Andersen v. Pella (Fed. Cir. 2008)(non-precedential)
Andersen sued Pella and WL Gore for infringement of its window screen patent. Apparently, the patented screen allows ventilation and blocks insects, but is easier to see through than traditional screens. The claims focus on the diameter and strength of the screen wires and as well as on the screen’s “transmittance” and “reflectance” properties.
Prior to KSR, the district court had rejected the defendant’s summary judgment motions on obviousness – finding that the prior art references lacked a motivation to combine. After KSR, the district court reversed course – this time granting summary judgment of invalidity based on obviousness of the claimed screen. In its analysis, the district court asked and answered the following question: “would an insect screen manufacturer of ordinary skill have found it obvious to use the [prior art] screening material, decrease its reflectance value, bond it, and place it in a window frame? The answer, plain and simple is ‘Yes.'” According to the lower court, the prior art mesh was the “heart” of the claimed invention, and it was a “simple act of common sense” to slightly modify the mesh and apply it to a window. Although secondary factors of nonobviousness were shown, the lower court found they were not enough to rebut a strong showing of obviousness.
Analogous Arts: On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated – finding material facts that prevent summary judgment of obviousness. In particular, the appellate panel found that the prior art mesh might not count as nonobviousness type prior art because it “outside the scope and content of the prior art.” The court based its decision on three issues: (1) the prior mesh was not in the same “insect screen manufacturing field”; (2) there was some evidence that the prior mesh would not be useable for an insect screen (teaching away); and (3) the PTO specifically considered the reference before granting the patent and should be given some deference.
Upon our review of the record in the light most favorable to Andersen, we find support adequate to overcome summary judgment on the question of whether the TWP mesh was outside the scope and content of the prior art. Andersen put forth evidence in the record that, one, the TWP mesh was not part of the insect screen manufacturing field, and, two, an insect screen manufacturer would have read the prior art to teach away from using a mesh with the characteristics possessed by the TWP mesh. This field-of-invention and teaching-away evidence, combined with the deference owed to the PTO’s issuance of this patent after reviewing the same prior art references that form the basis of this obviousness challenge, raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether an ordinarily skilled insect screen designer would have found the combination of the TWP mesh with the other prior art references obvious. |
Teaching away and price feasibility: One of the ‘teaching away’ arguments accepted by the Federal Circuit was that of price infeasibility. Andersen had argued that the prior mesh would not have been considered by a designer because it was quite “extraordinarily expensive.” In its holding, the appellate panel gave backing to the notion that a high price would discourage consideration of a potential prior art reference.
As to the third characteristic, pricing, Andersen’s expert, Laurence Armstrong, stated that the TWP mesh was “extraordinarily expensive in comparison with traditional insect screen material, costing about $75.00 per square foot.” It is not unreasonable to suggest that a significant difference in cost could discourage an insect screen designer from using the more expensive mesh. . . . On the whole, we think, the record creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the durability, transparency, and pricing of the TWP mesh would have discouraged an ordinarily skilled artisan from incorporating the mesh into an insect screen. |
Summary judgment vacated.
In re Soli, 317 F.2d 941, 945-46, 137 USPQ 797, 800 (CCPA 1963)
That’s 1963. Enough said.
“Neither the rule nor that case require applicant to state why the noticed fact is not considered to be common knowledge or well-known in the art.”
As a matter of fact that rule states that:
“(b) In order to be entitled to reconsideration or further examination, the
applicant or patent owner must reply to the Office action. The reply by the applicant or patent owner must be reduced to a writing which distinctly and specifically points out the supposed errors in the examiner’s action and must
reply to every ground of objection and rejection in the prior Office action. The reply must present arguments pointing out the specific distinctions believed to render the claims, including any newly presented claims, patentable over any applied references. ”
Note here that this is an office rule, and is entitled to Chevron deference if the PTO’s interpretation is reasonable, which it is, and the statute does not speak directly to the issue, and it does not. Should you like to further challenge the interpretation and actually managed to win, then I’m sure we’d be happy to change the rule to better accomodate you.
Also note here that “supposed errors” is not limited errors of application of written publications or other more traditional prior art, or obviousness determinations, or official notices or anything. If you don’t take issue with the official notice as being a supposed error then we assume you do not regard it as such.
If you prefer, we could simply not reconsider or further examine your application. Since we’re as nice as we are about not holding you non-compliant though we simply inform you that you skipped completing distinctly and specifically pointing out what the supposed error with the examiner’s official notice is and send you an action. We’re a generous lot. You of course argue that there is no requirement to address why the supposed error is an error. However, it is axiomatic that in any indiation of an error that one must explain why it is an error or else your assertion will simply be overlooked for what it is, an assertion with no reasoning behind it. I get assertions like this about facts found in references occasionally and I answer them the same way I would an incomplete official notice traversal. I simply state the applicant has not provided any reason to believe that an error has been made, and that I can think of none, so it seems there is no reason to take the assertion of an error being made into account.
Also, you should note that:
link to uspto.gov
relies on In re Soli in addition to Chevenard and Soli seems most relevant to the discussion at hand.
For your convience:
In re Soli, 317 F.2d 941, 945-46, 137 USPQ 797, 800 (CCPA 1963)
link to altlaw.org
Therein they state: “This court has long held that wherever possible, issues should be crystallized before appeal to this court. It is neither the function of oral arguments nor briefs before this court to question for the first time the propriety of actions of the examiner or the board to which a response conveniently could have been made before the Patent Office. See In re Chevenard, 139 F.2d 711, 31 CCPA 802” when the applicant failed to “challenge” in the old school manner before appeal. Today we don’t even require you to make a challenge. Simply point out an error and state why it is an error.
I note with particular glee this gem: “Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that the rule of this court were not as stated in the Chevenard case, we noted that appellant’s attempt to refute what we think is the justifiable position of the Patent Office relating to the skill of the art consists merely of stressing what the Patent Office has admitted — that neither Strawinski nor Taggart discloses, by itself, the use of a control. On the question before us, we think that fact is not significant. It is well within ordinary skill of the art to use a control.”
Lol, in that case fact was not significant. I’m rofling some mao over here.
As the final word on the matter, this change was a change to “patent examining policy” which, at least in the past, I have seen time and time again be used by the courts as a justification for holding for the office. I have yet to see a change to “policy” be successfully challenged in a decision and I would be interested to see any cases where this has occured.
another xmainer,
We’ll have to agree to disagree. I’ve never traversed the taking of Official Notice by explaining why, or even arguing that, the facts taken notice of are not well known. I’ve always simply requested the requisite documentary evidence from the examiner. I’ve never had an examiner declare such a “challenge” to be “inadequte.”
I went back and looked at the memo from February, 2002 that Mr. Kunin issued regarding Official Notice. For the requirement that “[t]o adequately traverse such a finding, an applicant mus specifically point out the supposed errors in the examiner’s action, which would include stating why the noticed fact is considered to be common knowledge or well-known in the art.” For support, Mr. Kunin cited Rule 111(b) and Chevenard. Neither the rule nor that case require applicant to state why the noticed fact is not considered to be common knowledge or well-known in the art. Mr. Kunin simply made that up.
“But the law == the law that we all agree on — requires that the trier of fact focus on the invention as CLAIMED.”
I don’t agree with that. I suspect that many others don’t agree as well.
another xmainer,
We’ll have to agree to disagree. I’ve never traversed the taking of Official Notice by explaining why, or even arguing that, the facts taken notice of are not well known. I’ve always simply requested the requisite documentary evidence from the examiner. I’ve never had an examiner declare such a “challenge” to be “inadequte.”
I went back and looked at the memo from February, 2002 that Mr. Kunin issued regarding Official Notice. For the requirement that “[t]o adequately traverse such a finding, an applicant mus specifically point out the supposed errors in the examiner’s action, which would include stating why the noticed fact is considered to be common knowledge or well-known in the art.” For support, Mr. Kunin cited Rule 111(b) and Chevenard. Neither the rule nor that case require applicant to state why the noticed fact is not considered to be common knowledge or well-known in the art. Mr. Kunin simply made that up.
“But the law == the law that we all agree on — requires that the trier of fact focus on the invention as CLAIMED.”
I don’t agree with that. I suspect that many others don’t agree as well.
Mr Gur, not sure whether it’s my gob that has to be smacked but I will comment anyway on your “gobsmacked” point. A stunning “technical effect” is great evidence of non-obviousness in Europe, but only when the effect is the consequence of the technical features that characterize the claimed subject matter relative to the prior art starting point. Just as diamonds look stunning in the jewellery shop, so an insect screen will likely look amazingly transparent at a stand at a trade show. But so might the prior art, if similarly set up. Think of all those Before/After advertising comparison photos, where the model wears flattering clothes, make-up and posture, but only in the “After” photo.
As to your
“reason for the obviousness test is to prevent withdrawing what is already known”
I suppose that by “withdrawing” you mean “monopolising”. Now that seems to be saying that we need obviousness because we haven’t got a novelty filter. But that’s not what you mean, is it?
“The facts about pricing are not materials ONLY to the question of if the art teaches towards or away, which was GIMF which the court said that they bore relevance to. ”
=
“The facts about pricing are not material ONLY to the question of if the art teaches towards or away, which was GIMF which the court said that they bore relevance to. ”
It’s early.
“Given the procedural posture of this case, i.e., a motion for summary judgment by the defendant, and the requirement to review the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, did the defendant raise no genuine issues of material fact? If so, why are the facts raised (including facts about pricing) not material, and/or why do they create no genuine issues?”
I have specifically stated that they did raise some GIMF’s. Problem is, not all of what they said in the analysis was correct, and they gave more GIMF’s than the party actually genuinely raised. The facts about pricing are not materials ONLY to the question of if the art teaches towards or away, which was GIMF which the court said that they bore relevance to. The facts about pricing may be material to a common sense analysis, but that’s up to whoever is doing that analysis, and they would be overwhelmed by the rest of the common sense analysis as the DC noted.
“Then why did the Adams opinion, in its non-obviousness determination, focus on arguments about practicality, safety, and operability, even though these characteristics were not explicitly claimed?”
Because SCOTUS always did use common sense analyzing? Just a guess.
@: “But its (future) applicability to cheap applications” MIGHT BE “obvious.”
– and –
@ “Pricing gets about this | | much consideration”.
Given the procedural posture of this case, i.e., a motion for summary judgment by the defendant, and the requirement to review the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, did the defendant raise no genuine issues of material fact? If so, why are the facts raised (including facts about pricing) not material, and/or why do they create no genuine issues?
@ “the law that we all agree on”:
these threads suggest we ALL agree relatively rarely. Nevertheless, did not the Supremes, via their Adams opinion, state the law of the land? Has that opinion been overruled?
@ “arguments about ‘durability’ and ‘expense’ are irrelevant as a matter of law because neither the specification nor the claims require any such advantage for the claimed screen”
Then why did the Adams opinion, in its non-obviousness determination, focus on arguments about practicality, safety, and operability, even though these characteristics were not explicitly claimed?
@ “KSR (page 12) quoting A&P (page 12) says that the reason for the obviousness test is to prevent withdrawing what is already known from skillful men. Prior to the Andersen patent application we did not have the nifty Andersen screens, ergo not obvious.”
Perhaps.
In fuller context, A&P stated: “Courts should scrutinize combination patent claims with a care proportioned to the difficulty and improbability of finding invention in an assembly of old elements. The function of a patent is to add to the sum of useful knowledge. Patents cannot be sustained when, on the contrary, their effect is to subtract from former resources freely available to skilled artisans. A patent for a combination which only unites old elements with no change in their respective functions, such as is presented here, obviously withdraws what already is known into the field of its monopoly and diminishes the resources available to skillful men. This patentee has added nothing to the total stock of knowledge, but has merely brought together segments of prior art and claims them in congregation as a monopoly.” Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U. S. 147, 152 (1950).
KSR quoted a portion of the above paragraph from A&P and added: “The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.”
Did not the Adams Court focus on predictability, as evidenced by facts relating to practicality, safety, and operability? Did not the Andersen court focus on predictability, as evidenced by facts relating to practicality, that is, facts relating to durability, required physical characteristics (e.g., transparency), and/or pricing?
How did the Andersen court err in following the law established by Adams, A&P, and KSR? How did the Andersen court err in following the the law of summary judgment?
Malcolm,
Thanks for your response.
You say that there exists a “the law we all agree on” but this is not true. For example, you do not agree with the law of design patents which you condemn at every turn.
As for patents, the meaning of “legal obviousness” has changed over the last few years, not because we are closer to some cosmic truth, but due to a public policy decision.
Again, I believe that according to “real word obviousness” in which inventors work, the Andersen screen is not obvious. The best evidence is that the one person (Scribo on November 20) we know who saw an Andersen screen was gobsmacked (that’s for you Max).
That said, my gut feeling (without having really reviewed the evidence) is that if I were a judge I would rule that the Andersen claims are obvious under the current definition of “legal obviousness”.
This does not change my belief that the current definition of “legal obviousness” does not achieve the goal of encouraging technological advancement, and it seems the court agrees with me: KSR (page 12) quoting A&P (page 12) says that the reason for the obviousness test is to prevent withdrawing what is already known from skillful men. Prior to the Andersen patent application we did not have the nifty Andersen screens, ergo not obvious.
E6K (3:53) Pella did not need to sell the Andersen screens. They could have kept on selling the old wire screens we are all quite happy with.
Also, why use PAIR? All the cool kids use the E danimal.
“6,
emphasis on “x””
So then because you can’t spell you get off the hook? I suggest dropping the last part. You know they’re watching us in real time now right? So says the POPA conspiracy theorists. Though, I wouldn’t doubt it.
Sorry I forgot about the case in this thread, I actually thought this was a different thread. In any event, yes, there’s a distinction to be made, and if you read the rest of that decision by the board you’ll find even more. In any event, prosecutors will come around shortly, as the one in that case did. Read his appeal, all the way through.
examiners are citing many more references which are not analogous these days because they are doing word searches instead of “shoe” searches.
I am talking about the official notice case JD cited, above. 09/077,337. Available on public PAIR.
6,
emphasis on “x”
What case are you talking about xaminer? You are aware that posting under a name on these boards from a PTO computer using a name indicating you are an examiner is breeching the rules o the road, right?
“Generally, can a (KSR-mandated common sensical) factual analysis of practicality not reasonably include evidence related to durability, required physical characteristics (e.g., transparency), and/or pricing?
If not, why not?”
Of course it can. Pricing gets about this | | much consideration, and that consideration is not directed to whether the prior art taught toward or away, it is directed to the overall common sense obviousness. Under a common sense analysis you can include the alignment of the stars if the analyst so choose to let you.
“As long as the claims of the patent are novel, no damage can be done to society.”
Tell that to the other manufacturer being sued for infringment of a claim that has only mickey mouse differences from the nearest prior art. Sure, taking from the public that which is theirs is no problem, right?
For a quick little story I’ll tell you about the time I had an application which claimed the basis of the art to which it pertained in the independent. Anyone of any stature in that art knew all about the founding works on which they were building. It just so happened a man came here to the office and gave a presentation on the very works which I dug up as prior art from the interwebz. In any event, after having dug down to the deps I eventually came upon some that were allowable so far as I could tell. The claims involved using some specific chemicals for a specific purpose. There were a few chemicals well known in that art that were used for the same purpose. In any event, after the long presentation I asked the guy for all the examples of chemicals which he could think of to use for that purpose. He quickly rattled off all the commonly used ones and I thanked him for his time. Many of those were not included in every publication but it would have been obvious to use all of those chemicals for this purpose for making those devices. The guy I talked to failed to mention anything about the chemicals claimed. So, failing finding anything in the art, I came to the conclusion that for once I felt 100% justified in having found the proper subject matter for, and issued a non-obvious patent. Bottom line is, novel \= non-obvious.
Disclosure doesn’t mean that you advanced anything.
SM & JD,
Not trying to restart the official notice war again, or even disagree with your interpretations, but I do not think that what JD cites is really saying what he wants it to say.
The board 1st prefaced their decision by reiterating that official notice “is limited to ‘notice of facts beyond the record which, while not generally notorious, are capable of such instantaneous and unquestionable demonstration as to defy dispute.'” They then continued by saying “the appellants responded to the examiner’s official notice argument by stating that the examiner has not supported the official notice with prior art rather than by stating that the noticed facts are not well known” and that the “the appellants’ challenge to the official notice indicates that the facts officially noticed are not capable of such instantaneous and unquestionable demonstration as to defy dispute. Consequently, the examiner’s official notice is improper.”
This last sentence, taken in context of the whole, appears to more indicate that the board was saying the “taking” of official notice was “improper” (because the items were not capable of easy demonstration) rather than supporting the position that the applicant properly challenged the taking of official notice. Maybe a fine distinction, but there does appear to be one there.
(For what it’s worth, I do agree with the board here that what the examiner took notice of was something that appears to be improper to be taking notice of. Taking official notice is supposed to be for things that are not “esoteric” and that one of ordinary skill would readily know to be true. These items do not appear to satisfy that criteria.)
The issues of “was the notice properly taken?” and “was the notice properly challenged?” are two different issues. Just like the issues of “was a prima facie case of obviousness made?” and “was that prima facie case properly rebutted?”. If the 1st one fails, the 2nd question is never addressed. Here, it appears that the board never got by the 1st question, so they did not need to address the question of “did the appellant properly challenge the taking of official notice”.
“As long as the claims of the patent are novel, no damage can be done to society.”
Mr Gur, you cannot be serious. Pro-patent is all very well, but that’s just weird. Oh, but just a minute, I think I’ve rumbled you. You’re just being provocative, right.
Erez “For an anti-patent ideologue, any see-through material with pores less than 3 mm diameter is suitable as an antifly screen and is therefore obvious to try. As a result, such people believe there is no patentable invention in the field of fly screens.”
And there we have it again: the Big Lie. Can you get your head farther down in the sand, Erez? We’re not convinced that you can.
There are undoubtedly many patentable inventions in the field of fly screens. There is possibly even a patentable invention lurking in the specification of the patent at issue in this case.
But the law == the law that we all agree on — requires that the trier of fact focus on the invention as CLAIMED. And the claimed invention is obvious. The arguments about “durability” and “expense” are irrelevant as a matter of law because neither the specification nor the claims require any such advantage for the claimed screen. On the contrary, the specification quite plainly contemplates using the insect screen in areas where durability is not an issue. Because any obvious embodiment falling within the claims renders the claims obvious, then the obviousness of creating an expensive, see-through but not particularly durable fly screen using elements in the prior art is easily established. There are no relevant secondary considerations.
“there is an uncomfortable feeling that Pella suddenly had an urge to produce screens using the Andersen technology only after Andersen proved how great these screens were.”
So what? It’s just too bad that Anderson didn’t hire a better patent attorney to protect their alleged invention.
Bubba, less than “great minds differ” the differences in opinion are ideological.
For inventors, “obviousness” is a factual question: would the guy sitting at the bench come up a given solution.
Since there is no test for real obviousness, “obviousness” in the patent world is based on vague legal definitions based on various fallacies, e.g., Inventors are aware of and understand the significance of all publications in existence.
People who are anti-patent, for example because they believe patents retard technology, are ideologically or financially committed to see everything that is not novel as obvious.
People who are pro-patent, for example because they believe patents advance technology, are ideologically or financially committed to see everything that is not novel as not obvious.
The case of the screen door is a good example.
For an anti-patent ideologue, any see-through material with pores less than 3 mm diameter is suitable as an antifly screen and is therefore obvious to try. As a result, such people believe there is no patentable invention in the field of fly screens.
For a pro-patent ideologue, any antifly screen made of a material not already used is not obvious, because if it was obvious it would already exist.
I personally tend to be pro-patent because that is the result I want to achieve.
Since bringing an idea to market is much more than just writing a patent application, it should be relatively easy to receive a patent to allow an innovator (even of a fly screen) to develop his or her idea.
As long as the claims of the patent are novel, no damage can be done to society.
In this context, there is an uncomfortable feeling that Pella suddenly had an urge to produce screens using the Andersen technology only after Andersen proved how great these screens were. Why didn’t Pella continue the old screens they were making before?
Bubba my problem is with the line “It it’s expensive, then it ain’t obvious”. Imagine any new polymeric material coming on the market. At first it’s going to be expensive. But its (future) applicability to cheap applications might me immediately…wait for it…obvious.
It is a given that “known disadvantages in old devices which would naturally discourage the search for new inventions may be taken into account in determining obviousness”. United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 52 (1966). Adams elaborates that known disadvantages can discourage a person reasonably skilled in the prior art from investigating a combination of well known elements, and can include disadvantages relating to practicality, safety, and/or operability. Id. at 50-52.
Generally, can a (KSR-mandated common sensical) factual analysis of practicality not reasonably include evidence related to durability, required physical characteristics (e.g., transparency), and/or pricing?
If not, why not?
If so, is not most of this thread simply a “great minds can differ” situation, where some, like the district court, have “found that the teaching toward evidence outweighed the teaching-away evidence”, and some, like the Federal Circuit panel, the contrary?
Um no, I was referring to the fact that they got it wrong on some points and that not being a big deal since they got it right on some other points. This being because the decision to send it back to the lower court will not be changed.
That doesn’t excuse them getting it wrong in part of their analysis. Funniest part about it is that they start off on the points they get wrong so well how they manage to go horribly awry I can’t figure out.
“In any event, it is hardly a huge deal.”
Another way that 6 says “OK, you got me, I was wrong again”.
Thank you for the help, John Darling.
“”This is not to say that one who merely finds new uses for old inventions by shutting his eyes to their prior disadvantages thereby discovers a patentable innovation. We do say, however, that known disadvantages in old devices which would naturally discourage the search for new inventions may be taken into account in determining obviousness.””
Again, that is a reason not to combine. That might be considered under the OBVIOUSNESS determination, which as we all know now involves a bunch of mess and common sense. Of course you must consider the reasons not to combine in determining if the combination was obvious, but the determination of whether common sense etc. leads towards obviousness and “[W]hether [the prior art] teaches toward or away from the claimed invention [[which is]] also is a determination of fact.” are two separate things. They are two separate factors to consider in the overall consideration of obviousness. In fact, “[W]hether [the prior art] teaches toward or away from the claimed invention [[which is]] also is a determination of fact.” is under the part of the analysis of what the scope and content of the prior art is, just as the CAFC noted.
In any event, it is hardly a huge deal.
Besides being an inventor, I happen to be a 35 year house carpenter. Anderson and Pella both make the best windows in the U.S.-hands down- I have a number of both brands in my contemporary A-frame. The next sunny day, I’m going to put both screens up to the sunlite and see what all the hoopla is about. Not today though-blowinga$$ snow and colder than a witch’s tattoo out there. Got my patent and the biggest tool builder in the U.S. is currently evaluatiog for licensing. Time to put some more firewood in the woodstove.
“A helpful insight into the CAFC’s error is right here.
“Recognizing that the Supreme Court in KSR cautioned us to not be too rigid in applying the TSM test, we may still consider evidence of teachings to combine (and, presumably, not to combine) because, according to the Supreme Court, they “capture[ ] a helpful insight” into the obviousness inquiry.”
The “presumably not to combine” part is completely made up off the cuff and for no reason. The part about cost is a reason not to combine but it is not a teaching away, and those are the things which need to be considered in determining See Para-Ordnance Mfg., Inc. v. SGS Imps. Int’l, Inc., 73 F.3d 1085, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[W]hether [the prior art] teaches toward or away from the claimed invention [[which is]] also is a determination of fact.”). And that is at least one place where this analysis goes all to heck.
Anyway, back to my smacking down such ridiculousness irl.
Posted by: 6 | Nov 20, 2008 at 03:14 PM”
With all due respect, didn’t SCOTUS recognize the legitimacy of consideration of evidence of teachings NOT to combine in United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966), decided the same day as its more famous counterpart, Graham, 383 U.S. 1? Look especially at the discussion at 383 U.S. 351-52, and the following quote:
“This is not to say that one who merely finds new uses for old inventions by shutting his eyes to their prior disadvantages thereby discovers a patentable innovation. We do say, however, that known disadvantages in old devices which would naturally discourage the search for new inventions may be taken into account in determining obviousness.”
Id. at 352.
Thanks for that, Mr Darling. Good to know you’re doing OK at the EPO. In that case, you will already know about “obvious for what”. See in particular Agrevo T_0939/92, downloadable from the EPO website under Caselaw of the Boards of Appeal. To find the “what” out, I just need the app as filed and the “D1” prior art “starting point” reference. But to opine on the obviousness of the claim here in suit, I would want to assimilate first all the evidence. In the present case as I understand it, the technical field is insect screen mesh and so the PSA D1 would be the most promising springboard from which to start out, on the date of the claim, with no hindsight knowledge of the claimed solution, on the quest for the performance enhancement (greater transparency, wasn’t it?) taught by the app as filed. If the D1 screen is somewhat opaque, what mods would the PHOSITA have made to D1 to make it more transparent? (OR: if the app says, ours is more robust, what was the state of the art back then telling PHOSITA would make the known screen robuster.) It is not that PSA eliminates the need for evidence, or even reduces the volume of evidence. It is just that it defines a framework in which the obviousness argument shall proceed in efficient, scientific and seemly fashion. Queensbury Rules produces a result, every time. Frankly, the EPO usually sees through such parameter claims. My suspicion is that this one would never have got to grant in the EPO. Remember what happened in the EPO to the Teleflex app in KSR. First EPO action issued, and we never again heard from the Applicant. End of story.
SM,
See the paragraph briding pages 7-8 in the November 29, 2005 BPAI decision in U.S. Application 09/077,337.
Max,
I wasn’t asking for your analysis of this particular case. But as you’ve indicated that answering the question “obvious for what?” requires reviewing all the evidence adduced, that’s all I need to know. I’m still not sure how that differs all that much from our obviousness analysis, but I have found EPO examiners much more willing to consider evidence/arguments of non-obviousness than USPTO examiners.
Of course I’m interested in PSA. I have plenty of cases pending in the EPO.
Mr Darling I realise you are waiting for an exposition on how EPO PSA would be applied to this case. I am sorry to disappoint you. To do that would involve my first reading the app, the relevant art and all the evidence adduced, thoroughly enough to see off any criticisms you come back with, when I publish. You’re not paying for my time and, frankly, I have more rewarding things to do today. Anyway, out of all the readers of this blog, it’s only you who cares about PSA, isn’t it?
John Darling; could I trouble you to provide again the BPAI “traversal of Office Notice” decision you reference above.
I dealing w/such in a current appeal.
Thank you.
“…while doing my best not to contribute to the shxtpile of worthless words on paper.”
Sorry Malcolm, you fail. No breadcrumbs for you.
pds:
How can a PHOSITA ask himself/herself whether a secondary reference’s mesh C would be expensive to cover an opening A of a door B in the primary reference without contemplating the secondary reference’s mesh C covering the opening A of the door B in the primary reference?
How can a PHOSITA ask himself/herself whether a secondary reference’s mesh C would be durabble enough to cover an opening A of a door B in the primary reference without contemplating the secondary reference’s mesh C covering the opening A of the door B in the primary reference?
Now, if there was reason to believe that covering an opening with mesh was somehow an unpredictable art (and thus you could contemplate it without knowing whether it would work), maybe you’d have something, as I conceded above.
“What is it that you do exactly?”
I collect paychecks and watch the economy implode while doing my best not to contribute to the shxtpile of worthless words on paper.
“A distinction without a difference.”
Actually, pds, that “distinction without a difference” is what this pointless argument between you, JD and e6K is all about. JD got loose with his language, he got his chops busted, and now you struggle to prop him up. To what end?
Cracks me up that you three seem to love wrestling with each other over such pointless garbage. Let me know when you need more vegetable oil.
“A distinction without a difference.
Moreover, you haven’t explained why this distinction makes any difference in your arguments.”
pds, you’re wasting your time. I cited 6k a BPAI decision that completely blew away his whole “adequate traversal of Official Notice” nonsense and he came back and said, “Well, the Board said it wasn’t the applicant’s challenge that was adequate, it was the act of challenging that was adequate.”
LOL
“The pro-patent peddlers always love to stick their heads in the sand and act dumb as rocks. Why? Because that is what they do for a living”
Malcolm, can you tell us what you do for a living. Seriously. Do you represent accused infringers? Do you prosecute patent applications? Do you represent patentees in asserting their patents? What is it that you do exactly?
“And notice here that even after all this there is no statement in the MPEP about considering the ‘subject matter of the prior art as a whole’, there is a statement about considering the ‘prior art as a whole, i.e. including statements that teach away’.”
A distinction without a difference.
Moreover, you haven’t explained why this distinction makes any difference in your arguments.
As for your “teaching away,” let me repeat (yet again), my comments to you were not directed to you “teaching away” arguments but as to your “as a whole” comments.
“this MUST be the result of either gross incompetence or intellectual dishonesty. Which is it, Malcolm?”
It’s neither. Incompetent blog commenting? LOL. Nice attempt at distraction, though.
Maybe you can try dealing with those very unfortunate facts that (1) I predicted in my first comment and (2) eventually retrieved from the patent to put to bed any notion that baloney like “expensive” or “durability” was a relevant consideration in this case.
The pro-patent peddlers always love to stick their heads in the sand and act dumb as rocks. Why? Because that is what they do for a living: they act like they have no idea what patent law is or what the claim actually says. They pretend they are patenting something in the specification with all kinds of “properties” and “advantages” that are not inherent to the actual claim at issue but are inherent only to some preferred embodiment (or none at all).
It is dishonest but dishonesty is a way of life for many lawyers (or agents in the case of patent prosecution where one does not even need to pretend be a lawyer to engage in wordplay for the purpose of defrauding the public).
“…the court states unequivocally that the patentee’s evidence and arguments, including the pricing of the TWP prior art mesh, created a genuine issue of material fact.”
BTW, the court states that the evidence and arguments creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the prior art teaches away from the claimed invention.
Again, page 11, first full paragraph, second sentence.
“The ‘presumably not to combine’ part is completely made up off the cuff and for no reason.”
Uh, no. This is simply what many of us familiar with logic call a corollary. If the court is required to consider evidence that tends to show it would have been obvious to combine, the corollary is that they are also required to consider evidence that tends to show that it would not have been obvious to combine.
Simple logic. Amazing how it manages to escape so many.
“…the court states unequivocally that the patentee’s evidence and arguments, including the pricing of the TWP prior art mesh, created a genuine issue of material fact.”
BTW, the court states that the evidence and arguments creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the prior art teaches away from the claimed invention.
Again, page 11, first full paragraph, second sentence.
“The ‘presumably not to combine’ part is completely made up off the cuff and for no reason.”
Uh, no. This is simply what many of us familiar with logic call a corollary. If the court is required to consider evidence that tends to show it would have been obvious to combine, the corollary is that they are also required to consider evidence that tends to show that it would not have been obvious to combine.
Simple logic. Amazing how it manages to escape so many.
“…the court states unequivocally that the patentee’s evidence and arguments, including the pricing of the TWP prior art mesh, created a genuine issue of material fact.”
BTW, the court states that the evidence and arguments creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the prior art teaches away from the claimed invention.
Again, page 11, first full paragraph, second sentence.
“The ‘presumably not to combine’ part is completely made up off the cuff and for no reason.”
Uh, no. This is simply what many of us familiar with logic call a corollary. If the court is required to consider evidence that tends to show it would have been obvious to combine, the corollary is that they are also required to consider evidence that tends to show that it would not have been obvious to combine.
Simple logic. Amazing how it manages to escape so many.
“…the court states unequivocally that the patentee’s evidence and arguments, including the pricing of the TWP prior art mesh, created a genuine issue of material fact.”
BTW, the court states that the evidence and arguments creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the prior art teaches away from the claimed invention.
Again, page 11, first full paragraph, second sentence.
“The ‘presumably not to combine’ part is completely made up off the cuff and for no reason.”
Uh, no. This is simply what many of us familiar with logic call a corollary. If the court is required to consider evidence that tends to show it would have been obvious to combine, the corollary is that they are also required to consider evidence that tends to show that it would not have been obvious to combine.
Simple logic. Amazing how it manages to escape so many.
“The only thing that must be considered if a fact is brought up and argued to be material, and is also argued to weigh in one direction or another, is first whether or not the fact is indeed material. And the judge must decide if the fact is material or not. And in this case iirc it seems he already did, and it was not.”
Unfortunately, you recall incorrectly. As I advised you before, you may want to actually read the decision. For example, in the second sentence of the first full paragraph of page 11, the court states unequivocally that the patentee’s evidence and arguments, including the pricing of the TWP prior art mesh, created a genuine issue of material fact.
BTW, as I clearly stated, the determination of obviousness requires the consideration of the subject matter as a whole, i.e. consideration of 1) the subject matter sought to be patented, 2) the (pertinent) prior art, 3) the differences between the two, and 4) any secondary considerations.
“Welcome to the wonderful world of reading comprehension. Hope you enjoy your stay.”
I’m enjoying my stay tremendously. You know what the best part of my stay is? You’re not here.
A helpful insight into the CAFC’s error is right here.
“Recognizing that the Supreme Court in KSR cautioned us to not be too rigid in applying the TSM test, we may still consider evidence of teachings to combine (and, presumably, not to combine) because, according to the Supreme Court, they “capture[ ] a helpful insight” into the obviousness inquiry.”
The “presumably not to combine” part is completely made up off the cuff and for no reason. The part about cost is a reason not to combine but it is not a teaching away, and those are the things which need to be considered in determining See Para-Ordnance Mfg., Inc. v. SGS Imps. Int’l, Inc., 73 F.3d 1085, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[W]hether [the prior art] teaches toward or away from the claimed invention [[which is]] also is a determination of fact.”). And that is at least one place where this analysis goes all to heck.
Anyway, back to my smacking down such ridiculousness irl.
“‘The insect screening of the invention can be used in the manufacture of original
screens and can be used in … ***many other structures where screening is used***’
Do you understand what an admission is? Do you understand that the claims aren’t limited to a “durable” or “cheap” insect screen? Do you understand that the specification expressly states that the insect screen includes a screen that does not need to be durable or cheap?”
Perhaps I’m clueless, but the relevant question is whether it would have been obvious to use the “prior art” electromagnetic screen as an insect screen. Not whether it would have been obvious to use the invention as something else. This supposed “admission” doesn’t admit anything.
“I hope you do. Because if you don’t understand that, you are either clueless or dishonest. I’ll let you pick.”
Didn’t Big Guy challenge you above regarding honesty/competence? I don’t think you’ve answered his question.
“The consideration of the subject matter as a whole, however, requires it to be considered as probative of non-obviousness if [one side brings it up and argues it weighs one way or another]”
Hardly. The only thing that must be considered if a fact is brought up and argued to be material, and is also argued to weigh in one direction or another, is first whether or not the fact is indeed material. And the judge must decide if the fact is material or not. And in this case iirc it seems he already did, and it was not. And he was right. Your arguing that the fact that the sky is blue is relevant to our case about bicycles doesn’t make your fact material just because you brought it up and argued that it weighed in one direction or another JD. Welcome to the wonderful world of reading comprehension. Hope you enjoy your stay.
Also, to reiterate the above, there is no mandated “consideration of the subject matter as a whole” there is only mandated “consideration of the subject matter of the claims as a whole” and mandated (by caselaw) “consideration of the prior art (not the subject matter of the prior art) as a whole”.
All that said, there were other issues of material fact which technically should have been addressed by a trial so yes, it was proper to remand. But the grounds on which the remand was based included many improper portions.
“However, my comments weren’t about “teaching away,” but about your assertion regarding the “as a whole” concept (i.e., you wrote: “[t]he requirement to consider the subject matter as a whole is referring to the subject matter in the claim. Not the ‘subject matter’ of the references.)”
Your response is that I was wrong, and I say I was right, and still am. I already said that there is a requirement FROM CASELAW NOT from the LAW that supported JD’s position. However, I did have my examples of the caselaw wrong, as I specifically noted I might. But here is where the requirement comes from straight out of your MPEP citation:
“A prior art reference (NOTE HERE THERE IS NO SUCH ANIMAL AS “THE SUBJECT MATTER OF A PRIOR ART REFERENCE) must be considered in its entirety, i.e., as a whole, including portions that would lead away from the claimed invention. W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 220 USPQ 303 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984)”
In any event, as I have said from the beginning, there is no requirement to review the SUBJECT MATTER of the PRIOR ART as a whole. This being because 1. there is no such monster as “the subject matter of the prior art”, there is only “the prior art”. This has zero relevance to the discussion on whether or not the prior art must be reviewed a a whole.
So, I then bring up that JD’s position is supported by caselaw, IF we consider his calling prior art “the subject matter of the prior art”.
“I understand why you make the argument that it [the prior art as a whole] should be included in the analysis, but it isn’t in the patent laws, plain and simple. I do seem to recall some cases where they mentioned that a combination must have been obvious to have made in order for it to be considered prior a valid combination for the purpose of rendering a claim obvious. I could be mistaken on that last point however.”
And as I’ve noted already, I was wrong about the specifics of the caselaw, but there is no requirement in the actual law.
And notice here that even after all this there is no statement in the MPEP about considering the “subject matter of the prior art as a whole”, there is a statement about considering the “prior art as a whole, i.e. including statements that teach away”. The reason this is important in this case is that the cost of the screen, as already mentioned many times here, is not a “teaching away” a mere mention of factors that might lead to one embodiment not being optimal compared to another embodiment is not teaching away, it is simply information. And it is not information that is relevant to the obviousness determination under TSM, since motivations, short of actual teaching away, to not use something are not relevant, what are relevant are motivations to use something. It might would be relevant under KSR’s common sense approach if we were discussing if it would be or would not be obvious to make an insect net manufacturing line from the combination. However, we are not discussing making a manufacturing line, we are discussing making the combination itself. And as already posted here, making a simple combination is not impacted by cost considerations until after you have already concieved of the idea to combine and figured out it would work and have made the combination, though you may not have decided if it was worth making products from.
If there is any remaining ambiguity, I’m sorry, that’s the best I can try to do to explain it to you. And it seems that short of calling you and discussing it in your language you’re not going to get it if you don’t get it from the above.
“My response to you was … you are WRONG — considering the subject matter as a whole also includes the subjct matter of the reference”
And there again, you use the terms wrong. You say considering “the subject matter as a whole”. There is no requirement, ANYWHERE to consider “the subject matter as a whole”. There is a requirement to consider ONLY “the subject matter of the claims as a whole” which is quite different from “the subject matter as a whole”. AND there is a requirement to consider the prior art as a whole, NOT to consider the “subject matter” of the prior art as a whole.
The fallacious use of the terms in your sentence is relevant because if we actually had to consider the subject matter of the whole case, claims, prior art, and etc. as a whole, the considerations like cost and etc. would need to be evaluated, not necessarily as teaching away, but would just need to be factored in to an obviousness determination, and they most certainly do not.
To use your example, a .5lb bowl shaped anvil that costs ten million dollars can be used as a hat, and it is obvious to do so if there is a reference teaching .5lb bowl shaped anvils that cost ten million dollars and another reference that teaches using anvils as hats. The cost involved doesn’t detract from the want to use a bowl shape to help the anvil stay on ones head. Thus, all prior art elements are there, and there is a motivation to combine, reasonable expectation etc. That is all which is required. End of analysis. There is no requirement to factor in the 10 million.
“However, in actuality, the vast majorities of examiners, once establishing a prima facie case of obviousness believe that no additional analysis need be made and ignore applicant’s rebuttal.”
It may appear that way from the outside, but in reality we discuss these things quite often and at great length. Often however, I do find the attitude amongst primaries is to not put any of this discussion on paper, because if you do then you might lessen your chances at the board. It’s the same as you not saying certain things for the record so that you don’t hurt your clients case PDS, just in reverse. If you don’t like it, then start being open and honest about the fact that 99% of the combinations made will involve all old parts/methods and are mere combinations and tell us this up front so that we can determine if there was a motivation to combine. I’m sure your case will get taken care of much faster that way, and they may even take into consideration your secondary factors more often and etc. If you don’t want to do those types of things, then live and let live, we have an adversarial proceeding taking place, because of your decision.
I’m going to put it right under your noses again, my patent peddling friends:
“The insect screening of the invention can be used in the manufacture of original
screens and can be used in … ***many other structures where screening is used***”
Do you understand what an admission is? Do you understand that the claims aren’t limited to a “durable” or “cheap” insect screen? Do you understand that the specification expressly states that the insect screen includes a screen that does not need to be durable or cheap?
I hope you do. Because if you don’t understand that, you are either clueless or dishonest. I’ll let you pick.
My work is done here. I’m sure the district court judge’s clerk will understand even if you don’t.
“there aren’t any facts to suggest that one of ordinary skill, after recognizing that the mesh could be combined with an opening, would not also recognize that the mesh could function as a fly screen.”
The standard is “WOULD have been obvious,” not “COULD have been obvious.”
We could blast the Empire State Building into space with sufficient rockets.
A house could be built out of gold.
Pigs could fly by a number of various means.
MM could practice intellectual honesty.
6K could write a cogent sentence.
Any number of things could be possible, and one having ordinary skill in the art would recognize the possibility of these things.
However, before you get to ask the question of “could C be combined with door AB,” you must first explain why one having ordinary skill in the art would even ask the question.
A likely question one having ordinary skill in the art would ask beforehand is what are candidates of materials that could be used for AB? It is with that question and for reasons already discussed (i.e., cost, durability, etc.) that one having ordinary skill in the art would likely reject C before even considering whether “could C be combined with door AB?”
This is the “as a whole” analysis that was discussed above. One needs to look at the all the teachings of the applied prior art and not selectively cull from the prior art those teachings that support obviousness while ignoring those that support nonobviousness.
The totality of the record must be considered when determining whether a claimed invention would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made. Therefore, evidence and arguments directed to advantages not disclosed in the specification cannot be disregarded. In re Chu, 66 F.3d 292, 298-99, 36 USPQ2d 1089, 1094-95 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Although the purported advantage of placement of a selective catalytic reduction catalyst in the bag retainer of an apparatus for controlling emissions was not disclosed in the specification, evidence and arguments rebutting the conclusion that such placement was a matter of “design choice” should have been considered as part of the totality of the record. “We have found no cases supporting the position that a patent applicant’s evidence or arguments traversing a § 103 rejection must be contained within the specification. There is no logical support for such a proposition as well, given that obviousness is determined by the totality of the record including, in some instances most significantly, the evidence and arguments proffered during the give-and-take of ex parte patent prosecution.” 66 F.3d at 299, 36 USPQ2d at 1095.). See also In re Zenitz, 333 F.2d 924, 928, 142 USPQ 158, 161 (CCPA 1964) (evidence that claimed compound minimized side effects of hypotensive activity must be considered because this undisclosed property would inherently flow from disclosed use as tranquilizer); Ex parte Sasajima, 212 USPQ 103, 104 – 05 (Bd. App. 1981) (evidence relating to initially undisclosed relative toxicity of claimed pharmaceutical compound must be considered).
The specification need not disclose proportions or values as critical for applicants to present evidence showing the proportions or values to be critical. In re Saunders, 444 F.2d 599, 607, 170 USPQ 213, 220 (CCPA 1971).
“Interesting but not unsurprising fact: none of the terms “durable,” “resistant,” “inexpensive,” “cost,” or “price” appear anywhere in the patent.”
You keep forgetting that SCOTUS, within KSR, absolutely LOOOOOVE the use of “common sense.”
Common sense says that if you are going to build an insect screening door it should be durable, resistant, and inexpensive. BTW — if it is going to be exposed to insects — odds are that it will be exposed to the elements as well.
You simply cannot put “common sense” on a pedestal when it works in the favor of a conclusion of obviousness and hide “common sense” in the backroom when it doesn’t favor a conclusion of obviousness.
Interesting but not unsurprising fact: none of the terms “durable,” “resistant,” “inexpensive,” “cost,” or “price” appear anywhere in the patent.
Where did the lawyers for the patentee come up with all that stuff? Answer: they pulled it out of their butts.
Here’s a phrase that does appear in the patent: “The insect screening of the invention can be used in the manufacture of original
screens and can be used in … ***many other structures where screening is used***.”
Of course, “many other structures” includes structures where bogus ad hoc considerations like “durability” are irrelevant.
This is the end of the analysis. If you don’t understand why, you are clueless or a liar. Go ahead. Embrass yourself. I mean, the attorneys for the patentee weren’t afraid to embarass themselves. Then again, they got paid to kick up dust and find experts to offer irrelevant testimony.
This case sickens me.
correction: there aren’t any facts to suggest that one of ordinary skill, after recognizing that the mesh could be combined with an opening, would not also recognize that the mesh could function as a fly screen.
pds:
The “one” is one of ordinary skill in the art, not Neo or Obama.
“what if nobody recognize that C could be added to AB?”
— that’s different. Here, there aren’t any facts to suggest that one of ordinary skill, after recognizing that the mesh could be combined with an opening, would not function as a fly screen.
If one of ordinary skill finds that it would be obvious to use the mesh to function for some purpose (i.e., a fly screen), it’s obvious. Regardless of whether one of ordinary skill would instantaneously recognize that the mesh would be too expensive to allow one to make money. Obvious, profitable concepts are a subset of obvious concepts as a whole.
Since durability and price are not claimed, the patentee would be free to assert its claims against all competitors regardless of durability and price. Thus, it doesn’t make sense to (ahem)screen the prior art on the basis of durability and price.
“According to Andersen, the delicacy of the TWP mesh, its need for special care, and its vulnerability to damage upon contact could discourage an insect screen designer from using it.”
Do the claims require that the insect screen be placed in a weather-exposed area children are playing?
No, they don’t. Here’s an exemplary claim:
“An insect screening material in a frame removably attached to a fenestration unit that permits ventilation therethrough and having reduced visibility, comprising a plurality of screen elements having a diameter of 0.007 inch or less, the screen elements having a tensile strength greater than 5500 psi, wherein the screening has a transmittance of light of at least 0.75 and a reflectance of light of .04 or less.”
All this baloney is just wanking over what an insect screen “has to be”. But it’s just that: wanking. Bogus. Lies.
“…you don’t know whether something is factually ‘obvious’ till you have specified ‘obvious for what?’.”
Max, under PSA, would it have been obvious to use the prior art mesh as an insect screen?
Please also explain how you arrive at the answer. In other words, how do you determine that it would, or would not, have been obvious to use the prior art mesh as an insect screen if you do not take account of considerations such as the need for durability and low price?
Or is the answer simply that the prior art mesh COULD be used as an insect screen?
And if that’s the answer, how do you deal with evidence to the contrary, i.e. evidence (or arguments) introduced by the applicant that the prior art mesh COULD NOT be used as an insect screen?
As you remind us, pds, this is a Summary Judgement case, with all that that implies. All the same, your comments and those of others create another great thread for revealing how superior is the EPO Problem and Solution Approach to obviousness (Boring, boring, I hear you all cry, but I will continue, nevertheless). That’s because PSA works by ascribing some “specific technical purpose” to the notional PHOSITA notionally contemplating the State of the Art without benefit of hindsight.Just as you can’t tell whether a trademark is “descriptive” till you know the goods, so you don’t know whether something is factually “obvious” till you have specified “obvious for what?”. And the “for what” emerges (inevitably, ie there’s nothing you can do, after filing your app, to stop it) from the app as filed, which was written before the date of the claim. Some day, the whole world will use PSA, and wonder how they ever managed without it.
“You can have a claim that recites ABC … the question is whether the mesh C could be added to a generic door AB. If one recognized that it could be done, the analysis is over.”
You need to tighten up your analysis. You write “[i]f one recognized that it could be done,” but who do you refer to? I.e., which “one” are you referring to?
Ultimately, the inventor recognized that it could be done. However, that isn’t particularly relevant to patenability.
If the evidence shows that, prior to the invention, someone else recognized that C could be used for door AB or even door GH, then you have the basis for a successfuly obviousness analysis.
However, what if nobody recognize that C could be added to AB? Then we are left with are artificial construct of “one havng ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” Certainly, one “could” use this screen material, chickwire, or rebar for the mesh material. However, that is only one side of the equation. The second side requires us to consider why one wouldn’t use these materals for the mesh of the screen door.
To establish a prima facie case of obviousness, the examiner can certainly make a finding that C could be used with AB. Once a prima face case had been made, this would pass the burden to applicant of rebutting the examiner’s findings. For example, applicant could present evidence that use of these materials would not be desirable for various reasons (e.g., cost, not suitable for the purpose of an insect barrier, etc.)
In “theory,” the examiner would weigh the evidence and come to a conclusion of obviousness. However, in actuality, the vast majorities of examiners, once establishing a prima facie case of obviousness believe that no additional analysis need be made and ignore applicant’s rebuttal.
“Before you can conclude not to use the prior art mesh because it’s too expensive to be used as a window screen, you’ve already recognized that it could be used as a window screen.”
A 500lb anvil could be used as a hat (i.e., it will protect your head from the elements (e.g., rain, sun, wind). However, it’s use as a hat would not necessarily be obvious.
Turning to the case at hand, the following was written:
Andersen submitted evidence that durability is a desirable characteristic of insect screens because they experience wear and tear from exposure to daily weather conditions and interactions with humans and pets. Appellant’s Br. at 36-37. In that regard, the TWP website called the electromagnetic-shielding mesh used by Andersen the “world’s most delicate metal fabric” and specified that it requires “great care in handling.” The Sims Patent, a prior art reference also before the PTO examiner, teaches that fine mesh should only be removed from the glass panes if it will not be subject to accidental damage and contact. U.S. Patent No. 5,012,041, col.3 l.51-56 (filed Jun. 22, 1989). According to Andersen, the delicacy of the TWP mesh, its need for special care, and its vulnerability to damage upon contact could discourage an insect screen designer from using it.
===========
Thus, evidence was also produced that screen was likely to be considered, by one skilled in the art, as unsuitable for use with a screen door.
Heck … one could use chicken wire as the mesh material. However, I don’t think its use would have been obvious.
There is a distinction between “what one having ordinary skill in the art would have considered as capable of being combined” and “what one having ordinary skill in the art would consider obvious to combine.”
The ultimate determination of patentability is based on the entire record, by a preponderance of evidence, with due consideration to the persuasiveness of any arguments and any secondary evidence. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 24 USPQ2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
This means that you weigh the evidence provided for obviousness against the evidence provided for non-obviousness. The fact that the mesh had some certain desirable property is evidence of obviousness. The fact that the mesh was EXTREMELY expensive (particularly when compared to the currently-used materials) is evidence of non-obviousness.
To grant summary judgment, there must be no genuine issue of material fact to be resolved. However, since there was evidence of obviousness versus non-obviousness to be weighed, this decision was a no-brainer by the FC.
consider a person of ordinary skill in the art with an insect problem and he is stuck in the African bush with only tent poles and a huge ream of this magnetic shielding mesh. wouldn’t be obvious to use the mesh to make a tent. because it’s not FOR mosquitoes, and it might ruin his radio reception, IF he had a radio. Plus, it would be totally worth it if he didn’t ruin it so he could sell it for $75/sq ft when he gets back to civilisation.
“I am not following the jump in logic.”
What’s there not to understand? Before you can conclude not to use the prior art mesh because it’s too expensive to be used as a window screen, you’ve already recognized that it could be used as a window screen.
pds recognizes an interesting twist: one of ordinary skill in the art wouldn’t know whether it would work. we don’t have those facts articulated here. (keep in mind, of course, that one of ordinary skill need only recognize that it could work for purposes different from the purpose of the inventor)
“Also, your logic precludes the use of “teaching away” – nothing can be taught away that hasn’t been thought of – no?”
No. There are plenty of complex claims that have several elements that are spread out over several references. You can have a claim that recites ABC, a first reference that teaches AB and a second reference that teaches C and away from B. That works. In this case, the question is whether the mesh C could be added to a generic door AB. If one recognized that it could be done, the analysis is over.
6K,
Here is a great opportunity for you to suck it up and just admit how wrong you were in this particular instance, rather than to keep digging by showing lousy search skills and wildly contorted misapplied MPEP section analysis when the MPEP is plainly provided.
Malcolm,
While you may not care what people care about what you say, your eagerness to jump on 6K’s bandwagon impacts the validity readers attest to you in general and that includes those things that you are correct about. A slice of pie for you too.
I can understand why e/m screen is sold at high prices per sq ft. Its purchasers judge its performance to exacting standards, I imagine, and its per sq ft price is a trivial part of the system into which it is built. A piece of humble staple GORETEX is horrible expensive, when it is destined to be a vascular graft. But pds I don’t understand why you say it costs USD 1500 to make an insect screen having the numerical parameters of representative claim 1. After all, all it has to do is keep insects out. Now if the patent in suit were to start out from the problem that mesh is horrible expensive, and teach how to make it an order of magnitude cheaply, then the claim would be differently formulated, no?
“In determining whether the invention as a whole would have been obvious under 35 U.S.C. 103, we must first delineate the invention as a whole. In delineating the invention as a whole, we look not only to the subject matter which is literally recited in the claim in question… but also to those properties of the subject matter which are inherent in the subject matter and are disclosed in the specification. . . Just as we look to a chemical and its properties when we examine the obviousness of a composition of matter claim, it is this invention as a whole, and not some part of it, which must be obvious under 35 U.S.C. 103.” In re Antonie, 559 F.2d 618, 620, 195 USPQ 6,8 (CCPA 1977) (emphasis in original).
The price of the mesh does not have to be recited in the claim. The consideration of the subject matter as a whole, however, requires it to be considered as probative of non-obviousness if the applicant (or patentee) introduces it into the record and argues that it weighs in favor of non-obviousness.
Pretty simple. Maybe too simple for some to grasp.
6K
I can only respond to what you actually write — not what you wish you had written, but didn’t because of bad writing and/or bad grammar.
I understand that the best use of “teaching away” is an explicit teaching of “don’t use Y,” when “Y” is being claimed.
However, my comments weren’t about “teaching away,” but about your assertion regarding the “as a whole” concept (i.e., you wrote: “[t]he requirement to consider the subject matter as a whole is referring to the subject matter in the claim. Not the ‘subject matter’ of the references.)
My response to you was … you are WRONG — considering the subject matter as a whole also includes the subjct matter of the reference (i.e., “prior art reference must be considered in its entirety, i.e., as a whole”).
An issue I see all the time is where an examiner takes a isolated portion of the reference, incorporates it into the primary reference, and “voila … the claimed invention.” However, when the secondary reference, as a whole, is looked at: the obvious combination is something that isn’t close to the claimed invention or one skilled in the art would not make such a combination for various “common sense” reasons.
“Next time, read the case before you proceed to mischaracterize it.”
I’m with pds on this issue – that was a gross mischaracterization of In re Gurley. It seems to me that this MUST be the result of either gross incompetence or intellectual dishonesty. Which is it, Malcolm?
“The element of “cheapness” MUST be recited in the claims or, at the very least, be listed as a primary objective of the invention in the disclosure. A reference will teach away when it suggests that the developments flowing from its disclosures are unlikely to produce the objective of the applicant’s invention. In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994).”
Next time, read the case before you proceed to mischaracterize it. link to precydent.com
“Surely the objective can’t be universally assumed to be ‘a profitable product’ or ‘an inexpensive product.'”
Says someone who is obviously divorced from the “design incentives and other market forces” of the real world. SCOTUS, in KSR, continually harps upon “common sense.” Common sense says that one doesn’t build a $1,500+ screen door.
Then again, when dealing with 6K and MM, why would “common sense” ever have any traction?
I saw Anderson’s new window mesh at a trade event. It actually seems invisible as you look through the window and focus on objects some feet away from the outside – a real “wow” effect. If the disputed patent covers structures that achieve that effect then there is some great secondary evidence of nonobviousness available. (And, BTW, I do not represent them).
Paul, when I saw your name I was expecting to read in your contribution something about technically obvious versus commercially obvious, and the English caselaw on corkscrews. The issue is surely not whether it is obvious to bring an insect screen product to market as whether the concept defined in representative claim was obvious as such, that is, an insect screen with good resilience, good transparency and low reflectivity. Adding parameter numbers to the claim gives it a spurious patina of selection invention validity and renders it harder to knock it out on prior patent disclosures. But suppose there was no more of the proprietary insect screen in stock but plenty of the e/m screen material, and the Olympic job just had to be finished before the day the President opens the Games. Would it have been obvious to use the available e/m screen. Of course it was.
Those who practice before the EPO are well aware of the utility of field of endeavour arguments and the need to define in the specification and claims the field of endeavour in which an inventor is working and in which the technical problem underlying the invention arises. Such a practitioner might well feel motivated to support the present decision.
However, there is much to feel uneasy about in this opinion. The invention is very simple, and while the usual arguments about simple inventions apply that does not mean that a simple invention should not be held obvious when the surrounding matrix of facts requires. The commercial availability of the mesh is a “bad fact” for the patentee and an argument that a skilled person would not look at all the links on a mesh manufacturer’s website is unconvincing. The argument about price is also unconvincing – the invention might well start at the high price end and move downmarket, as has happened many times in the past. The concept of a skilled window designer who wishes to achieve better transparency, but knows nothing of optics is sufficiently bizarre to deserve highlighting – a European practitioner would say that the technical problem has moved into the optical field and therefore that an expert in optics should bercome involved as part of the team.
This may well be a case for a full trial before the district court, followed by an unequivocal determination of obviousness which on the facts so far seems the most sensible outcome notwithstanding the present decision.
Like a true poseur, Mooney is making it up as he goes along. Gurley has no specific requirement vis-a-vis the claims. A teaching away can be general or specific.
I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again, you need a clue my white wine drinking little friend.
But keep up the good work. I suppose if enough people get completely confused from listening to you, it will improve the market considerably for those of us who actually know what we’re doing.
That’s right Mooney just giving credit where it’s due. I know that is a concept(whether giving or receiving credit) that is foreign to you, with the exception that I do give you credit for being an annoying m0r0n.
BTW Mooney, what have you been doing (besides blogging all the time) now that you don’t have any real work to do?
PDS can’t read either. What you’re reminded of is getting pwnt in the face for the umpteenth time. Just keep arguing, I’ll keep charging for RCE’s from you and yours.
“nothing can be taught away that hasn’t been thought of – no? Yet, “teaching away” is used and can be effective. What I am missing?”
You are missing that “teaching away” is at its most effective when the prior art says in one reference, that must be combined with another reference: Oh for gods sake do not do what claim limitation no. 3 says it would totally ruin the process! The sliding scale of effectiveness of the teaching away argument trails off to 0 when you get to a reference that says: “Meh, it wouldn’t be good to use claim limitation 3 because it might have some small, but likely neglible negative effect.” And that’s that.
“The simple question to be answered is “would the combination be obvious to one skill in the art.”
The simple question is: at the time of filing, can a reasonable motivation to combine the elements be gathered from the prior art to make the claimed invention, and would there be a reasonable expection of success that the combination would work for its intended purpose.
The answer to both questions is yes. The fact that some expert can be found to testify “Well, it would be really expensive so we wouldn’t make a profit on it” can not be possibly sufficient to rebut a prima facie case of obviousness. Talk about impermissible hindsight! We might as well throw KSR out the window if courts allow that garbage in.
The element of “cheapness” MUST be recited in the claims or, at the very least, be listed as a primary objective of the invention in the disclosure. A reference will teach away when it suggests that the developments flowing from its disclosures are unlikely to produce the objective of the applicant’s invention. In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Surely the objective can’t be universally assumed to be “a profitable product” or “an inexpensive product.”
What remains unclear to me is how did Anderson get around the expense of TWP’s mesh and why isn’t that “solution” the non-obvious invention here instead of the frigging window. The answer, I assume, is that a claim to that solution was deemed “not valuable” or “too narrow” or maybe even (uh-oh) “unpatentable.”
Go figure.
patent drafter,
Be careful of the advice you give – the manual I had access to during my patent bar exam (2007)was NOT a pdf version. The testing center used a different version with far inferior search capability, basically rendering searching useless (no count of hits, no surrounding words and a purely sequential walk through of hits from the beginning of the manual through the end). Unfortunately, someone else gave me the same advice and I trained on being able to search any topic quickly (in PDF). When the poor man’s version was sprung – my strategy was destroyed and I missed passing by 2 points – it may as well have been by 50.
best advice I did receive was run through the practice exams. run through them some more. run through them some more. If you can get consistently in the 90’s, then you are ready.
SF,
I am not following the jump in logic.
If I understand your thinking, the following also follows:
Anything is possible, ergo, everything is obvious and nothing is patentable.
Also, your logic precludes the use of “teaching away” – nothing can be taught away that hasn’t been thought of – no? Yet, “teaching away” is used and can be effective. What I am missing?
“teach me: How can you determine that a combination is too expensive to manufacture without first recognizing that the combination could be made?”
You don’t have to ask an automobile engineer if they could make the frame of an car out of solid gold. Once it is readily apparent that the price of the proposed combination is too expensive to be worthwhile, one skilled in the art doesn’t care whether it will work or not.
Similarly, the FC relied upon a finding that the screen material cost $75 ft2. For a full-size screen door, you are probably looking at rought 20 ft2 or about $1,500 in material for just the screen door.
Current screen door materials run from around $0.25 to $2 ft2. link to popularmechanics.com
The simple question to be answered is “would the combination be obvious to one skill in the art.”
As a former engineer (although not working in the screen door art), I would feel safe in saying that if an engineer said let’s try this $75/ft2 material for out screen door, he would be laughed out of the company.
This is a problem that I see in many proposed combinations from examiners. They assert that a particular combination would be obvious when no sane person of ordinary skill in the art would ever combine the art in the manner suggested. I’ve seen combinations that would have brought Rube Golberg to tears.
The fact that a combination is feasible doesn’t make it obvious.
as we all know, the most valuable granted patents are those that _aren’t_ particularly startling for their innovation … just startling to competitors.
regarding preps for the patent bar, Mr. Bloom is correct. practice problems are what you want, along with the .pdf version of the MPEP E7R8 – since that is what you’ll get at the testing center.
get 1000 – 2000 practice problems, find the answers to all the practice problems, and you (probably) will be able to pass the patent bar first try.
this stuff ain’t rocket science.
rocket science makes sense and follows laws superior to human policy whims.
teach me: How can you determine that a combination is too expensive to manufacture without first recognizing that the combination could be made? If you recognize that it could be made (and it would work), it’s still obvious, even if you later realize that its expensive.
There’s a good reason this case is not precedential, folks.