Supreme Court to Decide Patent Export Case: Life Tech v. Promega

by Dennis Crouch

The Supreme Court has granted a petition for writ of certiorari in the pending patent case of Life Tech. v. Promega Corp (14-1538) – focusing only on Question 2:

Whether the Federal Circuit erred in holding that supplying a single, commodity component of a multi-component invention from the United States is an infringing act under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1), exposing the manufacturer to liability for all worldwide sales.

The court will not review the Billy Idol question of whether one can induce ones self.

As the question presented indicates, the case focuses on the statutory interpretation of Section 271(f)(1). That section provides for infringement liability against someone who exports components of a patented invention. The text:

Whoever without authority supplies … from the United States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention, where such components are uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.

I have underlined the requirement that at least “a substantial portion of the components” be supplied before infringement occurs because that language forms the basis for the case.

Here, the case in question involves certain genetic testing that occurred abroad. However apparently a single component of the invention (Taq polymerase) was supplied from the US. For those who have not learned biology in the last 20 years, Taq polymerase is now a commodity product used to amplify DNA via the polymerase chain reaction (PCR).

The jury found that export of the single component was sufficient to meet the requirement of “a substantial portion of the components” when the accused genetic testing kits include a primer mix, a PCR reaction mix, a buffer solution, control DNA, and the polymerase Taq.  However, the district court granted JMOL against the patentee.  On appeal, the Federal Circuit sided with the jury – finding that substantial evidence supported the verdict.

[The asserted claim] recites five components: a primer mix, a polymerizing enzyme (such as Taq polymerase), nucleotides, a buffer solution, and control DNA. Tautz patent, LifeTech’s domestic arm supplies the Taq polymerase to its facility in the United Kingdom, which both manufactures the remaining four components and assembles all the components into the accused STR kits. Taq polymerase is an enzyme used to amplify the DNA sequences in order to obtain enough replicated sample for testing. Without Taq polymerase, the genetic testing kit recited in the Tautz patent would be inoperable because no PCR could occur. LifeTech’s own witness admitted that the Taq polymerase is one of the “main” and “major” components of the accused kits. In short, there is evidence in the record to support the jury’s finding that a polymerase such as Taq is a “substantial portion” of the patented invention.

On the question of law, the Federal Circuit held that, in some circumstances “a party may be liable under § 271(f)(1) for supplying or causing to be supplied a single component for combination outside the United States.”  In his essay on the decision, Jason Rantanen wrote this holding was “probably erroneous.”  

 

 

56 thoughts on “Supreme Court to Decide Patent Export Case: Life Tech v. Promega

  1. 5

    271(f) (2) specifically requires that the components sold not be a staple

    Right. That’s because 271(f)(2) creates a necessary and reasonable exception for single items that are staple commodities.

    because 271(f) (1) does not, it seems reasonable to conclude that the components sold do not have to be non-staples.

    271(f)(1) doe not make an exception for single staple items of commerce because that part of the statute is concerned with the sale of uncombined pluralities of items that are sold in a manner that induces infringement.

    Let’s say someone invents a combination of V, W, X, Y and Z hat is non-obvious and patentable. And let’s say each of those items is a staple items of commerce. 271(f)(1) says that I can’ t avoid infringement by setting up a factory in Mexico and shipping out V, W, X, Y and Z in a box along with instructions to assemble them into the invention. I probably also infringe under 271(f)(1) if I ship out only V, W, X and Y in a box.

    But do I infringe if I ship out just V? Of course not. And it doesn’t matter who I’m shipping to and it doesn’t matter if I know that they’re infringing. That’s not my problem. It’s perfectly legal to ship staple items of commerce back and forth. Why on earth would anyone want it to be otherwise?

    1. 5.2

      MM, I agree that just knowing that someone is infringing is not enough when shipping just one commodity component. There has to be something more — and that here is the fact that the shipping company itself is assembling abroad.

      Beyond facts like this, perhaps if the shipping instructions say to the customer to get the rest of the combination and assemble it like so….? But if one is just a passive actor and one’s only activity is to ship a commodity component to one who is known to infringe, then there should be no liability.

      The bottom line, there has to be some active involvement beyond just shipping a commodity component.

      1. 5.2.1

        Ned: I agree that just knowing that someone is infringing is not enough when shipping just one commodity component. There has to be something more — and that here is the fact that the shipping company itself is assembling abroad.

        Except the company is “assembling” — and selling — only in a different country (1) where there is no patent and (2) they are sourcing only a single staple item of commerce from the US. Creating infringement liability for that kind of activity would be absurd. All you’re doing is making it less desirable for commodity manufacturers/shippers to do business and employ people here.

        1. 5.2.1.1

          MM, there are policy arguments on both sides of this issue. However, the one party is assembling all the elements of the patented combination. It is just that they are doing some assembly here in some assembly there. Interesting problem.

          1. 5.2.1.1.1

            It is just that they are doing some assembly here in some assembly there.

            Unless I missed something, the only “assembly” they are doing in the US is the assembly of a staple commodity, i.e., a DNA polymerase.

            They could freely sell that polymerase in the US if they liked. They could even sell it to someone who was making an infringing product, without incurring any liability. Somehow it’s supposed to be worse for them if they are shipping that staple commodity out of the country? It makes no sense.

            Can you explain what in heck is the point of 271(f)(2) if the sale of single staple item can lead to infringement liability (as the inevitable losers of this argument wish)? Why create an express and clear exception that is completely nullified by another sub-section?

            Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States any component of a patented invention that is especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, where such component is uncombined in whole or in part, knowing that such component is so made or adapted and intending that such component will be combined outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.

            1. 5.2.1.1.1.1

              Maybe you ought to ask Congress instead of pretending that the law is something other than what it is.

              Because “you don’t like it” is an awful reason for attempting to spin the law into something that you would rather have.

              You turn a blind eye to normal and accepted statutory construction principles jus because your “feelings” may be hurt.

              Far better to correctly portray the law and then to simply criticize that law (as properly understood).

              1. 5.2.1.1.1.1.1

                Maybe you ought to ask Congress

                LOLOLOLOLOLOL

                This case is already over except for your crying, “anon.”

                Stock up on the tissue.

            2. 5.2.1.1.1.2

              Listen, MM, I concede that one cannot sell a staple to others even knowing that they are infringing and face liability.

              But there is a difference here. The (real) party shipping the component is also assembling the kits. Limited to this fact situation, the sale in the US is part of a “direct” infringement where the one party is doing the making.

              1. 5.2.1.1.1.2.1

                the sale in the US is part of a “direct” infringement where the one party is doing the making.

                There’s no direct infringement, Ned.

                1. Point Malcolm is that the one party is assembling all the components into a kit. If they were doing it in the United States they would be directly infringing. If they were doing it in England, and assuming a patent there, they would not be directly infringing. But by spreading the infringement acts to more than one country, they avoid infringement.

                  I think there is something wrong in this “artistry.” Unless principles international law would forbid this application of the statute in this environment, I think the holding of the Federal Circuit is correct.

                  The origin of the doctrine of equivalents came from exactly this kind of situation. The claim literally did not cover the accused device, yet the principle of the invention was appropriated by minor changes. The Supreme Court nevertheless found infringement.

                2. If they were doing it in the United States they would be directly infringing.

                  Right. But they’re not doing it in the United States.

                  by spreading the infringement acts to more than one country, they avoid infringement.

                  There is only one “act” that would infringe anywhere on the planet. That “act” is assembling some staple components into a kit. They’re not “spreading that act” around at all. That “act” is taking place solely in the UK, where there is no patent.

                  The origin of the doctrine of equivalents came from exactly this kind of situation.

                  Except that there isn’t a statue that expressly says “you can’t use the d.o.e. to find infringement liability.” Here we have a statute that expressly puts staple commodity items out of reach.

                  And there’s great reasons for that!

                  I’m still waiting for you to explain what in the world is wrong about importing a staple item to yourself in your own country so you can make something in your own country where a patent doesn’t exist or isn’t valid in your own country. I wouldn’t want the US to have such a law and I’m not aware of any reasonable person who would want that law. Certainly Congress didn’t want that law when it wrote the statute.

                  So let’s hear the explanation. Why is your law a good thing, Ned? What’s the “policy” being promoted? I’m dying to know.

                3. Adding: the d.o.e. has a boatload of exceptions built into it as well, including exceptions concerning the foreseeability/obviousness/dedicated-t0-the-public nature of the non-literal “equivalents”. Those would be analogous to the staple items (if you want to make the analogy to the d.o.e. — that was your call, not mine).

                4. OK, perhaps we need just a bit more — importation by someone of the kits made by the accused infringer.

                  But I do see your point and it is a good one.

                5. importation by someone of the kits made by the accused infringer.

                  In that case you have vanilla flavor direct infringement and the Deep South “loopholes” addressed by these statutes are irrelevant.

                  And just for the record (lest we forget): the defendant in this case was busted for doing just that. As I recall, they didn’t even bother appealing that part of the case.

    2. 5.3

      The view of “uncombined pluralities” is being misrepresented.

      The substantial portion item can be a single item.

      This is a simple and direct result of basic statutory construction.

      To pretend otherwise – no matter how much that might “make you happy,” is simply not in accord with the law.

      This is a simple and direct point that Malcolm should recognize by now.

      The rest of the statute under discussion DOES continue as pointed out by Ned at 1.1.

      Certain others here also miss the point by trying to fight a different patentability battle (102/103) when such a battle is simply not on point to this section of law.

      Simple clarity and focus, peeps – you can do it.

      1. 5.3.1

        “anon” The view of “uncombined pluralities” is being misrepresented.

        The substantial portion item can be a single item.

        LOL

        This is the exact question that the Supreme Court is going to answer exactly as I’ve described. There is no “misrepresentation.”

        1. 5.3.1.1

          There is every misrepresentation on everything else that you posted to this topic.

          Do you even understand the basics of statutory construction?

  2. 4

    I’ve used this example before and have yet to hear a decent response: Claim 1 is directed to a novel, non-obvious car battery, particularly claimed. The advantage of the battery is that it holds twice a charge, but otherwise functions exactly the same as current batteries. Claim 2 is a system comprising a car and the battery of Claim 1, wherein the battery powers the car in the conventional manner that car batteries do. Claim 3 is a method directed to a known method of determining the remaining charge in a battery without using the battery to do so (maybe you shoot a laser at it, whatever) wherein the subject of the method is the car battery of Claim 1.

    Claim 1 is novel and non-obvious, particularly claimed, described, enabled and eligible, and therefore is patentable.

    I’d submit to you that Claims 2 and 3 cannot be issued. Why? Because the invention was already claimed in Claim 1. Claims 2 and 3 are efforts to re-monopolize other people’s inventions. Everyone already knew that prior to this invention a battery can be used to start a car, and the method was already known. It turns the patent system on its head to have a claim which describes what was actually invented (Claim 1) and then increase the damages by simply reciting what the art already knew (Claim 2) and reach new “infringers” that one could not reach by *use* of the inventive battery (Claim 3).

    So the options are 1) Claims 2 and 3 are actually fine and should issue, 2) Claims 2 and 3, despite containing a piece which is novel and non-obvious by themselves are not non-obvious and fail 103 because when considering the claim as a whole the subject matter is obvious (i.e. the non-obviousness of Claim 1 “washes out” when placed into Claims 2 or 3) Claims 2 and 3 fail to particularly claim what the applicant considers to be their invention under 112b.

    I’m actually in favor of (2) as the correct course of action, because I believe that the unique features of something can wash out when it is placed within a context that doesn’t utilize it, such that the system as a whole is still similar to what came before. There is, however, no case that I know of which supports (2). Plus if you allow Examiners to actually rationalize why novel limitations should be ignored for 103 (beyond basic printed matter rules) you’re gonna have a bad time.

    There is, however, a case that supports (3). Lincoln Engineering expressly held that this type of claiming was invalid, but the Federal Circuit tossed Lincoln Engineering aside *precisely because of 271 and similar statutes* and then proceeded to decide 271 in a manner that enhanced the very fears Lincoln Engineering premised its holding on.

    Claims 2 and 3 are what the law used to refer to as an “old combination” issue. To bring this back to the instant case – One can imagine that when there is an old combination, the non-inventive part of the combination could never support 271 liability. In other words, even if Claim 2 had 50 limitations, 49 of which dealt with a conventional car and a conventional/battery relationship, the fact that someone ships out 49 of the 50 limitations still would not incur 271 liability. The only way 271 liability could be incurred is if one shipped out the battery (and thus directly infringed Claim 1 anyway) or if the combination itself was not old.

    Suppose, for example, that Claim 1 is never actually claimed, only Claim 2 is claimed. For me, it’s a difficult question to find liability for making the battery in the US if the applicant had dedicated Claim 1 to the public by not claiming it. Why should 271 liability attach on Claim 2 when the only reason direct infringement (and it’s attendant notice) is not in play is entirely at the inventor’s discretion by not claiming Claim 1?

    It seems to me that the only time 271 can apply for certain is with a new combination: Where a benefit is gained from the grouping that is appreciably beyond what one would get from the constituent pieces. 271 liability would attach only when what was made here either encompasses the combination benefit or has no use other than to later acquire the combination benefit. I suspect that is where the Supremes will end up on this case.

    1. 4.1

      As Lord Coke said, “The button to the coat.”

      For 400 years it was well understood that one could not re-patent an old combination for improvement of one element. Then along came In re Bernhart overturning the Supreme Court. (Now, just how did they do that?)

      But, Random, how does that apply to “this case?” Is the patented combination directed to an old combination? If so what is the novel element?

      1. 4.1.1

        My understanding is that its all old stuff and that the “kit” is just a standard grouping. It should never have issued because its all an old combination, but under the rules I just put forward each and every piece on its own would be part of the old, so there’s no way to reach the “substantially” threshold and 271 can’t apply.

        1. 4.1.1.1

          “Never should have issued” is the wrong argument in a 271 discussion.

          Try staying on point.

        2. 4.1.1.2

          Random, I am confused. If this is the standard grouping, such as a combination itself is known, how in the world could the patent office granted such a patent with nothing at all new? Have you looked at the prosecution history here?

  3. 3

    I sense that the justices have found that certain patent cases are good for them for certain reasons; they are generally non-political questions, they provide subject matter where the justices can reason together on technical legal matters as individuals, rather than as actors encumbered with their team’s ideology. I also believe they are trying to condition the CAFC to simply expect emphatic reversal when the CAFC tries to carve out patent law-only exceptions, or when they demonstrate a disregard for justice in pursuit of patent-law formalism (e.g. design patent damages and the present case).

    If I had to gain cert on a case, those are the angles I would pursue. Sequenom just didn’t have the vibe to get across the line, but I hope some Alice case does sooner or later.

    1. 3.1

      Martin, one could argue that there IS a Court-attractive G.P. aspect here – the extraterritorial impact?

  4. 2

    Are people looking for the component itself to be the “inventive step” or some “Point of Novelty” of the larger invention as claimed…?

    As I understand this section of law, the component only has to be a component and any “description” in relation to the “inventiveness” or “gist” is just not there in the words of Congress.

    Mistaking “substantial portion” to somehow be “portion providing the inventive gist or inventive step” seems to be a substantial mistake (buy easy to see where those accustomed to claim dissection would miss the actual law).

    On a separate matter of statutory construction, is there anyone out there (other than Malcolm) that does not comprehend the “singular/plural” basics of statutory construction?

    1. 2.1

      Are people looking for the component itself to be the “inventive step” or some “Point of Novelty” of the larger invention as claimed…?

      Nope. People are just looking for “substantial portion” to exclude a single staple item of commerce (like a DNA polymerase). And that’s what the Supreme Court is going to hold.

      The facts of this case are pretty straightforward. Kicking up dust isn’t going to work when the adults are in the room with you.

      1. 2.1.1

        Not sure what you think is “kicking up dust” here.

        Please feel free to point any specific error in my post.

          1. 2.1.1.1.1

            That is a typical “run away” response, so let me again ask you to point out what you consider to be the error in what I have said.

            Too difficult for you?

      2. 2.1.2

        The court very well might use “staple item of commerce”, but it also very well might not – considering this section of the statute was added after 271(c) which has that exact phrase in it. It is unlikely that the court will go that route.

        Giving the word “substantial” a definition will be an interesting exercise, that I will leave for the reader at home to do.

        1. 2.1.2.1

          Giving the word “substantial” a definition will be an interesting exercise,

          It’s actually not that interesting.

          The term to be construed is “substantial portion of the components … where such components are uncombined”. Note the plural: components.

          What would be the point of mentioning “uncombined components” if the statute covered a single staple item of commerce?

          The court very well might use “staple item of commerce”, but it also very well might not

          Nope. The Court is definitely, unquestionably going to refer to the “staple item of commerce” question because Congress put that exception squarely into the statute. The CAFC drove a truck through that exception and that’s why the Supreme Court took this case and that’s why it’s going to reverse the CAFC 9-0.

          All this was predicted literally hours after Judge Chen’s “tour de farce” was published. By me. Just fyi.

          1. 2.1.2.1.1

            Regarding your 9-0 prediction … Bet you don’t get more than 8 justices reversing the CAFC this time.

            1. 2.1.2.1.1.1

              I think MM figures that whichever unqualified justice President Trump puts through the Senate will be seated by then.

              1. 2.1.2.1.1.1.1

                Mellow, qualifications of the candidates of the rival parties is hardly the issue, now is it?

                1. But I did not write anything about the qualifications of the parties’ candidates.

                  I don’t think there’s much to say in that regard in any event.

            2. 2.1.2.1.1.2

              Bet you don’t get more than 8 justices reversing the CAFC this time.

              There’s a good chance of that.

              Heck, as long as the Senate and the Presidency are controlled by different parties, we may never see a 9 member Supreme Court again. Thank you, GOP! Great work.

              P.S.: Justice Thomas called. He’s lonely.

          2. 2.1.2.1.2

            question because Congress put that exception squarely into the statute.

            Great.

            Now get to the different part of the statute under discussion here.

            (But your goalpost – moved as it is – sure is pretty in that other portion of the statute)

          3. 2.1.2.1.3

            term to be construed is “substantial portion of the components … where such components are uncombined”. Note the plural: components.

            Absolutely wrong on how to “construe” the statutory text.

            As previously explained – even with a case cite, and yet, the clench-tight eyes and misrepresentations continue unabated.

            Portion itself is a word of singular nature.

            That there are a plural of components is where the “emphasis” of plurality can be found.

            The notion of “substantiality” is just not constrained to a mindless mathematical “plurality.”

    2. 2.2

      Are people looking for the component itself to be the “inventive step” or some “Point of Novelty” of the larger invention as claimed…?

      Probably, in that if something was in generic commerce beforehand it was neither the intent nor within the patent power to remove it from commerce just because someone got a patent to some more limited system. If something was in use beforehand it necessarily cannot be a point of novelty, and vice-versa, so being a point of novelty is probably a requirement.

      As I understand this section of law, the component only has to be a component and any “description” in relation to the “inventiveness” or “gist” is just not there in the words of Congress.

      This doesn’t hold water. Congress put in a novelty and a non-obviousness requirement. If you’re manufacturing something that by itself wasn’t novel then Congress didn’t intend the person to recover for it, and (though I doubt you’d agree on this certainly-true point) Congress would have lacked the jurisdiction to issue the patent even if they wanted to.

      Regardless, there’s settled law on the issue – Anderson’s Black Rock specifically refutes the logic used in this case and Lincoln Engineering had the same principles.

      1. 2.2.1

        It certainly holds water:

        You are trying to apply the wrong section of law. No one is trying to apply 102/103 to the component. There simply is no legal requirement for that.

        1. 2.2.1.1

          No one is trying to apply 102/103 to the component. There simply is no legal requirement for that.

          Of course there is, if element A wouldn’t have been eligible (and thus find liability) on its own, it doesn’t make sense that adding non-inventive material suddenly makes element A on its own liability-incurring. That would cause claim liability to actually increase despite claim scope shrinking, pretty sure that’s the opposite of quid pro quo.

          So, for example, if you ship a general purpose computer you’re at risk for 271 liability to each and every software patent that is out there, is that what you’re suggesting? If not, what is it about the general purpose computer that distinguishes it from this case? The computer isn’t less novel or non-obvious than a piece of the kit. The computer is capable of the same general commerce value as a piece of the kit. What jury instruction prevents a jury from paralyzing the computer market by allowing every software patentee from suing with a colorable claim to a 271 violation?

          1. 2.2.1.1.1

            You are on the wrong section of law being discussed – the issue is simply not one of patentability.

            1. 2.2.1.1.1.1

              Point to where in the constitution you find support for Congress having the authority to protect pre-existing articles of commerce invented by others under the patent power

              1. 2.2.1.1.1.1.1

                In fact lets go even more basic – Give me a rational basis for upholding a law designed to promote the advancement of science when the application awards money to someone who did not invent the staple of commerce article being exported.

                1. Easy: to prevent the concerted actions abroad that would be deemed infringement if performed here.

                  You seem unable to get out of your own way.

                  Try reading my post at 5.3 and do not forget to include Ned’s reminder at 1.1.

                2. to prevent the concerted actions abroad that would be deemed infringement if performed here

                  LOL

                  It’s a staple item of commerce. You can’t use your country’s patent system to tell me what to do with a staple commodity in my own country if you don’t have a patent in my country.

                  So what’s being “prevented” again, in your fantasy world?

                  And please tell everyone in the US why they should be happy to have your version of the law applied everywhere, including to people in the US who are buying off-patent commodities made overseas and using them to practice inventions that are off-patent here. After all, “we the people” presumably chose to have this liability foisted on yourselves. Go ahead and explain why.

                  LOL

                3. You can’t use your country’s patent system to tell me what to do with a staple commodity in my own country if you don’t have a patent in my country.

                  Wrong – that is a direct loophole that Congress intended to close. You really do have to take the right statute (and not move the goalpost to (2)) and not close your eyes.

                  And speaking of moving goalposts (with a generous insertion of straw)…

                  and using them to practice inventions that are off-patent here.

                  Where did this “off-patent here” point come from? NO ONE is speaking of such.

                  After all, “we the people” presumably chose to have this liability foisted on yourselves. Go ahead and explain why.

                  Asked and answered Malcolm – there is a very direct tie back to this country that MUST be there in order to avoid the PURE extraterritoriality issue.

                  I have expounded on this point in great detail on the earlier linked threads.

                4. Random, I really like it when somebody gets down to the fundamentals. Doing this one begins to understand the problem.

              2. 2.2.1.1.1.1.2

                You are still not focusing on the section of law under discussion.

                Try this instead: for argument’s sake ONLY focus on 271, taking as given that all other sections of the law have been met.

                Doing this will help you achieve clarity to discuss the point of law actually on point here.

              3. 2.2.1.1.1.1.3

                Random, pre-existing articles invented by others? Do you think the Congress has the power to protect pre-existing anything not invented by the applicant?

          2. 2.2.1.1.2

            Random, should be the general purpose computer cannot be an infringement under the theory of the Federal Circuit. The seller here was selling to himself abroad and there completed the combination. Effectively, the seller was completing the entire combination, albeit, in two different locations.

  5. 1

    Jason Rantanen wrote this holding was “probably erroneous.”

    Indeed he did. It’s one of the most obviously erroneous decisions the Federal Circuit ever wrote. And the Supreme Court took the right question here. It’s an easy one and reversing the CAFC on that basis is all it takes to resolve the case.

    (And while we’re at it, let’s not forget that the Federal Circuit’s obviously erroneous decision was praised immediately after publication as a “tour de force” by the totally unbiased Hal Wegner.)

    1. 1.1

      MM: 271(f) (1) reads:

      “Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention, where such components are uncombined
      in whole or in part, in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.”

      The Feds held there was no question that the American had the specific intent to induce infringement — they were selling to a company they knew was putting the entire kit together. Since 271(f) (2) specifically requires that the components sold not be a staple, and because 271(f) (1) does not, it seems reasonable to conclude that the components sold do not have to be non-staples.

      Simple sales of commodity products abroad cannot cause liability under the statute. There has to be more than simply the sale of the component. The statute requires “in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such components.” Here the infringer knew and intended that the component be combined abroad in an infringing matter. What else must he have done to make him liable?

      So you down to whether one should be liable if one sells the most important component of the combination to the offshore “infringer” or must one also sell at least one more component, itself also a staple, where one specifically intends to induce infringement – “in such a manner” which is a material part of the statute in question.

      1. 1.1.1

        The singular/plural aspect disappears when one applies basic statutory construction principles.

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