All posts by Jason Rantanen

About Jason Rantanen

Jason is a Law Professor at the University of Iowa College of Law.

The Unpredictability of Patent Litigation

Patent

By Jason Rantanen

In her article Predicting Patent Litigation, recently published in the Texas Law Review (and available here.), Professor Colleen Chien proposed a model for predicting which patents are most likely to be litigated based on a combination of intrinsic and acquired patent file characteristics.  The article has since spawned two short responses, one by Professor Lee Petherbridge of Loyola Los Angeles and the other by Professors Jay Kesan (Illinois), David Schwartz (Chicago-Kent), and Ted Sichelman (San Diego), both published by the Texas Law Review. Both acknowledge Chien's substantial contribution to the literature, but express caution about the extent to which it is possible to perform practically useful data-driven patent litigation prediction given the current state of knowledge.

In On Predicting Patent Litigation, Lee Petherbridge argues that data-driven patent litigation prediction presents difficult modeling problems, especially when models are constructed from the types of data identified in Predicting Patent Litigation.  He points out that models used to identify which patents are likely to be litigated need to be both specific and sensitive in order for them to be useful to innovators and their advisors. He also explains that models that rely on causal relationships between acquired patent characteristics (such as reexamination) and patent litigation can be adversely affected by problems such as omitted variable bias and simultaneity. These concerns, he argues, limit such models’ predictive usefulness because they can suppress the specificity and sensitivity necessary to make models practically useful. The response is available here.

Kesan et. al. also express reservations about Professor Chien's model in Paving the Path to Accurately Predicting Legal Outcomes, but do so from the angle of methodological concerns.  In particular, Kesan et. al. identify and discuss the merits and the limitations Chien's dataset and empirical methodology, also raising the endogeneity concerns discussed by Petherbridge.  In addition, they question the connection between Chien’s observations and her policy recommendations regarding patent record-keeping. The response is available here.

Taken together, these three works provide both a great starting point and a useful guide for anyone considering a data-driven approach to predicting patent litigation.

In re Google

Patent

By Jason Rantanen

In re Google Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Nonprecedential Order) Download In re Google
Panel: Lourie, Prost, and Moore (author)

Earlier this week, the Federal Circuit denied a petition for a writ of mandamus sought by Google in a dispute with Oracle.  The petition sought to prevent Oracle from using a juicy email on the ground that the email was privileged.  The email was sent from a Google engineer to Google's VP in charge of its Android operating platform, as well as Google's senior counsel and another engineer.  The email itself is reproduced in the court's opinion; it  relates to an investigation of alternatives to Java that Google was considering.  Google included the final version of the email on its privilege log, but produced "autosaves" of the email as it was being drafted.  After Oracle referenced the substance of the email at a hearing, Google asked Oracle to return all versions of the email, citing privilege.  Oracle complied, but moved to compel.  The district court subsequently held that the email was not protected under the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine.

Although the court's affirmance of the district court's refusal to protect this communication under the attorney-client privilege is fact-specific (and nonprecedential), the opinion nevertheless provides a useful short primer on attorney-client privilege issues in the context of activities performed at the behest of an in-house counsel. 

The opinion also illuminates one of the consequences of the dump-and-recall approach that patent litigation is trending towards: if Google had carefully reviewed all of its document before they were produced, it likely would not have produced autosaves of this email. Instead, they would likely have ended up as a few lines among an untold number of nearly anonymous entries on a privilege log.  Indeed, if even Google cannot avoid the inadvertent production of documents it intended to shield via its privilege log, it is questionable that anyone can – especially as document volumes continue to grow.  (But perhaps search technologies will improve as well). 

This consequence is not necessarily undesirable, however.  Privilege logs can include documents of questionable privilege; often, the claims of privilege are not challenged (perhaps because parties on opposite sides are concerned about a possibility of mutually assured destruction).  By their very nature, dump-and-recall opens the door to the possibility of more challenges to these types of questionable documents – which may lead to more greater disclosure of significant documents that otherwise would have languished in secret. 

Dealertrack v. Huber: Unpatentable “computer aided” claims

Patent, , ,

By Jason Rantanen

Dealertrack v. Huber (Fed. Cir. 2012) Download 09-1566
Panel: Linn (author), Plager (concurring in part and dissenting in part), and Dyk

The Federal Circuit's opinion in Dealertrack adds to the evolving law on subject matter patentablility of computer-related inventions. It should be read in connection with two other recent decisions in this area, Ultramercial v. Hulu, 657 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011) and CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

At issue was the subject matter patentability of claims 1, 3, and 4 of Patent No. 7,181,427.  Claim 1 is representative:

1. A computer aided method of managing a credit application, the method comprising the steps of:
[A] receiving credit application data from a remote application entry and display device;
[B] selectively forwarding the credit application data to remote funding source terminal devices;
[C] forwarding funding decision data from at least one of the remote funding source terminal devices to the remote application entry and display device;
[D] wherein the selectively forwarding the credit application data step further comprises:
[D1] sending at least a portion of a credit application to more than one of said remote funding sources substantially at the same time;
[D2] sending at least a portion of a credit application to more than one ofsaid remote funding sources sequen-tially until a finding [sic, funding] source returns a positive funding decision;
[D3] sending at least a portion of a credit application to a first one of said remote funding sources, and then, after a predetermined time, sending to at least one other remote funding source, until one of the finding [sic, funding] sources returns a positive funding deci-sion or until all funding sources have been exhausted; or,
[D4] sending the credit application from a first remote funding source to a second remote finding [sic, funding] source if the first funding source de-clines to approve the credit application.

On appeal, the CAFC agreed with the district court that these claims are "directed to an abstract idea preemptive of a fundamental concept or idea that would foreclose innovation in this area," and thus are invalid under 35 U.S.C. §101.  In its simplest form, the court reasoned, the claimed process explains the basic concept of processing information through a clearinghouse.  "Neither Dealertrack nor any other entity is entitled to wholly preempt the clearinghouse concept."  Slip Op. at 35. 

Nor was the link to a computer sufficient to limit the claims to an application of the idea.  "The claims are silent as to how a computer aids the method, the extent to which a computer aids the method, or the significance of a computer to the performance of the method.  The undefined phrase "computer aided" is no less abstract than the idea of a clearinghouse itself."  Slip Op. at 35.  "Simply adding a computer aided limitation to a claim covering an abstract concept, without more, is insufficient to render the claim patent eligible."  Id. at 36.  In essence, the claimed process was akin to the unpatentable binary-coded decimal to pure binary conversion in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), and covered a clearinghouse process "using any existing or future-devised machinery."

This opinion completes a trio of recent opinions dealing with the patentability of computer-related inventions, the others being Ultramercial and CyberSource.  In Ultramercial, authored by Chief Judge Rader and joined by Judges Lourie and O'Malley, the court concluded that a process for monetizing copyrighted products using a computer fell on the patentable side of the abstract ideas versus patentable application divide.  Reaching the opposite result on the issue of abstractness, the CyberSource panel of Judges Bryson, Dyk (author) and Prost concluded that a method of verifying a credit card transatction over the Internet constituted an unpatentable process.  In Dealertrack, the court drew upon the reasoning in CyberSource while distinguishing Ultramercial.

The court also addressed issues of claim construction and indefiniteness. Particularly noteworthy was the court's conclusion that "i.e.:" in the context of a patent-in-suit could not be read definitionally. Slip Op. 17-20.

Towards a more efficient judicial process:  Writing in partial dissent, Judge Plager disagreed with the majority's decision to address subject matter patentability:

[A]s a matter of efficient judicial process I object to and dissent from that part of hte opinion regarding the '427 patent and its validity under §101, the section of the Patent Act that describes what is patentable subject matter.  I believe that this court should exercise its inherent power to control the processes of litigation, Chamberes v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991), and insist that litigants, and trial courts, initially address patent invalidity issues in infringement suits in terms of the defenses provided in the statute: "conditions of patentability," specifically §§102 and 103, and in addition §§112 and 251, and not foray into the jurisprudential morass of §101 unless absolutely necessary.

Judge Plager appears to be thinking in the same direction as suggested by Professors Crouch and  Merges in their recent article Operating Efficiently Post-Bilski by Ordering Patent Doctrine Decision-Making, 25 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1673 (2010), in which they proposed that "the § 101 issue of Bilski be considered only when doing so is absolutely necessary to determine the validity of a claim or claims in a patent. We believe any claim that can be invalidated under one of the less controversial and less complex requirements for patentability—§§ 102, 103, and 112, for instance—ought to be disposed of without considering subject matter patentability. In other words, the Bilski issue should be avoided wherever it is not strictly necessary."

Guest Post on New Inter Partes Reexamination Standard

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Guest Post by Jon E. Wright and Joseph E. Mutschelknaus of Sterne Kessler Goldstein & Fox, PLLC1

On September 16, 2011, the America Invents Act (“AIA”) changed the threshold standard for initiating inter partes reexamination. The new standard requires a requester to demonstrate that:

[T]he information presented in the request shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the requester would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the request.

America Invents Act – Sec. 6(c)(3)(A)(i)-(ii). We refer to the new standard as the “RLP” standard. The RLP standard is significant because it matches the future standard for initiating inter partes review under the AIA.

This post addresses the new RLP standard. First, we review case law surrounding the “reasonable likelihood” standard as it exists in other contexts such as preliminary injunctions. Next, based on our analysis of every single post-AIA inter partes reexamination the PTO has acted upon, we analyze how the Office has been applying the new RLP standard in reexamination orders. Finally, we consider how inter partes reexamination requests (and future petitions for inter partes review) should be structured for the best chance at meeting the RLP threshold.

The “Reasonable Likelihood” Standard

Patent practitioners are familiar with the “reasonable likelihood” standard in the context of preliminary injunctions. For a court to grant a preliminary injunction, a patentee must demonstrate four factors, one of which is a “reasonable likelihood of success on the merits.” Ranbaxy Pharm., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 350 F.3d 1235,1239 (Fed. Cir. 2003). This standard may be instructive in learning how the Office will deal with the new RLP standard for current inter partes reexamination requests and inter partes review petitions later this year.

According to the Federal Circuit, the reasonable likelihood of success standard for preliminary injunctions must be made “in light of the presumptions and burdens that will inhere at trial on the merits….” Id. In the context of inter partes patentability proceedings at the Office, claims do not enjoy the presumption of validity that they do before a district court. Rather, the standard of proof before the Office is the “preponderance of evidence” standard. MPEP § 706.I. The same is true for the new inter partes review proceedings. See AIA § 316(e). Therefore, Requesters (or Petitioners) must demonstrate a “reasonable likelihood” that they can invalidate at least one claim of the patent for which reexamination is sought under the preponderance of the evidence standard.

But what does this really mean? In the context of preliminary injunction proceedings, the Federal Circuit has stressed that “[a]t this preliminary stage, the trial court does not resolve the validity question….” New England Braiding Co., Inc. v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 970 F.2d 878, 882-83 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Rather, the decision maker “must … make an assessment of the persuasiveness of the challenger’s evidence, recognizing that it is doing so without all evidence that may come out at trial.” Id. This is just as true in inter partes reexamination (or review) because both parties to the proceeding are permitted to submit additional evidence in support of their positions, at least during the first round of replies and comments.

Moreover, in addition to recognizing that it may not have all the facts, the decision maker must also assess the persuasiveness of the evidence. This may include making credibility determinations. As the Federal Circuit stated in New England Braiding, “[a] credibility determination is well within the court’s province when ruling on a preliminary injunction motion.” Id.

If the preliminary injunction standard for determining a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits is any guide, we can thus surmise the following with respect to requests for inter partes reexamination (or future petitions for inter partes review):

  • The request or petition must be based on “evidence,” which at the initial stage will likely be limited to prior art patents or printed publications;
  • The request or petition must reviewed by the Office under the “preponderance of evidence” standard, with the burden placed on the requester or petitioner;
  • The request or petition need not conclusively demonstrate unpatentability;
  • The Examiner (or Board) may properly make credibility determinations; and
  • The Examiner (or Board) must make an assessment of the persuasiveness of the evidence and accompanying argument set forth by the requester or petitioner, recognizing that it does not have all the evidence.

As shown next, the Office appears to be adhering to these standards.

The Office’s Application of the RLP Standard

As of the date of this post, the Office has acted on forty-two (42) requests for inter partes reexamination that were filed on or after September 16, 2011. The authors analyzed each one to determine how the Office is implementing the new RLP standard. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the Central Reexamination Unit is still struggling with the new standard. But nonetheless, several observations can be made from these orders.

First, despite the change, early data suggests that the Office continues to be granting reexaminations at about the same rate under the new RLP standard as it was under the old “substantial new question” or “SNQ” standard. In fiscal year 2011, for example, the Office granted 342 inter partes reexamination requests out of 366 total decisions. That accounts for a 93% grant rate under the old SNQ standard. Of the 42 orders issued under the new RLP standard, 38 have been granted (at least in part), putting the current grant rate under the RLP standard at about 90%. Thus, while the sample set is still limited, the Office appears to be granting reexamination requests at about the same rate under the RLP standard as it had been under the SNQ standard. This runs contrary to the general belief among practitioners that the RLP standard would be stricter than the SNQ standard.

 Wright Guest Post

Second, in finding an RLP, the Office appears to be focusing on the persuasiveness of the requester’s evidence on the merits. The Office is also correctly placing the burden of establishing the reasonable likelihood prevail on the requester. In cases where RLPs are denied, the Office frequently uses language like, “Requester has failed to show the claim step is taught by the reference.” (See, e.g., 95/001,809, p. 6.) At the same time, the Office is not shying away from addressing the underlying legal issues presented in the request, such as claim construction. For example, in several cases, the Office explicitly construed claim terms, and then made a finding that the cited references do not teach claims under that construction. (See, e.g., 95/001,785, 95/001,792.) Thus, in establishing whether there is an RLP, the Office is considering the merits of the cited prior art against the claims on both factual and legal bases.

Third, while the importance of the art’s strength against the claims may have increased with the RLP standard, the importance of the art’s “newness” may have decreased. Under the SNQ standard, the Office would almost always take into account the prosecution history and discuss whether the cited prior art was presented a new light. In contrast, of the forty-two (42) orders issued under the RLP standard, only three (3) make any discussion of the prosecution history or cumulativeness of the art. And in no case did this appear to be dispositive. This is consistent with the AIA, which made the newness requirement effectively discretionary on the Office. See AIA codified at 35 U.S.C. § 325 (“In determining whether to … order a proceeding under [the inter partes reexamination/review chapter], the Director may take into account whether, and reject the … request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments were previously were presented to the Office.”) (emphasis added). In sum, the weight given to the art’s newness appears to be waning.

Practice Tips

Given the above observations, drafting a strong, persuasive request supported by quality prior art references remains paramount under the new RLP standard, just as it was under the old SNQ standard. But in view of the Office’s tendency to now focus more intently on the merits of the individual rejections under the new standard, requesters may want to provide and justify claim constructions in their initial requests. Also, requesters may want to consider including expert declarations with their request, especially if the art upon which the reexamination is based is complicated and would benefit from expert clarification or explanation. Keep in mind, though, that reexaminations must still be based on patents and prior-art publications, not expert declarations.

At the same time, requesters may need less discussion in their requests of how their art is noncumulative or new with respect to what the Office has already considered. This could result in structural change to reexamination requests. For example, prior inter partes reexamination requests usually included two separate questions, one developing and showing the SNQ and a second section with the proposed rejections—i.e., the manner and pertinency of applying the prior-art references. Now, with the increased focus on the substantive merits of the proposed rejections and the decreased focus on newness or cumulativeness of the art, the second section becomes the most important section. Indeed, a fully developed set of proposed rejections would seem to be sufficient in proving up the RLP standard.

In sum, the authors believe it was a good idea for Congress to immediately implement the RPL standard for inter partes reexaminations. It gives patent practitioners a taste of what is to come for inter partes review under the AIA, and the ability to prepare for that change. It also appears as if the Office is adopting evaluation standards similar to those used the context of preliminary injunctions. We hope this post provide some new insight into the RLP standard—a standard with which we will have to live for the foreseeable future.

1Jon Wright is a Director and Joe Mutschelknaus is an Associate at Sterne Kessler Goldstein & Fox, PLLC www.skgf.com. The views expressed herein are the authors’ alone and should not be attributed to the firm or its clients.

Edited on 2/2/2012 to reflect that it was Congress's decision to immediately implement the RPL standard.

Recap of Recent AIA-related PTO Activities

Patent

By Jason Rantanen

The America Invents Act contains several provisions that require the PTO to (1) issue new rules and (2) report back to Congress on specific patent-related issues.  In addition to the proposed Supplemental Examination rules I discussed yesterday, the PTO also recently published four other proposed sets of rules and completed two of its reports. 

Proposed Rules
Submissions to the PTO: Two related sets of rules address submissions to the PTO, one implementing the preissuance submissions by third parties provision of the AIA and the other addressing post-issuance submissions.  Paul Morgan recently wrote a guest post discussing these proposed rules.  The Federal Register sections are available here: /media/docs/2012/01/77fr448.pdf and /media/docs/2012/01/77fr442.pdf, and the rules are open for public comment until March 5, 2012.

OED: On January 5, the PTO also published its proposed rules to implement the statute of limitations provision for office disciplinary proceedings.  Dennis's discussion of these rules is available here, and the full set of rules is available at /media/docs/2012/01/77fr457.pdf.  The comment period for these rules runs until March 5, 2012. 

Inventor's Oath: The following day, the PTO published its proposed changes to the rules relating to the inventor's oath or declaration.  The public comment period for those proposed rules runs until March 6, 2012, and the rules are available at /media/docs/2012/01/77fr982.pdf

AIA-Mandated Studies
International Patent Protections for Small Businesses: As required by the AIA, earlier this month the PTO submitted to Congress a report on international patent protections for small businesses.  Based upon its study, the PTO declined to recommend a program of taxpayer-funded financial assistance to support small business foreign patenting at the present time. The report is available at /media/docs/2012/01/20120113-ippr_report.pdf.

Prior User Rights: The PTO also recently completed its report on prior user rights.  The report essentially concludes that there is an insufficient basis to recommend a change to the prior user rights scheme chosen by Congress, and is available at /media/docs/2012/01/20120113-pur_report.pdf.

Genetic Testing: Earlier this week, the PTO published a Request for Comments and Notice of Public Hearings in connection with its study on genetic testing.  Public hearings will be held on Febuary 16, 2012 in Alexandria, Virginia, and on March 9, 2012 in San Diego, California.  Written comments will be accepted until March 26, 2012.  The announcement is available at /media/docs/2012/01/2012-1481_genetic-testing-hearing-notice.pdf. 

PTO Announces Proposed Rules for Supplemental Examination

Patent,

By Jason Rantanen

Yesterday, the United States Patent and Trademark Office announced the proposed rules for supplemental examinations and proposed revisions to ex parte reexamination fees.  These proposals detail the supplemental examination process, including the information that requesters must submit, as well as the substantial fees that will be associated with post-grant review in the future.  The PTO will accept comments on the proposed rules until March 26, 2012. 

The relevant Federal Register section is here: /media/docs/2012/01/77fr3666.pdf.

Major points include:

  • The request must be filed by the patent owner.  Only the patent owner will be permitted to participate in the supplemental examination or any reexamination ordered as a result. (§ 1.601)
  • Each supplemental examination request may identify up to ten items of information to be considered, reconsidered, or corrected.  Multiple supplemental examination requests may be filed at one time. (§ 1.605)
  • The cost for filing a supplemental examination request is steep: $5,180 for the initial request plus $16,120 for the ex parte re-examination fee. (§ 1.20(k))  Both must be paid at the time of initial request, and the $16,120 will be refunded if no re-examination is ordered in the supplemental examination certificate.  (§ 1.26(c))  In addition, there are substantial fees associated with documents over 20 pages, as well as with petitions filed in connection with the proceeding. 
  • The supplemental examination request must include ((§ 1.610(b)):
    1. a cover sheet;
    2. an identification of the patent for which supplemental examination is requested;
    3. a list of each item of information and its publication date, if applicable;
    4. a list identifying any other prior or concurrent post patent Office proceedings involving the patent to be examined;
    5. an identification of each aspect of the patent to be examined;
    6. an identification of each issue raised by each item of information;
    7. a separate, detailed explanation for each identified issue;
    8. an explanation of how each item of information is relevant to each aspect of the patent to be examined and of how each item of information raises each identified informaiton;
    9. a copy of each item of information; and
    10.  summary of the relevant portions of any submitted document, other than the request, that is over 50 pages in length.

The full requirement for item 8 is:

(8) A separate, detailed explanation for each identified issue, discussing how each item of information is relevant to each aspect of the patent identified for examination, and how each item of information raises each issue identified for examination, including:

(i) Where an identified issue involves the application of 35 U.S.C. 101 (other than double patenting) or 35 U.S.C. 112, an explanation discussing the support in the specification for each limitation of each claim identified for examination with respect to this issue; and

(ii) Where an identified issue involves the application of 35 U.S.C. 102, 35 U.S.C. 103, or double patenting, an explanation of how each limitation of each claim identified for examination with respect to this issue is met, or is not met, by each item of information. The detailed explanation may also include an explanation of how the claims distinguish over the items of information.

(Proposed § 1.610(b)(8)).  Note that if the PTO concludes that an examination request is not in compliance with the content requirements, it will not be entitled to the original filing date.  Rather, the filing date will be the date the corrected request is received.  (§ 1.610(d),(e))  This appears to mean that the PTO's three-month deadline for issuing a supplemental examination certificate will not begin until the corrected request is received and the safe-harbor provisions of 35 U.S.C. 257 may not be triggered even if a request is filed should the PTO conclude that requirement 8, for example, is not met.

The proposed cost to file an ex parte reexamination will increase from the current $2,520 to $17,750.    Given both this increase and the substantial cost to file a supplemental examination request, I'm skeptical of the PTO's prediction that it will receive about 800 ex parte examination requests and 1,430 supplemental examination requests annually.  The latter number, especially, seems to be based on some highly dubious assumptions.

 

Falana v. Kent State University

Patent,

By Jason Rantanen

Falana v. Kent State University (Fed. Cir. 2012) Download 11-1198
Panel: Linn (author), Prost and Reyna

This case raises an important issue for developers of chemical compounds: when is an inventor's contribution to the method of making a claimed compound an inventive contribution?

The plaintiff in this Section 256 action, Dr. Olusegun Falana, was a post-doctoral researcher hired by Kent State and Kent Displays, Inc. to synthesize organic molecules in connection with a project to develop a temperature independent, high helical twisting power chiral additive for use in portable liquid crystal displays. During his employment, Dr. Falana developed a synthesis protocol for making a novel class of chemical compounds. Dr. Falana used this process to synthesize a compound within this genus designated "Compound 7." While Compound 7 possessed some of the desired characteristics, and represented "significant progress," it did not completely satisfy the project goals. Dr. Falana subsequently resigned from KDI and Kent State to take another position.

A few months after Dr. Falana's resignation, the Kent State professor who had selected Dr. Falana used Falana's synthesis protocol to synthesize another member of the novel class, "Compound 9." Compound 9 possessed the desired degree of temperature independence, and KDI and Kent State filed an application that led to Patent No. 6,830,789; the patent did not list Dr. Falana as in inventor.

Upon learning that he was not listed as an inventor, and after receiving an unsatisfactory response from the Chief Science Officer at KDI, Falana filed a Section 256 action to correct inventorship. The district court ruled in Falana's favor following a bench trial, further finding that the case was exceptional and awarding attorneys fees in an amount to be determined.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit concluded that Dr. Falana had contributed to the conception of the claimed invention. Drawing upon established law, the court first noted that "[c]onception of a chemical compound 'requires knowledge of both the specific chemical structure of the compound and an operative method of making it.'' Slip Op. at 12 (quoting Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. Ewen, 123 F.3d 1466, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Here, Dr. Falana contributed to the method of making the claimed compound in a way the required more than the exercise of ordinary skill. The court recognized an important limitation on its holding, however:

"[This] does not mean that such an inventor necessarily has a right to claim inventorship of all species within that genus which are discovered in the future. "Once the method of making the novel genus of compounds becomes public knowledge, it is then assimilated into the store-house of knowledge that comprises ordinary skill in the art." Id. at 15-16.

Comment: The court was also careful to limit its holding in another way. It could have concluded that Falana was inventor simply due to his contribution to the method used to make Compound 9. It did not. Instead, the panel held "that a putative inventor who envisioned the structure of a novel genus of chemical compounds and contributes the method of making that genus contributes to the conception of that genus." Id. at 15 (emphasis added). It was able to articulate the rule in this way because it agreed with the district court that the patent's independent claims do not include a temperature independence limitation – in other words, the claims as construed were not limited to Compound 9, but rather encompassed the genus of compounds produced using Falana's synthesis protocol. Falana thus contributed both to the method of making the genus as well as the structure of the genus itself. The opinion implies that the outcome could conceivably be different if the claims had been limited to Compound 9. See, e.g., Slip Op. at 17.

Finality of Judgment: Federal Circuit practitioners may want to pay particular attention to the section at the end of the court's opinion in which it concluded that the district court's exceptional case determination was not before it in this appeal. Although the court's ruling on the issue of inventorship represented a final judgment, the court concluded that absent a determination of the attorney fees, the exceptional case determination did not. Nor, the court concluded, was there a basis for it to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the issue.

Streck v. Research Diagnostic Systems: Dismissal of Invalidity Counterclaims, Written Description, and Enablement

Patent, ,

By Jason Rantanen

Streck, Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic Systems, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2011) Download 11-1044
Panel: Newman, O'Malley (author), and Reyna

Streck, Inc. sued Research & Diagnostic Systems, Inc. for infringement of three patents relating to hematology control technology using integrated reticulocyte controls.  In response, R&D counterclaimed for declaratory judgment of noninfringement and invalidity.  During the district court litigation, R&D argued that the claims were unsupported by adequate written description, that they were not enabled, and that it was entitled to priority.  The district court granted summary judgment in Streck's favor on written description, JMOL in Streck's favor on enablement, and a jury ruled for Streck on the issue of priority.  Following trial, the district court entered a permanent injunction.

Dismissal of Invalidity Counterclaims:  On appeal, the CAFC concluded that the district court properly dismissed R&D's invalidity counterclaims against unasserted claims.  During the litigation, Streck submitted a series of infringement contentions in which it progressively limited the specific claims asserted, while R&D amended its invalidity contentions to ultimately encompass all but one claim of the patents-in-suit.  When R&D moved for summary judgment of invalidity on two of the unasserted claims, the district court dismissed the invalidity counterclaims for those claims citing a lack of "reasonable apprehension" of suit on R&D's part as to those claims.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with the District Court's dismissal.  Even in the wake of MedImmune, a declaratory judgment plaintiff must show the existence of a case or controvery, as evaluated on a claim-by-claim basis. Drawing upon the reasoning of a New Jersey district court opinion addressing the same issue, Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Mylan Inc., No. 2:09cv1692, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114784, at *17-18 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 2009), the Federal Circuit held that "consistent with MedImmune, a counterclaimant must show a continuing case or controversy with respect to withdrawn or otherwise unasserted claims."  Slip Op. at 20.

The CAFC further concluded that R&D failed to satisfy this requirement.  Although the district court technically erred by relying exclusively on the reasonable apprehension of suit test, "there is no evidence that R&D met its burden of showing a continuing case or controversy with respect to the unasserted claims."  Id. at 23. Nor was the court persuaded by R&D's arguments based on Scanner Technologies Corp. v. ICOS Vision Systems Corp., 528 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008):

"unlike the situation in Scanner Technologies, where all of the claims were at issue and were never withdrawn or altered by either party, here, both parties were on notice from the start of litigation that the scope of claims at issue was only a subset of the full patents-in-suit and, significantly, did not include Claim 3 of any patent."

Id. at 22.

Written Description Satisfied: Streck v. Research Diagnostic is also notable for its reliance on the knowledge of a PHOSITA in the context of written description.  In this instance, the asserted claims covered both the use of a "true" reticulocyte or an analog of a reticulocyte in the claimed control composition.  The two parties' technical lineage differed based on this distinction: the inventor of Streck's patents used only a reticulocyte analog when he reduced the invention to practive, while R&D developed its composition using a true reticulocyte.  Leveraging this distinction into a written description argument, R&D contended that the patents-in-suit failed to provide adequate written description for a true reticulocyte integrated control.

On appeal, the CAFC agreed with Streck and the district court that the patents contained sufficient disclosures to support claims encompassing the use of true reticulocytes when combined with the knowledge of a PHOSITA, namely, that "use of true reticulocytes in stand-alone controls was well-known in the prior art."  Slip Op. at 28.  Based on the disclosures of the patents, "one skilled in the art would have recognized that the claimed integrated controls could be made using either true reticulocytes or reticulocyte analogs." Id.

Enablement: Focus on the "Novel Aspect" of the patents-in-suit: The CAFC also affirmed the district court's grant of JMOL of enablement, agreeing with Streck's claims that the "novel" aspect of the invention was an integrated control using both reticulocytes and white blood cells and that true reticulocytes are "virtually indistinguishable" from analogs.  While "the specification, not the knowledge of those skilled in the art, 'must supply the novel aspects of an invention,'" id. at 32-33 (quoting Automotive Technologies v. BMW, 501 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2007), the court apparently did not view the type of retriculocytes as a novel aspect of the invention in this case.  "Here, there was unrebutted evidence that true reticulocytes and Ryan’s reticulocyte analogs 'work in exactly the same way in a hematology control, and are virtually indistinguishable, even to one skilled in the art.'”  Id. at 33.

The CAFC also affirmed on the issue of priority, citing its earlier and controlling decision in Streck, Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic Systems, Inc., 659 F.3d 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2011), and concluded that the wording of the permanent injunction was not overly broad. 

Chief Judge Rader & Band DeNovo to “Rock” San Diego’s House of Blues

Patent

Guest Post by Ted Sichelman, Professor, University of San Diego School of Law

Aside from his international and national speaking tours, Chief Judge Rader recently embarked on a musical “tour” with his band, DeNovo. After playing a few IP-related events and a recent Federal Circuit holiday party, DeNovo—which also includes Professor Sean O’Connor of the University of Washington and Matthew Bryan of WIPO—is hitting the big time by playing at the House of Blues in downtown San Diego on Thursday, January 19. Bands from NuVasive and Qualcomm will open, and Dean for IP Studies at George Washington School of Law and former SG of the USPTO, John Whealan will MC. The bands are performing as part of University of San Diego’s Second Annual Patent Law Conference (click here for more info), taking place Friday, January 20. Chief Judge Rader will give the keynote address—other panelists include Judge Marilyn Huff, Judge Janis Sammartino, and Magistrate Judge Cathy Ann Bencivengo (Southern District of California), as well as Professors Colleen Chien, Mark Lemley, Robert Merges, Shine Tu, and John Whealan, and distinguished local attorneys.

Fed Cir HOB

Patents, Litigation and Reexaminations

Patent,

By Jason Rantanen

The number of patents involved in litigation
The number of patent suits filed each year is well known.  But what about the number of patents involved in those cases?  Mark Lemley and others have estimated that about 1-2% of all issued patents have ever been litigated.  To test this estimate, I searched the LEXIS utility patents database using the LIT-REEX field to identify all patents that were flagged as the subject of litigation filed in the year 2009.*  I ended up with 3404 patents, or approximately 2% of the average number of utility patents that the PTO issued annually over the previous decade. 

This result provides further confirmation of the conventional belief that the vast majority of patents are never litigated – especially since I suspect it overstates the percentage of patents involved in litigation, as it assumes that the litigation flag is limited to just infringement suits (as opposed to inventorship disputes, for example) and it does not take into consideration the fact that some patents are the subject of multiple suits filed in different years.  

How old are these patents?
The below chart shows the age of the patents involved in suits filed in 2009.  More than half (55%) of these patents were at least five years old as of the litigation filing date; 24% were over ten years old. 

Reexams and litigation

What about reexamination requests?
The above chart also shows the number of patents involved in suits filed in 2009 that have ever been the subject of a reexamination request.  Of the 3404 total patents, LEXIS reports that reexams were requested at some point for 578 (17%).  Many of these requests were filed in 2009 or later (likely as part of a litigation strategy): 398, or 11% of the total number of patents involved in suits filed in 2009 were the subject of a reexam request in 2009, 2010, or 2011.

*I used 2009 because the 2010 and 2011 results were affected by the numerous false marking suits filed in those years.  

Patently-O Bits & Bytes by Lawrence Higgins

Patent, , ,

USPTO news

  • On December 20th the USPTO released its updated website. The new website seems to be more user friendly and the design is more attractive than the previous website design. [Link]
  • The USPTO in cooperation with the Center of Excellence for Collaborative Innovation (COECI) launched the USPTO Innovation Challenge, a $50,000 prize to develop new algorithms to aid in patent examination. [Link]

Chisum Patent Academy

  • The Chisum Patent Academy will hold its next Intensive Patent Law Training Seminar in New York City on Feb. 22-24, 2012. Topics to be addressed include the America Invents Act of 2011, recent nonobviousness decisions, inequitable conduct post-Therasense, and the continuing schism in the Federal Circuit over patent claim construction. The Chisum Patent Academy offers what CLE providers and patent bar review courses simply can't: premium-quality patent law education in a unique seminar-style setting. Co-taught by leading patent law scholars Donald Chisum and Janice Mueller, the intensive three-day seminars are limited to ten (10) participants and conducted in roundtable, interactive style. [Link]

Student Writing Competition

  • Georgia State University College of Law will hold its first annual Intellectual Property Student Writing Competition in 2012. The GSU Intellectual Property Writing Competition seeks papers addressing legal issues and challenges in the intellectual property field. Winners will have the opportunity to have their paper published in the conference materials for the 2012 Corporate IP Institute (CIPI) and also win a cash prize. [Link]

Evil Twin Debate

  • On November 18, the University of Richmond School of Law hosted the Fifth Annual Evil Twin Debate, featuring Professor Daniel Crane of University of Michigan Law School and Professor Michael Carrier of Rutgers University School of Law at Camden. The video of the event has been posted on YouTube and is very entertaining. [Link]

Patent Jobs:

  • Zagorin O'Brien Graham is seeking patent attorneys with 2+ years of experience and a degree in electrical engineering to work in their Austin, Texas office. [Link]
  • Pioner is searching for IP attorneys with 5-7 years (or more) prior experience in patent prosecution and a background in life sciences to work at their Iowa location. [Link]
  • Bristol-Myers Squibb is seeking an IP Counsel with 5+ years of patent attorney experience and a background in molecular biology or biochemistry to work at their New Jersey location. [Link]
  • Guntin Meles & Gust is looking for patent attorneys with2+ years of patent prep and prosecution experience and a degree in EE or CE to work at their Chicago office (remote locations may be considered). [Link]
  • Steinfl & Bruno is seeking a patent agent with 2-3 years of experience and a degree in EE or related fields to work in their Pasadena, California office. [Link]
  • Klarquist Sparkman is searching for an IP litigation associates with 1-2 years of experience in IP to work at their Portland office. [Link]
  • Klarquist Sparkman is looking for a patent attorney/agent with an advanced degree in organic chemistry and 3+ years of experience to work at their Portland office. [Link]
  • Roberts Mlotkowski Safran & Cole is searching for a patent attorney with 2-4 years of experience and a degree in EE to work at their McLean, Virginia office. [Link]
  • Roberts Mlotkowski Safran & Cole is searching for a patent attorney with 2-4 years of experience and a degree in chemical engineering to work at their McLean, Virginia office. [Link]
  • Clements Bernard is seeking a patent attorney/agent with a degree in electrical/computer engineering to work at their Charlotte office. [Link]
  • Wells St. John is looking for a patent attorney with 4+ years of experience in all aspects of IP to work at their Spokane office. [Link]
  • An IP firm in Northern Virginia is seeking a patent attorney/agent with at least 3 years of experience and a background in semiconductor inventions (telecommuting option). [Link]

Upcoming Events:

  • The American Bar Association Section of Intellectual Property Law, Young Lawyers Division, ABA-IPL Young Lawyers Action Group and the ABA Center for Continuing Legal Education will sponsor a webinar on January 20 at 1 p.m. Eastern time. The webinar, Prosecution Strategies: Tackling USPTO Obviousness Rejections will explore how the KSR standards have been applied in various technology areas and provide guidance for effective avenues of argument based on the technology area. Speakers include: Janet Hendrickson, Gregory Hillyer, Michelle O'Brien, and Zachary Stern. [Link]
  • The American Conference Institute (ACI) The Comprehensive Guide to Patent Reform For Life Science Companies, conference is scheduled for January 31- February 1 in New York. (Patently-O readers register with PO 200 for a discount). [Link]
  • The 7th Annual Conference on EU Pharma Law & Regulation will be held on February 22-23 on London. The conference will bring together eminent in-house counsel from the world's largest pharma and biotech companies, top legal practitioners and regulatory experts in an outstanding speaker panel. (Patently-O readers register with PO 10 for a discount). [Link]

Contact Lawrence.Higgins@patentlyo.com with leads for future Bits and Bytes.

Inter Partes Re-exam Requests Continue To Rise, For Now

Patent, , ,

By Jason Rantanen

Some of the most touted changes of the America Invents Act are its modifications to ex parte and inter partes reexaminations, modifications that are intended to fine tune these post-grant review mechanisms.  Both ex parte and inter partes reexam requests have been on the rise for the past decade, as shown by the following two graphs:

Ex parte requests

Inter partes requests 2000-2011
Inter partes reexaminations, in particular, saw a dramatic increase in popularity over the last few years. 

The above data may paint an overly rosy picture of reexams, however.  Especially with respect to inter partes reexams, I am dubious that their rapid growth will continue.  One of the AIA's most significant changes to inter partes reexams (inter partes review starting on September 16, 2012) is to raise the standard for successfully initiating a reexam from "a substantial new question of patentability" to "a reasonable likelihood that the requester would prevail."  This change took effect when the AIA was enacted, and may lead to a decrease in the number of inter partes reexam requests filed – or at least, a slowing down of the rapid growth in this area. 

Inter partes reexam requests may also plateau for another reason.  The PTO reports that 70% of the patents involved in inter partes reexams are known to be in litigation.  If the initiation of re-exams is largely a function of litigation, there is a soft cap on the number of potential reexams that will be initiated.  In addition, AIA limitations on inter partes reexam requests involving patents that are the subject of infringement litigation, although easily avoided with foresight, may have a depressing impact on the number of requests filed.

Source data for reexams: http://www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/Reexamination_Information.jsp

The above graphs are corrected from an earlier version.  The original graphs treated the PTO's fiscal year as running from January to December.  It runs from October of the preceding year to September of the identified year.

Guest Post on Myriad by Prof. Megan La Belle

Patent, ,

Guest Post by Megan M. La Belle, Assistant Professor at Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.

Last Wednesday was an eventful day for patent cases at the Supreme Court.  In addition to oral arguments in Mayo v. Prometheus, the plaintiffs in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad Genetics) – another high-profile case concerning patentable subject matter – filed their petition for a writ of certiorari.  The petition presents two questions.  Predictably, the first question addresses the limits of patentable subject matter and asks the Court to decide whether human genes are patentable.  The second and less obvious question focuses on plaintiffs’ standing to sue.  Specifically, the petition asks: “Did the court of appeals err in adopting a new and inflexible rule, contrary to normal standing rules and this Court’s decision in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007)….?”  Some might be surprised that plaintiffs are challenging standing, since the Federal Circuit held the Myriad case justiciable and decided it on the merits.  Yet, as I argue in Standing to Sue in the Myriad Genetics Case, 2 Cal. L. Rev. Circuit 68 (2011), the Federal Circuit’s decision in Myriad raises compelling questions about standing in patent declaratory judgment actions that warrant the Court’s attention. 

In MedImmune, the Supreme Court held that there is standing to bring a patent declaratory judgment action if “the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.”  In announcing this all the circumstances standard, the Court criticized the Federal Circuit’s longstanding bright line test for standing, which required plaintiffs to show that: (1) the alleged infringer had a reasonable apprehension of suit at the time it filed the action; and (2) the alleged infringer is conducting infringing activity or has made meaningful preparations toward conducting infringing activity.

Initially, the Federal Circuit responded to MedImmune by abandoning its bright line test and announcing that it would use the all the circumstances standard instead.  More recently, however, the Federal Circuit has backpedaled.  In Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008), the Federal Circuit held that “proving a reasonable apprehension of suit is one of multiple ways that a declaratory judgment plaintiff can satisfy the more general all-the-circumstances test.”  Similarly, in Cat Tech LLC v. Tubemater, Inc., the court concluded that plaintiffs still must satisfy the second prong of the old test – i.e., the “meaningful preparations” prong – to establish standing.  And finally, with its decision in Myriad, the Federal Circuit has come full circle and is evaluating standing in patent declaratory judgment actions according to a bright line test that is strikingly similar to the one utilized before MedImmune.

In Myriad, twenty plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action asking the court to declare certain gene patents invalid.  The trial court held that all twenty plaintiffs had standing.  On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed there was standing to sue, but only as to one plaintiff – Dr. Harry Ostrer – and on far narrower grounds.  The Federal Circuit concluded that Dr. Ostrer was the only plaintiff who had suffered an injury-in-fact, a prerequisite for standing in federal court.  In reaching this conclusion, the Federal Circuit claimed to be following MedImmune, yet in reality it had applied a bright line rule:

[T]o establish an injury in fact traceable to the patentee, a declaratory judgment plaintiff must allege both (1) an affirmative act by the patentee related to the enforcement of his patent rights, and (2) meaningful preparation to conduct potentially infringing activity….

Myriad, 653 F.3d at 1344.  The Federal Circuit then found that none of the other plaintiffs had standing, either because they failed to allege “affirmative patent enforcement actions directed at them by Myriad,” or because they had not made “meaningful preparation to conduct potentially infringing activity.”

This return to a formalistic test for standing in patent declaratory judgment actions not only violates the letter and spirit of MedImmune, but it is problematic because it makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to challenge potentially bad patents.  For years, the Supreme Court has adopted flexible legal standards that facilitate lawsuits brought by parties challenging patent validity, in view of the public benefit created when bad patents are eliminated.  More recently, Congress and the President have signaled their intent to encourage patent validity challenges by enacting the America Invents Act, which provides for certain post-grant review proceedings.  Yet, despite these strong messages, the Federal Circuit has heightened the standing requirements and created a procedural bar for many alleged patent infringers.  Although the Supreme Court addressed this standing question just a few terms ago in MedImmune, it seems the Court needs to remind the Federal Circuit of the purpose of declaratory relief and its essentiality to a well-functioning patent system.

Summary of Mayo v. Prometheus Oral Argument

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Guest Post by Jonas Anderson, Assistant Professor at American University Washington College of Law

Yesterday morning I attended the highly anticipated oral argument in Mayo v. Prometheus at the Supreme Court.  The case raises the question of whether a patent claim that covers correlations between blood tests and patient health is 'patentable' under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 

I assume most PatentlyO readers are familiar with this case, but will provide a very brief background before diving into today's argument.  Prometheus is the owner of a patent that covers a method of analyzing the effectiveness of thiopurine drugs for treating gastrointestinal disorders.  Claim 1 of the relevant patent reads as follows:

    (1) A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising:

(a) administering a drug providing 6-thioguanine to a subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder; and

(b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder,

wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol per 8×10^8 red blood cells indicates a need to increase the amount of said drug subsequently administered to said subject and

wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 8×10^8 red blood cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of said drug subsequently administered to said subject.

Prometheus offers a blood test which analyzes metabolite levels in patients.  Mayo sought to offer a competing blood test at a lower price.  Prometheus promptly sued Mayo for infringement.

I have divided my review into 7 topics.  The topics are ranked based on my impression of the importance that the justices appeared to give to each topic.  Although I have tried to transcribe the key statements made by the justices and advocates as accurately as possible, all quotations are approximate.

1.  The preemption question

The justices and the parties focused much of their discussion on the issue of preemption.  One of Mayo's principal arguments in its brief and at oral argument is that Prometheus's patent preempts the use of a law of nature — namely, the relationship between metabolite levels and patient health. 

Justice Kennedy began the preemption questioning by asking whether a system of measurements that continually monitor drug retention would be patentable.  Mayo's counsel responded that it would depend on the breadth of the claims.  "Claim specificity is key."  According to Mayo, if Prometheus's patent had provided competitors room to develop different, more accurate metabolite levels it may have passed the 101 test.  But, in this case Prometheus's patent preempted any reduction in dosage if a patient's metabolite levels were above 400 pmol.  In Mayo's view, "incidental" steps added to a natural phenomenon were insufficient to avoid preemption.  Thus, any patent consisting only of a natural phenomenon and "incidental steps" would be preempted under Mayo's test.

Justice Breyer, the author of the famous LabCorp dissent, focused nearly all of his questions on the issue of differentiating between a patentable application of a law of nature and an unpatentable law of nature.  He pressed both parties to identify a process by which the court could discern the difference.  Mayo's counsel first suggested that a preemption test could be used to ferret out unpatentable laws of nature.  Later, he suggested that Bilski suggests that courts can determine if the non-novel elements of a claim are "incidental."  "You're getting warmer," Justice Breyer quipped.

Justice Scalia interrupted the exchange and scoffed "I'm not comfortable with that.  It depends on how broad it is?  Is up to 700 [pmol]? Is that OK?  550?  830?  How are we supposed to apply that kind of rule?  It just seems to me not a patent rule that we could apply."  It seems fair to say that Scalia was not convinced by either party that a 101 standard based on preemption could be reliably applied by courts.

Despite Scalia's concerns, preemption seemed to carry the day — with both sides.  Justice Breyer continued the preemption line of questioning with Prometheus's counsel.  "What has to be added to a law of nature to make it a patentable process?  If you put too little to the answer to that question, I believe I can take things like e=mc2 and make them patentable, and if you put too much in you'll wreck your case."  Prometheus's counsel also advocated a preemption test, but its test would be much more limited than Mayo's.  Whereas Mayo would consider any natural phenomenon with "incidental" transformational steps as preempted subject matter, Prometheus would only find preemption when no applicative steps were added.  Prometheus repeatedly cited to the Morse telegraph case as a classic example of preemption under 101.

Of course, Prometheus's suggested application of the preemption test has an obvious problem: Bilski.  The patented hedging method in Bilski was not a naked claim to an abstract idea; the claim was limited by both industry and analysis techniques.  Prometheus's counsel acknowledged this difficulty, but argued that Bilski's abstract idea was merely coupled with other abstract ideas.

2.  The 'creep' of novelty and obviousness

Many of the Justices, but primarily the Chief Justice, expressed concern about the blurred relationship between novelty, non-obviousness and the 101 inquiry.  Chief Justice Roberts wanted to know what efficiencies would be gained, if any, by relying on Section 101 instead of obviousness or novelty to reject invalid patents.  Mayo made the case that 101 is a much more manageable and predictable doctrine than 102 or 103.  Prometheus countered by reference to the very case before the court — clearly Section 101 had not led to a quick resolution of this long-running case.

The Chief Justice asked Prometheus's counsel whether he was advocating for the elimination of a Section 101 limitation on patentability.  In response, counsel conceded that he was urging that courts rely on other patent doctrines in most cases, but that there would be some instances, such as the Morse case, in which 101 would be the proper vehicle for rejecting or invalidating a patent.

3.  The impact (or lack thereof) of LabCorp

In my view, one of the most surprising statements of the day came about as a result of Mayo's suggestion—in response to a question from Justice Scalia—that Justice Breyer's dissent in LabCorp could guide some of the analysis in this case.  Justice Breyer quickly interrupted and seemed to distance himself from his dissent.  Although he was convinced that the patent claims in the LabCorp case were merely directed to an observation of a law of nature, the dissenting opinion, he said, "lacked an explanation of why [the claims in that case were not] an application of the law of nature."

Throughout the argument, he was clearly wrestling with how much "extra" is needed in order to patent a newly discovered natural law.  If, as many have predicted, Justice Breyer pens part of the Prometheus decision, I expect that he will attempt to give some guidance to this most difficult question.

4.  The innovation question.

A healthy amount of discussion centered around the impact on innovation that a decision in this case will have.  Justice Breyer, who had been extremely skeptical of diagnostic method patents in his dissent in LabCorp, noted that discovering laws of nature can be an incredibly expensive process.  His search for a line between phenomenon and application seemed to center around balancing the incentive to discover new laws of nature with a desire to allow access to those laws to follow-on innovators. 

Mayo repeatedly urged the court to overturn the patent at issue by arguing that Promtheus could limit others from developing new, improved, and cheaper alternatives to their blood test and was therefore preemptive.  Mayo argued that if the claims incorrectly correlated metabolite levels and outcomes, "the public is stuck with the erroneous information."  In response, Prometheus stated that there are ways that follow-on innovators can improve on Prometheus's patent; namely, by acquiring an improvement patent or by challenging Prometheus's patent under Section 101's utility requirement.

Finally, as any good appellate attorney would, Mayo's counsel attempted to limit the perceived impact of a reversal.  When asked by Justice Sotomayor how many patents would be impacted by a ruling favoring Mayo, counsel responded "only a couple."

5.  The scope of Prometheus's patent

The newest Justices, Sotomayor and Kagan, directed nearly all of their questions to the scope of the patent claims at issue.  Although claim construction was no longer at issue, the Justices probed the extent to which Prometheus's patent foreclosed competitors.  Justice Kagan wanted to know what, in Mayo's opinion, Prometheus's patent attorney could have done to make their invention patent-eligible.  Mayo's counsel responded by saying that a claim with a more narrow range of relevant metabolite levels and a specified treatment protocol would satisfy 101.  Justice Kagan followed-up by asking whether "the difference is the scope of the ranges, or the treatment protocol."  "Both," Mayo responded.

Justice Kagan followed up with Prometheus.  When asked why the patent drafter had failed to include a therapeutic step (which Mayo conceded would have made the claim patent-eligible), Prometheus's counsel responded that it was unnecessary.  He pointed to numerous patents that merely claimed a method of gathering information: patents on identifying ore deposits (but not requiring removal); patents on navigating boats in fog (but not requiring redirecting the ship); patent to find leak in a water main (but not requiring repair).

6.  Prior decisions: are they helpful?

Justice Scalia seemed genuinely dismissive of the Court's precedents that have held that laws of nature (or natural phenomenon) are not patentable.  "Tell me why you can't patent nature?" he asked Mayo's counsel early in the proceeding.  "Doesn't any medical patent rely on natural processes?  Even if you invent a new drug, what that new drug does is natural.  Whatís the difference [from this case]?"  When Mayo's counsel responded that the specificity would be the key test for preemption, Justice Kennedy responded "I thought your answer to Justice Scalia would be…that [the claims here cover] the measurement of a result.  That's how I would have answered the question.  But that's obviously not the right way to do it."

In a related vein, Justice Breyer openly questioned whether the holdings in Flook and Diehr can be reconciled.  "If you look at the Court's cases, they seem to say Flook, one thing, and Diehr another thing."

7.  The transformation question

Almost no time was devoted to discussing whether the claims at issue meet the machine or transformation test. In fact, I can't recall hearing the words "Machine or Transformation" escape from the Justices.  Perhaps the Court is going to distance itself from the MOT test — or at least give courts another "clue."

Conclusion

Predicting the outcome of Supreme Court rulings in patent cases is a treacherous hobby.  If anything, the argument today revealed a Court troubled by the fact that both sides have urged an application of Section 101 that centers on preemption, but with little guidance on how to apply such a test.  While I would expect a ruling to have some mention of preemption, none of the justices seemed comfortable with either side's suggested application of such a test, while Justice Scalia was dismissive of such an idea. 

Perhaps most surprising was that the Court's most vocal critic of diagnostic patents, Justice Breyer, appeared to distance himself from LabCorp.  I get the feeling that he is still troubled with the idea of granting patent rights covering natural phenomenon, he is genuinely concerned with the impact of the Court's decision in this case on the medical innovation community. 

Teva v. Astrazeneca: Invalidating a patent with secret prior art

Patent

By Jason Rantanen

Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. v. Astrazeneca Pharamceuticals LP (Fed. Cir. 2011) Download 11-1091
Panel: Rader, Linn (author), Dyk

"Secret" prior art is prior art that is not available to the public as of the date of invention for the relevant patent.  The most well-known category of secret prior art is that of pre-publication patent applications. 35 U.S.C. 102(e).  Less commonly asserted is prior invention by another under 102(g)(2).  This case illustrates the strength of such prior art under the current novelty framework.

Teva, the owner of Patent No. RE39,502, sued AstraZeneca, asserting that an AstraZeneca drug (CRESTOR) infringed several claims of the '502 patent covering a pharmaceutical formulation stabilized exclusively by an amido-group containing polymeric compound ("AGCP compound").  The problem Teva faced was that AstraZeneca had made the first batches of its drug in the summer of 1999, prior to Teva's asserted invention date of December 1999. Given this prior invention by AstraZeneca, the district court granted summary judgment of anticipation under 102(g)(2). Teva appealed.

Teva's principal argument on appeal was that because AstraZeneca had failed to appreciate the stabilizing role the AGCP compound played in its drug product in 1999, it had not conceived of – and therefore not made – the invention as required by 102(g)(2).  This argument rested on the undisputed fact that although AstraZeneca's drug contained an AGCP compound, it was designed to use a non-AGCP compound as the stabilizer; the AGCP compound was believed to be a disintegrant.

Note: Because both the product that Teva accused of infringing and the 1999 batches were the same formulation, AstraZeneca conceded infringement for purposes of its motion for summary judgment of invalidity.  In other words, it was undisputed that the AGCP compound was acting as the exclusive stabilizer even if AstraZeneca was unaware of that fact in 1999.

Conception requires an appreciation of what is made, not why it works: Rejecting Teva's argument, the panel concluded that AstraZeneca had met the requirement for conception of its prior invention by appreciating "that the compound it created was stable and what the components of the formulation were."  Slip Op. at 12.  AstraZeneca did not need to appreciate which component was responsible for the stabilization or why the invention worked.

The "invention" as distinct from the claims for purposes of 102(g): In arriving at its ultimate conclusion of anticipation, the court drew a distinction between the "invention" and the claims, at least for purposes of 102(g).  Traditionally, an anticipation analysis involves first establishing that something is prior art and then demonstrating that this prior art contains all the elements of the claimed invention either expressly or inherently.  Under a conventional approach to anticipation, then, Teva's claims would be invalid once the prior art status of AstraZeneca's 1999 batches was established since there was no dispute that the batches met all the limitations of Teva's claims.

Section 102(g) operates somewhat differently, however, due to its origins in the interference context. It requires that another inventor have made "the invention" that is at issue.  To address this issue, the court in Teva invoked a broad view of what constitutes the "invention" that allowed it to conclude that AstraZeneca had conceived of the same invention as Teva despite AstraZeneca's failure to think of it in the claimed terms.  Quoting from Dow Chemical Co. v. Astrao-Valcour, Inc., 267 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2001), the court applied a concept of the "invention" as distinct from the claims.  "The invention is not the language of the [claim] but the subject matter thereby defined."  Slip Op. at 12, quoting Dow (quoting Silvestri v. Grant, 496 F.2d 593, 597, 599 (CCPA 1974)).  “The language of the count is but one way to define the new form and certainly not a unique definition [. . . and a]ny claim they might have written, based on this or other information specific to [the new form] would still define the same subject matter as the count even though in different terms.” Slip Op. at 9, quoting Silvestri at 601 (CCPA 1974)).  “[T]hat which we call a rose [b]y any other name would smell as sweet.”  Slip Op. at 9, quoting William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliette act 2, sc. 2.  Based on this view of the "invention" as a metaphysical entity existing independent of any defining claim language, the court held that AstraZeneca had conceived of Teva's invention, despite doing so in different terms than Teva chose to use in the patent claims. 

The Impact of the AIA: With the change to a first-to-file-or-first-to-disclose system, the America Invents Act eliminates 102(g)(2) prior art.  The impact of this change is significant in cases such as this one: under the future 102, AstraZeneca would not have been able to bring this validity challenge.  Nor is it probable that AstraZeneca could seek protection under the framework of prior user rights: even if its batches met the requirement of being a composition of matter used in a commercial process (there's a strong argument they would not), AstraZeneca's manufacture began less than one year before the filing date of Teva's provisional patent application.

Correction: The first sentence of the original version of this post referred to secret art as art that is unavailable to the public as of the patent's priority date.  That is incorrect.  Secret prior art is prior art that is unavailable to the public as of the invention date for the patent (the relevant date for purposes of 102(e), (f), and (g)). 

Addendum: Several of the comments have pointed to the sentence in the court's opinion that says "By late summer 1999, AstraZeneca had disclosed the ingredients and quantities for its rosuvastatin formulation matching those of all commercial drug dosage strengths," and pointed out that this implies that AstraZeneca's formulation was publicly disclosed prior to Teva's invention date.  The court's use of "disclosure," however, appears to just be an unfortunate word choice.  According to AstraZeneca's brief, the only relevant events that took place during that time period were the manufacture of the batches and an internal company presentation on the finalized sales formulation of the tablets.  Any form of public disclosure took place much later, such as through its patents and applications, the first of which was filed in Great Britain on January 26, 2000.

Patently-O Bits & Bytes by Lawrence Higgins

Patent
USPTO's Steve Jobs Exhibit
  • On November 16th the USPTO unveiled the Steve Jobs exhibit, highlighting the Patents and Trademarks of Steve Jobs. "This exhibit commemorates the far-reaching impact of Steve Jobs' entrepreneurship and innovation on our daily lives," said David Kappos. "His patents and trademarks provide a striking example of the importance intellectual property plays in the global marketplace." The exhibit features more than 300 of the patents that Steve bear Steve Jobs name. The exhibit will run through January 15, 2012 and is free and open to the public. [Link] [Link]
Kauffman Foundation

   
  • The Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation is pleased to announce that the nomination period is now open for the Kauffman Junior Faculty Fellowship in Entrepreneurship Research (KJFF). The Kauffman Foundation will award up to seven Junior Faculty Fellowship grants to junior faculty members in the United States whose research has the potential to make significant contributions to the body of literature in entrepreneurship. Each Fellow's university will receive a grant of $40,000 over two years to support the research activities of the Fellow. Nominees must be tenured or tenure-track junior faculty members at accredited U.S. institutions of higher education who received a Ph.D. or equivalent doctoral degree between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2010. [Link]
Northern District of California
  • The Court is considering adopting a new Civil Local Rule 5-4 that will address the requirements for electronic filing and abrogating General Order 45. The new rule reflects the evolution of the e-filing program and more accurately captures the current requirements than does the general order which was written in 2003 shortly after the inception of the e-filing program. Comments may be submitted by sending an e-mail to evidence@cand.uscourts.gov before 5:00 p.m. (PST) on December 14, 2011. View the notice and the draft rule: [Link].
  • On November 10, 2011, the District and Magistrate Judges of the Northern District of California adopted General Order 67, promulgating new procedures for the assignment of patent cases. In order to allow necessary changes to be made to the District's computer-based case assignment system, the new procedures will become effective on January 1, 2012. Earlier in 2011, the Northern District successfully applied to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts for designation as a participating district in the Patent Pilot Program. District Judges participating in the program are: Chief District Judge James Ware, Senior District Judge Ronald Whyte, District Judge Jeffrey S. White, District Judge Lucy Koh and District Judge Edward Davila.
  • Although the implementing patent pilot statute refers to District Judges as pilot judges, the Northern District has taken the position that the patent pilot statute does not supersede statutes that allow Magistrate Judges to handle any case pursuant to consent by the parties. Therefore, as the following Magistrate Judges have a particular interest in presiding over patent cases and subject to consent of the parties, the Court will strive to increase the number of patent cases assigned to these judges: Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Laporte, Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Spero, Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler, Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu, Magistrate Judge Paul Grewal, Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley and Magistrate Judge Nathanael Cousins. In the remaining weeks of 2011, members of Judge Koh's committee will hold a series of meetings with local bar associations to discuss the new procedures. View the notice and the text of General Order 67: [Link].
Patent Jobs:
  • Young Basile is searching for a patent attorney with 1-4 years of experience and a degree in EE or CS. [Link]
  • Singleton Law Firm is looking for a patent attorney/agent to work in the electrical area. [Link]
  • Coats & Bennett is seeking a patent attorney with a degree in EE and at least 2 years of patent prep and prosecution experience. [Link]
  • Sheppard Mullin is seeking 2 attorneys (1) an associate with at least 2 years of patent prosecution experience, and (2) an associate with 2-4 years of patent litigation experience. [Link]
  • McDermott Will & Emery is searching for an associate with 2-5 years of patent litigation experience. [Link]
  • Howard & Howard is seeking a patent attorney with 3-9 years of experience in patent prep and prosecution and a chemical background. [Link]
  • Patterson Thuente IP is looking for a patent attorney with a minimum of 2 years experience in patent prosecution for high tech clients. [Link]
  • Michaud-Kinney Group is searching for an IP associate with an electrical or mechanical background and at least 3 years of experience in patent prep and prosecution. [Link]
  • O'Brien Jones is looking for patent attorneys/agents with 2-5 years of experience. [Link]
  • Buether Joe & Carpenter is seeking 1 or more attorneys with patent infringement litigation experience. (5 or more years of patent litigation experience preferred) [Link]
  • Cantor Colburn is searching for a patent attorney with an advanced degree in organic chemistry and at least 2 years of patent drafting experience. [Link]
Upcoming Events:
  • On December 1, 2011, the Institute for Intellectual Property and Social Justice (IIPSJ) will co-present with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) the Second National IP Empowerment Summit. The IIPSJ/USPTO IP Empowerment Summit will serve the general public and intellectual property professional and activist community in educating and empowering minority and marginalized artists, inventors, entrepreneurs, and other IP stakeholders in underserved communities. The Summit will provide practical information and presentations for creators and inventors regarding the development, protection, and exploitation of their own innovative and creative works as well as works and inventions in the public domain. [Link]
  • Indiana University School of Law's Center for IP Law and Innovation will hold "The America Invents Act: Patent Law's New Lease on Life" symposium on December 2nd. Speakers include a legendary patent law jurist, patent reform leaders, chief corporate patent counsel, leading practitioners and scholars, as well as the PTO's Patent Reform Coordinator. [Link]
  • The American Conference Institute's 2nd Annual Forum on: Paragraph IV Disputes will be held in San Francisco on December 7th. Experienced faculty of renowned litigators and judges will guide attendees through every stage of a Paragraph IV challenge to help them formulate offensive moves and defensive plays. (Patently-O readers can receive a discount by registering with code PO 200) [Link]
  • IBC Legal is holding a conference on International Patent Litigation 2011 in London on December 7th-8th. Use VIP Code FKW82249PO to get a 10% discount. [Link]
  • The Lawyers Association of Kansas City will be presenting a 4 hour CLE on changes to US patent law under the America Invents Act at the offices of Lathrop & Gage in Kansas City, MO on Thursday, Dec. 8, 2011 from 1pm to 5pm. Presenters include: Kent Erickson, Bryan Stanley, and John Garretson. [Link]
  • The WSBA IP Section, WSPLA, IEEE IP Professional Initiative, and the University of Washington School of Law's Law, Technology & Arts Group will be presenting an all-day CLE at the University of Washington School of Law on Friday, December 9, 2011 on the impacts of the America Invents Act.
  • Fitch, Even, Tabin & Flannery will hold a free webinar, "Collection, Review, and Production of Your Client's Electronic Information," presented by Shane Delsman on December 14, 2011 at 12:00 noon EST. The webinar will cover topics including collecting electronically stored information (ESI) for further use in the e-discovery process; processing collected ESI; reviewing ESI for relevance and privilege; producing ESI in appropriate forms and storage media; and how the Federal Rules affect the above procedures. [Link]
  • On December 16, the University of San Diego School of Law will host "A Review of the America Invents Act and its impact on the USPTO," with David Kappos. Kappos will discuss the USPTO's efforts to start implementing the law and also give a broad perspective of the various changes the agency is undertaking to facilitate the public's understanding of regulatory revisions. Also, Leonard Svensson will provide a brief overview of the major changes included in the America Invents Act and what the changes means for the San Diego innovation economy. [Link]
Contact Lawrence.Higgins@patentlyo.com with leads for future Bits and Bytes.

In re Ricoh Patent Litigation: Costs May Be Awarded For Document Production Databases

Patent

By Jason Rantanen

In re Ricoh Company, Ltd. Patent Litigation (Fed. Cir. 2011) Download 11-1199
Panel: Lourie, Bryson, Dyk (author)

After seven years of litigation between Ricoh Co., the patent holder, and Synopsys, Inc., the latter party prevailed via summary judgment of noninfringement, a decision affirmed by the Federal Circuit earlier this year.  After Synopsys's victory on the merits, the district court awarded costs totalling $938,957.72.  Ricoh appealed, challenging three categories of costs as not allowed by 28 U.S.C. § 1920, the relevant authorizing statute.  In ruling on Ricoh's challenges, the Federal Circuit applied the law of the regional circuit (in this case that of the Ninth). 

Costs for Document Production Database: A significant expense of patent litigation is that of document discovery and this case was no exception.  During discovery Ricoh sought production of emails and other documents.  Initially the parties were unable to agree on the form of production, but ultimately agreed that Synopsys would produce documents using Stratify, an e-discovery company that provides document processing, review, production and hosting services.  The district court awarded the full cost of using Stratify as "fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case" under § 1920(4).

On appeal the CAFC agreed with the court's characterization of the costs.  "The act of producing documents is not so narrowly construed as to cover only printing and Bates-labeling a document."  Slip Op. at 6.  "Thus, the costs of producing a document electronically can be recoverable under section 1920(4)."  Id. at 7.  In this case, however, Ricoh and Synopsys had agreed during the litigation to share the costs of using Stratify.  The CAFC held that the agreement was controlling, leading it to reverse the district court's award for Synopsys's share of the database.

Note: Although not explicitly addressed by the panel, the parties' briefs suggest that Synopsys used Stratify as a mechanism for both review and production.  The CAFC's opinion is unclear on whether this should make any difference – it both implies that this dual use does not matter ("We do not consider any of the Stratify database costs to fall into the unrecoverable category of 'intellectual efforts,'" Slip Op. at 7), while at the same time leaving open the future possibility of disallowing certain costs tangential to the production itself. ("In light of our decision, we need not decide if the additional challenged items related to the database were improperly allowed.")

 Copying Costs Must Be Specific: The CAFC also declined to affirm the district court's award of copying costs, citing a lack of specificity in the supporting documentation:

When the prevailing party seeks to recover copying costs related to its own document production, to meet the documentation requirements, the prevailing party must establish, in connection with its proposed Bill of Costs, that the reproduced documents were produced by it pursuant to Rule 26 or other discovery rules; that they were copied at the prevailing party’s expense and at the request of the opposing party; and that the copies were tendered to the opposing party.

Depositions and Translation Costs Allowable: Ricoh also challenged the award of costs associated with depositions that were related to issues other than noninfringement.  The CAFC concluded that allowing costs for these depositions was within the discretion of the district court as it was reasonable to expect they would be used in trial.  It further held that the district court appropriately taxed costs for both  videotaping and preparation of written transcripts, rejecting Ricoh's argument that it was limited to one or the other.  

Evaluating Supplemental Examination

Patent,
By Jason Rantanen
As seen in the recent Powell v. Home Depot case that Professor Crouch wrote about last week, the net effect of a weakened inequitable conduct doctrine post-Therasense is an increase in the ability of applicants to engage in troubling behavior during patent prosecution.  My colleague Lee Petherbridge and I expressed this concern shortly after Therasense issued, particularly warning about its consequences for patent prosecutors who are arguably worse-off post-Therasense, caught between clients who may be more interested in playing fast and loose with the rules and their own ethical and legal responsibilities.
Therasense was not the only significant development in the area of inequitable conduct this year, however.  The creation of a mechanism for supplemental examination in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act further alters the landscape of inequitable conduct, and not necessarily in a positive way.  In a short essay recently published in Michigan Law Review First Impressions, Professor Petherbridge and I examine the supplemental examination mechanism created by the AIA and conclude that it may jeopardize American innovation, job creation, and economic competitiveness.
A copy of the piece is available via SSRN.

Patent Models

Patent

MousetrapBy Jason Rantanen

As every student of patent law knows, inventors were required to submit a working miniature model of their invention along with their patent application until the late nineteenth-century.  Famous models include those of such iconic inventions as the Whitney cotton gin, the Singer sewing machine, and the Morse telegraph register.  A substantial number of those models still exist, although virtually all are in private collections. 

The Smithsonian Institute recently opened a a two-year exhibition of patent models from the collection of Alan Rothchild, offering everyone an opportunity to view examples of these models.  Entitled "Inventing a Better Mousetrap: Patent Models from the Rothschild Collection," the curated exhibit runs until November 3, 2013.  If you are in Washington D.C., it may be worth your while to wander over to the American Art Museum to check it out. 

Bonus: the Rothchild Peterson Patent Model Museum website has a page explaining what the models are and linking to the patents themselves.  

Patently-O Bits & Bytes by Lawrence Higgins

Patent

Business Plan Competition

  • The Licensing Executive Society Foundation 2012 International Graduate Student Business Plan Competition registration has started. Graduate students, including MS/MBA/MD/JD/PhD and postdoctoral scholars, from across the globe are invited to register (http://les2012.istart.org) to participate in the 2012 LES Foundation Graduate Student Business Plan Competition, which uniquely focuses on business plans that include an overview of IP assets and describe how those assets will be managed and commercialized to achieve business goals. Student teams will compete to win expenses-paid trips to the Final Round of Competition at the LES (USA & Canada) Spring Meeting in Boston, MA, May 15-17, where they will attend educational sessions, mingle with global IP leaders and compete for the $10,000 Grand Prize and valuable in-kind prizes or the $5,000 Global Award. Runner-up teams receive $1,000. Students receive comprehensive feedback throughout the process from IP business leaders who share valuable expertise earned in the trenches of businesses ranging from start-ups to Fortune 500 companies. [Link]

The American Growth, Recovery, Empowerment and Entrepreneurship (AGREE) Act

  • On November 15, Senators Chris Coons and Marco Rubio introduced a jobs bill, the AGREE Act. Title VI: Protecting American Businesses Against Illegal Counterfeiting, of the Act reads: "The Coons-Rubio bill helps to protect American IP from counterfeit or otherwise infringing commercial activity. Specifically, the bill clarifies the Trade Secrets Act, making it explicitly clear that it is not a crime for federal officials, in the performance of their duties, to share information about suspected infringing products with the right holder of a trademarked good." This language will supposedly allow custom and border patrol agents to determine if merchandise is legitimate by asking the owner of the trademark that appears on the product. Further, Title II: Encouraging Cutting Edge-Research and Innovation, discusses various tax credits for businesses and is supported by BIO and the Semiconductor Industry Association. [Link]

.xxx and Cybersquatting

  • It seems that many universities and companies are playing it safe and are acquiring .xxx domain names. Organizations can currently pre-register .xxx domain names for around $200 dollars. The University of Missouri recently pre-registered mizzou.xxx, missouri.xxx, and missouritigers.xxx, because they do not want people coming across their trademarks on porn sites. It would seem ideal for educational institutions to pre-register .xxx domain names. However, should every trademark owner be so cautious? Cybersquatting is registering, trafficking in, or using a domain name with bad faith intent to profit from the goodwill of a trademark belonging to someone else. Cybersquatters can cost organizations money and time in their pursuit to try to get rights to a domain name. Therefore, I would think that it would be better to play it safe in this situation, and pre-register .xxx domain names. However, in the near future, there may be some very interesting cases of cybersquatting if an organization fails to pre-register. [Link] [Link]

Patent Jobs:

  • Baker & Hostetler is seeking a patent attorney with 5-8 years of experience. [Link]
  • Hewlett-Packard Company is searching for a patent counsel with a degree in EE, CE, Physics, or CE and 0-6 years of experience. [Link]
  • Hiscock & Barclay is looking for a patent attorney/agent with 3-5 years of experience. [Link]
  • Pramudji Law Group is seeking a patent attorney/agent with at least 2 years of experience and a degree in EE or physics. [Link]
  • Thompson Hine is searching for an associate with 3-5 years of experience and a degree in engineering or physics. [Link]
  • Abel IP is looking for a patent attorney with 4+ years of experience and a background in chemical and/or ceramic materials. [Link]
  • Oblon Spivak is seeking associates with 3-7 years of experience and a background in electrical or mechanical arts. [Link]
  • Shumaker & Sieffert is searching for patent attorneys with 2-5 years of experience and a background in EE, CE, CS, or physics. [Link]
  • Patent GC is looking for a trademark attorney and a patent attorney with an EE or CS background and 10+ years of experience in each case. [Link]
  • Mannava & King is looking for an electrical engineering patent attorney/agent and at least 2 years of experience. [Link]
  • Kacvinsky is seeking lateral associates with 4+ years of patent preparation experience and a degree in EE, CE, or CS. [Link]

Upcoming Events:

  • Has Your ADR Neutral Met Their Disclosure Requirement? Webinar will be held on November 18. The webinar is sponsored by the ABA Section on IP Law and ABA-IPL Young Lawyers Action Group. The program will discuss different ethical conflicts that may arise during IP Mediation/Arbitration and the level of disclosure required by the mediator/arbitrator. The webinar will start at 1:00 PM eastern time and last about 90 minutes. [Link]
  • On Friday, November 18, the Intellectual Property Institute at the University of Richmond School of Law will host the Fifth Annual Evil Twin Debate, featuring Professor Daniel Crane of University of Michigan Law School and Professor Michael Carrier of Rutgers University School of Law at Camden. The Evil Twin Debate series is founded on the notion that experts are often at loggerheads on important issues of IP policy, yet remain friendly on a personal level. The series therefore brings together pairs of scholars who disagree on an important IP topic, but who can air their disagreements in a friendly exchange — serious in substance but lighthearted in tone. [Link]
  • IBC will hold a US Patent Reform Congress Conference on November 18th in London. The conference will focus in the impact of the Leahy-Smith America Invents for the European practitioner, with expertise from the EPO, AIPLA, USPTO and more. (Patently-O readers receive a 10% discount) [Link]
  • Indiana University School of Law's Center for IP Law and Innovation will hold "The America Invents Act: Patent Law's New Lease on Life" symposium on December 2nd. Speakers include a legendary patent law jurist, patent reform leaders, chief corporate patent counsel, leading practitioners and scholars, as well as the PTO's Patent Reform Coordinator. [Link]
  • The American Conference Institute's 2nd Annual Forum on: Paragraph IV Disputes will be held in San Francisco on December 7th. Experienced faculty of renowned litigators and judges will guide attendees through every stage of a Paragraph IV challenge to help them formulate offensive moves and defensive plays. (Patently-O readers can receive a discount by registering with code PO 200) [Link]
  • IBC Legal is holding a conference on International Patent Litigation 2011 in London on December 7th-8th. Use VIP Code FKW82249PO to get a 10% discount. [Link]
  • The WSBA IP Section, WSPLA, IEEE IP Professional Initiative, and the University of Washington School of Law's Law, Technology & Arts Group will be presenting an all-day CLE at the University of Washington School of Law on Friday, December 9, 2011 on the impacts of the America Invents Act.

Contact Lawrence.Higgins@patentlyo.com with leads for future Bits and Bytes.