Section 101 Report from the USPTO

The USPTO’s new Section 101 Report [101-Report] is fairly bland, and primarily reports that most of the public input favored a legislative change that would expand patent eligibility to include many of the life-science and software innovations excluded under Mayo/Alice.

On his Director’s Blog, Joseph Matal writes:

Commenters confirmed that the recent Supreme Court cases have significantly changed the standards for determining patent subject matter eligibility. . . . A diverse group of representatives from academia, industry, law firms, and legal associations proposed legislative changes aimed at reversing the recent trend in the law and restoring, in their view, a more appropriate dividing line between eligible and ineligible subject matter. In contrast, a sizable portion of representatives from the software industry argued that the Court’s two-step test provides an appropriate standard for patent subject matter eligibility. This group cautioned against legislative redress and instead recommended that the common law should be allowed to evolve. . . . A healthy patent system that fuels research and development of innovative technologies is a critical component of our nation’s robust system of IP rights. Given the link between a healthy patent system and our nation’s economy, the contours of patent subject matter eligibility are of great concern to the USPTO and the IP community.

Section 101 Report [101-Report].

 

82 thoughts on “Section 101 Report from the USPTO

  1. Processing data takes time, energy, and space. The conservation of information is the most important law in physics.

    Machines that process information (like our brains) should be patent eligible. This whole debate is based on people creating new abstractions that have no meaning in the context of science and technology.

  2. My posting just got refused by the filter. So I will try again, with two small changes. Here goes.

    At 421111 below, Paul Cole writes:
    “An image is made with light. If it is of a face, you can look at it and recognise it.
    Data is numbers. Even if the numbers encode a face, you cannot see it or recognise the face just from the numbers. You need physical apparatus to convert the numbers to an image.
    There is a difference which should be perceptible to an xxxxx, or even a judge.”
    The difference is perceptible to me, and I think it helpful, indeed important, in the context of debates on eligibility for patenting.
    Anybody else?

    1. The “difference” is the “physical apparatus” that converts a digital signal (ineligible) to “images” (also ineligible).

      The “physical” apparatus we are talking about is a programmable computer hooked up to a display. That apparatus is ancient technology and it exists to convert data for images.

      What’s left? Logic. Also ineliglble.

      But wait! Writing instructions for computers simply has to be eligible for patenting! Because some rich attorneys say so, even if most of the people doing the actual instruction writing think it’s a terrible idea and even if the PTO and the CAFC is completely incompetent when it comes to evaluating “new logic” over “old logic” and — for bizarre inexplicable reasons — performs that evaluation using legal tools created for physical compositions and processing.

      By the way, how is the PTO doing with its effort to create a searchable organized database of algorithms and coding logic? Hasn’t even started? Oh, great.

      1. How goes your project for obtaining copyright on that “logic” that you are so characterizing….?

        If anything should be deemed offensive, it is the blatant and rampant misrepresentations that Malcolm uses all the F’n time.

        Say it with me: “La Vee.”

  3. Provocatively, at 421111 below, Paul Cole writes:

    “An image is made with light. If it is of a face, you can look at it and recognise it.
    Data is numbers. Even if the numbers encode a face, you cannot see it or recognise the face just from the numbers. You need physical apparatus to convert the numbers to an image.
    There is a difference which should be perceptible to an idiot, or even a judge.”

    The difference is perceptible to me, and I think it helpful, indeed important, in the context of debates on eligibility for patenting.

    Anybody else?

    1. The notion of “You need physical apparatus to convert the numbers to an image.” does not change what software is: a machine component, and – in the patent sense – an equivalent to the other machine “wares” of hardware or firmware.

      Only those who purposefully want to blind themselves to the fact that software is solely made (manufactured, by the hand of man – again, fully in line with the patent concept of that term) to BE a machine component, only those people will be “confused” or rather more correctly, will seek to confuse.

      And those people overwhelm id10ts and judges alike.

      1. I think it is not helpful to declare the absolute, that “If it is a process, it is eligible.” Not every process is eligible. It depends what the process does.

        Neither do I think it helpful to declare another absolute, that “If it is a program for a computer, then it is a machine component and therefore it is in itself patent-eligible”. Not every program for a computer is eligible. It depends what the program does.

        Substance over form, I say.

        1. Let’s try again…

          You say (equivalently) never mind the statutory category and focus instead on the exception.

          This is opposite of the message being provided by Paul Cole. The substance is the direct law of the statutory categories.

          Not helpful? To whom? To those that have an agenda against software and business method patents, that’s to whom.

          Do you deny that software is a machine component?

          How would it be helpful to obfuscate about that direct and simple point?

        2. ” Not every program for a computer is eligible.”

          I don’t understand Max. Can you give examples of eligible and ineligible programs for computers?

          1. Here is how I see it Les. Inside or outside the “useful arts”. Thus:

            Eligible: software that delivers sharper MRI or tomography medical images

            Ineligible: a program that outputs cube roots (or some other pure mathematical function)

            1. Here is how I see it Les. Inside or outside the “useful arts”.

              As I thought – you are conflating the other major prong of 101 (utility) with the statutory category prong.

              Compare then the utility that falls into the useful arts with that which does not: Fine Arts.

                1. But the application of logic, or algebra or arithmetic or geometry – i.e,, engineering has ALWAYS been a part of the Useful Arts.

            2. Thanks Max – I understand what your are saying, but don’t understand why sharper MRI images are useful, but more accurate or more precises or faster cube roots are not.

              1. Pure mathematics is “useful” just as writing thrilling novels is useful, or composing a symphony. But that’s not the issue. What is decisive is that the useful arts do not include such human endeavours as pure math or literary work product or musical compositions or flower arranging.

                1. Max – stand by for a fairly witty reply now caught in moderation, my guess is for making a historical reference that mentions a farm animal involved in the production of bacon.

  4. Just for the record, and as I have commented before, any law student who when concentrating on interpretation of a statute ignored the substantive provisions of the section and instead considered only exceptions should not only fail the question but also be asked whether he or she really has the mental equipment for a career in the law.

    Using the Mayo/Alice test without reference to the positive provisions of Section 101 and the case law related to those positive provisions falls within the category of error set out above. And as I have said elsewhere, if claimed subject matter falls as a matter of substance and not as a matter of mere outward form within one of the four categories, then it cannot be removed from eligibility by judicial exception without creating serious separation of powers issues. That was the “dynamite” question in Sequenom which unfortunately was not taken up by the Supreme Court.

    I have long advocated the position that the law does not need changing, merely careful and correct application to the cases which come before the court, and without judicial re-writing of claims to overlook important claimed elements as in Recognicorp.

    1. “the law does not need changing, merely careful and correct application to the cases which come before the court.”

      I agree 100% with this sentiment, both in patent law, and all other areas of the law. But no congressman is going to run on a platform of “the laws are good, so let’s just sit around and watch the judiciary properly apply them.” No, congressmen feel the need to change and complicate and accumulate laws, not for the good of the country, but for their own good, consequences be danged.

      1. So you have faith that every statue ever adopted is the best that could be done? Wut?

        Meanwhile, when a statute is simply too indefinite to reliably interpret, what then?

        For instance, the definition of the word process can mean virtually any activity in the world, including many that simply can’t be patentable subjects. All the careful and correct application in the world cannot change the fact that the outcome will be forum-specific because the word is inherently indefinite.

        1. “For instance, the definition of the word process can mean virtually any activity in the world, including many that simply can’t be patentable subjects.”

          If the statute says they are patentable, then they are patentable. Where do you come up with “that simply can’t be patentable subjects”?

          1. Les, the word “process” is no different from any other word, in that its meaning varies with context. It is wrong, futile and self-defeating to ascribe any particular meaning to a word, say “screw”, until you have identified the context in which it is being used, and then construed the word in view within the landscape set by the context.

            Here, the context is the Congressional Act to implement the Patents Clause of the Constitution.

            In that context, “process” is a reference to the useful arts.

            All that Martin is asserting is that there exist many very useful processes, for example thought processes that can solve real life personal problems, which are not within the ambit of the expression “useful arts” found in the Patents Clause of the Constitution. Or do you say that thought processes are eligible under the Constitution for patenting in the USA?

            1. You mistake “in context” with a conflation of two different prongs of the statutory 101.

              Yes, to be patent eligible, both prongs must be passed.

              But that does not mean that one prong is not passed based on the status of the other prong.

              As it is, you apparently do not want to engage in a meaningful dialogue on either prong.

        2. Breadth is not indefintiteness.

          You may not like the breadth, but do not confuse what you do not like with a different particular legal notion.

          1. Please. The nature of overbeadth is to be indefinite.

            Les,

            “Because the only limitation on the plain meaning of “process” that the Court acknowledges explicitly is the bar on abstract ideas, laws of nature, and the like, it is presumably this limitation that is left to stand between all conceivable human activity and patent monopolies. But many processes that would make for absurd patents are not abstract ideas. Nor can the requirements of
            novelty, nonobviousness, and particular description pick up the slack. Cf. ante, at 12–13 (plurality opinion). A great deal of human activity was at some time novel and nonobvious”.

            BILSKI v. KAPPOS STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment

            1. Absurd in whose opinion?

              I guess what you meant to say was not so much “that simply can’t be patentable subjects” but more ““that I [Martin] do not want to be patentable subjects.”

            2. Stevens, in “concurrence” was actually a dissent (his having actually lost the majority position in the case) – your quote does NOT carry the force that you may think it does.

              Quite in fact, it is an indictment against judicial activism.

              1. Yes, citing a Supreme Court justice making the same observation is just the same thing as pulling it out of my anon.

                Steven’s words carry the clear force of truth: process is insolubly indefinite and in the eye of the beholder.

                That can and should be fixed, and it can and should happen legitimately by common law or statute.

                Waaaa

                1. “process is insolubly indefinite and in the eye of the beholder”

                  How so? Why is it any more indefinite than, “manufacture,” or machine?

        3. There is considerable case law around the category “process” and it is not as straightforward as you suppose. The process has to bring about real world transformation, Cochrane v Deener if my memory serves. Unfortunately this important case law is now overlooked as a result of excitement over Alice.

          1. Paul,I think Cochrane v. Deener (rightly) only calls for an identifiable result.

            To me, the nature of that result is exactly the question of the M0T. If the result be intangible (i.e. abstract), than there needs to be a test for degree of abstraction.

            You know what test I favor.

          2. Paul, Cochrane is the MOT. The government urged the Supreme Court to adopt the MOT in Benson. They failed to do it there, but applied it in Diehr. When the Federal Circuit got a right in Bilski, the Supreme Court put a kibosh on the test in Bilski.

            If Congress really wanted to be bold, they would codify the MOT and specifically overrule Benson, Flook, Bilski and Alice.

          3. The process has to bring about real world transformation

            You overstep there Paul, as the Court in Bilski (and Prometheus) does NOT agree with you. Note that these occurred prior to Alice.

            As I have mentioned, you want to switch the focus to how the lower courts are applying what the Supreme Court has done and you continue to miss the point that what the Supreme Court has done itself IS the problem.

    2. merely careful and correct application to the cases which come before the court, and without judicial re-writing

      Too late.

      The table has been set, and one simply cannot ignore the fact that the Court itself has not properly applied “interpretations,” and has instead (as correctly shared by Director Matal), engaged in common law writing.

      It is too late to warn against creating serious separation of powers issues, as the Court has already created those serious separation of powers*** issues.

      I have heard you speak many times that the problem is in how the lower courts are applying what the Supreme Court has done. While there may be problems with such applications, you continue to miss the point that the larger problem is with the Supreme Court cases themselves.

      To the extent that you wish to NOT see (and address) the larger issue, your calls then are a hindrance, rather than a help to resolving that larger issue.

      ***among other issues, including but not limited to a Void for Vagueness concern given that they have refused to delineate what several factors in their “Gist/Abstract” sword common law writing includes.

      1. If Recognicorp goes en banc, we might JUST get some limitation on judicial re-writing e.g. confusing an image on a display screen with mere data. It would be nice if we could have confidence in the Federal Circuit to (a) take the case en banc, (b) get the facts and the law straight, and (c) come to a correct and useful conclusion.

          1. My thought exactly. What is an image if not data?

            Well…..there is a human meaning too….unfortunately much of that meaning (i.e. value) is entirely different for every person.

            There is the symbol itself, which has no outside meaning other than as a vehicle (pure data), then there is the agreed upon meaning (the objective description of the image) and then there is the iceberg of the utility of that meaning to a human being,where the patent system has no business being.

            Vehicles should be patentable. Public meanings should be copyrightable. Private meanings? GTFO.

            1. @ Martin

              An image is made with light. If it is of a face, you can look at it and recognise it.

              Data is numbers. Even if the numbers encode a face, you cannot see it or recognise the face just from the numbers. You need physical apparatus to convert the numbers to an image.

              There is a difference which should be perceptible to an idiot, or even a judge.

              1. What? An image is made of a photon flux array striking your retina.

                What is the difference between an image on a TV or IRL to your retina?

                Likewise what is the difference between a photon bounced off an object or a photon released from an LED?

                An image is three things: photons themselves (including media for generation and storage), any agreed upon social meaning (e.g. this is a house, that is a dog) and the personal experience of the image in the mind of a person.

                Just of those should be subject to patents.

                1. What? An image is made of a photon flux array striking your retina.

                  Not quite true.

                  The photon flux array exists whether or not it strikes a human retina.

            2. Mr. Snyder, until you grasp the concept of the legal term of utility, your comments along the lines of “the iceberg of the utility of that meaning to a human being, where the patent system has no business being.” only shows how little you understand of that which you want to advocate upon.

              Be informed before you decide to lock in your belief system.

                1. Wrong, wrong and wrong.

                  You pivot far too much on the “mind to perceive” and miss the fact of the objective presence that exists -with or without the mind to perceive.

    3. then it cannot be removed from eligibility by judicial exception without creating serious separation of powers issues.

      All they are doing is interpreting a statute to prevent the scheme from being unconstitutional. Far from being “a separation of powers issue” its the norm in all their interpretations. They assume Congress intended to act constitutionally and construe the statute as such. If Congress were to re-pass 101 and explicitly allow for, e.g. abstract ideas or natural laws with only token additions, the court would just declare the scheme unconstitutional because Congress’ patent power only extends to what promotes the sciences.

      There’s no mechanism by which you can teach the public nothing and still get a patent, because Congress doesn’t have that power. If you have a preexisting method and implementing it in a new field of use presents no technical problem, the patent either has to be obvious or it has to be ineligible. What you can’t have is a re-monopolization of something previously dedicated to the public when no new teaching is presented.

      Let me give you a simple analogy – right now nobody can live on Mars. If someone enables landing a person and living on Mars, that person can’t repatent everything that is done here on earth but doing it “on Mars” simply because there was no “on Mars” enablement (and thus was non-obvious) before. Unless the act requires some sort of new technological teaching growing out of the fact that Mars is a different environment than Earth, the patent would have the effect of 1) monopolizing the planet of mars because anything you could conventionally do on earth you would be prevented from doing there and 2) taking all of the acts previously dedicated to the public to use anywhere and re-apportioning it to a single individual. Those are not patent power acts.

      The fact that the office has routinely allowed for “old thing in new field despite no new technical teaching required” is why Alice is such a huge issue right now.

      1. Random, people want to read cases such as Darcy v. Allen, the so-called Case of Monopolies. One person in the kingdom have been given the right to import and sell playing cards regardless that they were not new. It was patents such as these that led to the Statute of Monopolies that sought to and granting of patents that did not bring new “trade” to England. Charles I ignored the statute, continue to grant monopoly patents to his friends, which eventually led to the English Civil War and his beheading.

        Obviously, we cannot grant patents that do not bring new trade to America because we, in our patent laws and in our Constitution, limited patents to inventions and discoveries within the useful arts which can be read to patents and inventions that bring new manufactures to America.

        So the question to me when considering a claimed invention is whether it actually is new, and whether it is arguably a manufacture of some kind, or a way of making something. Patents on trade that do not involve new technology, new things, new manufacturers, are what the Statute of Monopolies and the United States Constitution is all about.

        1. Except not – as you are again not giving proper credit to the plain words of Congress in the 1952 statute (35 USC 100(b).

          Your continued insistence on ignoring the plain words does not make those plain words disappear.

        2. Obviously, we cannot grant patents that do not bring new trade to America because we, in our patent laws and in our Constitution, limited patents to inventions and discoveries within the useful arts which can be read to patents and inventions that bring new manufactures to America.

          Obviously, that is bogus logic, being completely circular.

      2. Nobody thinks that abstract ideas or natural laws should be patentable, either in Europe or in the US.

        If you plot the eligible categories and the judicial exceptions on a Venn diagram, as I have done for lectures in the US, there is no intersection between the two.

        The problem comes when you broaden the exceptions to overlap the eligible categories and nibble away at them. Sequenom is one example, complying with the process category both in form and as a matter of substance, as I wrote in the CIPA amicus brief. Recognicorp is another.

        The words “directed to” in the Alice test is part of the problem. A process for cooking an omlette starts with eggs. It ends with an egg product. But that does not mean that the cooking method is directed to eggs, even if that is where Judge Reyna’s logic would point us.

      3. The fact that the office has routinely allowed for “old thing in new field despite no new technical teaching required” is why Alice is such a huge issue right now.

        What a crock.

    4. Great post and great Amicus Brief in Recognicorp. I have yet to see an official PTO position on the TRIPs issue (examiners are all over the place in Ex Parte appeals but that’s to be expected), and I would be very curious to see how the Federal Circuit would address it. It seems like a very clear issue under Charming Betsy. I’m keeping my fingers crossed for en banc review.

      Overall, there seems to be something clearly wrong when a judicial exception that was solely justified by pre-emption concerns is so often applied without any discussion of pre-emption. This is particularly true with respect to abstract ideas, where it is easy to characterize almost anything as abstract, and rare to see actual discussion of how a claim is at risk of pre-empting use of a specifically identified abstract idea.

      Cheers!

  5. If the office actually applied written description you wouldn’t have software wanting the abstract idea exception so much because you wouldn’t have every claim be directed to overbroad functional results. Imagine how any other field would be if you routinely foreclosed the act of solving a problem because someone may or may not have found a single solution.

    That being said, software is not the only place that this happens, and the eligibility test probably has to be as wide as it is.

    1. Your feelings are noted, Random.

      How is PoIr (sp?) doing with his Math(S) philosophy an dyour view of software’s “overbroad” issue?

        1. Random,

          PoIR is a gentlemen whose writing YOU have referenced (so your claim to not knowing him is more than a bit suspicious.

          He is a gentlemen that tends towards the philosophical end of the math/applied math/Math(S) philosophy spectrum and has written extensively on how equations have WIDE equivalencies (based on math principles).

          Readers may (or may not) be interested in knowing that THIS WAS THE SUM of a post that somehow was deemed “offensive” and was removed.

          That removed post had ZERO malicious “bite” to it. It does however, reflect Random’s own linked support for a position that makes Random’s views unsustainable.

          It is no doubt part of the problem of the ecosystem – and the perceptions of the OVER-editorial control and shaping of the desired messages to be had from conversations here – that this type of comment was removed. I can see no valid reason for its removal – because there is NO valid reason for its removal.

  6. The problem is I see it is that the Supreme Court in Benson and Bilski were asked whether mathematical algorithms claimed as part of a computer system, in the case of Benson, or business methods in the case of Bilski, presented subject matter that constituted a process within 101. But instead of answering the questions presented in either case, the court declared in Benson that mathematical algorithms are ideas, and in Bilski that “business methods” were abstract. Of course, ideas and abstractions were historically determined not to be patentable as such because of considerations that are better addressed under section 112 – the claimant has claimed far more than he has described and enabled. Whether the claims in Benson and Bilski were actually claiming the invention at the level of abstraction was never actually addressed.

    Alice attempted to rescue the situation by saying that a claim having abstract material – whatever it is – can still be patentable if it, as a whole, claims an inventive application. But this again is a matter that is best considered under 112 and really has nothing to do with whether the claimed subject matter is directed to subject matter described in 101.

    As a result, there seems to be mass confusion everywhere about why certain claims are declared ineligible under 101: are they declared ineligible because the subject matter is not within the four classes described in 101 or are they ineligible because they are claiming at the level of an idea?

    I think the simplest solution to this is to force the Supreme Court to go back to the drawing board and answer the questions presented to them in both Benson and Bilski. So if there is going to be a legislative solution, I would simply declare that Benson, Flook, Bilski and Alice are all overruled, with a suggestion by Congress that a programmed computer is hardly abstract or an idea, nor is a series of steps involving actions by human beings.

    In my observation, the MOT is what the Federal Circuit is now applying even though they do not say that they are applying the MOT. If left alone by Congress, the law would developing this direction naturally. But if Congress wanted to make itself very clear on this point, it could add a new section of 100 that a patentable process consists of – the MOT. That “test” is entirely supported in the case law, and it could be implemented without changing section 101 at all.

    1. That “test” is entirely supported in the case law

      You mean besides the Supreme Court case law that tossed MoT as a test 9-0 in Bilski or the Supreme Court case law that said MoT was not sufficient in Prometheus, or (likely), both?

      Because this point is not new to you Ned, I have to draw the conclusion that the rest of your well-meaning position is (also) critically flawed.

      1. Anon, the MOT was not disapproved is a test, just as an exclusive test.

        The MOT first appeared in Benson, was a basis for the decision in Diehr, and was approved of by the Supreme Court in Bilski – but not as an exclusive test.

        If Benson, Flook, Bilski and Alice are all reversed, MOT was still be available. But will not be available its holding claims unpatentable under 101 as directed to ideas or as abstract, or combination of these.

        1. Your views on MoT are simply untenable.

          A clue is simply not a test.

          Test implies that one must pass that test.

          It just is not so with MoT.

          1. Anon, just because the old parts of the claim pass the MOT does not mean that the claim as a whole passes the MOT. The Federal Circuit’s analysis in Mayo v. Prometheus left something to be desired.

            1. It is not only the Federal Circuit’s analysis that leaves something to be desired.

              You cannot even recognize your own position in the weeds.

    2. “nor is a series of steps involving actions by human beings. ”

      What? Why would that be an issue? Are you saying that a series of steps involving actions by human beings is not patentable?

      Methods are one of the four categories are they not? Who in your view carries out the steps of an eligible method?

        1. Yes, but you seem to also be saying that someone else has asserted the contrary, and while I am aware of an issue around “mental steps,” I am not aware of a broader “actions by human beings” controversy.

          1. The “mental steps” “issue” sure could use an academic examination explication showing the rise, fall, and current zombification efforts to turn that doctrine into an anti-software patent doctrine.

            And by “academic,” I mean an explication by a source that the anti-software “folks” will not dismiss out of hand.

            Funny then, that for as long as the zombification efforts have continued, that such an explication has been not performed.

            Such an explication would certainly clear the air and remove much obfuscation.

            1. Yes, well, each court stretches the judicial exceptions a little further. Mental steps stretches to include pencil and paper. Fundamental truths and basic building blocks gets stretched to cover shadow accounts. Its all result oriented judicial nonsense.

  7. A diverse group of representatives from academia, industry, law firms, and legal associations proposed legislative changes aimed at reversing the recent trend in the law.

    I’m curious: did any public interest groups who weren’t stakeholders or representatives of stakeholders chime in to the PTO to express their gratitude for the diminished number of pan-industry patent lawsuits being filed against them (e.g., “do it on a computer” patents where the novelty is the descriptive context (“wherein the input data is hotel reservation data”; wherein “said fields are movie preference input fields”; wherein “said display is dynamical and wherein said display provided personalized diagnostic information, wherein said diagnostic information is associated with maternally inherited cancer, and wherein said display is touch-sensitive”; etc etc etc)? Seems like there must have been groups like that commenting … but perhaps not. Probably some pre-selection taking place in terms of who responds.

    In contrast, a sizable portion of representatives from the software industry argued that the Court’s two-step test provides an appropriate standard for patent subject matter eligibility.

    So the obvious implication here is that nobody — no academics, no law firms, no “legal associations –other than some “sizable portion of representatives in the software industry” bothered to tell the PTO that they thought Alice got it right. Is that an accurate description of who provided feedback?

    1. Did you see the part about “the common law to evolve,” and Miss noting that the statutory law that is patent law is not up the Judicial Branch TO evolve?

      Your (snippy) comment about “the truth leaking out” would be appropriate here.

      1. I think the more correct term that should have been used here is “case law.”

        the statutory law that is patent law is not up the Judicial Branch TO evolve?

        This statement makes no sense in the context of our legal system. Courts intepret statutes. Interpretations involve because humans are doing the interpreting against an evolving set of facts and an evolving understanding of those facts.

        Basic stuff.

        1. This statement makes no sense in the context of our legal system.

          LOL – at the same time you want to crow “basic stuff,” you also want to get wrong the basic difference between statutory law and common law, and then double down by attempting to say that the simple and direct statement of mine makes no sense in the context of our legal system?

          You need to understand the basic stuff of that context, my friend.

          This is NOT about “evolving interpretations” – no matter if the Court attempts to scrivin their judicial activism as being merely “interpretation” (of which it most certainly is not).

          1. the simple and direct statement of mine makes no sense in the context of our legal system?

            You’re right. That simple and direct statement of yours makes no sense in the context of our legal system.

            This is NOT about “evolving interpretations”

            LOL

            Hey, you can believe whatever you want. Free country. But you’re wrong. And so plainly wrong that it makes me laugh. LOL! There, I laughed again.

            1. Way to take that reply out of context.

              A triple down on your obfuscation efforts.

              And your feelings about whether I am wrong or not are just that: your feelings.

      2. Yea, the common law as applied to a statute that codified and restated the law. Give me a break. It’s like saying the common law as applied to the speed limit statute. 35 usc 101 – already overturned various circuit pet creations concerning ‘subject matter’ exclusion.

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