Lourie, Circuit Judge, with whom Newman, Circuit Judge, joins, concurring in the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc.
I concur in the court’s declining to rehear this case en banc. There is plausibility to the panel holding that there are fact issues potentially involved in this case concerning the abstract idea exception to patent eligibility. And the panel, and the court, are bound to follow the script that the Supreme Court has written for us in § 101 cases.
However, I believe the law needs clarification by higher authority, perhaps by Congress, to work its way out of what so many in the innovation field consider are § 101 problems. Individual cases, whether heard by this court or the Supreme Court, are imperfect vehicles for enunciating broad principles because they are limited to the facts presented. Section 101 issues certainly require attention beyond the power of this court.
We started from the statute that provides for patents on “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court put a gloss on this provision by excluding laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174-75 (1852) (“[A] principle is not patentable. A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.”); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (“The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable.”). So far, so good. Laws of nature (Ohm’s Law, Boyle’s Law, the equivalence of matter and energy), properly construed, should not be eligible for patent. Nor should natural phenomena (lightning, earthquakes, rain, gravity, sunlight) or natural products, per se (blood, brain, skin). Of course, the latter are also unpatentable as lacking novelty under § 102.
But it’s in the details that problems and uncertainties have arisen. The Court held in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., that the claim at issue “set forth laws of nature” and was ineligible under § 101 as “a drafting effort designed to monopolize the law of nature itself.” 566 U.S. 66, 77 (2012). That claim recited “[a] method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising” administering a drug and then measuring the level of a metabolite of the drug. Id. at 74-75 (quoting U.S. Patent 6,355,623).
The Supreme Court whittled away at the § 101 statute in Mayo by analyzing abstract ideas and natural phenomena with a two-step test, including looking for an “inventive concept” at step two, thereby bringing aspects of §§ 102 and 103 into the eligibility analysis. Id. at 72-73, 90. The decision we now decide not to rehear en banc holds that step two of the two-step analysis may involve the type of fact-finding that underlies §§ 102 and 103, further complicating what used to be a fairly simple analysis of patent eligibility under § 101. We now are interpreting what began, when it rarely arose, as a simple § 101 analysis, as a complicated multiple-step consideration of inventiveness (“something more”), with the result that an increasing amount of inventive research is no longer subject to patent. For example, because the Mayo analysis forecloses identifying any “inventive concept” in the discovery of natural phenomena, we have held as ineligible subject matter even meritorious inventions that “combined and utilized man-made tools of biotechnology in a way that revolutionized prenatal care.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The case before us involves the abstract idea exception to the statute. Abstract ideas indeed should not be subject to patent. They are products of the mind, mental steps, not capable of being controlled by others, regardless what a statute or patent claim might say. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (“[M]ental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work.”). No one should be inhibited from thinking by a patent. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813) (“[I]f nature has made any one thing less susceptible, than all others, of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an Idea.”). Thus, many brilliant and unconventional ideas must be beyond patenting simply because they are “only” ideas, which cannot be monopolized. Moreover such a patent would be unenforceable. Who knows what people are thinking?
But why should there be a step two in an abstract idea analysis at all? If a method is entirely abstract, is it no less abstract because it contains an inventive step? And, if a claim recites “something more,” an “inventive” physical or technological step, it is not an abstract idea, and can be examined under established patentability provisions such as §§ 102 and 103. Step two’s prohibition on identifying the something more from “computer functions [that] are ‘well-understood, routine, conventional activit[ies]’ previously known to the industry,” Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2359 (2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 73), is essentially a §§ 102 and 103 inquiry. Section 101 does not need a two-step analysis to determine whether an idea is abstract.
I therefore believe that § 101 requires further authoritative treatment. Thinking further concerning § 101, but beyond these cases, steps that utilize natural processes, as all mechanical, chemical, and biological steps do, should be patent-eligible, provided they meet the other tests of the statute, including novelty, nonobviousness, and written description. A claim to a natural process itself should not be patentable, not least because it lacks novelty, but also because natural processes should be available to all. But claims to using such processes should not be barred at the threshold of a patentability analysis by being considered natural laws, as a method that utilizes a natural law is not itself a natural law.
The Supreme Court also held in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., that claims to isolated natural products were ineligible for claiming “naturally occurring phenomena.” 569 U.S. 576, 590 (2013). The Court concluded that those claims “are not patent eligible simply because they have been isolated from the surrounding genetic material.” Id. at 596.
However, finding, isolating, and purifying such products are genuine acts of inventiveness, which should be incentivized and rewarded by patents. We are all aware of the need for new antibiotics because bacteria have become resistant to our existing products. Nature, including soil and plants, is a fertile possible source of new antibiotics, but there will be much scientific work to be done to find or discover, isolate, and purify any such products before they can be useful to us. Industry should not be deprived of the incentive to develop such products that a patent creates. But, while they are part of the same patent-eligibility problems we face, these specific issues are not in the cases before us.
Accordingly, I concur in the decision of the court not to rehear this § 101 case en banc. Even if it was decided wrongly, which I doubt, it would not work us out of the current § 101 dilemma. In fact, it digs the hole deeper by further complicating the § 101 analysis. Resolution of patent-eligibility issues requires higher intervention, hopefully with ideas reflective of the best thinking that can be brought to bear on the subject.
The call for higher authority to change the law is interesting here.
For a federal appellate court, there are typically two such “higher authority” mechanisms for altering the law: (1) Supreme Court reinterpretations and (2) changes in the law itself. In the opinion, Judge Lourie rules out a reinterpretation by the Supreme Court as insufficient — thus leaving us with changing of the law.
Typically, the Patent Act is modified through typical Congressional legislative process. I wonder why Judge Lourie did not then simply call for Congressional action but rather called on action by “higher authority, perhaps by Congress.” An intriguing question here is what other higher authority might Lourie be calling upon? One potential is not for Congress to reexamine the law, but rather to provide the USPTO with rulemaking authority to reconsider the law of eligibility.