In re Google (Fed. Cir. 2020)
In a mandamus order, the Federal Circuit has ruled that Google cannot be sued in E.D. Texas for patent infringement — holding that the district is an improper venue under TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017).
For most Federal Causes of action, venue is deemed proper if the court hearing the case has personal jurisdiction over the defendants. However, patent infringement cases are different. Patent cases fall under a more specific venue statute that limits actions to districts where either (a) the defendant ‘resides’ (i.e., is incorporated) or (b) the defendant has a regular and established place of business and has committed acts of infringement. 28 U.S.C. 1400(b).
In Super Interconnect Techs. LLC v. Google LLC, No. 2:18-CV-00463-JRG, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132005 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2019), Super Interconnect sued Google for infringing, but Google responded a motion for dismissal for improper venue.
Google is not a Texas company and so does not reside in E.D. Texas. Google is accused of infringing in TX, but Google argues that the company does not have a “regular and established place of business” in the district.
- Yes, Google does have many millions of customers and dollars in revenues from the district.
- Yes, Google does market its goods and services directly to consumers in the district.
- Yes, Google has AI services that provide immediate access to information and activities to millions within the district.
- Yes, Google ha[d] very large servers located within the district particularly designed to serve customers within the district. (Note (1) these servers were operated by local ISPs rather than Google itself; and (2) after the filing of this lawsuit, Google removed its servers from the District in order to avoid being sued in E.D. Tex.).
But:
- No, Google does not have a regular and established place of business in the district.
In its decision, the Federal Circuit repeated its prior holding in Cray that a regular-and-established-place-of-business must be a physical place located within the district. While the servers qualify for the physicality requirement, they are not a “place of business.” According to the court, a “place of business” must have an “employee or agent” conducting business in the location — Google’s AI is not sufficient.
We conclude that a “regular and established place of business” requires the regular, physical presence of an employee or other agent of the defendant conducting the defendant’s business at the alleged “place of business.”
In making this “employee or agent” requirement, the court looked to the patent-law service-of-process statute 28 U.S.C. 1694 that indicates service may be made upon a defendants “agent or agents conducting such business” at the regular and establish place of business. The court explains:
The service statute plainly assumes that the defendant will have a “regular and established place of business” within the meaning of the venue statute only if the defendant also has an “agent . . . engaged in conducting such business.” Likewise, the provision that “service . . . may be made by service upon the agent” and the “regular and established” character of the business assumes the regular, physical presence of an agent at the place of business. In the absence of a contrary indication, these assumptions must govern the venue statute as well. . . .
Slip Op.
Judge Wallach joined the opinion, but also penned a concurrence questioning Google’s business model (hmm, seems that the company is doing pretty well for itself…). Judge Wallach explains:
I join with the majority’s order, but I write separately to raise questions about Google’s business model. During oral argument, Google did not answer, when asked, the question of what its main source of business is in the Eastern District of Texas. Google simply explained that it does not “actively do[] anything. In other words, there’s no evidence of any employee or agent . . . being present in the district.” Oral Arg. at 51:55–52:15.
When asked again, “what do you do in the Eastern District?,” Google responded what “what Google does in the District will depend on what the subject of that verb is,” and “when you look at the service statute the subject of that verb has to be ‘employees’ or ‘agents’ in the District.” Id. at 52:30–52:53. Finally, Google was asked “when you gather information, from customers, which is part of your business, you agree. How does that get passed back to Google? It goes through the server?” Id. at 58:59–59:10.
Google’s counsel responded stating: “I am not aware.There’s nothing in the record that I’m aware of on that point, your Honor.” Id. at 59:11–59:14. Given the absence from the record of information sufficient to understand Google’s business model, the question remains for the District Courts to determine whether Google’s end users become agents of Google in furtherance of its business by virtue of voluntarily or involuntarily sharing information generated on Google’s servers. If, for example, by entering searches and selecting results a Google consumer is continuously providing data which Google monetizes as the core aspect of its business model, it may be that under the analysis in which I today join, Google is indeed doing business at the computer of each of its users/customers. Because this is a question I believe should be entertained by District Courts, I concur.
Remember, the venue statute for Google is the same as the venue statute for anyone else. Any rule that you contrive to stick it to Google will be applied to every other defendant.
Do you really want a rule that says that some mom-&-pop record store in Boston that makes sales over the internet can be sued in the DNM? Imagine that the plaintiff really is mistaken about that mom-&-pop, and the defendant is not found liable. Do you not agree that it is a totally avoidable and unnecessary hardship to have made that Boston mom-&-pop litigate (i.e., find counsel, supply documents for discovery, send personnel for depositions, etc) half-way across the country, when there is a perfectly acceptable district court less than five miles from their homes and business that could have served as well?
Those are not bad questions.
See my reply ALREADY touching on this.
Oh, wait, your bruised ego prevents you from actually being meaningfully in touch with what others have already said…
You don’t need to go there. The weak part of the CAFC decision, IMO, is that the workers who were maintaining Google’s servers (employees of two companies with which Google contracted) were not its agents.
It gets there by reviewing the legislative history, and concluding that “business” only means serving customers directly, or producing what the business offers. That sounds like a BS distinction to me.
In this modern day and age, actual “real people” NEED NOT be on hand for a business to have a presence and have customers served directly or producing what the business offers directly – at anywhere and anywhen.
This is directly the point that the now wooden “place of established business” mentality NEEDS to be changed.
As Greg (correctly) points out, this MAY WELL affect a lot of people who have taken advantage of the modern business environment in order to grab the benefit of business on a “anywhere, anywhen” scale.
The real question is whether or not THAT ability to grab the benefit SHOULD BE divorced from the (traditionally) encumbrance of burden for being ABLE tot have that business in that “any” place.
AS I note below, the “just doing business” question has become inextricably linked with how the heck CAN one DO business just anywhere WITHOUT a business presence TO DO THAT business.
This a quantum world away from the old catalogue nature, in which processing of the catalogue orders (which did come from pretty much ‘just anywhere’ was STILL done at a more centralized ‘place of business.’ Those older cases simple were different in kind from the full scope of business that NOW can so easily be done in ANY person’s hand, at ANY time and at ANY where.
It is beyond ludicrous to try to ignore these differences.
Your points are well taken Greg. But what about the opposite. What about the small mom and pop operation that has a dispute with Google. Should they have to go to Northern CA or Delaware when a giant corporation is clearly endemic to the entire country and doing business with 80 percent of the people in their jurisdiction?
Yes. That is the common understanding of what is fair through all of U.S. (and antecedent) history. You begin a lawsuit with the presumption that the defendant is a innocent. Moreover, the plaintiff has the leisure to plan their approach, to search out suitable counsel in the relevant venue, to get their evidence in order, etc. The defendant has no such leisure—the complaint gets served and the clock starts ticking for the defendant to make an answer. Therefore, the venue is settled to suit the defendant’s convenience.
Incidentally, venue is not just about the parties’ respective convenience’s. There is also the matter of what is convenient to justice. If Google is choosing to take actions that infringe a patent, those decisions are being taken in the Bay Area, not in the deserts of Texas. The court wants the relevant decision makers to be on hand and accessible. Setting the trial hundreds of miles away from the relevant personnel and documents just complicates the search for justice to no good purpose.
Those are all good points and I concede it has been many years since I read all the cases about venue.
Probably the key point about this is as Dennis seemed to point out. And that is whether AI would satisfy the doing business and infringement provision.
Not sure that any old cases take into account modern business models and modern information processing. If I had the time, I could probably figure out how and why this affects Alice.
There is where Greg goes off the rails with what amounts to a slippery half-truth:
“There is also the matter of what is convenient to justice. If Google is choosing to take actions that infringe a patent, those decisions are being taken in the Bay Area, not in the deserts of Texas”
This is an absolutely false statement.
Greg wants to isolate and divorce the decision of just where Google IS choosing to do business (ALL OVER THE US) with some notion that a business choice to do business ALL OVER THE US may be traced to a board room decision to take advantage of modern capabilities to DO business at an “anywhen and anywhere” model.
The actual business is NOT so limited to that “Bay Area” boardroom decision location. While certainly “relevant decision makers” FOR choosing to avail of the “anywhen and anywhere” model may indeed BE in that “Bay Area” boardroom, the nuts and bolts of implementation — and THIS is where the rubber meets the road — IS at ALL of those places (and times) of the “anywhere and anywhen.”
Greg throws up a smokescreen to protect the BIG CORP model, while ignoring the true real issue that the old wooden application of a pure Bricks and Mortar understanding of business carries over.
This is nothing more than deceptive half-truths.
The actual doing of business – and YES, the model of being able to do business THROUGH the device of the client does indeed turn that device INTO the virtual agent of the business.
Again, ANY business, from the largest of the large in the Google’s and Amazon’s down to the smallest of the small, the mom-and-pop bakery at the corner, CAN FOR THEMSELVES CHOOSE the mode of business model that turns any and all smart phones and like devices INTO virtual agents of business at and and all locations such devices may well be.
This is a BENEFITS decision BY the business owner.
In perhaps the most direct question possible on this topic, WHY should the burden that accompanies a business choice to BE and to HAVE virtual agents on an “anywhen and anywhere” basis somehow be excused from carrying the associated burden that such a “Brick and Mortar-LESS” (but no less fully self-contained) business decision entails?
The easy answer is that a Business MAY WELL CHOOSE NOT to engage in the “anywhen and anywere” model and structure according to other well known legal vehicles.
To be even more direct, Greg is pulling the wool over the eyes of EVERYONE by merely declaring that the dictates of this being a “matter of what is convenient to justice.” aligns with HIS view, when the plain fact is that the alignment of justice is exactly the opposite.
“There is also the matter of what is convenient to justice. If Google is choosing to take actions that infringe a patent, those decisions are being taken in the Bay Area, not in the deserts of Texas”
This is actually a factual issue of where the people are that would be deposed. So Greg is either right or wrong. And my guess is that he is more right than wrong.
This is not a question of where people are who would be deposed.
THAT is the spin.
The question is where is the business being conducted, and how can business be conducted anywhere without the business having a place to conduct that business.
The current venue ‘definition’ simply lacks a touchstone with modern business and no longer serves the purpose of its creation.
Entertaining ‘spin’ of “where are the board members who decided to implement an “anywhere, anywhen” business model has ZERO to do with the actual business BEING conducted under that model.
What happens next when a company ‘decides’ that it is its distributed AI model that ‘made the decision’ and NOT the board group in the Bay? Do you then have NO reach? No subpoena? No accountability?
TIL That the E.D.Tex was situated in a desert.
Patent attorneys arguing about “the law” as if that really matters anymore. They’re so serious!
Funny stuff.
Well, we can’t say they weren’t warned.
The important thing is to be civil and not upset the Party or its members. Just go along with The Great Plan, and they will provide those of us who aren’t lazy with work. The AI machines will make those determinations.
In the meantime, let’s all just remember that patents are the most efficient tools for promoting progress in correlating stuff and and progress in applying logic in that context that is just like that other context except it has a different name.
Happy Friday!
Brushing aside the snark (and the typical cognitive dissonance that you have in regards to patents), and…
there is nothing here in your post.
Did you have an actual, legally cognitive point to share?
The way to think of this is the software at the users computer is the agent of Google.
LOL
Not sure WHY you would “LOL” that, Malcolm, this actually goes quite well with your usual mantra about computing machines being mere proxies for real humans.
Is your reaction here merely because you are seeing that the post is written by Night Writer, and you are compelled to disagree?
Would a prosecutor have jurisdiction over an online gaming web site – if it could show people in the district putting in credit cards and online gambling? Would it matter that the servers are offshore? The google ad system is no different, people in the district putting in credit cards and purchasing advertising from google.
Sure, but this is not a personal jurisdiction case. It is a venue case. Venue is usually more restricted than personal jurisdiction, and so it is here.
?
your argument is odd – personal jurisdiction IS a type of venue item.
Reality–Google does business with probably 80 percent of the people and businesses in the E.D. of Texas and earns a large revenue from those people. To say that Google is not doing business in E.D. of Texas is to ignore economic reality over contrived abstractions, which is not surprising for the tyrant judges Obama appointed.
I seem to remember that there was some old case where Sears could be sued pretty much anywhere because of their catalog business. Seems very similar to me. But probably the case for Google is even stronger as the reality is that since the software is downloaded to your computer in part the transactions are actually happening right in your home or business in the E.D. of Texas.
Again, we have judges at the CAFC that just shove nonsense down our throats and expect us to believe them or respect them.
It is inconceivable to a person that understands Google’s business model that they cannot be sued in the E.D. of Texas.
As the bare-bones BOOTSTRAPPING and insertion of “real person” present in order to create venue shows — the existing and controlling Rule of Law of venue needs to be overhauled.
People such as Malcolm (and I would add Greg, even if Greg is an inte11ectual coward and won’t even bother to read posts from those that have “offended him”) should recognize how my position does not confuse and conflate what IS the law of venue with my suggestions, but instead clearly indicate THAT I desire a change in law — and WHY I desire a change in law.
One may even draw a further conclusion as to the ‘player’ involved here being a juristic person.
We as a nation have allowed the naturally uneven nature of a juristic person to have OUTSIZED effects on our laws (and political process).
We need to constrain the power of juristic persons — especially in areas in which the differences between juristic persons and real persons have real world effects. Clearly, venue is one such area. And clearly, the “voice” of political donations (and the danger of subsequent government capture) is another.
As I noted below at 1.1.1.1.2.1, ignoring the particulars and pretending that juristic persons are the same as real persons in ALL regards is an invitation to disaster.
The specter and dystopia of Corportacracy has NO compunction for abusing any and all notions of their juristic personhood.
And why should they? Maximizing such is only what a Rational Actor would do.
The point then being that once this “Rational Actor” mode is recognized, it is up to Congress to take this into account and shape the laws accordingly.
They have been either asleep — or worse — already captured.
What the CAFC tyrants do is twist anything to weaken patents. They will get to the bottom of something if it weakens patents. They will feign ignorance if it weakens patents. They will adopt modern thinking if it weakens patents. And, here, they will not modernize old venue rules to technological realities because it would not weaken patents.
It’s tyranny, I tells ya!
Can’t these CAFC judges tell the good kind of judicial activism from the bad kind???
LOL
THIS is actually pretty funny coming from the guy known to celebrate any judicial item that reaches a (desired) Ends without regard to the Means.
Malcolm being inadvertently ironic….
Reality–Google does business with probably 80 percent of the people and businesses in the E.D. of Texas and earns a large revenue from those people.
Fine, all of which is irrelevant to the relevant statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) provides that “[a]ny civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district… where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business” (emphasis added).
It is, in other words, not enough—for venue purposes—merely that the defendant be doing business in the ED Tex. That would likely be enough for personal jurisdiction, but this case was not disputing personal jurisdiction. This case was about venue, and for venue one needs to have a “regular and established place of business” in the district. Customers wandering the district using the Google app on their smart phones are not a “regular and established place of business,” no matter how much revenue their searches accrue to Google.
…and Greg BEING obtuse yet again….
MUCH like the beatdown he received when he was obtuse on exhaustion….
Judge Wallach’s prescient concurrence points the way forward for entities wishing to file in the jurisdiction of their choice:
“If, for example, by entering searches and selecting results a Google consumer is continuously providing data which Google monetizes as the core aspect of its business model, it may be that under the analysis in which I today join, Google is indeed doing business at the computer of each of its users/customers.”
If Super Interconnect takes the Judge’s “hint,” Google’s, “see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil” baloney will (as it should) fail back at the Dist. Ct.
Fact is, the Federal Courts in all U.S. States have jurisdiction over Google.
Whether they like it or not.
I would not call it “prescient,” I would call it nutty. The whole concurrence has a kind of goofy feel to it. Decades of case law establishes that, for both jurisdiction and venue (and most forms of liability generally), customers are not agents of a company simply by using the products or services the company provides, no matter how “interactive” those products may be. I would expect this concurrence to be largely ignored, and since it didn’t carry more than one vote, will not impact how Google is handled in this district. Google basically no longer has to worry about being sued in E.D. Texas anymore.
I agree – agency law just won’t stretch to include customers.
“goofy feel”. I guess Lode if that is what you call common sense and reality.
I guess reality does often have a goofy feel when technology changes reality.
At the same time, we all should recognize that the agents for receiving service need not be the same type or degree of an “agent” for conducting business.
These are clearly two very different functionalities, and it is clearly an improper bootstrapping to take the one and import it into the other.
I agree with pro say.
The issue is that, in fact, Google is doing business with a large percentage of the people in E.D. of Texas with each search.
Google is presenting advertising, collecting user information, selling videos, etc. It is as if Google was a chain store that had 50,000 outlets throughout the USA.
That is reality.
It is just more outrageous absurdity that the courts have fabricated nonsense to deny what, in fact, is happening because of new technology.
The CAFC is a complete and total disgrace. Obama put the worst people on the CAFC.
There is still a sense of separation between doing business WITH clients and the agents OF your business with whom clients may be interacting with.
A real world approach would require past judicial decisions (dating back to the paper catalogue days) to be revisited, and actual modern modes of business be reflected in venue rules.
This of course would effect MORE THAN just juristic persons, as even individual real persons create the type of “business presence” by virtual agent that the connected web provides.
The fact of the matter is that any one — even any real single person — CAN establish a real world business presence (IF that person avails themselves of some pretty ubiquitous tools) at ALL points of venue throughout the US.
When one realizes this fact, Greg’s (rather decent) post at 1.1.1.1.2 needs to be adjusted somewhat to account for the fact that a single person has decided to take advantage of modern business capability that simply did not exist at the same scale when the fairness of venue rules were being out together.
One needs to recognize that there is a material difference between mailing out catalogues across the US and the enabled and immediate business presence in the palm of anyone anywhere holding a smart phone.
One way to look at this is to realize that it is an affirmative business choice to avails oneself to HAVE the benefits of a modern business capability of that nigh- instant and nigh-anywhere “agent” of business being the tiny electronic device that the customer themselves own. If the business owner does not choose to allow business to be conducted through this virtual agent (anytime and anywhere), then the client device would NOT become the agent.
One question — and perhaps the driving one — is whether or not the business has itself chosen to BE “anytime and anywhere”….? If the business HAS made this affirmative choice to obtain that type of benefit, then should not the accompanying burden ALSO be allocated to that affirmative choice?
There seriously needs to be a venue change to reflect that the patent right is Federal — and present throughout the Federal system, with the concomitant proper place to bring action being throughout the federal system.
A decision like this that force feeds a bootstrap notion that ’employee’ in one section that may be able to receive service necessitates an employee present in order to establish a general place of business is beyond ludicrous.
Here’s an easy test that is sure to generate a change:
carry this over to any state’s ability to charge taxes on a business for that business having the same hyper-defined “place of business.”
You lack one for patent venue? You lack the same for having to pay taxes.
Anyone guess how loud the roar would be then?
What exactly is wrong with the current venue rules other than not being what you prefer? Is there something inherently good about allowing patent owners to pick any district court in the entire country?
To me, what is exactly wrong is the very apparent incongruity of where a patent may be in effect, and where a patent issue may be brought into court.
Yes, there is something inherently good (and symmetrical) about these two things being coextensive.
Let me flip this and ask you the opposite: what exactly is right with the current venue rules not being symmetrical, and is there something inherently bad about having a patent that is ‘good’ anywhere and everywhere, but not enforceable in a particular court anywhere and everywhere?
Mind you, I am NOT saying that there could not be (must not be) motions that would move venue for any number of reasons. And there well may be plenty of circumstances in which it would make sense to transfer venue. But this is quite starkly different than simply declaring (apparently ad hoc) that venue has to be different than the extent to which the rights reach.
Also keep in mind that I am NOT saying that the current venue rules ARE as I would prefer. I AM saying that the current venue rules simply make little sense.
Venue is about where the rights can be adjudicated–not where they are enforceable. With respect to a given defendant, the scope of every district court’s decision is nationwide. Thus, provided that there is personal jurisdiction, any court will do. My point is that venue is somewhat arbitrary. A rule where the plaintiff gets to pick any district court where infringement occurs is just as arbitrary as a rule where the defendant can only be sued at its headquarters (where the infringement is directed and controlled). The venue rule could be place of residence for individual plaintiffs, but otherwise random selection from among all courts with personal jurisdiction over the defendant. It all depends on what Congress believes is the “best” way to designate the appropriate venue(s). However, which every court adjudicates the dispute, the ruling will have nationwide effect.
I just don’t see how the venue rules relate in any way to the geographic scope of patent rights.
“Thus, provided that there is personal jurisdiction, any court will do”
um sure – is there a reason why you are going into details that are not at point here?
“My point is that venue is somewhat arbitrary.”
um sure – but does that NOT MORE support my position on symmetry then? Are you saying that your point is actually in support of my point?
“I just don’t see how the venue rules relate in any way to the geographic scope of patent rights.”
I can only believe that your lack of ability to see is based on your decision to keep your eyes clenched tight. You already indicate a sense of “arbitrary” and with your own admission, why NOT be symmetrical is a question that apparently you have no answer whatsoever to. Not even a ‘bad’ answer.
Since you have NOT given me any answers, let me ask again:
Let me flip this and ask you the opposite: what exactly is right with the current venue rules not being symmetrical, and is there something inherently bad about having a patent that is ‘good’ anywhere and everywhere, but not enforceable in a particular court anywhere and everywhere?
My point is that venue is somewhat arbitrary.
Hm, that does not sound right to me. A defendant is presumed not to be liable in our system. That is to say, we begin every private suit with the idea that the defendant is not liable, and the plaintiff has the burden to prove liability.
If—as our justice system presumes—defendants are innocent of the charges brought against them, then it is an unworthy hardship worked upon them even to make them show up in court at all. Naturally we are willing to tolerate that presumptive indecency as simply a necessary evil to the proper working of the system. However, there is no need to make this indecency worse than it absolutely has to be. It would simply compound the indecency to impose the unnecessary hardship of making the defendant show up in a court halfway across the country from the defendant’s customary location. Rather, we can at least do the presumptive innocents the decency of minimizing the inconvenience to which they be put.
In other words, venue rules are not really arbitrary. They are a reflection of fairness and decency in view of the presumptions inherent in our system of justice.
I can accept Greg’s points here.
At least to a certain extent.
However, the larger context here (that our inte11ectual coward has shut his eyes to) has to do with those entities that ARE ubiquitously everywhere. The nature of the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s charges (based on both the national level of the federal reach is symmetrical with the defendant’s actions (quite outside what has become an overly stilted and wooden “place of business.”
We ARE talking about entities that operate at every jurisdiction across the nation based on the type of activity in the purported suit.
Reality–Google does business with probably 80 percent of the people and businesses in the E.D. of Texas and earns a large revenue from those people. To say that Google is not doing business in E.D. of Texas is to ignore economic reality over contrived abstractions, which is not surprising for the tyrant judges Obama appointed.
To say that Google is not doing business in E.D. of Texas is to ignore economic reality…
No one is saying that Google does not do business in the ED Tex. Merely doing business in the ED Tex is not enough for venue purposes, even if it would be enough for personal jurisdiction. See, 3.3 above.
Let’s cut through the obtuseness of Greg and ask a really simple question:
How does one DO business without having a point of established business with which TO DO that business?
The two really are inextricably linked. Only those who wish to keep their heads buried in the sand are willing to pretend that the LARGER issue here necessarily implicates the two.
Another way of thinking about this:
I pull out my smart phone and decide to do business with Google – at my smart phone.
Clearly, Google “has done business.”
So where IS this established place of business FOR Google to have just done this business?
Mind you, no “real person” was involved.
It appears — from the present decision — that there is NO actual “place of business (for Google)”.
Take that next step: since we have just established that there is NO place, how can ANY place turn around and demand taxes from Google from that business that was just done?
To be “logically consistent,” NO place is permitted to claim any right to taxes on that business; and that would necessarily include the Federal Government. Since the is NO ‘real person’ and hence NO ‘real place,’ then there can be NO government entity that can rightfully lay claim to tax revenue of the “place-less” business deal (for Google).
The fact — of course — that the IRS would never allow this type of thinking should far more immediately supplant the very different bootstrap of “real person” to receive legal service (which is NOT a business transaction).
Anon prefers filing suuuueeets right out side of the confederate museum across the street from the ED Tex courthouse. So he can stop by the museum on his way to trial 🙂
I for one do not blame him for loving history.
Sorry 6, but there is ZERO basis for this type of attribution from you for me.
And personally, it just does NOT fit.
That is a great idea anon. The taxes are where the rubber hits the road.
It is unbelievable the wan kie little arguments presented to counter such arguments.
It is all about power and tyrants. Obama was one of the worst tyrants in the history of the USA, but he did it silently in the dark.
Here we have these wan k boy and girl judges that generate shxt out their mouths and expect us to bow to their shxt.
Taxes come to mind because that is where one of the early reactions to the advanced (and now nearly ubiquitous) capability of business anywhere and anytime first hit with real world effects of the shift in benefit without burden.
As I noted above, there is a quantum jump level of difference between ‘virtual agents’ and the old paper catalogue days. Any judicial decision — as well as most likely any legislative process — SHOULD recognize this quantum difference.
Of course (and appropriately in the Legislative sphere) policy choices of how much ‘lubrication’ business ‘over the web’ should have — and the relation to the vitality (if not viability) of a brick-and-mortar-LESS model should be afforded can be a debatable item. Note as well, that such debate quickly raise State versus Federal questions.
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