by Dennis Crouch
In SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu (2018) [16-969_f2qg], the Supreme Court issued a split 5-4 decision holding that:
When the Patent Office institutes an inter partes review, it must decide the patentability of all of the claims the petitioner has challenged.
Although quite narrow, the decision reversed the PTO’s prior interpretation of the IPR statutes and will likely impact IPR strategies both for petitioners and patentees.
Any Patent Claim Challenged: Private parties may challenge an issued patent by filing an inter partes review (IPR) petition. The petition must specify which claims are being challenged, and explain why the challenge is likely to succeed. Under the statutory provisions, the USPTO Director must then decide whether or not to grant the petition and institute a trial before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB or Board). At the conclusion of the trial, the Section 318(a) of the Patent Act indicates that the PTAB “shall issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner and any new claim added [during the IPR].” 35 U.S.C. §318(a). The Supreme Court decision here is tightly focused on statutory interpretation — holding that the statute requires that the PTO decide the patentability of all challenged claims (that are not dismissed). The PTO had interpreted the statute to allow for partial-institution-decisions.
In the case before the court, SAS had challenged all 16 claims of the ComplementSoft U.S. Patent No. 7,110,936. However, rather than instituting on all claims, the PTO only instituted review of 9 claims. Writing for the majority, Justice Gorsuch explained:
The Director (in truth the Board acting on the Director’s behalf) . . . instituted review on only some (claims 1 and 3–10) and denied review on the rest.
Once a final judgment was issued by the PTAB (finding eight of the nine unpatentable), SAS appealed — arguing that the statute required decisions on the remaining five claims.
Now, SAS will get its opportunity. For SAS, the potential to challenge these additional claims may help the company avoid having to fight those claims in court. In addition, the all-challenged-claims rule may also serve as a bargaining chip for the patent challenger in any settlement hearings.
Although the patent-challenger may benefit in this particular case, I expect that the overall benefit from the decision will help patentees. In particular, most non-instituted claims are ones that would likely have been confirmed as patentable. That decision from the PTAB will lend strength to patentee claims in court and also raise estoppel problems down the road for patent challengers.
Simplifying petitions decisions: The decision here should simplify the petition institution decisions. Following SAS, the question should simply be whether there is at least 1 challenged claim where the petitioner has presented a “reasonable likelihood” of prevailing on the merits. 35 U.S.C. 314(a).
The majority did not spend time on policy determinations — instead simply stating that the PTO should take its case to Congress.
The Director’s policy argument—that partial institution is efficient because it permits the Board to focus on the most promising challenges and avoid spending time and resources on others—is properly addressed to Congress, not this Court.
It will be interesting to see whether new PTO Director Iancu will go to congress on this point – I expect not, unless there are clear efficiency concerns. At this point, the Office only provided the following statement:
The USPTO is carefully considering the Supreme Court’s decisions and determining their impact on various proceedings at the PTAB.
Deference: An important element of the decision for administrative law folks is the majority statements regarding Chevron deference:
[W]hether Chevron should remain is a question we may leave for another day. Even under Chevron, we owe an agency’s interpretation of the law no deference unless, after “employing traditional tools of statutory construction,” we find ourselves unable to discern Congress’s meaning.
Here, the majority found no ambiguity — and thus gave no deference to the PTO. I expect that the 5-4 split between the justices in this case largely comes down this particular question — when should courts give deference to legal interpretations made by expert administrative agencies? Supreme Court precedent on the issue continues to be messy, although there remains some thought that Congress will solve the problem by actually spelling out whether deference applies when it writes its statutes.
On a final issue, the PTO argued that the question before the court was effectively a challenge to the PTO petition decision — something made expressly unappealable by the Patent Act §314(d). “Even if the statute forbids his partial institution practice, the Director suggests we lack the power to say so.” However, the majority disagreed with the PTO Director — holding that the case here involves “exactly the sort” of “shenanigans” that serve as exceptions to the Cuozzo rule.
Writing in dissent, Justice Ginsberg, joined by the other three most liberal justices, calls Gorsuch’s reading “wooden” and lacking of any true understanding or indication of congressional intent: “Court’s opinion offers no persuasive answer to that question, and no cause to believe Congress wanted the Board to spend its time so uselessly.”
Coming back to Deference: A more thorough dissent by Justice Breyer explains his position that the statute offers enough of a gap in certainty to allow the PTO to fill-in its interpretation and be given deference for that gap-filling.
Because I believe there is such a gap and because the Patent Office’s interpretation of the ambiguous phrase is reasonable, I would conclude that the Patent Office’s interpretation is lawful.
(Breyer in dissent.) Overall, this is a set of nicely written decisions that serve as an example in the patent law field of the broader and ongoing administrative law debate over the role of administrative agencies in interpreting their governing statutes.
Could the PTAB, in its final decision simply say:
Claims 1-20 were challenged
Claims 1-16 were reviewed
Claims 1-16 are invalid, Claims 17-20 remain presumed valid.
Or more likely:
Claim 1-20 were challenged. Our initial determination is Claim 1-16 were likely invalid. Claims 17-20 were not likely invalid.
Our final determination is Claims 1-16 are invalid and Claims 17-20 are not invalid.
It may seem like form over substance, but I think the Board decision is problematic if they don’t fully address the claims challenged and accepted.
The correct decision [just as in a D.C.] is “Claims 17-20 have not been proven invalid.”
There is some confusion below between the number of claims needed to start an IPR [1] versus, as in this SAS case, to finish it [all petition-asserted claims]:
“35 USC 114:
(a) Threshold- The Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”
I’m not seeing such a big deal with the SAS opinion.
The upside for patent owners is there should be estoppel for all challenged claims for any petition that is instituted.
For the Board, they can keep the same procedure they have now with the exception of stating in the initial determination that while the Board does not find claims x, y, and z likely invalid, petitioner can address those claims if so desired at trial.
No extra work for the Board.
Then at the final determination, the Board can copy paste from the initial determination for the reasoning that they included regarding the claims that were not likely invalid.
What this does, however, is expand the appealable issues to the Fed. Cir.
Re: “The upside for patent owners is there should be estoppel for all [IPR] challenged claims for any petition that is instituted.”
A downside for patent owners is the higher odds that the claims will be removed from the patent by the IPR [rendering estoppel moot], whereas before those untried claims would clearly survive that IPR.
Justice Ginsberg’s comment regarding partial institution:
“Court’s opinion offers no persuasive answer to that question, and no cause to believe Congress wanted the Board to spend its time so uselessly.”
…is very misguided in my reading of the AIA. The AIA was pitched as a faster, cheaper ALTERNATIVE to district court validity rulings. Under the Lee regime, the partial institution decision gave petitioners no reason to not always throw every claim and argument against the wall to see what stuck. Any claims not instituted were handed back to the petitioner with no estoppel to argue validity again in District Court. The SAS ruling provides a jeopardy that, I believe, was intended in the AIA: pick your forum for ALL validity questions, the PTAB or District Court.
To make a larger point, the reason the AIA passed with bi-partisan support is that, on its surface, it sold the fairly tale of offering a faster, cheaper and better ALTERNATIVE to district court litigation regarding validity.
I am a big believer in the saying, “You can have it fast, cheap or good… pick two”.
Following this principle, the inherent “slow and expensive” nature of district court patent litigation ensured the outcome would be the most fair and thorough possible.
Conversely, setting up the PTAB to somehow come to an equally fair decision by constraining the timeline was always a fool’s errand. We now have thousands of PTAB validity decisions that were produced fast and (relatively) cheap. It is impossible for these decisions to be as “good” as if they were given the due process afforded by a District Court.
We now have thousands of PTAB validity decisions that were produced fast and (relatively) cheap. It is impossible for these decisions to be as “good” as if they were given the due process afforded by a District Court.
Ok, please cut the c@ rp.
It’s not only possible for a decision on validity to made far, far more quickly and cheaper than a District Court can do it, but it happens all the time and it’s going to continue to happen.
That’s the whole point. The PTO’s Examination corp makes *huge* mistakes, particularly in the s 0 f tie w0 ftie arts, because it has woefully inadequate methods for searching, a non-existent database of logic, and a an applicant-biased systematic shortcoming when it comes to parsing overly-scrivened ju nk. Allowing a third party to come in and hold the PTO’s hand makes all the difference in the world. It’s not a question of “due process”. It’s a question of simply opening one’s eyes.
Your tinfoil hat is on a little tight there.
Justice Ginsberg’s comment regarding partial institution… is very misguided in my reading of the AIA. The AIA was pitched as a faster, cheaper ALTERNATIVE to district court validity rulings… The SAS ruling provides a jeopardy that, I believe, was intended in the AIA: pick your forum for ALL validity questions, the PTAB or District Court.
When I first encountered the SAS case (back at the CAFC oral argument stage), I thought that this argument was nuts. The longer I think about it, however, the more I come to think that you are correct. If—as seems clear—IPRs were meant to be an alternative to litigation, and not just another stage tacked on to add time and expense to an already long and expensive process, then it makes sense to read the statute as saying “one or the other, but not both.” If the PTAB feels that it lacks the resources to do all the work, then it is best if it simply declines to do any of the work.
I am a big believer in the saying, “You can have it fast, cheap or good… pick two”… [S]etting up the PTAB to somehow come to an equally fair decision by constraining the timeline was always a fool’s errand. We now have thousands of PTAB validity decisions that were produced fast and (relatively) cheap. It is impossible for these decisions to be as “good” as if they were given the due process afforded by a District Court.
Here I cannot agree. The test of whether the PTAB’s decisions are as “good” as district court opinions is whether the PTAB gets reversed on appeal more often than district courts. It does not. There is simply no objective basis for contending that the PTAB does lower quality work.
Dennis, this is just to test the last part of your SAS comment that: “Although the patent-challenger may benefit in this particular case, I expect that the overall benefit from the decision will help patentees.”
Given the page limitations of IPR petitions, and the fact that 85% are responses to patent suits, I question if many IPR Petitioners attack claims they are not accused of infringing [or, leave accused infringed claims unchallenged]? Thus, they would like to see decisions on all of them, as this SAS decision now requires? Also, IPR estoppel does not preclude litigation defenses based on anything other than patent or publication prior art. Also, if one cannot even invalidate a claim in a IPR, how likely is that to be accomplished in a jury trial even it is one of the 5% or so that ever get to that point?
Comments appreciated.
I guess I’m one that doesn’t see a whole changing from the way things are based on SAS. The real effect will be to apply estoppel to all claims challenged rather than the ones that were previously instituted.
In the initial determination, the panel can simply change a few words from what has been happening: – We find the following claims likely unpatentable and therefore institute. We are unpersuaded that the following claims are unpatentable, but the parties can address them in briefing and at trial…
Perhaps due to the estoppel effect, the petitioner will not be throwing in a bunch of dependent claims that were at best marginal due to the danger of the estoppel effect.
Justice Ginsberg, joined by the other three most liberal justices, calls Gorsuch’s reading “wooden”
The law is one of the few contexts in which the maximalists grow nostalgic for the “iron age.”
“The law is one of the few contexts in which the maximalists grow nostalgic for the “iron age.””
That’s neither particularly witty nor even remotely accurate.
It’s the anti’s that pine for the Iron Age and their irrational view of software as if software was somehow “magical” (vis a vis the Grand Hall experiment).
It seems clear that the majority opinion does not like the fact that the institution decision cannot be appealed and is not subject to Article III review, despite the plain reading of Section 314. Their reasoning on Section 314 is unsound, there is ambiguity in the statute and the PTO should have been given deference under Chevron.
Now the PTO will have to write a Final Decision on those claims that did not meet the statutory requirements for a challenge and petitioners get a second bite at the apple (on appeal) for claims on which the PTO did not institute. I can see several benefits and drawbacks, but no clear winner between patent owners and petitioners in this decision (e.g., Patent Owner benefit: estoppel for all claims challenged if any survive; Petitioner benefits: appellate review of decision on all challenged claims, patent owner cannot cancel partial institution claims to get out of IPR).
You do have to give SAS Institute credit for taking one on the chin. They failed to meet their burden on Claim 2 on the merits, and failed to meet their burden on claims 11 through 16 because they did not address the means plus function elements. Presumably this will be remanded to the Board and it is highly unlikely that they will prevail on invalidating all the claims. I would expect that SAS Institute will face a trial in which they are estopped from challenging validity of ALL surviving claims (at the very least, claims 2 and 4).
I expect that you are correct that the practical application of this holding will be fairly minor, but it should be huge, if the statute were being properly applied. That is to say, under §315(e)(2), a party is estopped from raising in a civil suit any invalidity defense that “the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised” during the IPR. The only sane reading of this statute means that because you could have petitioned to challenge Claim 2 for obviousness in your IPR, if—for strategic reasons—you only challenged Claim 1, then you are estopped from challenging Claim 2 for obviousness in the corresponding infringement trial. Unfortunately, under the CAFC’s crazy reasoning in Shaw Indus. v. Automated Creel Systems, 817 F.3d 1293, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2016), if the PTAB does not institute on Claim 2, then one is not estopped against Claim 2 challenges.
In other words, under SAS, one might very well only petition against Claim 1, for fear that the PTAB would deny institution on a challenge against Claims 2–7, and one would still be free to challenge 2–7 in court. Under the only sane reading of §315(e)(2), however, one would ignore 2–7 at one’s peril. In a world where such were the case, one might be much more leery of going the IPR route at all. Unfortunately, Shaw is the law, and defendants face no such quandaries.
? Greg, the decision hold that the PTAB “must decide the patentability of all of the claims the petitioner has challenged.” That does not apply to other claims the petitioner did NOT challenge.
Sorry if my point was less than clear. Yes, you are correct. SAS does not hold that the PTAB must address claims that the petitioner does not challenge.
My point is that—in view of SAS—a petitioner might well say to herself “if I challenge Claims 1–7, the PTAB might decide that this is more work than they can tackle in their one year statutory limit, and therefore they might decline to institute. Therefore, I will only challenge Claims 1 & 2.” Under the law as it stands, this is a rational decision for the petitioner to make, because if the petitioner never challenges Claims 3–7 in the IPR petition, the petitioner is still free to challenge those claims in the parallel court proceeding.
Under a sane reading of §315(e)(2), however, this strategy would not work. If the petitioner reasonably could have challenged Claims 3–7 in the petition and chose not to do so, then the petitioner would be estopped from challenging 3–7 in the parallel court proceeding. The petitioner would either have to do 1–7 in the IPR, or else do 1–7 in court. No half measures.
This would be a very big part of the petitioner’s strategic thinking, in a hypothetical world where SAS is the law, but in which Shaw went another way than it stands now. As it stands, however, SAS will affect petitioner’s strategic thinking only minimally, because there is essentially no penalty for IPR challenging only a sub-set of the claims about which one cares.
Greg, there are word limits in IPR. So if I am up against a word limit in challenging claims 1-12, you are saying I should be estopped from arguing claims 13-40 in court?
Yes. Or rather, I am saying that if you cannot—within your PTO-imposed word limits—make a plausible challenge against all claims that you wish to challenge, then you should save it for district court.
Greg,
Despite the existing Shaw Industries decision (which was based on an understanding that the PTO did and could initiate IPRs on only certain petitioned claims…a practice overturned in SAS), I happen to believe it WILL effect the equation… (IANAL however)
It may not officially be estoppel….but it will be
1) a factor in the decision to IPR a patent in the first place (i.e. serial challenges will be denied much more often)
2) an appeal point that the patent owner can and will use to overturn the decision.
Note that the Shaw Industries decision involved a case where the CAFC panel explained it could NOT review the PTO decision to initiate the IPR. This bad assumption was subsequently overturned by the recent Wi-Fi One v Broadcom which opened the door to some very limited judicial review….in running with the slight opening that the SCOTUS Cuozzo Speed decision left. Since §315(e)(2) is a clear limitation on the Directors authority to initiate an IPR…it is very similar to the Wi-Fi One case time-bar requirement.
Greg is adding a dimension outside of the immediate case, and attempting to apply the (wooden?) view that DID hold sway in the immediate case to language that has not been contested (I believe) in a court of law.
I can see why you may be initially confused, and perhaps I am giving Greg too much credit (here, I think not), but the SAS case does more than merely decide the specific arguments in that case, The SAS case, when viewed as a TYPE of case and how the law affected by such types of case should be understood, reveal a different point.
The biggest problem of course is that any such reading, being attempted to be grounded in reason, objectivity and dare I say, consistency, means nothing to a Court that simply wants what it wants and does not care how tortured a path it leaves behind.
Shaw is saying that the petitioner was denied the opportunity to fully raise the invalidity issue of any claim non instituted in the IPR; therefore, the petitioner/infringer could raise the issue in court. This is different from the petitioner choosing not to raise an invalidity issue in the IPR, and then wearing out the patentee in court. So, I think the reading of 315(e)(2) that you qualify as sane is the good one: estoppel could apply to invalidity challenges that the petitioner did not raise in the IPR, and not raising a challenge is at the petitioner’s peril.
As long as we are clear that the above is Greg’s personal desire, and not in the pro-IPR-Petitioner decision written by Justice Gorsuch in In SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu. J. Gorsuch leaves the IPR Petitioner with the same right to control which of the patent claims get to be challenged that it had before. The Petitioner now additionally gets to require the Board to render decisions on all the claims that it challenges.
As long as we are clear that the above is Greg’s personal desire, and not in the pro-IPR-Petitioner decision written by Justice Gorsuch…
Right. I apologize if that was not clear. I was trying to say that SAS is kind of small beer in the real world, but it could have been a much bigger deal in a parallel universe in which Shaw had gone another way.
I think the issue is in your paraphrasing of the statute. Most importantly, the statute does not apply to “any invalidity defense that “the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised” during the IPR”:
“The petitioner in an inter partes review of a claim in a patent under this chapter that results in a final written decision under section 318(a), or the real party in interest or privy of the petitioner, may not assert either in a civil action arising in whole or in part under section 1338 of title 28 or in a proceeding before the International Trade Commission under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 that the claim is invalid on any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during that inter partes review.”
By its express terms, the statutory estoppel only applies to the claim that was reviewed in the IPR. I just don’t see how your reading is supported by the statute.
A good read to Anon2’s observation is Envy: A Theory of Social Behaviour – Helmut Schoeck
The upshot of Oil States is that the Director of the USPTO is now going to be a very big political decision with lots of money being offered for the choice of the director.
SAS is minor side show. It does shift things a little bit, but this can be easily changed by Congress with a minor amendment.
In terms of strategy for IPRs, I think that now putting statements in the record during prosecution is now good as they can then help you through the IPR process.
What kinds of things do you mean?
Why was the question about who is Justice Gorasch deleted?
There is a Justice Gorsuch, but no Justice Gorsach.
Who is Justice Gorsach?
Fixed that.
The “wood” appears to seriously limit the ability to use Chevron deference in the first place.
What I simply cannot fathom, is how the Left seem to have no fear whatever of the erosion of the rule of law, the erosion on the checks and balances on Government and the ever growing power of the State at the expense of individual freedoms.
In today’s unprincipled tug of war in Right and Left interest groups, one would assume BOTH sides would be terrified of letting Government power get out of check, because Government is always Political, and inevitably the OTHER side will come into power.
The more I see the more I am forced to conclude that the Left are NOT simply pushing for social freedoms and economic controls (in contrast to the current Right who are for economic freedom and social controls) with a backdrop of a Government in check and individual rights prioritized, they are slowly turning into actual Statists… that the rag they hold for the freedom they despise (economic freedoms) has become so great they would rather impose total control rather than to see something so evil as profit, wealth, production, and financially flourishing individuals…
I heard a story once, witnessed by a student at a prominent college: a group of students (in the context of an “exercise” in egalitarianism and/or psychology) were asked if they had to choose between the following which they would prefer:
1) everyone is free and all doing better than “poor” but there are large variations in wealth or
2) no one is free but everyone is equally well off, all doing worse than “poor”
to the horror of the student practically everyone else chose 2… here we see the naked pettiness and jealously… the hatred of the good for being good…
Bring them ALL down…
and so they HAVE.
This is right Anon2.
If you have ever had to deal with the administrative state–trust me–you want the option of going to an impartial Article III judge.
I heard a story once, witnessed by a student at a prominent college…
Pics, or it didn’t happen.
DanH: what a thoughtful contribution.
Let me be clearer, Night. I don’t believe Anon2’s “story.” I find it telling how often those with, um, somewhat extreme worldviews and/or in the highest leadership posts in the land have to rely on fictional anecdotes to support their positions. If the USA were truly full of young people that believed that we should strive for a system where everyone is worse off than the “poor” of today, then yes, I’d be bemoaning the current state of affairs right along with you. But of course, it’s not, and so I’m not.
Have a great day!
Let me be clearer, NW. I think the story recited above is made up. I find it telling how often those of certain persuasions and/or in the highest leadership posts in the land have to rely on made-up anecdotes to support their positions. If our country was truly full of young people that believed that we should strive for a system where everyone is worse off than the “poor” of today, then yes, I’d be concerned right along with you. But, of course, it’s not, and so I’m not.
Have a great day!
As far as I know it is not made up, it is of course merely anecdotal and could have occurred in a small class. I have no reason not to believe the person who told it (a few decades ago I might add).
It sounds as if you doubt how prevalent Egalitarianism and the philosophical views if the likes of John Rawls have been in the curricula of American colleges now far many decades. Given the views of the Academic Left and prominent power players of the left constantly available in the mainstream media, rather than doubt it, I would assume everyone would have suspected as such.
It should be no surprise then that such a survey asked of semi-indoctrinated 2nd or 3rd year students (for example) at a particularly “progressive” school would garner such a response.
Ah, it’s a small class, long ago, in a particularly progressive school, and you heard it from a friend who heard it from a friend. I do appreciate the honesty.
Sorry, but that alleged survey and the supposed outcome is a silly caricature of Rawls’s philosophical output, while “egalitarianism” is such a broad term as to be meaningless. Regarding the latter, I suppose that makes it more fearsome when you capitalize it and convert it into some secret movement that’s out to take away your stuff. From what I can tell, the tendency towards reliance on made-up stories I mentioned above tends to go hand in hand with a need to create imaginary bogeymen.
My rudimentary knowledge of Rawls comes from a survey class that read a fair amount of Aristotle, Aquinas, Locke, and Llewellyn, as well as Rawls. I’m not sure any of it was successful as “indoctrination,” but it was interesting.
My apologies, somehow this turned into some kind of petty pi$$1ng match… to the extent I have caused this degradation in the discussion I truly am sorry.
Can you remind me what the substance of your point was so that I may rationally respond to it?
lol – when somebody disagrees with you, it’s a “petty pi$$1ng match”?
The “substance of my point” was that your original rant against “the Left” appears to be based on strawmen and fake anecdotes. You’re free to be frightened of shadows, of course. And if demonizing those who disagree with you is part of it, then so be it. All I’m doing, however, is arguing that your characterizations of your opponents are groundless.
Ah, just so.
I have never seen a picture of DanH, do he must have never happened.
the Left seem to have no fear whatever of the erosion of the rule of law,
It never ceases to amaze how many liz@rdbrain pieces of glibertarian sh irt there are floating around in the patent blog punchbowl. In the real world at the most successful IP firms you have to lift up quite a few rocks to find these moufbreathers.
If you disagree with something I have stated, then please, by all means proceed here to disagree with it.
“What I simply cannot fathom, is how the Left seem to have no fear whatever of the erosion of the rule of law, the erosion on the checks and balances on Government and the ever growing power of the State at the expense of individual freedoms.”
No need to be surprised at all. The left’s ideal gubmit/world is stalinesque. I’m not even being facetious. Infinite power of the state and 0 individual freedoms, excepting historical victims of course, who will have all the freedoms, and some additional privileges, that they could ever want, as will be granted to them by the all powerful gubmit to help correct their “group position”. Moving towards this goal is literally the Left’s (capital L hard left, set aside bill clintonites) goal. The reasoning is that individual freedoms (and some other things) continuing for everyone ends up just continuing “white supremacy” (what they consider the status quo at this moment, “whites” being on top in terms of cultural, societal, political etc. power) because whites (specifically white cis hetero christian male capitalists) stole/took/conquered the victims and are now “ahead” of this and that victim group and will likely always, or at least for the next 100-200+ yearsish, maintain that “being ahead” (in their theory this is because of the head start from the lootz they stole/conquered/etc, not because there’s anything special about white people, who in their estimation are just evil) unless corrective actions by the state are taken to “knock them down from their perch”. This principle in total is known as “equity”. Which I guess means “according to the conscience” of a white guilt-ridden feminist upper middle class white cis hetero woman who is hypothetically the “judge” of white people and “white civilization”.
To an extent, they’re probably generally right, but this view is obviously incompatible with the evil whtie cis hetero christian patriarchial capitalistic gubmit we currently have that places restrictions on the gubmits power.
And no, I’m not even making this up. This is literally what modern hard leftists are about, though some of them throw in actual commieism.
“has become so great they would rather impose total control rather than to see something so evil as profit, wealth, production, and financially flourishing individuals”
Its literally because those individuals when looked at in groups keep on not being the “correct” (politically correct) skin tone, ethnicity, nationality, gender, sexuality etc. etc. that they want. Though they are naturally power mad, the current situation is untenable to them for that reason.
Hello
Typo in my last post, that should say “rage they hold for the freedoms they despise”
Thanks for that correction. I was scratching my head and wondering if “holding a rag for…” is a colloquialism that I had not encountered.
lol … I like that.
BTW I’m somewhat surprised, and flattered that you read through my post. I am fully aware my comments do not resonate with any “majority” in the mainstream and that only a small fraction of people external to that mainstream will bother to read anything I write after previously having read one or two of my posts.
For what it is worth, I “hold a rag” for many political and philosophical trends in the west, whose lights are dying out, but
I do not “hold a rag” for you by any stretch.
Anon2,
Your posts need not resonate with anyone to have value.
And have value they do – thank you for that, even if I do not say so often enough.
Comments are closed.