This week USPTO Commissioner for Patents Vaishali Udupa issued a memorandum to all patent examiners entitled “Resources for Examining Means-Plus-Function and Step-Plus-Function Claim Limitations (35 U.S.C. 112(f)).” The purpose of the memo is to remind examiners of the resources and guidance available when examining claims under 35 U.S.C. 112(f), commonly referred to as “means-plus-function” or “step-plus-function” claims. The memo summarizes key points regarding:
- Determining whether a claim limitation invokes 112(f)
- Clearly communicating on the record when 112(f) has been invoked
- Evaluating the adequacy of the supporting disclosure
The USPTO has also requested public feedback on the guidance (6/18/24 deadline). Examiners will apparently undergo some training. Although not clear if this will be enforced, it may become more of a requirement for examiners to provide a claim construction section in their office action rejections.
Although the memo is generally helpful, there are two points of guidance that are lacking, and that I discuss below:
- How is BRI applied at the initial stage of determining whether a claim is written in means-plus-function form?
- How are means-plus-function limitations evaluated under the 112(a) written description and enablement requirements. Particular, must the “equivalents” covered by the claim be adequately supported by the specification?
Background: Section 112(f) permits means-plus-function claim limitations. The statute provides:
(f) Element in Claim for a Combination.— An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
The guidance memo notes that drafting claims that comply with 112(f) “can be beneficial to applicants by allowing them to recite a function in a claim and rely on the specification for the corresponding structure, material, or acts that perform the function and equivalents thereof.” This permits applicants to avoid specifically identifying the means or steps in the claim itself and instead “point to a more robust description of the means or steps in the specification.” Notice the careful writing here that 112(f) is not intended to permit broader claims but rather to offer claims that fit the “robust description” of the structure disclosed in the specification.
Because 112(f) limitations are tied to the structure, material, or acts described in the specification, the result is that they may “be afforded a narrower interpretation than a limitation that is not crafted in means-plus-function” format.
Determining Whether a Claim Limitation Invokes 112(f)
The memo reminds examiners to apply the 3-prong analysis outlined in MPEP 2181, subsection I to determine if a claim limitation invokes 112(f):
(A) the claim limitation uses the term “means” or “step” or a term used as a substitute for “means” that is a generic placeholder (also called a nonce term or a non-structural term having no specific structural meaning) for performing the claimed function;
(B) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is modified by functional language, typically, but not always linked by the transition word “for” (e.g., “means for”) or another linking word or phrase, such as “configured to” or “so that”; and
(C) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is not modified by sufficient structure, material, or acts for performing the claimed function.”
The memo notes there are no absolutes in terms of generic placeholders that invoke 112(f). Rather, “The examiner must carefully consider the term in light of the specification and the commonly accepted meaning in the technological art.” Examples are provided of terms like “mechanism for,” “module for,” “device for,” etc. that have been found in some cases to be generic placeholders invoking 112(f).
One Problem: Although the memo discusses the use of Broadest Reasonable Interpretation (BRI), it does not delve into how BRI applies to the initial step of determining whether a claim term invokes 112(f). The difficulty here is that at this initial step, it is unclear whether MPF designation leads to a broader claim or a narrower claim. At this initial step, it may be unclear whether interpreting a term as a 112(f) limitation will ultimately lead to a broader or narrower claim scope. On one hand, invoking 112(f) can limit the claim to the corresponding structure disclosed in the specification and equivalents thereof, potentially resulting in a narrower interpretation than if the limitation were given its full BRI. However, if the specification discloses broad or generic corresponding structure, the 112(f) interpretation could end up being quite broad.
This ambiguity arguably creates a challenge for examiners trying to apply the BRI standard. In my view, the purpose of BRI is to ensure claims are tested for validity during the examination process in order to give effect to the presumption of validity associated with issued patents.
If it’s unclear whether a 112(f) construction would be broader or narrower, one could argue the examiner should choose whichever interpretation would lead to finding the claim unpatentable, as that would best serve the public interest underlying the BRI standard. However, this approach could be problematic from a number of standpoints. The better approach here is to choose the best interpretation, and then clearly make that interpretation of record in the case.
Certainly, more clarity from the USPTO on how to navigate the BRI standard alongside cases such as Williamson v. Citrix would be welcome.
Establishing Claim Interpretation on the Record
The memo emphasizes that “[e]stablishing the interpretation of § 112(f) limitations in writing during prosecution is critical in supporting the agency goal of establishing a clear prosecution record.” Examiners are encouraged to use form paragraphs to set forth any 112(f) interpretations in a dedicated claim interpretation section of the office action. This notifies the applicant and public of the examiner’s claim construction and how it impacted the prior art search and application. It also allows the applicant to clarify their intended construction early in prosecution if needed. Traditionally, patent examiners do have not included a claim construction section — this may be a sign of changes.
Evaluating Disclosure Support Under 112(a) and 112(b)
Once a limitation is determined to invoke 112(f), the adequacy of the specification’s disclosure must be evaluated to determine if it defines the claim scope and provides enablement and written description support.
The memo states:
The proper test for meeting the definiteness requirement of a § 112(f) limitation is that the corresponding structure must be disclosed in the specification itself in a way that one skilled in the art will understand what structure will perform the entire recited function. If there is no disclosure of structure for performing the entire recited function, the claim fails to satisfy the requirements of § 112(b) and should be found indefinite.
For computer-implemented 112(f) limitations, the specification must at least disclose an algorithm for performing the claimed function, or else the claim should be rejected under 112(b). A general purpose computer alone is not sufficient corresponding structure.
The memo notes a 112(f) limitation found indefinite under 112(b) for lacking sufficient corresponding structure “will also lack adequate written description and may not be sufficiently enabled to support the full scope of the claim under § 112(a).” The specification must describe the invention in enough detail to establish possession of the claimed invention and enable a skilled artisan to make and use it.
Equivalents: One beauty of means plus function claims is that they cover disclosed embodiments and their “equivalents.” This statutory equivalents has the power to expand out the scope of the claims in interesting ways. My traditional thinking is that the written description and enablement requirements are satisfied in 112(f) cases by providing at least one structural disclosure linked to the claimed function. However, in Xencor, the PTO held otherwise — indicating that the equivalents must also be supported by the written description. That case is now before the Appeal Review Panel at the USPTO following remand from the Federal Circuit.
The memo does not particularly address the PTO’s view on whether whether the written description must also support any “equivalents” that fall within the scope of a 112(f).
Comments can be provided to the USPTO at the following link: https://www.regulations.gov/document/PTO-P-2023-0045-0001
Eight hidden links from Greg.
Not a one tethered to reality.
¯\_(ツ)_/¯
It is funny that Greg’s hidden links would likely be ignored by most users except for the fact that you feel the need to point them out. If it wasn’t for you, I, for example, wouldn’t have thought to search them out.
If so, I would have missed the obituary of Vernor Vinge — one of my favorite science fiction writers. I had seen that he passed away a couple of days ago but this obituary is new to me. I’m curious as to how this is “[un]tethered to reality.”
One of the articles was to a NY Times articles talking about how micro-houses (e.g., a 600 ft2 house or less) is becoming more of a thing. I’m curious as to how this is “[un]tethered to reality” since they show a real picture of a real (very tiny house) in the article itself.
Of the articles was to a Doonesbury cartoon highlight that a certain subset of the US population are election deniers. I’m curious as to how this is “[un]tethered to reality.”
Untethered to the reality of anon’s mom’s basement.
One of the links is an NYT article proclaiming that “Los Angeles is a Donut Town.” Anyone who thinks that is untethered from reality has never been to L.A. I thought that I must have died and gone to donut heaven when I first moved down here.
Greg’s hidden links…
You say “hidden links,” I say “Easter eggs.” These are all links that I have found to be interesting and/or amusing, and it pleases me to imagine that at least some other folks might also find them interesting or amusing, so I share them about.
How “hidden” are they, really? It takes no effort to find them. I do not want to distract from the main topic of a thread by just thrusting them into discussions (as, for example, 6 likes to do), so I do not just paste the links into my posts. I also do not want anyone to misunderstand them to be support for some point I am making, so I do not let them extend across a whole word. That is why I confine them to one letter or one punctuation character.
They are really more “unobtrusive” than “hidden.” Indeed, what would be the point of “hiding” a link that I want other people to enjoy? In any event, to the extent that they are “hidden,” it is in only the same sense that Easter eggs are “hidden,” where half the fun is in finding them and the other half in opening them.
Greg’s “easter eggs” are like fetid shrimp and sardines hidden in the hollows of curtain rods – something smelly and just wrong.
“It takes no effort to find them.”
It does for me, maybe it’s just my resolution settings or my eyesight but if anon doesn’t say something I don’t notice most.
My notice and comment has less to do with any actual meaningfulness of what ‘delights’ Greg, and is more of a shine the spotlight on “what delights Greg” – given that most (but not all) are vapid regurgitations of mindless Sprint Left propaganda narratives.
That he nigh constantly feeds on this is why Greg posts as he posts.
so that’s what it takes to wake some folks up.
good to know (and contrast to their usual quiet ‘in response.’
The I was only kidding retort … where have I seen that one before?
You misconstrue my ‘retort.’
That was not an “I was only kidding.”
While perhaps I did embellish a bit, none of the multitude of links have anything to so with patent law. and a fair number of them are in fact the type of Sprint Left propaganda that Greg imbibes in.
I also noticed that you seem to be overly nonchalant about the fact that Greg is stooping to hidden signaling in the comments section of this blog – for spreading materials that does not have anything to do with this blog.
While perhaps I did embellish a bit, none of the multitude of links have anything to so with patent law. and a fair number of them are in fact the type of Sprint Left propaganda that Greg imbibes in.
OMG [clutching pearls] … people do that?
Wt – comments in filter
Does the guidance address pharmaceutical claims that use “effective amount”? The CAFC has recognized “effective amount” as a functional limitation.
“Our predecessor court has stated that “effective amount” is a common and generally acceptable term for pharmaceutical claims and is not ambiguous or indefinite, provided that a person of ordinary 1384*1384 skill in the art could determine the specific amounts without undue experimentation. In re Halleck, 57 C.C.P.A. 954, 422 F.2d 911, 914 (1970). By its terms, a “synergistically effective amount” is a functional limitation. As explained in In re Swinehart, 58 C.C.P.A. 1027, 439 F.2d 210, 213 (1971), a functional limitation covers all embodiments performing the recited function. Thus, this claim term should not be limited to the disclosed dosage range of 50 mg to 500 mg but instead should encompass any dosage amount that can achieve therapeutic synergy.”
Geneva Pharmaceuticals v. GlaxoSmithKline, 349 F.3d 1373, 1383-84 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
That case is more than 20 years old and quotes CCPA cases that are 50 years old. Whatever it stands for, the actual law and its application today is going to be a lot more nuanced than the blurb makes it appear to be. Moreover, in an unpredictable art, an unconstrained (i.e., unlimited or undefined in the specification) element like that is basically a death sentence for the claim (if not at the PTO then almost surely in the courts or PTAB).
Surely, you must agree that “effective amount” is functional language. As functional language, it should be examined in the same way that any other functional language is examined.
Be careful with your answer or run the risk of being recognized as a hypocrite — by those unfamiliar with your ways.
For the easily confused children out there: whether a claim term that is taken out of context is deemed “functional” (as a term like “effective amount” may be), if that term is clearly DEFINED structurally in the specification then that’s the beginning and end of the claim construction exercise and all this case law on “functional” terms is instantly mooted.
No wait,
Like many, I stopped using means plus function language years ago. Besides, the PTO can issue guidance but the PTO can’t (won’t) reprimand them when they don’t. As long as Examiners are making 100%+ of their required production, nothing the Examiner does is wrong (even after being reversed by the PTAB).
Sadly so.
Me, I like to sprinkle in a few M+F claims here and there; for who knows what the future may hold for them? Cheap insurance for the unknown, I say.
Save money and just drop the language in the spec.
I stopped using means plus function language years ago.
Have you also stopped using functional language without specifying in the claims the structure that performs the function? If not, you effectively ensure that your client’s counterparts can convert your claim into a M+F at their option, according to whether a M+F construction is more favorable to them.
Or do you mean the old saw of Prof. Crouch’s “Vast Middle Ground” of terms merely sounding in function but NOT invoking 35 USC 112(f)?
You know, Snowflake, a real lawyer would know that a blog post is not binding authority. Also, Crouch’s post came before the en banc decision in Williamson v. Citrix. That makes his blog post what we real lawyers call “bad law,” even if it had been authority at the time.
“… your client’s counterparts…”
My apologies for confusion. Autocorrect changed counterparty into counterparts.
I’ve also been trying to avoid them (while simultaneously hedging against the nuance word doctrine).
But… I’m starting to think I should switch my standard CPP claim set to a M+F claim on the grounds that: 1) Festo – statutorily required equivalents may get you to a jury; 2) nobody actually sells a CPP nowadays; 3) possibly stronger 101 case, as it’s now ‘directed to’ disclosed structure; and 4) claim differentiation that my main method claim isn’t M+F.
All good points. The thing is, you get three independent claims for your filing fee. Even if claim 1 is not M+F, why not make your next independent claim M+F, just to buy all of the possibilities you just listed?
Traditionally, your 3 independent claims are method, CPP, and system. The method is theoretically the broadest. The system has the highest potential royalty base. CPP claims were desired to directly target the software manufacturer (vs. end user) for “selling” the invention … but nowadays, is generally just a picture claim.
I’d love to file 4 or 5 independents (e.g., both server side and client side, or both broader and narrower claims), but computer/tech clients seldom approve the extra expense.
+1
Nicely stated.
Re: “I’d love to file 4 or 5 independents (e.g., both server side and client side, or both broader and narrower claims), but computer/tech clients seldom approve the extra expense.”
This is all too common in many technologies these days, and classic “penny wise – pound foolish.” The added cost of a couple of extra independent claims is trivial compared to the total cost of obtaining and maintaining U.S. and foreign equivalent patents, much less the costs of trying to defend a patent trying to be monetized. But how much PR effort is being made by patent attorneys to convince the misguided penny-pinchers – the CPCs and GPs controlling patent preparation and prosecution costs? The IPO and AIPLA should be addressing this also.
+1
As the above commentators point our, limiting one self to only three indies (and 20 total claims) is just plain foolish. Relative to prep / pros + maintenance fees + potential suit costs, they’re nothing money.
And potentially company-killing for startups and small companies with few if any patents to protect their invention/s.
Furthermore, since the CAFC just loves to shortcut justice by zeroing in on a single (allegedly representative) claim to analyze — often the first indie claim — perhaps the first claim should be an M+F?
Preparing a large claim set is a great idea (full set gets dropped in the spec) but paying for examination of that large claim set up front when the claims are highly likely to be restricted and/or amended seems like throwing money down the drain. There’s something to be said for keeping the examination focused and controlling the timing of grants, particularly when examination is taking place around the world.
Shockers, but Malcolm’s point here is a decent one.
Of course, any actual claim (and continuation) strategy is one the should be discussed with the client and proceed upon their direction.
I’m puzzled by question 2 in the blog that asks “How are means-plus-function limitations evaluated under the 112(a) written description and enablement requirements. Particular, must the “equivalents” covered by the claim be adequately supported by the specification?”
A 112(f) determined claim element only has narrow” equivalents” of just its spec supporting examples. If it has at least one. If it has none, the claim is dead for ambiguity.
You should be puzzled by the question, because it is fundamentally nonsensical—as in, literally makes no sense if you think about it carefully.
Section 112(f) speaks of two categories: “corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.” The question is premised on the idea that it is possible to describe the “equivalents,” and then asks whether such is also necessary.
But, of course, it is not possible to describe the equivalents. Once one describes something in the written description of the specification, that something becomes—by definition—a “corresponding structure.” One can never describe an “equivalent,” because to do so moves the thing described out of the “equivalent” category and into the “corresponding structure” category.
meh – you are trying too hard Greg.
One can certainly have a variety of corresponding structures described, and then for each of the provided variety, coverage extends to those corresponding (but not described) equivalents – for each.
You are being drawn again to attempt to speak of the computing realm – which you have several times admitted to NOT being within your bailiwick.
Three thoughts:
1. Closing the gate after the horse is out: Why a request for public feedback AFTER the guidance has been issued? Could feedback result in guidance changes? Why subject Examiners to potential examinational whipsawing? How much weight will — or should — Examiners give this guidance . . . knowing it could change as soon as later this year?
2. “in Xencor, the PTO held otherwise — indicating that the equivalents must also be supported by the written description.”
Sorry PTO, but you lack the legal authority to materially change patent statutes — including 112(f). And that’s what this would be.
3. Given the ever-increasing complexity of — and almost constant changing of — examination / prosecution, is it time for the U.S. to transition to a patent registration system? The prep + pros folks would quickly find work in litigation.
“is it time for the U.S. to transition to a patent registration system”
It’s long past time for that.
Worst idea ever for reasons that are obvious to most sane people who pay attention to how the patents granting system relates to the courts.
“how the patents granting system relates to the courts.”
Yes. Yes. I know that, silly. But just imagine what the resultant patent explosion in the courts would look like! Heck; even the now-out-of-work Death Squad PTAB attys would have plenty of litigation work to keep themselves busy.
Start popping the popcorn and break out the corn nuts!
What fun, right?!
Please do not confuse the skill sets of mere litigators with those that work to earn protection for innovators.
You excessively glorify the litigators and denigrate those work for protection.
“You excessively glorify the litigators and denigrate those work for protection.”
Whoa — glorify litigators and denigrate those who work for protection?
You know me better than that, my friend.
I think so, too.
Great Minds think alike
on some things.
I meant it be come out under, ““is it time for the U.S. to transition to a patent registration system””
“It’s long past time for that.”
Offering a poll on where the US should transition to a patent registration system here
link to linkedin.com
I hope those proposing a patent registration system realize the massive amount of patent litigation it would spawn, to the even greater benefit of patent litigators. Especially given the high percentage of patent applications now being filed with extremely broad “shotgun claims” [due to no prior art searches], that would cover many more, even prior art, products, and have even higher rates invalidity decisions. It would also overwhelm the reexamination, reissue, and IPR systems.
The mollusks don’t care about any of the inevitable catastrophic results that will harm others. They just care about “more patents for them”. It’s similar to how the f u n d y types think about ending control over reproduction. The downsides are for “the other people”. They are incapable of thinking beyond that because they are that self-absorbed and they are part of a cult.
That’s why there is (and always will be) substantial overlap between the patent maximalists and the right wing. It’s a lot of the same mentally challenged b o z o s.
I’d need to find a new career if we went to a registration system.
But the ensuing fecal storm would force congress to fix patent law.
“force congress to fix patent law”
You’d have to first “force Congress” to move to a registration system. Or the PTO would have to unilaterally stop doing ANY substantive examination of utility patents (in which case Congress would respond with the far easier route of “forcing” the PTO to do its job).
The bottom line is that it’s a silly proposal. And why stop with a “registration” system? Just let every citizen file a lawsuit for patent infringement based on the citizen’s own evidence of earlier invention. Freedom!
“1. Closing the gate after the horse is out: Why a request for public feedback AFTER the guidance has been issued? Could feedback result in guidance changes? Why subject Examiners to potential examinational whipsawing? How much weight will — or should — Examiners give this guidance . . . knowing it could change as soon as later this year?”
It’s called: Ready, Fire, Aim.
Algorithms aren’t “structures” so all of this is logically (and legally) just a massive pile of steaming dogs—t designed to prop up the worst patents ever written or granted.
In a means-plus-function claim in which the disclosed structure is a computer, or microprocessor, programmed to carry out an algorithm, the disclosed structure is not the general purpose computer, but rather the special purpose computer programmed to perform the disclosed algorithm. See Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1545, 31 USPQ2d at 1558.[4]
WMS Gaming, Inc. v. International Game Technology, 184 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
NPtC – Malcolm has his own special place of denial.
Like denying he lost an election . . . .
They’re peas in a pod.
More than once – and not generated by me – Malcolm has been labeled the Trump of Patently-O.
The irony is delish.
The problem which is plain as day to people who aren’t willfully ign 0rant hacks is that there is no readily identifiable objective structural difference between the “new” computer and the prior art computers. Its pure functionality, claimed as functionality and the reality is papered over by a l i e.
Again, this is not news to anybody. Enjoy the farce but don’t become a part of it by pretending that it’s not a farce.
‘B-b-but three resistors (in series) is the same as three resistors (in parallel).’
If this: “it may become more of a requirement for examiners to provide a claim construction section in their office action rejections.” entails a full examination under the law and includes such things as fully fleshing out applicable Graham Factors for any 103 rejections, this may actually fall to improving examination quality.
One side note: let’s see the Examiner’s Union’s position on impacts to internal metrics (without turning around and trying to impact my clients).
Since this new PTO Guidance is statutory examiner guidance about 35 USC 112(f) application rejections, inherently requiring correct PTO statutory interpretation, I was surprised to seen only one Fed. Cir. case cited for supporting authority – “Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339,1349, 115 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc).” Especially in view of the current judicial attack on the Chevron Doctrine. I.e., there is other supporting judicial authority available that could have been cited.
The closely related and coordinated subsections ii and iii of this Guidance specifically for dealing with software may be of particular interest to many PTO practitioners?
P.S. If the PTO’s drafting concern is that insertions of CAFC decisions makes Guidelines [or MPEP] text harder for examiners to read or cite, why not put them in numbered footnotes like other legal publications?
Paul – I agree, and at least this should have also been noted (my emphasis added):
35 U.S.C. 131 Examination of application.
The Director shall cause an examination to be made of the application and the alleged new invention; and if on such examination it appears that the applicant is entitled to a patent UNDER THE LAW, the Director shall issue a patent therefor.
The main conditions precedent to the grant of a patent to an applicant are set forth in 35 U.S.C. 101, 102, 103, and 112.
I believe this is what Paul is referring to (my emphasis on a *must* that appears to be an improper creation of a new legal requirement):
ii. Special considerations for computer-implemented claim limitations
For computer-implemented § 112(f) claim limitations, the specification MUST disclose an algorithm for performing the claimed specific computer function, or the claim should be found indefinite. The sufficiency of the disclosure of the algorithm must be determined in light of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Applicant may express the algorithm in any understandable terms including as a mathematical formula, in prose, in a flow chart, or in any other manner that provides sufficient structure. A claim that recites a means for performing a specific computer-implemented function and only discloses a general purpose computer as the structure designed to perform that function would not be an adequate disclosure of the corresponding structure to satisfy the requirements of § 112(b). See MPEP section 2181, subsection II (B).
iii. Adequate written description and enabling disclosure under § 112(a)
A § 112(f) claim limitation that is found to be indefinite under § 112(b) based on failure of the specification to disclose corresponding structure that performs the entire claimed function will also lack adequate written description and may not be sufficiently enabled to support the full scope of the claim under § 112(a).
To determine whether the claim limitation finds adequate written descriptive support in the specification, the examiner must consider whether the specification describes the claimed invention in sufficient detail to establish that the inventor or joint inventor(s) had possession of the claimed invention as of the application’s filing date. Additionally, any analysis of whether a particular claim is supported by the disclosure in an application requires a determination of whether that disclosure, when filed, contained sufficient information regarding the subject matter of the claim to enable one skilled in the pertinent art to make and use the claimed invention. See MPEP § 2181, subsection IV, and MPEP section 2185.
Re the subset ii “For computer-implemented § 112(f) claim limitations, the specification MUST disclose an algorithm for performing the claimed specific computer function, or the claim should be found indefinite.”
This is only for a claim limitation that has first been found to be §112(f) “means for” or “step” equivalent [or nonce-term equivalent], i.e., undefined in the claim itself, so that it is §112(f) defined solely by a spec’s supporting example. I.e., this is not a requirement for an algorithm for the vast majority of computer implemented claim elements. Especially with the great decrease in current applications with “means for” or “step” equivalent claims.
“must” being only disclosing “an algorithm.”
There are other ways to show the items for “means” or “steps.”
There’s plenty of case law indicating that an algorithm MUST be disclosed.
WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1349 [51 USPQ2d 1385] (Fed. Cir. 1999))
Net MoneyIN Inc. v. VeriSign Inc., 88 USPQ2d 1751 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
BobM
Both of the cases are to the subset in which the means derives from a general purpose computer (whatever THAT is – from an objective physical point of view) that is PROGRAMMED TO.
As noted at 1.3.1.1, there are other ways to show the items (think ASIC).
“ Applicant may express the algorithm in any understandable terms including as a mathematical formula, in prose, in a flow chart, or in any other manner that provides sufficient structure.”
Algorithms don’t have any structure so w t f is this supposed to mean? Rhetorical question, of course. It’s not supposed to mean anything except “there is a myth and a farcical loophole in the patent system for certain applicants to exploit as long as nobody asks too many questions”.