Helsinn v. Teva: On Sale Bar Post AIA

by Dennis Crouch

Helsinn Healthcare v. Teva Pharma (Supreme Court 2018) [Helsinn cert petition]

Helsinn has now filed its much anticipated petition for writ of certiorari focusing on the question of how exactly the 2011 AIA changed the “on sale bar.”

Question Presented:

Whether, under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, an inventor’s sale of an invention to a third party that is obligated to keep the invention confidential qualifies as prior art for purposes of determining the patentability of the invention.

The well drafted petition from Williams & Connolly top Supreme Court lawyer Kannon Shanmugam has a good shot of being granted — especially if supported by a strong amicus brief from the Federal Government.  The difficulty here is that the petition asks the Supreme Court to shed an approach it has developed over the past 200 years without (in my view) a clear statutory statement from Congress.

Prior to the AIA, the On Sale Bar prevented the patenting of inventions that had been on-sale more than one year before the application’s filing date. 35 U.S.C. 102(b).  Pre-AIA, on sale activities include non-enabling secret offers to sell the invention (so long as the invention was otherwise ready-for-patenting).  Because most companies outsource elements of product development and manufacture — the rule has created potential for trapping the unwary.

I will return to this in a separate post, but the basic statutory question is whether the statutory revision eliminates secret or non-enabling sales (or some aspect thereof) from the scope of prior art.

Pre-AIA 102: A person shall be entitled to a patent unless … (b) the invention was … on sale in this country [before the critical date]

Post-AIA 102: A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . (1) the claimed invention was … on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the [critical date]

The statutory hook is the “otherwise available to the public” clause that the patentee here argues should be seen as also limiting the scope of the on sale bar to only include publicly available sales activity.  This statutory hook is coupled with supporting evidence from the AIA’s passage and about making prior art  is coupled with the USPTO’s interpretation of the statute in accord with Helsinn’s approach.

143 thoughts on “Helsinn v. Teva: On Sale Bar Post AIA

  1. 12

    One of the things the AIA repealed was 102(f) in order to overturn OddzOn products. Somehow, the powers behind the AIA thought this case was wrongly decided when the fact it was properly decided. We need OddzOn products.

    I have been involved situations where consultants and even patent attorneys were made familiar with existing processes that were secret. What they do? Even while 102(f) was still in place, they patented variations of these secret process. If such processes are not prior art to such faithless consultants, those patents are valid.

    It simply has to be that secret processes known to inventors – particularly hostile inventors – must be prior art to those inventors.

    So why did the powers that be removed 102(f) as a source of prior art given its seeming necessity? I don’t have a clue. The talk about transparency etc. A lot of smoke screens. The patent bar and Congress were not well served by these folks.

    I’m also fairly sure that in England where it was determined that a process was widely practiced, it made no difference that individual firms kept the subject confidential. It was considered to be in public use. I don’t see why the same should not be the case in the United States.

    Even if a process is not publicly known, practitioners of the process prior to the patent should not be liable for infringement. There should have been equitable intervening rights even before section 273 was passed.

    Also, MM makes a great point. It is beyond unethical for one to try to figure out, perhaps because actually know, what industry is doing and secret and then file patent applications on that for the purposes of asserting the patent against them. That as another reason why we need prior user rights.

    But again, I think that if a process is a widespread but secret use it is in fact in “public” use. I further think that a patent based upon an invention that is not one’s own should be invalid. Such people are hardly inventors, but more are like pirates and should be punished, if not imprisoned.

    1. 12.1

      Your “simply has to be” is not.

      I “get” that you do not like this.

      Talk to your Congressman, Senator, or both.

      The patent bar and Congress were not well served by these folks.

      Pretty much applies to most all of the AIA.

      I don’t see why the same should not be the case in the United States.

      Because our Sovereign has chosen differently. Please stop trying to make the US into an “England-lite.” We chose differently (now and more critically, at the start of this country) for good reasons that you would be better served understanding and accepting even though they may conflict with your personal (anti-deistic) views.

      Even if a process is not publicly known, practitioners of the process prior to the patent should not be liable for infringement.

      Most definitely NOT – spare the rod and all that. The best (and appropriately strong) patent system employs BOTH a carrot and a stick approach.

      There simply is NO appropriate reason for Prior User Rights.

      None.

      But again, I think that if a process is a widespread but secret use it is in fact in “public” use.

      That too is just not what Congress has stated.

      Again, talk to your Congressman, Senator, or both.

      further think that a patent based upon an invention that is not one’s own should be invalid. Such people are hardly inventors,…

      Where (and how) would you draw the line on “Improvement Inventions?” We already have protection against true fraud on the Office. We is it that you would think that more is needed?

      1. 12.1.1

        anon, when a purported inventor actually is filing on the invention of another he cannot provide a proper declaration without committing perjury. I would hope that any court would find any patent issued on such a declaration unenforceable.

        But, what about obvious variations? It seems to me the declaration is not a lie and the patent is valid unless the prior invention/secret use is prior art.

        1. 12.1.1.1

          anon, when a purported inventor actually is filing on the invention of another he cannot provide a proper declaration without committing perjury. I would hope that any court would find any patent issued on such a declaration unenforceable.

          Thanks for repeating back to me my point to you.

          But, what about obvious variations? It seems to me the declaration is not a lie and the patent is valid unless the prior invention/secret use is prior art.

          What about it? If, – as you state – the declaration is not a lie, then what exactly are you complaining about? Your notion of “obvious variation” appears to (purposefully) disassociate from the legal meaning of obviousness. It matters not at all – not one whit – how much an improvement an invention is over something secret, as the choice to keep that initial matter secret carries that risk – and always appropriately did so under a strong patent system.

          Choosing NOT to share and attempting to penalize anyone choosing to share (keeping in mind your admission that the term of inventor properly holds) is anathema to the very purpose of having a patent system.

          As I have stated in other places, I begrudge no one the choice to go the Trade Secret path. But when you start elevating that path OVER the patent path, then I have some serious reservations about your true intent.

    2. 12.2

      Ned, yes, those situations can occur, if application filing is avoided or delayed. But, AIA patents still require correct inventor designations, including joint inventors, and inventorship oaths, for what is being claimed. Also there could be a IC issue for asserting to the PTO patentable novelty in claim features or claim elements not original to, or contributed by, any of the named inventors.
      If the disclosure of a trade secret to a contractor or consultant was pursuant to a confidentiality agreement there is trade secret law recourse. If the disclosure was made without any express or implied confidentiality agreement the trade secrecy was being blown anyway.

      1. 12.2.1

        Paul, I know there are breach of contract remedies for disclosing a trade secret. But if the ex employee/consultant/patent attorney files on an obvious variation, there may be no contract or trade secret remedy. That is why OddzOn was and still is so necessary.

        1. 12.2.1.1

          Why is disclosing someone else’s trade secret in a patent specification which is publicly disclosed NOT both a breach of a confidentiality contract AND a trade secret law damages case?

          1. 12.2.1.1.1

            Paul, if what is disclosed and claimed is an obvious variation of what is being used by the principal, then what is disclosed is not the trade secret property of the principal. Of course, without that background process being public or prior art to the applicant under 102(f), the variation would not be obvious over that which is publicly known.

            I have carefully limited my remarks to variations not in use by the principal, but which may be on their road map even if they do not appreciate it yet.

            Recall the Japanese use to do this to foreign company patents — surround them on all sides with patents on obvious variations so that the company eventually would have to deal with the Japanese.

            1. 12.2.1.1.1.1

              Ned,

              You cannot have it both ways.

              The item shared either IS a Trade Secret violation, of the Trade Secret holder has no legitimate course of action against the (even just a obvious** variant) other inventor.

              Further, you continue to attempt to use the word “obvious” improperly. There is no such legal thing as an obvious variant of something that could not on its own serve as obvious (as the proper legal understanding of that term bears) to the other inventor.

              This is a just and due risk of NOT sharing and choosing the Trade Secret path.

              1. 12.2.1.1.1.1.1

                “Surround” patenting was a different situation, in which pending, unpublished, applications filed in Japan [based on U.S. parents] were allegedly disclosed to Japanese competitors by their MITI agency before their publication and filed-on before those publications. In one E.K. case a “surround” improvement patent even copied a mistake in the unpublished application. In other cases the U.S. and Japanese companies had joint ventures and the base invention was disclosed to the joint venture partner before filing.

            2. 12.2.1.1.1.2

              Recall the Japanese use to do this to foreign company patents — surround them on all sides with patents on obvious variations so that the company eventually would have to deal with the Japanese.

              And this is a perfectly legitimate exercise.

              What then is your problem?

  2. 11

    Ned and I have been discussing in this thread trade secrets and PUR, in the context of inventions of interest to national defence.

    Ned are you aware of the very long-standing NATO Agreement that allows patenting throughout the NATO area, while keeping as a secret (even till after the patent expires) the subject matter of the patent? Does that not assuage your concerns?

    If not, here’s a link:

    link to en.wikipedia.org

    1. 11.1

      MaxDrei,

      You overstate what is being allowed. (hint: what is being allowed is the cross-alliance-nation filing – the actual grant and use thereof remains constrained by any one nation’s secrecy orders)

      A deeper link is: link to treaties.un.org

      The more you post, MaxDrei, the more apparent it is that you have no actual experience in these types of matters.

      1. 11.2.1

        Neither did MaxDrei (and here, I am talking about what the treaty actually states, as provided by my deeper link)

  3. 10

    Meanwhile: “Pharma Bro” Martin Shkreli admitted that he was “very far from blameless” in a letter to a judge asking for leniency, according to court filings. “I was wrong, I was a fool. I should have known better,” Shkreli wrote in his letter to Brooklyn federal court Judge Kiyo Matsumoto. “I accept the fact that I made serious mistakes, but I still believe that I am a good person with much potential,” Shkreli said.

    Hey, Martin, you can always write patent articles for Big Jeans’ blog, even in prison. Or maybe start your own. You can call it “The Broken Scoreboard”.

    1. 10.1

      You associated the “broken scoreboard” in an entirely dishonest manner, as that person has never referenced the concept.

      This is yet another flavor of the all too typical Accuse Others, being YOU are at least as dishonest as the person (Shkreli) you are attempting to pan.

      1. 10.1.1

        You associated the “broken scoreboard” in an entirely dishonest manner,

        Not at all because Martin Shkreli and you have a lot in common, “anon.” More than you’ll ever be able to understand … unless you get some really expensive therapy which you can’t afford because you’re professional incompetence is so severe.

        1. 10.1.1.1

          perhaps freed from the filter:

          Your comment is awaiting moderation.

          March 6, 2018 at 8:37 am

          Not at all because Martin Shkreli and you have a lot in common, “anon.”

          Utter B$ – and as pointed out, it is YOU and Shkreli that have that “lot in common.”

          And there is no need for any therapy of any kind (expensive of otherwise) to see your Accuse Others meme in action.

          Man, does it s u c k to be you.

  4. 9

    This issue was first debated by Arkwright as justification for his non disclosure of the secrets of his carding machine, a technology that made England an economic powerhouse at the time: Whether the national interest requires that significant technical advances that put the nation into economic leadership be treated as national secrets or published that the world might use them in competition.

    The English courts were unimpressed with the argument and invalidated his patent. I still think Arkwright had a point and that we should consider some way to keep such technology secret. Obviously, new manufactures and machines can be reversed-engineered justifying a patent system to protect such. But, manufacturing technology is entirely different.

      1. 9.1.1

        anon, but it was raised in the discussion: trade secret vs. patent protection vs. prior user rights. There is another issue and I raise it here. It is the same reason we must impose tariffs on steel and aluminum: to maintain a national industry. Those who do not understand the national security implications, but only argue economics, are the problem.

        1. 9.1.1.1

          I understand that there is more TO “the issue” than merely the legal issue at hand.

          But that does not mean that your insertion of other “legal” wrinkles is on point.

          Specifically, the legal point that you present from Arkwright will only lead to confusion of the actual legal point here.

          Yes, other aspects are important (and note as well that I also discuss the other aspects). But I do not use those other aspects as a dust-kicking on the particular legal point.

          In fact, if you bothered to read my posts with any sense of openness, you would see that my points form a cohesive view, not only of the legal point directly at issue, but also as to the proper legal position of the accompanying topics.

          It is (often) as you may MIS-interpret the point at hand, and then use your selective historical remembrances (while omitting critical items particular to the US experience) that you end up doubling down on being not only off-point, but remain off on the actual legal point at hand.

          1. 9.1.1.1.1

            “anon” my points form a cohesive view

            LOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOL

            It’s cwazee time, folks!

            LOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOL

          2. 9.1.1.1.2

            Arkwright erred on by putting the cart before the horse. He should have negotiated non publication (or restricted publication) before he got his patent or before his specification was accepted.

            From a recent article written about Arkwright, it appears the British Crown did in fact prohibit the export of carding technology at some point in time. This might be considered a Pyrrhic victory of sorts by Arkwright.

  5. 8

    “anon”: the “smarter” play would be to not devastate the patent directly

    Who on earth cares about a patent being “devastated”?

    Hardly anybody owns them and that’s always going to be the case.

    Someone’s patent gets tanked by some prior art that they weren’t aware of … oh noes! BFD. Happens all the time. The difference with secret prior use is that the fruits of the technology are actually in hands of the public *and* the public is free to practice the “secret” process after it reverse engineers or arrives at the process independently.

    So who cares about “the patent”? I mean other than low rent patent attorneys like yourself who need every last ounce of work they can scrounge up because they would otherwise be outcompeted in the attorney marketplace. Why should anyone except the patentee be bothered because a patent was “devastated” by the discovery that someone else was already practicing the claimed method?

    Please tell everyone without invoking your and Ron’s ridiculously self-serving and transparent b.s. that “nobody will innovate and nobody will invest” unless you get your way. Go for it, guys!

    Note that I’m not suggesting that there is not, somewhere, a compelling argument for the result you seek. But you aren’t making it. And lurking in the background is the obvious fact that, waiting in the wings, as always, is this group of well-heeled ethically bankrupt rent-seeking scriveners who file applications based on what they assume BigCorp is doing.

    1. 8.1

      The answer to your question of “who cares” is already in the post.

      As to the rest of your rant, there is nothing there but your usual screed.

  6. 7

    Ron Katznelson, cracking me up:

    Paul and Max, have you ever sat in an investor presentation where a patent holder for a new powerful process that solves a long-recognized problem seeks an investment in his technology?

    News flash, folks: Ron has never sat in one of these meetings either, as far as anybody can tell. But he loves waxing on about it! Mmmmmm, “investors”. “Powerful process.” So exciting!

    C’mon, kids, let’s make sure Ron continues to have as much as possible. More patents for everybody! Crank it up to eleven! It’s all about him.

    1. 7.1

      Kind of you, MM, to show us that quote from Ron. I laughed too. Ron fantasizes about investors piling in, and then suing for infringement a BigCorp who has been basing its profits on Ron’s invention for years prior to Ron’s priority date.

      Ron dreams that he’s going to identify and move against the infringing acts committed after his patent issues, when the same acts that happened before his filing date are totally invisible to him.

      Ron supposes that when a potential investor muses to him that BigCorp might have been aware of Ron’s invention for years, the Investor’s thought is not that there are infringers out there to be milked but rather that i) BigCorp might already have done the work to establish that Ron’s invention is, sadly, a lemon and that ii) Ron’s specification falls short of an enabling disclosure how to commercialize the invention profitably.

      Ron, you can take this as another “insult” from me, if it pleases you to do so. Feel free.

      I have to warn you, gentle reader, as to PUR in a FtF landscape, beware of know-it-all Chickens Little running around, squawking that the sky is about to fall in. But it’s entertaining, I’ll give them that.

      1. 7.1.2

        Max, you make good point here I make another point at post 9 and would like your comment on that.

        But on this point, the Supreme Court in Kewanee Oil upheld the constitutionality of state trade secret protection because a decision to keep a process secret would run the risk that a third party might discover and patent the secret and eventually move against the original inventor. Thus regardless of the risk or nonrisk taken by the startup, it is the fact that they exist which is important to the Supreme Court. Remove the risk of third-party patenting of a trade secret by prior user rights, and the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Kewanee Oil would suggest that a trade secret protection would be unconstitutional.

        The alternative argument would be that the recent trade secrets act and the authorization of prior user rights expresses the policy of Congress in favor of trade secret protection which the Supreme Court would respect absent some mandate by the Constitution itself.

        1. 7.1.2.1

          Ned, I hardly know where to start, in addressing your invitation to discourse on national security.

          The UK Patents Act has a complete chapter of provisions about Government use of patented inventions “for the services of the Crown”. Then there is the NATO Agreement on the mutual safeguarding of inventions of defence interest. More recently, there is the current activity in Germany to address the problem that China has acquired the national champion in robotics manufacturing. At what point does a NATO member veto share dealing in industries relevant to national defence?

          The Crown User provisions allow HMG to use patented inventions for the services of the Crown, and pay compensation afterwards. The Nato Agreement allows HMG to impose secrecy on patents, if necessary indefinitely.

          Serious people have chewed through these issues ages ago. The UK statute with all this stuff, these finely tuned and proportionate checks and balances in it was enacted in 1949, long before patent law got sexy, and interesting for the carpetbaggers. Even the 1973 belongs to the time when patent law written by experts, undisturbed by the monetarizers and creative accountants.

          1. 7.1.2.1.1

            1949, long before patent law got sexy, and interesting for the carpetbaggers

            Wow – that is an ignorant statement on so many levels.

            1. 7.1.2.1.1.1

              “anon” that is an ignorant statement on so many levels.

              Please identify just three of these “many levels,” Billy.

              1. 7.1.2.1.1.1.1

                The year,
                The reference to carpetbaggers,
                Patent law has always been “sexy”

          2. 7.1.2.1.2

            The US also focuses on military, space and nuclear technology. Encryption is right up there, on the top. But clearly, the German initiative regarding robotics seems to shine a light on technology critical to German manufacturing that needs to be husbanded.

            Suppose, for the sake of argument, that I was the inventor of a new method of making silicon-carbide, the next gen substrate for integrated circuits. This technology may actually be critical to the manufacture of ICs in the future. The problem I see in seeking patent protection is that a patent application publication instructs the entire world while protection is national. I sorely wish there was some way I could delay publication of the US specification until after the eventual US patent expires. I know already that international protection without publication is impossible.

            Then again, it is not up to me, the inventor, to create national policy, but to abide by it. But it certainly seems to me that the US Congress should address the issue of national security more broadly than just military, space and nuclear technology. I would think the technology behind the manufacturing of integrated circuits to be right up there as something that should not be shared outside the US.

            1. 7.1.2.1.2.1

              Ned see my #11 above. You write that international protection without publication is “impossible”. That simply isn’t so. See, people had thought of that, and devised a solution, back in 1960.

        2. 7.1.2.2

          and the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Kewanee Oil would suggest that a trade secret protection would be unconstitutional.

          Even with my “Ned-IMHO” glasses on, I cannot see even this in that case.

          Where do you see any support for such a statement?

          1. 7.1.2.2.1

            anon, “We conclude that the extension of trade secret protection to clearly patentable inventions does not conflict with the patent policy of disclosure. Perhaps because trade secret law does not produce any positive effects in the area of clearly patentable inventions, as opposed to the beneficial effects resulting from trade secret protection in the areas of the doubtfully patentable and the clearly unpatentable inventions, it has been suggested that partial pre-emption may be appropriate, and that courts should refuse to apply trade secret protection to inventions which the holder should have patented, and which would have been, thereby, disclosed.[20] However, since there is no real possibility that trade secret law will conflict with the federal policy favoring disclosure of clearly patentable inventions partial pre-emption is inappropriate. ”

            The assumption made is that trade secret protection is weak because it does not prevent independent invention which the court deemed highly likely thereby forcing the inventor to seek a patent to enjoy exclusivity. Today, with the advance in protection of trade secrets, I am not so sure that trade secret protection is not sufficient. I am also not convince that others can invent secret processes all that quickly.

            Just for example, why is it that it takes countries like Iran or Pakistan or India that do not have access to the data and techniques developed by the Manhattan Project, many decades to build an atom bomb? With enough security, trade secret protection can keep fundamental advances from rapidly spreading.

      2. 7.1.3

        “when the same acts that happened before his filing date are totally invisible to him.”

        Max, you mentioned that prior use rights are infrequently an issue, but didn’t really provide a reason why they should be protected. At a minimum, PUR lessen the motivation to disclose ASAP. Under a system without PUR, anyone can protect themselves for free by publishing on the net a description of their process. So why should PUR be observed?

            1. 7.1.3.1.1.1

              Ben,

              There are plenty of reasons for protection (Ned’s cited case does discuss several of them).

              That being said, there is ZERO reason why patent rights should be diminished in any manner by the NON-Article I Section 8 allocation of authority to the Legislative Branch to write the Federal statutory law that is patent law.

              And yet, people are only too eager to conflate the different “times of protection”

            2. 7.1.3.1.1.2

              The whole point is to not publish one’s valuable trade secrets.

              NOT

              PUBLISH.

              is the WHOLE point and objective of prior user rights.

              Any system that actually forces one to publish one’s trade secrets in the first place is a very bad system, IMHO.

              I also think it is a bad idea to publish the trade secrets to the world as a condition of obtaining a patent. This has to be rethought.

              1. 7.1.3.1.1.2.1

                The point of the patent system is to promote progress in the useful arts.

                How does saying ‘if you use this in secret, we will protect you from other people who actually disclosed the same ideas to the public’ promote progress in the useful arts?

                Trade secrets are not otherwise without risk, correct? Why isn’t this just another risk in the trade secret calculus?

                1. Why PUR? Ben, the way I see it is as follows:

                  I hope we agree, that innovation enriches everybody. We should do all we can to encourage it.

                  One excellent way is to provide a system of patents: a period of exclusivity, contingent on the giving, at the outset, of an enabling disclosure.

                  But that’s not the only way to foster innovation. In general, fostering trust in business partnering does it too. Trade secret law nurtures trust.

                  To maximise innovation, all tools in the encouragement box need to be sharp and specialised. A balance is needed, between the cutting edge of the patent tool and the cut of the PUR tool.

                  In Europe, PUR is there, but strictly confined, to protect parties who already invested heavily in commercialization of an invention. The “U” of PUR means what it says.

                  Do you not have in the USA some reticence about applying retrospective changes in the law to parties who took the earlier law as they found it, in all good faith? Do you not see, that parties who have already sunk a lot of money into commercializing innovation are to be commended, and deserve some “slack” against Johnny Come Lately’s who only invent, file later and are lucky enough to bamboozle the PTO into granting them a right they can assert against all and sundry.

                  Don’t make the elementary and one-eyed patent attorney mistake, of supposing that the economy revolves around the patent system. It’s the other way round. Or should be. Patent rights are a restraint of trade and need to be strictly constrained. Just like PUR rights need to be. OK?

                2. Utter balderdash: “Trade secret law nurtures trust.

                  Quite the opposite.

                  There is NO nurturing – Trade Secret law is enforced through the threat of force through law suit of a personal nature.

                  Your view that “patents cut” while closing your eyes to the knife edge of Trade Secret law is “a hoot.”

                  How often have YOU personally been involved with PURs? You speak of them as if purely from a textbook, even while you heap disdain on Ron K. Your posts come across as shallow and merely being a mouthpiece, MaxDrei.

                  Even your view of patents is hackneyed and contradictory.

                  Contrast “I hope we agree, that innovation enriches everybody. We should do all we can to encourage it.” with “ Patent rights are a restraint of trade and need to be strictly constrained.

                  You simply do not get patents at all. No matter how many times you have been “around the block.”

      3. 7.1.4

        MaxDrei,
        Like I said, your comment exposes the scope of your ignorance about the nature of due diligence investors and startups go through. It shows that you are clueless about how the uncertainty of the scope of secret art vs alleged patentable subject matter in pending patent applications must be represented to investors. So to you “gentle reader” of the startup community, just ignore Max’s nonsense; talk to your M&A patent asset counsel and find out how you should navigate through your disclosure obligations to investors. Then talk to your Congressional representative and explain how PUR “helps” you raise capital.

        1. 7.1.4.1

          Ron,

          MaxDrei is on the order of Malcolm (except far less ad hominem).

          He is a shill and is not capable of any cogent interaction.

  7. 6

    Ron, the cert “Question” here starts with “Whether, under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act….” I.e, properly asking a specific legal question, rather than making a statement or argument or going into a background discussion of the prior case law [which the brief itself does, where it belongs]. [Unlike some poor cert petitions.] [And “Whether” is a shorter version of “Whether or not”]
    From the briefs lengthy prior case list:
    “Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1 (1829) …………..[pp] 5, 26 ”

    There is no constitutionality issue here, since this is not a challenge to bars against patenting previously publicly available n products. Nor has their ever been a constitutional challenge to Fed. Cir. and other Metallizing Engineering Doctrine case law.

    1. 6.1

      Paul, I think the point is that the question assumes that an on sale bar is prior art. On the one hand, prior art is that which is already available to the public. On sale, by the inventor, only require commercial exploitation, and it does not require disclosure of the invention.

      The petition openly is trying to confuse and conflate, just like the arguments made to Congress.

      1. 6.1.1

        It is Congress that sets the rules of the patent game, Ned.

        You keep on wanting a different branch of the government to do that.

        “New to you” is the official “new.”

      2. 6.1.2

        Ned, your view that an “on sale” only applies to the inventor and was not prior art if done by anyone else is the opposite of the position of respected patent law treatise writer Robert Harmon citing In re Epstein (Fed Cir. 1994), J.A. LaPorte Inc. v. Norfolk Dredging Co. (Fed Cir. 1986), and Milliken Res. Corp. v. Dan River Inc. (Fed Cir. 1984) and Baker Oil Tools Inc. v. Geo Van Inc. (Fed Cir. 1987).

  8. 5

    Is there an elephant in the room? I mean, if “available to the public” qualifies “on sale” then an inventor of, say, a new and improved injection molding process can extract more than 20 years of exclusivity with an initial period of, say 20 years of keeping it a trade secret followed by 20 years of patent protection. Isn’t it abhorrence of that possibility (40 years of exclusive rights on the invention) which is prejudicing the judges of the CAFC, and decisive to the outcome, thus far?

    This elephant was, albeit rather briefly, a big issue in Europe in the 1970’s when the EPC, with its “or otherwise made available to the public” formulation was the new patent law kid on the European block.

    If not an elephant, why then is it not mentioned, either by Judge O’Malley or by Petitioner Helsinn?

    I mean, it is not as if the AIA abolished “secret prior art”. Just as before, also under the AIA obviousness attacks will continue to be routinely built around secret prior art.

    Or is it me? Am I the one who is overlooking something important?

    1. 5.1

      can extract more than 20 years of exclusivity with an initial period of, say 20 years of keeping it a trade secret followed by 20 years of patent protection. Isn’t it abhorrence of that possibility (40 years of exclusive rights on the invention) which is prejudicing the judges of the CAFC, and decisive to the outcome, thus far?

      That’s no elephant – that is the clear ERROR that I discuss below. (and yes, you are overlooking something important)

      Trade Secret law has its genesis OUTSIDE of the realm of patent law.

      As noted, Congress has chosen for our Sovereign to make “new to you” as the new “new” for patent purposes.

      And at core, why not? If after ANY length of time of a Trade Secret, the item can still obtain a patent, then the bargain of the Quid Pro Quo is still fully recognized.

    2. 5.2

      Max, those behind the legislation continue to conflate and confuse “prior art,” which is applicable to all because it is in the public domain, or legally in the public domain by statute, with the on-sale bar, which is a personal bar to the inventor/applicant. The on-sale bar prevents the inventor from exploiting the invention commercially prior to filing an application in a manner that does not itself create prior use “by others” prior art. The policy is discussed in Pennock, which those behind the AIA never brought to the attention of Congress. Not once, as far as I can tell. They intended to confuse Congress, and some of the things that Senators and others said about secret prior art said was complete nonsense. (One of the things I can recall is that without this proviso third-party Chinese secret use would become prior art to American applications because the scope of public use would become worldwide. Where in the world that they get that?) It is almost as if the people behind the AIA were committing fraud on the court – instead they were committing fraud and Congress – by misrepresenting the law.

      It is the same folks a gave us IPR’s. The brief goes out of its way to comment approvingly on these post-grant proceedings. That gives me pause for a different reason. I don’t think I can trust these folks or the folks behind this petition at all. They do not have the best interests of the United states patent system in mind.

      1. 5.2.2

        Yes OK Ned but the reality is that replacing FtI with FtF changes the foundations so much as to render Pennock logic no longer viable, under the AIA.

        One always had a choice whether or not to file, and if so, when. But under FtF, the penalty for any tardiness in filing can be disastrous. I mean, not only no patent for you, my friend, but worse than that, a valid and enforceable patent for your ugliest competitor. No amount of lab notebook writing, no amount of diligence, no acts of actual reduction to practice will get you out of the hole.

        As a way to “promote the progress”, therefore, Ftf is unrivalled. with 18 month A publication of a disclosure that enables over the full scope of the claim it gets even more promotional. An “on sale bar” brings no further promotional advantage. Under FtF it is superfluous. It muddies the legal landscape, deprives business of legal certainty and therefore retards rather than promotes progress. It has no place in any FtF jurisdiction.

        As the USA gets to find its way around the new FtF landscape it too will come to this realisation.

        1. 5.2.2.1

          Max, two points: 1. Prior user rights. 2. This from Pennock citing the English, the source of the rule:

          In the case of Wood vs. Zimmer, 1 Holt’s N.P. Rep. 58, this doctrine was fully recognised by lord chief justice Gibbs. There the inventor had suffered the thing invented to be sold, and go into public use for four months before the grant of his patent; and it was held by the court, that on this account the patent was utterly void. Lord chief justice Gibbs said, “To entitle a man to a patent, the invention must be new to the world. The public sale of that which is afterwards made the subject of a patent, though sold by the inventor only, makes the patent void.” By “invention,” the learned judge undoubtedly meant, as the context abundantly shows, not the abstract discovery, but the thing invented; not the new secret principle, but the manufacture resulting from it.

          1. 5.2.2.1.1

            Ned, two replies. Prior user rights are needed, lest the prior user be stopped, by the enforcement of the patent, from doing that which he started, in all good faith, prior to the filing of the patent application. Any defensible patent system needs to provide such rights.

            The Wood case point is relevant if we ask ourselves, what is the quid pro quo of the patent system. Is it to encourage inventors to make an early enabling disclosure to the public, that disclosure promoting the progress? Or is it to encourage investment in innovation in manufacturing business? If the former, then we need to distinguish between the sort of public use that makes the claimed subject matter available to the public, and that which does not. Europe, under the EPC, did all this in the 1970’s and 80’s. But the judge in Wood surely never saw that distinction, did he?

            These days, I expect more from our patent judges.

            1. 5.2.2.1.1.1

              Prior User Rights are neither sensible nor needed.

              Spare the rod – spoil the child.

              All that Prior User Rights does is spoil the child and weaken the stick aspect of a carrot and stick approach.

              (MaxDrei, you should note that Ned claims to have has a hand in the original Prior User Rights legislation)

              1. 5.2.2.1.1.1.1

                I agree with Anon, but let me be a bit more specific as to why I do.

                Prior user rights (PUR) are an anathema to the patent system. Consider the scenario where two inventors A and B both come up with the same invention, inventor A chooses to patent, and inventor B chooses to practice the invention as a trade secret. Under a legal system with no PUR and with a personal bar to patenting after secret commercial use (as was in pre-AIA times), inventor A, the inventor that chose to patent, elected to assume only one risk – the risk of disclosure in exchange for exclusive rights for a limited time. On the other side, inventor B who chose to maintain the invention as a trade secret runs two risks. First, by commercial use of a trade secret,and not filing for a patent, inventor B forfeited the right to ever obtain the patent. Second, should the patent issue to inventor A, it would be enforceable against all, including against inventor B, the trade-secret inventor. The quid pro quo of the patent system is the reward of a right to exclude, in exchange for disclosure. But only one inventor can hold a patent for the invention, and thus the dual risk for B is an incentive to be inventor A rather than inventor B.

                Under a legal system with PUR, things are turned over: the trade secret user, inventor B, may have a defense against a patent issued to A, who made the disclosure for the patent right. Inventor A would never be confident that the patent can be enforceable against a major competitor. The PUR system thus transfers enormous risks to those who participate in the patent system from those who do not. It fundamentally shifts the reward from those who make their inventions public to those who keep their ideas secret.

                A shift to a PUR system favors large market incumbents over startups and small disruptive innovators. Large market incumbents have sufficient market power without patents and their choice to be inventor B makes inventor A’s risk larger because of their inability to appropriate returns from a larger share of the market.

                To those who argue that PUR is fair because it protects substantial investments, I say that substantial investments in new technologies can, and should be protected by participating in the patent system – not by undermining it. In essence, PUR makes prior use akin to prior art, equating, illogically, a secret with a public good. Our Forefathers had some experience with the ills of hoarded secret technologies from the guilds in Europe and wanted instead to encourage disclosure in order to promote the progress of the useful arts. A shift away into a PUR system is a recipe for undermining a patent system.

                1. Ron, it depends. When you have had a lifetime of experience of FtF + PUR, you will see it differently.

                  The only defence to being enjoined by the patent owner is when the accused commercial act is one that the accused has been doing, continuously, since before the priority date of the asserted claim. The defence is narrow; the act must be exactly the same, for the defence to succeed. Hardly surprising then, that the defence is seldom invoked. You know, I cannot recall a single case since the CPC was done in 1973 when it succeeded.

                  But it’s there, just in case.

                  You say it turns everything over. I see it’s a Once in a Blue Moon event.

                  I recall that when the AIA was going through Congress there were many Chicken Little commentators telling us that the sky would fall. It seems that they haven’t wearied yet, of running around warning of disaster.

                2. Hmm,

                  The insertion of the little “emoticons” appears to have been negated by editorial control.

                  I wanted to signify agreement with Ron’s excellent post with the “handshake” icon.

                  I would rebut MaxDrei’s attempt (below) that some sense of “fairness” is present with PUR, as well as the false notion of frequency of use of the defense as any indicator that the defense is just.

                  First, as Ron so eloquently states, PUR undermines the “stick” portion of the carrot and stick approach, and heavily weighs in favor of the large trans-national type Big Corp as yet another reason NOT to share (when they feel that they do not want to share).

                  Giving a reason (and protection) for NOT sharing can only logically be viewed as anti-patent. to clothe this “anti-patent” in the sheepskin of equity belies that lack of understanding that the patent system seeks to (as Ron notes) make the choice of being type Inventor A more worthwhile than being type Inventor B. The notion of “equity” attempted with “protecting” Inventor B – no matter how “Blue Moon” or infrequent any subsequent use may be does not change the nature of that action.

                  As Ron points out, the damage is already done in the undermining of the certainty that SHOULD be present in the choice to pursue patent protection.

                  One thing though that I will correct Ron’s “A” and “B” notion though: the original*** Quid Pro Quo presented was not for a mere chance at a patent with the exchange of the information released to the public. Rather, the exchange was far more substantial (and balanced) in that an applicant was to be able to see that a patent was or was not likely BEFORE the publication hit.

                  ***this deal was denigrated with the move to a de facto timed publication stance – a stance that can be defused with the extra step of a non-publication request. It is standard practice with all of our clients that we advise them to take this non-publication request as a default, and then add a later review milestone for those items that employ a world wide effort that would necessitate rescinding the non-publication request. Further, the guarantees put in place with Patent Term Adjustment are there in substantial part as a type of prodding of the government to take substantial examination effort on the application prior to the publication mark so that applicants could still decide whether or not to pull the application prior to publication.

                  It would be a mistake to “easily” switch thinking of what the Quid Pro Quo is meant to be from a meaningful exchange to a mere “lottery” – and a poor one at that, seeing as at the point of publication, the government has taken the entirety of their side of the bargain (leaving NO impetus to be reasonable, either in timing or effort, with the applicant) .

                3. There is no Fed. Cir. decision in which anyone has ever defeated a patent suit with either the old or the AIA expanded commercial prior user rights statute. I did that research myself a few years ago. There are also additional restraints on trying to use that statute besides the one’s Max mentioned.
                  Thus, irrespective of the public patent disclosures of inventions policy arguments against such a statute, it is not being used in patent litigation.

                  On the different issue here, of tacking a patent protection term onto a long trade secret protection term, that concern is eliminated if either the Fed. Cir. or the Sup. Ct. holds that the personal forfeture or estoppel of Judge Learned Hands Metallizing Engineering doctrine was NOT eliminated by the AIA.

                4. Ron, even before prior user rights, and under first-to-invent, big companies did not publish their critical manufacturing processes in any way whatsoever, including in patents. This would be like giving that technology to their competitors for nothing. (As a corollary to this, if one sees a patent on a process from a major company, this typically is a dead end.)

                  As anyone can understand, big company competitors cannot typically sue each other for patent infringement because they will be countersued. No one can win such a war except the lawyers. That is why they either refrain from starting a war in the first place, or they actively cross-license their competitors to prevent one.

                  So there already exists multiple reasons for why there are very few if any patent lawsuits between major companies over process patents. The presence or absence prior user rights changes nothing, or very little, in this regard.

                5. Paul,

                  To put it as bluntly as possible, your statement of:

                  On the different issue here, of tacking a patent protection term onto a long trade secret protection term, that concern is eliminated if either the Fed. Cir. or the Sup. Ct. holds that the personal forfeture or estoppel of Judge Learned Hands Metallizing Engineering doctrine was NOT eliminated by the AIA.

                  is as UNTHINKING as possible.

                  Employ some critical thinking please.

                6. Paul: There is no Fed. Cir. decision in which anyone has ever defeated a patent suit with either the old or the AIA expanded commercial prior user rights statute.

                  Looking in the dark for a lost item only under a lamp-post will get you nothing. Federal Circuit decisions that (years later) deal with a minute fraction of patent disputes hardly tell the real story. More importantly, PUR patent disputes never reach litigation. This is because when the alleged infringer can reasonably document prior commercial use, both parties have a substantial interest in a confidential settlement, even if their perspectives on the strength and merits of their respective cases diverge. The settlement may also address (i) patent claims to which there is no PUR defense, and (ii) potential technology transfer from which both parties may benefit. Under such settlement, the prior user gets to keep his trade secret and also helps to maintain the credibility of the patent against his other competitors; the patentee benefits from that retained credibility against those having no prior user defense, without premature exposure to potential invalidity challenges under Sections 101-103 and 112, otherwise raised by the purported prior user.

                  Another reason one does not hear much about the effect of PUR is because the greatest harm the law inflicts does not result in any patent disputes – it is the invisible chilling effect on investments in patented methods and processes that may be subject to PUR:

                  Paul and Max, have you ever sat in an investor presentation where a patent holder for a new powerful process that solves a long-recognized problem seeks an investment in his technology? Have you witnessed the investors ask: “Big tech Co. which has a 60% market share, has been working on this problem for a long time. How do we know that they have not already discovered your method and that your patent would be unenforceable against 60% of the market? How do we even begin to assign any valuation to your proposed venture?” You can see where this would be going….

                  Ned, it appears that you too are missing the point. The fact that Big tech Cos. already resorted to secrecy and cross-licensing prior to the expansion of PUR in the AIA is no proof that PUR has had no adverse impact on other smaller entities. As explained above, PUR effects are not only invisible when asserted (confidential settlements) but are also invisible as the source of chilling effects on investments. As so typical with most recent patent legislation, the harm is mostly to startups, small entities, and individual inventors.

                7. Ron, I have to say, your new offering at 3:12 pm is a hoot.

                  As to your “have you ever been present…” question, no I have never been present at a meeting with an investor asking the question you put into his mouth. Investors, in my experience, don’t know enough about patent law to formulate such a question. I put it to you that you just made it up.

                  But if ever I did receive such a question from a dithering investor, I would welcome it. Here’s why.

                  That a solution has been long sought, but not yet found, is an excellent indicator of non-obviousness. That there is still no sign of BigCorp having found a solution is stunning evidence that BigCorp STILL hasn’t stumbled on a solution, and a striking demonstration of the power of my invention to extract tribute from BigCorp, still desperate for access to the solution, to which I have exclusive rights. If they were unsure whether to invest before asking their question, they would be less hesitant after I answer.

                  Your turn again now.

                8. Of course, Ron, the existence of prior user rights does undercut the development of the same technology by newcomers whose investments need to be protected by patents. The investment, as you might note, might not be as valuable as that they might think and the patents may be all but worthless if they cannot be enforced against large companies who have been practicing the technology and secret.

                  And it is probably the case as well that big companies have to consider the likelihood of a startup developing and patenting the same technology and then coming after them with an injunction. This does somewhat force big companies to really consider the risk of not patenting.

                9. First, if “Big Corp” was already working on a solution to an important problem they intended to keep secret they would not be publicly disclosing that effort [or even the problem], especially to venture capitalists for potential competitors. Secondly, the prior user rights statute requires prior actual and continuous commercial use, not just “working on the problem.” Thirdly, the prior user right is only a defense and to be effective as a defense the prior user has a clear and convincing evidence burden to prove it, and a statutory penalty if if they do not.

                10. Max,
                  “Investors, in my experience, don’t know enough about patent law to formulate such a question. I put it to you that you just made it up.” Your comment is insulting. It shows your unfamiliarity with US technology investors and their self-preservation instincts. It shows that you have never attempted to raise millions of dollars in capital for a new technology venture; I have.

                  And contrary to your baseless allegation, this type of question I have heard myself from an investor who knew nothing about PUR even before PUR was expanded under the AIA. Read the question again – do you see any particular sophisticated knowledge “about patent law” in it? Do you think US investors are clueless? Do you think they know nothing about how patents work or about due diligence on patent assets?

                  These types of investor’s questions were always in play. PUR only makes answering them much harder. I am not sure you are aware of the procedure we have here, wherein before Closing an investment, we must make certain Representations and Warranties (“R&W”) to investors representing to them possible risks to their investment. Have you ever had to write such R&W with respect to patent assets? Investors do not need to ask anything specific about PUR – it is the duty of those making the R&W to disclose it to them. Have you seen how these R&W look today, after the AIA expanded PUR? I doubt that you have – we would not be having this conversation.

                  Your hypothetical answer is a non-sequitur that is equally unavailing:
                  “That a solution has been long sought, but not yet found, is an excellent indicator of non-obviousness. That there is still no sign of BigCorp having found a solution is stunning evidence that BigCorp STILL hasn’t stumbled on a solution…”

                  But if the process is applied and kept as a trade secret one would not know that it was “not yet found” nor that “BigCorp STILL hasn’t stumbled on a solution…” The whole point is that PUR protects processes the existence and use of which are not discoverable by others, including by inspecting the products produced by the secret process or method; if prior use of the process were known, the patent holder would have been unable to obtain a patent for the process.

                  You apparently did not comprehend the nature of the uncertainty for patent holders under PUR. The investor question I put to you only stated that “Big tech Co. which has a 60% market share, has been working on this problem for a long time.” That fact alone is not dispositive as to which solutions they have already discovered nor which ones they are still looking for, nor which is under development – these are trade secrets by definition.

                  Your dismissive hypothetical that ” If they were unsure whether to invest before asking their question, they would be less hesitant after I answer,” and the non-sequitur argument above you would give them would make investors decidedly more hesitant, not less, and steer them away from you – “this guy does not even understand the questions we put to him.”

                11. Ron, I have to say, your new offering at 3:12 pm is a hoot.

                  Once again, in response to the cackling of MaxDrei, Ron nails it.

                  But before I (in my turn) dismiss MaxDrei entirely, I am curious as to this portion of his comment: “When you have had a lifetime of experience of FtF + PUR, you will see it differently.

                  From past interactions, we have been able to glean that MaxDrei has been “around the block**” at about 40 years worth of time.

                  **how big that block is – that appears at times to reflect a postage stamp sized “block” as opposed to a Big City or countryside “block.”

                  Given as well Paul’s offering of his (admittedly US based)research showing zero PUR actions, I have to wonder if that “impressive-sounding” lifetime of experience includes ANY actual PUR assertions/actions/negotiations/anything-of-substance-at-all, or if this is merely more of the (typical) MaxDrei “here, wear my bifocals, they work for me” posturing.

                12. I would also add to Ron’s point concerning the nature of PUR in that PUR is the anti-patent version of the dreaded “submarine” analogy.

                  By this, the submarine of PUR merely threatens to surface long after the fact, long after others have committed to the (optional) choice of sharing by partaking in the patent system, and even then, would only surface when it comes time to enforce any such patent so dedicated to obtaining.

                  Even under the (again, optional) gold standard of Best Practices of the most painstakingly prior art search, the PUR would be a weapon “after the fact,” and would only come up if an enforcement mode were to be engaged.

                  As Ron noted, the submarine would not likely be “shown to the world,” as that may negate its effectiveness against all other competitors beyond the patent holder.

                  Rather, the “smarter” play would be to not devastate the patent directly, leaving that patent in place to keep out all others except the PUR holder, and would encourage the PUR holder to ride the coattails of (and expense suffered by) the patent holder.

                  People appear eager to conflate two very different times of protection (Trade Secret protection and Patent protection) in some sense of “combined time” umbrage, and yet turn a blind eye (or even worse in the cases of Ned and MaxDrei – state that PUR are needed and beneficial) to the ability to denigrate the patent right and free-ride on the choice of another to choose to share their innovation in the patent system.

                  Umbrage is truly being placed, or more correctly, MISplaced.

                  I would not withhold the option of Trade Secret from anyone.

                  Such has its strategic value, and as appropriately pursued, is a fully legal option.

                  But make no mistake, patents and those who chose to partake in the patent system, should be given every advantage over Trade Secrets.

                  And also make no mistake, the time of protection under each are – and should be held to be – eminently distinct.

                  Just as it would be a mistake to give patent-defeating “rights” to a Trade Secret holder, it is entirely congruent to NOT conflate the different “times of protection.”

                  Anyone so desiring to play the Trade Secret route may choose that route freely with the known risk (and a risk that should be total) of someone else winning the race to the patent office to obtain patent rights – rights that would be (should be entirely) enforceable against any Trade Secret holder.

                  And this maxim cuts both ways. Just because a party chooses the (different) path of Trade Secret, does NOT mean that the (different) path of patents are foreclosed. It is only the officious (and incorrect) conflation of the different times that drives such a view that would foreclose something that remains “new to you.”

                  The “race” remains “on” – even to racers employing Trade Secrets. MaxDrei does get something right on this thread: the change to a race to the Office removes the logic of the Court when the Court looked at a different controlling statutory patent law and opined their conflated view of intermixed different “times of protection.” Removing the effect of being able to swear behind some other filer should put the nail into the coffin of conflating the different realms of Trade Secret and Patent.

                13. Ned:
                  And it is probably the case as well that big companies have to consider the likelihood of a startup developing and patenting the same technology and then coming after them with an injunction. This does somewhat force big companies to really consider the risk of not patenting.

                  Exactly. Their best defense is to patent early themselves – as a <Prior User that can truly avail themselves of a PUR defense, they would get the patent. The result is that there would be earlier disclosure and more participants in the patent system to better promote the progress of useful arts.

                14. Ronny the K: Your comment is insulting.

                  LOL

                  Ron, you insult most of us every time you post here.

                15. “anon”: the “smarter” play would be to not devastate the patent directly

                  Who on earth cares about a patent being “devastated”?

                  Hardly anybody owns them and that’s always going to be the case.

                  Someone’s patent gets tanked by some prior art that they weren’t aware of … oh noes! BFD. Happens all the time. The difference with secret prior use is that the fruits of the technology are actually in hands of the public *and* the public is free to practice the “secret” process after it reverse engineers or arrives at the process independently.

                  So who cares about “the patent”? I mean other than low rent patent attorneys like yourself who need every last ounce of work they can scrounge up because they would otherwise be outcompeted. Why should anyone except the patentee be bothered because a patent was “devastated” by the discovery that someone else was already practicing the claimed method?

                  Tell everyone without invoking you and Ron’s ridiculously self-serving and transparent b.s. that “nobody will innovate and nobody will invest unless you get your way”. Go for it, guys.

                  Note that I’m not suggesting that there isn’t a compelling argument for the result you seek. But you aren’t making it. And lurking in the background is the obvious fact that, waiting in the wings, as always, is this group of well-heeled ethically bankrupt rent-seeking scriveners who file applications based on what they assume BigCorp is doing.

                16. Ronny the K: the source of chilling effects on investments

                  “The” source?

                  Give us a break, please.

                  A shift to a PUR system favors large market incumbents over startups and small disruptive innovators.

                  Oh here we go again with the “small disruptive innovotor” bullcr @p.

                  As Ron and everyone else knows, our entire economic system favors “large market incumbents” over everyone else and the resolution of this issue one way or another isn’t going to change that one bit. Of course, if Ron really cared about “large market incumbents” controlling too much of the market, then he would be aware of and promoting all kinds of well-known legal reasonable and direct means for reducing the power (i.e., wealth) of those “large market incumbents” and distributing that wealth to genuinely smaller players. But Ron never does that. Anybody wonder why? I sure he heck don’t.

                17. Malcolm,

                  The solution of your choice (that runs to the redistribution effects of communism and central planning) have repeatedly been shown not to work.

                  Pull your head out already.

            2. 5.2.2.1.1.2

              Max, I think it is self-evident that the point of the patent system is to encourage investment and development of new manufactures. At least that was the point in England and is “arguably” the basis of the United States patent system.

              However, before the inventor of a new manufactures can obtain a patent he must disclose his invention. That is the quid pro quo.

              If one assumes of the whole point of the patent system is only to obtain disclosures of inventions that somehow are automatically made by inventors without any other incentive to make them, that is, the invention is automatically made regardless of the patent system, then you are right that the whole point of the patent system is to obtain disclosure of the invention. I believe that was the situation we had in Venice back in a glassblowing days. The problem was not making new inventions in Venice, but disclosing them that other manufacturers could take advantage of the new knowledge.

              Thus, if the advancement of the arts comes from the investment and development of new products that would not otherwise be invented or developed but for the patent system, then the requirement for the disclosure is only a bonus. In fact, there is a significant other reason for the requirement of disclosure and that is when the patent is enforced it must be certain that the patent is not being used to imposed legal liability on those who are not actually using the invention and who are potentially using the prior art or the independent inventions of others. One cannot tell the metes and bounds of an invention without full disclosure. It is the reason that the British first developed the requirement for specification. If one claims to have invented X, and that is the entirety of the specification, one can later assert the any thing that basically does the same thing as X is covered by the patent. Do you see the problem?

              1. 5.2.2.1.1.2.2

                Ned you misunderstand me. Whether deliberately, I know not.

                20 years of exclusive rights in return for X. That is the patent bargain, the quid pro quo.

                Some say it’s for first revealing an enabling disclosure of a new, useful and not obvious invention. That’s what serves, to promote the progress. Count me in to their number.

                Others (you?) say it’s 20 years in return for making new and innovative business. Bigger GNP, more jobs. I disagree. I say that is the secondary effect of greater dissemination of information about new inventive activity.

                There are many sorts of “progress” that we can together “promote” but the patents system is for promoting only one form of “progress”. I suspect we are debating what sort that is, or should be. What does “science” mean today, in the context of the Patents Clause, and what are the “useful arts”?

                1. Ned you misunderstand me. Whether deliberately, I know not.

                  It is NOT just you, MaxDrei, and it is certainly on purpose that Ned misstates the law, and the purpose of the law.

                  His “tyranny of the must make,” is a t001 of the already established, typically large, trans-national type Big Corp.

                  That was expressly NOT the type of system that the US Sovereign chose to have at the time our nation emerged with its glorious experiment.

                  Instead we wanted a patent system NOT dependent on being already established.

                  Instead we wanted a patent system that fostered what is today denigrated as “Tr011” in that we purposefully chose the patent as property model and designated that property as the type of thing that is FULLY alienable and not limited to only those that were the inventor, not only to those that could make (or worse yet) were making ANY hard goods that may have flowed from the patent property.

                  That view is simply not in accord with US law, or reason for US law.

                  I suspect we are debating what sort that is, or should be.

                  No. I think that this statement of yours is merely an attempt to “get on the same side” with Ned. The actual issue here is the “must make” prong that Ned really wants to push. Let’s not insert this false sense of politeness as some sort of dust-kicking over the very real error of Ned’s view point here. Let’s fix that viewpoint error by thrusting it firmly into the spotlight and watch it wither and crisp like the vampire of innovation that it is.

                2. Max, we debate the purposes of patent systems.

                  They were established in England and the US to promote the introduction of new manufactures. In England, this was initially accomplished by bringing new, skilled labor to England in exchange for exclusive rights. The period of exclusivity was chose to allow for two sets of apprentices to be trained without having to face competition from them. There was no need for a specification. The training of the apprentices did the trick.

                  Ditto when English inventors discovered new techniques.

                  But, in the early 1700s, as patents were being enforced, it was found hard to define exactly what was the invention and what was old without a specification. That is why specification were first required. Later, Mansfield insisted that the specifications themselves be sufficient to enable others to make and use as a quid pro quo. But, you see, that was because times were changing laborers were not so free to move and start new businesses. It was actually necessary to write it done publicly that the invention be propagated.

                  But it remains, the primary reason for the patent systems of England and the United States is to promote invention itself, to promote the discovery of new techniques. These do not happen by themselves as they did in old Venice where the problem was dissemination of knowledge.

                  You might already know this, but almost no one in American industry reads patent specifications to keep up with technology. In fact, many are suspicious of the patents of others thinking they only patent dead ends to lead their competitors down the rabbit hole. (Many large firms are very sensitive about critical technology and will not let it out of the shop even in patent specifications. They also are very aggressive in policing employee transferring to competitors — employing “inevitable use and disclosure” theories with relish.) The last thing the big company wants is an disclosure that enables their competitors to use their best mode.

                  Small inventors are particularly harmed by the requirement for full disclosure. They disclose, so now they need not be acquired by their larger competitor who wishes to use their inventions if they can invalidate their patents. Without the guarantee of enforcement, small inventors would be best advised to keep it secret.

                  Anyhow, the patent system does not exist in England or the US to publish technology. Quite the contrary.

                3. to promote the introduction of new manufactures

                  Simply wrong as stated – as if that was the Be All and End All.

                  Ned – you are not in accord with US law or the reasons for US law.

              2. 5.2.2.1.1.2.3

                Ned, in short, I find myself unable to agree with you, that the advancement of science and the useful arts comes only when a new product is launched on the market. Perhaps that was so in Venice, hundreds of years ago. But no longer.

                Conversely, the steady flow of A publications stimulates innovative design arounds. Well, that’s my experience anyway, with medical science and technology, here in Germany.

                1. Max, I confine my remarks to the US and its English parent. Germany might have adopted a patent system for the same reason as the Venetians, where dissemination was the purpose.

                2. Ned,

                  Your view of US as “England-light” is simply – and utterly – in error.

                  There is no inte11ectually honest way to defend your position.

                3. Was dissemination the purpose of the patent system, not only in Germany but also in the USA? You deny it but I think it was in the UK and I suspect also in the USA.

                  You say that nobody in the USA reads A publications. that is not my experience with US manufacturers who ask me for FTO opinions in Europe. The A publications brought to their attention stimulate them to design around. The patent system is alive and well and promoting the progress, at least with US manufacturers of medical devices.

                  Of course it is not like that in the “tech” sector. Perhaps patents have no place in that sector. When you were young, how many software patents did you handle?

                4. Max, FTO reviews have nothing to do with instructing the public about technology. It further adds to the pressure to develop noninfringing products rather than infringe. The critical point here is that new products are being developed.

                  The original purpose for the disclosure in England is as I stated: to define the meets and bounds. When one was inventing a new product like a chemical that could be sold, one really didn’t need much of a specification to clearly delineate what was patented. Not so if the product was not entirely new, or just a variation of something that already existed. The description of the invention could equally apply as well to the old technology. In fact improvement inventions caused quite a controversy in England for a very, very long time. That is why the Crown required Englishmen to describe their inventions with particularity in order that others might know what was patented with more certainty in order to avoid infringement rather than to learn from the patent in order to copy and infringe.

                  Many decades after the requirement for a specification was first established in England, Mansfield developed the idea that the specification also enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the invention. This indeed was a requirement of teaching above and beyond a requirement for description of the invention. But it was an added requirement, not essential to the purposes of the patent system to function.

                  You now flip the entire purpose of the patent system on its head and take the secondary function of the written description requirement and place it on a pedestal as if it were the purpose for the patent system.

                  Max, if we must disagree, then so shall it be.

                5. possibly salvaged:

                  Your comment is awaiting moderation.
                  March 4, 2018 at 12:19 pm

                  Ned,

                  Your view of US as “England-light” is simply – and utterly – in error.

                  There is no inte11ectually honest way to defend your position.

                  (see also my post of today to a book highlighting some of the critical differences that you just do not want to see)

          2. 5.2.2.1.2

            Lord Gibbs does not get to define the meaning of the word “new.”

            Here in the US, that is the job of Congress.

              1. 5.2.2.1.2.1.1

                Your feelings are noted.

                (that is all that you offer – See United States Constitution, Article I Section 8)

    3. 5.3

      Max, there is a frequent confusion of the U.S. Metallizing Engineering forfeiture case law with the 102 statutory “on sale” bar. The “on sale” bar is where a product is sold or offered for sale, by anyone, before a patent application is filed on that product. That sale becomes prior art against everyone. In contrast, the Metallizing Engineering doctrine applied where a party had been selling a product for some time which was made by a trade secret process [not detectable from the product], and then that same party latter patents the process [not the product]. That doctrine did not prevent anyone ELSE from getting a patent on the process, i.e., it was not a statutory bar. The continued existence of this judicial forfeiture case law is another unresolved AIA interpretation dispute. It will only potentially get resolved if the kind of public policy argument you made above gets made to the Sup. Ct. in this case or a later case.

      1. 5.3.1

        Paul, to be prior art, the product must be in the hands of some member of the public that it can be reversed engineered. Third party on sale reduces to public use or use by others.

        There is little wonder that the American Bar gets this wrong when those discussing it are not careful.

        The policy is set forth in Pennock. Hand simply restated the holding of Pennock, citing it.

        1. 5.3.1.1

          It is worth noting that even the Giant of Judge Learned Hand fell asleep at the switch (he too nodded) when it came down to recognizing that two very distinct “times of protection” were being conflated while talking about the “time of protection” afforded by Trade Secret and the “time of protection” afforded by Patent.

          The laws of Trade Secret and Patent are distinct – each with genesis under different sections of the Constitution.

          Ned has clamored several times about “conflation,” while it remains HE that conflates on this underlying principle.

          The mistake by the Justices (and judges) has been corrected by Congress explicitly in the AIA.

          Much like portions of the Act of 1952 that Ned does not like, he now “cannot see” the controlling law as written by Congress (the branch of the government actually allocated authority to write the statutory law that is patent law).

          Pretending is not persuasive Ned. You need to do more than merely clench tight your eyes.

          1. 5.3.1.1.1

            Anon, simply incredible. You don’t even know that trade secrets are matters of state law? And you sit there lecturing me?

            1. 5.3.1.1.1.1

              I do know that (duh).

              The only trace back to a Constitutional aspect though would be the Commerce Clause – and most definitely not the Patent Clause.

              Yes, I lecture you – you would do well to pay attention.

            2. 5.3.1.1.1.2

              And you sit there lecturing me?

              Let me be not the only one to lecture you Ned.

              Your penchant for ignoring critical differences in the historic great American experiment (ranging across a spectrum of facts and includes your rather peculiar attempts to not give credit to the inalienable rights aspects of this country, instead attempting to substitute your own non-deistic beliefs) should be put in check.

              I suggest that you pick up the book that is the subject of what appears to be a series of articles over at another blog (not by Quinn) and make an (inte11ectually) honest study of those differences.

              The series:
              link to ipwatchdog.com

              link to ipwatchdog.com

      2. 5.3.2

        Ah-ha. Indeed, I had not grasped fully the distinction between the Metallizing “personal forfeiture on sale” doctrine and the Pennock “102 statutory on sale” bar. Many thanks Paul.

        1. 5.3.2.1

          Note as well MaxDrei, that it was an avowed intention of Congress to eliminate personal forfeitures in the extensively revamped 102/103 legislative changes.

          Let me also remind everyone that when Congress is explicit in that it is extensively revamping a section of law, it does NOT need to go about and list any of the ancillary court cases that may be affected (abrogated) by the extensive change. Some confuse the lack of singling out court cases by name as some indication of a limited scope of the change in law and THAT notion is pure legal error.

      3. 5.3.3

        Also, Paul, if a public disclosure of the invention occurs, why must there be an offer for sale? The public disclosure itself is a public use.

        What the people behind the petition are trying to do is remove on sale from the law.

  9. 4

    Dennis: The difficulty here is that the petition asks the Supreme Court to shed an approach it has developed over the past 200 years without (in my view) a clear statutory statement from Congress.

    It’s worse than that, as you allude to elsewhere in your post. The statements made by Congress during the negotiations leading up to the statute are crystal clear that the CAFC’s holding is not what they intended.

    1. 4.1

      You do realize that your “it’s worse than that” goes in the opposite direction of the comment from Prof. Crouch, right?

      1. 4.1.1

        Billy, your Mommy called. She wants you to use declarative sentences and express your arguments and beliefs without relying on the mindreading abilities that you imagine that you and others possess.

        1. 4.1.1.1

          Adding: I’m always happy to be corrected, Billy. I’m a grown up. I can take it (unlike you). It wouldn’t surprise me if I’ve got the positions of the parties mixed up, or even if I’m confusing this case with some other case. That kind of thing happens.

          Big difference, of course, between that and clinging to some baseless nonsensical position literally years after that position has been demonstrated to be baseless and nonsensical and d.o.a. And then pretending that the “scoreboard is broken” (whatever that means). That’s your game, Billy. And we can all see it and we can all recognize your putrid stink.

          1. 4.1.1.1.1

            LOL – spew mindless ad hominem, and THEN realize that you have flubbed this simple matter quite completely.

            A new instant classic.

            1. 4.1.1.1.1.1

              There was no “mindless ad hominem,” Billy. Just a recognition that your command of English is barely above that of a middle school student who recently came to the US from, oh I dunno, Russia or some other Eastern European “sherthole”.

              LOL

            2. 4.1.1.1.1.2

              you have flubbed this simple matter

              ROTFLMAO

              I haven’t bothered to check yet. Like I said: it’s possible. I’m happy to be shown where I “flubbed” it. But I doubt the issue is “simpler” than than the cases you’ve been flubbing forever, e.g., Prometheus or (better yet) LifeTech in which case your flubbery and Hal Wegner’s flubbery was pointed out in real time literally within a couple hours of the CAFC’s opinion. I wrote half of Sotomayor’s opinion later that day. You, on the other hand, spent the next year tongue-bathing your own crotch and moaning an incoherent about “statutory construction”. Yes, you’re some expert, Billy!

              LOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOL

              I still can’t stop laughing.

              1. 4.1.1.1.1.2.1

                You obviously should not be laughing. My original comment to you used 21 words in a clear and direct manner, to which you took 290 words in reply, all of which evade the point of my 21 words and only digs yourself deeper into the mindless ad hominem that is your hallmark.

                1. You obviously should not be laughing.

                  Like I said, I’m happy to be wrong,”anon.”

                  Right now I’m laughing at your inability to “spit it out.” This is a recurring problem of yours, and we all know the source. [shrugs]

                  LOL

                2. You being “happy to be wrong” must have made you delirious, seeing how often you are wrong.

                  Of course, most people simply could not stand that much happiness.

                  And of course, most people would call that “happiness” something else.

                  (I’m not the one that should be ‘spitting’ anything out)

                  Man, does it s u c k to be you.

  10. 3

    Yes indeed, this is a “well drafted petition” [and a well-presented simple cert question]. Quite a contrast to so many other patent case cert petitions seen here. For a further demonstration, read this opening paragraph:
    “Yet again, the Federal Circuit has issued a decision that is “untethered to the statutory text” of the patent laws. Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2120 (2014). This case involves the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), the most significant revision to our Nation’s patent laws in more than half a century.”

    [Even though the actual facts in the case are messy, the legal issue presented to Sup. Ct. to decide is a clear and simple statutory interpretation, with nice reminders of the Supreme Courts prior views of the court below.]

    1. 3.1

      Re: “The difficulty here is that the petition asks the Supreme Court to shed an approach it has developed over the past 200 years without (in my view) a clear statutory statement from Congress.”
      Even if that was an accurate statement, note that it is just what the Sup. Ct. did in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 119 Sct. 304 (1998) for the same statute – re-defining requirements for “on sale bar” in some ways not even argued by either party in that case and overruling several prior Fed. Cir. decisions. I vividly remember that from a contemporary AIPLA presentation by the attorneys who argued that case.

    2. 3.2

      Paul,
      I am perplexed by your “well-presented simple cert question” conclusion, because the Question Presented in fact mischaracterizes the issue and therefore is not well-presented. It propounds:

      “Whether, under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, an inventor’s sale of an invention to a third party that is obligated to keep the invention confidential qualifies as prior art for purposes of determining the patentability of the invention.”

      A sale that keeps the invention secret has never, and is not now, qualified as “prior art.” That which is not available to artisans in the field dos not define the “state of the art.” However, it is a bar on the inventor to patentability under pre-AIA law. The question now is therefore whether the AIA had not abrogated this constitutionally-based bar enunciated in Pennock and Kendall (the latter not even being mentioned in this cert petition). This question – and not the one presented above – was answered affirmatively by the CAFC and a SCOTUS review of that answer is what petitioners seek now.

      1. 3.2.1

        Ron,

        Two points.

        First point:

        As a topic that we have sparred about previously, here, counsel provides some of the background facts:

        From pages 7-8:

        The legislative history confirms that Congress’s intent in adding the residual phrase “or otherwise available to the public” was to eliminate “secret sales” as prior art and to require that the sale make the “claimed invention” “available to the public.” See generally Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part I of II, 21 Fed. Cir. B.J. 435, 466-475 (2011). The phrase originated in the Senate Judiciary Committee, which explained that it was adding the phrase to “emphasize the fact that [prior art] must be publicly available.” S. Rep. No. 259, 110th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (2008); accord S. Rep. No. 18, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (2009). After the Senate bill passed, the House Judiciary Committee considered a revised bill that became the AIA. That bill contained the same residual phrase, and the House Committee echoed the explanation that the phrase was intended to “emphasize the fact that [prior art] must be publicly accessible.” H.R. Rep. No. 98, 112th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. I, at 42-43 (2011); see id. at 43 n.20 (citing floor statements of the Senate sponsors).

        Several of the AIA’s sponsors reiterated the point in floor statements. Senator Kyl explained that the new residual phrase operated on the preceding phrases, thus “limit[ing] all non-patent prior art to that which is available to the public.” 157 Cong. Rec. S1370 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011). Senator Leahy, the AIA’s lead sponsor in the Senate, similarly explained that the statute would “do away with precedent under current law that private offers for sale or private uses of secret processes * * * may be deemed patent-defeating prior art.” 157 Cong. Rec. S1496 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2011). The AIA’s lead sponsor in the House, Representative Lamar Smith, agreed: “[C]ontrary to current precedent, in order to trigger the bar in the new [Section] 102(a) in our legislation, an action must make the patented subject matter ‘available to the public’ before the effective filing date.” 157 Cong. Rec. H4429 (daily ed. June 22, 2011).

        Second point: Part A

        The question now is therefore whether the AIA had not abrogated this constitutionally-based bar enunciated in Pennock

        There is NO SUCH thing as this supposed “Constitutionally-based-bar.” The Constitution is a delegation of authority, with its lead-in phrase hortatory (and to which, the supposed “may” in any sense of any “future impact” aspect is beyond the authority of the Supreme Court to conjecture about.

        I suggest that you read Pennock a bit closer, and note that what the Court did there was in actuality draw to the words of Congress in effect at the time in their comparison of what was deemed “Constitutional.”

        Second point: Part B

        As I posted elsewhere, the Court (and even greats among the lower courts) have consistently gotten the law wrong when calculating the “times of protection” that run from patent law (as to be contrasted with the times of protection that may inure from OTHER laws not based on the patent clause (for immediate example, any time of protection that inures from Trade Secret law is NOT law that comes from – or is any legally supportable way related to – patent law.

        It is clear legal error to conflate any sense of Trade Secret protection time with the “limited times” ascribed from the Patent Clause.

        Congress was clear on this (even as you seek to deny it): the AIA redefined “new” to be “new to you.”

        1. 3.2.1.1

          Anon,
          Note that my comment did not get into the thick of the arguments on the merits (that you and I have had for some time), and so I would not comment on the one-sided view presented in the cert petition. I would note, however, that you conspicuously omitted my reference to “Kendall (the latter not even being mentioned in this cert petition).” While Kendall and Pennock do rely on the patent statute, their compelling reasoning for the personal bar expressly invoke the Constitution, as the inventor’s personal bar to a patent cannot be literally read in the statute. So I suggest that you too read these cases again:

          “The true policy and ends of the patent laws enacted under this government are disclosed in that article of the Constitution, the source of all these laws, viz., “to promote the progress of science and the useful arts” contemplating and necessarily implying their extension, and increasing adaptation to the uses of society. By correct induction from these truths, it follows that the inventor who designedly, and with the view of applying it indefinitely and exclusively for his own profit, withholds his invention from the public comes not within the policy or objects of the Constitution or acts of Congress. He does not promote, and, if aided in his design, would impede, the progress of science and the useful arts.” Kendall, 62 U.S. at 328 (citing U.S. CONST., Art. I, Sec §. 8, cl. 8) (emphasis added).

          If an inventor should be permitted to hold back from the knowledge of the public the secrets of his invention; if he should for a long period of years retain the monopoly, and make, and sell his invention publicly, and thus gather the whole profits of it, . . . and then . . . he should be allowed to take out a patent, and thus exclude the public from any farther use than what should be derived under it during [the patent term,] it would materially retard the progress of science and the useful arts, and give a premium to those who should be least prompt to communicate their discoveries.” Pennock,27 U.S. at 19 (emphasis added).

          Now, you may disagree that these SCOTUS considerations survived the AIA, and maybe SCOTUS will rule on that, but you cannot say that these early SCOTUS decisions were not directly informed by the Constitution. That is why I call the inventor bar, that is not literally stated in the statute, a constitutionally-based bar. Other may call it an equitable bar but it is clear that the balance of the equities is informed by the “policy or objects of the Constitution” in addition to the patent statute.

          1. 3.2.1.1.1

            Indeed! Why didn’t the Petitioner explain in its petition that this riduculous Pennock “retard the progress” theory is clap-trap and that the Supreme Court ought not to fall into the trap of supposing that it has any merit. Beats me.

            If under First to File, I invent something, I choose when to file at the PTO, knowing full well the risks of any delay in filing. Remember when the AIA was new, and various headless chickens were running round squawking that, if attorneys failed to file on the same day that the client inventor told them of their invention, they would be sued for malpractice? Also ridiculous.

            1. 3.2.1.1.1.1

              Indeed! Why didn’t the Petitioner explain in its petition that this riduculous Pennock “retard the progress” theory is clap-trap and that the Supreme Court ought not to fall into the trap of supposing that it has any merit. Beats me.

              There is more than one way to skin a cat.

              That this “beats you” is not saying much.

              At all.

            2. 3.2.1.1.1.2

              Max, Why didn’t the Petitioner explain in its petition that this riduculous Pennock “retard the progress” theory is clap-trap and that the Supreme Court ought not to fall into the trap of supposing that it has any merit.

              Max, Pennock is controlling Supreme Court authority for Christ sake.

              1. 3.2.1.1.1.2.1

                Ned , if the AIA re-wrote 102, and if the re-written 102 does in fact mean what Congress intended it to mean, does that not deprive Pennock of control?

                Not an easy concept, this “control”. For example, those who voted for BREXIT thought they were “taking back control”. Poor saps, all of them.

          2. 3.2.1.1.2

            as the inventor’s personal bar to a patent cannot be literally read in the statute.

            That’s nothing more than judicial mockery previously “made official” by Congress – and to which – pointedly – Congress in the AIA removed.

            How else would you explain the explicit choice to change even the title of the sections and REMOVE “personal bars”…?

            You should also take heed of my note as to any such “subjective future projections” and the FACT that the Court has flubbed the difference between Trade Secrets and patents.

            To put it plainly, once the patent path is walked down, there is no more “unlimited times.” Prior to walking down that path (and only on the Trade Secret path) there is no nexus with patent law.

            Overly Officious musings of the Court – untethered to the actual law that is patent law – carry NO legal weight.

            As directly put forth, Congress explicitly changed the implicit errors of the past by redefining “new” in the patent sense to be “new to you.”

            Pennock was decided under a different patent law – one that is changed now with the AIA on that material point.

            The Court has no leg to stand on. Policy and “objects” are NOT the domain of the Court, and it is Congress that has deliberated – and changed the law to match what it views as the best way to achieve the Constitutional (hortarory) “limitation.” As also pointed out, by properly separating the two different domains of “time protection” (each to its proper different underpinnings), there is NO genuine concern that can be raised for the PATENT CLAUSE.

            (Of course, that is not to say that the Court may attempt to rewrite the statutory law that is patent law again)

            1. 3.2.1.1.2.1

              Anon,
              “Policy and ‘objects’ are NOT the domain of the Court, and it is Congress that has deliberated – and changed the law to match what it views as the best way to achieve the Constitutional (hortarory) ‘limitation.’”

              We do agree on the first part – “”Policy and ‘objects’ are NOT the domain of the Court, and it is Congress that has deliberated.” The disagreement we have is on the second part. Congress deliberated but did not change the meaning of ‘On sale” and ‘Public Use.’

              Had Congress as a whole (not only three Senators and four Congressman) wanted to change the meaning of those terms, it would have done so without hiding “elephants in mouseholes.” Whitman v. American Trucking Association, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). It would have removed those terms. The AIA proponents did try, though. If you read again my amicus brief in Helsinn (link to bit.ly), you will read how the Managers’ Amendment that took those terms out failed (p. 19). Apparently, the majority did not want to change Section 102 to remove these established personal bars.

              We have been at this for a while, and you have never explained how you reconcile your interpretation with the specific failed amendment I document on page 19 of my brief. Will you do so now?

              Try as some AIA proponets such as Bob Armitage and Joe Matal might, changing the title of Section 102 and three Senators inserting in the Congressional Record a colloquy among themselves instead of persuading their colleagues to make clear changes in the language of Section 102, does not change the long-standing meaning of terms in the statute which they failed to remove.

              Pennock, Kendall, and Metallizing Engineering are judicial interpretations of the Constitution and the patent statutes. As you correctly point out, the Court does not make the law. If Congress does not believe that these interpretations are correct, it should change the statute’s plain language to preclude such interpretations. This is not rocket science – Congress knows how to write statutes.

              Am I happy with the result of having zero grace period for ‘On Sale’ and ‘Public Use’? – of course not. Unfortunately, that is what we have today. But without clarity from the courts about the incorrectness of the interpretation that you hold – that there is no indefinite grace period for non-informing ‘On Sale’ and Public Use’ activities – it would be impossible to have Congress take up corrective legislation to restore a robust grace period. Without such clarification, it would be impossible to restore inventors’ ability to file within a year of any ‘On Sale’ and ‘Public Use’ events and still have patent protection.

              1. 3.2.1.1.2.1.1

                you have never explained how you reconcile your interpretation with the specific failed amendment I document on page 19 of my brief. Will you do so now?

                I have not done so because I need not do so – you presume that your interpretation is correct and I have shown you that it is not.

                What those few senators – and Congressmen – did, was sufficient to establish the view that I have provided.

                I “get” that you do not like this “end-run,” but such is the life of politics. As a politician may have failed in one path, another path succeeded.

                It really is as simple as that.

                (but I will read your brief, as generally, I find your legal writing to be most excellent)

                Further, I note that another post of mine in this thread did not make it through the “do not have a dialogue” count filter. I will also see if I can salvage that post.

                1. Salvaged…?

                  Your comment is awaiting moderation.
                  March 3, 2018 at 11:35 am

                  Ron,

                  Pennock and Kendall were written concerning a law no longer in place. Those decisions are NOT Constitutional edicts – they merely reflect the statutory law at that time.

                  Do not confuse Supreme Court dicta with actual controlling law.

                  The statement of “it can scarcely be supposed, that the legislature had within its contemplation such knowledge or use.” is NOW factually false, thus, the conclusion rooted in that statement no longer has the force of law.

                  I “get” that you and a few others do not like what Congress has done in this accord. But what you like does not change what Congress DID.

                  These are factual matters and are simply not up for debate.

                2. Pennock and Kendall were written concerning a law no longer in place. Those decisions are NOT Constitutional edicts – they merely reflect the statutory law at that time.

                  Anon, you have no idea what you’re talking about.

                3. To the contrary Ned, it is you that (badly) misreads the earlier cases.

                  It is you that (fundamentally) misunderstands that the Constitutional patent clause was a delegation of authority to write the patent law (and that delegation was expressly not to the judicial branch).

                  Elsewhere you rail on and on about violation of the Separation of Powers (said violation being perpetrated by the Executive Branch).

                  You need to be aware that ALL three branches are constrained by the Separation of Powers and NO branch is above the Constitution.

                  Your view of Separation of Powers has a Supreme defect.

              2. 3.2.1.1.2.1.2

                Pennock, Kendall, and Metallizing Engineering are judicial interpretations of the Constitution [_]

                No.

                They are not.

                That is elevating dicta into some type of Constitutional amendment – and is clear legal error.

  11. 2

    Would love to see elucidation about the pre-AIA conflation of “time of protection” from two very different legal realms*** finally recognized for that error that such conflation was.

    That being said, in the AIA, Congress was pretty clear that in their revamping of the notion of what “new” was intended to cover was “new to you.”

    *** Time of protection from Trade Secret status has zero to do with the legal realm of patent protection, and any sense of “time of protection” from that very different legal source.

  12. 1

    Will some a please correct me if I’m wrong here. But if I understand the facts correctly, the patentee filed his first provisional application after they had received FDA approval. Something stinks to high heaven here because Congress has also provided patent term restoration for regulatory delays after a patent has issued. It just seems that the patent owner here placed the cart before the horse.

    1. 1.1

      …coming from one who so recently (on another topic) insists on putting the cart before the horse….

    2. 1.2

      Is there a good argument that disclosures to the FDA, even if they would otherwise be public disclosures, would be subject to the experimental use exception?

      1. 1.2.1

        be subject to the experimental use exception?

        Fair question – which of course brings along with it the follow on question of whether any patent filed prior to the completion of FDA activities could be said to satisfy the possession requirement (related to the notion of “ready for patenting.”

        If the FDA is something that is necessary (to avoid Ned’s view of “experimental use”), then the other edge of the sword is the indication that the patentee lacks possession (as of that date) because any filed application is merely “experimental.”

        1. 1.2.1.1

          My goodness get with the program. The standards for FDA approval are very different from the standards for patentability. This is basic stuff.

          But maybe hard to appreciate if you “innovate” functionally described data processing “apps” that are enabled from the moment the attorney scrivens them out using as many words as possible.

          That would explain a lot.

          LOL

          1. 1.2.1.1.1

            My goodness, the differences in standards has nothing to do with possession of that which must pass BOTH standards.

            After all, the claimed utility (also something that must be possessed at date of file) is that which passes the FDA level.

            Pull your head out Malcolm.

            1. 1.2.1.1.1.1

              My goodness, the differences in standards has nothing to do with possession

              It has everything to do with it because the “experimental data” necessary for FDA approval of a drug for human treatment go far beyond the “experimental data” necessary to show possession for the purpose of getting a valid patent.

              Just stop digging, “anon.” Upthread you have a simple task to complete. Focus on that.

              1. 1.2.1.1.1.1.1

                Nonsense Malcolm – possession of the stated utility is the same level.

                You either have the utility or you do not.

                Period.

              2. 1.2.1.1.1.1.2

                Contrast “ Upthread you have a simple task to complete. Focus on that.

                with

                Mommy called. She wants you to use declarative sentences and express your arguments and beliefs without relying on the mindreading abilities that you imagine that you and others possess.

                Malcolm at his typical Accuse Others, seeing as he has set no “task” with anything remotely close to “declarative sentences” and entirely relies on ” mindreading abilities that you imagine that you and others posses”

                Stultifying.

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