Retractable Technologies v. Becton, Dickinson and Company (BD) (Fed. Cir. 2011)
In 2010, Judge Folsom of the Eastern District of Texas confirmed the jury finding that BD was liable for infringing three of RTI’s retractable syringe patents and that BD’s invalidity arguments were not convincing. On appeal a two-member majority (Judges Lourie and Plager) reversed-in-part — finding that the district court had erred in its construing of the term “body” too broadly by not limiting the term to a “one piece body.” The majority opinion was written by Judge Lourie. Judge Plager filed a concurring opinion asking courts to focus on the “actual invention” when construing claims. Chief Judge Rader wrote in dissent that the majority’s construction improperly imported limitations from the specification into the claims.
I begin with Judge Plager’s minority view of focusing attention on the actual invention (rather than solely on the written claim language) that has been a recent topic for discussion in the legal academy.
However much desired by the claim drafters, who want claims that serve as business weapons and litigation threats, the claims cannot go beyond the actual invention that entitles the inventor to a patent. For that we look to the written description. I have written elsewhere about the curse of indefinite and ambiguous claims, divorced from the written description, that we regularly are asked to construe, and the need for more stringent rules to control the curse.
I understand how a perfectly competent trial judge can be persuaded by the siren song of litigation counsel to give the jury wide scope regarding what is claimed. But it is a song to which courts should turn a deaf ear if patents are to serve the purposes for which they exist, including the obligation to make full disclosure of what is actually invented, and to claim that and nothing more.
Although the written description and enablement requirements are intended to ensure that the claim scope is commensurate with the disclosure, Plager’s approach has some merit as a mechanism for allowing courts to adjust patent scope based on disclosure problems rather than the binary valid/invalid choice available under Section 112 p1 defenses.
The Majority Claim Construction: The meaning of a patent claim is considered a question of law that is reviewed de novo on appeal. That is, on appeal, no deference is to be given to the lower court’s opinion. In the 2005 en banc decision of Phillips v. AWH, 415 F.3d 1303, the Federal Circuit wrote that claim meaning should be determined by looking at the words of the claims themselves; the patent specification; the prosecution history; and any relevant extrinsic evidence. Phillips changed the law of claim construction by requiring that clams always be construed “in view of the written description.”
One-Piece Body: The claimed syringe includes a limitation to “a hollow syringe body comprising a barrel and having a front end portion and a back end portion, the back end portion further comprising at least one radially extending member providing finger grips for the syringe body.” The district court looked primarily to the claim language in ruling that the claimed “body” is not limited to a one-piece structure (except for dependent claim 25 that did explicitly limit the body to “one piece”).
Claim Differentiation: On appeal, the Federal Circuit first addressed the claim differentiation argument and found a weak implication that a claimed “body” should be broader than a claimed “one piece body.”
While the patents contain an independent claim that recites a “body,” with a dependent claim that limits the “body” to a “one-piece body,” none of the claims expressly recite a body that contains multiple pieces. Thus, while the claims can be read to imply that a “body” is not limited to a one-piece structure, that implication is not a strong one.
The decision suggests that the claim differentiation would have been a much stronger argument if a separate dependant claim had been limited to “a multiple-piece body” or “a non-one-piece body.”
Specification: In several decisions, the Federal Circuit has ruled that claim differentiation arguments will be outweighed by a contrary construction “dictated by the written description or prosecution history.” Here, the court found that the specification’s background section discussing the prior dictated the a narrow construction. In particular, the background section of one of the asserted patents included the following line:
The prior art has not recognized that such a structure can be molded as a one piece outer body
And, the Summary of the Invention stated that the invented syringe “features a one piece hollow outer body.” The specification discusses several embodiments of a one piece body and never discloses a body that consists of anything other than a one-piece body (except in disparaging the prior art).
In considering these competing arguments, the court noted that there is a very “fine line between construing the claims in light of the specification and improperly importing a limitation from the specification into the claims.” Here, the court ruled the one piece body is necessary “to tether the claims to what the specifications indicate the inventor actually invented.”
Chief Judge Rader’s dissent evokes the pre-Phillips notion that a patent claim can often be read in a vacuum unless scope is disclaimed during prosecution or terms specially defined in the specification.
[Under Phillips] Claim language is to be given its ordinary and customary meaning, as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. In this case, neither party contends that “body” has a special, technical meaning in the field of art, and thus claim construction requires “little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words.” (quoting Phillips). The ordinary and customary meaning of “body” does not inherently contain a one-piece structural limitation. Moreover, neither the claim language nor the written description evinces intent by the patentee to limit the scope of “body” to one-piece bodies.
. . .
Certainly, the claims do not stand alone and must be read in light of the specifications. Nothing in the specifications, however, rebuts the strong presumption created by the claim language that “body” does not contain a one-piece structural limitation. The specifications do not reveal a special definition given by the inventor to the word “body.” Nor do the specifications contain an intentional disclaimer or disavowal of claim scope by the inventor.
This opinion serves as evidence that the court continues to struggle with claim construction and that there continues to be some amount of panel dependence in the results.