In Life Technologies Corp. v. Promega Corp., the Supreme Court has asked for the views of the Solicitor General — greatly raising the likelihood that the high court will take the case. The kicker will be how the US Gov’t responds.
The case centers around Life Technologies’ international sales of genetic testing kits. A portion of the kit included Taq polymerase that was manufactured in the US and sent to the UK where it was combined with additional components to produce the infringing kit. Of course, the UK manufactured kit isn’t infringing under ordinary U.S. patent law because it is being manufactured, sold, and used outside of the US. However, Section 271(f) of the Patent Act provides a cause of action for infringement based upon export of components of a patented invention to be combined abroad.
This case focuses on Section 271(f)(1) that provides:
Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention, where such components are uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.
The elements of infringement under Section 271(f)(1) appear to be:
- Supply or cause to supply in or from the US;
- A substantial portion of the components of a patented invention in uncombined form; and
- In a way that actively induces the combination outside of the US in a manner that would infringe the patent if it had been combined within the US.
In finding for the patentee, the Federal Circuit made two interesting decisions:
- The exporter can induce itself to combine the components abroad.
- A single component (here the Taq polymerase) can serve as “a substantial portion of the components.”
In his essay on the decision, Jason Rantanen wrote that these holdings are “probably erroneous—doctrinal developments.”
Now, in its petition for certiorari, the adjudged infringer has followed Prof. Rantanen’s lead and asks the following questions:
- Whether the Federal Circuit erred in holding that a single entity can “actively induce” itself to infringe a patent under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1).
- Whether the Federal Circuit erred in holding that supplying a single, commodity component of a multi-component invention from the United States is an infringing act under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1), exposing the manufacturer to liability for all worldwide sales.
The basic arguments here stem from the Supreme Court’s prior statements that 271(f) should be interpreted narrowly. In his amicus brief supporting the petition, Dean Tim Holbrook argues that the Federal Circuit “consistently fails to consider the presumption against extraterritoriality” and that important interpretive doctrine leads to the conclusion that the court went too far here.
Next step in the case will be a brief submitted by the US Government staking out its position as to whether export should count as infringement. Although I am sympathetic to Holbrook’s position, the US administration is active enough in patent cases so that it can be the one making the argument if the case so warrants.
(Beg pardon; second try – having filter issue…)
Gonna have to go with Jason on this one. I’m having trouble imagining a majority (or even small number) of the SC justices agreeing either on auto-induction or on the idea of a single component – a staple good like the polymerase – being “a substantial portion of the components” of the kit claimed below.
A kit for analyzing polymorphism [the kit having these [numbered just for fun] components]…
[1] at least one vessel containing
[2] mixture of primers constituting between 1 and 50 of said primer pairs;
[3] a vessel containing
[4] a polymerizing enzyme suitable for performing a primer-directed polymerase chain reaction;
[5] a vessel containing
[6] the deoxynucleotide triphosphate adenosine,
[7] [the deoxynucleotide triphosphate] guanine,
[8] [the deoxynucleotide triphosphate] cytosine and
[9] [the deoxynucleotide triphosphate] thymidine;
[10] a vessel containing
[11] a buffer solution for performing a polymerase chain reaction;
[12] a vessel containing
[13] a template DNA comprising i) a simple or cryptically simple nucleotide sequence having a repeat motif length of 3 to 10 nucleotides and ii) nucleotide sequences flanking said simple or cryptically simple nucleotide sequence that are effective for annealing at least one pair of said primers, for assaying positive performance of the method.
Is that a process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter?
Do I qualify as item 5 (including 6 – 9)?
Mellow: I’m having trouble imagining a majority (or even small number) of the SC justices agreeing … on auto-induction
I’m curious as to what you believe is the strongest argument against the “auto-induction” theory of infringement of 271(f)(1).
Let’s change the facts of this case and say that every single one of the recited components is mailed in two separate packages (i.e., uncombined), from the US by company X to Life Tech, at Life Tech’s request (company X has no idea what Life Tech is using the various components before other than PCR generally). I think we would both agree that would prevent a closer case of infringement under 271(f)(1) by X. What about Life Tech? Liable?
Let’s say X is liable under the above scenario. Can liability really be avoided by Life Tech buying company X and converting it into a wholly owned and controlled subsidiary? That seems like a pretty big loophole. If it’s so clear that “auto-inducement” of this sort isn’t included, it’s a bit odd that this question hasn’t come up earlier. Maybe one possible way out of the issue is to recognize (rightly or wrongly) that a subsidiary company, even a wholly controlled one, isn’t “self inducing” when it behaves in this manner. It’s inducing it’s parent company to infringe, period, and the statute doesn’t care about the relationship of the foreign “otherwise direct infringer” to the domestic entity.
[Just as a side note: every item in the claim you presented, except for possibly the last one, is the sort of commonplace staple item you could expect to find in the chem lab of any well-funded high school]
Gah. Another typo:
“I think we would both agree that would present [<– not "prevent"!] a closer case of infringement under 271(f)(1) by X"
Apologies for any confusion.
Mellow – You may be right. Certainly the statute requires a “substantial” portion. How would that be defined? It seems that you are suggesting that it should matter whether the component is a ‘point of novelty’ for the invention or instead a staple-of-commerce. Should we tie-in the Alice-style claim analysis to consider which components are post-solution add-ons that do not add significantly to the invention? I don’t think that the calculation can be so simple to say that 1 component out of 13 can never be a substantial portion.
Dennis, not Alice, but Quanta/Univis Lens.
See note 9. link to patentlyo.com
What is sold from the US must embody the invention.
DC: I don’t think that the calculation can be so simple to say that 1 component out of 13 can never be a substantial portion.
Why not? That’s the sort of predictability that people are always seeking. 271(f)(1) concerns multi-component
Let’s say “the single component” constitutes 88 assembled pieces of a claimed device with 100 elements, where the other 12 elements are staple items. In that scenario, “the single component” is almost surely going to be a non-staple item and 271(f)(2) will apply. No injustice there.
Throw in one of the staple items along with that non-staple single component and you’ve got a good argument for infringement under 271(f)(1). Again: no injustice.
Am I missing an easy hypothetical example that would prove the contrary?
At the end of the day the problem for composition/device patentees is the same as ever: claim the valid innovation with the least number of moving parts so you can capture direct infringers. The claim at issue here is a bit of an oddity, to say the least. What the heck is all that old stuff doing in there? There’s no unexpected or “synergy” arising from providing separate reagents in a kit.
Point of novelty….?
One would hope a professor of patent law would not forget the fact that a valid invention can be composed entirely of items that are each in their own right not novel, and thus not have at all a “point of novelty.
Perhaps the millionth time this is explained to you it will stick: the “point of novelty” in a combination claim is the point at which two (or possibly more) “old” elements which have never before been combined or which have never before been described as being combined/combinable are, in fact, described in the claim as being combined.
Simple example for you:
Claim: A medicinal tablet for relieving pain and constipation, comprising: aspirin, filler, and prune juice extract. Prior art ref A teaches aspirin and filler, and ref B teaches prune juice extract and filler. There’s no unexpected results. What’s the “point of novelty”? Aspirin plus prune juice.
Will there be cases where the “point of novelty” is the entirety of the claim because, e.g., the claim has only two old elements that were never taught in combination? Sure. But that fact doesn’t mean that considerations of “point of novelty” are always out of the question or improper. Nor does it mean that those who fail to bring up this fact every time “point of novelty” is raised are ign 0rant of that fact.
Your endless attempts to eliminate the concept of a “point of novelty” from discussion of patent law have failed miserably and that’s going to be the case forever. There’s a good reason for that. Maybe it’s time to think about hanging it up? Pretty much everybody would appreciate that. At the very least maybe think about holding off with the bizarre insults of “professors” who don’t share your clinical obsessions.
And, as has been explained to you even more times, “Point of Novelty” is a canard, as the claim as a whole is the “point of novelty.”
Repeating your nonsensical fantasies isn’t an “explanation”, “anon.”
Keep digging.
“Keep digging”
Again, the man with the shovel in his hands employs his short script and AccuseOthersOfThatWhichMalcolmDoes.
Y
A
W
N
Mellow, “staple?” What was sold from the US to England was a “staple?” Is this true?
Yes, Ned. A generic DNA polymerase, including a generic PCR-compatible polymerase, can be freely made by anyone and sold anywhere in the world. Happens every day. That’s been the case for a while.
Also, Ned: I’m not sure it’s accurate to say that the dispute before the Supreme Court involves anything that was “bought” or “sold” from the US. Life Tech has a manufacturing plant in the US. It shipped the polymerase from it’s plant in the US to its other manufacturing plant in the UK where the kit was assembled.
The one-way editing is getting downright silly.
What is being edited?
LOL – the statement about what is being edited is itself edited….
My take — what is the invention? Is the thing sold in the US the invention — with whatever that is done outside some final, but conventional step? I am thinking here, Quanta and Univis Lens, where a sale of a component substantially embodying the essential elements of the invention exhausts. It should also infringe. And if the sale is in the US to someone abroad, it should still infringe.
The statute should be construed accordingly.
Is that “invention,” “gist of invention” or “part(s) of invention”…?
Anon, If an element or sub-combination is the invention as described in the specification or as allowed during prosecution, that is what the Supreme Court requires, I think.
I am glad that you added the “I think,” because as Alice shows, the Court does have a habit of disregarding actual claim elements when they want to “Gist” to whatever level they want to get to.
FN 14 of Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp., 773 F. 3d 1338 – Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit 2014 link to scholar.google.com.,+773+F.3d+1338+%28Fed.+Cir.+2014%29&hl=en&as_sdt=2006#r[17]
“Promega does not assert infringement under § 271(f)(2) because Taq polymerase is “a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial non-infringing use.” See J.A. 6289.”
That settles it for me.
MM, it is not whether there was one component or two, or that the party in England was in the same corporate family, but that which was sold was a staple item of commerce. This changes my view of this case 100%.
In an appropriate case, if only one component is sold, and it embodies the invention, there should be infringement. But apparently, it is infringement under 271(f)(2) anyway.
Now, in principle, I agree with the Federal Circuit and the point made here in the Reply by Seth Waxman representing Promega:
“More specifically, the panel rejected the rigid rule that
“a single component supplied from the United States, no matter how important or central to the invention,
can never constitute ‘a substantial portion of the components
of a patented invention.”‘ !d. 34a (emphasis
added). It is no surprise that not a single member of
the Federal Circuit dissented from the denial of rehearing
en bane on that limited holding.
Then they go off the reservation here:
In reality, the panel’s statement that the “Tautz patent would
be inoperable” without Taq polymerase was immediately
followed by the statement that “LifeTech’s own witness
admitted that the Taq polymerase is one of the
‘main’ and ‘major’ components of the accused kits.” Pet.
App. 34a. The panel also emphasized that its ruling
was “based on the facts of this particular case.” I d. 28a.”
“Central to the invention” is not the same thing as “major component” of the “kit.”
I do not see HOW a commodity can be “central to the invention.”
Seth Waxman: It is no surprise that not a single member of the Federal Circuit dissented from the denial of rehearing en bane on that limited holding.
It was a surprise to me, given that 271(f)(1) on its face expressly refers to “components [plural] and given that 271(f)(2) is plainly intended to deal with single component exports.
This business about a single component being “central” or “important” to the invention is a complete red herring. There’s nothing about that in any part of the statute or the Congressional testimony. That wasn’t what Deep South was about.
271 refers to a component that is “especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use.” That’s quite a different concept from “important to the invention” (a worthlessly vague notion if there ever was one).
If people believe that it’s necessary for 271(f)(1) to capture the export of single components, I’d like to know why they believe that. Is there some sort of undesirable activity that is going to take place if 271(f)(1) is construed construed otherwise (as it should be)?
MM, I don’t think we need fuzzy logic here, or indistinct borders. If a single component is being sold it must, in my view, embody ALL the essential elements of the invention so that its sale would exhaust the patentee’s right to sue anybody downstream from infringing by completing the patented combination or by performing some of the remaining steps.
This is why I think the Federal Circuit is way off the ranch in it recent ITC decision that importation of staples is an infringement. That cannot be. That too needs to be reversed.
9-0
9-0
The Feds recent track record 0f unanimous reversals needs to be kept perfect. I must not draw even one dissent when the Supreme Court reverses.
[Mein Gott is this court bad — seemingly always getting cases of first impression wrong.]
Ned: it is not whether there was one component or two, or that the party in England was in the same corporate family, but that which was sold was a staple item of commerce
Right. It should have been an easy slam dunk for Life Tech under the undisputed facts but the CAFC went out of its way to botch things up and create both additional uncertainty and waaaaaay more additional liability where previously there was little or none.
But also recognize that if Life Tech had shipped, say, 12 staple elements (from the list of 13 elements in the claim) to itself then we’d be having a different discussion. In that event, 271(f)(2) wouldn’t apply and we could focus properly on what “substantial portion” and “actively induce” means in the context of, e.g., shipping half of the “components” in a claim, where the claim recites a combination of only staple “components”, or where the claim recites a mixture of staple and non-staple “components”.
Agreed.
It’s a nice day for a right vetting
It’s a nice day to start again
There is nothing fair in this world
There is nothing safe in this world
And there is nothing sure in this world
And there is nothing pure in this world
If there’s something left in this world
It’s a nice day for a right vetting
Really? White Wedding — right vetting….. Nothing?
….sigh….
Tap, Tap, Tap. Is this thing on?
Holbrook’s amicus brief here: link to papers.ssrn.com
Nice brief, Professor Holbrook. It’s short and to the point, just like the Supreme Court’s 9-0 reversal will be.
I think the meaning of the word “induce” is in question here. Inducement usually means you persuade someone else to do something. However, it also means simply “to bring about or give rise to”. The obvious logical controversy is, if they are “inducing themselves”, why can’t you just go after the infringer for infringing. Well, because the infringement didn’t occur inside the US. The language of 271(f)(1) seems to pretty directly address this loophole and says nothing about inducing “others”, only about inducing the combination. The focus is on whether the invention is combined, and not on who does the combining. The facts still need to support “all or a substantial portion of the components”, which seems to be the critical point of question 2. Identifying a part as a commodity doesn’t inherently exclude a finding, but it does seem to suggest that that particular component shouldn’t be considered to be “substantial”.
The facts still need to support “all or a substantial portion of the components”, which seems to be the critical point of question 2. Identifying a part as a commodity doesn’t inherently exclude a finding, but it does seem to suggest that that particular component shouldn’t be considered to be “substantial”.
There’s also the fact that 271(f) refers to “such components [that are supplied] are uncombined”. Components is plural. Of course it’s plural. If it was singular, there would be no need to include all this business about “uncombined” components, which is the whole point of the statute (to capture folks who are trying to avoid infringement of a US patent by doing everything except final assembly of the patented device before shipping).
If Congress wanted to make infringers out of foreigners who use US parts to practice US patents in their own countries, Congress could simply have written “Anybody in a foreign country who uses any US-manufactured part in a device that would infringe a US patent if it was made in the US is an infringer, regardless of whether that part is a staple item of commerce or not.” But that’s not what Congress wrote. They wrote the opposite.
The folks around here who stop their analysis at “the definition of portion includes a single thing” are doing their analysis in a vacuum or in some kind of alternate universe where 271 has no other sections (most importantly 271(c)) and where Congress concocted 271(f) out of thin air without any rhyme or reason.
<imost importantly 271(c))
and 271(f)(2)!
No one is “stopping their analysis”
Stop the dissembling.
There is a HUGE difference between your spin and your own actions of simply not applying basic statutory construction and hanging your hat on the plural/singular form of the word in the statute.
Get the statutory constructions correct first, then continue your “analysis.” Don’t “skip” that important point just to get to the “spin” that you want to get at.
your own actions of simply not applying basic
*click*
For cripes sake, man, get a frigging grip already.
No one is “stopping their analysis”
Interesting. Is there another part to your “analysis” beyond the “the definition of ‘portion’ includes a single thing” part? Some evidence of Congressional intent to include single staple items of commerce within the scope of 271(f)(1) perhaps? Please share.
LOL – it is you that needs to “up” your analysis with a clear improvement to the foundation of the statutory reading.
My posts on this have been clear and direct.
Ah, so there is no other part to your analysis. I thought so.
Thanks for confirming that in your own very special way. You never fail to disappoint.
Once again – it is YOUR analysis that is at fault.
You keep on wanting NOT to pay attention to that.
Wah.
Just let everyone know if there is another part to your analysis other than the simplistic “portion includes singular” part that we’ve all heard you beat to the ground already.
There isn’t another part, right? Step up, “anon.” This a real shining moment for you. Be proud.
You keep on wanting to put this on my – take your own advice about learning to read and try (again) this short declarative sentence:
“Once again – it is YOUR analysis that is at fault.“
edstirling: The focus is on whether the invention is combined, and not on who does the combining.
In fact, on its face, meeting the terms of the statute does not clearly require that the supplied uncombined parts are ever actually combined by anyone (although such an event would seem to lend support to an otherwise speculative argument as to whether, e.g., the shipping of some uncombined parts constituted an “inducement”).
Ah, Holbrook’s brief includes the reminder: the Federal Circuit has held that there is infringement under § 271(f) even if the device is never assembled outside of the United States. Waymark Corp. v. Porta Systems Corp., 245 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001). This interpretation expands the scope of this provision by ensnaring conduct abroad regardless of whether the device has been assembled.
Holbrook also notes:
Oddly the Federal Circuit suggested this interpretation avoided the appearance of providing extraterritorial reach to United States, id., yet the court’s decision actually expanded such reach.
Just for the record, there is no dispute that, in the instant case, Life Tech used an exported item of commerce (Taq polymerase) to assemble an otherwise infringing kit overseas.
Dennis: “in his amicus brief supporting the petition, Dean Tim Holbrook argues that the Federal Circuit ‘consistently fails to consider the presumption against extraterritoriality’ ”
Huh? The statute is aimed at extraterritoriality. That is the very reason the statute was amended to include 271(f) – the presumption against extraterritoriality, as applied in deepsouth by SC [correctly, I believe], caused Congress to enact the section. Is he arguing that the statutory presumption should operate to limit congress’s plainly written words?
I think inducing yourself is not far fetched in the current global supply chain; definitionally, it’s an artificial division. The definition of substantial is slippery – but any argument based on policy focusing staple article of commerce is beside the point. See 271(f)(2), which explicitly uses that phrase – if congress was worried about staple articles of commerce, they knew how to address it. It’s just a gap-filer begging courts to use smoke and mirrors.
slaf I think inducing yourself is not far fetched in the current global supply chain; definitionally, it’s an artificial division.
I’m not sure what “artificial” is supposed to mean in this context but the issue isn’t whether “inducing yourself” is “far fetched”. Multinational corporations were hardly unusual when this statute was drafted. On the country, multinational corporations were famously several centuries old (at least) when the statute was drafted.
The statute is aimed at extraterritoriality.
Nobody is disputing that. But there is zero evidence that Congress intended 271(f) to create US patent liability for foreign companies who import single staple items of commerce into their country from the US (or anywhere else).
f congress was worried about staple articles of commerce, they knew how to address it.
Indeed. And Congress was worried about creating liability for the import/export of single staple items of commerce which is why Congress expressly stated that such acts don’t fall within the scope of 271.
The definition of substantial is slippery – but any argument based on policy focusing staple article of commerce is beside the point.
No, it’s certainly not “beside the point.” It is the point. Congress was enacting policy when it wrote the law. Construing a “slippery” term requires understanding what policy Congress intended to promote when it wrote the law. Did the facts in Deep South concern the export out of the US of a single staple of commerce? Nope. Of course not. And Congress could have cared less about that scenario for the simple reason (but not the only one) that no US business would want to be found liable for infringement of a Mexican or Chinese or Japanese or Canadian or South African patent merely because they imported a single staple “fastening means” from one of those places and used it as a component in a device that’s off-patent in the US. But that’s the crazy scenario the CAFC endorsed with their bizarre decision.
Once again, the statutory construction principles of singular/plural seem to escape your abilities to understand law.
Basics, Malcolm – basics.
See, for example, footnote 44 at link to fas.org
“The Dictionary Act provides that ‘unless the context indicates otherwise,’ ‘words importing the singular include and apply to several persons, parties, or things; words importing the plural include the singular.’ 1 U.S.C. § 1.“
“anon” the statutory construction principles of singular/plural seem to escape your abilities to understand law.
I’ve addressed this nonsense of yours a hundred times already.
Your “version” of “address” is itself sheer nonsense Malcolm.
You have never properly accounted for this basic element of statutory construction.
Ever.
You have never properly accounted for this basic element of statutory construction.
Your precious “basic element of construction” doesn’t matter for squat given all the other “basic elements of construction” in the construction kit, most importantly the “basic element” that says you don’t read a statute as if you were born yesterday or as if the statute was written in a sealed vacuum divorced from reason, logic and common sense.
It is actually something that directly matters. For the very purpose that such a statutory construction canon exists in the first place.
If in fact as you claim now (that it doesn’t matter for squat) then there would have been no need for you to engage in your claimed activity of “I’ve addressed this nonsense of yours a hundred times already.”
Your L I E spawns ever more L I E S.
You are not very good at this.
Try less spin and more substantive positions.
no need for you to engage in your claimed activity of “I’ve addressed this nonsense of yours a hundred times already.”
Well, when some kinda crazee person keeps bringing up the same nonsense over and over and over and over again and ranting about how it’s never being “addressed” there might be a “need” to say something. That has nothing to do with the actual “importance” of the nonsense, however.
I apologize if that’s too nuanced for you.
LOL
LOL – your not (actually) addressing a basic canon of statutory construction is not a matter of “nuance”
It’s a pretty flagrant and obvious lack on your part.
Maybe try less spin and more actual statutory construction.
your not (actually) addressing a basic canon of statutory construction
I’ve addressed the singular versus plural nature of terms in 271(f)(1) and 271(f)(2) *endlessly*.
Simply because I find your pet theory nonsensical (because it ignores the plain language of 271(f)(1), not to mention the statutory history and what your reading does to the other parts of the statute) doesn’t mean that I haven’t “addressed” it.
Your inability to grasp this is just another manifestation of your clinical narcissism. Get help.
Once again, Malcolm, your “version” of “address” just does not cut it.
Your “version” is equivalent to “Wah, I don’t like it so I am going to pretend it does not exist – plural, plural, plural – wah”
“anon” your “version” of “address” just does not cut it.
Please show everyone exactly what would “cut it” in your fantasy world where everybody needs to genuflect before your oh-so-serious beliefs.
Do I need to call you out by name and make particular note of your awesome contribution (which surely was unprecedented), with a supremely generous thank you, before I move on to explain why it makes no sense on its face, not to mention the enormous and ridiculous expansion of liability that results and the obvious extreme problems it creates for other sections of the statute? Is that what you’re looking for?
Maybe next time. Seems a little late now but at least you have something to look forward to.
“call you out by name”
HA HA HA HA
What an arse.
I didn’t mean your “real name”, “anon” (my gob, who could possibly care?).
I meant your silly fake one.
I agree with slaf that deciding this case on whether it is substantial component or not is a bad idea, but for a different reason.
Say the patent owned by X consists of components (and limitations) A, B, C. A is the substantial component. Company Y ships component A to its subsidiary so as (among other things that A can be used for) to assemble A with B and C. Under this decision, which I agree is bizarre, Y has induced infringement. Practically, X has a patent on the shipment of A, even though the patent only covers A+B+C. That’s why this case needs to be decided under question 1.
J: I agree with slaf that deciding this case on whether it is substantial component or not is a bad idea, but for a different reason.
I think you misunderstand the facts of the case here, J.
The question isn’t whether or not Taq polymerase is a “substantial component” of the kit. Under the Federal Circuit’s definition “substantial”, pretty much every necessary element of a device is itself a “substantial component.”
The issue in this case is whether the term “substantial portion” of uncombined components as used in 271(f) can include a single staple item of commerce (like Taq polymerase) (in which case 271(f)(2) is completely swallowed up).
The answer to that question resolves the case and, given that it’s an incredibly easy question to answer (the answer is “no, of course not”), it’s question 2 that needs to be addressed.
If some foreign company thinks it can avoid infringing a US patent on the combination of A,B,C,D,E and F by having its US subsidiary export A,B,C,D,E plus uncombined F to its home country for final assembly, then it should take its chances. It might be a real money-saver! At least that way the Supremes will have a case with the appropriate facts.
“If some foreign company thinks it can avoid infringing a US patent on the combination of A,B,C,D,E and F by having its US subsidiary export A,B,C,D,E plus uncombined F to its home country for final assembly, then it should take its chances. It might be a real money-saver! At least that way the Supremes will have a case with the appropriate facts.”
LOL – look who is playing the “gee I was born yesterday” game now…
Did you have a point to make other than the insult, “anon”?
Get the meds adjusted.
^^^ and here we go again with the “meds” short script nothingness.
Great “ecosystem” Prof.
here we go again
If you’d actually respond to the point I raised with a coherent argument rather than an incomprehensible insult with zero other content, then we wouldn’t be “going again.”
What on earth did you mean by your 5.1.2.1.1. comment? Go ahead and explain how that’s responsive to what I wrote. That’s what you should have done the first time. Do it now instead of crying to Dennis because Dennis surely knows how you operate. We all know that.
One way editing runs amuck.
The Supreme Court is not that interested in deciding cases like on the facts. It usually defers to the lower courts in those instances.
Situation 1: If a patent consists of A+B, and I ship A with instructions on where to find and how to combine with B.
Situation 2: Patent consists of A+B+C, I ship A and C with instruction on where to find and how to combine with B.
If Situation 2 is induced infringement, and from my understanding it is, are you saying that Situation 1 is not induced infringement because Congress added an “s” to components? Unlikely, in my opinion.