It has been a busy year for law makers seeking better protection for trade secrets. Much coverage has been given to the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), which provides a federal private right of action for trade secret protection. President Obama signed the DTSA on May 11, and the law takes effect immediately. Patently-O has covered the DTSA legislation and legislative process in several posts here.
On May 17 the European Council is expected to formally adopt the Trade Secrets Directive, requiring all Member States to provide certain minimum standards for trade secret protection. Member States will have two years to implement the provisions of the Directive into their own national laws.
How do the US and EU positions on trade secrets compare? Below are the key similarities and differences between the DTSA and the European Trade Secrets Directive.
What has led to these Legislative Changes?
The desire for harmonization of trade secret protection has spurred these movements both in the US and the EU. According to the European Commission, the lack of a uniform European approach has resulted in a “fragmentation of the internal market” and “weakening of the overall deterrent effect of the relevant rules.” The EU Directive seeks to harmonize the laws of the various member states by providing a consistent definition of what qualifies as a “trade secret.” Additionally, the Directive addresses the remedies available to trade secret holders and the measures courts can use to prevent the disclosure of trade secrets in legal proceedings.
In the U.S., the DTSA arose from a desire to federalize trade secret protection, which had thus far been dominated by state law (although most states had previously adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), published by the Uniform Law Commission in 1979). While certain federal protection previously existed in the form of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, the DTSA provides an individual right sue in federal court, thus obviating the need to bring private actions in various state courts where procedures differ greatly.
How is “Trade Secret” Defined?
Under both the EU Trade Secrets Directive and the DTSA, to qualify as a trade secret the information at issue must be kept confidential and must derive economic value from being kept confidential.
Article 2 of the Trade Secrets Directive defines a trade secret as information which meets all of the following requirements:
- is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration and assembly of its components, generally known among or readily accessible to persons within the circles that normally deal with the kind of information in question;
- has commercial value because it is secret;
- has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret.
This definition tracks the definition for “undisclosed information” provided in article 39(2) of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), which requires all signatories to afford some level of protection for confidential information.
The DTSA definition of “trade secret”, meanwhile, consists of “all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing if-
- the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret; and
- the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, the another person who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the information.”
As seen, whether in Europe or in the U.S., to be considered a trade secret the information must be kept confidential and derive an economic value from the fact that it is confidential. Both the EU Directive and the DTSA are aimed at protecting commercial confidential information. What is not required is that the information be entirely novel, a distinction from other forms of intellectual property. Further, the EU Directive makes explicit that combinations of otherwise publicly available information can be protected provided they are not readily accessible or generally known.
Confidentiality in Litigation
The EU Directive and DTSA have similar provisions for the preservation of confidentiality during legal proceedings for trade secret misappropriation. In the U.S. the ability to file confidential documents under seal to maintain secrecy has long been an option open to litigants. The DTSA specifically sets out that a court may not authorize or direct the disclosure of information unless the owner is first given the opportunity to file a submission under seal describing the interest in keeping the information confidential. The DTSA therefore extends the option of filing briefs under seal to include disclosure at trial and in court opinions, and also allows non-parties to request that certain information be kept confidential.
The EU Directive similarly addresses preserving confidentiality during legal proceedings. The Directive sets out that an applicant must first supply a “duly reasoned” application as to why certain information should be kept confidential. The maintenance of secrecy is therefore not the default position, and requires court approval. It remains to be seen how the national laws of the Member States will implement the Directive and how courts will interpret what qualifies as a “duly reasoned” application. In some countries this will require minimum changes (for instance, in the U.K. no change will be required), while in others it will be a more significant cultural and legal shift.
Protection for Whistle-blowers
The protections for whistle-blowers and press freedom have been a significant part of the public debate concerning the EU Directive. Opponents of the Directive expressed concern that, as a result of the Directive, journalists and whistle-blowers could be criminalized for publishing information that companies consider secret. However, the EU Directive specifically sets out that it should not prevent whistle-blowers and those publishing trade secrets to serve the public interest from doing so. Moreover, there are no criminal provisions in the Directive. The Directive states:
The measures, procedures and remedies provided for in this Directive should not restrict whistleblowing activity. Therefore, the protection of trade secrets should not extend to cases in which disclosure of a trade secret serves the public interest, insofar as directly relevant misconduct, wrongdoing or illegal activity is revealed. This should not be seen as preventing the competent judicial authorities from allowing an exception to the application of measures, procedures and remedies in a case where the respondent had every reason to believe in good faith that his or her conduct satisfied the appropriate criteria set out in this Directive.
This exception for whistle-blower activity is much broader than that provided by the DTSA. The DTSA provides immunity from liability for disclosing a trade secret only when the disclosure is confidential and made to the government or in a court filing (under seal). There is no specified exception for journalists or other public good-doers, although arguably the First Amendment provides protection. The DTSA does include a provision by which employers must notify their employees of the protection available under the new law, a notice requirement which is not present in the EU Directive. Employee is defined broadly by the DTSA to include those working as contractors or consultants.
The most controversial part of the DTSA has been the introduction of an ex parte seizure order as a federal measure. Under the DTSA, a court can issue an order for the seizure of property “necessary to prevent the propagation or dissemination of the trade secret that is the subject of the action.” Additional remedies include injunctions and damages, where an injunction is deemed most appropriate for any continuing harm. For previous harm, a court may award damages for actual loss or any unjust enrichment. A court can also choose to award damages measured by a reasonable royalty for the unauthorized use of the trade secret. As with other protection of intellectual property, violation of the DTSA done wilfully or maliciously may result in a court awarding enhanced damages as well as attorneys’ fees.
The EU Directive similarly allows for injunctions, damages measured as lost profits, account of profits, or a reasonable royalty for the trade secret use (paid as a lump sum). The Directive also allows for provisional and precautionary measures, and says that Member States can provide for more far reaching protection, so long as the safeguards in the Directive are met.
The EU Directive does not call for enhanced damages for malicious activity, but rather approaches damages from the opposite viewpoint, specifying that Member States may limit the liability for damages of employees for misappropriating trade secrets if the employee acted without intent.
Employee Mobility and Non-Compete Agreements
In the sensitive area of employee mobility and competition, the Directive specifically states that it shall not offer any ground for restricting the mobility of employees. However, the Directive does not include any requirement to harmonize the laws in relation to post-termination restrictions or non-compete clauses, meaning that national laws will continue to apply.
The DTSA addresses employee mobility in requiring that an injunction against a former employee be “based on evidence of threatened misappropriation” of trade secret information and not simply on the fact that the person may know certain information. The DTSA also states that any injunction preventing or limiting future employment cannot conflict with applicable state laws protecting employee mobility. Shortly before the DTSA took effect, the White House released a report that criticizes non-compete agreements and state laws that offer too much protection for such agreements. While no immediate action is expected following the report, it is offered as a discussion point in considering what is necessary in non-compete agreements and how states should treat them.
In the U.S., the limitation period for a company to bring an action under the DTSA is three years after the date on which the misappropriation is discovered or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence. The EU Directive gives the Member States the freedom to set the limitation period for their respective national laws, but sets the maximum period at six years (albeit Member States have discretion as to when the clock starts to run).
It is obviously desirable that trade secret protection be consistent across borders, whether state or national, as protection is only as strong as its weakest link. In the U.S., the DTSA specifically sets out a requirement that the Attorney General provide a report on the threats of trade secret theft outside the U.S. and the protection of trade secrets afforded by U.S. trading partners. How the EU Directive and DTSA play out as Member States implement the Directive and courts interpret the laws will help shape trade secret protection around the globe.