Guest Post: Judgment Preservation Insurance and the Federal Circuit

Guest post by Jonathan Stroud and Sam Korte.  Mr. Stroud is the General Counsel of Unified Patents and Mr. Korte is Senior Principal Counsel – IP at Garmin.

An exotic insurance product has recently taken the litigation world by storm.  Judgment preservation insurance, or JPI, was neither offered nor widely discussed, at least publicly, as recently as five years ago.[1]  Now, it’s hard to avoid; a brief Internet search will turn up hundreds of hits and dozens of explainer articles by insurance brokers, law firms, and litigation funders extolling the benefits and pitching such policies to appellants. In IP lit, panels, presentations, and brand-new conferences, insurers and lawyers extol the virtues of these “bespoke” policies.  They now undergird some of the biggest eye-popping judgments on appeal to the Federal Circuit.

Briefly, JPI is a when a civil litigant (or funder) who has won a money judgment—let’s say, $100m—purchases an insurance policy guaranteeing some percentage of the judgment.[2]  In this example—taken from a pitch—a $12.5m policy premium might offer a guarantee of 80% recovery, or $80m, if the appeal results in a settlement, or if full recovery is otherwise stymied—remand, lack of collectability, or another adverse intervening event.  Here the plaintiff-appellant, while out the immediate $12.5m, now has a policy worth at least $80m, against which they can borrow or otherwise book the judgment at some predictable gain; perhaps to continue the appeal or offset recovery costs.  Sellers promote policies alongside litigation financing portfolios to de-risk and otherwise encourage litigation.  And litigation financiers are bundling these verdicts (with their other litigations) and selling shares in the result.  Thus, JPI provides them a floor for these bundled “securities” and allows them a way to assure gains.

Developer Appian secured a $2 billion judgment in a trade secret case, and publicly disclosed to the Wall Street Journal they insured it, including the terms. There, the $47.5m policy ($57.3m including fees) guaranteed 25% (at least $500m) of the judgment. A policy that large held by a publicly traded company whose total revenue in 2022 was, by comparison, $468 million, turned heads.  It has been explained as a smart (if expensive) way to hedge against the high risk of reversal of these supersized judgments.

The policies themselves, at the guaranteed rates currently offered, seem terribly risky. We have heard experienced insurers complain of competing brokers offering guarantees of 50%-80%, and in one case, 96%; clearly, actuarial tables don’t exist for judgment collection, but the reversal rate in appeals from the District Courts was 57% in 2022—and there can be remands and other appeals.

Now, to spread risk and reduce the harm when policies are called, insurance underwriters employ tranches and towers—multiple insurers—and will often sell off insurance liability. But the incentive to compete to sell policies and earn premiums is likely driving these guarantees higher than reasonable.  Given reversal and recovery rates, maybe a 25% policy is sensibly balanced in the patent context based on known reversal rates and settlements; case-specific issues, like preexisting judgments or bad facts, might push it higher.  But anything much higher than that seems, to most in the field, foolish.  Perhaps there’s a sales volume that justifies that risk, and many more policies than estimated are being written; or perhaps we are riding an insurance bubble in this niche market.  Either way, if JPI insurers write policies for Federal Circuit damages appeals at higher rates, plaintiff-appellants will take them—if offered at such eye-catching terms, they have rational attraction.

In-house counsel told us that within hours of receiving patent mega-judgments—which we arbitrarily peg as above $100m—multiple insurance brokers reached out, some directly by phone within hours, to discuss JPI policies.  We have been told by many that the $2.2 billion Intel v. VLSI judgment was insured, though for how much and by who hasn’t been publicly disclosed, as far as we know.

Federal Circuit district court reversal rates and recovery being what they are—as high as 43%, depending on the year—if insurers are willing to offer 80% (or more) at reasonable premiums, why wouldn’t most plaintiff-appellants take them?  Even cash-rich plaintiff-appellants could likely further monetize the guarantee.  Plaintiff-appellants could borrow against that policy, calm investors, or incentivize holding out through the length of an appeal, which currently average 418 days.[3]

But are JPIs good policies for the insurers?  The math suggests not, at least at these high rates of guarantee.  To be sure, insurers and underwriters are not generally reckless.  It’s likely at least some of the risks have been analyzed and justified or accounted for.  There are many ways insurers de-risk alternative insurance products—through “insurance towers,” by drafting agreements that give them some control over the appeal, or to include terms to continue incentives for the appealing party not to settle at a loss to the insurer.  One would imagine that insurers in some appeals can and might need to subrogate, stepping into the shoes of the appellant when necessary to defend their risk—or writing policies that set a settlement floor to collect.

Nonetheless, analysts, insurers, and reinsurers may not truly understand how volatile and persnickety patent appellate recovery can be—particularly given the trend of nuclear judgments being reversed on appeal.  Maybe they do; maybe they don’t care; maybe this is such a (relatively) small slice of the alternative insurance market, and it’s been analyzed and de-risked so well, that it won’t matter.  It is a brand-new “bespoke” insurance product with a brand-new market, no oversight, and is yet little understood.  While we’re not sure those broker incentives mentioned earlier don’t naturally tilt toward overselling of risky policies unlikely to pay off in the long run, we’re also not sure it matters, if the policies have been de-risked.  But they remain, on their face, incredibly risky.

And then there is the disclosure gap problem. Since the 1970s, all Federal litigants have been required to disclose insurance agreements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, for myriad compelling reasons explained in the comment to the rule.[4]  (One reason being that it is possible both sides are insured by the same or related insurers, and the parties might be unaware of the obvious conflict.)   No similar rule exists in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure—understandable given insurance purchased after judgment and targeting appeals—JPI—did not exist at the time.  There’s an argument that those policies must be disclosed on any remand, though docket searches suggest that’s not happening.

The disclosure gap affects other rules, too—for instance, FRAP and local Federal Circuit Rule 33 address the Federal Circuit’s Mediation Program (link).  While the Federal Circuit loosened its language earlier this year and no longer requires mandatory settlement discussions between the parties (link to this year’s amendments), JPI certainly changes, and in some cases may frustrate or eliminate entirely, the possibility of settlement, contrary to the intent of those rules. It may also change the real party in interest on appeal, if the insurance company holding the policy subrogates the claim or the policy is written such that they are the real appellant.  And it could introduce conflicts if related insurers are on both sides of a dispute.  At a minimum, FCR 33 should be amended to require disclosure of JPI and to include insurers in the mediation program.

Regardless of whether the Court and the Judicial Conference yet realize it, though, JPI is here in force, and is being offered widely, at terms both attractive and likely to alter settlement dynamics.  It is affecting appeals.  And while it seems likely that at least some of these policies are riding an insurance bubble and will pop, that moment has yet to come. Perhaps we are entering a phase where available insurance coverage is the rule, and not the exception.  It would be a shame if premature overselling of risky policies or settlement disputes led to a bubble popping and a painful contraction.

[1] See Aviva Will & David M. Perla, United States: Litigation Funding Comparative Guide, Burford Capital, March  23, 2023 (noting that “in recent years” the “legal finance market has witnessed “the growth of a new finance-adjacent product: litigation insurance policies on affirmative recoveries by companies and law firms.”);

[2] For a general explainer, see Certum Group, Judgment Preservation Insurance (video), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J3tF7d50_-E (last accessed Nov. 14, 2023).

[3] Morrison Forrester offers a rather useful instant tool that can show you the current pendency rates for Federal Circuit appeals.  For patent cases originating from district court, it’s currently an average of 418 days from filing of the notice of appeal to decision.  See Statistics, Federal Circuitry, Morrison Forrester (interactive tableau tool), available at https://federalcircuitry.mofo.com/statistics (accessed and tabulated Nov. 14, 2023).

[4] The comment to the 1970 FRCP amendment:

“Disclosure of insurance coverage will enable counsel for both sides to make the same realistic appraisal of the case, so that settlement and litigation strategy are based on knowledge and not speculation. It will conduce to settlement and avoid protracted litigation in some cases, though in others it may have an opposite effect. The amendment is limited to insurance coverage, which should be distinguished from any other facts concerning defendant’s financial status (1) because insurance is an asset created specifically to satisfy the claim; (2) because the insurance company ordinarily controls the litigation; (3) because information about coverage is available only from defendant or his insurer; and (4) because disclosure does not involve a significant invasion of privacy.

Disclosure is required when the insurer “may be liable” on part or all the judgment. Thus, an insurance company must disclose even when it contests liability under the policy, and such disclosure does not constitute a waiver of its claim. It is immaterial whether the liability is to satisfy the judgment directly or merely to indemnify or reimburse another after he pays the judgment.”

 

The MPF Resurrection: Still Waiting for a Miracle?

by Dennis Crouch

I have been thinking about the potential rise in the use of means-plus-function (MPF) claims as a reaction to indefiniteness cases such as Williamson v. Citrix as well as pressure from other doctrines, including enablement, written description, and eligibility.  But, my preliminary data show that the foretold rise has not yet come.  As the chart above illustrates, MPF claims continue their descent into obscurity, with no sign from the preliminary data of rising from the grave any time soon.

The chart above shows a visualization of the percentage of issued patents that include means-plus-function (MPF) claims over time, with two separate estimates based on the wording used in the claims. MPF claims are a particular type of claim in patent law that allows an inventor to claim an invention based on the function that it performs, rather than the specific structure or materials used. 35 U.S.C. 112(f).  Although MPF claims may seem broad on their face, the statute limits their scope to cover only the corresponding structures disclosed in the patent document (the specification) and their equivalents.

The chart shows a clear trend: a decline in the use of MPF claims from 1980 through to the mid-2020s. The high estimate in the chart indicates the broader inclusion of MPF claims that use the word “Means,” shows a more substantial presence and a steeper decline than the low estimate, which tracks claims specifically using the phrase “Means For” or “Means To.”

The decline in MPF claims can be linked to several legal decisions and changes in patent doctrine. Historically, MPF claims were indeed a powerful tool, as they allowed patent holders to claim a range of equivalent structures that performed the same function, without having to list them all out.  However, this breadth of protection has been significantly curtailed by precedential decisions that have limited the scope of the claims (as required by the statute) and invalidated many MPF claims as indefinite (something that I believe is not required by the statute). These decisions from the 1980s and 1990s began the downward drive of MPF usage.

Functional claiming is a constant lure for patent drafters.  The an invention’s function (what result it obtains) is typically tied more directly to the market and business goals than the particular structure or technological details used to reach that end. A functional claim limitation offers the tantalizing ideal of broad coverage and technological flexibility. By defining an invention by what it does rather than the nuts and bolts of how it is accomplished, functional claims can appear to encompass any means for achieving the stated function. This breadth can deter competitors by making it more difficult for them to design around the patent. Additionally, defining an invention functionally may allow the claim scope to adapt to future technological advances that arise after the patent filing date, as long as the new technologies perform the claimed function. The functional format also simplifies claim drafting for complex inventions and supports filing patents amidst technological uncertainty before landing on a final design.

As MPF claims were declining, patent applicants still felt the draw for functional limitations and began to use alternative claiming strategies.  Rather than a “means for” performing an algorithm, applicants began claiming a “processor configured to” perform the algorithm, or other alternatives that avoided the magical words “means.” Under the (old) precedent, the use of alternative words such as “processor for” were ordinarily not treated as means-plus-function form and therefore did not have the narrow construction and invalidity risk mentioned above.

In its important 2015 decision in Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc), the Federal Circuit changed the law again — going after these non-means nonce words.  Williamson established the absence of the term “means” no longer creates a strong presumption against applying MPF construction.  Thus, words such as “mechanism for,” “module for,” “device for,” and “member for” are all likely to be treated as invoking 112(f) means-plus-function construction absent some indication that the limitation directly imparts a structural limitation.

Moreover, enablement and written description requirements have clamped down on non-MPF-style functional claims. For example, in Amgen v. Sanofi, the 2023 Supreme Court invalidated Amgen’s broad functional genus claim covering for monoclonal antibodies that bind to PCSK9 to lower cholesterol.  The case suggests that some broad functional limitations might never be enabled even with extensive disclosure.  Eligibility cases raise similar issues with functional limitations undergoing significant scrutiny. In Electric Power Group, for instance, the Federal Circuit explained that the “result-focused, functional character of claim language has been a frequent feature of claims held ineligible under § 101.”

One seeming solution to all of these arising issues is for patent applicants to more directly assert MPF claim limitations and include a number of embodiments.  But, for now at least, the miracle resurgence of MPF remains elusive.

= = =

Just to confirm that there not a lagging rise in MPF usage, I did the parallel analysis on claims found in published applications and found similar results with continued decline of the use of “means” and “means for” language up through applications published in 2023.

GUI Guidelines: The Old Rules are New Again

By Sarah Burstein, Professor of Law at Suffolk University Law School

USPTO Notice, 88 FR 80277 (Nov. 17, 2023)

Last week, the USPTO released a document entitled “Supplemental Guidance for Examination of Design Patent Applications Related to Computer-Generated Electronic Images, Including Computer-Generated Icons and Graphical User Interfaces.” In it, the USPTO reaffirmed its prior interpretation of the phrase “design for an article of manufacture” and did not—as many had hoped—expand its interpretation of that phrase.

The statutory subject matter provision for design patents, 35 U.S.C. § 171, states: “Whoever invents any new, original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title” (emphasis added).

In the 1990s, the USPTO interpreted the phrase “design for an article of manufacture” to cover designs for “computer-generated icons”:

The PTO considers designs for computer-generated icons embodied in articles of manufacture to be statutory subject matter eligible for design patent protection under section 171. Thus, if an application claims a computer-generated icon shown on a computer screen, monitor, other display panel, or a portion thereof, the claim complies with the ‘‘article of manufacture’’ requirement of section 171.

61 Fed. Reg. 11380, 11381 (footnotes omitted). This interpretation has been criticized by myself and others.

In support of this interpretation, the USPTO cited its own 1992 decision in Ex parte Strijland for the proposition that “[c]omputer-generated icons, such as full screen displays and individual icons, are two-dimensional images which alone are surface ornamentation.” Id. at 11382 (citing 26 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1259, 1262 n.2 (Bd. Pat App. & Int. 1992). In these original GUI Guidelines, the USPTO also suggested that it believed the relevant “article of manufacture” to be the “computer screen, monitor, other display panel, or portion thereof.” 61 Fed. Reg. 11380, 11381–82.

In late December 2020, the USPTO published a request for information on “The Article of Manufacture Requirement.” In this document, the USPTO sought “public input on whether its interpretation of the article of manufacture requirement in the United States Code should be revised to protect digital designs that encompass new and emerging technologies.” In particular, the USPTO asked for input on the protectability of designs for thing like “projections, holographic imagery, or virtual/augmented reality”—i.e., designs that “do not require a physical display screen or other tangible article to be viewable” or, as I call them, disembodied designs. The tone of the request seemed to suggest that USPTO wanted to expand its definition of § 171 to cover designs “not applied to or embodied in a physical article.”

In the request for information, the USPTO again pointed to Strijland but focused on a different part of that decision, the part that talked about icons being “integral to the operation of a computer.” See 85 Fed. Reg. 83063, 83064–65. (By contrast, the original GUI Guidelines did not mention the word “integral” at all. See 61 Fed. Reg. 11380.)

In February 2021, the USPTO published 19 comments that were submitted in response to the request, including these comments submitted by myself and other design law professors.

Over a year later, in April 2022, new USPTO Director Vidal announced the release of a “summary of public views on the article of manufacture requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 171” and announced that the USPTO would “immediately turn to reviewing the ‘Guidelines for Examination of Design Patent Applications for Computer-Generated Icons’ and the surrounding law.” The tone of the announcement, which framed the issue as whether the USPTO’s rules should be “reevaluated to incentivize and protect design innovation in new and emerging technologies,” seemed to suggest that the USPTO was planning to expand its interpretation of § 171. (For more on that summary, see this post.)

But it didn’t. In the “supplemental guidance,” the USPTO doubled down on its “it’s okay if it’s on a screen” interpretation of the statute but did not extend its interpretation of “design for an article of manufacture” to cover disembodied designs:

[T]he mere display of a computer-generated electronic image that is not a computer icon or a GUI (i.e., that is not an integral and active component in the operation of a computer) shown on a display panel does not constitute statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 171. However, the USPTO considers a computer icon or a GUI shown on a display panel, or a portion thereof, to be more than a mere display of a picture on a screen because a computer icon or a GUI is an integral and active component in the operation of—i.e., embodied in and/or applied to—a programmed computer displaying the computer icon or the GUI. Therefore, a computer icon or a GUI is eligible under 35 U.S.C. 171, if properly presented and claimed (e.g., the drawing(s) fully discloses the design as embodied in the article of manufacture).

So what’s different here? The USPTO added “or a GUI” to the same category as “icons.” But that seems to be a codification of USPTO practice, not an actual change in policy. See, e.g., D1,001,156 (issued to Google in October for a “design for a display screen or portion thereof with graphical user interface”); D436,580 (issued to Sony in 2001 for a design for a “design for graphical user interface for a display screen”).

If anything major has changed, it’s the USPTO’s justification for its screen rule. The USPTO is now leaning hard on the “integral and active component” language from Strijland. But while that part of Strijland suggested the relevant article is the “programmed computer,” the USPTO seems to be sticking with its conclusion that the relevant article is the screen. And it remains to be seen just how expansively the USPTO will interpret and apply the phrase “integral and active component.”

Comment: Although many in the design patent community will no doubt be disappointed that the USPTO refused to expand its interpretation of § 171, the USPTO was right not to do so. As we pointed out here, providing protections for disembodied designs would raise serious First Amendment concerns, among other problems.

And as I pointed out here, disembodied designs are already automatically (and costlessly) protected by copyright as long as they can meet the low standard of creativity mandated by Feist v. Rural. That’s really what this debate is about—whether design patents can and should be awarded for designs that fail to meet the low bar set by copyright law. (And, no, the Feist standard is not subsumed by the requirements of § 102 and 103. For more on that issue, see this forthcoming article.)

As for the USPTO’s new defense of the status quo, the new justification is no more persuasive than the old one. But at least the USPTO didn’t make the situation worse.

Further Thoughts on Patent Eligibility and Predictability

By Chris Holman

I enjoyed reading the recent article by Professors Rantanen and Datzov, and was not surprised by their conclusion that the courts are generally applying the Supreme Court’s patent eligibility precedent in a relatively predictable manner. I have not conducted such a systematic review of patent eligibility decisions, but over the years I have read quite a few of them, and for some time I have felt that I can usually predict which way the court will go in deciding these cases.

The two-part Alice/Mayo framework for assessing the patent eligibility of method claims, which formally involves determining whether a patent claim is “directed towards” one of the judicial exceptions (law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea), and if so, to determine whether there is “enough” additional “inventive concept” to render the claim a patent eligible “application” of that judicial exception, seems quite indeterminate on its face. But Alice provides some important clarifying language:

[Petitioner’s method claims do not] purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. Nor do they effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field. Instead, the claims at issue amount to nothing significantly more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea of intermediated settlement using some unspecified, generic computer. Under our precedents, that is not “enough ” to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.

The message I have taken from this paragraph is that technological innovations, including software that “improve[s] the functioning of [a] computer,” generally remain patent eligible. And I have found that, when reading judicial decisions addressing the patent eligibility of method claims relating to computers and computer programs , if it looks and feels like the purported innovation is technological in nature, the claim is likely to be upheld. On the other hand, if the claimed method feels less technological, e.g., a method of playing bingo on the Internet, or a “business method,” I expect it to be struck down. Occasionally I am surprised by a decision, but from what I have seen the courts are generally treating the “abstract ideas” exception as a bar to the patenting of non-technological innovations.

The “natural phenomena” and “laws of nature” exceptions tend to be invoked in the context of life science innovations, and it seems to me that most method claims arising out of the life sciences will be deemed patent eligible unless the court deems it to be directed towards a “diagnostic method,” i.e., an analytical method based on the discovery of a correlation between a biomarker and some clinically significant information, e.g., a genetic sequence and the likelihood of developing cancer, or a chemical metabolite and the optimal dosage of a drug.  If a claimed method relating to the life sciences can plausibly be characterized as something other than a diagnostic claim, e.g., a method of preparing some sort of biological product, or treating a disease, etc., it is generally going to be found patent eligible.  But if the court concludes that it is a diagnostic method, it is going down.

In the Federal Circuit’s decision denying en banc rehearing of Athena Diagnostics, all of the judges on the Federal Circuit seemed to agree that, under the court’s current interpretation of Mayo, diagnostic methods are essentially patent ineligible per se. They also seem to agree that this is an unfortunate state of affairs, given the tremendous medical benefits that innovative diagnostic methods can provide, as exemplified by the claims struck down in Athena Diagnostics. The major split revealed by the various opinions dissenting and concurring with the court’s en banc decision to deny rehearing is that a majority of the judges on the Federal Circuit believe that their hands are tied by Supreme Court precedent, particularly Mayo, while a significant number of dissenting judges disagreed, arguing that the Federal Circuit had unnecessarily tied its own hands with respect to diagnostic methods, and that, properly interpreted, Mayo left open the possibility of finding at least some diagnostic methods patent eligible.

Some of the Federal Circuit judges seemed to voice approval for the way in which Alice has been deployed in the abstract idea context to invalidate claims directed towards business methods and other non-technological inventions.  On the other hand, they voiced concern that in the laws of nature/natural phenomena context Mayo was resulting in the invalidation of meritorious diagnostic method claims.  In any event, when it comes to the life sciences and method claims, the Federal Circuit seems inclined to interpret Mayo relatively narrowly, and uphold the eligibility of method claims, so long as the claimed invention can plausibly be characterized as something other than a diagnostic method.

Failures to Function and Likelihood of Confusion: Takeaways from Two Recent Federal Circuit Trademark Decisions

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently affirmed two Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) decisions. In In re GO & Associates, LLC, 2022-1961 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 13, 2023), the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s refusal to register the mark EVERYBODY VS RACISM because it failed to function as a trademark. In Trek Bicycle Corp. v. Isaacs, 2022-1434 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 15, 2023), the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s dismissal of Trek’s opposition to the registration of the RANGER TREK mark, finding no likelihood of confusion with Trek’s registered marks, and that Trek’s bicycle fame did not extend to backpacks.

In re GO & Associates

In In re GO & Associates, GO sought to register the mark EVERYBODY VS RACISM for various goods and services, including (1) apparel, (2) bags, and  (2) services promoting racial reconciliation. The examining attorney refused registration under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052 and 1053, finding that the mark failed to function as a source identifier and instead conveyed an informational message.

In order to qualify for federal trademark registration under the Lanham Act, a mark must be able to function as a source identifier. In other words, it must be able to indicate the source of the applicant’s goods or services and distinguish them from others. This requirement stems from the core purpose of trademark law, which is protecting the ability of consumers to readily identify the sources of goods and services.

If a mark fails to function as a source identifier, it cannot be registered as a trademark under the Lanham Act. The Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP) § 1202.04 explains that certain types of informational content, such as slogans used by the public to convey sentiments, are typically not registrable because the public is unlikely to perceive them as trademarks or service marks identifying a single commercial source. The threshold determination is whether the public perceives the mark as a source identifier rather than an informational message or sentiment.

Here, the TTAB affirmed the refusal, finding substantial evidence that the mark was commonly used by the public in a non-trademark manner to convey an anti-racist sentiment. The Federal Circuit agreed, emphasizing that “[i]f the PTO were to allow the registration of marks that are used by the public in such a way that they cannot be attributed to a single source, the purpose of trademark law would be undermined.” As the Supreme Court recently stated, “a trademark is not a trademark unless it identifies a product’s source.” Jack Daniel’s Props., Inc. v. VIP Prods. LLC, 599 U.S. 140 (2023).

GO raised the pending case of Elster v. Vidal that is focused on the mark “TRUMP TOO SMALL.” In that case, the Federal Circuit had concluded that the TTAB’s refusal to register was an unconstitutional violation of speech.  In that  Elster, as well as others such as the FUCT case and MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN registration, many commentators have suggested that the marks should be rejected for failure to function.  In the GO appeal, the Federal Circuit found no precedential merit in those cases because failure to function was not an issue on appeal there.   The court also refused to call into question the USPTO’s “informational matter doctrine” — explaining that “[c]ontrary to GO’s position, nothing in the Lanham Act prohibits registration of a mark containing informational matter, so long as the mark also functions to identify a single commercial source.”

Because substantial evidence showed that the public was unlikely to associate EVERYBODY VS RACISM with a single source for GO’s goods and services, the Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of registration.

Trek Bicycle Corp. v. Isaacs

In the second case, Trek opposed the registration of the RANGER TREK mark for apparel and bags, arguing a likelihood of confusion with its previously used and registered TREK marks. Applying the DuPont factors, the TTAB dismissed Trek’s opposition, finding insufficient evidence of likely confusion.

I see the TREK mark as conceptually weak because it is so suggestive of outdoor activities.  The TTAB and Federal Circuit noted that:

  • Dictionary definitions defined “trek” as an “arduous journey” or “difficult journey, hike or trip,” suggesting the word trek refers to outdoor activities.
  • There were third-party registrations containing the word “TREK” for apparel and bags, showing the word is commonly used in connection with those goods.
  • These dictionary definitions and third-party registrations demonstrated that “trek” is a suggestive term for apparel and bags used for outdoor trekking and hiking.

At the same time, TREK is a famous mark — but only for bicycles, not for backpacks.   In the end, the court gave most weight to the lack of evidence of  similarity and confusion. The court agreed that the addition of RANGER to TREK “resulted in the parties’ marks having a different overall commercial impression.”

Although speech was not a central aspect of these decisions they offer a glimpse into how trademark law has been designed to help accommodate speech interests. While marks that primarily function as source identifiers can be registered even if they contain expressive content, the bar for registrability remains high for marks whose primary purpose is simply to convey a message.

14,000 Words to Win It: Why Medtronic’s Appeal Strategy Backfired

by Dennis Crouch

The Federal Circuit’s new decision in Medtronic v. Teleflex delves into the old pre-AIA law of inventorship and prior art.  It also provides an important appellate procedure lesson with the court finding the appellant waived a key argument. 

Teleflex’s U.S. Patent No. RE46,116 claims methods for using a special extension for its guide catheter. Medtronic filed a pair of IPR petitions, asking the USPTO to cancel the claims. Although the PTAB granted the petitions, it eventually sided with the patentee — agreeing that one of the asserted references did not qualify as prior art.  On appeal, the Federal Circuit has affirmed.

The basic question is whether Itou (7,736,355) qualifies as prior art against Teleflex’s patent (RE46,116). The Itou application was filed about nine-months before the Teleflex application.

Under the AIA Teleflex would clearly lose. Itou was filed first and eventually published and therefore qualifies as prior art under AIA 102(a)(2).  And,  the AIA limited 1-year grace period under 102(b)(2) would not apply since Teleflex did not first disclose the invention. But, these applications are all pre-AIA.

In this situation, Medtronic wants Itou to qualify as prior art as of its application filing date.  That means that we apply pre-AIA 102(e).  35 U.S.C. 102(e) provided that a person shall not be entitled to a patent if the claimed invention was described in a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for patent.   Thus, Itou is prior art so long as it was filed prior to the Teleflex invention date.

Proving Invention Date.  Establishing invention date requires determining when the inventor both conceived of the complete invention and then reduced it to practice.  Conception is typically seen as the most important aspect of invention, but invention is not complete until it is reduced to practice. Conception occurs when an inventor forms a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention in their mind. This is the critical inception of the invention. However, conception alone is not enough – the inventor must also reduce the invention to practice. This can occur either by actually building and testing the invention to show it works for its intended purpose (actual reduction to practice).  But, in patent law we also observe the legal fiction that filing a patent application describing the invention in sufficient detail to enable a person skilled in the art to make and use it will also qualify (constructive reduction to practice).

When proving a prior invention date, the law allows inventors to claim all the way back to their provable date of conception, so long as they also show reasonable and continuous diligence by the inventor to reduce the invention to practice.  Thus, if the inventor conceived the invention but then set it aside for a long period before filing a patent application or resuming diligent efforts to reduce it to practice, this can negate the prior invention date.  Once the invention is reduced to practice, diligence is no longer required, but the inventor must be careful not to unduly delay in filing for patent protection because it could create abandonment, estoppel, or laches issues.

In this case, the PTAB agreed with Teleflex that Itou was not prior art, finding that the invention was both actually and constructively reduced to practice before Itou’s filing. On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed on the grounds of constructive reduction to practice, declining to reach the issue of actual reduction to practice. Constructive reduction to practice requires (1) conception prior to the filing date of the asserted reference, and (2) reasonably continuous diligence from just before the reference’s filing until the priority application.

Here, Teleflex provided dated technical documents about the “GuideLiner” product it was developing sufficient to prove diligence and submitted declarations and other supporting evidence showing ongoing development of the invention through the filing date of the patent application.   These included records of prototypes, emails, testic documents, manufacturing prep, etc.

On appeal, Medtronic argued that the PTAB erred in finding that Teleflex established an actual reduction to practice before Itou’s filing date. Specifically, Medtronic asserted that the plain language of Teleflex’s claims requires in vivo testing, as the claims recite steps like “advancing a distal end of a guide catheter . . . through a main blood vessel to an ostium of a coronary artery.” According to Medtronic, Teleflex’s bench testing in an anatomical model was insufficient to meet this limitation and demonstrate actual reduction to practice.  In response, Teleflex contended that actual reduction to practice allows some flexibility rather than rigidly requiring that every claim limitation be performed exactly as stated. Teleflex pointed to cases like In Re Spiller finding reduction to practice despite variations from the explicit claim language. However, the Federal Circuit panel questioned whether Spiller actually supports such flexibility, and whether the Board properly construed the precedent it relied on.

Ultimately, the Federal Circuit declined to decide the issue of actual reduction to practice, affirming solely on the grounds of constructive reduction to practice since Medtronic had seemingly waived its diligence arguments on appeal through improper incorporation by reference.

Incorporation by Reference Doesn’t Work: For anyone appealing to the Federal Circuit, the waiver aspect of this case will be the most important part.   Appellants get 14,000 words in their appeal brief. Although that word length is quite a lot — it gets eaten up pretty quickly and appellants are regularly cutting arguments that they feel could be winners. Here, Medtronic attempted to incorporate 20 pages of briefing from another case by reference that detailed its argument on lack-of-diligence.  The brief itself only included a cursory statement that if the Federal Circuit vacated the diligence finding in the parallel case, it should also vacate and remand on diligence here. But, Medtronic did not substantively argue against the PTAB’s diligence analysis in the brief proper. During oral arguments, Judge Chen offered the following remarks:

We have a 14,000 word count limit to our briefing. You’re at 13,979 and on page 41 you want to incorporate 20 pages of briefing from a separate appeal, which would obviously blow right through the 14,000 word count.  So I’m trying to figure out what to do here. We’ve got 14,000 word count limit that’s being blown through. And likewise, we have a pretty strong precedent that says you’re not allowed to incorporate by reference arguments made in other documents into your briefing. So I don’t know if we can read this as a permissible incorporation by reference.

In the decision, the court concluded that the 14,000 word count limit for principal briefs under Federal Circuit Rule 32(a) along with prior precedent prohibits incorporation by reference to ensure parties fully develop their arguments within the allotted word limits. Despite Medtronic asserting the diligence issue was fully briefed in the other case, the Federal Circuit held Medtronic waived any challenges to the PTAB’s diligence determination and affirmed on the basis of Teleflex’s constructive reduction to practice. According to the court, Medtronic made a strategic decision (a bet) regarding how to allocate its words, and could not undo that choice by asking the court to consider extra-record briefing (without a successful motion to extend the word count).  Thus, while Medtronic contested the finding of diligence before the PTAB, the Federal Circuit found this challenge waived on appeal due to inadequate briefing.

Affirmed.

Predicting Eligibility

by Dennis Crouch

I have really enjoyed reading the new article by Professors Rantanen and Datzov providing empirical evidence that eligibility outcomes are now quite predictable.  When the Supreme Court decided Bilski back in 2010, I was quite concerned about predictability and co-authored a BTLJ article with Prof. Rob Merges on the topic.  If you recall though, in Bilski the Supreme Court offered no decision making framework beyond suggesting a case by case approach.  At the time, there were only a sparse few prior cases to guide future decisions.  But a more complete legal framework was developed fairly quickly in the subsequent cases of Alice Corp and Mayo, and the lower courts decided several hundred eligibility cases that provided substantial guideposts that so often seek in our common law system.

Although I was initially surprised at their reported high affirmance rate of eligibility decisions — on reflection it has begun to make sense. The framework provided a key procedural process and hundreds of decisions gave the opportunity to work through ambiguities. In our 2010 article, Merges and I were particularly concerned about USPTO patent examiners being able to follow the atextual guidelines offered by Bilski, but the Patent Office also acted to create and then repeatedly modify its eligibility examination guidelines in a way that offered a straightforward path for non-lawyer examiners to substantially follow the law set out by the Court.

The article addresses the rhetoric of unpredictability and argues that “there is significant reason to think the popular narrative that § 101 and the Mayo/Alice framework cannot be predictably applied, particularly by judges, may be more of a misconception than an accurate narrative.”

For folks fighting through eligibility cases these days, the biggest concern is no longer unpredictability, but that the law has pushed too far against patentability.  Many like the pendulum analogy because it suggests a return — that the pendulum will swing back.

In my view, the pendulum will (and is) swinging back, but not via a change in the law.  Most of the patents that have been invalidated were those applied-for prior to the Supreme Court’s radical change in eligibility law.  Since then patent prosecution attorneys have substantially modified their approach to drafting patent applications in ways that provide more detailed technical analysis, focusing on technical solutions to technical problems, clearly defining the computer hardware elements, and tying the claims to these technical embodiments.  Likewise, patent litigators are wary of asserting claims that are likely to be found ineligible and so shy away from those potential case killers.   The result then is that I expect to see far fewer eligibility cases in the coming years, but that will reflect in a change in practice rather than another change in the law.

Design Patent Bar Now Reality

by Dennis Crouch

The USPTO is officially establishing a separate design patent practitioner bar with its final rule published on November 16, 2023 and effective January 2, 2024.  This is an historic change that opens the door to becoming a patent practitioner to a much wider audience and will likely lend itself to further growth in this specialty area. After proposing the idea in May 2023 and receiving positive feedback, the USPTO implemented the design patent practitioner bar through its rulemaking authority under 35 U.S.C. 2(b)(2).

Currently, a single patent bar governs registration for anyone seeking to practice before the USPTO in utility, plant, and design patent matters. Applicants must meet the fairly high scientific and technical requirements before being permitted to join the bar.  Of course, ornamental design is often a different creature from utility patents. Good design is now very much ensconced within the formal education — but outside of traditional engineering and science programs.  So, although these designers are often design patent inventors, they have been prohibited from becoming patent practitioners.  The new rules introduces an additional path focused on visual arts credentials. To qualify, applicants need a bachelor’s, master’s, or doctoral degree in one of the following fields or an equivalent:

  • Industrial design
  • Product design
  • Architecture
  • Applied arts
  • Graphic design
  • Fine/studio arts
  • Art teacher education

These align with degrees the USPTO currently accepts for design patent examiner roles.  Equivalent design field degrees will also be accepted on a case-by-case basis.

The setup here is that the design patent practitioner bar will be separate and distinct from the patent bar.

  • Regular Patent Bar: Can continue to prepare and prosecute utility, design, and plant patents.
  • Design Patent Bar: Can only prepare and prosecute design patents.

Design patent bar applicants will take take and pass the existing registration exam. This critical step demonstrates knowledge of patent laws, rules, and procedures. All applicants also undergo a moral character evaluation.

I like what the USPTO has done here.  I love good design, and I believe that design patent attorneys and agents can be helpful in that process in a way that circles back to increase innovation in the field.

The Predictability of the Mayo/Alice Framework – A New Empirical Perspective

By Jason Rantanen and Nikola Datzov. Professor Datzov is an Assistant Professor  at the University of North Dakota School of Law.

The Mayo/Alice framework used to determine patent eligibility has been a lightning rod for criticism since the Supreme Court’s decisions a decade ago. Some have argued that the two-step framework is inconsistent with earlier patent eligibility precedent, while others have focused their objections on its purported negative effects on innovation. But arguably the most popular narrative is the asserted fatal flaw that the framework lacks administrability and cannot be applied predictably.

Too many critics to count—including academics, practitioners, legislators, and judges—have lambasted the patent eligibility framework as an unpredictable morass of confusion. Even some judges on the Federal Circuit have labeled the eligibility framework as an “incoherent doctrine”[1] that might tempt district courts into “an effective coin toss,”[2] while others have openly confessed that “the nation’s lone patent court … [is] at a loss as to how to uniformly apply § 101.”[3] The latest legislative attempt to reframe patent eligibility is similarly premised on “extensive confusion and lack of consistency [in applying the 101 exceptions] throughout the judicial branch of the Federal Government and Federal agencies.”[4] These concerns for unpredictability are undoubtedly echoed by countless practitioners who have been in the trenches of litigating this polarizing issue. Given the particular emphasis on bringing predictability to patent law in creating the Federal Circuit, these criticisms raise a grave concern regarding one of the most important areas in patent law.

Yet, empirical analysis suggests that those claims of unpredictability may stand on shaky grounds. In an attempt to better understand whether judges have been able to predictably apply the doctrine, we analyzed the Federal Circuit’s entire body of 368 cases on § 101 from 2012-2022 at a more granular level than any prior study. To evaluate the level of predictability within § 101 jurisprudence, we used a multi-dimensional approach that considered: (1) whether lower tribunals are reaching the legally correct outcome (i.e., reversal rates); (2) whether lower tribunals are correctly applying existing law in each case (i.e., error rates); and (3) whether appellate judges demonstrate disagreement in applying the law (i.e., dissent rates).

What we found shocked us. It turns out that patent eligible subject matter jurisprudence looks remarkably like other patent law issues at the Federal Circuit and lacks the kinds of empirical hallmarks that we would expect given the rhetoric for unpredictability. In fact, under one of the most well-established metrics for measuring the predictability in the law, § 101 proved to be more predictable than other areas of patent law over the past decade.

Importantly, our goal was not to examine or argue where the line should be drawn for determining what is eligible for a patent. Instead, we just sought to evaluate whether judges can tell where the line has been drawn by the Supreme Court in Mayo. In other words, whether the Mayo/Alice framework has proven workable and predictable through ten years of litigation. As to that question, our analysis suggests that the popular narrative that § 101 and the Mayo/Alice framework cannot be predictably applied, particularly by judges might be more of a misconception than an accurate narrative.

Below are some of our key findings regarding predictability from the research study.  If you’d like to jump ahead to the draft paper itself, here’s a link: http://ssrn.com/abstract=4380434.

 A Historically High Affirmance Rate

Our examination of the Federal Circuit’s body of case law on § 101 revealed that from the Federal Circuit’s perspective, the district courts and the PTO are getting the right result nearly every time, boasting an overall 87.2% affirmance rate.

Graph of affirmance rates for Section 101

Figure 1

Figure 1 shows that the Federal Circuit believes district courts and the PTO are getting the right result in a very high percentage of cases. This is especially notable given that 98.2% of the district court decisions reviewed by the Federal Circuit arose in the context of a Rule 12 motion, summary judgment, or JMOL—procedural postures in which the standard of review on appeal owes no deference to the district court.

Thinking about these numbers in context, the high affirmance rate on patent eligibility is not only a far cry from the Federal Circuit’s one-time 50% affirmance rate on claim construction, it’s higher than the Federal Circuit’s track record on obviousness. In fact, this may be the highest affirmance rate of any significant patent law issue tracked over a significant period of time.

District Courts Very Rarely Err in Their Analysis

To take a deeper look, we also examined the Federal Circuit’s analysis when it did affirm to see whether maybe the lower tribunal got the right result but for the wrong reason.  Although an analysis of affirmance rates has been an established and important marker in measuring the predictability of the law, it provides a somewhat incomplete picture of judges’ ability to apply the law predictably because it focuses only on the outcomes and not the process of making the decision. It’s possible that a judge can err in the legal analysis (or incorrectly apply a legal standard) and still reach the correct overall result—in other words, get the right result for the wrong reasons. Thus, looking beyond mere outcomes to determine how often a judge applies the correct analysis is an important perspective in determining whether a law can be predictably applied.

We found that district court and PTAB judges not only rarely get the outcome wrong, they also make very few errors in applying the law. When district courts reached the right outcome (i.e., complete affirmance on § 101), the Federal Circuit noted a mistake in the district court’s § 101 analysis a mere 4.5% of the time—and 0% of the time for PTAB judges. There were a mere 7 errors in 153 affirming opinions (excluding Rule 36 affirmances). If looking only to precedential opinions (those written for the bar and interested persons other than the parties), there were 4 errors in 67 opinions, resulting in a comparable 6.0% error rate. Overall, taking into account reversals and vacated decisions, more than 80% of the time for the district court—and 95.5% of the time for the PTAB—the judge’s Mayo/Alice analysis was error free.

This type of granular examination of appellate outcomes has been largely absent from earlier empirical studies, so it’s difficult to put the § 101 error rate in historical context. Still, the low rate of errors in district court and PTO § 101 decisions appears to be remarkably low for an area of law identified to be in crises.  Indeed, it appears to be another strong indicator that district courts and the PTO understand how to apply the law, overall.

Federal Circuit Judges Rarely Disagree Regarding § 101 Outcomes

Athena Diagnostics v. Mayo, 927 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2019) and American Axle v. Neapco, 966 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2020) are § 101 decisions frequently cited as exemplars of what some—including several judges on the Federal Circuit—have argued to be a complete breakdown among the Federal Circuit on how to apply § 101 law. Surprisingly, despite the attention § 101 has received, there have been almost no empirical studies to examine this question on a deeper level.

Yet, in what may be the most surprising finding from our study, in all but a few cases, Federal Circuit judges have shown remarkable agreement (93.5%) in deciding § 101 issues over the past decade. In fact, under this measure of predictability, § 101 proved to be more predictable than the other areas of patent law.  In the 368 § 101 cases decided by the Federal Circuit from 2012 to 2022, there were just 24 dissenting opinions relating to § 101. As shown below, the number of cases in which there was a dissenting opinion on § 101 has remained consistently low and peaked in 2019-2020:

Graph of dissents in Sectino 101 decisions

Figure 2

Putting the § 101 dissent rates over the past decade in historical and subject matter context further indicates that § 101 law has not been the subject of more disagreement than other areas of patent law.

Table of dissent rates at the Federal Circuit

Figure 3

The summary tables above show that the dissent rate in Federal Circuit decisions involving § 101 over the period 2012-2022 is identical to the rate among all other Federal Circuit decisions, and was lower than in non-101 patent decisions. And while the rate of dissents in § 101 opinions is somewhat higher than in all other opinions that don’t involve § 101, it’s still lower than the dissent rate in non-101 patent opinions generally and nearly identical for patent opinions arising from the district courts—likely because a substantial number of § 101 appeals are summarily affirmed. With that in mind, it’s remarkable that the dissent rate for § 101 decisions (including Rule 36 affirmances) arising from the district courts is actually lower than the court’s dissent rate in appeals from the district courts that don’t involve § 101.

***

More details on the methodology and analysis—as well as additional findings on the types of appeals, procedural posture of decisions, breakdowns by exception type, and invalidity outcomes—can be found in the working draft paper on SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=4380434. In addition to our core findings on predictability, we also provide updated data on § 101 issues studied by previous scholars. Comments are welcome, and can be communicated by email to Jason Rantanen.

[1] Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Plager, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part).

[2] Realtime Data LLC v. Reduxio Sys., Inc., 831 F. App’x 492, 493 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (emphasis added).

[3] Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc. v. Neapco Holdings LLC, 977 F.3d 1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (Moore, J., concurring).

[4] Patent Eligibility Restoration Act of 2023, S. 2140, 118th Cong. § 2(3) (2023) https://www.congress.gov/118/bills/s2140/BILLS-118s2140is.pdf.

AI as an Inventing Tool – it’s Implications for Patent Law

by Dennis Crouch

Berkely Center for Law & Technology is hosting a great half-day virtual-conference this week: “AI as an Inventing Tool – it’s Implications for Patent Law” organized by Prof. Rob Merges, Dr. Yuan Hao (PhD), and Prof. Colleen Chien.

Details:

I’ll be there participating along with a great set of academics, government officials, law practice leaders, and tech developers.  Hope to see you online!

In a recent talk about the Future of IP, I noted that I have never been comfortable with the Winslow Tableau. The basic idea from this old CCPA case is that we assume that the PHOSITA is sitting in his shop with all the relevant prior art posted to the wall.

We think the proper way to apply the 103 obviousness test to a case like this is to first picture the inventor as working in his shop with the prior art references — which he is presumed to know — hanging on the walls around him.

Application of Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017 (C.C.P.A. 1966).  The Winslow Tableau presents an unrealistic conception of the PHOSITA possessing encyclopedic knowledge of all prior art. As Judge Rich described, the PHOSITA is envisioned sitting in a shop with all relevant references figuratively hanging on the walls around him, available for mental combination. While a useful thought experiment, this assumption of comprehensive awareness of the state of the art has always been out of touch with how ordinary creation truly occurs. However, recent advances in AI provide a more natural model for the hypothetical PHOSITA.  Importantly, LLMs know the references and have their key points accessible for dynamic consideration and analysis.

And, although AI may be an automated system, its responses are closer to the “common sense” reasoning suggested by Chief Justice Roberts in KSR rather than the discarded “automaton” approach.

With these new models, Winslow is suddenly less ridiculous and instead much more prescient.  It is then interesting to think about whether the level of skill in the art is changed by the addition of AI.  One way to answer this is ‘no’ – AI does not change the level of skill in the art in any legal sense. Rather, its addition changes the potential creation methodology to no match the level of skill already required in cases like Winslow.  The legal fiction is becoming reality.

 

Guest post by Hampole, Truffa & Wong: Breaking the Glass Ceiling: The Power of Female Peer Networks

Guest post by Menaka Hampole, Assistant Professor of Finance, Yale School of Management, Francesca Truffa, Postdoctoral Scholar, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Ashley Wong, Assistant Professor of Economics, Tilburg University. This post is part of a series by the Diversity Pilots Initiative, which advances inclusive innovation through rigorous research. The first blog in the series is here and resources from the first conference of the initiative are available here.

The glass ceiling — the barrier obstructing females and minorities from obtaining upper-level positions— persists. Even with decades of advancements in labor force participation and university enrollment, companies still underrepresent women in top corporate leadership roles. For instance, women constitute 40% of the workforce in the S&P 1500 companies, yet they only occupy 6% of CEO positions. The gender gap expands at every level of the corporate hierarchy.

In our recent study, we look at MBA graduates from a top U.S. business school in the last two decades, and we find a big gender gap in management roles. While almost all male and female grads step into management roles within 15 years of graduation, women have a 24% lower chance of reaching senior positions. This difference appears within a year of getting their MBA and lasts for at least 15 years, and this gap exists even when you consider factors like experience or the type of company they work for.

Figure 1. Representation in the Corporate Pipeline Among MBA Graduates in the First 15 Years Post-Graduation by Gender

Grap of probability of holding manage position by genderNotes: We plot the percentage of male and female graduates who ever held any managerial positions, a VP or Director position, SVP positions, and C-level Executive position within fifteen years since graduation. We display the 95% confidence intervals from the t-test of gender equality. Sample includes students of the graduating classes 2000-2018, excluding 2009.

If managerial talent exists equally across genders, the scarcity of women in executive roles suggests current leaders are misallocating talent.  Executives significantly shape performance and innovation outcomes within their firms, so when firms lose female talent moving up the corporate ladder, they are likely reducing employee productivity, inventive capacity, and firm value.  Furthermore, female managers can serve as role models and enact policies that lower obstacles for other women. Consequently, female leaders can foster a more gender-diverse and inclusive corporate environment. Given the potential widespread impacts of having too few women in executive roles, it’s crucial to understand what policies can help reduce the leadership gap.

Can access to a larger network of female peers in business school help women reach leadership positions?

Women can gain insights from other women on companies that support their career growth and how to make the most of benefits like maternity leave. However, connecting with men, who often have wider networks and hold powerful positions, might offer more advantages. So, it’s a real question whether female peers truly help close the management gender gap.

Our study documents that having a higher share of female peers in school has a positive impact on women’s advancement into senior leadership positions.  We find that adding 5 more women to a section of 60 students would increase women’s likelihood of achieving senior managerial positions from 39% to 45%. In contrast, there is no effect on male students. This overall effect translates into a 26% reduction in the management gender gap.

This effect is largest in male-dominated industries like tech and manufacturing, where women are underrepresented the most, suggesting that female peer networks are most important in industries where women are more likely to face barriers in accessing informal networks in the workplace.

When we looked into company features, we found that women with strong networks of female peers often get promoted to top roles in companies that are supportive of women. What’s interesting is that women tend to join these companies six to ten years after getting their MBA, around the time they might have young kids. This hints that having support from other women might be most helpful when challenges in their careers are growing.

In our interviews with female MBA graduates, many shared that their female friends offered emotional support, pointed them to job openings, gave tips about work opportunities, and advised on balancing work with family life. This feedback shows how crucial female friendships are for women’s career success. By adding more women to MBA programs and encouraging them to network together, we might finally shatter that stubborn glass ceiling.

To all the innovators and patent pioneers out there, please take note. The insights we’ve gathered from MBAs are incredibly relevant, especially in the competitive, male-dominated world of innovation. Think about it – by actively nurturing female peer networks right from the get-go with young recruits, you could help to ignite real change.  Let’s champion this approach and bring a fresh wave of diversity and creativity to the forefront of innovation.

Three main takeaways:

  1. Persistent Gender Gap in Leadership: Even with advancements in education and labor force participation, a significant gender gap persists in top corporate roles. Women make up 40% of the workforce in major companies but only hold 6% of CEO positions. This disparity is evident even among MBA graduates from top U.S. institutions, where women face a 24% lower likelihood of reaching senior positions within 15 years of graduation.
  2. Importance of Female Peer Networks: Female MBA graduates benefit significantly from having strong female peer networks during their studies. Such networks can increase a woman’s chances of attaining senior management roles, especially in male-dominated sectors like tech and manufacturing.
  3. Implications for Innovation & Patenting: The underrepresentation of women in leadership roles can reduce a company’s productivity and inventive potential. By actively promoting and valuing female peer networks from early career stages, innovators and patent professionals can drive greater diversity in leadership and subsequently benefit from broader perspectives and increased innovation.

If you find this insight compelling and want to stay informed on the latest developments, sign up for the DPI research updates today!

Guest Post by Alice Li: Tips for Strengthening Innovation Ecosystems and Technology Transfer

Guest post by Alice Li, Cornell University, Executive Director of the Center for Technology Licensing, AUTM Board Member. This post is part of a series by the Diversity Pilots Initiative, which advances inclusive innovation through rigorous research. The first blog in the series is here and resources from the first conference of the initiative are available here.

Myriad inventions in history have been created based on the foundational research done by universities and academic institutions worldwide. Consider the following examples: Google, the search engine we use every day; COVID vaccines, which saved hundreds of thousands of people amidst the pandemic; and even Honeycrisp Apples, which many enjoy daily, are all widely used inventions with direct links to academic studies. In fact, from 1996 to 2020, nearly 500,000 inventions were created by academic institutions, and more than 17,000 startups were formed based on such inventions.

Given that technology transfer is a bedrock of the innovation ecosystem, it must be an inclusive step that helps ensure equality in the innovation and commercialization process.  For this reason, the Association of University Technology Managers (“AUTM”) has developed an equity, diversity, and inclusion (“EDI”) strategy to encourage the active participation of all demographic groups in technology transfer.  As the leading association of technology transfer professionals, with more than 3,000 members and 800 institutions globally, including universities, research centers, hospitals, businesses, and governmental organizations, AUTM has a crucial role to play in ensuring that the knowledge created by academic institutions is disseminated to a broader audience at many different organizations, improving the world and drives innovation forward.

But EDI should not be considered a separate pillar or task.  Instead, for best results, EDI should be integrated into everything technology transfer managers: educate, promote, and create professional networks and connections.  To achieve these strategic goals, AUTM established an EDI Committee that reports directly to the AUTM Office of the Chair.

The EDI Committee has two prongs to its strategy: first, to promote diversity in AUTM, the network of technology transfer professionals, and second, to promote diversity in the innovation ecosystem itself, which includes all inventors, entrepreneurs, and industry partners in the community. To pursue these goals, the EDI Committee has done Member Surveys to establish EDI objectives, developed Baseline Metrics for EDI in AUTM, and provided toolkits for EDI to technology transfer offices in more than 800 institutions. A few years ago, for instance, the AUTM EDI Committee officially released the Woman Inventor’s Toolkit, followed by the EDI Toolkit released last October. AUTM’s efforts to promote EDI in the profession continue.

Thus, today, I urge all the universities, institutions, technology transfer professionals, and diverse innovators to consider, once again, AUTM’s goals to promote EDI in the innovation ecosystem. First, I ask universities, agencies, and related institutions to incorporate the Innovator EDI Data into their metrics for innovation. AUTM has collected metrics data for the past thirty years. AUTM’s comprehensive dataset will provide organizations with a strategic and holistic guide to promote diversity in their research and operations.

Second, I ask technology transfer professionals to participate in the AUTM Biannual Demographic Survey. Your participation will allow a better understanding of the demographic makeup of the technology transfer and knowledge exchange in the innovation ecosystem. Such understanding will lead to more opportunities, improvements, and advancements in our community.

Third, I ask women and diverse innovators to join mentoring programs as mentors and supporters.  Last year, the AUTM EDI Committee developed a pilot program to support the growth and careers of university professionals who are at Minority Serving Institutions (MSI) and interested in the commercialization of academic research and technology transfer. AUTM provides participants access to the AUTM community, mentorship, and Association benefits through this program. AUTM has approached more than 30 universities since the program’s initiation, and currently, twelve are actively participating in it. Also, AUTM provided up to five individuals with complimentary memberships in each TTO, an eGroup that the EDI committee members facilitate for information sharing and mentoring. Furthermore, AUTM is actively supporting other programs in the community, such as Equalize, the National Pitch Competition, and Mentor Program to empower academic women entrepreneurs. Your participation in such programs as a mentor or a supporter can provide new women and diverse innovators in the field with ample resources and practical guidance.

Fourth, I ask institutions and organizations to assist with reaching out to diverse candidates.  For instance, Cornell has started the Ignite gap funding series. The gap funding program is designed to help entrepreneur scientists and engineers start new companies. In an academic research environment, gap funding provides critical support to promising technologies and innovations with significant commercial potential, but which are still “too early” for licensing or external investment. Applications for gap funding and other programs to accelerate innovation are due in the fall.  At Cornell’s Center for Technology Licensing, we look forward to supporting future successful diverse entrepreneurs in their journey in innovation.

Collective action and joint efforts involving all stakeholders are vital to building a robust system for technology transfer and creating a diverse innovation ecosystem. Please join us in our efforts to stimulate technology transfer and promote diversity in invention.

For more information, please feel free to contact us.

  1. To incorporate Innovator EDI Data into metrics for innovation: Lisa Mueller: llmueller@casimirjones.com
  2. To get information of the AUTM Demographic Survey: Colleen Loeffler cloeffler@autm.net
  3. To join the Equalize Competition and Mentor Program: Kristen Leute Equalize@gmail.com; Nichole Mercier Nichole.Equalize@gmail.com
  4. To assist with reaching out to diverse candidates to apply for the Ignite Gap Funding Fellow Positions: Alice Li XL11@cornell.edu

Main takeaways:

  1. Partner with AUTM for Tech Transfer: Many inventions and technologies came from initial studies done by universities and research institutions worldwide. Therefore, technology transfer is vital in the field of innovation. AUTM is a leading association of technology transfer professionals.
  2. Incorporate Innovator Data: To promote diversity in technology transfer, AUTM encourages you to incorporate the Innovator EDI Data into your metrics for innovation, participate in the AUTM Demographic Survey, join mentoring programs as mentors or supporters, and reach out to and educate diverse candidates for gap funding programs for entrepreneur scientists and engineers.

If you find this insight compelling and want to stay informed on the latest developments, sign up for the DPI research updates today!

The Debate Over the PREVAIL Act in PTAB Patent Reform

by Dennis Crouch

On Nov 8, the US Senate Judiciary IP Subcommittee held a key hearing on the PREVAIL ACT – The “Promoting and Respecting Economically Vital American Innovation Leadership Act.” PREVAIL is a bipartisan proposal from Senators Coons (D-DE) and Tillis (R-NC) who are looking to strengthen the power of patents. The proposal here is directed toward AIA trials — generally attempting to make it more difficult to invalidate patent claims via IPR.  Key provisions include:

  • Imposing standing requirements to restrict who can file AIA patent challenges.
  • Requiring “clear and convincing” evidentiary standard for invalidating claims.
  • Broadening estoppel. Challengers must either challenge 102/103 invalidity via PTAB or court, not both (only on prior patents or printed publication grounds).
  • Limiting repeat challenges of the same patent.
  • Adding additional transparency and safeguards.

Senator Coons opened the hearing, laying out his views on the need for patent reform. He argued that the current system allows large corporations to “weaponize” the PTAB to invalidate patents held by small inventors and startups.

The witnesses were Lamar Smith, former House Judiciary Chair and namesake of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (now at Akin Gump); Joe Matal, former interim PTO Director (and until recently at Haynes & Boone), Joe Kiani, Founder and CEO of the medical device company Masimo, and Michelle Armond, partner at Armond Wilson.

Smith and Kiani testified strongly in favor of the PREVAIL Act while Matal and Armond provided support for IPRs largely in their current iteration, although allowing for limited changes.

Any legislation needs a good personal compelling story.  Joe Kiani provided that here.  Kiani testified that his pulse oximetry technology was copied and patents challenged once he proved that the technology worked. Masimo spent over $13 million defending patents at the PTAB that withstood pre-AIA scrutiny. Kiani argued the AIA’s intent was an efficient second look at patents, not reflexive, duplicative challenges by “opportunistic” big companies to invalidate smaller entities’ rights. Predictable property rights drive investment and innovation, and Kiani endorsed PREVAIL’s reforms for providing more certainty and reducing PTAB abuse. He concluded with a statement that action is needed, otherwise “the United States will continue to cede technological supremacy to China.”

Mr. Smith testified that the PTAB has strayed from its original purpose as an alternative to litigation. He said it has become a tool for infringers to undermine valid patents. He endorsed the PREVAIL Act’s reforms as preserving strong patent rights while still allowing for challenges to bad patents.

Smith similarly testified that IPR proceedings have strayed from their original purposes and have now become an additional tool for “litigation gamesmanship.” Smith endorsed the proposed legislation as supporting smaller companies and individuals against “well-resourced corporations.”  “[I]f we lose sight of creating a system that truly rewards investment in innovation, we are really hurting ourselves.”

Matal testified that PTAB proceedings have proven to be timely, cost-effective, and produce accurate patentability results. He cited a study finding the PTAB is affirmed on appeal much more often than district courts due to judges’ technical expertise. Matal argued PREVAIL’s restrictions on PTAB reviews are contrary to the public interest. He opposed limits on serial challenges, saying they could entrench bad examiner decisions. He argued PREVAIL’s standing requirement would prevent beneficial challenges. Matal concluded the PTAB provides reliable review American manufacturers need, saying recent cases like VLSI v. Intel show billions in damages can be awarded on invalid patents absent PTAB access.

Finally, Armond testified that PTAB proceedings have transformed patent litigation over the past decade.  She suggested that PREVAIL’s early forum choice requirement and aligned evidentiary standard could advance the goals of efficiency and certainty. However, Armond opposed limits on PTAB access, saying strong patents come from quality examination rather than less scrutiny. She suggested a better area for reforms is to ensure examiner resources and technical training.

The divided views expressed at the hearing reflect the reality that passage of the PREVAIL Act in its current form is unlikely this Congress. While Chairman Coons and Ranking Member Tillis aim for bipartisan patent litigation reform, these issues have entrenched stakeholders on both sides — making any major movement in Congress unlikely.

In re TikTok: Fifth Circuit Implicitly Backs Federal Circuit’s Use of Mandamus to Transfer Cases Out of W.D.Tex.

by Dennis Crouch

The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals recently decided an important convenient venue case.  Granting TikTok’s mandamus petition to have its trade secret case transferred from W.D.Tex to N.D.Cal.  The decision does not really break ground in the venue/mandamus debate, but does solidify the Federal Circuit’s parallel approach in patent cases out of the same district.  In re TikTok Incorporated, — F.4th —-, 2023 WL 7147263 (5th Cir. 2023).  Decision.

A Chinese company – Beijing Meishe Network Tech.Co. (“Meishe”) – sued TikTok for infringing its copyrights and misappropriating traded secrets associated with AV editing software.  Although both companies are Chinese in origin, the plaintiffs sued in Judge Albright’s Waco Texas courtroom.  Judge Albright is seen as tech-plaintiff friendly and so likely was the key driver for the filing location. Still, TikTok has numerous employees within the district, including 300 in the Waco area.  Further, most of the actions associated with the underlying claims took place in China — and so the plaintiffs argued that there was no particular US court that would be clearly better.   The reality though is that TikTok has most of its US employees in California.

Judge Albright denied TikTok’s motion to transfer venue and TikTok then petitioned the 5th Circuit for a writ of mandamus who has now granted the motion and ordered the case transferred to N.D. Cal.

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is the federal statutory provision that governs requests to transfer venue in civil cases.  It applies particularly in situations where venue in the original court is “proper,” but still inconvenient or may otherwise frustrate justice. It provides that a district court may transfer a civil action to another federal district court if the court determines the transfer is warranted based on the “convenience of the parties and witnesses” and “the interests of justice.”

Under § 1404(a), district court generally has broad discretion to grant or deny a transfer motion.  But, the party requesting transfer must at least show that convenience and justice factors weigh in favor of litigation proceeding in the proposed transferee district rather than the district where the action was initially filed.  Although a district court has discretion, the Fifth Circuit has held that § 1404(a) motions should be granted if the movant demonstrates that the transferee venue is “clearly more convenient.” In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2008). This process requires weighing factors like the ease of access to sources of proof, availability of witnesses, and the connection between the venue and the events underlying the dispute.  Prior Fifth Circuit decisions have emphasized that the analysis focuses on convenience, not on “any particular circumstance in isolation.” In re Radmax, Ltd., 720 F.3d 285 (5th Cir. 2013).  Mandamus is designed as a rare mechanism similar to interlocutory appeal, and only permitted based upon “clear and indisputable” abuse of discretion. In TikTok, the appellate panel explained:

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that should be granted only in the clearest and most compelling cases. To obtain mandamus relief, TikTok must show (1) there are no other adequate means to attain the desired relief; (2) the right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable; and (3) the issuance of the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.

In re TikTok Inc., 2023 WL 7147263, at *3 (5th Cir. 2023) (internal citations omitted).  In most situations, a district court error can only be appealed after final judgment. But, inconvenient venue (absent a greater due process violation) is generally not appealable post-trial and not a justification for a new trial.  What that means is that mandamus is typically the only mechanism available to obtain reversal of an erroneous inconvenient venue decision.

The Fifth Circuit granted TikTok’s petition. It held that the district court clearly abused its discretion in analyzing multiple § 1404(a) factors. Two examples: (1) The district court erred in finding that access to sources of proof was neutral when the relevant source code and TikTok employees with access were located in California, not Texas. (2) The district court abused its discretion in weighing the cost of attendance for willing witnesses and court congestion against transfer.

The In re TikTok Decision Does Not Reflect a Change in Precedent

In my view, this new decision applies the Fifth Circuit’s established § 1404(a) jurisprudence, and also solidifies the Federal Circuit’s parallel patent cases that purport to apply Fifth Circuit law.   There has been a paucity of 5th Circuit precedent on point, and so this helps back-fill that foundation.

On the one hand, the Fifth Circuit explained that mandamus should be rare. But, on the other hand, the panel still granted the mandamus and transfer.  The insight then is that rare things happen — perhaps more often than we think.  Here, the appellate court identified this case as an “unprecedented situation” with no connection between the plaintiff’s claims and the Western District of Texas.  This, the case turns on the case’s unique lack of any connection between the forum and the dispute. As the court stated, “[o]ur holding today is restricted to the outlandish facts of this case.”  The appellate panel did not mention that the plaintiffs had alleged that copyright infringement occurred in the W.D.Tex.

The Fifth Circuit’s decision in In re TikTok provides support for the Federal Circuit’s approach to venue transfer in patent cases. Like the Fifth Circuit, the Federal Circuit has shown a willingness to grant mandamus to transfer patent cases out of the Western District of Texas in situations where the convenience factors strongly favor another venue.  Although the Federal Circuit applies Fifth Circuit precedent to the issue, there has been limited Fifth Circuit authority directly on point regarding venue transfer and mandamus in civil suits.  The In re TikTok decision thus lends support to the Federal Circuit’s body of law.

Rounding the Bend: Claim Construction and the Role of Extrinsic Evidence

by Dennis Crouch

Actelion Pharmaceuticals Ltd v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., No. 2022-1889 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 6, 2023) [decision]

The Federal Circuit’s bread-and-butter over the years has been claim constructions that often surprise or confuse district court judges. Part of the issue here is that most Federal Circuit judges have construed thousands of patents and are deeply immersed in the law of claim construction — while most district court judges see claim construction as a small part of a patent case, which itself is a small part of their overall docket. The other part of the issue, of course, is that no deference is given to the district court’s claim construction on appeal. The ensuing appeal then regularly turns out like that law school class where students seemed to provide really good answers in the Socratic game, but the professor could never resist tweaking — “almost right.”

The Actelion case involves a common situation where the patent claims include a measurement but do not state the level of precision, and the court is forced to decide whether values slightly outside the claimed range might be covered.

Actelion’s U.S. Patent Nos. 8,318,802 and 8,598,227 are directed to a new formulation of epoprostenol, a substance that naturally occurs in the human body and that is useful for treating cardiovascular diseases.  The claims appear directed to a product-by-process — a freeze dried powder (lyophilisate) formed from a solution that contains epoprostenol and that “has a pH of 13 or higher.” Mylan’s ANDA proposes a generic version that would have a pH made from a solution with pH slightly under 13.

The question for claim construction is whether the requirement of “13 or higher” pH encompasses something akin to a pH 12.6.  For abstract mathematicians, it is quite clear that 12.6 is less than 13 — the opposite of what is claimed. But, experimental scientists understand that a measurement of 12.6 might often be properly rounded to 13. The district court adopted Actelion’s proposed construction that “a pH of 13” includes values that round to 13, such as 12.5 and concluded that Mylan’s approach was infringing.  Mylan argued on appeal that the term requires an pH of “exactly” 13 — not values that are about or approximately 13.

The Federal Circuit opinion walked through various factors to help it understand the proper construction. As the court has held, the analysis begins with the claim language, as it is of primary importance. Additionally, “the specification is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis” and is  often “the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

Claim Language: The court examined whether the language setting a lower limit of “13” precludes rounding or not. The claim is written as a whole number, rather than in decimal form. The district court noted that this involved “two significant figures’ without implying any higher level of precision.”  At oral arguments, the patentee’s counsel explained:

[The inventor] did not say 13.0, which is a figure that would have 10 times the greater precision, and certainly didn’t say ‘exactly 13’, which is not scientifically possible in the context of pH, because you’re talking about measurement of billions of ions in a liter of water of hydrogen ions and determining their concentration.

Oral args at 18:00. On the other side, in places the specification appeared to equate 13.0 to the whole number 13.

Lack of Approximation Terms: The court noted that the claim lacks words like “about” that would imply approximation and that are often included within patent claims. As the court explained, “Unlike other claim terms, the disputed claim term lacks approximation language like ‘about.'”

Nature of pH Measurements: The court considered whether pH values can be measured precisely or inherently require some margin of error. The court noted Actelion’s argument that “it is not practically possible to measure exact pH values” because it would require counting every hydrogen ion in solution.

Specification: The specification alternately uses approximation terms like “about” or lacks decimal points when describing pH values. For example, the specification states the pH is “preferably adjusted to about 12.5-13.5, most preferably 13.” This shows the inventor knew how to use “about” to imply approximation, but did not for the “13” value.  The statement also suggests that 12.5 is different from 13.  As the court summarized, “the specification is inconsistent, also describing pH values like ‘13.0’, ‘11.58’, and ’13’ without clear precision.”

Prosecution History: During patent prosecution, the patentee had distinguished its invention from a formulation with pH 12 — arguing that pH 13 exhibited substantially more stability. But the prosecution history did not compare pH 13 with values in between 12 and 13. As the court explained, the examiner “drew a distinction between the stability of a composition with a pH of 13 and that of 12” but this did not address whether pH 13 includes values rounding to 13.

With claim construction, the Federal Circuit has ruled that courts can quite often construe claims based solely upon intrinsic evidence. But, at times courts are permitted to go further and access extrinsic evidence like scientific texts.  Here, the Federal Circuit concluded that this is a case where extrinsic evidence  is necessary to understand how a skilled artisan would view the claim language in terms of pH precision and significant figures.  As the court explained, “this case is one where the proper claim construction cannot be reached without the aid of extrinsic evidence.” The appellate panel thus vacated the claim construction and infringement judgment and remanded for the district court to consider the extrinsic evidence like scientific textbooks and perhaps expert testimony in the process of reconsidering the claim construction.

The panel consisted of Circuit Judges Reyna, Stoll, and Stark. Circuit Judge Stoll authored the opinion.

= = =

This case highlights an issue that has led to claim construction disputes in numerous cases involving measurements and precision with billions of dollars turning on so-called rounding errors. The lack of clarity stems from applicants not specifying the precision or margin of error for claim terms either in the original application or during prosecution. This ambiguity could be avoided if the USPTO were to put the onus on patent applicants to identify the precision and error margin for any measurements recited in the claims. For example, the USPTO examiner could reject the claims as ambiguous based upon the broadest reasonable interpretation and require the applicant to clarify whether “a pH of 13” allows for values that round to 13 and if so, the acceptable variance (e.g. ± 0.1, ± 0.01 pH units).

Requiring patent applicants to explicitly identify the precision and error margin for measurements during prosecution would prevent the need for courts to resort to extrinsic evidence to resolve ambiguity that should have been addressed before issuance. This would increase certainty around claim scope and reduce unnecessary litigation.

What do you think, should the USPTO consider more ways to have applicants clarify claim term precision when filing and prosecuting applications involving numerical measurements?

The Price of Principled Dissent: Fee-Shifting as a Deterrent to Legitimate Critique of Patent Doctrine

by Dennis Crouch

In re PersonalWeb Techs, — F.4th — (Fed. Cir. Nov 3, 2023)

A few years ago, I published an article along with Homayoon Rafatijo explaining our perspective of how the Federal Circuit has improperly extended the Kessler doctrine in cases like PersonalWeb Tech.  Law school classes teach two types of preclusion: res judicata and collateral estoppel. The Kessler doctrine is an additional patent-specific preclusion doctrine that the Federal Circuit applies against patentees in certain patent situation.  The basics of the doctrine is that it applies like non-mutual collateral estoppel to bar future litigation of infringement claims. But in PersonalWeb, the Federal Circuit removed some of the key safeguards of collateral estoppel — such as requiring that the issue have been actually litigated and decided  in a first case prior to precluding further litigation of the issue in a different context and against different parties. We spent a lot of time researching the history of the doctrine and its creation in the early 1900s and then walked through how the historical expansion the “claim” via notice pleading as well as expansion of non-mutual issue preclusion overtook any original justification for the doctrine.  Our article had some legs and was also awarded the ShookHardy & Bacon LLP Excellence in Research Award.  The Gov’t brief  in the subsequent Supreme Court petition did agreed that the Federal Circuit had improperly extended the doctrine.  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case.

I was surprised to see today that in a 2-1 decision, the Federal Circuit thought so little of our argument (and the SG brief) that it determined PersonalWeb’s lawsuit was objectively baseless — thus serving as a basis for an exceptional case finding and attorney fee award of $5 million to the accused infringers.

I’ll begin with Judge Dyk’s dissent that sets out the problem:

The majority’s opinion rests on the remarkable proposition that PersonalWeb’s arguments were objectively baseless (and supported a fee award) despite the Solicitor General’s agreeing that those very same arguments were correct. The majority’s opinion effectively awards fees for a lack of success, which is not an appropriate use of section 285, and will likely chill legitimate advocacy.

Dyk, J. in Dissent.  The majority opinion authored by Judge Reyna and joined by Judge Lourie defended the Federal Circuit’s caselaw and appears to reject any notion that the Federal Circuit has expanded the doctrine beyond its original bounds.  Notably, the Federal Circuit did not contend with any of the arguments suggested either in our article or the SG brief.  The majority also did not explain its effective conclusion that the SG brief was itself objectively baseless.

The Federal Circuit’s newest decision PersonalWeb is concerning. By penalizing reasonable legal arguments and showing little regard for scholarly critique or even the Solicitor General’s briefing, the majority opinion signals an overt hostility towards rethinking existing patent doctrine and legitimate litigation that endeavors to challenge existing law.

Nose of Wax: The Ongoing Ambiguity in Claim Construction Standards

by Dennis Crouch

One of the ambiguities with contemporary claim construction is how courts deal with loosely implied limitations from the specification. These do not rise to the level of ‘disclaimer’ but we’re never entirely sure whether the specification-forward approach of Phillips v. AWH will have traction.  The courts tend to strongly oppose importing limitations into the claims absent a disclaimer, but claim-language hook can often lead to interpretative narrowing.  This becomes even more interesting in situations where the patentee is using a coined term but without an express definition of scope.  In those instances it seems appropriate to read more into the the specification — but how much more?

The Federal Circuit’s decision in Malvern Panalytical Inc. v. TA Instruments-Waters LLC, No. 2022-1439 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 1, 2023) offers some guidance — and also rejects the use of prosecution history from a non-family-member application in interpreting patent claim scope.

At issue was the meaning of the term “pipette guiding mechanism” as used in a pair of patents owned by Malvern.  U.S. Patent Nos. 8,827,549 and and 8,449,175. The district court limited the term to only “manual” embodiments based on statements made during prosecution of an unrelated patent.  With that narrow construction, the accused automated devices clearly did not infringe — and the patentee stipulated as such. On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s claim construction, holding that the term was not limited to manual embodiments and that unrelated prosecution history should not have been used to construe the claims.

The patents relate to microcalorimeters, which are instruments used to measure the heat absorbed or released during a chemical reaction. Specifically, the patents describe an isothermal titration calorimeter (ITC) that contains several components including an automatic pipette assembly, a stirring paddle and motor, and a “pipette guiding mechanism.” The pipette guiding mechanism moves the pipette assembly between different positions, such as inserting the pipette into a sample cell for measurements or into a washing apparatus for cleaning. The key dispute was whether this pipette guiding mechanism included both manual and automatically operated embodiments. The Federal Circuit ultimately held that the plain meaning of the term encompassed both manual and automated guiding mechanisms.

District Judge Andrews (D.Del.) sided with the accused infringers in finding that the claimed “pipette guiding mechanism” should be limited only to manual operation forms.  On appeal, the TA defended the judgment and raised the following arguments: (1) The specification discloses two embodiments of the guiding mechanism, both of which are operated manually and refers to a “user skills” as an aspect of operating the machine.  (2) The specification goes on to describe other automated portions of the assembly, but did not do so with the guiding mechanism. (3) The term “pipette guiding mechanism” is a coined term without a plain meaning, so it can’t be broader than the embodiments in the specification. (4) that the patentee’s provided evidence that a product guide being distributed “included” the “relevant features” of their claimed invention.  That product guide only described manual operation.  (5) Finally, during prosecution of a separate non-family-member patent (US9103782), the patentee had argued that it was describing a ‘purely manual guiding system’ as an attempt to avoid prior art from an automated reference.   Although perhaps not a complete disclaimer, TA argued that these factors come together to narrowly construe the claim to cover only manual guiding mechanisms.  The Federal Circuit dismantled these arguments individually.

Claim Construction Analysis

The Federal Circuit began its analysis by looking to the plain and ordinary meaning of “pipette guiding mechanism” as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art. The court found that the plain meaning encompassed both manual and automatic guiding mechanisms. This was based on examining the individual words in the claim term, as well as the overall context provided by the claims and specification. The court found no clear disavowal or redefinition in the specification or the arguments made during prosecution and so gave the claims their full ordinary meaning.

As to the coined-term argument, the court found that even coined terms can have a discernible plain and ordinary meaning based on the intrinsic evidence of the patent. There is some tension among the cases on this issue.  Compare Indacon, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 824 F.3d 1352, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (coined terms without a plain and ordinary meaning in the art can be limited more readily by prosecution statements) with Littelfuse, Inc. v. Mersen USA EP Corp., 29 F.4th 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“[T]he district court was correct in seeking to give meaning to the term ‘fastening stem’ by looking to the meaning of the words ‘fastening’ and ‘stem’ as used in the patent.”).  The appellate panel first noted that the doctrine is “sparingly applied” and, as here, the patent uses the individual words “pipette” “guiding” and “mechanism” in a manner that can be readily understood and does not suggest a manual limitation.  Rather, “the plain and ordinary meaning of ‘pipette guiding mechanism’ is a mechanism that guides a pipette, which can be either manual or automatic.”

In this case, the claims lack a textual hook for a manual requirement and the court found no “clear and unmistakable” disavowal.  As such, the proper construction is the full scope.

Use of Unrelated Prosecution History

A significant aspect of the Federal Circuit’s decision was rejecting the district court’s reliance on prosecution history from a non-family member patent to construe the claims. Although not an official  ‘family member,’ the parallel application had a shared assignee, was being prosecuted by the same law firm, and and also covered a pipetting system. In that non-family-member case, the patentee had distinguished its invention from the prior art by arguing that its guiding mechanism operated manually rather than automatically.  The district court treated the statements as admissions limiting “pipette guiding mechanism” to manual embodiments.  That office action rejection was then submitted to the PTO in these cases as part of an IDS.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected the district court analysis, holding that  statements in an “unrelated” application do not guide meaning or serve as a disclaimer and further that submission of the OA in an IDS is insufficient to incorporate those statements for purposes of construing the claims at issue.

Although this answer here is probably correct, it makes me uncomfortable because it allows patentees to tell different stories in different cases.  Here, the cases were being handled by different examiners in different art units — it might be a different story though if the same examiner was looking through all the  similar but “unrelated” cases.

Although the logic of this case all seems clear from hindsight, I continue to be concerned that this situation offers lots of wiggle room for each side to push  for advantage — akin to a nose of wax.

Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence

by Dennis Crouch

The White House this week issued a new executive order focusing on a variety of aspects of regulating artificial intelligence, some of which focuses on IP issues.  The executive order lays out eight guiding principles for manages risks while allowing growth and benefits:

  1. Ensuring AI is safe, secure and trustworthy, including through developing guidelines, standards and best practices, verifying reliability, and managing risks related to national security, critical infrastructure and cybersecurity.
  2. Promoting innovation and competition in AI, such as through public-private partnerships, addressing intellectual property issues in ways that “Protect inventors and creators”, and ensuring market competition and opportunities for small businesses.
  3. Supporting workers affected by AI adoption, including through training, principles for workplace deployment, and analyzing labor market impacts.
  4. Advancing equity and civil rights when using AI in criminal justice, government benefits, hiring, and other areas.
  5. Protecting consumers, patients, passengers and students from risks of AI systems.  “[C]onsumer protections are more important than ever in moments of technological change.”
  6. Safeguarding privacy including through evaluating commercial data use and advancing privacy-enhancing technologies. “[T]he Federal Government will ensure that the collection, use, and retention of data is lawful, is secure, and mitigates privacy and confidentiality risks.”
  7. Improving government use of AI.
  8. Strengthening American leadership abroad to advance international cooperation on AI.

Beyond the stated goals, the order has a number of requirements — most of them directed to the various Federal executive agencies.  The tightest new regulations appear intended to focus on future AI models that are a few times larger than what OpenAI and other are currently deploying as well as “dual-use” models that could have potential national security impact.

  • It requires companies developing or intending to develop “potential dual-use foundation models” to provide information to the government about model training, ownership of model weights, results of AI “red team” testing, and measures taken to meet safety objectives.
  • It authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to define the technical conditions that would trigger these reporting requirements. Until defined, reporting is required for models trained on over 10^26 operations or primarily on biological sequence data over 10^23 operations.
  • NIST is charged with developing standards and tests to ensure that AI systems are safe, secure, and trustworthy and the Department of Commerce to develop guidance for content authentication and watermarking of AI-generated content.

The intellectual property-related aspects of the executive order ask the appropriate agencies to work on the problem.

  • It directs the USPTO Director to issue guidance to patent examiners and applicants on AI and inventorship, including issues related to using generative AI in the inventive process. It calls for the USPTO Director to issue updated guidance on patent eligibility for AI and emerging technologies.
  • It instructs the USPTO Director to consult with the Copyright Office and make recommendations on potential executive actions related to copyright and AI, including the scope of protection for AI-generated works and the use of copyrighted works for AI training.
  • It directs Homeland Security to develop a program to address AI-related intellectual property theft, including investigating incidents and enforcing actions. It also calls for updating the IP enforcement strategic plan to address AI.
  • It encourages the FTC to use its authorities to promote competition in the AI marketplace and protect consumers and workers from related harms.
  • It promotes public-private partnerships on advancing innovation, commercialization and risk-mitigation methods for AI. This includes addressing novel IP questions.

None of these requirements have immediate effect, but indicate that there will be further action over the next few months.

Prosecution Strategies for the AIA Era

by Dennis Crouch

The Federal Circuit’s new claim construction decision in Monterey Research, v. STMicroelectronics highlights the ongoing difficulty of patentees to obtain narrow claim construction at the PTAB during IPR. Typically, patentees are seeking narrow claim construction in order to better differentiate the patent claims from the asserted prior art.  And, although a patentee could expressly amend the claims, such an action could create problems in litigation such as eliminating back damages and potentially creating an estoppel problem. Broad claim interpretation at the PTAB was rampant in the early days as the administrative court applied the PTO standard “broadest reasonable interpretation.” More recently, the PTAB has moved to the narrower ordinary meaning standard, but the change has not been enough for many patentees to survive the IPR process.

Monterey’s U.S. Patent No. 6,534,805 covers an improved SRAM cell design for computer memory.  The claim requires “a single local interconnect layer comprising local interconnects corresponding to bitlines and a global wordline.”  Although not expressly included in the claim, the patentee argued that the interconnect layer should be construed to require lateral routing of signals along the interconnect layer.  Monterey pointed to several elements from the prosecution history that support its contention.

  • Figure 3 of the patent (above) shows the type of lateral routing of signals  being discussed. During prosecution, Monterey distinguished its claim from the prior art by referencing Figure 3 and stting that “all the runs [i.e. interconnects] for the bitlines, Vcc, Vss and the wordline are provided in the single layer of Fig. 3” in contrast to Osada’s multi-layer arrangement.
  • In fact, the “single local interconnect layer” limitation was specifically added to the claims in order to distinguish the invention from Osada.

The majority opinion authored by Judge Chen and joined by Judge Taranto rejected the patentee’s arguments — providing two key conclusions:

  1. The prosecution history statements did not clearly limit the claim scope but rather were too ambiguous and vague to constitute a disavowal of claim scope.
  2. Figure 3 does not clearly require lateral routing.  Rather, Figure 3 only showed a single contact point on each relevant interconnect, rather than contacts on both ends that would necessitate lateral routing along the length.

Judge Dyk’s dissent, on the other hand, pointed to the prosecution history statements referencing Figure 3 as limiting the claim scope to lateral routing to overcome the prior art.  Unlike the majority, Judge Dyk looked more to the purpose and context of the prosecution history rather than just the plain language.

Unpatentability Affirmed.

= = =

The standard conventional wisdom for patent prosecution is that a more limited record is better than one full of prosecution history statements and declarations.  That approach has the benefit and tendency to lead to broader claim construction. But, this case represents another example of how that broad approach can come back to bite the patentee — especially in today’s world of AIA trials.

The conventional patent prosecution wisdom has long been that fewer prosecution history statements are generally better — because they allow for broader claim construction down the road. This approach stems from the desire to avoid unintentional disavowals or limitations on claim scope. However, as this case illustrates, that strategy can come back to haunt patentees in AIA trials.

In the current post-AIA environment, patent claims are frequently challenged in inter partes reviews (IPRs) before PTAB judges who are ready and willing to delve into the prior art to in a detailed obviousness analysis. Thus, patentees today find themselves arguing for narrower interpretations to avoid prior art — but are lacking clear prosecution history support. Vague or ambiguous statements meant to preserve claim scope have been be inadequate for this task as are intentionally broad and ambiguous claim limitations. This approach left Monterey’s claims vulnerable to invalidity in light of the broader interpretation.

Post-Hoc Party: You Should Have Said That Before

by Dennis Crouch

Netflix, Inc. v. DivX, LLC, — F.4th — (Fed. Cir. 2023)

In recent years, a number of PTAB decisions have been vacated on appeal because the administrative court failed to address arguments raised by the various parties.  Seeing this potential avenue for appeal, many IPR-losers comb through their IPR filings in an attempt to identify potential untapped veins.

Netflix did just that in this case — arguing that the PTAB had failed to address several of its arguments. But the appellate panel refused to comply and instead held that the arguments Netflix had purportedly raised before the PTAB had, in actuality, not been sufficiently raised below.   Judge Chen authored the majority opinion joined by Judge Linn, Judge Dyk wrote in dissent.

DivX has developed a number of inventions related to video streaming.  The patents at issue here are designed to facilitate adaptive bitrate video streaming through the use of “top level index files” designed to be used by a playback device in choosing the appropriate stream to play that will both take advantage of the device capabilities and take into account network conditions. U.S. Patent Nos. 9,270,720 and 9,998,515.

In 2019, DivX sued Netflix for infringing the patents, and Netflix responded with a pair of IPR petitions arguing that the claims should be cancelled.  Although the PTAB granted the petition, it did ultimately sided with the patentee in holding that the claims had not been proven unpatentable.

On appeal, Netflix did not challenge any of the PTAB’s fact finding or legal conclusions, but instead argued that the PTAB had failed to address or misinterpreted two of its obviousness arguments.  Netflix cited cases like Donner Tech., LLC v. Pro Stage Gear, LLC, 979 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2020) for the prospect that the Board must meaningfully consider all of petitioner’s arguments.

Reviewing the PTAB’s interpretation of petition arguments for abuse of discretion, the majority held Netflix forfeited three arguments raised on appeal by failing to clearly raise them before the PTAB. See In re Google Tech. Holdings, 980 F.3d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“Any argument not raised to the Board is forfeited.”).

The dissent, concluded that the arguments had been properly raised, but the majority saw the appeal as “post-hoc attempts on appeal to include additional, new arguments not contained in the petition.”  On this point, the majority complied a long list of cases where IPR-losers had attempted to appeal arguments that had not been clearly proffered below.

  • Microsoft Corp. v. Biscotti, Inc., 878 F.3d 1052, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Microsoft did not present to the Board the full argument that it presents here on appeal . . . Microsoft’s brief on appeal is far more detailed and contains substantial new arguments regarding why it believes Kenoyer anticipates this limitation of claim 69.”)
  • Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“We also are unpersuaded by Continental’s attempts to cure the petition’s deficiencies in its subsequent briefing to the Board and to us.”)
  • Yita LLC v. MacNeil IP LLC, 69 F.4th 1356, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (disagreeing with Yita that an argument was raised in petition and thus finding no abuse of discretion by the Board in “declining to consider Yita’s argument about modifying the teaching of Rabbe . . . because it was presented too late—in a footnote in Yita’s reply brief”);
  • Henny Penny Corp. v. Frymaster LLC, 938 F.3d 1324, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“[T]he Board did not abuse its discretion by holding HPC to the obviousness theory in its petition”);
  • Ariosa Diagnostics v. Verinata Health, Inc., 805 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“We see no error in the Board’s rejection of Ariosa’s reliance, in its Reply submissions, on previously unidentified portions of a prior-art reference to make a meaningfully distinct contention.”).

Without delving deeply into the technology, Netflix had argued that a “filtering” limitation had been shown based upon the prior art Pyle’s selection of an existing manifest as well as Pyle’s creation of a new manifest.  But, the Board focused only on the selection portion.  Second, for a “retrieving” limitation, Netflix argued that Lewis alone disclosed these limitations, rather than needing to be modified.  But, the Board focused on whether it would have been obvious to modify Lewis to include that limitation.   What you can see here is that both of these arguments are quite narrow slivers from the overall obviousness arguments.

In looking at the petition and the Board’s initiation decision, both the petitioner and the patentee have reasonable positions as to whether the issue was properly raised.  In the end then, I expect that the deferential abuse of discretion standard of review for this issue carried the day.  Affirmed.

= = =

This is an aside, but one part of the briefing that was interesting to me is that more than 1/3 of the cases cited by the appellant in its opening brief were non-precedential federal circuit cases.  Prior to 2007 the Federal Circuit had a rule forbidding the citation of its unpublished opinions. Now, Fed. R. App Proc. 32.1 expressly permits those citations.