Tag Archives: Written Description

35 U.S.C. 112 SPECIFICATION. (a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.

Continuations-in-Part (CIPs) and Priority Claims

September 7, 2012PatentEnablement, First to Invent, obviousness, Written DescriptionDennis Crouch

By Dennis Crouch

This post considers the meaning of priority in a continuation-in-part application and, in particular, when the claimed priority document can serve as prior art against the child.

Yesterday, I wrote about the majority opinion in Santarus v. Par Pharma (Fed. Cir. 2012). In that case, the patentee was fighting for the validity of its continuation-in-part (CIP) patent. A CIP is a patent filing that claims priority to a previously filed parent patent document but that also adds some amount of new material to the disclosure and/or claims. In CIP applications, priority date is determined on a claim-by-claim basis. Of course the priority date is important because it largely defines the scope of prior art available to potentially invalidate the patent claims.

In its decision, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that some of the disputed claims were sufficiently disclosed in the parent filing and therefore properly claimed priority to that original filing date. Another set of claims, however, included matter that was added in the CIP. Those claims with new matter were not given priority to the original filing and thus had to rely on the filing date of the CIP application. Thus, for the claims with new matter any patent issued or document published more than one-year before the CIP filing date would count as prior art under 35 U.S.C. 102(b). See Paperless Accounting v. Bay Area Rapid Transit System, 804 F.2d 659, 665 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

At this point in the analysis, there is a major point of contention between the judges on one particular alleged prior art reference – whether the original patent filing counts as prior art against the child. The parent patent (really, the great grandparent patent) was filed in 1996 and issued as a patent in 1998. The descendent patent in being litigated in this case was not filed until 2003 but claims priority back to the original 1996 filing through a series of continuations and CIPs. Under normal circumstances, a 1998 patent would clearly serve as prior art against a 2003 filing under Section 102(b) as discussed above. However the system of priority claiming to parent applications is designed to overcome that problem by treating the child applications as if they had been filed on the same day as the original ancestor – so long as the procedures of 35 U.S.C. § 120 are followed. Interesting for the purposes of this discussion, Section 120 discusses priority at the patent level rather than claim-by-claim and asks whether the “application for patent” satisfies the written description and enablement requirements.

35 U.S.C. 120 Benefit of earlier filing date in the United States.

An application for patent for an invention disclosed in the manner provided by the first paragraph of section 112 of this title in an application previously filed in the United States . . . shall have the same effect, as to such invention, as though filed on the date of the prior application. . .

In Santarus, the invention of only some of the claims were sufficiently disclosed in the original specification. For those claims that lack priority, the big question is whether and to what extent the original patent can be used as 102(b)/103(a) prior art as part of an obviousness rejection.

In a per curiam opinion, the majority (Chief Judge Rader and Judge Moore) held that – since priority is determined on a claim-by-claim basis – that the original patent was prior art against the claims that lacked priority. Writing in dissent, Judge Newman argued that the priority should be given with regard to material disclosed in the priority document. Judge Newman’s approach also breaks the patent apart but divides priority more precisely according to which material was found in the original disclosure. Under Judge Newman’s approach, the original filing cannot be used as a priority document.

Newman writes:

The panel majority forgets that “matter disclosed in the parent application is entitled to the benefit of the filing date of the parent application.” Waldemar Link, GmbH & Co. v. Osteonics Corp., 32 F.3d 556 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“The earlier filing date of the parent application pertains to material in the C-I-P application also disclosed in the prior application. 35 U.S.C. §120.”). Instead, the panel majority relies upon the common subject matter from the ‘737 [original] patent disclosure to invalidate the ‘885 claims supported by that subject matter. This is incorrect, for the common subject matter in the ‘885 patent is entitled to the ‘737 filing date. That entitlement is not lost by issuance of the ‘737 patent.

Of course, majority did not “forget” as Judge Newman suggested. Rather, the majority found that the patentee had “waived any argument that the ‘737 patent is not prior art to the other claims” by failing to appeal that point.

+ + + + +

Although distinguishable, the most on-point decision relating to this issue may well be In re Chu, 66 F.3d 292 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In that case (and with Judge Newman on the panel), the Federal Circuit ruled that the asserted priority document could be used as prior art because all of the claims included added limitations not found in the priority document. The court wrote:

Chu is entitled to the benefit of the Doyle patent filing date only if the Doyle patent discloses the subject matter now claimed by Chu. This, however, is admitted by Chu not to be the case. In fact, Chu states that “the invention as now claimed[ ] was not described in the [Doyle] patent.” Specifically, Chu concedes that “nothing in Doyle suggests that SCR catalyst be placed inside the bag filter.” Therefore, independent claim 1, which includes this limitation, and dependent claims 2, 4, and 14, are not supported by the Doyle patent disclosure. Accordingly, Chu cannot obtain the benefit of the Doyle patent filing date for these claims and the Doyle patent was properly relied on as prior art.

The obvious difference between the present case and Chu is that some of the claims are supported by the priority document.

A Higher Written Description Standard for Negative Claim Limitations?

September 6, 2012PatentInequitable Conduct, Licenses, obviousness, Written DescriptionDennis Crouch

By Dennis Crouch

Santarus and the University of Missouri v. Par Pharma (Fed. Cir. 2012)

My employer (University of Missouri) owns several patents covering formulations of omeprazole proton pump inhibitors (PPIs). The patents are exclusively licensed to Santarus who markets the drugs under the brand Zegerid®. Par filed its request to make a generic version which prompted this infringement litigation.

The inventor, Dr. Jeff Phillips is a pharmacist at MU had the simple idea of combining omeprazole with baking soda (sodium bicarbonate). The baking soda helps the drug resist stomach acids long enough to be absorbed in the stomach wall. Although not a blockbuster drug, the approach has been successful for many patients with GERD and Santarus sales are about $40 million per year. (The reported deal is that MU receives about 5% of sales. As the inventor, Phillips receives a small cut from that.)

During litigation the patents were successfully attacked as obvious based upon a preliminary written description challenge.

Written Description Killing Priority and thus Nonobviousness: We know that patent applicants are allowed to narrow patent claims during the prosecution process. The vast majority of issued patent claims are not found in the originally filed patent application but instead are amended during prosecution. This is typically done by adding limitations into the claims as MU did here. The primary constraint on adding limitations is that the newly amended claim must be supported by the original application specification. Thus, a patentee cannot create limitations from thin-air, but must instead identify limitations found in the specification to be added into the claims. In the simple case, newly added claim limitations that are not supported by the specification are rejected for new matter at the USPTO and, once issued, can be invalidated for lacking written description under 35 U.S.C. § 112. The situation is a bit more confusing when the application claims priority to a prior patent filing. Of course, most issued patents do claim priority to a prior patent filing so the family member situation is quite important. In the patent family context, a child application might fully comply with the written description requirement if considered on its own. The child application can also be valid if new matter was added to the specification or claims at the time of filing. However, that new matter (if included within the claims) will mean that the patentee cannot claim priority to the parent application’s filing date. Where the parent case is published more than one year before the patent filing, that parent application can also serve as a prior art against the child application under 35 U.S.C. §102(b) unless priority can be established. (Query how this will works under the AIA?)

In this case, the generic challenger argued that one of the claimed limitations was not supported by the parent patent and, as a consequence, that parent patent serves as a critical piece of prior art that invalidates the claims.

One set of asserted claims were amended from the priority filing to included an exclusionary wherein limitation. In particular, the claims stated that “the composition contains no sucralfate.” The original specification had noted several reasons why omeprazole was preferable to sucralfate. In the same sentence, the specification also indicated that omeprazole is also preferable to sodium bicarbonate for those same reasons. Since sodium bicarbonate is actually an element of the invention, the district court held that the same sentence could not be used to particularly exclude sucralfate without further evidence that sucralfate is contraindicated. On appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected this reasoning – holding that preference statement in the specification was sufficient to justify addition of the exclusionary limitation and that the sodium bicarbonate inclusion (as a buffer) was justified by other portions of the specification.

Higher Bar for Negative Limitations?: The exclusionary limitation here is a negative limitation because it defines what the invention does not contain. Here, the invention does not contain sucralfate. The tradition in patent law has been to avoid negative limitations and, certainly, an invention cannot be wholly defined by negative limitations. However, negative limitations are allowed and are useful at times. It appears that the court sets a higher bar for the inclusion of negative limitations than it does positive elements of a claim. This is done by requiring that the specification include a reason for the exclusion in order to satisfy the written description requirement. The court writes here: “Negative claim limitations are adequately supported when the specification describes a reason to exclude the relevant limitation.” Ordinarily, such justification is not required for positive claim elements – although justifying explanations can be helpful in justifying greater claim breadth.

Although some reasoning is required, the patentee need not disclaim the element in the specification in order to add the exclusionary limitation in the claims. “Such written description support need not rise to the level of disclaimer. In fact, it is possible for the patentee to support both the inclusion and exclusion of the same material.”

With these notions in mind, the court held that the statements in the specification were sufficient to support the exclusionary limitation in this case. “The claim limitation that the Phillips formulations contain no sucralfate is adequately supported by statements in the specification expressly listing the disadvantages of using sucralfate.” And, as a consequence, the parent patent is not a proper prior art reference against those claims supported by the original specification.

Patent with Multiple Priority: In cases with a complex family structure, patent priority is actually determined on a claim-by-claim basis. As discussed above, the Federal Circuit held that some of MU’s claims properly claim priority to the original specification filed with the USPTO. On appeal, the patentee implicitly agreed that some of the other patent claims are not supported by the original specification. For those cases, the original filing qualifies as prior art against the no-priority claims under section 102(b). The question then is whether the newly added material is sufficiently different to avoid invalidation on obviousness.

Without going into detail, the Federal Circuit found that some of the patent claims that qualified for priority were also nonobvious and thus should be treated as valid and enforceable.

Need one to win: In the end, this appears to be a win for Mizzou since a patentee only need a court to find one of its claims is infringed and enforceable.

Notes:

Although I am employed by the University of Missouri, the university is not my client and I have not spoken with any of the university counsel about this case.
Par also appealed the district court’s finding of no inequitable conduct. The Federal Circuit affirmed that holding based upon a lack of clear and convincing evidence of intent deceive the USPTO.

MPEP 2106 Patent Subject Matter Eligibility [R-9]

September 1, 2012PatentAbstract Idea, Affirmed Without Opinion, AIA Trials, anticipation, Broadest Reasonable Interpretation, Claim Construction, Enablement, Licenses, obviousness, PGR, Subject Matter Eligibility, Written DescriptionDennis Crouch

There are two criteria for determining subject matter eligibility and both must be satisfied. The claimed invention (1) must be directed to one of the four statutory categories, and (2) must not be wholly directed to subject matter encompassing a judicially recognized exception, as defined below. The following two step analysis is used to evaluate these criteria.

I. THE FOUR CATEGORIES OF STATUTORY SUBJECT MATTER

Step 1: Is the claim directed to one of the four patent-eligible subject matter categories: process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter? The subject matter of the claim must be directed to one of the four subject matter categories. If it is not, the claim is not eligible for patent protection and should be rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 , for at least this reason. A summary of the four categories of invention, as they have been defined by the courts, are:

i. Process – an act, or a series of acts or steps. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70, 175 USPQ 673, ___ (1972) ("A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing." (emphasis added) (quotingCochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788, 24 L. Ed. 139, 1877 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 242 (1876)); NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1316, 75 USPQ2d 1763, ___(Fed. Cir. 2005) ("A process is a series of acts." (quoting Minton v. Natl. Ass'n. of Securities Dealers, 336 F.3d 1373, , 336 F.3d 1373, 1378, 67 USPQ2d 1614, ___ (Fed. Cir. 2003))). See also 35 U.S.C. 100(b); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 95 USPQ2d 1001 (2010).
ii. Machine – a concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain devices and combination of devices. Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 531, 570, 17 L. Ed. 650 (1863). This includes every mechanical device or combination of mechanical powers and devices to perform some function and produce a certain effect or result. Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267, 14 L. Ed. 683 (1854).
iii. Manufacture – an article produced from raw or prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms, qualities, properties, or combinations, whether by handlabor or by machinery. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308, 206 USPQ 193, ___ (1980) (emphasis added) (quoting Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11, 51 S. Ct. 328, 75 L. Ed. 801, 1931 (Dec. Comm'r Pat. 711 (1931))).
iv. Composition of matter – all compositions of two or more substances and all composite articles, whether they be the results of chemical union, or of mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids, powders or solids, for example. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308.

Non-limiting examples of claims that are not directed to one of the statutory categories:
i. transitory forms of signal transmission (for example, a propagating electrical or electromagnetic signal per se), In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357, 84 USPQ2d 1495, ___ (Fed. Cir. 2007);
ii. a naturally occurring organism, Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308;
iii. a human per se, The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), Public Law 112-29, sec. 33, 125 Stat. 284 (September 16, 2011);
iv. a legal contractual agreement between two parties, see In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1364, 90 USPQ2d 1035, ___ (Fed. Cir. 2009) (cert. denied);
v. a game defined as a set of rules;
vi. a computer program per se, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. at 72;
vii. a company, Ferguson, 558 F.3d at 1366; and
viii. a mere arrangement of printed matter, In re Miller, 418 F.2d 1392, 1396, 164 USPQ 46, ___ (CCPA 1969).

A claim that covers both statutory and non-statutory embodiments (under the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim when read in light of the specification and in view of one skilled in the art) embraces subject matter that is not eligible for patent protection and therefore is directed to non-statutory subject matter. Such claims fail the first step and should be rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 , for at least this reason.

For example, machine readable media can encompass non-statutory transitory forms of signal transmission, such as, a propagating electrical or electromagnetic signal per se. See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 84 USPQ2d 1495 (Fed. Cir. 2007). When the broadest reasonable interpretation of machine readable media in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art encompasses transitory forms of signal transmission, a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 101 as failing to claim statutory subject matter would be appropriate. Thus, a claim to a computer readable medium that can be a compact disc or a carrier wave covers a non-statutory embodiment and therefore should be rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter.

If the claimed invention is clearly not within one of the four categories, it is not patent eligible. However, when the claim fails under Step 1 and it appears from applicant's disclosure that the claim could be amended to be directed to a statutory category, Step 2 below should still be conducted.

II. JUDICIAL EXCEPTIONS TO THE FOUR CATEGORIES

Step 2: Does the claim wholly embrace a judicially recognized exception, which includes laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas, or is it a particular practical application of a judicial exception? See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225, 95 USPQ2d 1001 (2010) (stating "The Court's precedents provide three specific exceptions to § 101's broad patent-eligibility principles: 'laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.'") (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309, 206 USPQ 193, ___ (1980)).

Determining whether the claim falls within one of the four enumerated categories of patentable subject matter recited in 35 U.S.C. 101 (i.e., process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter) does not end the analysis because claims directed to nothing more than abstract ideas (such as mathematical algorithms), natural phenomena, and laws of nature are not eligible for patent protection. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185, 209 USPQ 1, 7 (1981); accord, e.g., Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309, 206 USPQ at 197; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589, 198 USPQ 193, 197 (1978); Benson, 409 U.S. at 67-68 , 175 USPQ at 675. "A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right." Le Roy v. Tatham,, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852). Instead, such "manifestations of laws of nature" are "part of the storehouse of knowledge," "free to all men and reserved exclusively to none." Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130, 76 USPQ 280, 281 (1948).

Thus, "a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter" under Section 101. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309, 206 USPQ at 197. "Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that E=mc²; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity." Ibid. Nor can one patent "a novel and useful mathematical formula," Flook, 437 U.S. at 585, 198 USPQ at 195; electromagnetism or steam power, O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113-114 (1853); or "[t]he qualities of … bacteria, … the heat of the sun, electricity, or the qualities of metals," Funk, 333 U.S. at 130, 76 USPQ at 281; see Le Roy, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 175.

While abstract ideas, physical phenomena, and laws of nature are not eligible for patenting, methods and products employing abstract ideas, physical phenomena, and laws of nature to perform a real-world function may well be. In evaluating whether a claim meets the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 101 , the claim must be considered as a whole to determine whether it is for a particular application of an abstract idea, physical phenomenon, or law of nature, and not for the abstract idea, physical phenomenon, or law of nature itself. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188-178.

In addition to the terms laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas, judicially recognized exceptions have been described using various other terms, including natural phenomena, scientific principles, systems that depend on human intelligence alone, disembodied concepts, mental processes and disembodied mathematical algorithms and formulas, for example. The exceptions reflect the courts' view that the basic tools of scientific and technological work are not patentable.

The claimed subject matter must not be wholly directed to a judicially recognized exception. If it is, the claim is not eligible for patent protection and should be rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 . However, a claim that is limited to a particular practical application of a judicially recognized exception is eligible for patent protection. A "practical application" relates to how a judicially recognized exception is applied in a real world product or a process, and not merely to the result achieved by the invention. When subject matter has been reduced to a particular practical application having a real world use, the claimed practical application is evidence that the subject matter is not abstract (e.g., not purely mental) and does not encompass substantially all uses (preemption) of a law of nature or a physical phenomenon. See, e.g., Ultramercial v. Hulu, 657 F.3d 1323, 1329, 100 USPQ2d 1140,1145 (Fed. Cir. 2011)(stating that the patent "does not claim a mathematical algorithm, a series of purely mental steps, or any similarly abstract concept. It claims a particular method . . . a practical application of the general concept.").

A. Practical Application of Machines, Manufactures, and Compositions of Matter (Products)

If the claimed product falls within one of the three product categories of invention and does not recite judicially excepted subject matter, e.g., a law of nature, a physical phenomenon, or an abstract idea, it qualifies as eligible subject matter. If a judicial exception is recited in the claim, it must be determined if the judicially excepted subject matter has been practically applied in the product.

Eligible machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter are non-naturally occurring products typically formed of tangible elements or parts that embody a particular or specific, tangible practical application of the invention. Thus, for these product categories, a particular practical application is often self-evident based on the claim limitations that define the tangible embodiment. This is because an idea that is tangibly applied to a structure is no longer abstract, and a law of nature or physical phenomenon that is practically applied to a structure is limited to that particular application of the concept. For example, a cup is the tangible application of the abstract idea of containing a liquid and is one limited embodiment of that idea (which is no longer abstract). As another example, a magnetic door latch is the tangible application of the concept of magnetism and does not wholly embrace the concept of magnetism but, rather, is one limited application of the concept.

A claim that includes terms that imply that the invention is directed to a product, for instance by reciting "a machine comprising…", but fails to include tangible limitations in accordance with its broadest reasonable interpretation is not limited to a practical application, but rather wholly embraces or encompasses the concept upon which the invention is based. This is impermissible as such claim coverage would extend to every way of applying the abstract idea, law of nature or physical phenomenon.

A claim that includes judicially excepted subject matter and whose broadest reasonable interpretation is directed to a man-made tangible embodiment (i.e., structure) with a real world use is limited to a practical application (the subject matter has been practically applied). The reason is that the claim as a whole must be evaluated for eligibility in the same manner that a claim as a whole is evaluated for patentability under 35 U.S.C. 102, 103 and 112.

Once a practical application has been established, the limited occurrence of preemption must be evaluated to determine whether the claim impermissibly covers substantially all practical applications of the judicially excepted subject matter. If so, the claim is not patent-eligible. If the claim covers only a particular practical application of the judicially excepted subject matter, it is patent eligible.

The following examples show the difference between a tangible embodiment that is evidence of a particular practical application and an abstract concept that has no practical application.
(a) A claim that is directed to a machine comprising a plurality of structural elements that work together in a defined combination based on a mathematical relationship, such as a series of gears, pulleys and belts, possesses structural limitations that show that it is a tangible embodiment, providing evidence that the mathematical relationship has been applied (a practical application). Additionally, that tangible embodiment is limited by the claimed structure and would not cover all substantial practical uses of the mathematical relationship. The claim would be eligible for patent protection.
(b) On the other hand, a claim that is directed to a machine ("What is claimed is a machine that operates in accordance with F=ma.") and includes no tangible structural elements under the broadest reasonable interpretation, covers the operating principle based on a mathematical relationship with no limits on the claim scope. Thus, as no tangible embodiment is claimed, there would be no evidence of a practical application. The claim would wholly embrace the mathematical concept of F=ma and would not be eligible subject matter.
(c) As another example, a claim to a non-transitory, tangible computer readable storage medium per se that possesses structural limitations under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard to qualify as a manufacture would be patent-eligible subject matter. Adding additional claim limitations to the medium, such as executable instructions or stored data, to such a statutory eligible claim would not render the medium non-statutory, so long as the claim as a whole has a real world use and the medium does not cover substantially all practical uses of a judicial exception. The claim as a whole remains a tangible embodiment and qualifies as a manufacture. As explained above, the additional claim limitations would be evaluated in terms of whether they distinguish over the prior art.

B. Practical Application of Processes (Methods)

The Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 95 USPQ2d 1001 (2010), clarified the requirements for a claim to be a statutory process. Not every claimed method qualifies as a statutory process. A process claim, to be statutory under 35 U.S.C. 101 , must be limited to a particular practical application. This ensures that the process is not simply claiming an abstract idea, or substantially all practical uses of (preempting) a law of nature, or a physical phenomenon. See MPEP § 2106.01 for further guidance regarding subject matter eligibility determinations during examination of process claims that involve laws of nature/natural correlations.

A claim that attempts to patent an abstract idea is ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 101 . See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230 (''[A]ll members of the Court agree that the patent application at issue here falls outside of § 101 because it claims an abstract idea.''). The abstract idea exception has deep roots in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (citing Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174–175 (1853)).

Bilski reaffirmed Diehr's holding that ''while an abstract idea, law of nature, or mathematical formula could not be patented, 'an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.''' See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981)) (emphasis in original). The recitation of some structure, such as a machine, or the recitation of some transformative component will in most cases limit the claim to such an application. However, not all such recitations necessarily save the claim: ''Flook established that limiting an abstract idea to one field of use or adding token postsolution components did not make the concept patentable.'' See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231. Moreover, the fact that the steps of a claim might occur in the ''real world'' does not necessarily save it from a 35 U.S.C. 101 rejection. Thus, the Bilski claims were said to be drawn to an ''abstract idea'' despite the fact that they included steps drawn to initiating transactions. The ''abstractness'' is in the sense that there are no limitations as to the mechanism for entering into the transactions.

Consistent with the foregoing, Bilski holds that the following claim is abstract:

1. A method for managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity sold by a commodity provider at a fixed price comprising the steps of:
- (a) Initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and consumers of said commodity wherein said consumers purchase said commodity at a fixed rate based upon historical averages, said fixed rate corresponding to a risk position of said consumer;
- (b) Identifying market participants for said commodity having a counter-risk position to said consumers; and
- (c) Initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and said market participants at a second fixed rate such that said series of market participant transactions balances the risk position of said series of consumer transactions.
Specifically, the Court explains:

The concept of hedging, described in claim 1 and reduced to a mathematical formula in claim 4, is an unpatentable abstract idea, just like the algorithms at issue in Bensonand Flook. Allowing petitioners to patent risk hedging would preempt use of this approach in all fields, and would effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea.

Bilski also held that the additional, narrowing, limitations in the dependent claims were mere field of use limitations or insignificant postsolution components, and that adding these limitations did not make the claims patent-eligible. Claims 1–9 in Bilski are examples of claims that run afoul of the abstract idea exception. The day after deciding Bilski, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Ferguson v. Kappos, U.S. Supreme Court No. 09–1501, while granting, vacating, and remanding two other Federal Circuit 35 U.S.C. 101 cases. The denial of certiorari left intact the rejection of all of Ferguson's claims. Although the Federal Circuit had applied the machine-or-transformation test to reject Ferguson's process claims, the Supreme Court's disposition of Ferguson makes it likely that the Ferguson claims also run afoul of the abstract idea exception. A representative Ferguson claim is:

1. A method of marketing a product, comprising:
- Developing a shared marketing force, said shared marketing force including at least marketing channels, which enable marketing a number of related products;
- Using said shared marketing force to market a plurality of different products that are made by a plurality of different autonomous producing company [sic], so that different autonomous companies, having different ownerships, respectively produce said related products;
- Obtaining a share of total profits from each of said plurality of different autonomous producing companies in return for said using; and
- Obtaining an exclusive right to market each of said plurality of products in return for said using.
The following guidance presents factors that are to be considered when evaluating patent-eligibility of method claims. The factors include inquiries from the machine-or-transformation test, which remains a useful investigative tool, and inquiries gleaned from Supreme Court precedent. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (stating that "[a] claimed process is surely patent-eligible under § 101if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing."); and Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227 (stating, "This Court's precedents establish that the machine-or-transformation test is a useful and important clue, an investigative tool, for determining whether some claimed inventions are processes under § 101. The machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible 'process.'").

While the Supreme Court in Bilski did not set forth detailed guidance, there are many factors to be considered when determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support a determination that a method claim is directed to an abstract idea. The following factors are intended to be useful examples and are not intended to be exclusive or limiting. It is recognized that new factors may be developed, particularly for emerging technologies. It is anticipated that the factors will be modified and changed to take into account developments in precedential case law and to accommodate prosecution issues that may arise in implementing this new practice.

Where the claim is written in the form of a method and is potentially a patentable process, as defined in 35 U.S.C. 100(b), the claim is patent-eligible so long as it is not disqualified as one of the exceptions to 35 U.S.C. 101 's broad patent-eligibility principles; i.e., laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.

Taking into account the following factors, the examiner should determine whether the claimed invention, viewed as a whole, is disqualified as being a claim to an abstract idea. Relevant factors—both those in favor of patent-eligibility and those against such a finding—should be weighed in making the determination. Factors that weigh in favor of patent-eligibility satisfy the criteria of the machine-or-transformation test or provide evidence that the abstract idea has been practically applied. Factors that weigh against patent-eligibility neither satisfy the criteria of the machine-or-transformation test nor provide evidence that the abstract idea has been practically applied. Each case will present different factors, and it is likely that only some of the factors will be present in each application. It would be improper to make a conclusion based on one factor while ignoring other factors.

With respect to the factors listed below, a "field-of-use" limitation does not impose actual boundaries on the scope of the claimed invention. A field-of-use limitation merely indicates that the method is for use in a particular environment, such as "for use with a machine" or "for transforming an article", which would not require that the machine implement the method or that the steps of the method cause the article to transform. A field-of-use limitation does not impose a meaningful limit on the claimed invention. Insignificant "extra-solution" activity means activity that is not central to the purpose of the method invented by the applicant. For example, gathering data to use in the method when all applications of the method would require some form of data gathering would not impose a meaningful limit on the claim.

1.   Factors To Be Considered in an Abstract Idea Determination of a Method Claim

(a)   Whether the method involves or is executed by a particular machine or apparatus

"The machine-or-transformation test is a useful and important clue, and investigative tool, for determining whether some claimed inventions are processes under § 101." Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227, 95 USPQ2d 1001, ___ (2010). If so, the claims are less likely to be drawn to an abstract idea; if not, they are more likely to be so drawn. With respect to these factors, a "machine" is a concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain devices and combination of devices. This includes every mechanical device or combination of mechanical powers and devices to perform some function and produce a certain effect or result. This definition is interpreted broadly to include electrical, electronic, optical, acoustic, and other such devices that accomplish a function to achieve a certain result. An "apparatus" does not have a significantly different meaning from a machine and can include a machine or group of machines or a totality of means by which a designated function or specific task is executed.

Where a machine or apparatus is recited or inherent in a patent claim, the following factors are relevant:

(a) The particularity or generality of the elements of the machine or apparatus; i.e., the degree to which the machine in the claim can be specifically identified (not any and all machines). Incorporation of a particular machine or apparatus into the claimed method steps weighs toward eligibility.

For computer implemented processes, the "machine" is often disclosed as a general purpose computer. In these cases, the general purpose computer may be sufficiently "particular" when programmed to perform the process steps. Such programming creates a new machine because a general purpose computer, in effect, becomes a special purpose computer once it is programmed to perform particular functions pursuant to instructions from program software. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545, 31 USPQ 1545, ___ (Fed. Cir. 1994); see alsoUltramercial v. Hulu, 657 F.3d 1323, 1329, 100 USPQ2d 1140, 1145 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (stating "a programmed computer contains circuitry unique to that computer"). However, "adding a 'computer-aided' limitation to a claim covering an abstract concept, without more, is insufficient to render [a] patent claim eligible" where the claims "are silent as to how a computer aids the method, the extent to which a computer aids the method, or the significance of a computer to the performance of the method." DealerTrack v. Huber, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 101 USPQ2d 1325, 1339-40 (Fed. Cir. 2012). To qualify as a particular machine under the test, the claim must clearly convey that the computer is programmed to perform the steps of the method because such programming, in effect, creates a special purpose computer limited to the use of the particularly claimed combination of elements (i.e., the programmed instructions) performing the particularly claimed combination of functions. If the claim is so abstract and sweeping that performing the process as claimed would cover substantially all practical applications of a judicial exception, such as a mathematical algorithm, the claim would not satisfy the test as the machine would not be sufficiently particular.

(b) Whether the machine or apparatus implements the steps of the method. Integral use of a machine or apparatus to achieve performance of the method weighs toward eligibility, as compared to where the machine or apparatus is merely an object on which the method operates, which weighs against eligibility. See Cybersource v. Retail Decisions, 654 F.3d 1366, 99 USPQ2d 1960 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("We are not persuaded by the appellant's argument that claimed method is tied to a particular machine because it 'would not be necessary or possible without the Internet.' . . . Regardless of whether "the Internet" can be viewed as a machine, it is clear that the Internet cannot perform the fraud detection steps of the claimed method").

(c) Whether its involvement is extrasolution activity or a field-of-use, i.e., the extent to which (or how) the machine or apparatus imposes meaningful limits on the execution of the claimed method steps. Use of a machine or apparatus that contributes only nominally or insignificantly to the execution of the claimed method (e.g., in a data gathering step or in a field-of-use limitation) would weigh against eligibility. See Bilski, 138 S. Ct. at 3230 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590, 198 USPQ 193, ___ (1978)), and Cybersource v. Retail Decisions, 654 F.3d 1366, 99 USPQ2d 1690 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("while claim 3 requires an infringer to use the Internet to obtain that data . . . [t]he Internet is merely described as the source of the data. We have held that mere '[data-gathering] step[s] cannot make an otherwise nonstatutory claim statutory.'" In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 840, 12 USPQ2d 1824, ___ (Fed. Cir. 1989) (quoting In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 794, 215 USPQ 193, ___ (CCPA 1982)))…

(b)   Whether performance of the claimed method results in or otherwise involves a transformation of a particular article

"Transformation and reduction of an article 'to a different state or thing' is the clue to patentability of a process claim that does not include particular machines." Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227, 95 USPQ2d 1001 (2010)(quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70, 175 USPQ 673, ___ (1972). If such a transformation exists, the claims are less likely to be drawn to an abstract idea; if not, they are more likely to be so drawn.

An "article" includes a physical object or substance. The physical object or substance must be particular, meaning it can be specifically identified. An article can also be electronic data that represents a physical object or substance. For the test, the data should be more than an abstract value. Data can be specifically identified by indicating what the data represents, the particular type or nature of the data, and/or how or from where the data was obtained.

"Transformation" of an article means that the "article" has changed to a different state or thing. Changing to a different state or thing usually means more than simply using an article or changing the location of an article. A new or different function or use can be evidence that an article has been transformed. Manufactures and compositions of matter are the result of transforming raw materials into something new with a different function or use. Purely mental processes in which thoughts or human based actions are "changed" are not considered an eligible transformation. For data, mere "manipulation of basic mathematical constructs [i.e,] the paradigmatic 'abstract idea'," has not been deemed a transformation. Cybersource v. Retail Decisions, 654 F.3d 1366, 1372 n.2, 99 USPQ2d 1690, 1695 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2011)(quoting In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1994). However, transformation of electronic data has been found when the nature of the data has been changed such that it has a different function or is suitable for a different use. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962-63 (Fed. Cir. 2009)(aff'd sub nom Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010)).

Where a transformation occurs, the following factors are relevant:

(a) The particularity or generality of the transformation. The Supreme Court has stated that an invention comprising a process of "'tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber [or] smelting ores' . . . are instances . . . where the use of chemical substances or physical acts, such as temperature control, changes articles or materials [in such a manner that is] sufficiently definite to confine the patent monopoly within rather definite bounds." Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70, 175 USPQ 673, ___ (1972) (discussing Corning v. Burden, 15 How.(56 U.S.) 252, 267-68). A more particular transformation would weigh in favor of eligibility.

(b) The degree to which the recited article is particular; i.e., can be specifically identified (not any and all articles). A transformation applied to a generically recited article would weigh against eligibility.

(c) The nature of the transformation in terms of the type or extent of change in state or thing, for instance by having a different function or use, which would weigh toward eligibility, compared to merely having a different location, which would weigh against eligibility.

(d) The nature of the article transformed, i.e., whether it is an object or substance, weighing toward eligibility, compared to a concept such as a contractual obligation or mental judgment, which would weigh against eligibility.

(e) Whether its involvement is extrasolution activity or a field-of-use, i.e., the extent to which (or how) the transformation imposes meaningful limits on the execution of the claimed method steps. A transformation that contributes only nominally or insignificantly to the execution of the claimed method (e.g., in a data gathering step or in a field-of-use limitation) would weigh against eligibility.

(c)   Whether performance of the claimed method involves an application of a law of nature, even in the absence of a particular machine, apparatus, or transformation

An application of a law of nature may represent patent-eligible subject matter even in the absence of a particular machine, apparatus, or transformation. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227, 95 USPQ2d 1001 (2010)(citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187, 209 USPQ 1, ___ (1981)) (stating that the Court had previously "explicitly declined to 'hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet [machine or transformation] requirements.") (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67, 175 USPQ 673, ___ (1972)). If such an application exists, the claims are less likely to be drawn to an abstract idea; if not, they are more likely to be so drawn. See MPEP § 2106.01 for further guidance regarding subject matter eligibility determinations during examination of process claims that involve laws of nature/natural correlations.

Where such an application is present, the following factors are relevant:

(a) The particularity or generality of the application. Application of a law of nature having broad applicability across many fields of endeavor weighs against eligibility, such as where the claim generically recites an effect of the law of nature or claims every mode of accomplishing that effect, such that the claim would monopolize a natural force or patent a scientific fact. See O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853)(finding unpatentable a claim for "the use of electromagnetism for transmitting signals at a distance"); The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 209 (1888)(discussing a method of "transmitting vocal or other sound telepgraphically … by causing electrical undulations, similar in form to the vibrations of the air accompanying the said vocal or other sounds," stating "[Bell] had detected a secret of nature . . . .[H]e proceeded promptly to patent, not only a particular method and apparatus for availing of that law, but also the right to avail of that law by any means whatever. Thus considered he has been able to monopolize a natural force, and patent a scientific fact.").

(b) Whether the claimed method recites an application of a law of nature solely involving subjective determinations; e.g., ways to think about the law of nature. Application of a law of nature to a particular way of thinking about, or reacting to, a law of nature would weigh against eligibility. See The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. at 210 (stating "[counsel for defendant] argued, that in all the cases upholding a claim for a process, the process was one capable of being sensually perceived, verified and proved by oath — not as a matter of opinion, but as a matter of fact."), id. at 211 (discussing Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880) ("[t]here was a process, all of which lay within ordinary means of observation and verification.").

(c) Whether its involvement is extrasolution activity or a field-of-use, i.e., the extent to which (or how) the application imposes meaningful limits on the execution of the claimed method steps. An application of the law of nature that contributes only nominally or insignificantly to the execution of the claimed method (e.g., in a data gathering step or in a field-of-use limitation) would weigh against eligibility.

(d)   Whether a general concept (which could also be recognized in such terms as a principle, theory, plan or scheme) is involved in executing the steps of the method

The presence of such a general concept can be a clue that the claim is drawn to an abstract idea. Where a general concept is present, the following factors are relevant:

(a) The extent to which use of the concept, as expressed in the method, would preempt its use in other fields; i.e., that the claim would effectively grant a monopoly over the concept.Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231, 95 USPQ2d 1001, ___ (2010).

(b) The extent to which the claim is so abstract and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of the concept, and be performed through any existing or future-devised machinery, or even without any apparatus. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68, 175 USPQ 673, ___ (1972) (stating "[h]ere the process' claim is so abstract and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of the BCD to pure binary conversion. The end use may (1) vary from the operation of a train to verification of drivers' licenses to researching the law books for precedents and (2) be performed through any existing machinery or future-devised machinery or without any apparatus").

(c) The extent to which the claim would effectively cover all possible solutions to a particular problem; i.e., that the claim is a statement of the problem versus a description of a particular solution to the problem. See The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 161-162 (1888) (discussing Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880)("'The claim of the patent [in Tilghman] is not for a mere principle.' . . . In that case there was a problem. Find a way, if you can, to combine each atom of water with an atom of acid. If you can do that, then you can reach this important result of resolving the neutral fats into glycerine and acids. And Tilghman's solution of it was: Heat the water under such pressure that the water shall not pass into steam. This was his process; and he claimed, and the court justly allowed, great latitude in its application.")).

(d) Whether the concept is disembodied or whether it is instantiated; i.e., implemented, in some tangible way. A concept that is well-instantiated weighs in favor of eligibility.

See, e.g., Bilski, 138 S. Ct. at 3230 (stating that the Court in Diehr "concluded that because the claim was not 'an attempt to patent a mathematical formula, but rather [was] an industrial process for the molding of rubber products,' it fell within § 101's patentable subject matter." (citing Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192-193)). Accord Research Corp. Technologies v. Microsoft Corp., 677 F.3d 859, 868-869, 97 USPQ2d 1274, ___ (Fed. Cir. 2010) (stating that the claims here "'do not seek to patent a mathematical formula'" but rather a process of halftoning in computer applications, presenting "functional and palpable applications in the field of computer technology" such that applicant's claimed invention requires instantiation (in some claims) through "a 'high contrast film,' 'a film printer,' 'a memory,' and 'printer and display devices'"); Ultramercial v. Hulu, 657 F.3d 1323, 1328, 100 USPQ2d 1140, 1144(Fed. Cir. 2011)(stating that the patent "does not simply claim the age-old idea that advertising can serve as currency, [but instead] a practical application of this idea.").

A concept that is not well-instantiated weighs against eligibility. See DealerTrack v. Huber, ___ F.3d ___, 101 USPQ2d 1325 (2012) where in the court stated:

The claims are silent as to how a computer aids the method, the extent to which a computer aids the method, or the significance of a computer to the performance of the method. The undefined phrase "computer-aided" is no less abstract than the idea of a clearinghouse itself. Because the computer here "can be programmed to perform very different tasks in very different ways," it does not "play a significant part in permitting the claimed method to be performed." Simply adding a "computer aided" limitation to a claim covering an abstract concept, without more, is insufficient to render the claim patent eligible… "In order for the addition of a machine to impose a meaningful limit on the scope of a claim, it must play a significant part in permit-ting the claimed method to be performed, rather than function solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved more quickly, i.e., through the utilization of a computer for performing calculations."

Dealertrack, ___ F.3d at ___, 101 USPQ2d at 1339-40 (citations omitted). Furthermore, limiting an abstract idea to one field of use or adding token postsolution components does not make the concept patentable.

(e) The mechanism(s) by which the steps are implemented; e.g., whether the performance of the process is observable and verifiable rather than subjective or imperceptible. Steps that are observable and verifiable weigh in favor of eligibility. The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. at 211 (discussing Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880) ("[t]here was a process, all of which lay within ordinary means of observation and verification").

(f) Examples of general concepts include, but are not limited to:
• Basic economic practices or theories (e.g., hedging, insurance, financial transactions, marketing);
• Basic legal theories (e.g., contracts, dispute resolution, rules of law);
• Mathematical concepts (e.g., algorithms, spatial relationships, geometry);
• Mental activity (e.g., forming a judgment, observation, evaluation, or opinion);
• Interpersonal interactions or relationships (e.g., conversing, dating);
• Teaching concepts (e.g., memorization, repetition);
• Human behavior (e.g., exercising, wearing clothing, following rules or instructions);
• Instructing ''how business should be conducted.''

See, e.g., Bilski, 138 S. Ct. at 3231 (stating "[t]he concept of hedging, described in claim 1 and reduced to a mathematical formula in claim 4, is an unpatentable abstract idea."), In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 90 USPQ2d 1035 (2009) (cert. denied Ferguson v. PTO, June 29, 2010)(finding ineligible "methods . . . directed to organizing business or legal relationships in the structuring of a sales force (or marketing company);" Benson, 409 U.S. at 67 (stating "mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work."); Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231 (quoting Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. (55 U.S.) 156, 175 ("[a] principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right")). See also Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3259 (Breyer, J. concurring).

2.   Making the Determination of Eligibility

Each of the factors relevant to the particular patent application should be weighed to determine whether the method is claiming an abstract idea by covering a general concept, or combination of concepts, or whether the method is limited to a particular practical application of the concept. The presence or absence of a single factor will not be determinative as the relevant factors need to be considered and weighed to make a proper determination as to whether the claim as a whole is drawn to an abstract idea such that the claim would effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea and be ineligible for patent protection.

If the factors indicate that the method claim is not merely covering an abstract idea, the claim is eligible for patent protection under 35 U.S.C. 101 and must be further evaluated for patentability under all of the statutory requirements, including utility and double patenting (35 U.S.C. 101 ); novelty (35 U.S.C. 102); non-obviousness ( 35 U.S.C. 103 ); and definiteness and adequate description, enablement, and best mode (35 U.S.C. 112). 35 U.S.C. 101 is merely a coarse filter and thus a determination of eligibility under 35 U.S.C. 101 is only a threshold question for patentability. 35 U.S.C. 102, 103 , and 112 are typically the primary tools for evaluating patentability unless the claim is truly abstract, see, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229, 95 USPQ2d 1001, ___ (2010). (''[S]ome business method patents raise special problems in terms of vagueness and suspect validity.'').

If the factors indicate that the method claim is attempting to cover an abstract idea, the examiner will reject the claim under 35 U.S.C. 101 , providing clear rationale supporting the determination that an abstract idea has been claimed, such that the examiner establishes a prima facie case of patent-ineligibility. The conclusion made by the examiner must be based on the evidence as a whole. In making a rejection or if presenting reasons for allowance when appropriate, the examiner should specifically point out the factors that are relied upon in making the determination. If a claim is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 on the basis that it is drawn to an abstract idea, the applicant then has the opportunity to explain why the claimed method is not drawn to an abstract idea. Specifically identifying the factors used in the analysis will allow the applicant to make specific arguments in response to the rejection if the applicant believes that the conclusion that the claim is directed to an abstract idea is in error.

III.   Establish on the Record a Prima Facie Case

USPTO personnel should review the totality of the evidence (e.g., the specification, claims, relevant prior art) before reaching a conclusion with regard to whether the claimed invention sets forth patent eligible subject matter. USPTO personnel must weigh the determinations made above to reach a conclusion as to whether it is more likely than not that the claimed invention as a whole either falls outside of one of the enumerated statutory classes or within one of the exceptions to statutory subject matter. "The examiner bears the initial burden … of presenting a prima facie case of unpatentability." In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445, 24 USPQ2d 1443, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1992). If the record as a whole suggests that it is more likely than not that the claimed invention would be considered a practical application of an abstract idea, physical phenomenon, or law of nature, then USPTO personnel should not reject the claim.

After USPTO personnel identify and explain in the record the reasons why a claim is for an abstract idea, physical phenomenon, or law of nature with no practical application, then the burden shifts to the applicant to either amend the claim or make a showing of why the claim is eligible for patent protection. See, e.g., In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566, 34 USPQ2d 1436, 1441 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see generally MPEP § 2107 (Utility Guidelines).

Under the principles of compact prosecution, each claim should be reviewed for compliance with every statutory requirement for patentability in the initial review of the application, even if one or more claims are found to be deficient with respect to the patent-eligibility requirement of 35 U.S.C. 101 . Thus, Office personnel should state all non-cumulative reasons and bases for rejecting claims in the first Office action.

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2106.01    ** > Subject Matter Eligibility Analysis of Process Claims Involving Laws of Nature [R-9]

I.   SUMMARY

The following guidance is intended for use in subject matter eligibility determinations during examination of process claims that involve laws of nature/natural correlations, such as the claims in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 1289, 101 USPQ2d 1961 (2012) (Mayo). Process claims that are directed to abstract ideas, such as the claims in Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 95 USPQ2d 1001 (2010), should continue to be examined using the guidance set forth in MPEP § 2106.

The guidance set forth in this section should be followed for examination of process claims in which a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or a naturally occurring relation or correlation (collectively referred to as a natural principle in the guidance) is a limiting element or step. In summary, process claims having a natural principle as a limiting element or step should be evaluated by determining whether the claim includes additional elements/steps or a combination of elements/steps that integrate the natural principle into the claimed invention such that the natural principle is practically applied, and are sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to significantly more than the natural principle itself. If the claim as a whole satisfies this inquiry, the claim is directed to patent-eligible subject matter. If the claim as a whole does not satisfy this inquiry, it should be rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter.

II.   ESSENTIAL INQUIRIES FOR SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY UNDER 35 U.S.C. 101

After determining what applicant invented and establishing the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claimed invention, conduct the following three inquiries on the claim as a whole to determine whether the claim is drawn to patent-eligible subject matter. Further details regarding each inquiry are provided below.
1. Is the claimed invention directed to a process, defined as an act, or a series of acts or steps?

If no, this analysis is not applicable. For product claims see MPEP § 2106. If yes, proceed to Inquiry 2.
2. Does the claim focus on use of a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or naturally occurring relation or correlation (collectively referred to as a natural principle herein)? (Is the natural principle a limiting feature of the claim?)

If no, this analysis is complete, and the claim should be analyzed to determine if an abstract idea is claimed (see MPEP § 2106). If yes, proceed to Inquiry 3.
3. Does the claim include additional elements/steps or a combination of elements/steps that integrate the natural principle into the claimed invention such that the natural principle is practically applied, and are sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to significantly more than the natural principle itself? (Is it more than a law of nature plus the general instruction to simply "apply it"?)

If no, the claim is not patent-eligible and should be rejected. If yes, the claim is patent-eligible, and the analysis is complete.

III.   DETAILED GUIDANCE FOR USING THE INQUIRIES

A.

Determining What Applicant Invented and the Broadest Reasonable Interpretation

Review the entire specification and claims to determine what applicant believes that he or she invented. Then review the claims to determine the boundaries of patent protection sought by the applicant and to understand how the claims relate to and define what the applicant has indicated is the invention.

Claim analysis begins by identifying and evaluating each claim limitation and then considering the claim as a whole. It is improper to dissect a claimed invention into discrete elements and then evaluate the elements in isolation because it is the combination of claim limitations functioning together that establish the boundaries of the invention and limit its scope.

Establish the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claims when read in light of the specification and from the view of one of ordinary skill in the art. This same interpretation must be used to evaluate the compliance with each statutory requirement. SeeMPEP § 2111 and § 2173 et seq. for further details of claim construction and compliance with 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, respectively.

B.

INQUIRY 1: Process

Under this analysis, the claim must be drawn to a process. A process is defined as an act, or a series of acts or steps. Process claims are sometimes called method claims.

C.

INQUIRY 2: Natural Principle

Does the claim focus on use of a natural principle, i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or naturally occurring relation or correlation? (Is the natural principle a limiting feature of the claim?)

A natural principle is the handiwork of nature and occurs without the hand of man. For example, the disinfecting property of sunlight is a natural principle. The relationship between blood glucose levels and diabetes is a natural principle. A correlation that occurs naturally when a man-made product, such as a drug, interacts with a naturally occurring substance, such as blood, is also considered a natural principle because, while it takes a human action to trigger a manifestation of the correlation, the correlation exists in principle apart from any human action. These are illustrative examples and are not intended to be limiting or exclusive.

For this analysis, a claim focuses on a natural principle when the natural principle is a limiting element or step. In that case, the claim must be analyzed (in Inquiry 3) to ensure that the claim is directed to a practical application of the natural principle that amounts to substantially more than the natural principle itself. So, for instance, a claim that recites a correlation used to make a diagnosis focuses on a natural principle and would require further analysis under Inquiry 3.

If a natural principle is not a limitation of the claim, the claim does not focus on the use of a natural principle and requires no further analysis under this procedure. If the claim focuses on an abstract idea, such as steps that can be performed entirely in one's mind, methods of controlling human activity, or mere plans for performing an action, refer to MPEP § 2106 to evaluate eligibility.

D.

INQUIRY 3: Practical Application and Preemption

Does the claim include additional elements/steps or a combination of elements/steps that integrate the natural principle into the claimed invention such that the natural principle is practically applied, and are sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to significantly more than the natural principle itself? (Is it more than a law of nature plus the general instruction to simply "apply it"?)

A claim that focuses on use of a natural principle must also include additional elements or steps to show that the inventor has practically applied, or added something significant to, the natural principle itself. See Mayo, 101 USPQ2d at 1966. To show integration, the additional elements or steps must relate to the natural principle in a significant way to impose a meaningful limit on the claim scope. The analysis turns on whether the claim has added enough to show a practical application. See id. at 1968. In other words, the claim cannot cover the natural principle itself such that it is effectively standing alone. A bare statement of a naturally occurring correlation, albeit a newly discovered natural correlation or very narrowly confined correlation, would fail this inquiry. See id. at 1965, 1971.

It is not necessary that every recited element or step integrate or relate to the natural principle as long as it is applied in some practical manner. However, there must be at least one additional element or step that applies, relies on or uses the natural principle so that the claim amounts to significantly more than the natural principle itself. Elements or steps that do not integrate the natural principle and are merely appended to it would not be sufficient. In other words, the additional elements or steps must not simply amount to insignificant extra-solution activity that imposes no meaningful limit on the performance of the claimed invention. See id. at 1966. For example, a claim to diagnosing an infection that recites the step of correlating the presence of a certain bacterium in a person's blood with a particular type of bacterial infection with the additional step of recording the diagnosis on a chart would not be eligible because the step of recording the diagnosis on the chart is extra-solution activity that is unrelated to the correlation and does not integrate the correlation into the invention.

Along with integration, the additional steps must be sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to significantly more than the natural principle itself by including one or more elements or steps that limit the scope of the claim and do more than generally describe the natural principle with generalized instructions to "apply it." See id. at 1965, 1968. The additional elements or steps must narrow the scope of the claim such that others are not foreclosed from using the natural principle (a basic tool of scientific and technological work) for future innovation. Elements or steps that are well-understood, purely conventional, and routinely taken by others in order to apply the natural principle, or that only limit the use to a particular technological environment (field-of-use), would not be sufficiently specific. See id. at 1968. A claim with steps that add something of significance to the natural laws themselves would be eligible because it would confine its reach to particular patent-eligible applications of those laws, such as a typical patent on a new drug (including associated method claims) or a new way of using an existing drug. See id. at 1971; see also 35 U.S.C. 100(b). In other words, the claim must be limited so that it does not preempt the natural principle being recited by covering every substantial practical application of that principle. The process must have additional features that provide practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the law of nature itself. See id. at 1968.

A claim that would fail this inquiry includes, for example, a claim having a limitation that describes a law of nature and additional steps that must be taken in order to apply the law of nature by establishing the conditions under which the law of nature occurs such as a step of taking a sample recited at a high level of generality to test for a naturally occurring correlation. See id. at 1970. Adding steps to a natural biological process that only recite well-understood, routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers in the field would not be sufficient. See id. at 1966, 1970. A combination of steps that amounts to nothing significantly more than an instruction to doctors to "apply" applicable natural laws when treating their patients would also not be sufficient. See id. at 1970.

Claims that do not include a natural principle as a limitation do not raise issues of subject matter eligibility under the law of nature exception. For example, a claim directed to simply administering a man-made drug that does not recite other steps or elements directed to use of a natural principle, such as a naturally occurring correlation, would be directed to eligible subject matter. Further, a claim that recites a novel drug or a new use of an existing drug, in combination with a natural principle, would be sufficiently specific to be eligible because the claim would amount to significantly more than the natural principle itself. However, a claim does not have to be novel or non-obvious to qualify as a subject matter eligible claim. Moreover, a claim that is deemed eligible is not necessarily patentable unless it also complies with the other statutory and non-statutory considerations for patentability under 35 U.S.C. 101 (utility and double patenting), 102, 103, 112, and non-statutory double patenting.

The weighing factors used in MPEP § 2106 are useful tools for assisting in the evaluation. For convenience, these factors and how they may assist in the analysis are summarized below.

E.

RELEVANT FACTORS USEFUL FOR INQUIRY 3

The following factors can be used to analyze the additional features in the claim to determine whether the claim recites a patent-eligible practical application of a natural principle and assist in answering Inquiry 3 above. Many of these factors originate from past eligibility factors, including the 'Machine-or-Transformation' (M-or-T) test. However, satisfying the M-or-T factors does not ensure eligibility if the claim features that include a particular machine or transformation do not integrate the natural principle into the claimed invention to show that the natural principle is practically applied, and are not sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to significantly more than the natural principle itself.
• Appending conventional steps, specified at a high level of generality, to a natural principle does not make the claim patent-eligible.
• Steps that amount to instructions that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity, previously engaged in by those in the field add nothing specific to the natural principle that would render it patent-eligible.
• A claim that covers known and unknown uses of a natural principle and can be performed through any existing or future-devised machinery, or even without any apparatus, would lack features that are sufficient for eligibility.
• A particular machine or transformation recited in more than general terms may be sufficient to limit the application to just one of several possible machines or just one of several possible changes in state, such that the claim does not cover every substantial practical application of a natural principle. This can be contrasted with only adding features that limit the application to a certain technological environment (e.g., for use in catalytic conversion systems), which would cover every substantial practical application in that field.
• Additional limitations that are necessary for all practical applications of the natural principle, such that everyone practicing the natural principle would be required to perform those steps or every product embodying that natural principle would be required to include those features, would not be sufficient.
• A particular machine or transformation recited in a claim can show how the natural principle is integrated into a practical application by describing the details of how that machine and its specific parts implement the natural principle (e.g., the parts of an internal combustion engine apply the concept of combustion to produce energy) or how the transformation relates to or implements the natural principle (e.g., using ionization in a manufacturing process).
• A machine or transformation that is merely nominally, insignificantly, or tangentially related to the steps or elements, e.g., data gathering or data storage, would not show integration. For example, a machine that is simply incidental to execution of the method (using a computer as a counter balance weight and not as a processing device) rather than an object that implements the method or a transformation that involves only a change of position or location of an object rather than a change in state or thing does not show that these additional features integrate the natural principle into the invention as they are incidental to the claimed invention.
• Complete absence of a machine-or-transformation in a claim signals the likelihood that the claim is directed to a natural principle and has not been instantiated (e.g., is disembodied or can be performed entirely in one's mind.)
• A mere statement of a general concept (natural principle) would effectively monopolize that concept/principle and would be insufficient. This can be contrasted with a tangible implementation with elements or steps that are recited with specificity such that all substantial applications are not covered. Such specificity may be achieved with observable and verifiable steps, for example, rather than subjective or imperceptible steps.

IV.

SAMPLE ANALYSIS

A.

Sample Claim Drawn to a Patent-Eligible Practical Application - Diamond v. Diehr

1. A method of operating a rubber-molding press for precision molded compounds with the aid of a digital computer, comprising:

providing said computer with a data base for said press including at least, natural logarithm conversion data (ln), the activation energy constant (C) unique to each batch of said compound being molded, and a constant (x) dependent upon the geometry of the particular mold of the press,

initiating an interval timer in said computer upon the closure of the press for monitoring the elapsed time of said closure,

constantly determining the temperature (Z) of the mold at a location closely adjacent to the mold cavity in the press during molding, constantly providing the computer with the temperature (Z),

repetitively calculating in the computer, at frequent intervals during each cure, the Arrhenius equation for reaction time during the cure, which is ln v = CZ + x where v is the total required cure time,

repetitively comparing in the computer at said frequent intervals during the cure each said calculation of the total required cure time calculated with the Arrhenius equation and said elapsed time,

and opening the press automatically when a said comparison indicates equivalence.

The above claim was found to be a patent-eligible practical application in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). Recently, the Supreme Court looked back to this claim as an example of a patent-eligible practical application as explained in the following excerpt from Mayo:

The Court pointed out that the basic mathematical equation, like a law of nature, was not patentable. But it found the overall process patent eligible because of the way the additional steps of the process integrated the equation into the process as a whole. Those steps included "installing rubber in a press, closing the mold, constantly determining the temperature of the mold, constantly recalculating the appropriate cure time through the use of the formula and a digital computer, and automatically opening the press at the proper time." [ ] It nowhere suggested that all these steps, or at least the combination of those steps, were in context obvious, already in use, or purely conventional. And so the patentees did not "seek to pre-empt the use of [the] equation," but sought "only to foreclose from others the use of that equation in conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed process." [ ] These other steps apparently added to the formula something that in terms of patent law's objectives had significance—they transformed the process into an inventive application of the formula. See Mayo at 1969 (emphasis added).

This claim would pass Inquiries 1-3 in the above analysis as it is a process that includes the Arrhenius equation as a limitation, with additional steps that integrate the Arrhenius equation into the process and are sufficient to narrow the scope of the claim so that others are not foreclosed from using the Arrhenius equation in different applications.

B.

Sample Claim Drawn to Ineligible Subject Matter - Mayo v. Prometheus

1. A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising:

(a) administering a drug providing 6-thioguanine to a subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder; and

(b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder,

wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol per 8×10⁸ red blood cells indicates a need to increase the amount of said drug subsequently administered to said subject and

wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 8×10⁸ red blood cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of said drug subsequently administered to said subject.

The above claim was found to be ineligible in Mayo. The Supreme Court determined that the claim focused on use of a law of nature that was given weight during prosecution of the claim – specifically the relationships between concentrations of certain metabolites in the blood and the likelihood that a dosage of a thiopurine drug will prove ineffective or cause harm. See id.at 1967. The Court analyzed the claim as follows:

The question before us is whether the claims do significantly more than simply describe these natural relations. To put the matter more precisely, do the patent claims add enough to their statements of the correlations to allow the processes they describe to qualify as patent-eligible processes that apply natural laws? We believe that the answer to this question is no. See id. at 1968.

The upshot is that the three steps simply tell doctors to gather data from which they may draw an inference in light of the correlations. To put the matter more succinctly, the claims inform a relevant audience about certain laws of nature; any additional steps consist of well understood, routine, conventional activity already engaged in by the scientific community; and those steps, when viewed as a whole, add nothing significant beyond the sum of their parts taken separately. For these reasons we believe that the steps are not sufficient to transform unpatentable natural correlations into patentable applications of those regularities. See id. at 1968.

This claim would pass Inquiries 1-2 and fail Inquiry 3. It is a process claim that includes a natural principle that was construed as a limiting feature of a claim during prosecution – the natural principle being the naturally occurring relationships noted above, which are a consequence of the ways in which thiopurine compounds are metabolized by the body. The Court emphasized that while it takes a human action to trigger a manifestation of this relation in a particular person, the relation itself exists in principle apart from any human action. See id. at 1967. The additional steps integrate the relationship into the process as the administering step involves the thiopurine drug, the determining step establishes the thiopurine drug level and the wherein clauses set forth the critical levels. The steps are not sufficient, however, to narrow the application such that others could still make use of the naturally occurring relationship in other practical applications. The claim essentially sets forth a law of nature with generalized instructions to apply it.

C.

Making a Rejection

After performing the appropriate Inquiries, a claim that fails Inquiry 3 should be rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 as not being drawn to patent-eligible subject matter. When making the rejection, identify the natural principle, identify that the claim is effectively directed to a natural principle itself, and explain the reason(s) that the additional claim features or combination of features, when the claim is taken as a whole, fail to integrate the natural principle into the claimed invention so that the natural principle is practically applied, and/or fail to be sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to significantly more than the natural principle itself.

A sample rejection of the following claim could read as follows:

Claim 1. A method of determining effective dosage of insulin to a patient, comprising the steps of administering a dose of insulin to a patient, testing the patient's blood for the blood sugar level, and evaluating whether the insulin dosage is effective based on the blood sugar level.

Analysis:

The claim passes Inquiry 1 because it is drawn to a process.

The claim passes Inquiry 2 because a naturally occurring correlation between insulin and blood glucose levels is a limitation of the claim.

The claim does not pass Inquiry 3 because, although the additional steps integrate or make use of the correlation in the process by administering insulin in one step and testing for the correlation in another step, the steps are not sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to significantly more than the correlation itself since every application of the correlation would require an administration of insulin and testing of blood to observe the relationship between insulin and blood glucose levels.

The rejection:

Claim 1 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to non-statutory subject matter because it is not a patent-eligible practical application of a law of nature. The claim is directed to a naturally occurring correlation between insulin and blood glucose levels. The combination of steps recited in the claim taken as a whole, including the steps of administering insulin to a patient and testing blood sugar levels, are not sufficient to qualify as a patent-eligible practical application as the claim covers every substantial practical application of the correlation.

D.

Evaluating a Response

A proper response to a rejection based on failure to claim patent-eligible subject matter would be an amendment adding additional steps/features or amending existing steps/features that integrate the natural principle into the process (by practically applying or making use of the principle) and are sufficient to limit the application of the natural principle to more than the principle itself + steps that do more than simply "apply it" at a high level of generality. Examples of both eligible and ineligible hypothetical claims follow. It would also be proper for the applicant to present persuasive arguments that the additional steps add something significantly more to the claim than merely describing the natural principle. A showing that the steps are not routine, well-known or conventional could be persuasive.

For example, a claim that uses the natural disinfecting properties of sunlight would require additional steps beyond exposing an item requiring disinfection to sunlight. The additional steps could involve constructing a sanitizing device that uses ultraviolet light for disinfection with steps that integrate the ultraviolet light into the device and are sufficient to confine the use of the ultraviolet light to a particular application (not so broad as to cover all practical ways of applying ultraviolet light). A claim that sets forth the relationship between blood glucose levels and the incidence of diabetes would require additional steps that do significantly more to apply this principle than conventional blood sample testing or diagnostic activity based on recognizing a threshold blood glucose level. Such additional steps could involve a testing technique or treatment steps that would not be conventional or routine.

See the 2012 Interim Procedure for Laws of Nature guidance memo issued July 3, 2012 and posted on the USPTO web site (http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law /exam/2012_interim_guidance.pdf) for additional examples. <

Director Kappos: Some Thoughts on Patentability

August 4, 2012PatentAbstract Idea, Enablement, First to Invent, Subject Matter Eligibility, USPTO Director, Written DescriptionDennis Crouch

The following is a reprint from USPTO Director Kappos’ recent statement on patentable subject matter:

+ + + + +

The recent Federal Circuit decision CLS Bank International v. Alice Corporation raises some important points that offer insight on advancing prosecution of patent applications. In CLS Bank, the claims to a computer-implemented invention were found to fall within an eligible category of invention and not to mere abstract ideas. In answering the question of eligibility under § 101, I found it interesting that the court looked at the different roles of the various statutory provisions, § 101, 102, 103, and 112. Sections 102, 103 and 112 do the substantive work of disqualifying those patent eligible inventions that are “not worthy of a patent”, while § 101 is a general statement of the type of subject matter eligible for patenting. The court notes that, while § 101 has been characterized as a threshold test and certainly can be addressed before other matters touching on patent validity, it need not always be addressed first, particularly when other sections might be discerned by a trial judge as having the promise to resolve a dispute more expeditiously or with more clarity or predictability. The court in CLS Bank also recognized that the exceptions to eligibility—laws of nature, natural phenomenon, and abstract ideas—should arise infrequently.

Based on my experience, I appreciate the wisdom of the court’s discussion relating to resolving disputed claims by focusing initially on patentability requirements of § 102, 103, and 112, rather than § 101. I have found that when claims are refined to distinguish over the prior art, recite definite boundaries, and be fully enabled based on a complete written description, they do not usually encounter issues of eligibility based on reciting mere abstract ideas or broad fundamental concepts. Put another way, every business looks for opportunities to sequence workflow so that the first issues addressed are the ones that can simplify or completely resolve other issues. This is good basic management for businesses, and for patent offices.

While courts can resolve patent disputes in the most expeditious manner given the facts of the case, the Office has the unique duty of ensuring that all patentability requirements are met before issuing a patent. Applications that are presented in the best possible condition for examination with clear and definite claims that are believed to distinguish over the prior art and are supported by a robust disclosure will most likely not encounter rejections based on eligibility. Avoiding issues under § 101 can have a very positive effect on pendency and help examiners focus on finding the closest prior art, leading to strong patent protection. Hopefully, the guidance supplied by the Federal Circuit in CLS Bank can help us as we continue to work on reducing pendency and enhancing quality of issued patents.

Making Pre-Grant Submissions More Efffective

July 19, 2012PatentAIA Trials, anticipation, Claim Construction, Enablement, obviousness, PGR, Written DescriptionDennis Crouch

by Dennis Crouch

The America Invents Act (AIA) expands the opportunity for third-party pre-issuance submissions in patent cases. Beginning September 16 of this year (2012), anyone will be permitted to submit published documents ('printed publications') that are relevant to the examination of a pending application along with a concise explanation of the importance of the documents submitted.

In a recently issued set of final rules, the USPTO outlines the procedures that it has put in place to handle the new filings. Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submissions by Third Parties Provision of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 F.R. 42150 (2012).

Targeted preissuance submissions offer an extremely inexpensive mechanism for limiting competitor patent scope. The process has little downside (in most cases) but does require additional competitor monitoring. The effectiveness of the process has not been tested. Although the process has major limitations, I believe that it will serve as an effective tool in the hands of skilled practitioners. I have spoken with several attorneys who are already preparing their preissuance submissions to be filed in late September.

Key points:

Implementation: Although the pre-grant submissions cannot be filed before September 16, once that date passes, they may be filed in applications that were already on file with the USPTO. I know of some individuals who are already preparing materials for pre-grant submissions against competitor applications. Presumably they will file those sometime on or after September 16, 2012.
Deadlines: During the legislative process, the PTO supported these third-party submissions, but offered some concern that late-stage submissions could create problems for both patent applicants and for the USPTO examination process. Thus, for most cases the preissuance submission must be filed before the first office action rejection is mailed. In cases where there is no office action rejection or where the PTO works quickly, submissions will be allowed if within an alternative deadline of within six-months of publication. The PTO will not consider any submissions submitted after the notice of allowance.
Requirements: Submissions may be done anonymously and electronically, but must include (1) A list identifying the items being submitted; (2) a concise description of the relevance of each item listed; (3) a legible copy of each non-U.S. patent document listed; (4) an English language translation of any non-English language item listed; (5) a statement by the party making the submission that the submission complies with the statute and the rule; and (6) the required fee ($0 if fewer than three-documents submitted).
Results: The patent examiner is required to consider compliant third-party submissions in preparation for the next office action. The submitted documents will be listed on the face of the patent as considered.

How to make preissuance submissions more effective?: Some may have a more nuanced or longer-term strategy, but the usual realistic goal of a third-party submission is to limit the scope of a competitor's pending application. Barring retaliatory competitor action, the only downside is that a broad patent may still issue with a prosecution history reflecting that the examiner considered the submitted documents. No estoppel is created by the submissions. The identical argument will not be available during a later post grant review and may be more difficult to prove at trial than it would have been if never considered at the USPTO.

Quality Art: The best preissuance submissions will begin with on-point prior art. Examiners will not likely be tolerant of submissions that lack prima facie credibility.
Concise and Well Drafted: There is a large risk of examiners ignoring submissions that appear as a large stack of dense documents. The concise explanation should be designed to quickly lead examiners to a rejection based upon the submitted documents.
Explaining Known Art: Rather than submitting new prior art, applicants may re-submit art already in the file along with an explanation of how the art should be applied.
Reputation: Certain practitioners and entities will earn reputations as filing credible/incredible.
Protect Potential Space: Remember that the patent applicant is still likely to receive a patent. The pre-issuance submission is useful for limiting and defining patent scope. The record will reflect that the patent definitely does not cover X. With the normal unpredictability of claim construction, this defining role result can be quite helpful down the road if the patent is ever litigated. Practicing entities should use the process to clear a path for their own current and potential technology usage. As discussed below, a third party may be satisfied with the applicant adding a definition to a claim term rather than actually amending the claim.
Internal Prior Art: Remember that e-mails and other correspondence can potentially serve as printed publications under the patent laws. (See caselaw on 35 USC 102(a) & 102(b)).
Other Questions of Patentability: The statute calls for the submission of documents “of potential relevance to the examination” and is certainly not restricted to issues of novelty and nonobviousness. The rules do not allow an applicant to simply submit an argument without an underlying published document. For a definiteness issue, a dictionary definition may serve as the hook. For a new-matter question, the document could be the related parent application. For a patentable subject matter issue, the document might be Mayo v. Prometheus.

Arguments Serving as Published Evidence: A third-party challenging enablement might want to hire an expert to study the application; publish an expert report; and then submit the report (along with a concise explanation) following these new procedures. This approach appears to fit within the statute that allows the submission of “any … printed publication of potential relevance.” However, in its notice of final rules, the USPTO has indicated that it will not accept materials created and published merely for the purpose of challenging the pending application in question. The USPTO appears to understand that the statute is broadly written and thus does not directly prohibit the filing of such documents. The Office instead concludes that the submission would be rejected because the required concise explanation of such a document “would likely be deemed an improper attempt by the third party to impermissibly participate in the examination of the application because the relevance of the document being described is its discussion of the patentability of the application.” In this sense, the Office seems to be setting up a conflict between these new submission procedures found in 35 USC 122(e) and the prohibition on protests and pre-grant oppositions left unamended in 35 USC 122(c).

I believe that the USPTO is probably wrong on its analysis of the law here — in many (if not most) cases, this type of evidence should be allowed under the law. The statute does not provide a particular mechanism for challenging the PTO's refusal to consider these submissions, but the Office is unlikely be convinced on petition without resorting to the filing of a federal case. As an aside, the filing of a non-compliant submission will likely trigger the applicant's duty of disclosure. In that case, the applicant will likely re-file the submission as part of an information disclosure statement.

Note: Some of these ideas came from reading Hal Wegner's useful report on Third Party Submissions: The Final Rule.

Survey Response: Does the Amendment Violate the Written Description Requirement?

June 7, 2012PatentBroadest Reasonable Interpretation, Claim Construction, Written DescriptionDennis Crouch

by Dennis Crouch

In an earlier post, I mentioned recently issued U.S. Patent No. 8,196,213. During prosecution, the examiner rejected the pending claims as improperly claiming unpatentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 101. In particular, the PTO submitted that the claimed “computer readable storage medium” could encompass transitory signals, which are themselves unpatentable. In response, the applicant (Microsoft) amended the claims by adding an express limitation excluding “signals” from the claim scope. The amended claim begins: “1. A computer readable storage medium excluding signals . . . ” This change satisfied the PTO and the patent quickly issued. The original patent application document did not discuss signals or directly define computer readable media other than having the functional qualities of being able to “store data that is accessible by a computer.” However, the application did list several examples of computer readable media, including “magnetic cassettes, flash memory cards, digital video disks, Bernoulli cartridges, random access memories (RAMs), read only memories (ROMs) and the like.”

In a one-question survey, I asked Patently-O readers “does this patent claim violate the written description requirement?” As discussed below, most readers (~75%) agreed that amendment did not invalidate the claim.

Of the 850 responses, almost half (46%) suggested that the claim is valid because the amendment does not go beyond what was originally described in the specification. In its 2012 memo to examiners, the USPTO argued as much:

A claim drawn to such a computer readable medium that covers both transitory and non-transitory embodiments may be amended to narrow the claim to cover only statutory embodiments to avoid a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 101 by adding the limitation “non-transitory” to the claim. . . . Such an amendment would typically not raise the issue of new matter, even when the specification is silent because the broadest reasonable interpretation relies on the ordinary and customary meaning that includes signals per se. The limited situations in which such an amendment could raise issues of new matter occur, for example, when the specification does not support a non-transitory embodiment because a signal per se is the only viable embodiment such that the amended claim is impermissibly broadened beyond the supporting disclosure.

See 1351 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 212 (Feb 23, 2012). I have some amount of difficulty understanding the explanation given by the PTO — that no new matter problem is created by the amendment “because the broadest reasonable interpretation relies on the ordinary and customary meaning that includes signals per se.” While the USPTO’s interpretation of the law is important during the prosecution process, no deference is given to this type of analysis when a court later considers a patent’s validity.

Another 22% also suggested that the claim is valid because “negative limitations such as this need not be disclosed in the original application.” And 4% argued that the limitation should be ignored because it is found in the claim preamble.

Only one option in the survey led directly to an invalidity conclusion. 26% of responses suggested that the claim limitation excluding signals from the scope was improper because that limitation was not disclosed in the original application and that the claim is therefore invalid under the written description requirement.

In my mind, this entire discussion is ridiculous. The invention in this case (as in several hundred thousand other cases) is a bit of software. Yet, because of these odd rules setup by the U.S. Supreme Court (and their interpretation by the PTO) applicants feel they cannot be straightforward enough to simply obtain a patent on the software.

*****

In the above discussion, I jump quickly between “new matter” and “written description” doctrines. During patent prosecution, the two doctrines are relatively inseparable. The PTO tends to issue new matter rejections under 35 U.S.C. 132. Once a patent issues, the facts that would have created a new matter rejection at the PTO lead courts to invalidate claims for failing the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. 112.

Avoiding Subject Matter Problems but Creating Written Description Problems

June 5, 2012Patentanticipation, Written DescriptionDennis Crouch

Since Bilski, the USPTO has been understandably struggling with its patentable subject matter procedures. This is especially true in the area of computer software.

U.S. Patent No. 8,196,213 issued this week to Microsoft and is directed to a method of verifying un-trusted code. The original application included claims directed toward “a computer readable storage medium” loaded with varous instructions arranged in a novel manner. In July 2011, however, the examiner and the art unit’s Supervising Patent Examiner (SPE) mailed a final rejection of the claim based upon their conclusion that the claim impermissible encompassed unpatentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 101. The examiners reasoned that the storage medium classification was broad enough to include signals and that signals are unpatentable under Section 101. See 1351 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 212 (Feb 23, 2012).

In response, Microsoft amended the claims – adding an express limitation that excludes signals. The amended claim begins: “1. A computer readable storage medium excluding signals . . . ” This change satisfied the PTO and the patent quickly issued.

The original patent document never discusses signals and only defines computer readable media by reference to various elements “which can store data that is accessible by a computer, such as magnetic cassettes, flash memory cards, digital video disks, Bernoulli cartridges, random access memories (RAMs), read only memories (ROMs) and the like may also be used in the exemplary operating environment.”

The Question: Should the PTO have rejected the amendment for failing the written description requirement?

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Means-Plus-Function: Invalid as Indefinite

April 2, 2012Indefinite, PatentAffirmed Without Opinion, Enablement, Written DescriptionDennis Crouch

by Dennis Crouch

Ergo Licensing v. CareFusion 303 (Fed. Cir. 2012)

In a split opinion, the Federal Circuit has affirmed a lower court ruling that Ergo's asserted claims are invalid. Judge Moore explains in her opinion, that the claims are indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2) because the means-plus-function limitations are not supported by any corresponding structure disclosed in the specification. Judge Linn joined Judge Moore's opinion. Judge Newman dissented.

Describing, Enabling, and Defining: 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1) requires that a claimed invention be fully described and enabled. In addition, the claims must be drafted in a manner that particularly identifies the scope of rights being claimed. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2). Although overlapping, these three requirements—written description, enablement, and definiteness—are separate and distinct requirements. Thus, a claim may fail the definiteness requirement even though the invention sought to be patented was fully described in the original specification in "full, clear, concise, and exact terms" and in a way that "enables any person skilled in the art … to make and use the same."

Means-Plus-Function: Patent claims ordinarily recite particular "structure, material, or acts" as elements that both provide for the inventive step and limit the scope of rights. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (6) allows a patentee to alternatively draft limitations as "a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof." To a lay reader, these means-plus-function claims appear quite broad. For instance a claimed "means for connecting elements A and B" seemingly covers any method or structure that accomplishes the claimed function. However, the statute itself require that means-plus-function claims be given a much more limited scope. Under § 112 (6), a means-plus-function claim "shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof." Thus, to know the meaning of a claimed "means for connecting," we must look to the patent specification to see what particular connecting means were disclosed and the scope of the claim would be limited only to those disclosed structures and their equivalents. The result here is that means-plus-function claims typically have a scope that is much narrower than one might expect on the initial reading.

Undefined Means: In recent years, a number of means-plus-function claims have been invalidated as lacking definiteness under § 112 (2). (I.e., invalid as indefinite). Courts follow the following approach: (a) The statute requires that a means-plus-function element be defined according to corresponding structure found in the specification. (b) If no corresponding structure is found then the term cannot be defined and (c) is therefore invalid as indefinite.

This case offers yet another example of claims being held invalid based upon means-plus-function claim elements that lack corresponding structure in the specification. The claims recite a "control means for controlling [an] adjusting means." The patentee argued that its disclosure of a general purpose computer was sufficient structure because a computer would be able to accomplish the task-at-hand. On appeal, the court rejected the patentee's argument and affirmed that such a computer was insufficient structure since a general purpose computer could not accomplish the function required by the claim. The court wrote that the patentee could have satisfied the requirement by additionally including the algorithm that the computer would use to accomplish its task."

If special programming is required for a general purpose computer to perform the corresponding claimed function, then the default rule requiring disclosure of an algorithm applies. It is only in the rare circumstances where any general-purpose computer without any special programming can perform the function that an algorithm need not be disclosed.

Thus, the means-plus-function limitation has no corresponding structure in the specification because "there is no algorithm described in any form for the function of 'controlling the adjusting means.'" As a result, the claim is invalid as indefinite.

In an extended dissent, Judge Newman argued that the ruling amounts to a formalistic technicality that is unfair to patentees – especially when the enablement and written description tests are not offended by the claim.

Disfavored by Patentees: Because of their narrow scope and high-likelihood of invalidity, "means for" claiming has been on a steady decline for the past two decades. The chart below shows a time series of the percent of patents that include at least one "means for" claim limitation. (Note – my search was for "means for" and so some MPF claims are not counted). These days, the only ones being caught in this trap are either (1) being poorly advised or (2) attempting to improperly extend the scope of their patent beyond what was actually invented. In my view, prudent patent applicants today never rely on MPF claims as their broadest or strongest claims. However, many still find some role for those claims and it is important to recognize that means-plus-function claim scope varies dramatically on the international level.

Device for: The majority opinion suggests the next frontier of challenge – patent claims that rely heavily on functional language but that do not use the magic "means" language. Here, the court at least suggests that an equivalent claim drafted as a "device for controlling" would have been invalid under the same analysis. The court wrote "The [hypothetical] recitation of 'control device' provides no more structure than the term 'control means' itself, rather it merely replaces the word 'means' with the generic term 'device.'"

Supreme Court: No Move Yet on Denying Human Gene Patents

February 21, 2012PatentSupreme Court, Written DescriptionDennis Crouch

The Supreme Court is in the midst of deciding whether to grant the Ass’n of Molecular Pathology’s petition for a writ of certiorari in the Myriad gene patent case. The petition, led by public interest patent attorney Dan Ravicher, poses a simple question to the court: “Are human genes patentable?” Petitioners also ask the Supreme Court to provide more latitude for public interest groups to challenge patents even in the absence of any personal or direct threat of an infringement action – arguing that the Federal Circuit is not following the Supreme Court’s guidance set forth in MedImmune.

In addition to the party briefs, ten amici briefs were filed with the court from a variety of medical associations, hospitals, and professors – all in support of the petitioners. None of the major patent law associations filed briefs in the case.

The briefs were complete and distributed to the Justices on January 25 in preparation of a February 17 conference. In patent cases, the typical result of the conference is that the court either (1) grants certiorari; (2) denies certiorari; (3) invites comments from the Solicitor General; or (4) does nothing until the next conference. We learned today that the Supreme Court is following path number 4 – no action until next time. At some point before the close of term, the Supreme Court will revisit the case and announce that it is following one of the other paths. In an e-mail, Hal Wegner noted that the Supreme Court is scheduled to release new orders three times during next five weeks.

The delay may well be related to the fact that the Court is in the midst of drafting a merits decision in another § 101 patent-eligibility case of Mayo v. Prometheus. Although the Mayo case focuses on medical methods rather than genes per se, there is still a good chance that outcomes will be linked.

Other Denials: The court today did deny certiorari in several patent cases, including Janssen Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories; Hynix Semiconductor v. Rambus; and Eastman Chemical Co. v. Wellman, Inc.

In Janssen Biotech, the patentee unsuccessfully challenged the de facto heightened written description standard that the court has placed on biotechnology focused patents. In Hynix, the accused infringer unsuccessfully asked the Supreme Court to follow principles of equity in preventing infringement claims over industry-standard products by a patentee who had concealed its pending patent applications from the standard setting organization and had amended its claims during prosecution to cover the agreed-upon standard. In Eastman Chemical, the Supreme Court refused to consider whether the Federal Circuit should add some teeth to the indefiniteness doctrine codified in 35 U.S.C. §112(2).

APPLE V MOTOROLA in the EPO and Germany – patentability of user interface features

February 21, 2012PatentAffirmed Without Opinion, anticipation, First to Invent, obviousness, Written DescriptionDennis Crouch

Guest Post by Paul Cole of the UK firm of Lucas & Co.

According to BBC News last Friday, Apple has succeeded in the German courts in enforcing a patent for a user interface feature for its mobile devices. The ruling demonstrates the value of European patents for "software" inventions where a "technical" effect can be demonstrated. The claims in the granted patents and the problems that they solve provide insight about what features of a user interface might be regarded as "technical" by the EPO. The advantages to a software developer of being able to patent innovative interface features that are important to the "look and feel" of the device and the software running on it are self-evident.

The affirmed patent is EP-B-1964022 which relates to the "slide to unlock" feature found in iPhones. The claim as granted is set out below:

A computer-implemented method of controlling a portable electronic device comprising a touch-sensitive display, comprising:
-detecting contact with the touch-sensitive display while the device is in a user-interface lock state;
-transitioning the device to a user-interface unlock state if the detected contact corresponds to a predefined gesture; and
-maintaining the device in the user-interface lock state if the detected contact does not correspond to the predefined gesture; characterized by
moving an unlock image along a predefined displayed path on the touch-sensitive display in accordance with the contact, wherein the unlock image is a graphical, interactive user-interface object with which a user interacts in order to unlock the device.

A copy of the decision is not yet available online, but study of the online file of the European patent application (which was not opposed after grant) is instructive. The Examining Division accepted that the provision of a device control method with visual feedback was a technical problem but objected that the claimed subject matter was obvious because dragging and dropping were known. In their reply, Apple argued that the objective technical problem was to provide a more efficient user-friendly procedure for unlocking a portable device and to provide a sensory feedback to the user regarding progress towards satisfaction of a user input condition that was required for unlocking to occur. As set out in the claim, the unlock image signalled to the user that the device was locked and simultaneously indicated a contact point that a user had to touch in order to unlock the device. The displayed path indicated to the user where and how the unlock image had to be moved and the current position of the image indicated progress already made towards the unlocked condition. The method was easier than in the prior art where a sequence of operations had to be memorised.

The second patent, EP-B-2059868 which relates to the handling of digital images, has not yet been ruled on by the German courts However, the granted claim and the reasons for grant are also of interest since any iPhone user will be familiar with the "Camera-Roll" feature in question.The main claim is set out below.

A computer-implemented method, comprising: at a device with a touch screen display:
-detecting a first movement of a physical object on or near the touch screen display;
-while detecting the first movement, translating a first digital object displayed on the touch screen display in a first direction, wherein the first digital object is associated with a set of digital objects; characterized in that:
-in response to display of a previously hidden edge of the first digital object and continued detection of the first movement, displaying an area beyond the edge of the first digital object;
-after the first movement is no longer detected, translating the first digital object in a second direction until the area beyond the edge of the first digital object is no longer displayed;
-detecting a second movement of the physical object on or near the touch screen display; and
-in response to detecting the second movement while the previously hidden edge of the first digital object is displayed, translating the first digital object in the first direction and displaying a second digital object in the set of digital objects.

It appears from the file of the granted patent (which again was not opposed) that the technical effect of allowing a user to navigate within an image and to switch between images with a minimum of user input types was sufficient to support patentability.

The EPO acted as International Searching Authority, International Preliminary Examination was not necessary since the written opinion accompanying the search was favourable to patentability, and no objections were raised on entry into the European regional phase. The advantages to US applicants of using the EPO as ISA and possibly subsequently IPEA if allowable subject matter is likely to be identified are also self-evident.

It is instructive to compare these two granted European patents with another "look and feel" application which was refused by the EPO (EP1249014, Appeal Board decision T 0050/07; US 6396520). Interestingly this is the only Apple patent or application which appears to have been the subject of proceedings before an EPO Appeal Board. The invention concerned transition of a window between a maximised state and an icon state on the taskbar.

The main claim before the EPO Appeal Board read:

A method of transitioning a window on a computer screen between an open state and a minimized state, comprising the steps of:
-obtaining location information associated with a first window position in the open state;
-obtaining location information associated with a second window position in the minimized state;
-defining a set of curves, wherein said curves connect two selected points that relate to a dimension of said window in its first position to corresponding points of said window in its second position; and
-displaying said window at successive positions within said curves from said first position to said second position while scaling said dimension of the window to fit within said curves in a manner so as to give the appearance of sliding.

The issues before the Appeal Board provide an object lesson in how the state of the art at the application date, the exclusions as to patentable subject matter under a.52 EPC and the limitations of the disclosure of the application itself can exert a collective "squeeze" such that the result is refusal.

The closest prior art was US 6002402 (Schacher, Symantec) which showed a window transitioning between a maximised and an icon state, and novelty was to be found in the set of curves through which the transition took place producing a "funnel-like" effect and the display of the window at successive positions while it was being scaled down.

Arguments based on improved functionality received short shrift, the Appeal Board observing:

"Moreover, the alleged ergonomic improvement achieved by directing the user's attention to the final destination of the minimized window, so that the user will remember its location and, thus, find it again more rapidly, is not convincing either. As far as the precise location of the minimized window on the task bar is remembered at all by the user, this will only be ergonomically valuable to the user for a short amount of time, after which it will normally be forgotten. Furthermore, as minimized windows are at any rate typically arranged according to some predefined scheme (typically added at the end of the task bar or returned to the corresponding application button on the task bar) the user would already know where to find the minimized window. Therefore, the board is not convinced that there would be any added ergonomic value in drawing the user's attention to the final destination of the minimized window in the claimed manner."

The differences between the invention and the prior art were therefore held to reside in the production of an aesthetic effect. Since that effect had no technical character, it could not in itself contribute to inventive step. However, it could be taken into account in formulating the objective technical problem over Schacher which was how to achieve the specified "funnel-like" effect. The information in the specification in this regard was limited, as indicated by the flowchart below:

The description did not show that there was any difficulty in the shifting and scaling operations, and on the contrary the description explained that a variety of techniques for doing this would be apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the Appeal Board held that the achievement of the indicated technical effect was held to be straightforward for a designer of graphical user interfaces.

If Apple had drilled further down into the transition method than they did, was there anything else that could have saved the application? The look and feel of a window as it transitions to and from the taskbar is a striking effect which it is submitted impresses most users each time they see it happen. The specification explains that the display is updated line-by-line during the transition and the image is recalculated for each line, but that was evidently not enough for allowance and in any event would be easy to avoid. However, in addition to software the invention is in the field of moving images where visibility and human persistence of vision are important. Was there an optimum time, or a range of optimum times within which the transition could take place without interfering with the operation of the computer and which would display the most clearly visible and most aesthetically satisfying sequence of images to the user? It is possible that the range of times for which the "micro-movie" that users see at each window transition lasts would not have been held to be obvious and instead would have been held to require thought both from the operating system point of view and from the standpoint of user trials. A limitation along these lines could have been something that the Appeal Board might have found less easy to treat dismissively.

One take-away message for US applicants is the need to draft applications bearing in mind the exclusions under the EPC: stating as one of the main objects of the inventions "to provide more aesthetically pleasing operations" plays straight into the hands of an Examining Division or Appeal Board within the EPO and even if such objects can and should be stated, functional objects are best set out first. Another message is not to overlook the role of the human user in the invention: in the refused application the needs of the computer and the attractiveness of the micro-movie as a matter of shape were explained but what was necessary for the user to see the "micro-movie" and how long it should last were left unstated.

IPCom Wins by Waiver – Federal Circuit Temporarily Revitalizes IPCom Case Against HTC

January 31, 2012PatentClaim Construction, Written DescriptionDennis Crouch

By Dennis Crouch

HTC v. IPCom (Fed. Cir. 2012)

IPCom is the German version of a “patent troll.” Or, as Lord Justice Jacob wrote in Nokia v. IPCOM, EWCA Civ 6 (2011), “IPCom is a ‘non practising entity’, i.e. a patentee with no business of its own in products covered by the patents.” The company is run by Bernhard Frohwitter, one of the most successful German patent litigators and backed by New York private equity. As suggested by this introduction, IPCom is pursuing patent battles against telecommunications device manufacturers around the world. [Even though I used the word “troll” here, I certainly believe that non-practicing entities should generally have a right to enforce their patents.]

In 2011, IPCom sued the Taiwanese company HTC Corporation in the US for infringement of its Patent No. 6,879,830. The patent covers an apparatus for solving the wireless communications problem of handing-over a data-stream connection to another base station as the wireless device travels geographically. The patent was originally owned by the German company Bosch who transferred rights to IPCom as part of a major IP asset purchase.

IPXL: The district court held the asserted claims invalid on summary judgment as indefinite under 35 U.S.C. §112. Following IPXL Holdings, L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 430 F.3d 1377, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the district court rejected the claims as reciting an apparatus with method steps. On appeal, the Federal Circuit has reversed – holding that the lower court misconstrued the language of the claims.

I have reproduced a representative claim below, but the basic gist is that a mobile station apparatus is claimed that operates with a network. The network provides a number of functions regarding the handover process, including storing data, holding information in reserve, and then later deleting the information after the handover. The claim includes only one element for the mobile station – requiring that the mobile station comprises “an arrangement” for reversing the handover if it is unsuccessful.

Claim 1. A mobile station for use with a network including a first base station and a second base station that achieves a handover from the first base station to the second base station by: storing link data for a link in a first base station, holding in reserve for the link resources of the first base station, and when the link is to be handed over to the second base station: initially maintaining a storage of the link data in the first base station, initially causing the resources of the first base station to remain held in reserve, and at a later timepoint determined by a fixed period of time predefined at a beginning of the handover, deleting the link data from the first base station and freeing up the resources of the first base station, the mobile station comprising: an arrangement for reactivating the link with the first base station if the handover is unsuccessful.

In IPXL, the court held a claim invalid that was structured as an apparatus claim that also required the performance of method steps. Here however, the Federal Circuit interpreted the claim language as having an apparatus defined by its capability to perform a set of defined tasks. The legal distinction here is in whether the apparatus must perform the step or merely be capable of performing the step. In addition, the language discussing the function of the network does not create any problem because the claim itself is actually claiming a mobile station. Thus, the “prohibition on hybrid claiming” identified in IPXL does not apply to this case.

In interpreting the claim, the court relied on its old rule of construction that claim terms “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Using ordinary meaning as a starting point ,the court also walked through the specification and prosecution history in reaching its conclusion that the seeming action-items were directed to the network rather than the mobile device itself.

Prosecution History: One basis of HTC’s argument came from the prosecution history where the applicant referred to the six action elements in the claim as a “process” and the examiner called them “steps.” The Federal Circuit held that HTC (and the lower court) placed too much emphasis on those statements – especially because “in most cases” the examiner was referring to parallel method claims not at issue here. In looking at the prosecution history, the court also sent the reminder that prosecution history is less important in interpretation than claim and specification language. “Although the district court was correct in considering the prosecution history, the claim language and specification in this case are better sources for the correct construction.”

Because the court identified the source of error claim construction rather than indefiniteness, the case was reviewed

Means-Plus-Function and Waiver: HTC also offered a separate invalidity challenge based on the claimed “arrangement for reactivating.” HTC argued that – as a means-plus-function limitation – the scope of the term is defined by the corresponding structure found in the specification. Further, HTC argued that the specification did not include any supporting structure and that the claim must therefore be held invalid as indefinite. The district court rejected that argument – holding that the disclosed processor and transceiver served as the corresponding structure. On appeal, the Federal Circuit identified that holding as in error because the claimed function must be tied to a more particular structure. Here that structure would ideally be an algorithm that defines in some terms how the arrangement would work. See Aristocrat Techs. Austl. PTY Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

After identifying the error, the appellate panel refused to reverse because HTC had failed to properly preserve an objection for the appeal. The problem: At the trial court, HTC had argued that more hardware disclosure was necessary beyond the “processor and transceiver,” while on appeal, HTC (and in the reply brief) shifted its argument to focus on the need for an algorithm. The appellate court held that this late-stage argument was too late.

To be clear, HTC had argued that the means-plus-function limitation was indefinite because it lacked sufficient corresponding structure in the specification. HTC’s error was that it identified the patent’s problem as lacking sufficient description of the hardware that would perform the claimed function while the Federal Circuit saw the patent’s problem deriving from lacking a sufficient description of the algorithm that would perform the claimed function. The Federal Circuit’s point was that no more hardware need be disclosed so long as the algorithm is there. This result is a bit odd for a few reasons. The practical reason for this failing is likely that these issues were litigated before the Federal Circuit’s 2008 decision on point. However, from a factual standpoint I suspect that HTC is absolutely correct – the lack of disclosed structure could-have been entirely solved by further disclosure of specific hardware designed to achieve the claimed function and without any further disclosure of the particular algorithm. Thus, the disclosure of a video graphics processor would likely serve as sufficient structure for a computer graphic processing function with a known solution even without disclosing the particular algorithm used for the processing. In the same way a nail could serve as the structure of a fastening claim even without a description of the particular process for hammering the nail into place. Likewise here, a particularly designed and disclosed circuitry could serve as the structure for achieving the claimed reactivating function even without disclosing its process flow per se. The fact that the Federal Circuit here chooses a different structure that should-have-been disclosed does not suggest that HTC waived its argument that the claimed function lacked sufficient structure. This leads me to a second and broader point about the accused infringer’s role in the invalidation process. It is not normally the accused infringer’s role to identify what the patentee should have invented or disclosed. Rather, invalidity is more simply based on a showing that the patentee did not do enough. In this sense, the accused infringer takes on a role parallel to a food critic who can identify poorly presented food even if she herself cannot cook. In my world, this is akin to my own low level spelling prowess. I usually know when a word is misspelled. However, I can only rarely posit the correct spelling formulation without assistance. Thus, the Court’s ruling here leaves a bad taste because it puts a new burden on accused infringers to take the additional step of identifying what the patentee should have said in the patent and then binds them to their suggested counterfactual.

Harmless Error on Remand: The Federal Circuit identified an error in the lower court’s judgment but, because of waiver, did not require the lower court to re-open this issue on remand. Odds are that the lower court will not stick to its original opinion that has now been adjudged legally incorrect. Instead the court will more likely assert its discretionary power to take a fresh look at the issue of indefiniteness. This is especially likely if the district court broadly considers Supreme Court precedent such as Leer v. Adkins and the associated policy that “bad patents” should be invalidated even if that means bending some of the norms of civil procedure.

Court of Appeals: For Judge O’Malley (the opinion’s author), the waiver portion of the opinion appears to be written as a reminder to patent litigators that the Federal Circuit is a Court of Appeals rather than a trier of fact or court of first instance. This legal reality continues to be lost on some of her colleagues on the appellate bench.

Means-Plus-Function in Combination: A final MPF issue that could also create trouble for IPCom involves the fact that the Federal Circuit’s new construction of the claim includes only one element and that element is a means-plus-function language. The basis for means-plus-function claiming is found in 35 U.S.C. § 112¶6. That paragraph includes an apparent limitation that MPF elements are available only in “a claim for a combination.” The result: single element claims may not use MPF language to define that lone element. In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

Guest Post: Should you Submit Third-Party Prior Art?

January 16, 2012PatentAIA Trials, anticipation, Broadest Reasonable Interpretation, Claim Construction, Inequitable Conduct, IPR, obviousness, PGR, USPTO Director, Written DescriptionDennis Crouch

By Paul Morgan

Introduction and Summary

On January 5 the PTO proposed a new 37 CFR §1.290 in the Federal Register for third party pre-issuance submissions of prior art in patent applications of others. The new rule is needed to implement the new statutory provision – 35 U.S.C. §122(e) – found in Section 8 of the AIA [Leahy Smith America Invents Act]. 35 U.S.C. §122(e) will be effective as of September 16, 2012, and will be usable against any pending applications [including reissues but not reexaminations] filed before or after that date. It will permit anyone to submit patents, published patent applications, or other printed publications, to the USPTO for consideration and inclusion in the record of a patent application as long as the submission includes a "concise statement of relevance" and meets some other paperwork requirements, which need not be discussed here since they will be clearly spelled out in the final PTO rules. As discussed below, §122(e) includes a significant expansion of the time period for submitting prior art documents to be put into someone else's pending application. The statute also expands what you can say about the documents (accompanying explanations and arguments) well beyond the present limitations found in 37 CFR §1.99. The submission process will remain cheap and simple, but it will still present the same conundrums as to whether or not you should use it?

In the same Federal Register is the proposed PTO rulemaking for amending 37 CFR §1.501 to accommodate the amendment of 35 U.S.C. §301. This amendment will slightly expand what information anyone can submit to the USPTO for inclusion in an already issued patent file when accompanied by a written explanation regarding the "pertinency and manner of applying" the information to at least one patent claim. That expand [new] information which can be put into an issued patent file will include written statements made by the patent owner before a Federal court or the Office regarding the scope of any claim of the patent. But the Office's use of such written statements will be limited to determining the meaning of a patent claim in reexamination proceedings and post grant review proceedings. This provision is also effective on September 16, 2012.

The Present Situation [PRE AIA]

First keep in mind that the PTO considers it to be actionable unethical conduct to put any papers into anyone else's ex parte [normal] patent application file unless there is an express statutory basis for doing so. Furthermore, papers attempted to be filed in a reexamination in which you are not a party [other than just the initial request papers for an ex parte reexamination], will not be entered. Adverse prior art submissions for anything in the PTO are quite restricted.

37 CFR §1.291 "Protests by the public against pending applications" and 37 CFR §1.292 "Public use proceedings" have existed for many years, but have been rarely used, and I suspect that few PTO practitioners or PTO personnel have ever seen one. Some senior PTO officials I asked at a CLE meeting several years ago doubted if there had been more than a handful per year. The rare Rule 292 proceedings are mostly used in connection with a parallel interference. Rule 291's potential usage was significantly restricted when the statute providing for U.S. 18 month application publications went into effect, ending Rule 291 "protest" filing opportunities after an application publication date.

The PTO at that time also put severe rule constraints that were not statutorily required into a 37 CFR §1.99 limiting what could be submitted and when. Rule 99 has a short time limit of only two months following the application publication date. Rule 99 also expressly states at (d) that a "submission under this section shall not include any explanation of the patents or publications, or any other information. The Office will not enter such explanation or information if included in a submission under this section." There is also a limit of 10 submitted documents. The PTO even threatened to reject submitted prior art patent copies if they were merely marked or high-lined to show the examiner where the relevant teaching or disclosure was buried in the patent! It seemed obvious to me at that time that the PTO did not really want to be bothered with any extra examiner work from third party prior art submissions. [The AIA has now at least made it clear that that is not quite what Congress has in mind.] An English language translation must be provided for all relevant portions of any listed non-English language document to be considered by the examiner, and that requirement will continue under the proposed new rules. Some patent attorneys reportedly consider it preferable to just send prior art to an applicant's patent attorney by registered mail and rely on the inequitable conduct concerns of that patent attorney to get that patent attorney to file the prior art the application, or to set up an IC defense if they do not.

35 U.S.C. §301 above [with its original 37 CFR §1.501] was enacted years ago accompanying the first [ex parte] reexamination system. It is simply to allow people to place prior art in an issued patent file without having to initiate a reexamination, so that the art might hopefully be considered if anyone subsequently requested a reexamination. It is understood that §301 has rarely been used, and I am not aware of any PTO statistics to the contrary, even though §301 says that it can be done anonymously. My very limited experience was that the PTO clerical staff did not know what to do with the [rare] §301 submittal and it was not placed in the patent file until we made follow-up efforts. [A copy of the PTO submittal mailed to the patent owner was helpful for a licensing discussion, but I wouldn't count on that happening often.]

What's New?

New 35 U.S.C.122(e)(1) and its proposed new rule 37 CFR §1.290 will greatly expand when you can legally put prior art into someone else's pending application file. As shown below, that is awkwardly expressed as "before the earlier of .. or the later of" three events in an application. But clearly it will normally be available for a much longer time period than the mere 2 months after a patent application is published of present Rule 99. It may be submittable for several years for applications not yet having a first office action with a claim rejection, as long as there is as yet no notice of allowance. Nor can the present unreasonable Rule 99 prevention of any explanations or comments on the submitted art remain, since "a concise description of the asserted relevance of each submitted document" is specifically required by this new statute:

(e) Preissuance Submissions by Third Parties-

(1) IN GENERAL- Any third party may submit for consideration and inclusion in the record of a patent application, any patent, published patent application, or other printed publication of potential relevance to the examination of the application, if such submission is made in writing before the earlier of–

(A) the date a notice of allowance under section 151 is given or mailed in the application for patent; or

(B) the later of–

(i) 6 months after the date on which the application for patent is first published under section 122 by the Office, or

(ii) the date of the first rejection under section 132 of any claim by the examiner during the examination of the application for patent.

(2) OTHER REQUIREMENTS- Any submission under paragraph (1) shall–

(A) set forth a concise description of the asserted relevance of each submitted document;

(B) be accompanied by such fee as the Director may prescribe; and

(C) include a statement by the person making such submission affirming that the submission was made in compliance with this section.

As noted, the proposed amended 37 CFR §1.501 for the AIA amendment of 35 U.S.C. §301 will just slightly add to the information can be submitted to the PTO to merely put into an issued patent file. That information can now comprise or include written statements made by the patent owner before a Federal court or the Office regarding the scope of any claim of the patent, and that information can supposedly be used in subsequent actual reexaminations. However, even if that made sense tactically or strategically in some situation, perhaps in anticipation of a potential ex parte reexamination initiated by the patent owner itself, I fail to see how that kind of material can affect that many reexaminations? The Fed. Cir. requirement that claim scope in a reexamination apply a "broadest reasonable interpretation" test is not the same as claim interpretation in patent litigation.

But Do You Really Want To Do It & How Likely Is the Overall Usage?

How likely is it that this somewhat increased opportunity to cite prior art in applications or patent files of others will be used? That depends largely on whether you think doing so is really a good idea or not. That obviously includes guessing how likely is a regular examiner in normal ex parte patent examination [not a reexamination] going to consider and apply that prior art to reject claims? A prior statistical study published by Prof. Crouch on his Patently-O blog of a low examiner usage rate of prior art cited by the applicants themselves is not encouraging. But perhaps a novel third party submission is more likely to get an examiner's attention and claim rejections than routine applicant IDS dumps?

Even if that effectiveness was predictable, there is clearly a serious risk in third party submissions of art into applications of others under any system. It will case the application owner to think that someone else thinks their patent application is important enough be worth attacking its claim scope. That is logically going to cause the patent application owner to put extra effort into getting that application allowed, with broad and variable scope claims, including possible RCE's and appeals if necessary, and possibly filing and keeping divisionals and continuations pending. Furthermore, the claims can be amended to distinguish the third party cited art without incurring "intervening rights" as would be the case in a reexamination. While the third parties citing the prior art do not face dangerous estoppels [as in inter partes reexaminations or PGR] they do risk greatly strengthening the enforceability of the resultant patent against that or similar prior art if not all potentially infringed claims are finally rejected.

The rare use of any of the present third party prior art submission systems does not suggest their likely future use, [unlike the increasing use of reexaminations]. The PTO has apparently never kept statistics on the number of prior art filings in other peoples patent applications under present 37 CFR 1.99 (in force since 2000), or otherwise. But I was cognizant of a docketing operation that was handling thousands of pending patent applications, and only one such third party prior art submission was ever identified as being filed against any of those thousands of U.S. applications [excluding those in interferences] and it was not successful in getting any claims rejected.

Perhaps there will be somewhat higher usage and success rates for the new 35 U.S.C.122(e)(1) and 37 CFR §1.290 because it will allow attached explanations of the relevance of the cited art. But until that is demonstrated, the conservative tendency of patent attorneys to save prior art defenses until they think they can be used more effectively later, especially in an inter partes reexamination [where the patent owner cannot make completely unchallenged ex parte arguments against the cited art] seems likely to prevail.

There is of course an academic myth, supported by some companies presumably for its PR value, that was at play in the lead-up to these AIA changes. Namely a strange inherent assumption that large numbers of the public have nothing better to do with their time and money than to undertake the tens of thousands of prior art searches and claim-relevant submissions that would be needed to have any significant effect on patent examination quality for the more than 500,000 patent applications a year, even though they are not aware of any that could ever threaten any of their products. A mere couple of hundred patent applications were provided with prior art submissions under a pilot "Peer to Patent" system, despite all its publicity, of which only a minority resulted in claims being rejected using the submitted prior art.

As usual, I would appreciate comments from others with relevant information on these subjects.

Streck v. Research Diagnostic Systems: Dismissal of Invalidity Counterclaims, Written Description, and Enablement

January 12, 2012Patentanticipation, Enablement, Written DescriptionJason Rantanen

By Jason Rantanen

Streck, Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic Systems, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2011) Download 11-1044
Panel: Newman, O'Malley (author), and Reyna

Streck, Inc. sued Research & Diagnostic Systems, Inc. for infringement of three patents relating to hematology control technology using integrated reticulocyte controls. In response, R&D counterclaimed for declaratory judgment of noninfringement and invalidity. During the district court litigation, R&D argued that the claims were unsupported by adequate written description, that they were not enabled, and that it was entitled to priority. The district court granted summary judgment in Streck's favor on written description, JMOL in Streck's favor on enablement, and a jury ruled for Streck on the issue of priority. Following trial, the district court entered a permanent injunction.

Dismissal of Invalidity Counterclaims: On appeal, the CAFC concluded that the district court properly dismissed R&D's invalidity counterclaims against unasserted claims. During the litigation, Streck submitted a series of infringement contentions in which it progressively limited the specific claims asserted, while R&D amended its invalidity contentions to ultimately encompass all but one claim of the patents-in-suit. When R&D moved for summary judgment of invalidity on two of the unasserted claims, the district court dismissed the invalidity counterclaims for those claims citing a lack of "reasonable apprehension" of suit on R&D's part as to those claims.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with the District Court's dismissal. Even in the wake of MedImmune, a declaratory judgment plaintiff must show the existence of a case or controvery, as evaluated on a claim-by-claim basis. Drawing upon the reasoning of a New Jersey district court opinion addressing the same issue, Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Mylan Inc., No. 2:09cv1692, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114784, at *17-18 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 2009), the Federal Circuit held that "consistent with MedImmune, a counterclaimant must show a continuing case or controversy with respect to withdrawn or otherwise unasserted claims." Slip Op. at 20.

The CAFC further concluded that R&D failed to satisfy this requirement. Although the district court technically erred by relying exclusively on the reasonable apprehension of suit test, "there is no evidence that R&D met its burden of showing a continuing case or controversy with respect to the unasserted claims." Id. at 23. Nor was the court persuaded by R&D's arguments based on Scanner Technologies Corp. v. ICOS Vision Systems Corp., 528 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008):

"unlike the situation in Scanner Technologies, where all of the claims were at issue and were never withdrawn or altered by either party, here, both parties were on notice from the start of litigation that the scope of claims at issue was only a subset of the full patents-in-suit and, significantly, did not include Claim 3 of any patent."

Id. at 22.

Written Description Satisfied: Streck v. Research Diagnostic is also notable for its reliance on the knowledge of a PHOSITA in the context of written description. In this instance, the asserted claims covered both the use of a "true" reticulocyte or an analog of a reticulocyte in the claimed control composition. The two parties' technical lineage differed based on this distinction: the inventor of Streck's patents used only a reticulocyte analog when he reduced the invention to practive, while R&D developed its composition using a true reticulocyte. Leveraging this distinction into a written description argument, R&D contended that the patents-in-suit failed to provide adequate written description for a true reticulocyte integrated control.

On appeal, the CAFC agreed with Streck and the district court that the patents contained sufficient disclosures to support claims encompassing the use of true reticulocytes when combined with the knowledge of a PHOSITA, namely, that "use of true reticulocytes in stand-alone controls was well-known in the prior art." Slip Op. at 28. Based on the disclosures of the patents, "one skilled in the art would have recognized that the claimed integrated controls could be made using either true reticulocytes or reticulocyte analogs." Id.

Enablement: Focus on the "Novel Aspect" of the patents-in-suit: The CAFC also affirmed the district court's grant of JMOL of enablement, agreeing with Streck's claims that the "novel" aspect of the invention was an integrated control using both reticulocytes and white blood cells and that true reticulocytes are "virtually indistinguishable" from analogs. While "the specification, not the knowledge of those skilled in the art, 'must supply the novel aspects of an invention,'" id. at 32-33 (quoting Automotive Technologies v. BMW, 501 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2007), the court apparently did not view the type of retriculocytes as a novel aspect of the invention in this case. "Here, there was unrebutted evidence that true reticulocytes and Ryan’s reticulocyte analogs 'work in exactly the same way in a hematology control, and are virtually indistinguishable, even to one skilled in the art.'” Id. at 33.

The CAFC also affirmed on the issue of priority, citing its earlier and controlling decision in Streck, Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic Systems, Inc., 659 F.3d 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2011), and concluded that the wording of the permanent injunction was not overly broad.

USPTO Notice and Comments

January 10, 2012PatentAIA Trials, PGR, Written DescriptionDennis Crouch

The USPTO currently has nine published notices and proposed rule changes that are open for comment. Most of these involve changes to USPTO procedure that implement aspects of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA). Under the AIA, the USPTO has been granted broader authority through this notice-and-comment period.

Proposed Rule: Eliciting More Complete Patent Assignment Information – Comments Due January 23, 2012. The USPTO is proposing a rule that would require the timely recordation of patent and application ownership and changes to ownership. [DDC: This appears to be a straw-man proposal and will likely be significantly changed or dropped based upon public input.]
Proposed Rule: Revision of Patent Term Adjustment Provisions Relating to Appellate Review – Comments Due January 27, 2012. [DDC: The new rule would largely lengthen PTA, but in some circumstances would reduce PTA depending upon the results of your appeal to the BPAI.]
Notice: Request for Comments on Additional USPTO Satellite Offices for the Nationwide Workforce Program – Comments Due January 30, 2012. The USPTO is planning to open additional satellite offices in 2012-2013 and is seeking input on the proper location.
Proposed Rule: Changes to Implement the Pre-issuance Submissions by Third Parties Provision of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act – Comments Due March 5, 2012. Third party submissions will be allowed beginning in September 2012. The proposed rules sets up requirements that such a submission must include "a concise description of the asserted relevance of each document submitted." The proposed rule suggests that a fee of $180 for the submission of up to ten documents. In order to promote submissions, the Office has proposed a fee exemption for the first submission by each third-party for each application (with a limit of three documents in that submission). Under the new rules, submissions must be filed by the later of: (i) Six months after the date on which the application is first published by the Office or (ii) The date the first office action.
Proposed Rule: Implementation of Statute of Limitations Provisions for Office Disciplinary Proceedings – Comments Due March 5, 2012. The AIA sets a new statute of limitations for USPTO disciplinary proceedings at the earlier of (i) 10 years after the date on of the alleged misconduct; or (ii) one year from the date on which the misconduct was made known to an officer or employee of the USPTO. The rule proposed by the PTO would further define the one-year deadline as being triggered only once the USPTO has completed a preliminary review of the case and received a "complete, written response" from the accused practitioner. Depending upon the circumstances, the one-year deadline may otherwise be triggered by the OED's receipt of a certified copy of a record of censure from another Bar or conviction of a serious crime. [DDC: The USPTO's interpretation of the one-year deadline appears to be in tension to the text of the new statute, but the PTO may be fine because of the deference for OED matters under Lavacara v. Dudas.]
Proposed Rule: Changes to Implement Miscellaneous Post Patent Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act – Comments Due March 5, 2012.
Proposed Rule: Changes to Implement the Inventors Oath or Declaration Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act – Comments Due March 6, 2012.
Notice: Changing the USPTO's Collection of Information in Matters Related to National Medal of Technology and Innovation Nomination Application – Comments Due February 6, 2012.
Notice: Changing the USPTO's Collection of Information in Matters Related to Patent Appeals – Comments Due March 5, 2012.

Patented or Described in a Printed Publication

January 4, 2012PatentEnablement, Written DescriptionDennis Crouch

By Dennis Crouch

The newly revised 35 U.S.C. § 102 states that no patent shall issue if “the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention…” 35 U.S.C. §102(a).

My question for the hour is whether (or not) the word “patented” in this fundamental provision is entirely superfluous. In other words, when is a claimed invention “patented” but not described in a printed publication? I should note at this point that the pre AIA Section 102 also includes the statement that an invention is not patentable if it was already “patented or described in a printed publication.”

Patented but not Published: It is largely safe to assume that patents are published and, therefore, any disclosure found in a patent should also be considered to be “described in a printed publication.” A narrow exception to this aforementioned assumption can be derived from regular SNAFUs that occur in patent offices around the world that allow for patents to issue without actually being published. Historically, some countries also granted patentee’s a period of post-grant secrecy. US courts have ruled that these foreign patents still count as patented under the statute so long as the secrecy is only temporary and the patent is eventually and meaningfully “laid open for public inspection.” See In re Kathawala, 9 F.3d 942, 28 USPQ2d 1789 (Fed. Cir. 1993) and In re Carlson, 983 F.2d 1032 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The statute covers patents issued in any country and because the US has no direct control over how any particular country publishes its patents, the “patented” clause has the potential of potentially becoming meaningful if countries decide to again limit publication.

Patented but not Described?: There is also some potential that, even when a patent is published, a particular element in the prior art will covered by the patent claims but not sufficiently described to qualify under the “printed publication” leg of the clause. The enablement and written description requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (as well as their worldwide equivalents) largely eliminate this possibility. However, the truth is that patents regularly issue that are directed to particular inventions but that are not fully enabled by the specification. In those cases it is quite possible that an invention be “patented” without being “described in a printed publication.” (Of course, this may be unlikely because US courts have placed such a low enablement requirement on prior art).

Thoughts?

The Narrows: Winning by Arguing Both Trade Secret Misappropriations and Patent Infringement

October 9, 2011Patent, Patent Cases 2011, Trade SecretEnablement, Trade Secrets, Written DescriptionDennis Crouch

Atlantic Research Marketing Systems (ARMS) v. Troy Industries (Fed. Cir. 2011)

By Dennis Crouch

This appeal stems from a 2007 patent infringement and business tort lawsuit filed by ARMS against its former employee and current competitor (Mr. Troy). ARMS' reissue patent claims a firearm hand-guard with an attachment point at the firearm's barrel nut. The original patent application included both the barrel nut attachment and a sleeve support as claim limitations. However, the reissue patent does not require the sleeve support. That change is important for the case because TROY's competing hand-guard uses the barrel nut as the single attachment point.

On summary judgment the district court ruled the patent invalid for failing the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 p1.

Written Description Requirement: Section 112 p1 of the Patent Act requires that a patent specification include "a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same." In Ariad, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed that this provision creates the separate and distinct requirements of written description and enablement. The test for written description considers whether, after reading the original specification, one of skill in the art would understand that the inventor was in possession of the claimed invention. Most written description cases arise in situations like this where the patentee has amended its claims well after the application filing date.

Although not cited here, this case is similar to the Federal Circuit's Gentry Gallery decision where an element in the original claims was omitted in a broader-amended claim. In Gentry Gallery, the original application was directed to a pair of recliners with controls located on a console. The amended claims removed any restriction on the console location. The Federal Circuit held those broader claims invalid because "the patent disclosure did not support claims in which location of recliner controls was other than on the console."

On appeal here, the Federal Circuit agreed that the broader claims are invalid under the written description requirement because it the specification does not provide any evidence that the inventor invented a hand-guard that uses the barrel nut as the one and only attachment point.

[I]t is undisputed that the written description for the '465 patent does not disclose to a person of ordinary skill in the art an invention where the yoke/barrel nut attachment point provides complete support for the handguard accessory. Claims 31-36, however, clearly cover such a design. Put differently, claims 31-36 [as amended] exceed in scope the subject matter that [the inventor] chose to disclose to the public in the written description. Therefore, we hold that the district court properly granted summary judgment invalidating claims 31-36 for failing to satisfy the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112. Mr. Swan used the reissue process to impermissibly obtain claims unsupported by the written description.

ARMS had also sued TROY for trade secret violation and argued in court that ARMS version of the barrel-nut-only attachment was a trade secret stolen by TROY. That testimony bolstered the court's conclusion that the asserted claims lacked the written description support to cover a barrel-nut-only attachment.

[ARMS] cannot now "have it both ways" by reaching back and relying on the disclosures in the '245 patent to claim an invention he was purposely shielding from the public.

Trade Secret Violation: Although TROY won the patent dispute, the jury found troy liable for trade secret misappropriation and breach of a fiduciary duty to his former employee. The award was $1.8 million in damages under Massachusetts Trade Secret Law. (Massachusetts has not adopted the UTSA). As noted above, the alleged trade secret is the method of attaching the hand-guard to a firearm using only the barrel nut. The jury was instructed that any protectable trade secret must go beyond what was disclosed in the '245 patent. Based upon that instruction, the Federal Circuit affirmed – finding no clear error.

This strategy worked perfectly for ARMS who would likely be satisfied winning either patent infringement or trade secret misappropriations. Although the court clearly sympathized with TROY's position, it noted that the legal positions taken by the two parties meant that ARMS was likely to win one of its claims.

Troy's argument illustrates the inherent tension Atlantic Research created by contending that Troy misappropriated trade secrets, while simultaneously asserting that the products Troy developed with the misappropriated trade secrets infringed its patent. In response, Troy contended that Atlantic Research's patent disclosed the trade secret, but also contended that the patent asserted against it was invalid for failing to disclose a written description of a handguard that attaches solely at the barrel nut. These conflicting positions left little room for either party to prevail on both claims.

The problem: In the end, the Federal Circuit vacated the jury verdict on a "jury taint" issue. One juror brought a plumbing clamp from home during deliberations to show other jurors and the appellate panel held that the judge should have taken more dramatic steps to ensure that the clamp did not have any "prejudicial effect on the jury as a whole."

Sarnoff: Derivation and Prior Art Problems with the New Patent Act

October 7, 2011Academic Studies, Articles and Publications, Guest Post, Patent, Patent LegislationClaim Construction, Marking, obviousness, Written DescriptionDennis Crouch

In a new Patently-O Patent Law Journal essay, Professor Joshua Sarnoff (DePaul) highlights a set of important problems in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act. The essay, titled Derivation and Prior Art Problems with the New Patent Act focuses primarily on the elimination of 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) and its implications regarding the patentability of material that was either wholly or partially derived from another source.

Professor Sarnoff writes:

Legislation sometimes is enacted that obviously requires either immediate revision or creative administrative and judicial interpretation. The new Leahy-Smith America Invents Act's derivation and prior art provisions fall in that category. Whether or not the move from a first-to-invent to a first-inventor-to-file system is viewed as good policy and as authorized by the Constitution, the particular changes made to the prior art provisions may not prevent or invalidate patents on inventions derived from others, i.e., when the applicant has obtained knowledge of an invention from another, original inventor and then files for a patent on the same or a similar invention. In particular, obvious inventions made with unauthorized derived knowledge will now be patentable, given the elimination of prior art section § 102(f). Absent creative interpretations by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and the courts, the new derivation proceedings will not prevent a first filer from obtaining a patent even if the first filer's invention is merely an obvious extension of information derived from another. Further, the new act adds a narrow and poorly understood category of prior art that may generate years of needless litigation to re-settle the currently well-understood boundaries of the public domain. I discuss these problems in detail below.

There is some hope that Congress and the Administration will take Professor Sarnoff's concerns to heart.

Read the article: Joshua D. Sarnoff, Derivation and Prior Art Problems with the New Patent Act, 2011 Patently-O Patent Law Review 12 at /media/docs/2012/10/sarnoff.2011.derivation.pdf.

Prior Patently-O Patent Law Journal Articles include:

Bernard Chao, Not So Confidential: A Call for Restraint in Sealing Court Records, 2011 Patently-O Patent L.J. 6.
Benjamin Levi and Rodney R. Sweetland, The Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) Recommendations to the International Trade Commission (ITC): Unsound, Unmeasured, and Unauthoritative, 2011 Patently-O Patent L.J. 1.
Kevin Emerson Collins, An Initial Comment on King Pharmaceuticals: The Printed Matter Doctrine as a Structural Doctrine and Its Implications for Prometheus Laboratories, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 111.
Robert A. Matthews, Jr., When Multiple Plaintiffs/Relators Sue for the Same Act of Patent False Marking, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 95.
Kristen Osenga, The Patent Office's Fast Track Will Not Take Us in the Right Direction, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 89.
Peter S. Menell, The International Trade Commission's Section 337 Authority, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 79.
Donald S. Chisum, Written Description of the Invention: Ariad (2010) and the Overlooked Invention Priority Principle, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 72.
Kevin Emerson Collins, An Initial Comment on Ariad: Written Description and the Baseline of Patent Protection for After-Arising Technology, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 60.
Etan Chatlynne, Investigating Patent Law's Presumption of Validity—An Empirical Analysis, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 37.
Michael Kasdan and Joseph Casino, Federal Courts Closely Scrutinizing and Slashing Patent Damage Awards, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 24.
Dennis Crouch, Broadening Federal Circuit Jurisprudence: Moving Beyond Federal Circuit Patent Cases, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 19.
Edward Reines and Nathan Greenblatt, Interlocutory Appeals of Claim Construction in the Patent Reform Act of 2009, Part II, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 7.
Gregory P. Landis & Loria B. Yeadon, Selecting the Next Nominee for the Federal Circuit: Patently Obvious to Consider Diversity, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 1.
Edward Reines, and Nathan Greenblatt, Interlocutory Appeals of Claim Construction in the Patent Reform Act of 2009, 2009 Patently-O Patent L.J. 1.
Paul Cole, Patentability of Computer Software As Such, 2008 Patently-O Patent L.J. 1.
Mark R. Patterson, Reestablishing the Doctrine of Patent Exhaustion, 2007 Patently-O Patent L.J. 38
Arti K. Rai, The GSK Case: An Administrative Perspective, 2007 Patently-O Patent L.J. 36.
Joshua D. Sarnoff, BIO v. DC and the New Need to Eliminate Federal Patent Law Preemption of State and Local Price and Product Regulation, 2007 Patently-O Patent L.J. 30
John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges Unconstitutional?, 2007 Patently-O Patent L.J. 21.
Joseph Casino and Michael Kasdan, In re Seagate Technology: Willfulness and Waiver, a Summary and a Proposal, 2007 Patently-O Patent L.J. 1.

Guest Post: Preclusive Inventor Disclosure Under Leahy-Smith

September 22, 2011Patentanticipation, obviousness, Written DescriptionJason Rantanen

Guest Post by Jeffrey Lefstin, Ph.D., Professor of Law at the University of California Hastings College of the Law

Under Leahy-Smith, inventor disclosures made less than one year before filing are themselves not prior art. But these disclosures play two entirely new roles in the Leahy-Smith scheme. New § 102(b)(2) provides that a disclosure is not prior art if the “subject matter disclosed” had previously been “publicly disclosed” by an inventor (or one who derived it from an inventor). And inventor disclosure precludes the defense of prior commercial use if that use commences less than one year before the inventor's disclosure.

Patent academics and practitioners are hotly debating whether inventor “disclosures” under § 102(b) are coterminous with the events that defeat patentability under § 102(a). But this debate overlooks what may be a more difficult conceptual question: what is the preclusive scope of a disclosure under § 102(b)?

A preliminary question is whether an inventor who has made a “disclosure” protected by § 102(b)(1)(A) has “publicly disclosed” subject matter so as to preclude prior art under § 102(b)(1)(B). Did Congress intend that some inventor disclosures do not bar patentability, but nonetheless fail to preclude subsequent prior art? And must inventor preclusive disclosures under § 102(b)(1)(B) actually be within one year of filing?

Regardless of what it means to “publicly” disclose, Leahy-Smith seems to require a qualitatively different analysis than those we are familiar with in patent law. Section 102(b)(1)(B) defines the ability of an inventor to exclude prior part not in terms of comparison between disclosure and claim, but between the inventor’s disclosure and a subsequent third-party disclosure: the inventor must have previously disclosed the “subject matter” appearing in a later third party disclosure to exclude it as prior art. This inquiry may pose some perplexing problems. The inventor’s disclosure and the third party’s disclosure may well be of incommensurable forms. How do we compare a publication to sale, or a public use of a tangible object to a patent disclosure? Moreover, the inventor’s disclosure and the third party’s disclosure are unlikely to be at the same level of generality: one is likely to be broader or narrower then the other.

Consider, for example, an inventor who publicly discloses a fuel consisting of 80% gasoline and 20% ethanol. Does that disclosure preclude a third-party disclosure of a 75%-25% mixture? A generic third-party disclosure of mixtures of ethanol with petroleum products? What if the inventor disclosed a mixture of gasoline and ethanol in generic terms rather than a particular composition?

Answers to these questions depend on the approach the courts take to the scope of preclusive disclosure under Leahy-Smith, and the choice of approach may have a huge impact on the inventor’s ability to preclude later prior art by disclosure. I outline two basic approaches here: a claim-focused approach that is easier to administer and more generous to inventors, but seems less grounded in the statutory text; and a subject matter-focused approach, that is more supportable by the statutory text, but potentially less favorable to inventors and much more difficult to administer.

Claim-Focused Approaches
The simplest approach would be that inventor disclosure immunizes any claim that encompasses the inventor’s disclosure. Under this approach, prior art appearing subsequent to the preclusive disclosure cannot be asserted against a claim reading on the preclusive disclosure. That immunity could either be extended to dependent claims that do not themselves read on the preclusive disclosure (thereby permitting the inventor to claim species disclosed by third parties), or restricted to claims that directly read upon the preclusive disclosure (thereby prohibiting the inventor to claim species disclosed by a third party).

The claim-focused approach permits us to use our existing framework for assessing novelty under § 102, because the only inquiry would be inclusion of the preclusive disclosure in a later claim. In addition, because in the strong form of the approach preclusive scope does not depend on the content of the later third-party disclosure, it eliminates the possibility of strategic disclosures by third parties and the disputes likely to ensue over whether the third-party’s disclosure was derived from the inventor’s.

The claim-focused approach is not the most faithful to the statutory text, because new § 102(b) defines the prior art exclusion by the subject matter disclosed by the inventor, not by a claim encompassing the inventor’s disclosure. Nonetheless, this interpretation would be attractive to a court seeking a straightforward analysis, or a court seeking to temper Leahy-Smith’s impact on the prior art regime.

Subject Matter-Focused Approaches
What if we confine preclusion to the actual “subject matter” disclosed by the inventor? We then need a methodology to define the preclusive scope of an inventor disclosure. We might establish the broadest preclusive scope based on an inventor disclosure, and exclude from prior art all subject matter within that scope. All things within the broadest preclusive scope of the disclosure would be claimable – including species later disclosed by third parties – although the inventor would not be immunized against disclosures lying outside the maximum preclusive scope.

Alternatively, we might define preclusive scope at a particular level of generality. Under this variation a preclusive disclosure of a genus might not immunize a generic claim from anticipation by a third party’s disclosure of a species.

The difficulty with the subject matter-focused approaches is how to define the preclusive scope, whether it be the broadest possible or confined to a particular level of generality. The problem seems parallel to the question of support for a claim under § 112 – particularly if we regard the written description requirement as defining the level of generality or specificity at which an inventor may claim. However, a patent disclosure is drafted specifically to support claims. How could we derive a permissible scope from a non-patent disclosure, particularly if § 102(b) “disclosures” include non-informing public uses or sales? In interferences, we do ask whether an inventor is entitled to make the interference count based on a non-patent disclosure, such as a documented conception or reduction to practice. But traditional interference practice awards priority of a generic count upon a showing of priority to a species, so the question of permissible scope from non-patent disclosure does not arise.

An alternative method of defining preclusive scope would rely instead on analogy to § 103: preclusive scope might be defined by what is obvious in light of the inventor’s disclosure. An obviousness-based definition would permit us to ask whether more specific subsequent disclosures were obvious in light of the inventor’s more general earlier disclosure. But since a later-disclosed genus would always be obvious over an earlier-disclosed species, the obviousness-based definition seems to always exclude any later disclosure more generic than the inventor’s. Worse, if a third party later discloses a non-obvious species, that species would seem to count as prior art, likely anticipating any generic claim by the inventor.

The Prior User Defense
The same conceptual problems arise in applying the Leahy-Smith Act’s new expanded defense of prior commercial use. Under new § 273(a)(2)(B), the prior commercial use defense is not available if use commenced less than 1 year before “the date on which the claimed invention was disclosed to the public in a manner that qualified for the exception from prior art under section 102(b).”

But new § 102(b) does not deal with disclosures of claimed inventions; it excepts from prior art disclosures by inventors or of the same subject matter previously disclosed by inventors. In deciding what claims are exempt from the prior use defense, we are faced with the same problem we face in interpreting the scope of preclusive disclosure. Is any claim that would encompass a preclusive disclosure impervious against the prior use defense, or is some more complex 112- or 103-like inquiry necessary to decide which claims qualify?

The reference in § 273 to disclosure of a “claimed invention” under § 102(b) might nonetheless provide the key to interpreting the scope of preclusive disclosure under § 102(b). Although § 102(b) literally defines preclusive scope in terms of the subject matter actually disclosed by the inventor, if we can only harmonize § 102(b) and § 273(a)(2)(B) by defining preclusive scope in terms of a claimed invention, then the principle of in pari materia might lead a court to embrace the claim-focused approach in construing § 102(b).

Flowchart Insuficient Structure to Define Sofware Means-Plus-Function Limitation

August 29, 2011Patentanticipation, Enablement, Written DescriptionDennis Crouch

In re Aoyama (Fed. Cir. 2011)

Aoyama’s pending application claims a supply chain management system with two elements: “an order controller system” and “a warehouse system.” According to the claim, the order controller generates “transfer data” using “reverse logistic means” and the warehouse receives the transfer data. The Examiner identified U.S. Patent Application Pub. 2001/0034673 (“Yang”) as fully anticipating and that rejection was affirmed by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“Board”).

On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, a split panel agreed that the claims lacked merit but found them impermissibly indefinite rather than anticipated.

The key to the decision focuses on the means-plus-function “reverse logistic means” limitation.

Means-plus-function (MPF) claims are deceptive. MPF claims appear to be broadly drafted and without any structural limitations. However, the patent act requires that the actual scope of MPF claims be limited to structures disclosed within their specifications. 35 U.S.C. 112 p6. The court has also repeatedly held that an MPF limitation is considered impermissibly indefinite if the specification does not contain any structure that performs the claimed function.

Here, the claimed “reverse logistic means” generate “transfer data.” Aoyama pointed to a flow-chart (Figure 8) as providing the necessary structure. (Shown below). In reviewing the flow-chart, however, the Federal Circuit could not identify sufficient structure. In particular, the court noted that the flow-chart identified a number of results, but did not identify any way that “a computer could be programmed to produce the results described in the boxes.” Quoting both the Examiner and the Board, the Court wrote that Figure 8 only “presents several results to be obtained, without describing how to achieve those results, and certainly not how to generate transfer data.”

Importantly, the question of means-plus-function structure is much like that of written description. It does not matter whether one skilled in the art would be able to create a structure to perform the claimed function. Rather, the focus is on whether such structures were disclosed in the specification.

Because the means-plus-function limitation lacked sufficient disclosure of an accompanying structure and are therefore unpatenable.

In dissent, Judge Newman argued (1) that the federal circuit improperly raised the issue of indefiniteness and (2) that the figure and accompanying text should be considered sufficient structural disclosure.

Interpreting the Scope of Patent Assignments Beyond Family Members

August 14, 2011PatentWritten DescriptionDennis Crouch

MHL TEK v. Nissan, Hyundai, KIA, Porsche, Subaru, Audi, Volkswagen and BMW (Fed. Cir. 2011)

MHL purported to obtain its patents from Animatronics and the inventors who themselves own MHL. However, Animatronics had already assigned a number of patent rights to a third-party, McLaughlin Electronics. The basic standing question for the case is whether the McLaughlin assignment encompassed the patents-in-suit. If so, then the later assignment to MHL was ineffective and the plaintiff had no standing to sue.

The McLaughlin assignment purported to assign “the inventions and discoveries set forth in [a different patent] application.” The parties all admitted that the assignment language was broad enough to encompass more than just the single application listed in the assignment. In considering the language of the assignment, the appellate court broadly held that the assignment was also not limited to “family member” applications linked by a priority claim. Rather, the test given by the assignment is simply whether the patent “claims inventions and discoveries set forth in the [original] application.” Here, the court focused on the claims of the patent-in-suit (the ‘516 patent) because “the claims of the patent define the invention” and basically conducted a written-description analysis to determine whether at least one of those claims were described in the specification of the original application. The court considered claim 1 of the ‘516 patent and found that its subject matter was fully disclosed by the originally assigned patent. Without explanation, the court then held that this single claim relationship was sufficient to render the entire patent within the assignment agreement. Thus, the functional interpretation of the assignment language was that the assignment encompassed any patent that included at least one claim that was reasonably described by the original specification.

The court also held that two continuations of the originally assigned application had also been transferred to McLaughlin through the assignment.

Finally, the court walked through a “carve-out” in the assignment that retained ownership for Animatronics for patents that “concern” certain identified “proprietary inventions.” Taking a technical view of the carve-out provision, the Federal Circuit looked at each patent claim of the asserted patents to determine whether any patent claims covered a proprietary invention as defined in the assignment. Although the court identified some similarity, the court could not find any claims whose scope could be said to cover one of the defined proprietary inventions. And therefore, the appellate panel affirmed that rights to those patents had been previously assigned by Animatronics and that MHL had no standing to sue on those patents.