Guest Post: Restoring “Causal Nexus”

Guest post by Bernard Chao

On September 17, 2015, the Federal Circuit issued another decision in the Apple v. Samsung smartphone war (summarized previously here). In the fourth court decision dealing with injunctions, Apple IV gave new guidance on the level of proof necessary to satisfy the “causal nexus” requirement. Although this requirement demands that patentees prove that the specific infringing feature cause irreparable harm, the majority opinion (by Judge Moore) observed that proving causation was “nearly impossible” in cases involving products with thousands of components. So the court watered down the causal nexus requirement by saying that it was enough for Apple to show the infringing features to be “important to product sales and that customers sought these features in the phones they purchase.” On October 19, 2015, Samsung filed a Petition for Rehearing en banc on this issue. Although I don’t agree with everything Samsung has to say about Apple’s injunction request, I do believe that the full Federal Circuit should revisit the decision and reinvigorate the “causal nexus” requirement.

As I argue in greater depth in my upcoming essay, Causation and Harm in a Multicomponent World
(forthcoming University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online), Apple IV is troubling on both doctrinal and theoretical grounds. On the doctrinal level, the decision fails to appreciate that most multicomponent technology products are made up of countless small advances, not a few far-reaching ones that change consumer preferences. Presumably, Apple chose its most valuable patents to assert against Samsung; but a review of the three Apple patents at issue show how minor the infringing features are — a conclusion that Chief Judge Prost’s dissent also made. If a powerhouse like Apple doesn’t have a pioneering patent to assert, there probably aren’t very many such patents out there. My point is that a single feature rarely, if ever, drives consumers from one technology-based product to another. Holding that causation is present for every important feature is therefore inconsistent with how consumers actually decide to buy multicomponent devices.

On a theoretical level, Apple IV reveals a deeper debate within patent law. Some view patents as a kind of traditional property that allows owners to do with it what they will. Others understand patent law to be focused on the public good. Reviewing Judge Moore’s majority opinion and Judge Reyna’s concurrence reveals that their willingness to accept less evidence of harm has been clouded by their view of patents as a form of traditional property. But this view of patents is wrong. The fundamental purpose underlying patent law is to promote innovation. To the extent that inventors receive financial rewards, it is simply a byproduct of encouraging innovation. This concept is rooted in the Constitution, which authorizes laws “to promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts . . .” Moreover, the Supreme Court has repeatedly sought to maximize innovation on behalf of the public when shaping various different patent doctrines. Most importantly, that is the view the Court took in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) when it held that patent owners no longer possess the automatic right to exclude others from infringing their patents. They must first satisfy eBay’s equitable four factor test. Of course, the first factor involves showing that the infringing feature actually caused irreparable harm.

In sum, there are both doctrinal and theoretical reasons for the full Federal Circuit to reconsider Apple IV and restore the “causal nexus” requirement so that patentees have to show real causation and harm. The failure to do so will allow patentees to use a permanent injunction (or the threat of one) to force an infringer to take a license at a rate that reflects the value of the injunction, which is often greater than the value of the patented feature. This is the kind of patent holdup that a prudent application of eBay helps avoid.

104 thoughts on “Guest Post: Restoring “Causal Nexus”

  1. 14

    NOT Sure why my comment is being DEL ET ED

    Dennis,

    I am sure Bernard Chao can defend himself. He is a big boy.

    ALL he has to do is say

    “I have been PAID by Samsung and Google X amounts of Dollars” over the last 5 years.

    As for the 2nd link : link to casetext.com

    it clearly says

    “The defendants nominate two candidates: (1) Professor Bernard Chao” ….
    It is also clearly stated that “defendant is Google and Samsung”

    Bernard Chao can also come out and say that “Chao Hadidi Stark & Barker LLP” has made money from Samsung and Google.

    Proper and honest Disclosure would give the readers the source of the bias I see in this anti-patent article.

    This is part of the Google PR machine to write one or two anti-patent pro Google / Samsung articles every week. Economist, NY times, WaPO, WSJ, other blogs.

    If anyone has experience in PR or has worked with PR agencies know what is happening here.

    This is all to make sure to influence the general public and the CAFC/Supreme / Congress for being against the patent system.

    ALL this is PR work is done is For CAFC/SCOTUS/Congress to feel that they are with the people .. PR firms do this and make 10 different authors write 10 different anti-patent articles every Q.

    PR agency deliverables for every Q are X number of articles generated Y number of views. So they can bill Google / Samsung for the PR/Lobbying work they did.

    Dennis I am pretty sure you are very intelligent person and you are not that incredulous to NOT see what is going on in the media with Google PR effort.

    All this is , is a Google / Samsung PR article to influence people who read your blog.

    1. 14.1

      I am sure Bernard Chao can defend himself. He is a big boy.

      I am sure too that any set of rules objectively and uniformly applied would have the same effect.

  2. 13

    I’d like to see a nexus between this article and reality. Anyone who as done real product design and marketing (and all those studies to try and figure out what people want) KNOWS that people don’t know why they do things. ANYONE that has remotely studied real product design and why people buy a product knows this.

    So, what does this mean—it means again we have an academic article that bears no nexus to real life. Why? Because, to get this “casual nexus” would mean we would have to know why someone bought something. And, we don’t know that. So, what have we done? We have substituted the fact that the product managers put the feature in the product to try and get people to buy it.

    Reality–not a fantasy world created by an academic to try to restrict patents.

    1. 13.1

      These “academic” articles are like a game of where’s Waldo, but instead of Waldo it should be titled, “Where the fallacy?”

      It is just shameful that professors will not engage in real debate. I’d like to see the good professor substantively address my comment.

    2. 13.2

      And furthermore, wow (!), what nonsense. Did the professor bother to get any idea how real product development is done? I’ve done this for multi-billion dollar products. These things are made by multi-billion dollar factories. I’ve decided what features are going into products where 10’s of millions of them are made. Features selected carefully because of the costs and desire to satisfy people and get them to buy the product.

      So, here we have a giant process in place to select the features by parties that are directly affected by the decisions to include the features or not. And, people are unreliable as to why they did something. It is psychology 101, that when you do studies and ask, “why did you buy that?” that you cannot trust their answer. EVERYONE knows that that works in this area.

      It is stunning how bad these papers are.

      1. 13.2.1

        When there is a product with a thousand features, I doubt any one feature (well, there are some big ones, I’ll admit) actually contributed to a person’s decision to buy the object, rather it was a combination of features. In your vast experience, how did you assign a value to each feature that was proposed to be included?

        1. 13.2.1.1

          OSita,

          Your post is actually a point against the thrust of the article.

          For some reason, there is an inherent bias against patents that are on “small” things**

          **small here being a relative term, coincident with a “larger” item of commerce that may have a number of these “small” things within it.

          Since the patent right is not – in fact – a “positive” right, this form of innate bias is especially pernicious.

        2. 13.2.1.2

          Squirrel, I didn’t say I had vast experience doing this. I have real experience doing this and have done it for real.

          You are trying to simplify it. It isn’t simple. The point is that the decisions of the product managers is a very good substitute for the buying decision.

        3. 13.2.1.3

          ordinary squirrel, the demand for a particular feature in a smart phone may be relevant to how valuable that feature is the overall phone sets that a royalty can be properly adjusted on the price of the phone, but we are talking here about “irreparable harm” not about reasonable royalty.

          The Supreme Court even recognize that with a patent that damages are not adequate because of the ongoing nature of the tort. Because the patent owner has no obligation to license is patent in the United States, he almost has a right to an injunction except under limited circumstances where that would be against the public interest. Even eBay can be cited for this proposition

    1. 12.1

      Why in the world is the Federal Circuit once again loading up an equitable doctrine that requires the balancing of equities with per se, legal, rules?

  3. 11

    This is a fundamental and critical error:

    failure to do so will allow patentees to use a permanent injunction (or the threat of one) to force an infringer to take a license at a rate that reflects the value of the injunction, which is often greater than the value of the patented feature.

    This completely misses the nature of the patent right: a negative right.

    Chao should know better.

    1. 11.1

      Anon, completely correct. The statement assumes that the infringer has a right to continue to infringe or has a right to a license at a royalty that it chooses.

      The way infringers can avoid being put into the situation in the first place is to conduct clearance studies before they place a product into the public domain. Otherwise, they claim a right to put products on the market without regard to the patent rights of others and to use their disregard of other people’s property rights as the reason for their right to continue to infringe or to obtain a license at a royalty they choose.

      1. 11.1.1

        There are not enough patent attorneys employed full time in the U.S. with a EE/CPE/CS background to do an adequate clearance study on all of the devices being manufactured. Your bar is in fact the impossible.

        On the subject of royalties, you should get what your patent is worth, which, in the aggregate, is very little in a device that is covered by hundreds, if not thousands, of patents (granted, there are some technologies that are more valuable than others). Likely, a small software feature is worth next to nothing (maybe 100 million time next to nothing is $10,000).

        1. 11.1.1.2

          Ordinary Squirrel — really? How so? Take a computer. It has parts X, Y and Z. The computer company does not make X, Y or Z. So it relies on indemnity. It only has to focus on combinations of X, Y or Z.

          Same could be said of manufacturers of X, Y or Z. And so on and so.

          It is amazing how the infringer lobby likes pretend that clearance studies are literally impossible when they are not.

          1. 11.1.1.2.1

            I think that is a terrible example. In a smart phone, we are talking about hardware and software that potentially implicate thousands of patents. Between the unindexible nature of software-based patents, the lack of a standardized vocabulary, vagueness, and the DOE, skilled judgment is needed to find and evaluate patents. That is why patent attorneys get paid the big bucks. However, these issues also mean that you can only reduce your level of risk, you cannot eliminate it. At some point, someone has to decide what level of risk the company is comfortable with. There will always be risk that you didn’t find every applicable patent or that the court will disagree with your judgment or take an odd turn in claim construction.

            Are clearance studies useful? Yes. Are they a panacea? No. Will they stop you from infringing a patent? Probably not, though they will reduce the likelihood that you will.

              1. 11.1.1.2.1.1.1

                Once again, you show up and entirely miss the point with you asinine one liners. Ned and I are having an interesting conversation to which you add absolutely nothing.

                1. I missed no point, squirrel, as my “one-liner” is directly on point to your rather myopic views.

                  You are always free to contact Ned privately if you want a solo conversation. This is, after all, a public forum you are using.

            1. 11.1.1.2.1.2

              Unindexable?

              This sentiment illustrates part of the problem of patenting software in the abstract as opposed to improvements to specific machines, processes, manufactures and compositions.

              May I suggest to the PTO that they impose a rule that requires a statement of what machines, processes, manufactures or compositions are being improved that the application might be better indexed and searched?

              If the applicant only says computers, the office should not examine the patent until something more specific is filed by the applicant.

      2. 11.1.2

        This seems unrealistic for a smart phone since a smart phone is also a general purpose computer. There are 1, 347, 348 patents containing the word ‘computer’.

        Results of Search in US Patent Collection db for:
        computer: 1347348 patents.
        Hits 1 through 50 out of 1347348

        1. 11.1.2.1

          /., who makes the processor in a smartphone? I assume any processor manufacturer can focus in on processor architecture patents to find possible infringements. Is this all that hard? If they buy processors from other people, they can rely on indemnity.

          1. 11.1.2.1.1

            There 668,8333 patents containing ‘computer’ and ‘processor’, which leaves 600,000 odd to check to see if your particular combination of components is infringing. Plus the processor manufactuer’s legal department may balk at an indemnity query with 668,833 items in it…

            1. 11.1.2.1.1.1

              What exactly is a “gen eral purpose computer” …?

              Maybe the smart phone (with software) no longer is such a thing… (See Alappat).

              Especially considering that a “smart phone” works equally as well without the particular added manufactures and machine components known as software as at issue in the present case, and those manufactures certainly are not “already in there” in the understanding of the patent doctrine of inherency.

            2. 11.1.2.1.1.2

              /., I am sure you are aware that for a very long time people patenting business methods and the like have been able to get patents through the patent office simply by including in their claims the words “computer implemented” or the like? These claims have little to do with computer architecture which are properly classified in particular classifications within the patent office. Undoubtedly a competent patent attorney could figure this out.

              1. 11.1.2.1.1.2.1

                simply adding in” sounds like a mere aggregation attempts….

                Or are you discounting (again) the full treatment of law under the exceptions to the judicial doctrine of printed matter?

  4. 10

    Bernard Chao is a PAID hack of Samsung and Google! and is part of the Anti-Patent narrative team.

    It would be good for Bernard Chao to make a public financial disclosure of HOW Much money has he made from Samsung/Google over the last 5 years.

    Anything and Everything he says or writes on Patent Policy has to looked through the prism of Samsumg/Anti-patent bias.

    Here is a link to the “Conference | Samsung-Stanford Conference on Patent Enforcement”

    link to youtube.com

    Google has hired him multiple times as an Expert

    Example Link
    link to casetext.com

    He is close to Michell Lee the USPTO / Google appointed paid hack in government

    Google and Samsung PAID hack and now writing hit pieces on this blog , without any disclosure.

    If it is not kosher for Pump and dump financial annalist to tout a stock / point of view without disclosure .. It should not the legitimate for Bernard Chao.

    1. 10.1

      Brian, the corruption apace in here is obvious for all to see. Chao cites to eBay as if it was all about establishing irreparable harm when, according to its citation to Continental Paper Bag and according to Roberts, that was all but established simply by the fact that damages can never be adequate in face of an ongoing tort and in view of the exclusive rights provided by a patent. The patentee has a right to not license.

      The problems that arise are because of the potential harm to the public, cited by the court in its reference to Roche, and because of the potential of significant harm to the infringer by removing one component of a larger device — assuming that there was no deliberate piracy in the first place, which there was here.

        1. 10.1.1.1

          MM, copying code? No. Copying popular features? Yes. That is why Jobs ordered the hit in the first place.

    2. 10.2

      the Anti-Patent narrative team.

      LOL. Reminds me: when are the new uniforms coming?

      Bernard Chao is a PAID hack of Samsung and Google

      And you …. why, you must be a paid hack for Apple! Or whoever is on the opposite team. Or something.

      1. 10.2.1

        Bottom line Malcolm is that there is in fact organized activity against patents.

        Quite in fact (since you love that term), there are more than one such group of organizations. And these organizations have different motives for their similar desired ends.

        No amount of inconsequential f1uff from you can change that reality.

        One of your short script retorts is the “born yesterday” meme – here, you employ that which you are so fond of accusing others of.

        1. 10.2.1.1

          there is in fact organized activity against patents

          Oh noes! Beware organized activity!

          Maybe when the More Patents Easier To Enforce All The Time Legion of Superheroes gets organized they can do battle.

          1. 10.2.1.1.1

            Oh noes – beware “functionality” (otherwise known as utility, which – by the by – every patent has).

            Funny that – the four categories still seem to be the law (as written by Congress)

    3. 10.3

      Brian – thank you for this information. Chao and Dennis should disclose, on this blog and up front, that Chao is/was a paid expert for a party that is the very subject of his article. Complete garbage!

      1. 10.3.1

        Chao is/was a paid expert for a party that is the very subject of his article. Complete garbage!

        Remember when “i invented that ” and “brian smith” went crrrrraaazzzy over the many strange articles that were posted here by directly invested inventors and law firm partners “explaining” why Prometheus just had to be allowed to sue people who thought something non-obvious about data obtained from a public domain data-gathering method? Because “that’s what obviousness is for” (or something like that)?

        Me neither. Imagine all the fascinating damages/injunction scenarios we’d be discussing now had the “no dissection” folks gotten their way.

        1. 10.3.1.1

          You do realize that the Claim as A WHole still is the controlling law, right?

          Your little pet theory only boils down to the b@nal “no mere aggregations.”

        2. 10.3.1.2

          Nice try MM! I’ve never commented on Prometheus on this blog, so you can’t possibly know my view on that topic. You’re just still sore that you were called out on 101/Alice and still are unable to provide an actual example of a claim that IS patentable. Back to the issue at hand, I believe that anyone that posts an article on this blog that is paid by a party discussed in the article should disclose that fact to the readers, regardless of their opinion one way or another. I have no idea whether Chao is in-fact paid by Samsung, which is why I thought he should set the record straight.

    4. 10.4

      Brian – I would normally delete this type of comment b/c it is so off the mark, but I thought I would respond here.

      1) The “hack” claim seems only pejorative without any direct substance.
      2) I also attended the Stanford Conference – Samsung did apparently pay Stanford to put its brand on the conference, but none of us attendees received any money other than reimbursement, and that was paid by stanford law school and only for actual travel expenses.
      3) Regarding the Google case, The link that you suggested involved Prof Chao being appointed by the court as a special master under R.53 — i.e., the Judge decided that Chao, based upon his record, should be relied upon as an impartial expert decision maker. He was also appointed a special master in the Katz litigation. This is totally different from serving as an expert witness.

      That said Prof Chao does maintain a legal practice at the firm he founded Chao Hadidi Stark & Barker LLP.

      1. 10.4.1

        A purely objective (and true) observation is again censored.

        Truth hurts – and persists even if the post is deleted. In fact, deleting such posts only confirms that which you find so “inconvenient.”

      2. 10.4.2

        Dennis,

        I am sure Bernard Chao can defend himself. He is a big boy.

        ALL he has to do is say

        “I have been PAID by Samsung and Google X amounts of Dollars” over the last 5 years.

        As for the 2nd link : link to casetext.com

        it clearly says

        “The defendants nominate two candidates: (1) Professor Bernard Chao” ….
        It is also clearly stated that “defendant is Google and Samsung”

        Bernard Chao can also come out and say that “Chao Hadidi Stark & Barker LLP” has made money from Samsung and Google.

        Proper and honest Disclosure would give the readers the source of the bias I see in this anti-patent article.

        This is part of the Google PR machine to write one or two anti-patent pro Google / Samsung articles every week. Economist, NY times, WaPO, WSJ, other blogs.

        If anyone has experience in PR or has worked with PR agencies know what is happening here.

        This is all to make sure to influence the general public and the CAFC/Supreme / Congress for being against the patent system.

        ALL this is PR work is done is For CAFC/SCOTUS/Congress to feel that they are with the people .. PR firms do this and make 10 different authors write 10 different anti-patent articles every Q.

        PR agency deliverables for every Q are X number of articles generated Y number of views. So they can bill Google / Samsung for the PR/Lobbying work they did.

        Dennis I am pretty sure you are very intelligent person and you are not that incredulous to NOT see what is going on in the media with Google PR effort.

        All this is , is a Google / Samsung PR article to influence people who read your blog.

      1. 10.5.1

        OSita,

        Your post only exemplifies your own lack of knowledge in the art of rhetoric.

        It is simply an ig norant fallacy to so attempt to classify all ad hominem so.

        1. 10.5.1.1

          Further,

          Your post also misses the distinction that I have provided that I engage with law and facts as well as “fight fire with fire.”

          Pay attention son.

          1. 10.5.1.1.1

            Haha. I think we have been over this in other threads before that I reject the notion that ad hominem attacks are valid part of the art of rhetoric. Nothing you have said thus far has swayed me from that position.

            1. 10.5.1.1.1.1

              It is a good thing then that you do not define what is included in the art of rhetoric.

              In the mean time, enjoy your self-imposed ig norance.

  5. 9

    A critique of Prof. Chao’s paper, referring to the Apple IV decision. Sorry for the length.

    “This lower standard is an ill-advised mistake that leaves multicomponent product manufacturers more susceptible to patent holdup,” at page 1. Let’s see how this works.

    “First, let’s consider the three Apple patents. Presumably, Apple selected some of its most valuable patents to assert against Samsung. But a review of these patents show that they cover surprisingly minor features,” at page 8. Which are easily designed around, he says, so no problem there.

    “It fails to appreciate that even those most innovative technology products are made up of countless small advances, not a few pioneering ones,” at page 9. Granted.

    “In Apple IV, Apple only asked for an injunction ordering Samsung to remove the accused features. … Because Samsung can remove the infringing features – apparently in just one month – its switching costs appear to be minimal…. In sum, Apple’s injunction will not result in patent holdup,” at Page 14. So, no problem there. But there could be later, he says.

    “For example, if the owner of one of the copious number of patents essential to the WCDMA standard were to bring suit against a smartphone company, an injunction will effectively prevent the sale of the entire smartphone,” id. True, but there is no mention of the FRAND agreements.

    “We can reimagine Apple’s suit as involving a feature in a microprocessor found in Samsung’s smartphones. Perhaps, the feature reduces battery drain. …The cost of redesigning a chip or moving to a different one is likely to be significantly higher than the value of the feature itself,” at page 15. Just a minute, if this is a “small advance,” it means there is an existing chip that lacks this feature. Source that one instead.

    What about the patent on the spark plug that goes into the equipment that mines the bauxite that makes the patented aluminum alloy that goes into the smartphone case? Patent exhaustion solves that and, I’d bet, most multicomponent problems.

    1. 9.1

      Troubled, do you agree or disagree that absent some overriding issue involving public rights that Samsung does not have a right to continue to infringe and does not have a right to a license.

      1. 9.1.1

        Clearly Roberts, Scalia and Ginsburg (concurring in eBay) believed the irreparable harm was cause by the nature of the right —

        “From at least the early 19th century, courts have granted injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement in the vast majority of patent cases. This “long tradition of equity practice” is not surprising, given the difficulty of protecting a right to exclude through monetary remedies that allow an infringer to use an invention against the patentee’s wishes— a difficulty that often implicates the first two factors of the traditional four-factor test. This historical practice, as the Court holds, does not entitle a patentee to a permanent injunction or justify a general rule that such injunctions should issue. ”

        The Roberts then cited to Roche that suggested that public interest factors might weigh in — as did the Supreme Court itself said in Continental Paper Bag. But nowhere in eBay did the court suggest that irreparable harm could be demonstrated by anything else that a violation of the exclusive right. It was the OTHER factors, other than irreparable harm, that might weigh in to permit a court to do something else than issue an injunction.

      2. 9.1.2

        Kennedy himself spoke of the potential harm to the infringer of an injunction as to why an injunction might not issue.

        “When the patented invention is but a small component of the product the companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not serve the public interest.”

        This again points to the harm to the infringer and the public interest. But, even as we see here in Samsung, as was in the earlier i4i case, redesign time and a temporary license may be enough to alleviate the harm.

        Besides, it is not that the patentee is willing to license his patents, it is the price he is willing to accept that is important — else he remains an unwilling licensee.

        1. 9.1.2.1

          That is the whole point. Before infringement, a licensee must determine how much value the invention would add. An injunction to desist would restore the status quo ante (almost). Somehow, this is unfair because of the infringer’s sunk cost and public reliance on the invention. If so, we are now stuck with a hypothetical negotiation which includes, inter alia, consumer surveys to determine what part of the sales price is due to the patented feature. To me, it looks like a can of worms. One that Apple/Samsung may be able to afford, but I fear that SME’s will be ground into the dirt.

          1. 9.1.2.1.1

            Troubled, there is something radically wrong with “before the infringement” determination of a RR if the patentee has the absolute right not to license at all unless he receives his price. If the patentee has an establish licensing program, and is willing to offer all comers a license at X, then X should be the RR.

            But, if the infringer forces litigation rather than paying X, his damages need to be radically enhanced — trebled. Only then should the court allow the infringer to continue with royalty X.

      3. 9.1.3

        Ned,

        Of course, Samsung has no right under the patent laws, but the issue is, what is the remedy. My comment above was directed to the horror-of-horrors argument that modern multicomponent items make (although not stated as such) remedies with teeth for patentees too difficult.

        1. 9.1.3.1

          Troubled, assume Samsung cannot design out an Apple patent from its phones at all. Rather it must cease being in the phone market entirely.

          Now, I would suggest that such a patent is essential for a phone.

          But, if it can easily be designed out, do so.

          Alternatively, let Samsung ask Apple for a license. Fat chance there.

    2. 9.2

      Also, the notion of “holdup” goes to the harm to the infringer, not to the harm to the patent owner.

      Here, Samsung admitted it would suffer virtually no harm at all if it were required to remove the infringing features.

      So, where in the world does it claim a legal right to continue to infringe?

      1. 9.2.1

        Further, I think eBay pointed out that an injunction should not automatically issue because the infringer might point to the significant damage it might be caused in doing so. Accommodations might be made to allow a transition; but the focus on irreparable harm should be on the exclusive right granted the patentee, just as stated by the Supreme Court.

        The Federal Circuit is lost in the weeds once again.

      2. 9.2.2

        where in the world does it claim a legal right to continue to infringe?

        Pretty sure you can trace this all back to the incredible mind-numbing st00pidity of the patent claims in questiom.

        1. 9.2.2.1

          MM, Apple’s inventions may be minor, or borderline obvious, but that does not mean that Samsung has a right to continue to use them unless they can show significant harm in their removal from their product, assuming they were not put there by an act of deliberate piracy in the first place, which they were, in point of fact, in this case, and unless the public interest will be harmed by their removal — hah, hah to that one, right?

          My principal objection with the Federal Circuit jurisprudence here is that harm to Apple is the violation of its exclusive right — not to some business interest. The Federal Circuit has marched patent law off the cliff once again.

          Apple has a absolute right to insist that Samsung discontinue infringement which should only be denied if Samsung would collaterally damaged to a significant degree and/or the public would be harmed.

          1. 9.2.2.1.1

            MM, Apple’s inventions may be minor, or borderline obvious,

            They’re much worse than that, of course. If only they were merely “obvious” or “minor”!

            This is what happens when the Patent Office, with the assistance of a short-sighted appellate court who believed its role was to serve “the stakeholders” at the expense of the public, opens the gates to the patenting of information and logic (including software).

            eBay was just the tip of the iceberg of what is and will continue to be necessary to deal with the cr pst0rm that was unleashed (and which is still being perpetuated). There’s more to come. If this rankles some, then I have another solution which will simplify things. Ask me about it.

            1. 9.2.2.1.1.1

              ^^* the blight of the loathsome diatribe continues…

              Pick a post – quite literally almost ANY post, and you can find this blight.

              What does that tell you all?

            2. 9.2.2.1.1.2

              MM, if the patent is found valid and infringed, we move beyond junk, do we not?

              The problem of course is that the Federal Circuit for too long was not enforcing 101, deeming the mere mention in the claim of a computer sufficient.

        2. 9.2.2.2

          You are – or should be – aware that the legal point under discussion is NOT tied to the specifics of the particular claim presented, right?

          Please kick up dust elsewhere.

  6. 7

    I disagree with Prof. Chao’s post.

    First off, let’s examine the scope of the injunctive relief Apple sought: an injunction on using the claimed product feature that also gave Samsung time to initiate a design-around. Samsung claimed during the litigation that it could easily (and apparently did) design around the infringing product feature. So, on that premise alone, I’m not seeing the “hold up” claimed by Prof. Chao, as the injunctive relief only applied to implementing the feature, not the sales of an entire class of product.

    Secondly, Prof. Chao is essentially advocating for compulsory licensing on all patents that are not directed to market essential patents.

    From a theoretical standpoint, if I invent a patentable product feature, incorporate it into my product and believe it is important to consumer purchasing decisions (but can’t definitively prove it), why should I face competition in the market from a product that incorporates that feature?

    I don’t understand how “causal nexus” affects the analysis. If I can prove a causal nexus under the standard Prof. Chao advocates, I basically have a “market essential” or extremely important patent. In that instance, the harm of an injunction to the alleged infringer (and the market at large) is potentially greater. Yet, Prof. Chao would apparently condone an injunction in that instance. If I can’t prove a causal nexus (or if none exists), then the patented feature is competitively less significant (apparently) and the harm of an injunction is less.

    Lastly, I don’t understand how the result of this case would impede innovation—in other words, allowing operating companies to protect (and keep its competitors away from) novel, important product features. After all, why go through all of this R&D to improve your product (which typically results in incremental advances), if your competitors can simply copy the features. Does that not harm innovation by decreasing the incentive to improve your product?

    1. 7.1

      I agree. It seems to me that the defendant should have the burden to prove what the consumer values or does not value in order to avoid an injunction, since the Constitution by its plain language grants an “exclusive right”. It is the defendant that is asking for an exception to or exemption from this default position, and should therefore have the burden of proof and persuasion.

      1. 7.1.1

        There is something fundamentally flawed in the whole concept of “casual nexus.” it is inconsistent, for one, with eBay that flatly rejected the notion that the only kind of irreparable harm was to one’s own business.

    2. 7.2

      I don’t want to respond to every comment that pops up because I think the underlying essay may answer some of the questions brought up here. In short, I am sympathetic to those that don’t have a problem with this injunction, but the analysis that gets us there will be prove troublesome later.

      1. 7.2.1

        Prof. Chao:

        I read your essay. It did change (ever so slightly) the way I think about this issue, but ultimately did not persuade me to your position.

        I think I understand your premise though. If harm = lost sales, then we need a sufficient nexus between the infringement and the lost sales. Otherwise, low value patents could be used to hold up innovators if they can be classified as “important to the purchasing decision.”

        I guess some of our differences stem from my view that patent infringement is a property right and the infringement itself can be a sufficient harm (especially to operating companies) to justify an injunction. I also believe that the relaxed standard achieves a better balance.

        I don’t think your examples support your thesis very well and ignores other examples where the harm is more palpable. Furthermore, in my view, the examples in your essay would likely fail under the CAFC’s relaxed causal nexus standard. In other words, the CAFC’s newer, relaxed standard still has teeth that most patents will likely not meet.

        As for your CDMA patent example, the patents are typically directed to some minor aspect of the standard (from which many non-infringing options were available) and will rarely be important to the purchasing decision—such a patent would have to be fundamental (example, the Raleigh OFDM patents) to get close to satisfying even the courts relaxed causal nexus standard. In other words, to borrow from the damages analysis in this space, a patent is not valued in the damages realm for its standards compliance (which is important to a purchase decision), but for its inherent advantages and importance to the standard (typically unimportant to the purchasing decision). Second, most CDMA patents have RAND commitments that basically take away injunctions for other reasons. Third, other injunctive relief factors could come into play to filter out bad results that might get thru—in other words, we may not need a stricter “causal nexus” standard to guard against the harms you mention.

        As for your processor power saving example, let me first point out that a particular implementation patent will have to be fundamental to a particular technology in the semiconductor space just to justify the cost and expense of determining whether infringement exists at all. Secondly (and more importantly), your analysis conflates the result (power savings) with what the invention is (a particular way of implementing a processor that consumes less power). If there are practical non-infringing alternatives that perform as well, then the patented invention will likely fail the relaxed causal nexus test. The result might be important to the purchasing decision, but not the how. If, however, the patented invention represents the only practical way to achieve power savings, then I have little problem with enforcing the injunction as the invention is likely not so minor after all.

        Lastly, where I find your position least satisfying (given my viewpoint) is where the patented invention is a consumer-facing product feature. From a business standpoint, businesses do not file patents merely to join some compulsory licensing scheme. If I owned a car company and were the first to invent the cup holder, I would expect my patent to keep other car companies from making cars with cup holders. Period. It might be important to the decision or not. Who cares. I invented it and it’s mine. I should enjoy the fruits of my invention even if I can not satisfy my legal burden to prove some form of causal nexus.

        In sum, I begrudgingly recognize that there may be instances where it may not be prudent to grant injunctions even when narrowly tailored to particular features. I don’t think a strict causal nexus standard achieves the appropriate balance between patents as property rights and downstream effects on innovation (which cuts both ways).

      2. 7.2.2

        Mr. Chao, do you care to respond to Brian’s comment that you were or are, in-fact, paid as an expert for Samsung, the same Samsung in your article?

        1. 7.2.2.1

          Prof. Chap has quite the history of “re-conceptualizing” what patent law actually is.

          A more straightforward position clarifying this should be a MINIMUM requirement.

        2. 7.2.2.2

          I don’t pretend to have read all the comments, but I have read many and appreciate the vibrant discussion here. I understand but disagree with many who think patents should have an presumptive right to exclude. I think that is bad policy and not the law. As for accusations that I am paid hack,those are the comments of someone unwilling to confront arguments on the merits. I have not been paid by anyone for this essay or any of my other publications. The beauty of being a professor is that I am free to write what I think without offending any clients.

          1. 7.2.2.2.1

            I understand but disagree with many who think patents should have an presumptive right to exclude. I think that is bad policy and not the law.

            As I stated: “re-conceptualize”

          2. 7.2.2.2.2

            The beauty of being a professor is that I am free to write what I think without offending any clients.

            That clearly misses the point.

            “Free to write” is NOT driven by any such “fear of offending clients” when it comes to writing fully and accurately about the law, what the law IS, and the distinctions made clearly about what you may instead simply WANT the law to be.

            Attorneys are NOT free to bend and mishape the law as they “want.”

            Teachers of attorneys should be held to an even more strict accord.

            There is NOTHING wrong with enunciating different views (or having different “ends”).

            There is EVERYTHING wrong in obfuscating what IS based on those desired different “ends” – no matter (and in fact, especially) how strong one’s personal Beliebs are.

    3. 7.3

      P Profhet: “Secondly, Prof. Chao is essentially advocating for compulsory licensing on all patents that are not directed to market essential patents.”

      Shouldn’t that read,

      “Secondly, Prof. Chao is essentially advocating for compulsory licensing on all patents…”

      He seems to be arguing that injunctions are available only for protecting business investments in marketing patented products. But that view was soundly dismissed in eBay itself.

      Where the infringer refuses to stop infringing, an injunction must issue unless the public interest is involved. There is no right to infringe. There is no right to a compulsory license.

    4. 7.4

      novel, important product features

      Was there a “novel imporant feature” at issue in this case?

      If so, I missed it. Remind me again what was the “novel important feature” of this previously existing portable device that carries information and is accessible via a touch-sensitive screen displaying virtual information to a user? What was this “new feature” that was so incredibly important that the PTO and the courts just couldn’t help but genuflect before it and it’s “inventors”?

  7. 5

    Regarding “irreparable harm,” equity has always granted injunctions where a tort is ongoing and being repeated, as in a nuisance.

    “From the character of the right of the patentee we may judge of his remedies. It hardly needs to be pointed out that the right can only retain its attribute of exclusiveness by a prevention of its violation. Anything but prevention takes away the privilege which the law confers upon the patentee. If the conception of the law that a judgment in an action at law is reparation for the trespass, it is only for the particular trespass that is the ground of the action. There may be other trespasses and continuing wrongs and the vexation of many actions. These are well-recognized grounds of equity jurisdiction, especially in patent cases, and a citation of cases is unnecessary.”

    Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 US 405 – Supreme Court 1908 link to scholar.google.com

    Continental Paper Bag was cited by eBay in discussing its heavy criticism of the district court’s denial of an injunction because the patentee was not making a product.

    1. 5.1

      Professor, so long as the scope of the injunction is limited to the claimed invention (and not to the product as a whole) where is the harm to the infringer? There is no right to infringe. None. Second, there is no right to a license. None. See, eBay on that.

      If one denies Apple an injunction, they can renew their suit against subsequent Samsung products, but this time with Samsung being a willful infringer. Willful infringement alone justifies an injunction. See, i4i v. Microsoft.

      I don’t see why the court should wait for the second suit. Simply impose the injunction now.

      1. 5.1.1

        There is no right to infringe. None. Second, there is no right to a license. None. See, eBay on that.

        That doesn’t entirely square with my (sometimes mistaken) memory. Microsoft was able to infringe in Motorola v Microsoft and Apple’s ITC import ban was removed by Obama’s office. Whilst there is no “right to infringe”, sometimes infringers are allowed to.

        1. 5.1.1.1

          bert, I recall. FUBAR, in my view. This is not caused by eBay, but by the Federal Circuit ignoring eBay.

  8. 4

    “Reviewing Judge Moore’s majority opinion and Judge Reyna’s concurrence reveals that their willingness to accept less evidence of harm has been clouded by their view of patents as a form of traditional property. But this view of patents is wrong.”

    With all due respect, Professor Chao’s view of patents as not being “a form of traditional property” is wrong. Did he bother to consider 35 USC 261 which says: “patents shall have the attributes of personal property”?

    1. 4.1

      Doesn’t 35 USC 261 exist precisely because Professor Chao’s view of patents as not being “a form of traditional property” is correct?

      1. 4.1.1

        DanH,

        Not all. What 35 USC 261 does is confirm that patents should be treated as “personal property,” not some other form of property such as “real property.” Patents being “property” has been true since at least the 18th Century: “Influenced by the philosophy of John Locke, the granting of patents began to be viewed as a form of intellectual property right, rather than simply the obtaining of economic privilege.”

        1. 4.1.1.1

          Cue the “how can a personal property be a ‘public right’” question…

          Ned, you want to address that?

          1. 4.1.1.2.1

            Ned,

            You’re misreading what the Horne case said:

            “Nothing in this history suggests that personal property was any less protected against physical appropriation than real property.”

            Horne didn’t say that patents were accorded the same protection as real property, but that personal property (which patents are) would be accorded the same protection as real property for the purposes of the Taking Clause of the 5th Amendment.

            1. 4.1.1.2.1.1

              Except that the Supremes keep changing the rules for interpreting 101 such that what you thought was valid property is no longer valid property.

        2. 4.1.1.3

          EG, the Supreme Court went through this argument you make here in United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 128 US 315 – Supreme Court 1888 link to scholar.google.com

          “Accordingly, the defendant objects, that the
          appropriate remedy, if any exists, is in the common-law courts, and not in a court of equity, and that in the ancient proceedings of our English ancestors, in regard to patents, the only remedy for relief against them, when they were improvidently issued, was by a scire facias in the name of the king, or by his express and personal revocation of them.

          Charters and patents authenticating grants of personal privileges were in the earlier days of the English government made by the crown. They were supposed to emanate directly from the king, and were not issued under any authority given by acts of Parliament, nor were they regulated by any statutes. Being, therefore, in their origin an exercise of his personal prerogative, the power of revoking them, so far as they could be revoked at all, was in the king, and was exercised by him as a personal privilege. This mode of revoking patents, however, seems to have fallen into disuse; and the same end was attained by the issue of writs of scire facias, in the name of the king, to show cause why the patents should not be repealed or revoked. These were, of course, returnable into some court; and it appears to have been the practice to do this in the Court of King’s Bench, or in the Court of Chancery, where the record of the patent always remained in what was called the petty bag office.

          But whatever may have been the course of procedure usual or requisite in the English jurisprudence, to enable the king to repeal, revoke or nullify his own patents, issued under his prerogative right, it can have but little force in limiting or restricting the measures by which the government of the United States shall have a remedy for an imposition upon it or its officers in the procurement or issue of a patent. We have no king in this country; we have here no prerogative right of the crown; and letters patent, whether for inventions or for grants of land, issue not from the President but from the United States. The President has no prerogative in the matter. He has no right to issue a patent, and, though it is the custom for patents for lands to be signed by him, they are of no avail until the proper seal of the government is affixed to them.

          The patent, then, is not the exercise of any prerogative power or discretion by the President or by any other officer of the government, but it is the result of a course of proceeding, quasi judicial in its character, and is not subject to be repealed or revoked by the President, the Secretary of the Interior, or the Commissioner of Patents, when once issued. See United States v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378.

          From Schurz …

          “… the possession of the patent as his property, and it was the plain duty of the Secretary to deliver it to him when demanded, then, under all the authorities, and especially the decisions of this court, he is entitled to the remedy he asks. From the case of Marbury v. Madison (1 Cranch, 137), down to the present time, such has been the settled doctrine of this court. And though it may be said that the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in that case was not necessary to the decision made, which was that this court had no original jurisdiction in that case, the principles of the opinion have since been repeatedly recognized and acted upon in this court, and the case cited with approval in its definition of the circumstances under which persons holding public offices will be compelled to perform certain duties which are merely ministerial…” United States v. Schurz, 102 US 378, 394-395 – Supreme Court 1880 link to scholar.google.com

  9. 3

    Dennis

    A couple of thoughts:

    1) I think the definition of “irreparable harm” cannot be straightjacketed into the “causal nexus” test – this is way too narrow, and ignores things such as Samsung’s continuing behavior in repeatedly knocking off Apple features based on efficient infringement calculus – IMO, given a Defendant’s historical behavior, a Court can easily consider this factor as part of “principles of equity” and prevent the IP abuser from continuing their plan;

    2) I see your point about the difference in the “value” of the injunction vs the “value” of the invention; but, again, that’s a calculus that the Defendant willingly takes, so they assume the risk on that one… also, if a feature really is as “trivial” as a Defendant makes it out to be, then the burden on them to remove it is small, and does not outweigh the benefit of the exclusion right granted lawfully to the Plaintiff

    regards!

    1. 3.1

      Thanks J. – First note that it is Prof Chao’s article.

      I agree with you regarding the potentially broader-scope of irreparable harm. In addition, you might consider a situation where a defendant intentionally designed a product that intermingled components so that a more narrow injunction would be difficult.

    2. 3.2

      From eBay:

      “[T]he District Court recited the traditional four-factor test, 275 F. Supp. 2d, at 711, it appeared to adopt certain expansive principles suggesting that injunctive relief could not issue in a broad swath of cases. Most notably, it concluded that a “plaintiff’s willingness to license its patents” and “its lack of commercial activity in practicing the patents” would be sufficient to establish that the patent holder would not suffer irreparable harm if an injunction did not issue. Id., at 712. But traditional equitable principles do not permit such broad classifications.

      To the extent that the District Court adopted such a categorical rule, then, its analysis cannot be squared with the principles of equity adopted by Congress. The court’s categorical rule is also in tension with Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U. S. 405, 422-430 (1908), which rejected the contention that a court of equity has no jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief to a patent holder who has unreasonably declined to use the patent.”

      From Continental:

      “From the character of the right of the patentee we may judge of his remedies. It hardly needs to be pointed out that the right can only retain its attribute of exclusiveness by a prevention of its violation. Anything but prevention takes away the privilege which the law confers upon the patentee. If the conception of the law that a judgment in an action at law is reparation for the trespass, it is only for the particular trespass that is the ground of the action. There may be other trespasses and continuing wrongs and the vexation of many actions. These are well-recognized grounds of equity jurisdiction, especially in patent cases, and a citation of cases is unnecessary. ”

      Taken together, Apple has a legal right not to use or license its patent. Equity will enjoin further invasions as traditional. The numerous cases need not be cited. But, if necessary to understand, they should be.

    3. 3.3

      “Efficient infringement” is absolutely the name of one of the games afoot.

      Moving the patent right from a property right to a mere “contractual” business matter ig nores the very essence of what a patent is.

      One part of “the Art of Rhetoric” is the by simply saying something often enough, that something garners an aura of “truth.” So it is with the (academic and others’) “free” writings of a desired state of law as if that desired state were actual law.

      The efforts of “re-conceptualization” continue…

  10. 2

    “To the extent that inventors receive financial rewards, it is simply a byproduct of encouraging innovation.”

    You have cause and effect scrambled up here. Financial rewards encourage innovation. Patents are just the mechanism for determining those rewards.

  11. 1

    Overall the author’s opinion is well reasoned. However, he overstates his position with the argument that: “To the extent that inventors receive financial rewards, it is simply a byproduct of encouraging innovation.” and cites to only a portion of Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8. If viewed as a social contract, in a bargained for exchange, each side of the consideration coin is equal, and it cannot be said that the public good is paramount and the inventor’s reward is “simply a byproduct”. The actual language of Clause 8 provides: “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”. Here, the language specifically says “exclusive right”. So, the default position for the patentee should be an exclusive right – meaning the right to exclude all others from practicing the invention. Equity may trump this default position, but we should recognize that exclusivity is the default position under a plain reading of the text.

    1. 1.1

      You’ve glossed over an important issue, IIT: “exclusive rights” are different from “financial rewards”. Importantly, “exclusive rights” do not guarantee any financial reward whatsoever to the inventor. They provide an opportunity and an advantage in the marketplace but, as we know, such opportunities are missed or squandered every day (with or without patent protection).

      If the Constitution had said “To promote Progress by providing financial rewards to Authors and Inventors”, we’d be having a much different discussion.

      Equity may trump this default position

      Equity is going to have to trump this default position unless other reasonable compensatory changes are made to the system, e.g., statutory changes directly addressing the equitable questions raised in cases such as this one.

      1. 1.1.1

        I agree with you MM – financial rewards are certainly different than exclusive rights, and there is no guarantee of financial rewards in the Constitution. I disagree that “equity is going to have to trump this default position” in all cases. Movement from this default position should require weighing both sides, and should require that the defendant demonstrate a substantially stronger case than the patentee in order move from this default position of exclusive rights. Particularly in the case of Samsung and Apple, it may be reasonable for Apple to make Samsung completely remove the offending feature from the product, since it may not offend the notion of equity to do so. Anyhow, my larger point was with respect to the default position, and the author’s comment which appears to entirely cast away the inventor’s benefit of exclusive rights in the exchange for the inventor’s contribution.

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