March 2010

Students Writing About the Law

I have been continually impressed with the Harvard Journal of Law & Technology’s Digest (JOLT Digest). The Digest is written in blog format by law students and covers interesting IP and technology related cases. Recent cases of interest include Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick, No. 08–103 (U.S. Mar. 2, 2010) (copyright standing & the registration requirement); Office Depot, Inc. v. Zuccarini, Case No. 07-16788 (9th Cir., Feb. 26, 2010) (in rem jurisdiction over domain names); A comment Citizens United and its Impact on the Internet. Rather than focusing on legal decisions, the Columbia Science & Technology Law Review blog tends to consider the legal side of issues in the news as does the Fordham IP Media & Entertainment Law Blog. The Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review is one of the top IP-focused law journals. The MTTLR blog includes recent posts on cloud computing regulation, biosimilars, music licensing fees, and online dating (Stud or Dud).

Are there other good law-student run resources for keeping track of intellectual property law? [In another post I will write about IP-focused law reviews]

The Role of Claim Construction in the Obviousness Determination

Alloc, Inc. v. Pergo, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2010)(nonprecedential)

Alloc and Pergo both manufacture and sell laminate flooring. Pergo’s patents cover a mechanical joint that allows the “boards” to be joined together without the usual glue or nails. After being threatened, Alloc filed a declaratory judgment action – asking the Wisconsin-based district court to render the patents invalid, unenforceable, and not-infringed. The jury complied and held the patents invalid and not infringed. In a subsequent bench trial, the district court did not find inequitable conduct in the prosecution.

In error, the district court had submitted questions of claim construction to the jury. Claim construction has long been considered a matter of law to be decided only by a judge. On appeal, the Federal Circuit ruled that the jury-submission mistake to be a harmless error. However, the court’s six-page non-precedential opinion creates confusion in my mind. I would have preferred this decision to have been issued as an affirmance without opinion.

On appeal, the appellate court first affirmed — finding the prior art “more than sufficient to support the jury’s finding of obviousness.” Then, when addressing infringement, the appellate court recognized the claim construction error but identified that error as harmless because the claims were also obvious. My outstanding concern is the appellate court’s implicit holding that errors in claim construction do not affect the obviousness determination. That holding is not correct or consistent with the current notion that the obviousness question should focus on the invention as claimed.

It may be relevant to note that the appellate opinion was written by Judge Virginia Kendall sitting by designation from the Northern District of Illinois. Judges Lourie and Dyk joined the opinion. It is probably best to identify this decision as non-precedential and then walk away.

First to Disclose: A Caveat to the Patent Reform Act of 2010

David French has been writing about the proposed change to a first-to-file system in the Patent Reform Act of 2010. Mr. French was closely involved with Canada’s 1989 switch to a first-to-file system.

Rather than moving to an absolute novelty system, the proposal calls for a limited grace period for “disclosures made one year or less before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.” To qualify for the grace period, the disclosures must either (A) come from the inventor(s), either directly or indirectly or (B) disclose subject matter that had already been publicly disclosed by the inventor(s), either directly or indirectly.

Section 102(b) EXCEPTIONS:

DISCLOSURES MADE 1 YEAR OR LESS BEFORE THE EFFECTIVE FILING DATE OF THE CLAIMED INVENTION

A disclosure made one year or less before the effective filing date of the claimed invention shall not be prior art to the claimed invention under subsection(a)(1) if

(A) the disclosure was made by the inventor or joint inventor or by another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor; or

(B) the subject matter had, before such disclosure, been publicly disclosed by the inventor or a joint inventor or others who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor.

In a limited sense, this rule promotes pre-filing disclosure because the grace period is only available for those who publicly disclose the invention before filing. I am confident that the prudent approach will usually be to file the patent application as early as possible.

It is unclear to me how the provision would operate during a nonobviousness determination. I.e., what if the inventor disclosed INV-A; then a few months later someone else disclosed INV-B; and then the inventor filed on INV-A? Would the grace period apply to “knock-out” the INV-B disclosure as prior art?

I would personally prefer the addition of a caveat (C) to the grace period that “the subject matter had been previously invented by the inventor or a joint inventor.”

Patent Reform Act of 2010: An Overview

The Senate has revived interest in the patent reform act with a substitute bill entitled the “Patent Reform Act of 2010.” The new bill is very similar to its predecessor, the Patent Reform Act of 2009.

First-To-File: The proposed reform would largely eliminate US’s unique first-to-invent priority system. The bigger deal is that the proposal would eliminate the one-year grace period unless the inventor was the “first-discloser.” A “derivation” proceeding would replace interferences.

False Marking: The proposed reform would eliminate the right of “any person” to file a false marking claim. Rather, those claims would be limited to individuals who have “suffered a competitive injury.” This change would apply to eliminate standing of already-filed cases.

Damages: The damages revision is no longer as major. Under the proposed revision, a court would be required to “identify the methodologies and factors that are relevant to the determination of damages, and the court or jury, shall consider only those methodologies and factors relevant to making such determination.” The parties would also be required to “state, in writing and with particularity, the methodologies and factors the parties propose for instruction to the jury in determining damages … specifying the relevant underlying legal and factual bases for their assertions.” The provision would also provide a right for summary judgment on damages if one party’s contentions lack evidentiary basis and only the approved-of methodologies would be allowed in court. It is already the law that the jury may only consider relevant information – this approach looks to primarily create a greater likelihood for appeal. The provision generally creates a better situation for accused infringers, but it does not necessarily limit damage awards.

Trial: Right to split trial into segments infringement & validity; damages; willfulness. This approach tends to favor defendants.

Willful Infringement: Spell out that the enhanced damages are for “willful infringement” that is at least objectively reckless by clear and convincing evidence. (current statute reads “the court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.”). The statute would make clear that “knowledge alone” is not sufficient for a finding of willful infringement and that any “close case” should be decided against willfulness.

Post-Grant Review: The statute would provide for a whole new system of post-grant reviews that would be handled directly by the patent appeals board. [I will write more on this later]. The proposal also calls for a new “supplemental examination” to ensure that the patentee has fulfilled the duty of disclosure.

Pre-Issuance Submissions of Prior Art by Third Parties: These would be allowed.

Litigation Venue: Cases should be transferred to venues that are “clearly more convenient.”

Fee Setting Authority: The USPTO would be given authority to adjust its fees so long as the fees are “in the aggregate set to recover the estimated cost to the Office for processing, activities, services and materials relating to patents and trademarks, respectively.”

Federal Circuit Judicial Residency: Judges for the Federal Circuit would no longer be required to live in the DC area.

Micro-Entity: A new type of entity defined as a “micro entity” that has fewer than 5 patent applications that would qualify for even further reduced fees.

Best Mode Requirement: The best mode requirement would remain as part of the law. However, failure to fulfill the best mode requirement would no longer be an invalidity defense nor could it serve as a basis for holding a patent unenforceable.

Investigating Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity—An Empirical Analysis

Etan Chatlynne reports post-KSR patent validity decisions with a special focus on the presumption of validity and the clear and convincing standard for rebutting that presumption. He finds that the presumption and evidentiary standard did not affect thirty-eight of forty-five (84%) Federal Circuit invalidity determinations made between April 2008 and June 2009. The standards may have affected the remaining seven of forty-five (16%) determinations. [Download Chatlynne.PresumptionofValidity.Final]

Etan Chatlynne, Investigating Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity—An Empirical Analysis, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 37.

Investigating Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity—An Empirical Analysis

Etan Chatlynne reports post-KSR patent validity decisions with a special focus on the presumption of validity and the clear and convincing standard for rebutting that presumption. He finds that the presumption and evidentiary standard did not affect thirty-eight of forty-five (84%) Federal Circuit invalidity determinations made between April 2008 and June 2009. The standards may have affected the remaining seven of forty-five (16%) determinations. [Download Chatlynne.PresumptionofValidity.Final]

Etan Chatlynne, Investigating Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity—An Empirical Analysis, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 37.

Patently-O Bits and Bytes No. 322

PatentlyO036Chicago Area Creative Achievement Award: The Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago (IPLAC) invites nominations for its 2010 Creative Achievement Award (formerly called the Inventor of the Year Award). In addition to recognizing inventors, the award is intended to recognize significant achievements in the creation of a trademark or service mark and related branding, marketing, and advertising activities, as well as achievements in literary, visual, musical, dramatic, and other arts protected by copyrights. The annual award may fall in any one of these categories for inventive/creative activity conducted in the Chicago metropolitan area. Details on criteria for the award and a nomination form are available on the IPLAC website. Nominations are due by Friday, March 12, 2010. IPLAC will announce the award winner at its Annual Meeting on May 4, 2010. Please email mrichards@brinkshofer.com or call Marc Richards at 312.321.4729, chair of IPLAC's Creative Achievement Award committee, with any questions.

Most popular Patently-O posts during the past month:

  1. Dear Patent Attorney and Patent Agent: Consider Joining to the PTO
  2. Top-Ten Pending Patent Cases
  3. Patent Reform Moving Forward
  4. What Does a Patent Examiner Do with 900+ References?
  5. Ariad v. Eli Lilly: Written Description Requirement
  6. The North Face versus The South Butt
  7. Patent Examiner Experience Levels
  8. Inequitable Conduct Based on Contradictory Statements to the EPO (in a non-family member application)
  9. False Marking False Marking False Marking False Marking all at up to $500 per offense
  10. Viagra, Cialis, & Levitra: Board of Patent Appeals Affirms Rejection of Pfizer’s Broad Patent over ED Treatment

Patently-O Bits and Bytes No. 322

PatentlyO036Chicago Area Creative Achievement Award: The Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago (IPLAC) invites nominations for its 2010 Creative Achievement Award (formerly called the Inventor of the Year Award). In addition to recognizing inventors, the award is intended to recognize significant achievements in the creation of a trademark or service mark and related branding, marketing, and advertising activities, as well as achievements in literary, visual, musical, dramatic, and other arts protected by copyrights. The annual award may fall in any one of these categories for inventive/creative activity conducted in the Chicago metropolitan area. Details on criteria for the award and a nomination form are available on the IPLAC website. Nominations are due by Friday, March 12, 2010. IPLAC will announce the award winner at its Annual Meeting on May 4, 2010. Please email mrichards@brinkshofer.com or call Marc Richards at 312.321.4729, chair of IPLAC's Creative Achievement Award committee, with any questions.

Most popular Patently-O posts during the past month:

  1. Dear Patent Attorney and Patent Agent: Consider Joining to the PTO
  2. Top-Ten Pending Patent Cases
  3. Patent Reform Moving Forward
  4. What Does a Patent Examiner Do with 900+ References?
  5. Ariad v. Eli Lilly: Written Description Requirement
  6. The North Face versus The South Butt
  7. Patent Examiner Experience Levels
  8. Inequitable Conduct Based on Contradictory Statements to the EPO (in a non-family member application)
  9. False Marking False Marking False Marking False Marking all at up to $500 per offense
  10. Viagra, Cialis, & Levitra: Board of Patent Appeals Affirms Rejection of Pfizer’s Broad Patent over ED Treatment

Rise in Restrictions: A Response

A Patent Examiner offered the following perspective on the seeming rise in the number of restriction requirements:

The numbers cited in this article to indicate an enormous rise in restriction requirements within the biotech group since the early 90’s are misleading. While restrictions have risen since that time what has really changed is the percentage of biotech restriction requirements which are written compared to those which are done telephonically and thus included within the FAOM. I have been a biotech examiner for almost twenty years. In the early 90’s I would estimate that approximately 75% of all cases within my art unit required a restriction requirement but virtually all of these were done telephonically. Thus the only first actions which were only restriction requirements were those in which the attorney would not elect over the phone. Today I would estimate that somewhere close to 90% of all cases in my art unit receive an initial restriction requirement but almost all of these are now done as written requirements prior to the FAOM. There two main reasons for the change from telephonic to written restrictions. They are a large increase in complexity of the requirements (in the early 90’s most requirements included only 2-4 groups and restrictions with more than 10 groups were very rare while today the average requirement probably has more than 10 groups and cases with even more than 100 groups are not uncommon) and the PTO’s policy of granting 1 hour of other time for written restrictions but not for restrictions included within an FAOM. This policy essentially penalizes an examiner for doing a telephonic restriction even though this would reduce overall pendency of many cases.

Federal Courts Closely Scrutinizing and Slashing Patent Damage Awards

Michael Kasdan and Joseph Casino discuss recent shifts in reasonable royalty jurisprudence with a particular focus on the recent cases of Cornell, Lucent, and Lansa.  Together, these decisions "indicate an emerging trend to more carefully scrutinize the evidentiary and economic basis of reasonable royalty-based patent damages awards in the setting of the appropriate royalty base, the application of the entire market value rule, and the calculation of the appropriate royalty rate." [Download Kasdan.Casino.Damages]

Other recent Patently-O Patent Law Journal Articles: 

Federal Courts Closely Scrutinizing and Slashing Patent Damage Awards

Michael Kasdan and Joseph Casino discuss recent shifts in reasonable royalty jurisprudence with a particular focus on the recent cases of Cornell, Lucent, and Lansa.  Together, these decisions "indicate an emerging trend to more carefully scrutinize the evidentiary and economic basis of reasonable royalty-based patent damages awards in the setting of the appropriate royalty base, the application of the entire market value rule, and the calculation of the appropriate royalty rate." [Download Kasdan.Casino.Damages]

Other recent Patently-O Patent Law Journal Articles: 

Rise in Restrictions

A recent article co-written by former PTO Director Jon Dudas along with Stepen Maebius and Sean Tu makes a strong statement regarding the rise in restriction requirements:

Restriction practice has clearly grown in the past few years. In 1993, there were only approximately 1,000 restriction requirements in the biotech practice group (out of approximately 32,000 first office actions). However, in 2008, the number of restrictions ballooned to 21,911 restriction requirements in the biotech practice group (out of approximately 42,000 first office actions). Thus, there has been a growth from only 1.5% of patents receiving restriction requirements to over 50% of patents receiving restriction requirements in the biotech practice group.

Squeezing More Patent Protection from a Smaller Budget Without Compromising Quality (2009).

Patent Prosecution Malpractice: Proving the Case-Within-a-Case

Davis v. Brouse McDowell (Fed. Cir. 2010)

Ms. Davis has developed the “IP-Exchange” as a networking portal for IP professionals. The site boldly claims a “Patent Pending Business Method.”

Before releasing her website, Ms. Davis spoke with Daniel Thomson then of the Ohio-based Brouse McDowell law firm about patent protection. Their conversation apparently included a discussion of potential international filing. There was no direct evidence, however, that Mr. Thomson informed her of the “absolute novelty” rule found in most countries that bars an inventor from obtaining a patent on material that had been publicly disclosed prior to the filing of the patent application.

Ms. Davis released her website in 2005 and then several months later (January 2006) she filed two provisional applications pro-se. Five-days before the non-provisional application was due, Ms. Davis again approached Mr. Thomson and asked him to file non-provisional applications and a PCT application. He agreed to do so in a rushed manner (despite a planned vacation). The PCT application was not filed by the one-year expiration date, although three US non-provisional applications were filed.

Ms. Davis eventually allowed her US patent applications to go abandoned. She then sued Thomson and Brouse McDowell for malpractice based on failure to file the PCT applications and negligence in preparing the US applications. The district court (Judge Sara Lioi) dismissed the case on summary judgment – finding that the case lacked merit. On appeal, Federal Circuit affirmed in an opinion written by Judge Moore and signed by Judges Newman and Bryson.

Patent prosecution malpractice has historically been difficult to prove because the court requires proof that – but for the malpractice, the invention would have been covered by a valuable patent.

We agree with the district court that Mr. O’Shaughnessy’s [expert] report provides sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Thomson breached a duty he owed to Ms. Davis as her attorney. Mr. Thomson went on vacation, missed filing dates, and, by his own admission, filed an application which he realized contained a poorly drafted specification and claims which he intended to repair at a later time. This is certainly not standard or adequate patent attorney representation, especially if, as Ms. Davis alleges, he did not inform her of his intention to proceed this way.

However, even if Ms. Davis can establish that Mr. Thomson breached a duty to her, she must still also prove causation, i.e., that absent his breach she would have obtained a patent. . . . [However, the] district court observed that Mr. O’Shaughnessy had not performed a prior art search or a “patentability analysis,” nor had he identified particular claims that could be made for Ms. Davis’s inventions. Therefore, the court found that Mr. O’Shaughnessy’s patentability opinion lacked adequate foundation and could not be relied upon by Ms. Davis as evidence of patentability.

We agree with the district court’s conclusion. . . . Mr. O’Shaughnessy’s opinion that Ms. Davis’s inventions are patentable is precisely [the] type of conclusory statement [that are insufficient to defeat summary judgment]. His expert report contains no affirmative analysis supporting his opinion on patentability; instead, the opinion is followed only by the equally conclusory assertion that Mr. O’Shaughnessy has seen nothing to “block” this patentability. An unsupported opinion such as this cannot and does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to the patentability of Ms. Davis’s inventions. . . . [A]n expert’s naked conclusion is insufficient to survive summary judgment.

In dicta, the court made clear that the “case-with-a-case” does not require that the malpractice plaintiff identify the exact patentable claims and how those claims would have been patentable over the prior art. Rather, the burden is to “establish the likelihood that her inventions would have been held patentable on examination . . . in accordance with the criteria of patentability applied during examination.”

Federal Courts Jurisdiction: An interesting aspect of the decision involves the jurisdiction of federal courts. Malpractice is typically a state claim, but some patent malpractice cases are properly adjudged by federal courts if the “relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law.” In this case, the court noted that federal jurisdiction would not exist if the malpractice claim had been wholly based on loss of foreign patent rights.

The Marking Requirement: Here is How the Statute has been Interpreted.

The Marking Requirement: Here is how the marking statute has been interpreted.

  • If a patentee sells (or authorizes the sale of) a product that is covered by the patent, the patentee can only collect past-damages for patent infringement if either (1) the product was properly marked as patented or (2) the infringer had actual notice of its infringement and continued to infringe.
  • If there is no authorized product covered by the patent, then the patentee can collect past damages (up to six years) even if the infringer had no knowledge of the patent.  Method claims typically do not have a corresponding product. However, there is some debate about the collection of past-damages without notice for method claims when the patent also includes apparatus claims that cover an authorized product.

Thus, the seeming plain language of 35 USC 287 does not apply. Section 287 indicates that “[i]n the event of failure so to mark, no damages shall be recovered by the patentee in any action for infringement, except on proof that the infringer was notified of the infringement and continued to infringe thereafter, in which event damages may be recovered only for infringement occurring after such notice.”  Courts have held that this section does not apply if the patentee had nothing to mark. 

This background law was described by the Supreme Court in its 1936 case captioned Wine Ry. Appliance Co. v. Enter. Ry. Equip. Co., 297 U.S. 387 (1936).  In that case the court held that “issuance of a patent and recordation in the Patent Office constitute notice to the world of its existence.”  Interpreting a precurser to today’s marking statute, the Supreme Court wrote that “[p]enalty for failure [to mark] implies opportunity to perform.”

Princo v. ITC and the FTC’s Radical Analytical Framework

Princo v. ITC (Fed. Cir. 2010) (En banc)

On Wednesday, March 3, the Federal Circuit will sit en banc to hear the oral argument in Princo v. ITC.  Two questions are presented in the appeal: < ?xml:namespace prefix ="" o />

1.       Whether a supposed agreement, between developers of new technology and a new product standard, to license one of the resulting patents only for use under that standard, thus foreclosing the possibility that it might be used to create a competing standard, could be held anticompetitive without (i) defining a relevant market in which the standards compete and (ii) proving that the agreement injured or was likely to injure competition in that market.

2.       Whether such an agreement, even if deemed anticompetitive, would be a proper basis for invoking the doctrine of patent misuse to refuse enforcement of different patents used to practice the joint standard.

More information on the case can be found in David Ryan short article published today titled Princo v. ITC and the FTC’s Radical Analytical Framework. [File Attachment: Princo.DavidFRyan.pdf (208 KB)]. 

This article is intended to assist those who wish to audit Wednesday’s oral argument . . . by providing an overview of the issues for determination before the en banc Court and a discussion of how the FTC’s arguments might affect determination of those issues.  Those issues and arguments are outlined in Section B, and the technical and procedural background facts are then set forth briefly in Sections C and D, respectively.  Section E then discusses in summary fashion the pertinent research market in which the RJV operated, the two pertinent product markets and the two vertical licensing markets within which the effects of the challenged patent rights clearance agreements must be assessed.

Scheduling

PatentLawPic938I don’t actually carry a calandar any more… But if I did carry a calendar, it would include the following three upcoming events where I will be speaking: 

  • Washington University Law School – local IP professionals are welcome for this free noon-time event on March 4, 2010, 12:00 noon – 1:00 pm.
  • IP Law Summit for Corporate IP Counsel in Miami at the Doral Resort on March 25–27, 2010 (This conference is virtually free for senior in-house IP counsel, but quite expensive for attorneys at law firms).
  • Corporate IP Counsel Summit in New York City at the Helmsley Hotel on April 27–28, 2010 (Use code FCZ835 when registering for a $500 discount).

Ending the Doctrine of Non-Statutory Double Patenting

In Boehringer Ingelheim Int’l v. Barr Labs and Mylan Pharma (Fed. Cir. 2010), the Federal Circuit made an interesting statement regarding the judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting — that the doctrine has been historically important.

The doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting is an important check on improper extension of patent rights through the use of divisional and continuation applications, at least for patents issued from applications filed prior to the amendment of 35 U.S.C. § 154 to create twenty-year terms running from the date of the earliest related application.

As suggested, the advent of a twenty-year term based on application priority date means that the justification for a double patenting rejection is largely becoming a moot-point.  And, I suspect that the court will eventually change the law by holding that a terminal disclaimer is not necessary if the two patent terms are already identical. A family of patents filed in the past decade will typically all have roughly the same ending-dates except for differences created by patent term extensions and adjustments (PTE & PTA). In my view, applicants should be allowed to take advantage of those extensions apart from any terminal disclaimer. The other hang-up with terminal disclaimers is that they require the two applications be commonly owned.