite levels all we wanted but not achieve the targeted results that follow from the inventors’ discovery and their disclosure of it to the public. Yes, a key form of the discovery may just be a thought in a doctor’s mind, but that still leads to a useful, and previously unobtainable goal. Justice Breyer (and other is the debate) clearly views this as rent-seeking and an improvident toll on the use of knowledge. Again, this is an expression of a policy opinion, not of what the law actually is. I view claims like those in Prometheus and Lab Corp as valid applications of discoveries of natural phenomena, and I think that patent law reaches the same result. I also believe that, on a policy level, it is valid, valuable, and useful to the progress of the useful arts to patent such claims. If other disagree, I suggest that changing the statute is the proper way to pursue that view, not by torturing patent law as it exists.

    Regarding preemption, the discussion in the thread on December 19 refers to but does not resolve the focus problem. Basically, nearly any claim that involves a natural phenomenon can be argued to preempt the natural phenomenon if you focus the analysis narrowly enough. In Prometheus, a specific drug is used to create/affect a natural phenomenon. If you focus on the “fact” that only this first drug is currently known to affect the natural phenomenon, then you can argue the claim preempts all uses of this natural phenomenon. On the other hand, if you imagine (as did the Federal Circuit panel in Prometheus) the claim is limited to the use of that one drug and that other drugs and means are possible for affecting the natural phenomenon then the claim should not be considered to preempt the natural phenomenon.

    Based on this, let’s consider to scenarios. In the first, assume a drug or means is known that affects the natural phenomenon. The inventor above then discovers that the drug above affects the natural phenomenon. A claim to using the drug clearly should not be held patent-ineligible for preempting the natural phenomenon. Hold that thought. In the second scenario, assume no prior drug or means to affect the natural phenomenon. The claim above is held to not be patent-eligible on the basis of preemption. Later, another inventor develops a second drug or means to affect the natural phenomenon. Clearly, the claim did not in fact preempt the natural phenomenon. Should the result of patent-eligibility depend on arbitrary conditions? I do not think so. This problem in focus is one of the reasons why preemption doctrine is a dangerous tool for assessing patent-eligibility.

    Related to this, inventors should be allowed patent claims to what they have invented and what they have contributed to the art. Here, the inventor provides (let us assume) the first drug or means for affecting a natural phenomenon. If the inventor claims this use limited to the drug or means invented (a result required by section 112), the patent grant comports with patent law (and preemption doctrine really should not disturb this). If instead the inventor attempts to claim every means of affecting the natural phenomenon, this might be considered to preempt the natural phenomenon (it also would likely violate 112—thus, this is another case where the other bases for patentability better solve the alleged problems that patent-eligibility is advocated to be needed to solve). Of course, the claims in Prometheus do not attempt to cover every means of affecting the natural phenomenon, so preemption is not a valid issue.

  160. 55

    These claims pass 101 – they’re directed to a process. That’s not where the difficulty is. Let’s see how the district court handles the 102, 103 and 112 issues. For example, it seesm to me that notwithstanding what’s written in the preamble, claim 1 quoted above doesn’t actually recite a process for optimizing – it recites a process where something is administered to a patient and afterward the level of a metabolite in the blood is measured. Those are the only process steps – and as I recall, they’re known in the art. The “whereby” clauses at the end aren’t part of the method, as they don’t recite any steps. So you can shoot this claim down on 102, 103 and possibly 112 (for failing to clearly recite an optimization process as alleged in the preamble).

  161. 54

    >>a claim to an eligible but old process >>characterised by a novel mental step must be >>invalid

    Maybe under 102 or 103, but not 101. Again, why are you using a judicially created exception and arguing it as if it is statutory construction. It isn’t. A judicially created exception should be applied as narrow as possible.

    I know the way the EPO works, and it is interesting to watch as europe slowly sinks in status compared with the U.S. in information processing.

  162. 53

    6, >>Sure you can, all you need is a printout of >>the claim and a pencil.

    And no morals.

  163. 52

    “Since when did the transformative part of a claim need be in the non-old-in-the-art element?”
    and
    “If the non-transformative mental step at the end of the claim is the only novel or non-obvious feature of the claim, then the “invention” is either a de facto abstraction or it’s anticipated/obvious or both.”
    and
    “You have to consider the claim as a whole. You can’t split it up for purposes of 101.”

    The EPO way: You have to consider the claim as a whole, but ineligible subject matter can’t add an inventive step to otherwise eligible but old subject matter.

    Of course, that’s founded in the “technical” criterion for patentability. But regardless of that, I’m with Mooney on this one: one way or another, a claim to an eligible but old process characterised by a novel mental step must be invalid.

    Also, where’s the utility? “Indicates a need…”??

  164. 50

    Ned: In contrast, we can ignore claim limitations for Section 101 purposes, even under Diehr’s claim as a whole approach, if the ignored claim limitations are “insigficant.”

    _____________

    What the Flook?!?!?

    The Supremes never said this in Diehr, and they did not say so in Bilski!!

    And how do you suppose an examiner could get away with such tactics, especially in the current legal climate which favors Actual Inventors and patents in general?

  165. 49

    What we assess for impermissible abstractness is not the claim itself (a series of runes that is inherently abstract), but the subject matter of the claim (the device or process that would infringe the claim).”

    I’m so confused that I said exactly that not a few days ago.
    Posted by: 6 | Dec 22, 2010 at 08:56 PM

    ___________

    Then you are both terribly confused. According the Courts, the only way claims are abstract under 101 is if all the steps are mental/thinking steps and/or pure acts of communication.

  166. 48

    Old and conventional material can be ignored for 101 purposes???

    Posted by: fish bones | Dec 22, 2010 at 11:18 PM

    __________

    No it can’t. Even if all the steps in a process are known I believe they can still meet the 101 requirement if the steps are applied in a new and useful way.

  167. 47

    You have to consider the claim as a whole. You can’t split it up for purposes of 101.

    Posted by: NWPA | Dec 22, 2010 at 08:18 PM

    ___________________

    This is correct. But I see the usual suspects are here denying the Diehr claims as a whole doctrine. The same bunch that thinks Benson and Flook cabined Diehr and the SCOTUS affirmed MOT as the sole test in Bilski.

  168. 45

    “You have to consider the claim as a whole. You can’t split it up for purposes of 101.”

    Sure you can, all you need is a printout of the claim and a pencil.

  169. 44

    “That’s where Rader lost his way in Research Corp. v. Microsoft, and it also seems to confuse 6.

    What we assess for impermissible abstractness is not the claim itself (a series of runes that is inherently abstract), but the subject matter of the claim (the device or process that would infringe the claim).”

    I’m so confused that I said exactly that not a few days ago.

  170. 42

    “We have met the problem”

    I tend to agree that we need to choose between 102 and 101. I think it better to use 101 in this case because of the difficulty in ignoring claim limitations when considering novelty. In contrast, we can ignore claim limitations for Section 101 purposes, even under Diehr’s claim as a whole approach, if the ignored claim limitations are “insigficant.”

    And this is the point of actual dispute between the Lourie-Rader-Bryson panel, and the Breyer+2 dissent in Lab. Corp. The former considers the “test” to be critical. The latter considers the “test” to be insignificant — after all, it is old and conventional: the only new subject matter in the “test and infer” claims being the admittedly unpatentable mental step.

  171. 41

    Since when did the transformative part of a claim need be in the non-old-in-the-art element?

    If the non-transformative mental step at the end of the claim is the only novel or non-obvious feature of the claim, then the “invention” is either a de facto abstraction or it’s anticipated/obvious or both. You appear to believe that such a claim is anticipated/obvious. Good for you. I’m not sure at all, however, why you believe that a majority of the Supremes agree with you. Then again, AI thought Bilski’s claims would be found valid … the original patent txxbagger (or more accurately, perhaps: patent bagholder).

  172. 40

    Except that the prior steps were old in the art, were they not?

    Since when did the transformative part of a claim need be in the non-old-in-the-art element?

    Oh, I am sorry, I forgot that this poster suffers from a severe, one might say Diehr, attack of selective legal understanding.

    !!! BILSKI 14 !!!

    Believe it. Live it.

    Pay attention – the Supremes have spoken – obviously, the CAFC have taken notice.

  173. 39

    CAFC: “A subsequent mental step does not, by itself, negate the transformative nature of prior steps.”

    Except that the prior steps were old in the art, were they not? Is Lourie really saying that I can take any old, “transformative” method and add a final mental step of thinking about a “result” of the transformation (or any other otherwise non-eligible step) then and I’m 101-compliant? How about:

    1. A method of improving the quality of a TV watching experience, comprising turning on the TV to a particular channel and determining what is on the TV, wherein if said broadcast relates to a story about a prostitute, a doctor, and a parrot with magical powers, a need to change the channel is indicated.

    Eligible, right? Must be. After all, “it’s a method of improving the quality of a TV watching experience”! How can that not be patentable? Such is the impeccable logic of this sad case. Or maybe the CAFC is just confused about the claims?

    “Thus, when viewed in the proper context, the final step of providing a warning based on the results of the prior steps does not detract from the patentability of Prometheus’s claimed methods as a whole.” Slip Op. at 21.

    There is no step of “providing a warning.” The claims say that the *result* indicates the need. The claims don’t say that “the doctor indicates the need to a patient.” That would be a different issue.

  174. 38

    >>clearly beaten in an argument.

    How? Pointing out that each time 101 comes up people on here debate excluding claims as if it is a matter of statutory construction rather than applying a judicial exception.

    What beat me is the persistent ignorance of some of the bloggers on here, and what beats me is why I waste my time typing to them.

  175. 36

    IBP, ya be quite the chuckles.

    You say that every time 101 comes up.

    Listen to my main man – a narrow application does not mean that ya ignore it, that ya don’t look to see if it applies every time. Pay attention when my main man tells ya teh law.

    Quite the chuckles – IBP noting that Einstein is a genius (although drinking with 6 does raise some concerns bouts that).

  176. 34

    So, the standard to apply doesn’t matter?

    Of course the standard matters, but you can’t use “it should be narrowly applied” as a reason to not apply it in every single case. That would be like saying in every case that the presumption of validity means we should not invalidate the patent.

    but the three judicially created exceptions are not part of the statute.

    They’re part of the law. Unless and until someone amends the statute to specifically exclude them, it’s a distinction that makes no difference.

  177. 33

    Einstein–

    You are of course correct.

    Yes, I could have expounded at greater length, to give greater precision to what I said–but I thought it was evident that what I said was that changes to a physical structure or physical condition or state should be the only things that are not abstract for 101 purposes, NOT THE DESCRIPTION THEREOF.

    Language is an abstraction? No kidding!

    Thanks, genius.

  178. 32

    >>Unless fact-specific

    So, the standard to apply doesn’t matter? I think it does because everytime 101 comes up you and the gang attempt to apply a judicially created exception as if it is part of the statute, but the three judicially created exceptions are not part of the statute.

  179. 31

    You know, boys and girls, the exclusions from being patent eligible are judicially created exceptions and as such should be extememly narrow and seldom used.

    You say that every time 101 comes up. Unless you think the judicial exceptions to 101 should be never used, try coming up with a more fact-specific argument.

  180. 30

    Just remember that all your whining about a particular patent becomes moot in at most 20 years.

  181. 29

    I don’t think it matters exactly how one charaterizes the problem, Section 101 or Section 102

    Clearly, nay, obviously, it very much matters exactly how one characterizes the problem.

    Problems characterized incorrectly will be solved incorrectly, if at all.

    C’mon people, if anyone should understand the nuances of particularity in stating the parameters of a problem, it is us lawyers, no?

  182. 28

    You know, boys and girls, the exclusions from being patent eligible are judicially created exceptions and as such should be extememly narrow and seldom used.

    You little boys are obviously not lawyers or you would understand that framework. (Or you are MM a supposed attorney working in the sub-basement of the PTO with his aunt.)

  183. 27

    If I understand things correctly, in this case the lab that is running the test and the doctors that are doing the treating are all under the Mayo umbrella. If it was any other way, I don’t see how there could be infringement. This is important, because invariably the lab and the doctor are not part of the same organization. But it doesn’t matter, for all the reasons that Malcolm and Ned have given. Knowing a previously unknown fact is not itself useful. This decision cannot possibly be correct under current law.

  184. 26

    If you ask me, that’s really too bad. In my view, the law ought to allow some way to identify the doctor as an infringer in this circumstance.

    What if we construe/define “determining the level” to include receipt of a test result indicating the level, or alternatively explicitly claim receiving information indicative of the level?

    I still think you’d need to positively recite administering a higher or lower dosage next time to make the claim valid, but at least you’d capture the doctor as a direct infringer.

    So, what Malcolm said I guess.

  185. 25

    TINLA In my view, the law ought to allow some way to identify the doctor as an infringer in this circumstance.

    It’s called “better claim drafting.” An invention that would reasonable be “transformative” in a 101-eligible manner would be a method of administering certain specified doses of drugs to certain specified patients. That would be a new method that achieves a new transformation. Such claims are not at issue in this case, however. The claims at issue in this case were drafted to cover a method of doing something that was old in the art and merely thinking about the result in a new way.

    Without being able to patent the application of the discovery to diagnosis patients, where is the incentive to disclose (reasonably assuming that people are as greedy and passive agggressive as all that)?

    The vast majority of scientific discoveries are not converted into crxppy claims like this one. Believe it or not, some people just like to discover things, especially helpful things, and would gladly do so for very modest sums (e.g., enough to eat and provide food and shelter to a child, or maybe, just maybe, afford a house near the research institute).

    The other incentive comes from increased sale of the drug itself. If you identify more suitable patients for the therapy, you can sell more drug to those patients.

    where is the incentive to invest in R&D intended to lead to such discoveries?

    See above. There are a lot of people out there who would be happy to do R&D. Maybe the government should give more money to them instead of giving it to banksters who use it to pay repo men to invade homes and steal or vandalize the belongings of innocent people (something we unincorporated mortals would be quickly imprisoned for).

  186. 24

    So what do we have?

    Administering the drug is old.

    Testing for the metabolites is old.

    The two steps are old in combination.

    People performing the old steps, presumably, cannot be infringers.

    A doctor reading the test results is not an infringer.

    Who infringes? A doctor who administers the drug and orders the test? But we have ALREADY determined that such cannot be an infringement because all such is old.

    So, he infringes when he reads the report — but only if he ordered the initial administration and test?

    This is crazy!

    We have examples of doctors researching completely differenct phenomena being called infringers if they administer the drug and order the tests.

    Lunacy.

    Obviously, we have very serious problems with these claims. I don’t think it matters exactly how one charaterizes the problem, Section 101 or Section 102, but there is nothing new here except useful information. But under Benson, Flook and even Diehr, such is not patentable subject matter. We do not have any real world USE of that information.

    What we have is information capable of being used, but the use itself is not claimed. This is Flook.

  187. 23

    “Oh, so now a lab that practices the prior art is liable for joint infringement because someone has patented a new way of interpreting the results?”

    Looking at it again, I think the contractual relationship with the lab in that case would probably be viewed as “arms length.” So a doctor might be able to order the old test be done and then assess the results themselves, leading to no infringement, so long as the test result did not come back with the an indication that it was in or out of range based on the specified value, leaving the doctor to make the assessment.

    If you ask me, that’s really too bad. In my view, the law ought to allow some way to identify the doctor as an infringer in this circumstance.

    Without being able to patent the application of the discovery to diagnosis patients, where is the incentive to disclose (reasonably assuming that people are as greedy and passive agggressive as all that)? But more importantly, where is the incentive to invest in R&D intended to lead to such discoveries?

    There is a problem here that needs to be addressed, and maybe leaving it up to Courts, with their many cooks, to figure out the right soup recipe for treating these sniffles is not the best strategy. Perhaps a change in the law of inducing infringement should be implemented to cover this sort of circumstance, and allow a finding of inducement without requiring that a direct infringer be identified if one entity (such as a doctor) is instructing others to carry out the other steps, despite a lack of direct control or agency.

  188. 22

    All claims are ABSTRACTED from the underlying reality.

    That’s where Rader lost his way in Research Corp. v. Microsoft, and it also seems to confuse 6.

    What we assess for impermissible abstractness is not the claim itself (a series of runes that is inherently abstract), but the subject matter of the claim (the device or process that would infringe the claim).

  189. 21

    CAFC (Rader, Lourie, Bryson – Lourie writing):

    We do not think that either the Supreme Court’s GVR Order or the Court’s Bilski decision dictates a wholly different analysis or a different result on remand…The Supreme Court’s decision in Bilski did not undermine our preemption analysis of Prometheus’s claims and it rejected the machine-or-transformation test only as a definitive test…Thus, the Court did not disavow the machine-or-transformation test. And, as applied to the present claims, the “useful and important clue, an investigative tool,” leads to a clear and compelling conclusion, viz., that the present claims pass muster under § 101. They do not encompass laws of nature or preempt natural correlations.

    It’s good to know that the claims don’t “preempt natural correlations”. Here’s claim 46:

    46. A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy and reducing toxicity associated with treatment of an immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising:

    (a) determining the level of 6-thioguanine or 6-
    methylmercaptopurine in a subject admin-
    istered a drug selected from the group con-
    sisting of 6-mercaptopurine, azathiop[u]rine, 6-thioguanine, and 6- methyl-mercaptoriboside, said subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal
    disorder,

    wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol per 8×108 red blood cells
    indicates a need to increase the[] amount of
    said drug subsequently administered to
    said subject, and

    wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater
    than about 400 pmol per 8×108 red blood
    cells or a level of 6-methylmercaptopurine
    greater than about 7000 pmol per 8×108
    red blood cells indicates a need to decrease
    the amount of said drug suministered to said subject.

    Just to be clear: if I can’t simply look at data and make a determination as to what is the most reasonable treatment, or if I can’t follow an instruction to do what is old in the art (test levels of thioguanine in a subject), then in fact a “natural correlation” (i.e., between drug metabolism rates and drug toxicity) has been preempted.

    Can someone remind me: did any party in this case ever bother to address the question as to whether steps of measuring post-administration thioguanine levels in a patient (for whatever reason) were old in the art? It always seemed unlikely to me that the levels couldn’t have been measured in patients well before these particular numbers were “discovered”.

    Also interesting how the Federal Circuit ends its decision with a real whopper:

    Viewing the treatment methods as a whole, Prometheus has claimed therapeutic methods that determine the optimal dosage level for a course of treatment. In other words, when asked the
    critical question, “What did the applicant invent?,” Grams, 888 F.2d at 839 (citation omitted), the answer is a series of transformative steps that optimizes efficacy and reduces toxicity of a method of treatment for particular diseases using particular drugs.

    Except that neither claim 1 (which includes an earlier step of administering a drug) or claim 46 actually reduces the toxicity of anything. One could argue that the methods in those claims yield information that can be used for achieving this goal, but the claims themselves do not achieve this goal. In fact, it’s really the information provided by the description section of the patent (i.e., the specific threshold levels of drug and/or metabolites in the blood) that are allegedy new and non-obvious for the stated purpose, not the information provided by the old “transformative” step of checking the level of a drug in a patients blood (I say “allegedly” because certainly if you are attempting to treat a patient with thioguanine and he is not responding at all and you check the level of thioguanine in his/her blood and it’s zero you may want to increase the dose. Seems a bit obvious, to say the least?)

    In the instant case, the presence of mental steps similarly does not detract from the patentability of the administering and determining steps.

    A very strange statement. Did Mayo argue that any claim that recites a mental step is patent ineligible? I was not aware of such an argument being made.

    Although a physician is not required to make any upward or downward adjustment in dosage during the “warning” step, the prior steps provide useful information for possible dosage adjustments to the method of treatment using thiopurine drugs for a particular subject.

    First off, there is no step in claims 1 or 46 that requires anyone to “warn” anyone about anything. Reading non-existent steps into a claim and then referring to those steps using quotation marks is a good sign of a Federal Circuit decision that has gone off the deep end.

    Ignoring the absence of any “warning” step, Judge Lourie seems to be suggesting that claims 1 and 46 should be patentable (and not just patent eligible) even *without* the “wherein” clauses. Were any such claims prosecuted by Prometheus to allowance at the same time that they filed the application that led to the patent at issue? i.e., claims to a method of administering thioguanine and then testing the levels of thioguanine in the patient *or* claims to merely testing the level of thioguanine in a previously treated subject, period (without the “wherein” clauses)? Because Lourie sure makes it sound like it’s *those* steps (really, just the latter step) that’s new and non-obvious and patent-worthy here. What do the “wherein” clauses add to these claims if the methods are deemed useful even where no action is taken? Did the Examiner ignore them as well?

    contrary to Mayo’s assertions, a physician who only evaluates the result of the claimed methods, without carrying out the administering and/or determining steps that are present in all the claims, cannot infringe any claim that
    requires such steps.

    Great to know. So if Joe is getting treated by his doctor with thioguanine for his gastrointestinal disorder, can he ask some third party lab to merely measure his thioguanine levels (old in the prior art) without anyone infringing the claim? Surely neither Joe nor the lab infringes by simply determining his thioguanine levels (there’s no “warning” step…). But what if Joe’s doctor advises him to take this step? Assuming Joe doesn’t know what the data means, does Joe infringe only after he tells his doctor the result? What if Joe goes instead to a second doctor with the result? According to the case, the second doctor isn’t infringing by analyzing the data if the second doctor doesn’t make or order the determination. What if the first doctor advises Joe “Get your thioguanine levels tested by this lab and take the results to a second doctor who can treat you accordingly”? Seems to me that there’s no inducement because, according to Lourie’s decision, there’s no direct infringement by anyone (assume neither I nor the lab looks at the results and/or we do not know what they mean). Would it matter if the doctors work at the same hospital? Seems like it wouldn’t matter because (again): no direct infringement by anybody according to Lourie’s holding. Which leaves only joint infringement …

  190. 20

    TINLA Even if the patient goes to the lab and gets the test and takes the results to a doctor, the lab and the doctor are both contracted by the patient, so wouldn’t there be joint infringement even in that circumstance?

    Oh, so now a lab that practices the prior art is liable for joint infringement because someone has patented a new way of interpreting the results?

    That’s extremely fxcked up. Then again, so is just about everything about the CAFC’s reasoning in this case.

  191. 19

    Otherwise, the claims are ABSTRACTED from the underlying reality, and should not pass 101.

    All claims are ABSTRACTED from the underlying reality. Langugae itself is an abstraction – there is no getting away from it. Words describing “physical structure” are merely abstractions for the electromagnetic, strong, weak and gravitational forces all intertwined in a cosmic web of vibrating strings.

  192. 17

    But isn’t there contract and/or agency in this case, so you can still say the hospital is the infringer?

    Sure, there’s a contract, but the hospital doesn’t exactly micromanage the doctors’ day-to-day medical decisions. Doctors are hired because they have specialized knowledge that allows them to decide on their own how to treat individual patients.

    Sure, the hospital is liable for malpractice if the doctor messes up, but I think you’d need more than a mere employee relationship to establish vicarious patent infringement where the standard is “control or direct”.

    Also, can we please start using “phenomenon” as the singular form? Thanks.

  193. 16

    You can discover a law of nature, but you can’t patent it! Just patent any use of it. 🙂

    I don’t know for sure, Michael, but I think there might be some contention between “patent a particular application of it” and “patent all uses or a field of uses of it.” Did you mean the former or the latter?

  194. 15

    “Hospitals” will not be a single entity – have you ever been to one?

    You get fifteen different bills after a minor visit.

    But isn’t there contract and/or agency in this case, so you can still say the hospital is the infringer?

    The recent case had a special set of facts in which the customer carried out the final step, but was not under contract or an agent of the software provider. Nor do I think that it was argued that the sale fo the softawre meant that the software provider developed the software and infringed the other steps under contract to the customer or as an agent of the customer, but I don’t know for sure.

    In the case of the test and diagnosis, I think it would be hard for that method to be performed without being able to find joint infringement. Even if the patient goes to the lab and gets the test and takes the results to a doctor, the lab and the doctor are both contracted by the patient, so wouldn’t there be joint infringement even in that circumstance?

  195. 14

    If the mental steps are included, they are the invention

    I don’t mean to quibble (for a change), but if the mental steps are included, the claim as a whole is the invention.

    Viewing the claimed method as a whole, which involves a bunch of old active steps and a single mental step that doesn’t affect any of the active steps, what distinguishes that claimed method over the prior art? A completely unverifiable state of mind. I don’t see how you can avoid discounting the mental step, if the mental step produces no tangible (if conditional) result that is positively claimed (as it does in Diehr).

    And that’s even discounting the infringement implications of a “practice the prior art but don’t think about a rhinoceros” situation.

  196. 13

    Well, I originally wanted to use the word G*A*R*B*A*G*E instead of junk, but it got blocked by the filter.

    G*A*R*B*A*G*E decision!!!!!!!

    RUBBISH!

  197. 12

    This decision is junk.

    Whatever the relevant “disease state” is, it should be defined at the structural or biochemical (i.e. physically structural) level, and the claims should be directed to physical changes in said physical properties.

    Otherwise, the claims are ABSTRACTED from the underlying reality, and should not pass 101.

    How many times must we get the run-around via CAFC jurisprudence? JUNK!

    As a practitioner, my problem with this type of decision is that it is useless for my clients, and useless for me. It provides no real guidance for the future.

    What am I to do, advise my clients to, next week, all file claims that satisfy a Prometheus-type of 101 analysis? Of course not! Who knows what the formulation will be in 3-4 years when grant time comes around.

    I certainly don’t–and more to the point, I can’t–even make a guess that is satisfactory. Sure, I can think of arguments that I think may be persuasive, but when there exists no climate, only weather, long-range planning is useless, and success depends on luck, not planning.

    Absolute junk. Legally weak, and logically ridiculous. This decision is absolutely nothing for the profession to be proud of.

    What is the deal with the CAFC anyway? Do they only care about MSPB and Veterans claims jurisprudence, and not really about patents at all?

    link to cafc.uscourts.gov

    Of the 3 major categories of caseload–IP law, money suits against the government, and admin law, the fraction represented by IP law has been increasing since 2007, from 29% in 2007, to 44% in 2010:

    link to cafc.uscourts.gov

    link to cafc.uscourts.gov

    Come on CAFC, with the increasing role of IP cases in your daily lives, get your act together and spend at least as much time on patent jurisprudence as on personnel issues.

  198. 11

    The initial drug administration and the initial test are old. The mental steps have to be discounted. So, what is the invention? What did he invent?

    I think case can be dismissed on novelty grounds if the mental steps are ignored. If the mental steps are included, they are the invention — and it seems to me, the analysis should view the previous steps up to and including the old test as mere data gathering.

    I think that is the way Breyer viewed it.

  199. 9

    What about the person who discovered a law of nature or natural phenomena that inherently occurred during a transformative prior art process?

    Wouldn’t that be the facts of King v. Eon?

  200. 8

    What about the person who discovered a law of nature or natural phenomena that inherently occurred during a transformative prior art process?

    Can the person claim the transformative prior art process (but with an additional mental step that recites a mental recognition of law of nature or natural phenomena) and clear 102 and 103?

  201. 7

    mmm-not

    “Hospitals” will not be a single entity – have you ever been to one?

    You get fifteen different bills after a minor visit.

  202. 6

    ping – I assume that in the hospital scenario, the hospital is going to be the single entity. I don’t think that that’s a real issue here.

  203. 5

    Because no claim in the Prometheus patents claims only mental steps, “contrary to Mayo’s assertions, a physician who only evaluates the result of the claimed methods, without carrying out the administering and/or determining steps that are present in all the claims, cannot infringe any claim that requires such steps

    Given the concurrent thread on joint infringement, one wonders, does any claim have steps performed only by a single player?

  204. 4

    The real test is coming up in the Classen remand. If the CAFC smacks Classen down (again), then SCOTUS may decide to stay out of it. But if they reverse their original decision and let the Classen claim through, I agree with Wegner that Bilski 2.0 won’t be far behind.

  205. 3

    “Citing with approval” in two separate concurrences does not add up to a majority as implicated by the “five Justices” remark.

    There has been and never was a five Justice concurrence on any single stated position that would give the MINORITY view of the dissent in Lab. Corp., ANY precedential value.

    Trying to force feed precedence from the losing side is simply BAD LAW

  206. 1

    I personally think that this opinion goes out of its way to make such treatment claims patent eligible. And, I think it tees up the case pretty well for the SCOTUS to slap down the Fed. Cir., again.

    I wonder whether there is really anything that could not be found to be patent eligible under the post-hoc reasoning that is found in this quote:
    “Viewing the treatment methods as a whole, Prometheus has claimed therapeutic methods that determine the optimal dosage level for a course of treatment. In other words, when asked the critical question, “What did the applicant invent?,” Grams, 888 F.2d at 839 (citation omitted), the answer is a series of transformative steps that optimizes efficacy and reduces toxicity of a method of treatment for particular diseases using particular drugs.”

Comments are closed.