Tag Archives: AIA Trials

The America Invents Act (AIA) of 2011 authorized the creation of a set of administrative trials (AIA Trials), including Inter Partes Review (IPR) proceedings, Post Grant Review (PGR) proceedings and transitional Covered Business Method Review (CBM) proceedings. In each of these proceedings, anyone can file a petition to challenge an issued patent, and, after instituting the trial, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) will decide whether the challenged claims should be confirmed or cancelled.

Patent Reform in the House of Representatives:

Earlier today, I testified in Congress before the House of Representatives Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet. [Link] The IP subcommittee will have jurisdiction over any patent reform measures introduced to the House.  The other two witnesses were Professor Dan Burk (UC Irvine) and Andrew Pincus (Mayer Brown, representing BSA).  The focus of today’s hearing was on the changes that have occurred in patent law since the patent reform process began in 2004.  I.e., what is left for Congress to reform? Our written and recorded testimony is available online here: http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear_03102011_2.html.

Questioning was extensive and included questions from subcommittee Chairman Goodlatte (R-VA), Vice-Chairman Watt (D-NC), and Representatives Conyers (D-Mich), Nadler (D-NY), Chu (D-CA), Reed (R-NY), and Adams (R-FL). Representatives Coble (R-NC) and Quayle were also in attendance.

My written Testimony Follows:

 

Committee on the Judiciary< ?xml:namespace prefix ="" o />

United States House of Representatives

Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, Competition and the Internet

 

Hearing

                                                                   

 “Review of Recent Judicial Decisions on Patent Law”

 

Prepared Statement of

Dennis Crouch

 

March 10, 2011

Washington, DC


 

I.                 Introduction:

 

We are likely nearing a turning point in a decade-long process of patent reform.  Although there is still clearly a strong demand for legislative measures, much has changed since the landmark FTC and NAS point-by-point criticisms of the patent law system were released in 2003 and 2004 respectively.[1] Likewise, much has changed in the six years since the Patent Reform Act of 2005 was introduced in the House of Representatives.[2]  Perhaps in response to these external pressures, the Federal Courts have taken a more active role in shaping patent policy from the bench and have particularly addressed many of the concerns raised by the various patent reform initiatives.

 

II.               The Rapid Developments in Patent Case Law over the Past Several Years:

 

In most areas of law, court-developed doctrines mature quite slowly.  Over the past decade, however, patent law has been a dramatic counter-example.  The courts have substantially altered many longstanding patent doctrines in the course of a few short years.[3]  Several factors combine to explain this phenomenon.  First, unlike most other federal legal questions appealed to regional Circuit Courts of Appeal, virtually all patent law related appeals from across the country are heard by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the “Federal Circuit”).  The national reach of the Federal Circuit means that a ruling by the court has an automatic nationwide impact in much the same way that decisions by the United States Supreme Court have a nationwide impact.  However, unlike the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit hears hundreds of patent cases each year.  Over the past ten years, the funneling of patent appeals to the Federal Circuit has resulted in the court hearing over four thousand patent infringement appeals in addition to its review of patent decisions from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (the “Patent Office”) and the International Trade Commission.[4]  The large number of cases provides the court with the opportunity to rapidly shift the law, even when each case presents only an incremental change. In addition to the means to effect change, it is apparent that both the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court have taken an interest in shaping patent law policy.[5]  Finally, unlike many Federal statutes, the Patent Act as codified in Title 35 of the United States Code is a relatively sparse statute that leaves tremendous leeway for interpretation.

 

Over the past six years, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and issued a number of important patent decisions that:

 

·       Make it easier to invalidate (or reject) a patent on obviousness grounds, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (eliminating technical hurdles for proving an invention obvious and instead applying a “common sense” analysis for assessing patentability); 

·       Make it more difficult for a patent holding company to obtain injunctive relief to stop ongoing infringement, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (holding that even an adjudged infringer should not be automatically enjoined from continuing to infringe; rather an injunction should only issue after consideration of the traditional four-factor test for equitable injunctive relief); 

·       Make it easier for a manufacturer to obtain a declaratory judgment of non-infringement, MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007) (holding that declaratory judgment (“DJ”) jurisdiction may exist even if the patent holder could not have sued the DJ plaintiff for infringement; apprehension that patentee will sue for infringement is not a necessary element for Article III jurisdiction); 

·       Solidify our understanding of the scope of patentable subject matter available for business method patents, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (invalidating Bilski’s claimed invention – a method of hedging against the occurrence of bad weather – as an unpatentable abstract idea);  

·       Limit the doctrine of export infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007) (holding that Microsoft could not be held liable for exporting software code because the exported source code does not qualify as a “component” under the statute); and  

·       Provide roadmaps for stronger patent licensing agreements, see Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (patent “exhausted” under first sale doctrine because patentee did not restrict licensee’s sales to third party purchasers) and Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (holding that in antitrust tying cases, courts should not presume that a patent confers market power).

 

During this time, the Federal Circuit has also actively addressed patent reform issues with decisions that:

 

·       Attempt to implement venue reform in a way that limits unreasonable forum shopping, In re TS Tech United States Corp., 551 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (on writ of mandamus, ordering case transferred out of venue that had no meaningful ties to the patent infringement case);[6]  

·       Rationalize patent damage awards, Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., ___ F.3d ___, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 11 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that the 25% Rule for calculating patent damages is “fundamentally flawed” and that total product revenue cannot be considered in the reasonable royalty analysis unless the Entire Market Value Rule applies.) and Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (requiring a proof that purported “comparable” licenses used for calculating a royalty rate are, in fact, comparable); Wordtech Systems, Inc. v. Integrated Networks Solutions, Inc., 609 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 

·       Limit enhanced damages, In re Seagate, 497 F. 3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (limiting the potential for treble damages to cases where the adjudged infringer’s actions were at least “objectively reckless”) (see Chart 1); 

·       Expand the false marking doctrine, Forest Group Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2009);  

·       Limit inequitable conduct pleadings, Exergen Corporation v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (requiring that inequitable conduct pleadings include “specific who, what, when, where, and how of [any] material misrepresentation or omission”); and  

·       Reject Patent Office substantive rulemaking authority, Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009).[7]   

 

PatentLawImage107

 

As we sit here today, the courts also have a number of important cases pending resolution. Among others, these include:

 

·       A challenge to the presumption of validity associated with issued patents, Microsoft Corp. v. I4I Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010) (certiorari granted on the issue of whether the presumption of validity associated with an issued patent must always be overcome with clear and convincing evidence);  

·       A challenge to the patentability of genetic material, See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. United States PTO, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35418 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding BRCA gene patents invalid for being directed to a law of nature); 

·       A Constitutional challenge to the False Marking provisions of the Patent Act, Unique Prod. Solutions, Ltd. v. Hy-Grade Valve, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18237 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (holding the False Marking statute unconstitutional) and United States ex rel. FLFMC, LLC v. Wham-O, Inc., Fed. Cir. App. No. 2011-1067 (pending appeal challenging Constitutionality of the statute);[8]  

·       A question regarding the mens rea requirement for inducing infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 458 (2010) (grant of certiorari);       

·       A major challenge to the implementation of the judge made law of inequitable conduct, TheraSense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 374 Fed. Appx. 35 (Fed. Cir. April 26, 2010) (en banc order requesting briefing); and 

·       A challenge to patent ownership rights under the Bayh-Dole Act, Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., 131 S. Ct. 502 (2010) (grant of certiorari).

                                                            

For better or worse, the courts have substantially shifted the playing field over the past six years. And, the cases currently pending and in the pipeline appear poised to continue this process.  Of course, the courts have limited power and cannot make statutory amendments or offer funding to the Patent Office.  It is safe to say, however, that the courts have addressed (or are addressing) virtually all of the legitimately raised patent reform issues that fall squarely within their purview.  Within this dynamic, an important ongoing role of Congress is at least to ensure that the courts are making the right policy choices.

 

III.              Administrative and Practice Changes that have Arisen Over the Past Several Years:

 

Patent Office Backlog: A key issue of patent law policy that has not been adequately addressed in the past six years is the growing backlog of patent applications pending at the Patent Office.  Although the current Patent Office management team is quite focused on reducing the backlog, their efforts have not been overwhelmingly successful to-date.  As seen in Chart 2 (below), the overall backlog of patent applications pending at the USPTO has increased more than 30% since 2005.  The forced delay is troubling for patent applicants because the exclusive patent right is only enforceable once the patent issues, and typically only against post-issuance infringement.  The multi-year prosecution delay is also troubling for potential competitors and customers because the patent right may eventually spring-forth to re-capture exclusive rights that had been in public use for years.

 

PatentLawImage103

 

Even more dramatic, is the twenty seven fold (~2700%) increase in the backlog of cases awaiting decision at the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI). (Chart 3).  The long and growing backlog of appeals more than doubles the expected duration of the patent prosecution process for the almost 50% of patent applicants that achieve at least a partial victory on appeal.

 

PatentLawImage106

 

These backlogs likely cannot be directly corrected by the courts. Instead, every effort must be made to ensure that the Patent Office is enabled and encouraged to right its own ship.  In the short term, the Patent Office will need to hire more examiners; re-work its failing information technology system; and apply effective negotiation theories to the examination process.  In the longer term, world patent offices must work-share when examining duplicate patent applications that have been filed in multiple countries.[9]  In addition, there are some relatively easy steps that can be taken to help ensure that patent applications are filed in a way that make them easier to examine.  This may include (1) requiring applicants to better delineate their invention and its purposes and (2) more rigorously enforcing the requirement that claims be clearly drafted in a way that relates to the invention as disclosed. 

 

Obviousness and the Backlog: The bulk of time spent in the patent examination process and in appeals to the BPAI revolves around the issue of obviousness.[10]  In other words, the backlogs can be largely attributed to time spent arguing the difficult issue of obviousness. Unfortunately, nothing in the proposed legislation does anything directly to alleviate this burden.  Although the process of examining patents for obviousness may seem to be one best left to the administrative agency, the Patent Office is bound to follow the examination processes laid out by the courts in KSR v. Teleflex[11] and Graham v. John Deere Co.[12]  Because so much time and energy is spent on this issue during the examination process, it may be one where increased substantive rulemaking authority would allow the Patent Office to create a more manageable approach to the statutory question. 

 

Foreign Inventor Influence on the US Patent System: Through a number of reciprocal international agreements such as Paris Convention, the US has promised citizens of other countries access to the US patent system.[13]  Under these agreements, an innovative Japanese company seeking exclusive rights in the US market could obtain US patent protection and enforce those rights in US courts against US competitors.  Despite this offer of rights, the bulk of issued US patent have always been based on US originated inventions.  This practical statistic meant that, historically, US patent reform primarily impacted US companies and US inventors.  Over the past six years, the statistic changed, and for the first time in history, the majority of US patents are now being issued on foreign-originated inventions. (Chart 4).

 

PatentLawImage105

  

For some, this decline in US-centric dominance of the US patent system will serve as a sign that US innovation could use additional encouragement.  In addition, however, the decline may signal a need to change our outlook on the role of patent rights in US policy. Certainly, the offer of patent rights encourages innovation and disclosure of new inventions.  However, this incentive is felt around the world – encouraging companies in Australia or Germany to innovate in their home countries in order to capture an exclusive slice of the US market.[14]  In this framework, patent reform is much more than a domestic policy issue. Rather, it becomes an issue of rooted in international trade and international relations.  This is not a new concept, but one that should be kept in mind as the legislation moves forward.

 

Rise in Patent Reexamination Filings: The US has two primary post-grant opposition processes already in place: (1) inter partes reexamination and (2) third-party requested (or prompted) ex parte reexamination.  Prior to 2005, it appeared that many potential defendants and accused infringers were reluctant to use the post-grant opposition processes.  That reluctance has largely evaporated – in part because of the USPTO’s successful implementation of a Central Reexamination Unit (CRU) composed of elite and highly trained patent examiners in sufficient quantity to have a high response rate.[15]  In addition, patent law professionals have seen that reexamination can be an effective and relatively inexpensive alternative to litigation.  At this point, high-dollar patent infringement lawsuits are usually associated with a parallel reexamination of the patents in-suit – so long as the defendant has a credible obviousness argument based on published materials.  Table 1, shows the rise in popularity of reexaminations over the past few years.

Table 1[16]

FY2000-2004

FY2006-2010

Percent Change in Number of Reexamination Requests

Inter Partes Reexamination Requests

53

903

1704%

Ex Parte Reexamination Requests

1,719

3,272

190%

A notable limitation of the current reexamination system is that reexaminations are only allowed to consider certain invalidity arguments (obviousness and anticipation) and apply a limited set of prior art (patents and printed publications).  Many countries offer broader latitude in their opposition proceedings, although some of those countries completely divide duties between the administrative agency (handling invalidity issues) and the court (handling infringement).[17]  The dramatic shift in usage of available post grant options gives me pause to consider whether the proposed reforms in 2005 offered a permanent solution to what was merely a temporary problem.

 

IV.             Identifying Elements of the Reform Measures that have not been Implemented:

 

A more straightforward approach to issues now before the Committee is to identify elements of prior patent reform measures that have not been addressed by the courts. These include:

 

(1)   Easing the USPTO’s ability to set fees for its services and to retain all fees collected;

(2)   Moving from a “first-to-invent” system to a “first-to-file” system;

(3)   Expanding prior-user rights;

(4)   Requiring that all patent applications be published by the USPTO;  

(5)   Allowing pre-issuance protests (or prior art submissions) by third parties;

(6)   Expanding the scope of post-grant reexamination or adding an additional post-grant opposition proceedings;

(7)   Eliminating the “best mode” requirement; and

(8)   Easing the rules for assignee submission of patent filings without the inventor’s express permission.

 

Each of these reform measures have their own potential benefits and detriments that vary according to the implementation approach chosen.

 

Thank you for this opportunity to present my remarks.

 

Dennis Crouch

March 10, 2011

 

 



[1] Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy, A Report by the Federal Trade Commission, October 2003; Nat’l Res. Council of the Nat’l Acads., A Patent System for the 21st Century (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., National Academies Press).

 

[2] Patent Act of 2005, H.R.2795.

 

[3] See William C. Rooklidge & Alyson G. Barker, Reform of a Fast-Moving Target: The Development of Patent Law Since fee 2004 National Academies Report, 91 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 153 (2009).

[4] Federal Circuit Statistics, Filings of Patent Infringement Appeals from the U.S. District Courts at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov. 

 

[5] Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1105 (2004) (“since its inception, the [Federal Circuit]—with some assistance from the Supreme Court—has moved aggressively in support of its widely perceived mandate”); Paul R. Michel, Assuring Consistency and Uniformity of Precedent and Legal Doctrine in the Areas of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Entrusted Exclusively to the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: A View from the Top, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 699, 702 (2009); Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1619 (2007); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, The Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can Solve It (2009)

[6] The TS Tech decision appears to have had a major impact on patent venue jurisprudence. In the two years since the case was decided, its analysis has been followed by almost four dozen different courts.  See, for example, Promote Innovation LLC v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16294 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 17, 2011) (granting accused infringer’s motion to transfer venue from the Eastern District of Texas to the Eastern District of New York).

                                             

[7] The Tafas decision was vacated pending rehearing en banc and eventually dropped after the USPTO retracted its planned implementation of rules that would limit both the number of claims that an applicant could file per patent application and the number of continuation applications an applicant could file based on a single invention disclosure. See also, Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State: The Patent Office’s Troubled Quest for Managerial Control, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2051 (2009).

[8] Over 1,000 false marking claims were filed in 2009 and 2010.  False Patent Marking at http://www.falsemarking.net/cases.php.

 

[9] See Rai, Growing Pains at note 6.

 

[10] Dennis Crouch, Understanding the Role of the Board of Patent Appeals: Ex Parte Rejection Rates on Appeal, University of Missouri School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009-16 (2009) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1423922. (90% of BPAI appeals involve a question of obviousness).

 

[11] 550 U.S. 398 (2007).

 

[12] 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (setting out the process of the obviousness inquiry as used in both courts and the Patent Office).

 

[13]  Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 2.

 

[14] See Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Organisation v. Buffalo Tech., 542 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Australian government entity suing on its US software related patent in the Eastern District of Texas).

 

[15] Gregory Novak, Concurrent Reexaminations as a Strategic Patent Litigation Defense Tool, 1020 PLI/Pat 797 (2010) (“since the inception of the Central Reexamination Unit (CRU), reexamination proceedings are producing favorable results [for the third-party] in a more timely manner”).

 

[16] Derived from USPTO Inter Partes and Ex Parte Reexamination Data (December 31, 2010) at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/Reexamination_Information.jsp.

 

[17] To my knowledge, no one has studied the potential impact of increasing the scope of US reexamination practice or adding a broader layer of post grant opposition.

Patent Reform Act of 2011: An Overview

LeahyThe Patent Reform Act of 2011 (S. 23) was introduced on January 25, 2011 by Senator Leahy (D-VT) who was joined by eight co-sponsors (all from the Judiciary Committee) that include Senators Coons (D-DE), Franken (D-MN), Grassley (R-IA), Hatch (R-UT), Klobuchar (D-MN), Kyl (R-AZ), Lieberman (I-CT), and Sessions (R-AL). The bill was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee which unanimously approved the bill. The House of Representatives will likely move more slowly. Although House Judiciary Committee chair Rep. Smith (R-TX) co-sponsored the similar Patent Reform Act of 2009, Rep. Issa (R-CA) is the “patent expert of Congress” and has only tentatively supported the reform bills in the past. [UPDATE –  Most Recent Version of S. 23 2/11/11]

PatentLawImage080First-Inventor-to-File: The reform measure would move the US further toward a first-to-file system. Each patent application would be given an “effective filing date,” and the patentability will be judged on whether any prior art was available prior to the filing date. One-year grace period would remain in effect, but only for the inventor’s own disclosures (and disclosures derived from the inventor). Obviousness will also be judged as of the effective filing date. Inventors will no longer be able to swear behind prior art nor will they be able to establish priority in an interference proceeding. A new creation in the bill is a “derivation proceeding” that would operate only in times where an original inventor alleges that a patent applicant derived the invention from the original inventor’s work.

PatentLawImage081Damages: Patent defendants have argued that courts often treat damages issues as afterthoughts with little procedural control. The proposed amendment would add specific procedures and checks on how a judge manages the damages portion of a case. The amended statute would require that a court “identify methodologies and factors that are relevant to the determination of damages” and that “only those methodologies and factors” be considered when determining the damage award. In addition, prior to the introduction of damages evidence, the court would be required to consider either party’s contentions that the others damage case lacks a legally sufficient evidentiary base. In addition, the statute would require a judge to bifurcate the damages portion of a trial if requested “absent good cause to reject the request, such as the absence of issues of significant damages or infringement and validity.” Oddly, the proposed statute seemingly bars a judge from amending the discovery schedule or any “other matters” based upon the trial sequencing.

PatentLawImage082Enhanced Damages: Although we often discuss enhanced damages for willful infringement, the current Patent Act is not explicitly limited to situations involving willful infringement. Rather, Section 284 simply states that “the court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.” Over the years, Federal Circuit precedent has limited the statute to only situations where the infringer’s actions were at least objectively reckless. The amended statute would codify that holding with the words “Infringement is not willful unless the claimant proves by clear and convincing evidence that the accused infringer’s conduct with respect to the patent was objectively reckless. [I.e., that] the infringer was acting despite an objectively high likelihood that his actions constituted infringement of a valid patent, and this objectively-defined risk was either known or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused infringer.” The statute also makes clear that accusations of willful infringement must be pled with particularity (following FRCP 9(b)); that proof of knowledge of patent is insufficient to establish willful infringement; that a pre-lawsuit notice of infringement cannot itself establish willfulness unless the notification is fact specific in explaining the infringement; that the failure to obtain the advice of counsel (or to present that advice to the jury) “may not be used” to prove willull infringement or inducement of infringement; and that damages subject to trebling are only those accrued after the infringement became willful; and that in a “close case” there will be no willful infringement (here, the statute requires a judge to “explain its decision” and to make a decision prior to the issue being tried by the jury).

Third-Party Challenges to Patent Rights: The bill includes three expanded ways that a third party can use the USPTO to challenge a patent: Pre-Issuance Third-Party Submissions; Third-Party Requested Post-Grant Review; and Inter Partes Post Grant Review.

Pre-Issuance Third-Party Submissions: Under the amendment, third parties would be allowed to submit any printed publication along with a description of the relevance to the USPTO to be considered during the examination of a pending patent application.

Third-Party Requested Post Grant Review: A post grant review proceeding would be created (similar to our current reexamination proceeding) that could be initiated by any party. The review would allow a third party to present essentially any legal challenge to the validity of at least one clam. A major limitation on the post grant review is the request for review must be filed within nine-months of issuance.

Inter Partes Review Proceedings: Once the nine-month window for post grant review is expired, a party may then file for “inter partes review.” This new system would replace inter partes reexamination and would be limited to consideration of novelty & obviousness issues based on prior art patents and printed publications. (It appears that third-party requested ex parte reexamination would remain a viable option as well).

False Marking: A large number of false patent marking cases have been filed in the past year. The bill would eliminate those lawsuits except for ones filed by the US government or filed by a competitor who can prove competitive injury.

PatentLawImage083Oath: The bill would make it easier for a corporation to file a substitute inventor’s oath when the inventor is non-cooperative.

Best Mode: Although an inventor will still be required to “set forth” the best mode for accomplishing the invention, the statute would be amended to exclude failure of disclose a best mode from being used as a basis for invalidating an issued patent. The PTO will still have a duty to only issue patents where the best mode requirement has been satisfied.

Fee Setting Authority: The PTO would be given authority to adjust its fees, but only in a way that “in the aggregate” recover the estimated costs of PTO activities. Along this line, a new “micro” entity would be created that would have additional fee reductions.

Briefing Microsoft v. i4i: Amicus Briefs Supporting Easier Invalidation of Patents in Court

Microsoft v. i4i, Docket No. 10–290 (Supreme Court 2011)

Briefing has begun in earnest.  Microsoft recently filed its opening brief on the merits (File Attachment: microsoftopen.pdf (250 KB)) and now twenty-five self-proclaimed friends-of-the-court have added their respective two-cents.  The case focuses on the burden of proof required to invalidate an issued patent. Microsoft has challenged the Federal Circuit’s rule that clear-and-convincing evidence is necessary. Instead, the software giant argues that a preponderance of the evidence should be sufficient to invalidate a patent — especially when a court is considering evidence of invalidity that was not considered by the Patent Office during examination. 

In many ways, this case would only shift marginal cases — such as when an accused infringer is able to prove that a patent is probably invalid, but cannot provide clear and convincing evidence of that fact.  The specific marginal problem for Microsoft is that it presented only limited evidence of the existence of custom built prior-art software that would invalidate i4i’s patent. Unfortunately for Microsoft, that twenty-year-old software code is no longer available and the parties presented competing factual testimony as to the operation of the prior art software.

Of the twenty-five friend-of-the-court (FOTC) briefs filed thus far, twenty explicitly and officially support Microsoft’s position that the standard should be lowered.  Five briefs claim to support “neither party.” (Briefs supporting i4i will be filed in March, 2011).  The official claim of support often has limited meaning. I would roughly divide the briefs into four groups: (1) Seven briefs support Microsoft’s position that the clear-and-convincing standard should not apply when the evidence of invalidity was not considered by the USPTO. (2) thirteen briefs further argue that the standard should be lowered-across-the-board in [essentially] all cases.  (3) Two briefs take the opposite position — that the standard should remain clear and convincing. Although these two briefs officially support neither party, I expect many similar briefs to be filed in support of i4i next month. (4) Three briefs focus on interesting issues of whether we should have dual (or variable) standards that depend upon whether the PTO considered the evidence during prosecution. The following is a discussion of some of the more interesting aspects of the briefs that I noticed.

Lowering the Standard when the PTO has not Considered the Arguably Invalidating Evidence:

The well respected Supreme Court patent team at Fried Frank of Jim Dabney, Professor John Duffy, and Steve Rabinowitz filed a brief on behalf several corporations, including SAP, Symantec, Facebook, and Yahoo!. Their brief agrees with Microsoft that the standard for invalidating a patent should be lowered unless the file wrapper “shows that the PTO has engaged in reasoned decisionmaking with regard to a factual issue.”  The brief grounds its argument in  the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). As suggested above, the brief indicates that the APA “reasoned decisionmaking” analysis should occur on a fact-by-fact basis — with deference only given when evidence shows that the PTO made a reasoned decision regarding the fact in question.  File Attachment: sap.pdf (170 KB). Writing for a group of 37 Professors, Professor Mark Lemley adds that APA deference may be appropriate only in very limited circumstances — such as when a particular factual question was decided in the course of an adversarial inter partes reexamination proceeding. File Attachment: lemley.pdf (229 KB). In a complementary brief, WM Mitchell Law School’s IP Institute (led by Profs Moy and Erstling) reviews 150 years of Supreme Court case to reach its conclusion that the clear-and-convincing evidence rule “was extended to issues not before the USPTO only recently.” File Attachment: wmmitchell.pdf (178 KB). See also File Attachment: bsa.pdf (196 KB)

Generic pharmaceutical companies generally support Microsoft’s position that “bad” patents should be easier to invalidate. Shashank Upadhye (Apotex’s IP chief) generally presents interesting arguments. The gist of his brief is that courts would do better to err on the side of free competition (i.e., invalidity). File Attachment: apotex.pdf (181 KB). Teva argues that C&C standard encourages applicant to conceal prior art. The logic behind that argument is that applicants would prefer to sneak through the PTO and then rely on the C&C standard in litigation to win the case or force settlement. File Attachment: tevapharma.pdf (234 KB). The Bar Association of DC argues the other-side — that increasing the incentive to submit prior art references during prosecution will not lead to better patent quality. File Attachment: badc.pdf (104 KB).

Apple and Intel support Microsoft’s position. However, it is clear that the companies (likely Apple) strained to avoid saying that they support “Microsoft” or even the “petitioner.”  Overall, I would say that the brief does more harm to its cause than good.  The problem is that the brief offers no additional arguments except for a three page section regarding “practical” and “empirical” evidence that the C&C standard makes a difference to juries. Unfortunately for Apple, the evidence presented is glaringly weak. File Attachment: apple.pdf (109 KB).  However, evidence from other briefs, such as that filed by Prof Hollaar may provide a cumulative bulk sufficient to make this case.  File Attachment: hollaar.pdf (262 KB).

EFF and PubPat: As might be expected, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and the Public Patent Foundation (PubPat) both argued that a preponderance of the evidence should be sufficient to invalidate a patent in all cases. EFF’s brief (penned primarily by Michael Barclay) focuses primarily on policy — arguing that the sheer number of issued-but-invalid patents makes this an important issue that needs resolution. File Attachment: eff.pdf (293 KB). Dan Ravicher at PubPat similarly writes that the “extremely poor quality” of US patents screams for a lowering of the standard. File Attachment: pubpat.pdf (92 KB). See also, File Attachment: ctia.pdf (200 KB), File Attachment: hercules.pdf (207 KB).  The brief by Google, et al., takes this a step further than the normal “lack of time” and “incompetence” statements –  arguing that the current law and practice “tilt the scales heavily in favor of granting patent applications based on incomplete analyses.” File Attachment: google.pdf (241 KB).

Cisco, Ebay, Netflix, Toyota, and others argue that the advent of third-party requested reexaminations changes the system in a way that impacts the proper standard used in district court litigation. The brief argues (in a way that I don’t yet fully understand) that the existence of reexaminations suggests that the litigation standard should be a preponderance of the evidence. File Attachment: cisco.pdf (187 KB).

Supporting a High Standard: As the largest US patent holder, it might be no surprise that IBM supports a high standard for invalidating a patent.  Of course, across the “v” sits Microsoft as another very large patent holder.  I would point to three primary differences between IBM and Microsoft: (1) IBM has a long and extensive pro-patent stance; (2) IBM has an extremely strong and lucrative patent monetization program; and (3) perhaps most importantly, IBM itself has only rarely been sued for patent infringement.  File Attachment: IBM.pdf (274 KB). The AIPLA –  the largest association of US patent lawyers – also supports the status quo. File Attachment: aipla.pdf (157 KB).

Professor Morris does not take a position regarding a high or low standard. Rather, her focus is on whether it makes sense to have two standards of proof that vary according to whether the particular fact in question was considered by the USPTO. File Attachment: Morris.pdf (494 KB).

Notes:

 

 

 

 

A Poor Man’s Tale of a Patent

John Smith's book got me thinking about the Charles Dickens 1850 essay titled “A Poor Man's Tale of a Patent.”  The essay — much like Smith's book — derides difficulty of obtaining a patent. In Dickens world, the patent applicant was forced to walk through 35–stages and spend the equivalent of $15,000 in order to obtain a patent. 

PatentLawImage066But I put this: Is it reasonable to make a man feel as if, in inventing an ingenious improvement meant to do good, he had done something wrong? How else can a man feel, when he is met by such difficulties at every turn? All inventors taking out a Patent MUST feel so. And look at the expense. How hard on me, and how hard on the country if there's any merit in me (and my invention is took up now, I am thankful to say, and doing well), to put me to all that expense before I can move a finger! Make the addition yourself, and it'll come to ninety-six pound, seven, and eightpence. No more, and no less. . . .

Look at the Home Secretary, the Attorney-General, the Patent Office, the Engrossing Clerk, the Lord Chancellor, the Privy Seal, the Clerk of the Patents, the Lord Chancellor's Purse-bearer, the Clerk of the Hanaper, the Deputy Clerk of the Hanaper, the Deputy Sealer, and the Deputy Chaff-wax. No man in England could get a Patent for an Indian-rubber band, or an iron-hoop, without feeing all of them. Some of them, over and over again. I went through thirty-five stages. I began with the Queen upon the Throne. I ended with the Deputy Chaff-wax. . . .

I will now conclude with Thomas Joy. Thomas said to me, when we parted, 'John, if the laws of this country were as honest as they ought to be, you would have come to London – registered an exact description and drawing of your invention – paid half-a-crown or so for doing of it – and therein and thereby have got your Patent.' My opinion is the same as Thomas Joy.

The British government was apparently quite moved by the essay and quickly passed the Patent Law Admendment Act of 1852 that established a single office to control patenting. It was not until 1883 that the British Patent Office began a limited examination of the patents — although even at that time the concern was only whether the specification sufficiently described the invention.  As you might expect, Dickens tale was an exaggeration.  The UKIPO reports that in 1850, a patent applicant only needed to visit seven offices (paying the appropriate fee at each).

In a recent essay, Professor Scott Kieff uses Dickens to argue against further layers of post-grant opposition procedures — writing that “[t]oday's patent system already too closely resembles the burdensome and byzantine procedures described in Dickens' A Poor Man's Tale of a Patent. Adding subsequent windows of administrative review will only make matters worse. A better direction is to strip away the range of inter partes administrative procedures and adopt the set of changes to court litigation that are proposed below.” Kief's proposed changes include “easier access to enhanced damages” and a reduction of the presumption of validity. F. Scott Kieff, The Case For Preferring Patent-Validity Litigation Over Second-Window Review And Gold-Plated Patents: When One Size Doesn't Fit All, How Could Two Do The Trick?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1937 (2009).

 

 

Hyatt v. Kappos: Federal Circuit Opens Door to Post-BPAI Civil Actions

By Dennis Crouch

Hyatt v. Kappos (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc)

Summary: In a 6-2-1 en banc decision, the Federal Circuit has reversed its prior precedent and held that a patent applicant must be allowed to introduce new evidence in a Section 145 civil action filed to challenge a USPTO refusal to grant patent rights and that the issues implicated by the new facts must be considered de novo.

[W]e hold that the only limitations on the admissibility of evidence applicable to a § 145 proceeding are the limitations imposed by the Federal Rules of Evidence and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, we hold that the district court applied the wrong legal standard for the admissibility of evidence in a § 145 proceeding and abused its discretion when it excluded Mr. Hyatt's declaration. . . .

The particular significance of a § 145 civil action is that it affords an applicant the opportunity to introduce new evidence after the close of the administra-tive proceedings—and once an applicant introduces new evidence on an issue, the district court reviews that issue de novo.

However, the Court also wrote that an applicant may still be barred from presenting new "issues" in the civil action and that, when no new evidence is presented, that BPAI findings and rulings should be given deference under the Administrative Procedures Act.

Impact: This decision could be seen as relieving some pressure on applicants to ensure that their cases for patentability are exhaustively presented to the USPTO's internal Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI). The decision is especially important in light of the growing role of BPAI appeals in the ordinary course of patent prosecution. In its argument, the USPTO suggests that a strategic applicant may now choose hold-back some evidence from the BPAI appeal in order to overcome the APA deference if the case goes to the District Court.

Statute in Question: 35 U.S.C. § 145 creates a right to a "civil action" in Federal District Court against the USPTO Director whenever an applicant is "dissatisfied with the decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences in an appeal under section 134(a)." In the alternative, an applicant may appeal directly to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

Background: Gil Hyatt is a well-known inventor and successful patentee. Hyatt filed a civil action in 2003 after the BPAI sustained written description and enablement rejections for seventy-nine of Hyatt's claims. The examiner had issued "2546 separate rejections of Mr. Hyatt's 117 claims" based on the doctrines of inadequate "written description, lack of enablement, double patenting, anticipation, and obviousness." The Board reversed all of the examiner rejections except for the § 112 p1 arguments. Complicating this case is the fact that the application's claimed priority date is 1975. Hyatt has aggressively pushed the bounds of USPTO practice. This decision is one of more than a dozen Federal Circuit decisions focusing on Hyatt's patent rights. When California pursued Hyatt for tax revenue for his patent licenses, Hyatt took the case to the Supreme Court and eventually won a $388 million judgment against the state of California for invasion of privacy.

After the Board affirmed a set of written description and enablement rejections, Hyatt filed a Section 145 civil action and included a declaration offering new evidence of enablement and written description. The district court excluded that inventor-declaration from evidence based on Hyatt's "negligence" in failing to previously submit the information to the PTO. In a 2009 panel decision, the Federal Circuit held that the district court had properly excluded the new evidence – holding that the district court may properly exclude evidence that Hyatt should have produced to the PTO. That opinion was penned by former Chief Judge Michel and Joined by Judge Dyk. Judge Moore wrote a vigorous dissent that supported a patent applicant's right to a full civil action including the right to submit additional evidence when challenging a PTO decision.

Judge Moore wrote the en banc decision that was joined by Chief Judge Rader and Judges Lourie, Bryson, Linn, and Prost. Judge Dyk dissented and was joined by Judge Gajarsa. Judge Newman Concurred-in-Part – arguing that the civil action should not give deference to PTO factual determinations.

A key to the majority decision is the notion that a Section 145 civil action is not an appeal, but rather a new, separate lawsuit filed to force the PTO to act. In its analysis, the court began with a focus on the 150-year history of the civil action right (and its predecessor Bill in Equity) and the reality that new evidence has always a part of those remedies. See, e.g., Gandy v. Marble, 122 U.S. 432 (1887) (explaining that the [predecessor] § 4915 suit in equity was "not a technical appeal from the Patent Office, nor confined to the case as made in the record on that office"). The court then reviewed the current text of the statute, implications of the APA, and various policy arguments before reaching its conclusions.

In a 37-page dissent, Judge Dyk argued that the majority made an improper leap from (1) the correct premise that new evidence should be admissible in the civil action to (2) the incorrect conclusion that the law provides no meaningful limits on the introduction of new evidence regardless of what was presented at the BPAI.

Notes:

Law Review Case Note Topics for 2010-2011

Dear Law Review Editors: Please send me a note (dcrouch@patentlyo.com) to let me know about patent law focused articles that you publish in your journal so that I can highlight them on Patently-O.

Student Note Topics: Here are some suggestions for patent law focused law review topics for 2010-11 that I would like to see for my own edification. Please send me an e-mail if you choose one of these.

Federal Circuit Review of Patent Term Extensions

By Jason Rantanen

During the summer, the Federal Circuit is a relatively quiet place.  The judges often take their non-sitting months during this time, and the pace of opinions tends to drop.  Thus, for the next few weeks, I'll mostly be posting summaries of cases that issued this past spring and early summer.  The two cases discussed below deal with a relatively minor — but still important issue in the pharmaceutical and medical device context: patent term extensions based on extensive regulatory review periods. 

Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Lupin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Fed. Cir.  May 10, 2010)
Photocure ASA v. Kappos
(Fed. Cir. May 10, 2010)

35 U.S.C. §156 allows a patentee to obtains a term extension if the patent covers a product that has been subject to a regulatory review period before it can be marketed or used.  Pharmaceuticals and medical devices are subject to such a review period, and new drug products in particular often involve a lengthy application and testing process.  The initial determination as to whether a patent term extension should be granted is made by the USPTO, in consultation with the FDA.  That decision is subject to review or challenge in district court proceedings.

One of the key issues in determining whether a patent term extension is warranted for a drug is whether it is the first time regulatory approval has been granted for this particular drug product, a determination that turns on whether or not the "active ingredient" had previously been approved by the FDA.  Ortho-McNeil and Photocure, both authored by Judge Newman and issued on the same day, provide an interesting contrast on this issue. 

Ortho-McNeil v. Lupin
In Ortho-McNeil, the extension issue arose in the context of an injunction entered against Lupin Pharmaceuticals prohibiting it from making, using, selling, etc. a drug product covered by U.S. Patent No. 5,053,407 (the '407 patent) during the extension period.  In that case, the district court affirmed the PTO's determination that an enantiomer was a different drug product then its racemate. In doing so, the district court noted that the PTO's determination should be afforded great deference.

Note: Enantiomers are molecules that are mirror images of one another.  Due to their different orientation, they have different properties.  A racemate is a composition consisting of equal parts of the two enantiomers.  The '407 patent covered a substantially purified form of one of the two enantiomers (levofloxacin) in the racemate ofloxacin.  There was no dispute that levofloxacin was separately patentable from ofloxacin.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court, concluding that there was no basis for challenging the established FDA and PTO practices of treating enantiomers as different drug products and rejecting Lupin's legislative intent argument.

Photocure v. Kapos
Photocure involved a contrary determination by the PTO: that the drug product at issue was not a different "active ingredient," and thus the patentee was not entitled to an extension.  In Photocure, the product at issue ("MAL") was a methyl ester of a compound ("ALA") that had previously been approved for the same therapeutic use.  While the FDA treated MAL as a new drug, requiring a full approval process, the PTO rejected the extension based on its conclusion that § 156(f)(2) does not mean the product approved by the FDA, but rather the "active moiety," which it concluded was the same in both MAL and ALA.

Both the district court and Federal Circuit disagreed.  In rejecting the PTO's interpretation of 156(f)(2), the Federal Circuit reasoned that § 156 focuses on the product that is subject to approval by the FDA, not the underlying pharmacological mechanism. Furthermore, Skidmore and Chevron deference standards did not apply because the statute was not unambiguous and the PTO's interpretation was neither persuasive nor consistent. 

Note: although not the primary focus of the opinon, the panel also concluded that the PTO was wrong even under its  "active moiety" interpretation as the biological properties of ALA and MAL are indisputably different.

* * * *

In addition to the issues discussed above, the scope of the injunction in Ortho-McNeil is worth noting.  Although the extension authorized by 35 U.S.C. § 156 covers the "selling" or "using" of the product covered by the patent, the district court enjoined Lupin from engaging in any of the traditional forms of direct infringement, including "making" or "importing."  Despite the literal language of §156, the Federal Circuit affirmed the scope of this injunction because there are no non-pharmaceutical "uses" of the drug product, a point that Lupin apparently conceded.  Although as a practical matter this distinction may be of little value, as pharmaceutical companies often have production facilities located outside the United States, it is something to consider when seeking or opposing litigation under § 156. 

Guest Post: Why Bilski Benefits Startup Companies


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I asked Professor Ted Sichelman to provide his thoughts on how the Bilski decision impacts start-up companies and their incentive to innovate. DC

By Ted Sichelman, University of San Diego School of Law

Before practicing law and becoming a professor, I founded and ran a small software company that sells speech recognition software to taxicab companies. After my company designed its technology, we filed for patents. Later on, when raising financing from angel and venture capital investors, they reviewed our pending applications carefully and considered them a way to stop potential competition. Indeed, in a recent survey of startup firms, the Berkeley Patent Survey—which I conducted with Robert Merges and Pamela Samuelson of UC Berkeley School of Law and Stuart Graham (now Chief Economist at the PTO)—startup executives reported that nearly 70% of venture capital firms and 50% of angel investors said that patents were important to their investment decisions. Relatively broad patentable subject matter assists startups in raising needed funds. As I have argued elsewhere, another reason for broad subject matter is that startups engage in substantial amounts of post-invention—but pre-commercialization—innovation that is not always technological in nature. For instance, many startups generate marketing, financial, legal, and other types of non-technological innovations during the costly commercialization process. Providing IP protection for these innovations not only can produce more of them, but also can help drive technology commercialization.

Assuming the Federal Circuit and the PTO do not go astray in implementing Bilski—which admittedly leaves many doors open to do so—the opinion will allow startups to continue to use patents to garner financing and will, hopefully, set an appropriate balance on the patentability of non-technological inventions. In particular, as I urged in an amicus brief with Professors Mark Lemley, Michael Risch, and Polk Wagner—Bilski rightly adheres to the 150-year old tradition that as long as the claimed invention is a machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or a process, only natural phenomena, laws of nature, and abstract ideas should be excluded from eligible subject matter.

One might contend that by allowing business methods—as well as software and other “intangible” innovations—to be patented, startup firms will encounter a greater “thicket” of patents, making it more difficult for them to enter particular markets. For example, an amicus brief in Bilski filed on behalf of “entrepreneurial and consumer advocates” argued that “if the PTO is permitted to grant broad business and service process patents, small start-up businesses would face an entirely new regime of business regulation – essentially requiring businesses to request private permits to operate from their competitors who have patents, independent of whatever technology the new business uses to compete.” Justice Stevens’ echoed this view by writing in his concurrence that business methods patents “can take a particular toll on small and upstart businesses.”

In actuality, under the Federal Circuit’s previous State Street Bank opinion, in operation for a decade prior to Bilski, the PTO regularly granted “broad business and service process patents” and there is little evidence that these patent-holders required startups to license them in any significant numbers. The Berkeley Patent Survey found that only 8% of the population of respondent software companies and 12% of venture-backed software companies had licensed-in even one patent. In sum total, a relatively low percentage, 0.6% and 3%, respectively, reported licensing a patent solely to avoid a lawsuit. And while Bilski ultimately holds that business methods are not per se unpatentable, the practical effect of the outcome will be to place unapplied business methods into the precluded “abstract idea” category. If implemented properly, such an approach will ensure that startups—and, indeed, larger and more established companies—are not unnecessarily subject to overly broad patents while maintaining robust incentives to innovate.

Ted Sichelman is an Assistant Professor at the University of San Diego School of Law, where he teaches patent law and other intellectual property courses.

Gary Locke: Patent Office Needs Self-Control of Funding and Enhanced Post-Grant Review

PatentLawPic985The following essay was written by Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke and originally published in Politico. Locke is the former Governor of Washington and former partner at Davis Wright Tremaine. As you may know, the US Patent & Trademark Office operates as a branch of the Department of Commerce. 

* * * * *

As Congress hurtles toward the midterm elections, there are two things everyone agrees Washington needs to keep working on: spurring job creation and promoting continuing economic recovery.

Fortunately, there’s legislation now before Congress that has bipartisan support, can boost our economy and doesn’t add a cent to our federal debt. This bill aims to fix the outdated patent system, which has left the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office with a backlog of 750,000 applications — a backlog that’s threatening America’s ability to innovate. 

And that’s a big problem, because innovation is the lifeblood of the U.S. economy. The introduction of new products and services accounts for three-quarters of America’s annual growth rate since World War II. This innovation is fueled by businesses, inventors and entrepreneurs who depend on patent protection to attract capital investment and to promote and protect their products and services in the global marketplace. Today, America’s patent system – and by extension our entire innovation system – isn’t working. As a result, we are jeopardizing our edge in the global economy.

America may still be a world leader in key metrics of economic success – like levels of entrepreneurship, R&D investment and IT infrastructure – but a report last year from the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation concluded that no advanced economy has done less than the United States to improve its competitive position over the past decade. President Barack Obama sees the urgency of this problem and has announced a formal National Innovation Strategy, which, among other things, calls for doubling the budgets of agencies like the National Science Foundation so they can better support the basic research that spawns new products and services.

But to unleash the full power of America’s innovators, we’ve got to repair an overloaded and inefficient patent system. The unacceptably long backlog at the patent office – in which the average time it takes to grant or deny a patent is more than 34 months – is a striking signal of the system’s dysfunction. Since taking over at the patent office last August, David Kappos has already made significant strides in reforming the workplace, improving productivity and boosting morale. These steps and others have been applauded by all sectors of the innovation community. But additional, desperately needed reforms require action by Congress. The Commerce Department just released a white paper that quantifies the effect America’s patent system has on the economy and job creation and describes the benefits of two key elements of pending patent reform legislation.

First, Congress will grant fee-setting authority to the patent office, which will enable it to adjust the actual costs of the services it provides. This could contribute significantly to the office’s ability to reduce the application backlog by 40 percent. Second, creating an enhanced post-grant review procedure within the office will provide an alternative to costly – and often lengthy – litigation. It could also provide greater marketplace certainty – at lower cost. This review procedure is expected to be 50-100 times less expensive than litigation.

The patent reform legislation being considered by both chambers will also improve patent quality, streamline the patent examination process, promote international harmonization of patent law and limit litigation expenses. All these provisions will foster innovation and contribute to long-term economic growth. As we move forward on reforming our patent laws, we need to remember that the ultimate goal is to create more American jobs that can provide dignity, security and a sense of hope for the future. After a decade fueled by speculation and short-term thinking, the United States needs to refocus on nurturing innovations that generate real value for society and spur sustainable job creation. It’s not the role of the federal government to predict or dictate exactly how this new economy will take shape. Our job is to create the right set of incentives, regulations and laws that allow innovators to experiment with new ideas, build new businesses and follow their dreams. Patent reform legislation is a key part of this strategy. To promote continued economic recovery, it is critical for Congress to create a business environment that fosters innovation and risk taking ‹ accelerating economic growth and job creation and expanding America’s ability to innovate. Now is the time to act. Congress should seize this opportunity and send patent reform legislation to the president’s desk. Gary Locke is the secretary of commerce.

Department of Commerce Reports that PTO Fee-Setting-Authority and Improved Post-Grant Patent Challenge Lead to Economic Growth

Doc-largeThe Department of Commerce has released a white-paper discussing the economic value of innovation and coupling that value to the need for reform of the US Patent Laws.  The report focuses on (1) the need for “timely patents” in order to successfully obtain venture capital financing; (2) the need for “high-quality” patents in the area of pharmaceuticals; and (3) the negative effects of poor quality patents and uncertainty in enforcement.  These background points are fairly well accepted. 

The more controversial aspect of the report are the Department’s policy conclusions. Namely, the Department of Commerce argues that (1) USPTO Fee setting authority (and what the Office does with that authority) will help to reduce the backlog; and (2) more broadly available and efficient post grant opposition proceedings will help reduce the cost of litigation. Finally, the report notes that the US patent office is “tax-free” in the sense that taxpayer money is not used to administer the office. The ability to avoid appropriations makes PTO reform a politically attractive policy lever.

USPTO fee-setting authority adds flexibility, allows the Office to more quickly raise needed funds, and also allows for the potential of aligning align fees with actual costs.  As an example, the white paper notes that “abandoned” applications pay only about one-third of the total examination costs.  That front-end cost is “subsidized by back-end patent issuance and maintenance fees that are assessed on successful applicants.”  The report states flatly that “With fee-setting authority, the USPTO could deliver on its aggressive goal of reducing to 20 months total average pendency. This anticipated 40% reduction in average pendency would offer greater certainty to innovators of all stripes, allowing for more timely and accurate R&D investments, and thus, substantially improve prospects for improvement in the Nation’s innovative performance and overall economic growth.”

A more efficient post grant review system would benefit the patent system offering a low-cost and quick mechanism to challenge weak patents. “These patents will then be taken out of the system, saving both potential litigation costs and costs to consumers from the exercise of unwarranted market power. . . . Indeed, almost every academic economist who has ever examined whether an enhanced system of post-grant review should be adopted has favored such adoption. . . . [E]nhanced post-grant review also offers advantages to those seeking to assert valid patents. Litigation-related delay in the resolution of validity contributes to uncertainty for technology investors, increasing the likelihood of underinvestment and mistaken investment, and adding transaction costs to technology commercialization.”

The report is titled “Patent Reform: Unleashing Innovation, Promoting Economic Growth & Producing High-Paying Jobs” and is signed by Professors Arti Rai (Chief Administrator of the USPTO’s office of External Affairs), Stuart Graham (Chief Economist of the USPTO), and Mark Doms (Chief Economist of the Department of Commerce).

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Guest Post: Ariad v. Lily: Choosing to Not Disrupt the Settled Expectations of the Patent Community

I asked Howard Skaist for his views on the recent decision in Ariad v. Eli Lilly. He wrote the following:

* * * * *

By Howard Skaist of Berkeley Law, LLC.

In an en banc case closely watched by the patent bar, the Federal Circuit made little change to the law regarding written description and provided little additional guidance, despite a majority opinion nearly 40 pages long, two concurrences, two dissents and having received 25 amicus briefs. At a high level, the case can probably be best understood as having been resolved on policy grounds in the face of an unclear statute and Supreme Court precedent that does not directly address the question at hand; however, policy is only a portion of the justification that the majority of the full court uses for the outcome. 

The fundamental question is whether or not a separate and independent written description requirement exists under 35 USC section 112, first paragraph.  The majority answers the question in the affirmative, relying on the language of the statute, Supreme Court precedent and policy considerations.  However, the concurrence and dissenting opinions demonstrate that this language of the statute is far from clear and that the Supreme Court precedent does not really address the question directly.  Therefore, the main division among the judges appears to rest on policy considerations.  In addition to the policy considerations regarding the advisability of a written description requirement, the majority apparently does not want to “disrupt the settled expectations of the inventing community….”  Majority Opinion at 16. 

The facts of this case suggest that it may have been a good one to test policy rationales since it was brought by a variety of academic and research institutions, including MIT and Harvard, against Eli Lilly.  The inventors had made a fundamental research discovery in biotechnology and hypothesized several possible ways to take advantage of it, but it took those working in the field several more years to successfully develop a product exploiting the discovery.  Therefore, at the core of this case, a legitimate question exists regarding the role or purpose of a patent system and how research or academic institutions should fare under existing legal standards.  Also telling is the citation by Gajarsa in his concurrence of work by Dennis Crouch and Chris Holman showing that few cases have invalidated claims based on written description.  Linn, in his dissent, also cites to Crouch’s work. 

Ariad and a variety of institutions sued Eli Lilly on US Patent 6,410,516 the day the patent issued.  The inventors were the first to identify NF-xB and uncover the mechanism by which it activates gene expression underlying the body’s immune response to infection.  Thus, the inventors recognized and suggested that artificially interfering with NF-xB activity could reduce harmful symptoms of certain diseases.  At the District Court level, a jury determined that Lily infringed the four claims asserted and determined the patent to not be invalid for anticipation, lack of enablement or lack of written description.  However, on appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed and held the patent invalid under 35 USC 112, first paragraph, for failing to provide an adequate written description.  Ariad petitioned for en banc review and the Federal Circuit granted the petition. 

In the en banc opinion, the majority does a good job clarifying the heart of the dispute by stating: “[A]lthough the parties take diametrically opposed positions on the existence of a written description requirement separate from enablement, both agree that the specification must contain a written description of the invention to establish what the invention is.  The dispute, therefore, centers on the standard to be applied and whether it applies to original claim language.”  The point of departure therefore appears to center more upon whether or not original claims can be held invalid for lack of written description or not.  The conventional view had been that a claim supports itself.  However, Federal Circuit decisions in the last few years have challenged that thinking, such as Fiers v. Revel, Enzo v. Gen-Probe and LizardTech v. Earth Res. Mapping.  Here, the Federal Circuit establishes that those decisions were correct. 

As alluded to above, the majority does not agree with Ariad’s arguments about the wording of the statute or its characterization of the relevant Supreme Court precedent.  However, Gajarsa, while concurring, states: “[T]he text of section 112, paragraph 1 is a model of legislative ambiguity.”  Likewise, even the majority, in discussing the Supreme Court precedent concedes: “Although the Court did not expressly state that it was applying a description of the invention requirement separate from enablement, that is exactly what the Court did.” Majority Opinion at 14. Therefore, Ariad’s points may have more substance than the majority concedes. Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit states that “[a]s a subsidiary federal court,” majority opinion at 15, it is obligated to follow such precedent.  The Federal Circuit, however, does directly address Ariad’s contention that original claims should be treated differently than amended claims saying that the distinction does not exist in the language of section 112 and that Ariad has not provided a principled basis for making the distinction being asserted.  Majority Opinion at 19. 

The court challenges directly the thinking that an original claim necessarily supports itself under written description: 

“Although many original claims will satisfy the written description requirement, certain claims may not. For example, a generic claim may define the boundaries of a vast genus of chemical compounds, and yet the question may still remain whether the specification, including original claim language, demonstrates that the applicant has invented species sufficient to support a claim to a genus. The problem is especially acute with genus claims that use functional language to define the boundaries of a claimed genus. In such a case, the functional claim may simply claim a desired result, and may do so without describing species that achieve that result. But the specification must demonstrate that the applicant has made a generic invention that achieves the claimed result and do so by showing that the applicant has invented species sufficient to support a claim to the functionally-defined genus.”  Majority Opinion at 20. 

The majority does provide a few clarifying points regarding application of written description: 

“[The] hallmark of written description is disclosure. Thus, ‘possession as shown in the disclosure’ is a more complete formulation. Yet whatever the specific articulation, the test requires an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art.”  Majority Opinion at 24 

The court also acknowledges the disadvantage that this law creates for basic research institutions: 

“[T]he patent law has always been directed to the ‘useful Arts,’ U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, meaning inventions with a practical use, see Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 532-36 (1966). Much university research relates to basic research, including research into scientific principles and mechanisms of action, see, e.g., Rochester, 358 F.3d 916, and universities may not have the resources or inclination to work out the practical implications of all such research, i.e., finding and identifying compounds able to affect the mechanism discovered. That is no failure of the law’s interpretation, but its intention.” 

Conceding that enablement and written description are similar, the court nonetheless maintains that in some fields they can be quite different, particularly in chemistry and biotech: 

“Perhaps there is little difference in some fields between describing an invention and enabling one to make and use it, but that is not always true of certain inventions, including chemical and chemical-like inventions. Thus, although written description and enablement often rise and fall together, requiring a written description of the invention plays a vital role in curtailing claims that do not require undue experimentation to make and use, and thus satisfy enablement, but that have not been invented, and thus cannot be described.”

The Relevance of Invention Date in Patent Prosecution: Part I

I am traveling over the next few days and so I pre-wrote a handful of blog posts relating to an article that I wrote for the Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review (MTTLR). The article has the perhaps overly provocative title: Is Novelty Obsolete? Chronicling the Irrelevance of the Invention Date in U.S. Patent Law, 16 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. __ (2010).

The abstract reads as follows:

Abstract: The US first-to-invent patent regime is unique in that it allows a patent applicant to assert priority rights back to the invention date. The level of reliance on inventorship rights is important because it informs the longstanding policy debate over whether the US should conform to a first-to-file system as well as for patent applicant strategy. Prior studies have considered the use of inter partes interference proceedings. However, that approach necessarily ignores ex parte prosecution.   

This paper presents a normative study of patent applicant use of invention-date rights during ex parte prosecution. Three sources inform the primary results: the prosecution history files of 21,000+ patent applications filed in the past decade; a survey of 1,000+ patent practitioners regarding their use of the novelty provisions of the Patent Act; and a collection of 11,000,000+ prior art references cited in recently-issued patents. Additional compilations of prosecution file histories for patents identified as either (1) valuable or (2) worthless supplement these data sets and allow for an evaluation of the differential importance of the novelty rights. Finally, a set of opinions from the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) evidences the difficulty of proving a prior invention date.

During prosecution, most patent applicants are faced with non-102(b) prior art that could be antedated. Yet, very few applicants actually attempt to assert prior-invention rights. A miniscule 0.1% of cases in my large sample included an assertion of novelty rights that directly led to an issued patent. The process of claiming priority to a pre-filing invention-date requires that an applicant prove prior conception and due diligence or reduction-to-practice. The difficulty of attempting to prove these elements are laid-out in a set of administrative patent appeal decisions where 77% of attempts to antedate references were rejected by the administrative court.

Given the difficulty of asserting invention-date-based novelty rights, it is unsurprising that applicants are more likely to assert such rights in cases of highly valuable inventions, choosing not to waste money in less valuable cases. Furthermore and perhaps contrary to conventional wisdom, my findings suggest that individual inventors assert invention-date-based novelty rights relatively less often and less successfully than large, publicly traded companies. Lastly, a practitioner survey of 1000+ patent law professionals reveals, inter alia, a shared concern that attempts to antedate prior art leave patents open to challenge during litigation by providing “fodder” for validity challenges.

Notes:

Appealing BPAI Rejections in Ex Parte Reexaminations

I have to admit some prior confusion as to the rules governing appeals from adverse BPAI decisions during an ex parte reexamination. My confusion stems from three potentially conflicting provisions in the Patent Act.

35 U.S.C. 145 indicates that “[a]n applicant dissatisfied with the decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences in an appeal under section 134(a) of this title may, unless appeal has been taken to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, have remedy by civil action against the Director in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia . . . .

35 U.S.C. 306 indicates that “[t]he patent owner involved in a reexamination proceeding . . . may seek court review under the provisions of sections 141 to 145 of this title, with respect to any decision adverse to the patentability of any original or proposed amended or new claim of the patent.

35 U.S.C. 141 indicates that “[a] patent owner, or a third-party requester in an inter partes reexamination proceeding, who is in any reexamination proceeding dissatisfied with the final decision in an appeal to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences under section 134 may appeal the decision only to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.”

§145 was part of the original 1952 Patent Act. §306 was added to the Patent Act in 1980 when ex parte reexaminations were introduced. In 1999, §141 was amended to add the limitation that “[a] patent owner in any reexamination proceeding dissatisfied with the final decision in an appeal to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences under §134 may appeal the decision only to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.” In 2002, the portion regarding “inter partes reexaminations” was added to §141.

Conflicting: §141 indicates that a patent owner in reexam may only appeal a BPAI decision to the CAFC; Section 306 indicates that the patent owner in reexam may appeal under either §141 or §145; §145 indicates the availability of an appeal in district court.  Of course, §145 focuses on an “applicant” rather than a patent owner, but pre 1999–cases held that patent owners whose patents are undergoing reexamination are “applicants” for the purposes of §145.

Solution: The PTO interpretation found in 37 C.F.R. § 1.303 and in MPEP § 2279 is that §145 controls and that reexaminations may only be appealed to the Federal Circuit. The caveat is that reexaminations filed prior to the 1999 amendment of §145 may also be appealed to a district court  under §141.

In a 2009 decision, an Eastern District of Virginia court recognized the statutory tension but substantially agreed with the PTO interpretation:

[T]he fact that § 306 continues to cross-reference §§ 141 to 145 following the AIPA’s enactment appears to be in tension with the AIPA amendment to § 141: Although § 145 authorizes a patent applicant–and thus a patent owner under the plain terms of § 306–to file a civil action in the D.C. District Court, § 141 was specifically amended to allow patent owners dissatisfied with a BPAI decision to “appeal the decision only to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.” Id. § 141 (emphasis added). Despite this tension, the statutory provisions continue to make clear that a patent owner’s right to seek court review of a BPAI decision accrues only after the BPAI renders a “decision adverse to the patentability of any original or proposed amended or new claim of the patent.” Id. § 306; see also id. §§ 141-145. Sigram Schindler v. Kappos, 2009 WL 4981473 (E.D. Va. Dec. 18, 2009).

Charles Miller of Dickstein Shapiro has worked on this issue and directed me to the statutory problem. In a forthcoming article, Miller and Daniel Archibald argue that the PTO’s interpretation is wrong and constitutes an unlawful extension of the agency’s authority. In particular, they argue that “Congress did not entrust the PTO with administering, nor did it authorize the agency to enact rules interpreting § 141, § 145, and § 306 of the Patent Act . . . these statutes pertain only to rights in proceedings outside the PTO’s jurisdiction and operational domain, and are exclusively for the courts to interpret and apply in cases that they decide.”

Notes:

  • Read the Sigram Schindler Opinion [File Attachment: SigramSchindlerMemo.pdf (1522 KB)]
  • Read the (losing) arguments by Sigram Schindler [File Attachment: SigramSchindlerBrief.pdf (86 KB)]
  • Reexam Center discusses the Sigram Schindler decision [Link]
  • Note, the Sigram Schindler decision was filed in E.D.Va. because the patentee was challenging the USPTO interpretation of the statutes rather than actually attempting to appeal BPAI decision.
  • The Schindler reexamination was filed by Cisco on US Patent No. 6,954,453. Cisco and Schindler (Teles) are currently litigating an infringement suit over the patent.

 

Patently-O Bits and Bytes No. 302

  • Texas Juries: Michael Smith reviews E.D. Texas patent trial verdicts for 2009 (thus far). Depending upon how you count, the score ranges “from 8-3-1 to 6-6-1 (depend[ing] on whether you count a post-jury selection grant of summary judgment or not).” [Link]
  • Judge Michel: A transcript of Chief Judge Paul Michel’s recent speech to the FCBA is now available through that organization’s website. [Link] In addition to announcing his retirement, Judge Michel argued strongly against a statutory right to appeal claim construction decisions. His discussion also touched on the fact that eight of the twelve Federal Circuit judging slots could open within the next 12-months. He suggests that the replacements should include (a) a district court judge and (b) a patent litigator who has extensive experience trying commercial cases in front of juries. Judge Michel suggested room for diversity on the court since all members are white and only 25% are women.
  • Appointing Judges: Regarding Federal Circuit appointments. The Obama administration is already focused on ensuring that minorities and women receive their share of appointments. In the words of Judge Michel, it is the Bar’s job to help “assure that the appointees to the Court are selected based on merit, on experience, on quality, on intellect, on intelligence, on energy, and not because they’re, you know, somebody’s cousin or whatever the other considerations might be.”
  • Concentration of Ownership: Hal Wegner and Justin Gray review the top 150 patent holders and reports on growing ownership concentration. [Link][See also Patent Prospector]
  • Written Description: Amicus Briefs in Ariad v. Lilly: Patent Docs Review the Briefs. [Link]
  • Presumption of Validity: Lucent v. Gateway: The Federal Circuit has denied Microsoft’s petition for rehearing. Microsoft is expected to file a petition to the Supreme Court focusing on the interpretation of Section 282’s “presumption of validity.” Microsoft questions whether that statute is properly construed to always require clear and convincing evidence of invalidity.
  • Presumption of Validity Redux: In a recent article, Scott Kieff and Henry Smith argue for a reduction in the presumption of validity. [Link]
  • Reexaminations: Reexamination Statistics: Of the 734 inter partes reexaminations that have been requested in the past decade, 498 (68%) are “known to be in litigation.” [Link]

Patently-O Bits and Bytes No. 302

  • Texas Juries: Michael Smith reviews E.D. Texas patent trial verdicts for 2009 (thus far). Depending upon how you count, the score ranges “from 8-3-1 to 6-6-1 (depend[ing] on whether you count a post-jury selection grant of summary judgment or not).” [Link]
  • Judge Michel: A transcript of Chief Judge Paul Michel’s recent speech to the FCBA is now available through that organization’s website. [Link] In addition to announcing his retirement, Judge Michel argued strongly against a statutory right to appeal claim construction decisions. His discussion also touched on the fact that eight of the twelve Federal Circuit judging slots could open within the next 12-months. He suggests that the replacements should include (a) a district court judge and (b) a patent litigator who has extensive experience trying commercial cases in front of juries. Judge Michel suggested room for diversity on the court since all members are white and only 25% are women.
  • Appointing Judges: Regarding Federal Circuit appointments. The Obama administration is already focused on ensuring that minorities and women receive their share of appointments. In the words of Judge Michel, it is the Bar’s job to help “assure that the appointees to the Court are selected based on merit, on experience, on quality, on intellect, on intelligence, on energy, and not because they’re, you know, somebody’s cousin or whatever the other considerations might be.”
  • Concentration of Ownership: Hal Wegner and Justin Gray review the top 150 patent holders and reports on growing ownership concentration. [Link][See also Patent Prospector]
  • Written Description: Amicus Briefs in Ariad v. Lilly: Patent Docs Review the Briefs. [Link]
  • Presumption of Validity: Lucent v. Gateway: The Federal Circuit has denied Microsoft’s petition for rehearing. Microsoft is expected to file a petition to the Supreme Court focusing on the interpretation of Section 282’s “presumption of validity.” Microsoft questions whether that statute is properly construed to always require clear and convincing evidence of invalidity.
  • Presumption of Validity Redux: In a recent article, Scott Kieff and Henry Smith argue for a reduction in the presumption of validity. [Link]
  • Reexaminations: Reexamination Statistics: Of the 734 inter partes reexaminations that have been requested in the past decade, 498 (68%) are “known to be in litigation.” [Link]

Patently-O Bits and Bytes No. 302

  • Texas Juries: Michael Smith reviews E.D. Texas patent trial verdicts for 2009 (thus far). Depending upon how you count, the score ranges “from 8-3-1 to 6-6-1 (depend[ing] on whether you count a post-jury selection grant of summary judgment or not).” [Link]
  • Judge Michel: A transcript of Chief Judge Paul Michel’s recent speech to the FCBA is now available through that organization’s website. [Link] In addition to announcing his retirement, Judge Michel argued strongly against a statutory right to appeal claim construction decisions. His discussion also touched on the fact that eight of the twelve Federal Circuit judging slots could open within the next 12-months. He suggests that the replacements should include (a) a district court judge and (b) a patent litigator who has extensive experience trying commercial cases in front of juries. Judge Michel suggested room for diversity on the court since all members are white and only 25% are women.
  • Appointing Judges: Regarding Federal Circuit appointments. The Obama administration is already focused on ensuring that minorities and women receive their share of appointments. In the words of Judge Michel, it is the Bar’s job to help “assure that the appointees to the Court are selected based on merit, on experience, on quality, on intellect, on intelligence, on energy, and not because they’re, you know, somebody’s cousin or whatever the other considerations might be.”
  • Concentration of Ownership: Hal Wegner and Justin Gray review the top 150 patent holders and reports on growing ownership concentration. [Link][See also Patent Prospector]
  • Written Description: Amicus Briefs in Ariad v. Lilly: Patent Docs Review the Briefs. [Link]
  • Presumption of Validity: Lucent v. Gateway: The Federal Circuit has denied Microsoft’s petition for rehearing. Microsoft is expected to file a petition to the Supreme Court focusing on the interpretation of Section 282’s “presumption of validity.” Microsoft questions whether that statute is properly construed to always require clear and convincing evidence of invalidity.
  • Presumption of Validity Redux: In a recent article, Scott Kieff and Henry Smith argue for a reduction in the presumption of validity. [Link]
  • Reexaminations: Reexamination Statistics: Of the 734 inter partes reexaminations that have been requested in the past decade, 498 (68%) are “known to be in litigation.” [Link]

Stays Pending Reexamination

The following guest post is by Matthew Smith

The grant rate of motions to stay is highly judge-dependent and (somewhat less obviously) district-dependent. The table below shows the approximate grant rate of contested motions to stay in major patent litigation districts since about the beginning of 2008. These data included around 150 motions, after excluding follow-on or duplicate motions on the same facts (e.g., in parallel cases against different defendants), stipulated motions, patent-owner-initiated motions, and motions initiated by declaratory judgment plaintiffs. The districts below are listed in order of decreasing frequency of the occurrence of such motions.

pic-74.jpg

The Eastern District of Virginia, Western District of Wisconsin, and Northern and Middle Districts of Florida had relatively few orders, and were excluded.

A review of the orders confirms a relatively clean division into favorable and unfavorable judges for stays. This division is often flawlessly mirrored in the reasoning of written orders. Courts usually analyze three factors when considering stays: prejudice, timing and simplification. Where stays are disfavored, courts focus on the prejudice that delay may cause to the patent owner, find excessive delay in filing the request a few months after service of the complaint, and identify a plethora of issues that will be left unresolved by reexamination. Courts where stays are favored search in vain for particularized prejudice to the plaintiff (e.g. deteriorating evidence), find that requests submitted on the eve of trial are timely, and focus on the possibility that the claims could be canceled by the PTO when analyzing simplification.

Despite this division, some courts are breaking out of the paradigm of binary yes-or-no orders. The relatively few stays granted in East Texas pending ex parte reexamination, for example, have usually required the defendant to forego defenses on the merits of prior art considered in reexamination (see QPSX Dev. v. Ciena Corp., Case No. 2:07-CV-118-CE (E.D.Tex. Aug. 27, 2009) or submitted to reexamination unless combined with new art (see Premier Int’l Assoc. LLC v. Hewlett Packard Co., Case No. 2:07-CV-395 (DF)(E.D.Tex. May 18, 2009). One court has required non-requesting defendants to agree to be bound by inter partes estoppel (see Riparius Ventures LLC v. Skype Technologies, S.A., Case No. 07-cv-00812 (N.D.Ill. June 6, 2009). Some courts are also more flexible with timing, granting stays even prior to the PTO’s decision on the request for reexamination, (see, e.g. CTC Cable Corp. v. Mercury Cable & Energy, LLC, Case No. SACV 09-261 DOC (C.D.Cal. Aug. 3, 2009), or pending some specific event in reexamination (see, e.g. HTC Corp. v. Technology Properties Ltd., Case Nos. C 08-00882 JF and C 08-00877 JF (N.D.Cal. June 16, 2009)).

There also appears to be a recent trend favoring stays pending inter partes reexamination, as opposed to ex parte reexamination. The estoppel associated with inter partes reexamination is sometimes viewed as a simplifying factor for issues in litigation. See, e.g., Anascape Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., Case No. 9:06-CV-158 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2007); see also Ceiva Logic Inc. v. Frame Media Inc., Case No. SACV 08-00636-JVS (C.D.Cal. June 9, 2009); Wall Corp. v. Bonddesk Group LLC, Case No. 07-844 GMS (D.Del. Feb. 24, 2009).

The data for this study were helpfully provided by the Docket Navigator.

Challenging the Strong Presumption of Patent Validity

One of the next major legal challenges to patent rights will be against the strong presumption of validity associated with the patent grant. Section 282 of the patent act says only that a patent and its claims "shall be presumed valid." Under longstanding doctrine, this presumption can only be overcome with clear and convincing evidence of invalidity. The challenge to this presumption is most likely on two fronts: (1) expanded post-grant review and (2) court challenges to the weight of the presumption.

Expanded Post Grant Review: The PTO uses the lower preponderance (more likely than not) standard when refusing to grant patent rights, and expanded post-grant oppositions will likely allow would-be defendants to challenge patents at the lower standard.

Challenging the Weight of the Presumption: The greater change would come, however, if the Supreme Court takes a case on point. Since the 1952 Supreme Court has not definitively weighed-in on the the level of proof necessary to overcome the statutory presumption of validity, and the Court's Radio Corp (1934) opinion arguably sums up the pre-unification state of the law: "The force of that presumption has found varying expression in this and other courts." Of course, the unified Federal Circuit cleared the air by firmly establishing the clear and convincing standard as the standard. In a 2004 article, Mark Janis reviews the history of the presumption – finding that the clear and convincing standard was already the majority rule prior to unification, but that the Federal Circuit made the standard "meaningful once again." His message: "there is no strict, inevitable correlation between the words of the evidentiary standard and the overlying message delivered by the presumption of validity."

More recently, in KSR the Supreme Court all but suggested one potential petition question: "whether the failure to disclose [relevant prior art] during prosecution … voids the presumption of validity given to issued patents." A more likely focus may be on reducing strength of the presumption over prior art that was not considered during prosecution.

Question: How would patent practice change if the strong presumption of validity was only applicable over prior art actually considered during prosecution?

Notes:

  • I do not believe that the presumption of validity should be reduced. However, I wrote this post to let folks know that it is on the horizon and that a change is somewhat likely during the life of any currently pending patent application.
  • Mark Janis, Reforming Patent Validity Litigation: The "Dubious Preponderance", 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 923 (2004).
  • This post was prompted by an e-mail amongst IP law professors with special input from Mark Lemley, Arti Rai, David Hricik, Howard Skaist, Josh Sarnoff and Tom Field. See also Mark A. Lemley and Douglas Lichtman, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of Validity, 60 Stanford Law Review 45 (2007)(suggesting gold-plated patents).

Bits and Bytes No. 101: Patent Bill & the Patent Lobby

  • Reform: Today, the Senate Judiciary Committee met shortly and announced that an agreement is “close” on all of the controversial issues and that the compromise will result in a major overhaul of S. 515. Gene Quinn has instant-comments. Potential changes include: (1) codifying the existing law of damages rather than changing it – except that a judicial check on jury-awarded damages would be added; (2) eliminate “best mode” as a ground for invalidating a patent; (3) lowering the standard for post grant review to an “interesting question” rather than a “substantial new question of patentability.” We should see some language this week.
  • Reform: A reader sent me the following points on the potential agreed-to compromise Bill in the Senate:
    • Damages. The amendment will strike the contentious calculation of reasonable royalty damages provision and will replace it with the gatekeeper language developed by Senators Feinstein and Specter, which will provide more of a role for the judge to identify the appropriate legal standards and relevant factual contentions for the jury.
    • Inter partes reexamination. The amendment will strike the controversial “in public use or on sale” additions on inter partes reexamination.
    • Best mode. The amendment will retain the requirement that a specification contain the best mode of carrying out the invention as part of the patent application, but not allow best mode to be used as means to invalidate a patent.
    • Interlocutory appeals. The amendment will tighten the interlocutory appeals provision. The bill as introduced would have given the district court complete discretion whether to approve an application for interlocutory appeal of a claims construction hearing. This amendment will provide district court with specific standards that it must certify have been met.
    • Willfulness. The amendment tightens the willfulness provision to ensure is in line with the Federal Circuit’s decision in Seagate.
    • Venue. The amendment will strike the current subsection on venue, and replace it with a codification of the Federal Circuit’s recent decision in TS Tech.
  • Lobby Lobby: The IPO reports that “by early afternoon yesterday, 16 paid ‘line sitters’ were already in line in the corridor outside the [committee] room, holding places for lobbyists to be admitted to the room this morning.”
  • Patent Jobs: The Patently-O Job board has picked-up some steam over the past week. Here are some recent job postings.

Gholz: Linking Post-Grant Review with Interference Procedure

Guest Post by Charles ("Chico") Gholz. Gholz is the head of the Interference Section at Oblon Spivak, a former chair of the Interference Committee of the AIPLA, and a frequent author on interference law and practice. I asked him to provide some thoughts on the proposed post-grant review proposals in the Patent Reform Act of 2009, telling him that I was especially interested in whether we should try to use the interference procedural structure for the new post-grant challenges.

It is my understanding that "the PTO" (actually, the PTO officials directly involved in administering interference matters—by which I mean Chief Administrative Patent Judge Fleming, Vice-Chief Administrative Patent Judge Moore, and Senior Administrative Patent Judge McKelvey) have expected the cancellation proceedings to be a species of the genus contested case and that, accordingly, they would be governed by Part 41, "Practice Before the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences," Subpart D, "Contested Cases," of 37 CFR. To those of us in the interference bar, that makes perfect sense, since the cancellation proceedings will be very, very similar to the first phase (formerly known as the "preliminary motions phase") of patent interferences—except that only one party will be filing substantive motions.

However, proposed 35 USC 326 in both bills provides that "The Director shall prescribe regulations…" governing the post-grant review proceedings (what I'm referring to herein as "cancellation proceedings"). Apparently the drafters of the bills (who I suspect are not members of the patent bar, let alone members of the interference bar!) either were unaware of 37 CFR 41 Subpart D or felt that either additional or different rules would be required for the cancellation proceedings.

Whether the cancellation proceedings are to be governed by Subpart D or by a different set of rules is not an insignificant point. Proposed 35 USC 326(a)(3) in both bills would require the Director to prescribe regulations "setting forth procedures for discovery of relevant evidence, including that such discovery shall be limited to evidence directly related to factual assertions advanced by either party in the proceedings, and [that] the procedures for obtaining such evidence shall be consistent with the purpose and nature of the proceeding." However, while that language could be read as mandating real discovery (i.e., discovery similar to the discovery available in district courts), the bills then go on to mandate that, "In carrying out paragraph (3) [i.e., in providing the rules for discovery], the Director shall bear in mind that discovery must be in the interests of justice," which might be read a giving the PTO room to provide for only the extremely limited kind of discovery that is currently available in interferences. See Gholz, Patent Interferences – Big Ticket Litigation With No Effective Discovery, 4 Intellectual Property Today No. 9 at page 10 (1997).

Similarly, proposed 35 USC 326(b) in both bills would provide that "Regulations under subsection (a)(1) [including the regulations governing discovery]…shall provide for discovery upon order of the Director [actually, it would presumably be upon order of the APJ handling the proceedings]," indicating that, in contrast to district court procedure, the burden of showing entitlement to discovery would be on the party seeking discovery, rather than imposing on that party's adversary the burden of showing why discovery should not be obtained.

Proposed 35 USC 326(b) in both bills would also require the Director to issue regulations providing "for filing under seal exempt from publication requirements" and providing for "protective orders governing the exchange and submission of confidential information"—both of which would be sharp departures from current interference practice. See Gholz, Compelled Testimony, Testimony Abroad, and Protective Orders in Interference Proceedings Under the New Rules, 67 JPTOS 239 (1985). However, 35 USC 326(b) then goes on to say that the Director's regulations "shall ensure that any information submitted by the patent owner in support of any amendment entered under section 329 is made available to the public as part of the prosecution history of the patent." Since the "confidential information" is more likely to be submitted by the patent owner than by its adversary, I wonder how often a protective order will actually issue. Or is the point that the protective order will automatically expire upon conclusion of the cancellation proceeding?

Both the House version and the Senate version of proposed 35 USC 334 govern the effect on cancellation proceedings of decisions in other proceedings (only an infringement action in the Senate version, but either an infringement action or an ITC action in the House version). Surprisingly, both versions seem to assume that the decisions of the courts (or the courts and the ITC), on the one hand, and the decisions of the Board, on the other hand, are of identical issues—despite that fact that the party attacking a patent has a lower burden of proof before the Board and therefore might win before the Board even though it would lose before a court or the ITC on identical evidence.

In sum, I'd like to express my hope that the drafters of the two bills will consult with experts on interference law and practice, both in the PTO and in the private bar, before passing either version of the bill.