July 2010

Leviton Manufacturing v. Universal Security Instruments

By Jason Rantanen

In Leviton, Chief Judge Michel issued his last words as a judge on the subject of inequitable conduct, while Judge Prost provided some hints as to her views on the questions pending before the court in Therasense v. Becton Dickinson.

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Leviton Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Universal Security Instruments, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Case No. 2009-1421)

The district court's inequitable conduct determination in this case arose from two patent applications Leviton filed in 2003 and 2004.  The applications contained virtually identical claims, but listed completely different inventors.  The first application (the "Germain application") was filed in October 2003 and claimed priority to a February 2003 provisional application; the second, which led to the '766 patent (the patent in suit), was filed in 2004 as a continuation of an application filed on August 20, 1999.  The prosecuting attorneys did not disclose the Germain application during the prosecution of the '766 patent.

After granting Leviton's mid-litigation motion to dismiss, the district court concluded that the case was exceptional based on inequitable conduct and vexatious litigation, resulting in an award of attorneys' fees.

  • Note: The majority treated the district court's inequitable conduct finding as a summary judgment, as there was no evidentiary hearing.  The dissent would have reviewed the factual findings under the clear error standard because they arose in the context of an exceptional case determination. 

Majority: Factual Issues Relating to Intent Precluded Summary Judgment of Inequitable Conduct
The majority, written by then Chief Judge Michel and joined by Judge Moore, concluded that summary judgment of inequitable conduct should be reversed.  With respect to materiality, they agreed with the district court that the Germain application constituted undisclosed material information.  Although the copying of the claims was not per se material under 37 C.F.R. § 10.23(c)(7) (which relates to the interference context), it was relevant to double patenting and inventorship.  They also agreed that the failure to disclose litigation involving the '766 patent's parents was material. 

On intent, however, the majority concluded that the district court's inference of deceptive intent was not the only reasonable one based on the record.  In particular, they noted that the explanation given by Leviton's litigation counsel was not unreasonable as a matter of law, thus precluding a grant of summary judgment.  Rather, it could only be found implausible following an evidentiary hearing.

Dissent: Summary Judgment Should Be Affirmed

In her lengthy dissent, Judge Prost indicated that she would reach the opposite conclusion on intent.  Particularly informative are her views on inferring intent.  First, she explicitly adopted the Larson Manufacturing requirement that an inference of intent "must be the single most reasonable inference able to be drawn from the evidence."  Dissent at 11.  Second, she gave her thoughts on plausible explanations, reasoning that the prosecuting attorney's explanation (that he did not believe the Germain application was material because it was not prior art) was implausible because a veteran patent prosecutor would know that prior art is not the only type of information that is material to the examiner.  Thus, she would "allow the district court to reject [the explanation] as "unreasonable" and "implausible" and therefore insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact."  Dissent at 17.

  • Comment: Judge Prost's logic would appear to be applicable to any situation in which the prosecuting attorney's explanation was incorrect – which generally necessarily follows once materiality has been found.  All one needs to do is to point out that the attorney must necessarily have known better, and the explanation would be rendered implausible.

About Jason: After spending several years in practice as a patent litigator, Jason is now looking at law from the academic side and is currently a Visiting Researcher at UC Hastings. Although he does not currently represent clients, for the sake of full disclosure he notes that he has represented clients on both sides of inequitable conduct issues, including Abbott Laboratories in connection with the Therasense litigation.

Attorney Fees and Equal Treatment for Plaintiffs and Defendants

Media Queue v. Netflix (Fed. Cir. 2010)

This case involves a classic “improvement patent” scenario. Nick Gross was a longtime Netflix user when he came-up with the idea that the service should provide additional user notifications — such as when the movie queue runs dry. Just before filing suit, Gross and partners formed Media Queue as a holding company. Media Queue then sued Netflix, Blockbuster, and others for patent infringement. Nick is also a patent attorney and a nice guy. We met at a conference last spring.

After construing the claims, the district court dismissed the case based on its summary judgment finding of non-infringement.  The court, however, refused to award attorney-fees to the defendants because the case was not entirely frivolous or filed in bad faith.  Media Queue has appealed the summary judgment.  However, the more interesting aspect of the case is the counter-appeal by Netflix asking the Federal Circuit for an en banc hearing to on the issue of when a court may find an “exceptional case” and award attorney fees to the prevailing party. In particular, Netflix argues that the current law of attorney-fee awards is imbalanced in favor of the plaintiff-patentee.

35 USC 285 simply states that “The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”  Several decisions have held that a prevailing-patentee may obtain attorney fees based on a finding of willful infringement — i.e., that the accused infringer was aware of an objectively high likelihood that the patentee would prevail.  Willfulness can be found even when the defendant has a non-frivolous non-infringement of invalidity argument. On the flip-side, however, a prevailing-defendant (accused infringer) seeking attorney fees must show a seemingly higher standard of litigation misconduct or inequitable conduct.

The appeal asks the Federal Circuit to apply the Supreme Court precedent of Fogerty v. Fontasy, Inc. (1994) in holding that plaintiffs and defendants in patent cases are entitled to equal treatment in obtaining attorneys' fees.

The appeal is filed by Mark Lemley’s team at Durie Tangri. Amazon, Facebook, Microsoft, Oracle, Toyota, and others “frequent defendants” have filed briefs supporting en banc hearing.

Documents:

Requests for Continued Examination Continue to Rise

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The chart above shows Requests for Continued Examination (and the earlier CPA/R129 processes) as a percentage of the total number of non-provisional patent applications filed each year. 

Notes: The denominator here does not include RCE filings but does include continuations and CIP filings. Thus, the calculation is: (Number of RCEs)/(Number of Non-Provisional Filing). The denominator does include plant & reissue applications, but those numbers are negligible.

 

Patently-O Bits and Bytes: USPTO PPAC Morning Report

Financial:

  • USPTO budget for FY2010 limited by Congress to $1.887 billion dollars. Projected collections for FY2010 is expected to be $200 million over that limitation. Under the current law, all of that money will be sent to congress. Congress has already allocated $100 million of that overage on other non-patent items. Thus, to get that money back at this point, Congress would need to take $100 million from another source.
  • Budget for FY2011 — requested budget of $2.3 billion that includes a bump for significant technology upgrades at the Office.

Backlog:

  • In January 2009, PTO had about 765k unexamined utility patent applications.  That number is now down to about 735k.  The PTO is pushing a 699k campaign to drive the number of unexamined cases under 700,000 this year.
  • The PTO has made 62 new “experienced” hires this FY. 

Patently-O Bits and Bytes

I worked with my former firm MBHB on a special Bilksi edition of their newsletter.

  • Snippets can be downloaded here: http://www.mbhb.com/snippets/bilski
  • Topics include:
    • Viewpoints on Life After Bilski v. Kappos 
    • With Bilski Having Come and Gone, It's Time to Get Back to Work 
    • Avoiding Abstract Claims by Broadly Defining the Problem 
    • A Critique of Bilski's Textual Analysis 
    • Questions Surrounding a Shift to an "Abstract Idea" Test
    • Bilski v. Kappos: Effects on Biotechnology Patents

Some New IP Blogs:

Old Stand-by IP Blog:

Patent Law Pro Bono and the Federal Circuit Bar Association

  • The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit handles several distinct types of cases.  The largest dollar-value cases typically involve patents.  The veteran and government personnel appeals are usually worth much less.  Many patent litigators have begun handling these lower-value appeals on a pro bono basis.  Professional representation in these cases helps insure that justice is served. In a recent ceremony, Federal Circuit Chief Judge Rader and CAVC Chief Judge Greene honored the volunteers for their service.  Four particular attorneys deserve special praise for their efforts: Ron Smith, Blair Taylor, Dion Messer, and Paul Eaglin (as well as Jim Brookshire of the FCBA).  Others who were recognized at the ceremony include: Mark Abate, Alan Anderson, Michelle Armond, Reynaldo Barcelo, Alyson Barker, Dawn Marie Bey, Elizabeth Brenner-Leifer, Carl Bretscher, William H. Burgess, John Bustamante, Kurt Calia, Mary Calkins, Steve Carlson, Virginia Carron, Yar R.Chaikovsky, Connor Civins, Bradley Coburn, David Cohen, Kristin M. Cooklin, Donald Curry, Steve Daniels, Lauren A. Degnan, Kirk Dorius, John Dragseth, Helen Dutton, Paul Eaglin, Geoffrey Eaton, Brian Edmunds, Sam Ernst, James Erwin, Cecilia Fex, Bob Fuhrer, Anthony Garza, Shane Glynn, Daniel Graham, Joshua Graham, Maximilian Grant, Frederick Hadidi, Thomas Halkowski, Jason Harp, Cathy Harris, Edmund Haughey, Nathan Henderson, Dan Herzfeld, Todd Hettenbach, Christopher Hower, Richard Hung, Christopher Ryan Johnson, Harold Johnson, Lawrence Kass, Lisa Kattan, Rudy Kim, Brian Kramer, Kevin T. Kramer, Deanna Kwong, Brad Lane, Steve Lauff, Lewis E. Leibowitz, Greg Lipper, Christopher Liro, John Livingstone, Christopher Longman, Doug Lumish, Chris Martiniak, Duane Mathiowetz, Aaron Maurer, Scott P. McBride, Scott McCaleb, Michael McCaleb, Ryan McCarthy, Richard McLaren, Dion Messer, John Molenda, Brian Pandya, Chad Pannell, Lee Perla, Matthew Phillips, Janet Phipps Burkhead, Thomas Puppa, George Quillin, Courtland Reichman, Edward Reines, Elizabeth Roesel, Elizabeth Rogers Brannen, Joshua Rothman, Adam Samansky, Jeff Schwartz, Beth Shaw, Chad Shear, William J. Simmons, Michael Sink, John Skenyon, Ronald Smith, Eric Sophir, Robert Stanley, Henry Su, Blair Taylor, Bryan Vogel, Keith Vogt, Daniel Volchok, Steven Warner, Scott C. Weidenfeller, Andrew Woodmansee, Jennifer Wu, and Hunter Yancey.
  • If you are interested in pro bono service, contact Nece Jordan at jordan@fedcirbar.org. 

 

Patently-O Bits and Bytes

I worked with my former firm MBHB on a special Bilksi edition of their newsletter.

  • Snippets can be downloaded here: http://www.mbhb.com/snippets/bilski
  • Topics include:
    • Viewpoints on Life After Bilski v. Kappos 
    • With Bilski Having Come and Gone, It's Time to Get Back to Work 
    • Avoiding Abstract Claims by Broadly Defining the Problem 
    • A Critique of Bilski's Textual Analysis 
    • Questions Surrounding a Shift to an "Abstract Idea" Test
    • Bilski v. Kappos: Effects on Biotechnology Patents

Some New IP Blogs:

Old Stand-by IP Blog:

Patent Law Pro Bono and the Federal Circuit Bar Association

  • The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit handles several distinct types of cases.  The largest dollar-value cases typically involve patents.  The veteran and government personnel appeals are usually worth much less.  Many patent litigators have begun handling these lower-value appeals on a pro bono basis.  Professional representation in these cases helps insure that justice is served. In a recent ceremony, Federal Circuit Chief Judge Rader and CAVC Chief Judge Greene honored the volunteers for their service.  Four particular attorneys deserve special praise for their efforts: Ron Smith, Blair Taylor, Dion Messer, and Paul Eaglin (as well as Jim Brookshire of the FCBA).  Others who were recognized at the ceremony include: Mark Abate, Alan Anderson, Michelle Armond, Reynaldo Barcelo, Alyson Barker, Dawn Marie Bey, Elizabeth Brenner-Leifer, Carl Bretscher, William H. Burgess, John Bustamante, Kurt Calia, Mary Calkins, Steve Carlson, Virginia Carron, Yar R.Chaikovsky, Connor Civins, Bradley Coburn, David Cohen, Kristin M. Cooklin, Donald Curry, Steve Daniels, Lauren A. Degnan, Kirk Dorius, John Dragseth, Helen Dutton, Paul Eaglin, Geoffrey Eaton, Brian Edmunds, Sam Ernst, James Erwin, Cecilia Fex, Bob Fuhrer, Anthony Garza, Shane Glynn, Daniel Graham, Joshua Graham, Maximilian Grant, Frederick Hadidi, Thomas Halkowski, Jason Harp, Cathy Harris, Edmund Haughey, Nathan Henderson, Dan Herzfeld, Todd Hettenbach, Christopher Hower, Richard Hung, Christopher Ryan Johnson, Harold Johnson, Lawrence Kass, Lisa Kattan, Rudy Kim, Brian Kramer, Kevin T. Kramer, Deanna Kwong, Brad Lane, Steve Lauff, Lewis E. Leibowitz, Greg Lipper, Christopher Liro, John Livingstone, Christopher Longman, Doug Lumish, Chris Martiniak, Duane Mathiowetz, Aaron Maurer, Scott P. McBride, Scott McCaleb, Michael McCaleb, Ryan McCarthy, Richard McLaren, Dion Messer, John Molenda, Brian Pandya, Chad Pannell, Lee Perla, Matthew Phillips, Janet Phipps Burkhead, Thomas Puppa, George Quillin, Courtland Reichman, Edward Reines, Elizabeth Roesel, Elizabeth Rogers Brannen, Joshua Rothman, Adam Samansky, Jeff Schwartz, Beth Shaw, Chad Shear, William J. Simmons, Michael Sink, John Skenyon, Ronald Smith, Eric Sophir, Robert Stanley, Henry Su, Blair Taylor, Bryan Vogel, Keith Vogt, Daniel Volchok, Steven Warner, Scott C. Weidenfeller, Andrew Woodmansee, Jennifer Wu, and Hunter Yancey.
  • If you are interested in pro bono service, contact Nece Jordan at jordan@fedcirbar.org. 

 

Federal Circuit Extends the Scope of 102(e) “Secret Prior Art”

In an important case, the Federal Circuit has expanded the scope of so-called 102(e) “secret prior art.” Under the decision, a US patent or published application will be considered prior art as of the filing date of its qualifying provisional application.  The case is important because of the large number of provisional patent applications being filed each year.

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In re Giacomini (Fed. Cir. 2010)

Giacomini’s patent application was filed on November 29, 2000.  In his search, the examiner found U.S. patent 7,039,683 (the “Tran patent”) and asserted that patent as prior art over Giacomini.  The Tran patent application was filed in December 2000 (after Giacomini) and issued in 2006. However, the USPTO asserted that the patent should be considered 102(e) prior art because it claims priority to a U.S. provisional application that was filed in September 2000.

35 U.S.C. 102(e)(2) bars patentability if

the invention was described in . . . a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for patent, except that an international application filed . . . shall have the effects for the purposes of this subsection of an application filed in the United States only if the international application designated the United States and was published under Article 21(2) of [the PCT] in the English language.

The question in this case is whether the 102(e) priority date for prior art reaches-back to the filing date of the provisional application. On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with the USPTO that the provisional filing date is the 102(e) priority date.

In the 1968 case of In re Klesper, the Federal Circuit predecessor court (the CCPA) held that the 102(e) follows the prior precedent of treating a prior art disclosure found in an issued patent as being disclosed as of the “filing date of the earliest U.S. application to which the patent is entitled, provided the disclosure was contained in substance in the said earliest application.”  The Federal Circuit agreed that this provision applies equally to provisional patent applications “ so long as the provisional application [provides] written description support for the claimed invention . . . in accordance with Section 119(e).”  Giacomini never argued that the provisional failed to describe the invention found in the prior art.

Therefore, the Tran patent “shall have the same effect,” [Citing 119(e)] including a patent-defeating effect, as to the claimed invention as though it was filed on the date of the Tran provisional. Accordingly, Giacomini, who filed his application after Tran filed his provisional application, cannot receive a patent covering the same subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).

This decision follows the BPAI’s 2008 precedential of Ex parte Yamaguchi, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d 1043 (BPAI 2008). However, the decision is in tension with the Hilmer doctrine. In re Hilmer, 359 F.2d 859 (CCPA 1966) (a U.S. application’s 102(e) priority date does not extend to its Section 119 foreign filing date). Giacomini had argued that provisional applications should be treated like foreign filings rather than like non-provisionals because the priority statute for provisional applications is also found in Section 119 and becaues provisional applications lack the formality of non-provisionals. 

Note: US Court interpretations of 103(a)/102(e) offer a major difference between US practice and European practice. Namely, in the US secret 102(e) prior art is available to be combined as part of an argument for obviousness while in most European countries, the filing date of prior art is only important for novelty purposes.

Federal Circuit Splits on Validity of Means Plus Function Claim

Telcordia Technologies, Inc. v. Cisco Systems pic-100.jpg (Fed. Cir. 2010)

Chief Judge Rader and Judge Prost sparred over the level of explanation necessary to ensure that a means plus function (MPF) claim is found definite. The Patent Act (35 U.S.C. 112 p6) permits claim limitations written as a "means or step for performing a specified function." The statute provides that an MPF "claim [limitation] shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof." However, the claim will be found indefinite and therefore invalid if the specification fails to include at least some structure that is clearly linked or associated with the claimed function. “The question is not whether one of skill in the art would be capable of implementing a structure to perform the function, but whether that person would understand the written description itself to disclose such a structure.” (Quoting Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).

Telcordia's patent in this case is directed to a double-ring network that is designed to withstand either a line-cut or a failed node. One element of the claim requires a "monitoring means, associated with the first ring and the second ring, for evaluating the integrity of the multiplexed subrate communications on the first ring and the second ring."

Writing for the majority, Chief Judge Rader (joined by Judge Lourie) held that the claimed "monitoring means" had been properly described in the specification. The dissent cited the same precedent but could not find anything in the specification that links disclosed structures to the claimed function. In discussing the opinion, Foley's Hal Wegner described the opinion as "pitting the leader of the older generation [of Federal Circuit Judges] against a contender from the next generation."

Stats: About 15% of newly issued patent included at least one claim having an MPF limitation. And, of those patents that include an MPF limitation, about half recite fewer than five such limitations. It appears that attorneys are using MPF claim language primarily as a back-up. Longer claim-sets are more likely to include means-plus function language. Thus 21% of patents with above-average-sized claimsets (by character count) include a means-plus-function limitation while only 11% of patents with below-average-sized claimsets include an MPF limitation. Looking claim-by-claim, I found that only 3% of the recently issued patents include means-plus-function limitations in every independent claim. Patents with MPF terms are more frequently associated with non-assigned patents (usually individual inventors). Patents arising from certain countries are much more likely to include MPF limitations. The chart below looks at the most common foreign filing jurisdiction for priority claims and reports the percentage of US patents arising from those foreign filings that include MPF limitations. [More Data]

 

Statutory Guidelines for Inequitable Conduct

In TheraSense, the en banc Federal Circuit is looking to rewrite the rules of inequitable conduct. By both its name and historic precedent, inequitable conduct appears to stem from non-statutory doctrines of equity. However, as with other equitable doctrines (such as injunctive relief), inequitable conduct could be somewhat tamed by the language of the Patent Act. In his TheraSense amicus brief, Professor Hricik is taking a useful approach by focusing on the statutory basis for holding claims unenforceable.

Two provisions of the Patent Act come to mind. One is general and the other specific. The general statute is 35 USC 282(1). That portion of Section 282 identifies "unenforceability" as a defense to patent infringement. In TheraSense, the court's first goal should be to interpret the meaning of unenforceability as found in that statute.

The more specific provision is Section 288. It is Section 288 that allows a patentee to assert infringement of remaining claims even after some of the claims are found invalid. Section 288 sets a specific limit on this separability principle. Namely, separability of claims does not apply when an invalidated claim was obtained through deceptive intent.

Whenever, without deceptive intention, a claim of a patent is invalid, an action may be maintained for the infringement of a claim of the patent which may be valid. 35 U.S.C. §288.

Section 288 is not exhaustive in its approach. Rather, the statute is only explicit that the remaining claims of a patent can be asserted even after one of the claims was found invalid, so long as that invalid claim was not obtained with deceptive intent. The statute does not explicitly indicate the result when an invalid claim was obtained with deceptive intent or, for that matter, when a valid claim was obtained with deceptive intent. In his brief, however, Professor Hricik concludes that these statutes should be read to – at times – limit the Court’s ability to automatically render all claims of a patent unenforceable after a finding of inequitable conduct.

Contact Professor Hricik if you (or your firm / company) are interested in joining the brief.

Patently-O Bits and Bytes

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Patently-O Bits and Bytes

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