Tag Archives: DTSA

The Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) was enacted in 2016 and created a civil cause of action in Federal Courts for trade secret misappropriation. Prior to the law’s enactment, these cases were based only upon state trade secrecy law.

Nationalizing Trade Secret Law

by Dennis Crouch

Defend Trade Secrets Act: The House Judiciary Committee is moving forward with the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) with a discussion of the bill (H.R. 3326) and its Senate companion (S. 1890) that was unanimously passed by the U.S. Senate.  The House and Senate versions were originally identical, but a set of amendments were added to the Senate version before its passage that both improved the language and reduced some potential negative impact of injunctive-relief associated with employee mobility. [See Pooley].  There is a strong possibility that the Senate version will be accepted by the House and passed with overwhelming majority.  Rep. Goodlatte (R-VA) is pushing the Bill through the Judiciary Committee (of which he is Chair).  Ranking Member Conyers (D-MI) is one of 155 co-sponsors of the legislation.  The Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) has announced its “strong support” for the bill.

Nationalizing Contract Law?: It is interesting that congress is moving forward so quickly with nationalizing the traditional state-law claim of trade secret misappropriation.  Most trade secret cases involve an underlying breach of contract between the parties.  The current bill would implicitly have courts rely upon local contract law to determine the scope of rights of the parties before then determining whether a federal claim of trade secret misappropriation exists.


Epic Trade Secret Case Billion Dollar Verdict

by Dennis Crouch

I expect that 2016 will be the year that Congress to creates a federal cause of action for trade secret misappropriation.  Acting in rare unanimous fashion, the Senate recently passed the Defend Trade Secret Act (DTSA) with republican leadership.  The house is expected to follow with President Obama also indicating support.  In his most recent State of the Union Address, President Obama noted that “[n]o foreign nation, no hacker, should be able to . . . steal our trade secrets.”

Meanwhile, state-law trade secret and business tort claims continue to wield power.

In Epic Systems v. Tata Group, a W.D.Wisc. jury has awarded Epic just shy of $1 billion on state-law trade-secret misappropriation, computer-fraud (trafficking in passwords under the CFAA), breach-of-contract claims, and unfair competition.  The damages included $240 million for compensatory damages and $700 million in punitive damages.

Tata Group (one of India’s largest companies) is accused of downloading documentation for hospital management software and then providing that documentation to its subsidiary Med Mantra.  This appears to be a case of exceeding authorization.  Thus, although Tata employees were permitted access the documentation, the breach came when the documentation was shared beyond what was contractually permitted.   If it collects, the verdict will more than double Epic’s annual profits.

The verdicts:

Following any post-verdict decisions, the appeal will be handled by the 7th Circuit. The damages theory of the case is tricky — it is unclear to what extent Epic should be permitted to use Wisconsin (or US) law to collect for damages either caused or felt in India.

Defend Trade Secret Act Moving Forward

by Dennis Crouch

I am always amazed how gridlock is pushed aside to implement intellectual property laws.  In a unanimous vote yesterday, the Senate passed the Defend Trade Secret Act (DTSA, S. 1890) that would create a federal cause of action for trade secret misappropriation and provides for damages and injunctive relief (including a seizure order to prevent dissemination).  Neither Senators Ted Cruz nor Bernie Sanders voted.  The identical bill H.R. 3326 is pending in the House of Representatives and includes 127 co-sponsors (mostly Republican).  President Obama has announced his support as well.

From Senator Hatch:

Trade secrets–such as customer lists, formulas, algorithms, software codes, unique designs, industrial techniques, and manufacturing processes–are an essential form of intellectual property. Other forms of intellectual property, such as patents, copyrights, and trademarks, are covered by Federal civil law. Trade secrets, by contrast, are the only form of U.S. intellectual property where the owner does not have access to a Federal civil remedy for misuse or misappropriation. As a result, billions of dollars each year are lost to trade secret theft, which stifles innovation by deterring companies from investing in research and development. Currently, the only Federal vehicle for trade secret protection is the 1996 Economic Espionage Act, which makes trade secret theft by foreign nationals a criminal offense. But this remedy criminalizes only a small subset of trade secret theft and relies on the thinly stretched resources of the Department of Justice to investigate and prosecute such offenses. . . . State laws today are perhaps even more variable in their treatment of trade secrets than they were at the time the Uniform Trade Secrets Act was proposed in 1979. This next mixed bag of differing legal regimes forces victims of trade secret theft to wade through a quagmire of procedural hurdles in order to recover their losses. . . . Put simply, State law is designed for intrastate litigation and offers limited practical recourse to victims of interstate trade secret theft–the contrast between intrastate and interstate. Maintaining the status quo is woefully insufficient to safeguard against misappropriation. U.S. companies must be able to protect their trade secrets in Federal court.

Most trade secret cases involve former employees who take knowledge with them as they move to a new venture.  The bill apparently includes minor safeguards for whistle-blowing employees and bar a court from preventing a person from moving to a new job. However, as far as I know, no employee groups have supported the Bill.

More info: 

Misappropriation is defined as “(A) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or (B) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a person who–(i) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; (ii) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that the knowledge of the trade secret was–(I) derived from or through a person who had used improper means to acquire the trade secret; (II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain the secrecy of the trade secret or limit the use of the trade secret; or (III) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain the secrecy of the trade secret or limit the use of the trade secret; or (iii) before a material change of the position of the person, knew or had reason to know that–(I) the trade secret was a trade secret; and (II) knowledge of the trade secret had been acquired by accident or mistake.”

Improper means “(A) includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means; and (B) does not include reverse engineering, independent derivation, or any other lawful means of acquisition.”



Effective Date: The amendments shall apply with respect to any misappropriation of a trade secret for which any act occurs on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

Not Intellectual Property: The new trade secrecy law “shall not be construed to be a law pertaining to intellectual property for purposes of any other Act of Congress.”  Thus, for example, the bankruptcy IP exception 365(n) would not apply to licenses of trade secret information.


Guest post by James Pooley.  Pooley is the former Deputy Director General of WIPO. He recently testified at the Senate Judiciary Committee in favor of the Defend Trade Secrets Act. See his earlier Patently-O guest posts . He wishes to thank Prof. Peter Menell for contributing to this post.

Last Thursday the Senate Judiciary Committee favorably voted out the Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”), which would amend the Economic Espionage Act (“EEA”) to give trade secret plaintiffs the option of filing civil claims for misappropriation directly in federal court. The vote reflected broad bipartisan support (there are now 27 cosponsors in the Senate) and followed a substantive hearing on December 2 at which I had the privilege to testify. Since that time a number of senators engaged in discussions about how to improve the legislation. The result was a series of amendments, all of which have been adopted. Because the bill is likely to proceed quickly at this point, it would be useful to describe what has changed and what those changes could mean for practitioners and companies.

The notable amendments generally fall into four categories: (1) harmonizing with existing standards under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”); (2) tightening up the process for preventive seizure of secrets; (3) ensuring that injunctions do not unreasonably restrain employee mobility; and (4) providing an exception for whistleblowers who disclose confidential information in order to report a crime to the authorities. The first three of these are laid out in a “Substitute” for S.1890, and the fourth is described in a separate amendment proposed by Senators Patrick Leahy and Chuck Grassley.


Bringing the DTSA in closer alignment with familiar provisions of the UTSA, the amendments have slightly changed the definition of a trade secret. The EEA had previously required that qualifying information not be known or readily ascertainable to “the public,” while the UTSA had used the phrase “persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use.” While it was never clear whether this difference would actually matter when applied in litigation, the UTSA formulation has now been adopted, so that the two laws are congruent. (Some still point to the different list of examples of protectable information in the UTSA and EEA definitions, but this has never been shown to make any difference in the broad meaning of the common basic term “information.”)

The amendments have also changed the term of the statute of limitations from five years to three. Although a number of states have designated longer periods (from four to six years), this brings the DTSA into line with the UTSA as it was originally proposed. In the same vein, the enhanced damages provision, which had allowed a punitive assessment up to three times the compensatory award, has been adjusted to match the provisions of the UTSA at twice the amount of compensatory damages.


The ex parte seizure provisions have been substantially tightened, providing more assurance that this remedy will not be abused. First, the bill now expressly refers to seizure as available only in “extraordinary circumstances.” Second, an ambiguity identified by Senator Whitehouse at the December hearing has been resolved by clarifying that the target of the seizure must be in “actual” possession of the trade secret and property to be seized. Third, access to the seized material is more limited: only federal law enforcement can perform the seizure, with assistance as necessary from state authorities and an independent technical expert, but the applicant is barred. And following the seizure, the court may have the material sorted by a special master who, like the technical expert, must be under confidentiality restrictions. Fourth, in issuing its order the court must direct when the seizure may be carried out, and whether force may be used to access locked areas. Finally, in a new section the bill requires the Federal Judicial Center to develop “best practices” for seizure and handling of electronically stored information.


One of the most interesting and potentially impactful provisions of the amendments concerns the preservation of employee mobility. Recognizing the critical importance of preventive relief to a right that can be so easily destroyed, the UTSA has always permitted injunctions against “threatened misappropriation,” and the same language is used in the DTSA. But because the DTSA would establish a national standard, some expressed fears that the “inevitable disclosure doctrine,” which has been expressly rejected in some states, might be used by federal judges to block an employee from taking a new job. The draft bill had tried to address this concern with a proviso that no injunction could “prevent a person from accepting an offer of employment under conditions that avoid actual or threatened misappropriation,” but this did not quiet the controversy.

To understand the nature of the dispute we need to wind back the clock to 1995, when the Seventh Circuit issued its decision in Pepsico v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995), affirming a five-month injunction against a former marketing executive who had lied about his plans to take an identical position with another company that was about to launch a directly competitive product. Although the court had emphasized the executive’s bad behavior, it also summarized that “defendant’s new employment will inevitably lead him to rely on the plaintiff’s trade secrets.” Commentators promptly wrenched this phrase from its context and warned that Pepsico could be used to justify enjoining someone from taking a job just because of what he or she knew. This is how the so-called “inevitable disclosure doctrine” was born.

Having (mis)construed Pepsico this way, it was easy for some to make it a target, raising the alarm that “inevitable disclosure” was the equivalent of a post-hoc judicially-imposed non-compete agreement. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the backlash was particularly strong in California, where employees are protected by a robust public policy against restrictive covenants. In Whyte v. Schlage Lock, 101 Cal. App. 4th (2002), an intermediate appellate court issued a blistering condemnation of the doctrine and flatly declared it unacceptable under California law. It did this in response to the plaintiff’s argument that the doctrine should be available as an “alternative” to proving “threatened misappropriation.” Just what kind of evidence might be enough to establish a threat under the UTSA was not addressed. However, that question was answered several years later in another appellate decision, Central Valley General Hospital v. Smith, 162 Cal. App. 4th 501 (2008). The court said that evidence of bad behavior, like a prior misappropriation, an intention to misappropriate, or a refusal to return confidential material, would be enough to supply the inference.

In the meantime, however, the ideological battle lines had been drawn, and the forces mustering against inevitable disclosure, reinforced by many academic and popular articles, were determined to stamp it out if possible, or at least to protect their own jurisdiction from infection. The fervor of the debate apparently distracted everyone from critically examining what “inevitable disclosure” meant, or how it was actually being applied in places that didn’t have a reflexive opposition to it. It turns out that the doctrine was almost never used as the opponents assumed, that is where the only threat indicator was how much the employee knew. In fact, in those cases judges typically explained their denials by reminding the plaintiff that if all this information had been so critically important they could have demanded that the employee sign a non-compete agreement.

Following last December’s hearing, and in the wake of continuing concerns over the relevant DTSA language, I reached out to my friend Mark Lemley, professor at Stanford Law School. Mark and I had worked together before on issues relating to California’s “high velocity” labor market, and after some discussion about what appeared to be this false conflict over the inevitable disclosure doctrine, we suggested to Senate staff that the issue could better be reframed around the kind and quality of evidence that should be required – under the UTSA or the DTSA – to prove “threatened misappropriation,” and that the inquiry should focus on the employee’s behavior, not merely on how much they knew.

Ultimately, Senator Dianne Feinstein proposed the relevant portion of the DTSA amendments, which now allows an order against threatened misappropriation, provided that it not “prevent a person from entering into an employment relationship, and that conditions placed on such employment shall be based on evidence of threatened misappropriation and not merely on the information the person knows.” (In a belt-and-suspenders approach, the DTSA also includes a directly related amendment proposed by Senator John Cornyn that the order may not “otherwise conflict with an applicable State law prohibiting restraints on the practice of a lawful profession, trade, or business.”)

The new language on threatened misappropriation has at least two very positive effects. First, it makes express the apparent consensus from the courts that “threatened” misappropriation may not be established merely by the importance of the information that someone knows. This makes sense not only as a matter of public policy but also of evidence law. Second, it relieves us from the energy-draining debate over “inevitable disclosure,” which was pretty much a straw man that people loved to punch. Courts will not have to consider whether a jurisdiction accepts or rejects this abstract “doctrine,” but instead will ask: what is the actual evidence from which we should conclude that this person (or their new employer) can’t be trusted to honor the integrity of the plaintiff’s trade secrets? Outcomes in particular cases should not be substantially different.


A second major amendment was offered separately by Senators Leahy and Grassley, addressing a new, and in my opinion long neglected, question: how do we assure that employees and contractors who come upon evidence of illegal activity, but who are constrained by nondisclosure agreements from communicating those facts, can safely speak to their lawyers and to law enforcement officials? One might think that this question would already have been reliably answered by now, but it hasn’t been. In a wide-ranging and thoughtful on the subject, Tailoring a Public Policy Exception to Trade Secret Protection, Professor Peter Menell of the UC Berkeley School of Law explores not only the sparse, murky, and sometimes contradictory legal authority, but also the psychology of whistleblowing and the importance of a clear “safe harbor” for those who are thinking of reporting wrongdoing. As he notes, “[t]he same routine non-disclosure agreements that are essential to safeguarding trade secrets can be and are used to chill those in the best position to reveal illegal activity.”  As a practical matter, employees and contractors face a stark dilemma, where the upside is a clear conscience (and possibly a reward for uncovering fraud) but the downside can involve painful and relentless retaliation as well as personal, financial, legal, and professional risk. Insulating the whistleblower from costly trade secret exposure serves larger societal interests in law enforcement, tax compliance, and surfacing and deterring securities fraud and fraud against the government..

Yet because of the difficulty of enforcing trade secrets once they leak, companies risk potentially significant losses if employees or contractors mistakenly disclose legitimate trade secrets—i.e., those that do not reveal illegal conduct. Peter’s article provided a balanced and effective solution to this dilemma that protects whistleblowers without jeopardizing disclosure of legitimate trade secrets. The proposed safe harbor insulates whistleblowers and their counsel from trade secret liability for disclosing trade secret information in confidence to government officials or as part of a lawsuit alleging retaliation by an employer provided that the information is filed under seal. (The federal Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905, generally prohibits governmental employees from disclosing trade secrets.) The proposed statutory exception to trade secret liability provides clear assurance to potential whistleblowers that they do not violate their NDAs merely by consulting legal counsel regarding reporting allegedly illegal conduct to a responsible government official through a confidential channel. In addition, this safe harbor insulates lawyers advising potential whistleblowers about their options and serving as conduits for presenting evidence of allegedly illegal conduct to the government. The efficacy of the safe harbor is enhanced by requiring that NDAs prominently include notice of the law reporting safe harbor to ensure that those with knowledge of illegal conduct are aware of this important public policy limitation on NDAs and exercise due care with trade secrets in reporting such activity.

After Peter’s article appeared just as the DTSA was gaining momentum in the fall, the Senate staff reached out to him to help craft appropriate language. The Leahy/Grassley amendment provides immunity under federal or state law against any claim for violation of an individual’s nondisclosure obligations for disclosure, made in confidence, to (a) an attorney or government official, for the purpose of reporting or investigating a violation of law, or (b) a filing made under seal in a lawsuit “or other proceeding.” In order to ensure that employees (a term that also includes contractors) know about their rights, employers are required to give an appropriate notice in the nondisclosure agreement (as is often done now with state inventor statutes), although this can be a reference to the company’s separate policy document. A failure to comply with the notice provision would block any award of attorneys’ fees or enhanced damages against an employee under the DTSA. Significantly – and this point was emphasized by Senator Feinstein at the hearing on January 28 – the whistleblower protection would not extend to any otherwise improper acts by the employee, such as hacking information in violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.


The DTSA in its current form is a strong bill, meeting its original objective of giving plaintiffs access to federal courts, which are better equipped to handle cases of interstate or international misappropriation of trade secrets. In my opinion, all reasonable objections have been adequately addressed, and there are sufficient protections built in against abuse. Moreover, passage of this bill would substantially improve the environment for both plaintiffs and defendants, by making trade secret litigation more predictable, establishing a national standard for issues like “threatened misappropriation,” and striking the right balance of interests to promote responsible efforts by whistleblowers to report possible violations of law.

REPORT AND ANALYSIS OF RECENT AMENDMENTS TO S. 1890 (The Defend Trade Secrets Act 2016)

By Professor Sharon K. Sandeen, Mitchell Hamline School of Law  

The Defend Trade Secrets Act (S. 1890) passed out of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary today, but not before it was amended to address a number of concerns that were voiced by opponents over the past two years. The following is my quick analysis of the changes.  Note that there were actually two sets of amendments to the legislation. The so-called manager’s amendment (labeled “S. 1890 Substitute Amendment”) and amendments offered by Senators Leahy and Grassley (labeled “Leahy-Grassley1”). The following page and line references are to the Substitute Amendment. The Leahy-Grassley amendments are discussed thereafter.  [S.1890 Substitute Amendment][Leahy-Grassley1].

1. S. 1890 Substitute Amendment

Page 1:

The legislation is now to be known as the “Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016” instead of “2015.”

Page 2, line 2:

“Misappropriated” added and language “aggrieved by misappropriation” deleted

Sandeen Comment: This change was apparently made in response to expressed concerns that “aggrieved” might be introducing a new concept of wrongdoing into trade secret law. Since “misappropriation” is a defined term in the DTSA (copied from the UTSA), it is better to stick with that language.

Page 2, lines 11-12:

With respect to the ex parte civil seizure remedy, the language “but only in extraordinary circumstances” was added.

Sandeen Comment: I am not sure what this language adds other than to emphasize the fact that this remedy should rarely be granted. But that begs the question: Why is the remedy needed at all if it will rarely or ever be granted? No one has ever explained to me why egregious cases that might justify such a remedy would not be championed by the U.S. Department of Justice in a criminal case. But there is a clue in later amendments to the EEA criminal provisions that give trade secret owners standing to assert secrecy concerns in such cases. (See report on new Section 3 below).

Page 2, lines 24-25:

The language “another form of equitable relief” was added to limit the circumstances under which an ex parte seizure order could be granted.

Sandeen Comment: As I understand the limitations built into the civil seizure provision, such an order is not to be granted unless other available equitable relief is inadequate. What seems to be lost in the discussion of all forms of equitable relief is that there are legal remedies available, including potential exemplary damages. Typically, equitable relief is not available when such is the case. In this regard, I wonder if “another form of equitable relief” would include a royalty injunction.

Page 4, line 5 et seq:

A new section (V) has been created (and subsequent subsections re-lettered accordingly) to highlight that “the person against whom seizure would be ordered” must have actual possession of both the trade secret and the property to be seized.

Sandeen Comment: While seemingly limiting the scope of the civil seizure remedy, this addition confirms what the opponents of DTSA were afraid of: that the civil seizure remedy can be used to seize property in addition to the actual trade secrets. While the person against whom seizure would be ordered must be shown to have either misappropriated a trade secret or conspired to misappropriate a trade secret, this language is actually much broader than it may seem on the surface. This is because the definition of misappropriation under the DTSA (and the UTSA) can apply to third-parties who were not directly involved in the initial misappropriation, provided they have the requisite (but obviously later acquired) knowledge. For instance, new employers.

Page 5, line 13:

Deletes the language “that are unrelated to the trade secret that has allegedly been misappropriated” in describing the elements of any civil seizure order.

Sandeen Comment: This was apparently intended to limit the scope of a civil seizure order, which is a good thing if it works.

Page 5, line 16 – page 6, line 11: 

Uses “prohibiting” instead of “restricting” and makes other changes to the provision concerning the required content of a civil seizure order, the most significant change being the addition of a new sub section (iv) which requires the court to “provide guidance to law enforcement officials” concerning how they are to execute the order.

Sandeen Comment: This language was undoubtedly added to address concerns that Senator Sheldon Whitehouse raised during the hearing on DTSA that was held before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary in December of 2015. His principal concern related to the use of force in the event that the person against whom seizure would be ordered was uncooperative.  

Page 7, line 13 – page 8, line 22:

The “Materials in Custody” provision was re-labeled and expanded, particularly with respect to the newly labeled sub-section “Storage Medium” and new provisions labeled “Protection of Confidentiality” and “Appointment of a Special Master.”

Sandeen Comment: The added language was undoubtedly added in an attempt to address concerns about the scope of any civil seizure order (including the very real possibility that property not relevant to the trade secret case might be seized), the handling of seized information, and the practical reality that federal court staff is ill equipped to manage such materials. Nothing in the legislation indicates who will pay for the services of a Special Master.

Page 9, line 2-15:

Deleted the language that used to allow state and local officials to execute a civil seizure order and instead specifies that a civil seizure order must be executed by federal law enforcement personnel.  State and local law enforcement personnel can be involved, but they cannot be involved in the actual seizure of property. Further, the court may allow for the use of a technical expert to assist federal law enforcement officials in executing the civil seizure order, again without specifying who will pay for the technical expert.

Sandeen Comment: These amendments address some of the concerns that have been expressed about how a civil seizure order will be executed and how it can be done without including the legitimate business information of the “person against whom civil seizure is ordered.” However, the more that efforts are made to address the concerns of critics, the more the risks of such a remedy are revealed. If this remedy will be used very infrequently as its proponents argue, Congress should ask if the marginal benefits of this remedy are worth its tremendous costs, particularly given the fact that: (1) criminal prosecution and seizure are possible in egregious cases; and (2) plaintiffs in trade secret cases have very robust legal remedies in the event of the loss of trade secrecy.

Page 11, line 6 et seq:   

The standing to file a motion for encryption has been broadened to include both parties to the litigation and “a person who claims an interest in the subject matter seized.”

Sandeen Comment: This is a positive development, but obviously it acknowledges that non-parties may be affected by a civil seizure order and be forced to hire an attorney to protect their interests.

Page 11, line 23 – page 12, line 8: 

The provisions concerning the effect of injunctions on employment were re-worked, re-lettered and expanded. First, the original language was amended so that any injunction must “be based upon evidence of threatened misappropriation and not merely on the information a person knows.” Second,   the legislation now includes language which states that an injunction cannot “otherwise conflict with an applicable State law prohibiting restraints on the practice of a lawful profession, trade, or business.”

Sandeen Comment: This is a very positive development that makes it clear that State law governing restrictive covenants, including non-compete agreements, will continue to apply as limits on the scope of injunctive relief. More specifically, it rejects the worst aspects of the inevitable disclosure doctrine which many states (most notably California) have found to be inconsistent with their laws against restrictive covenants, particularly those that restrict employee mobility. Issues of choice of law remain, of course. 

Page 13, line 9: 

The measure of potential exemplary damages has been lowered to 2 times instead of 3 times.

Sandeen Comment: This is a positive development, particularly for the proponents of the DTSA who claim that its primary purpose is greater uniformity in trade secret law. The new language is consistent with the UTSA. However, it appears that this change may have been part of a compromise since (as discussed below), the criminal penalties for a violation of the EEA have been increased.

Page 13, line 23: 

The statute of limitations has been lowered to 3 years from 5 years.

Sandeen Comment: This change also makes the statute of limitations consistent with the language of the UTSA (although some UTSA states have not adopted the statute of limitations specified in the UTSA). This is a positive development because businesses can now be more certain when threats of trade secret litigation will end. Since the statute of limitation follows the discovery rule, plaintiffs will have plenty of time to bring a lawsuit once the facts giving rise to such claims are discovered.

Page 14, line 8:

The definitions provisions of the DTSA must be read alongside the existing definition provisions of the EEA, which is where you will find the definition of a trade secret. A change from earlier versions of the legislation is that the word “public” in 18 U.S.C. §1839 (3)(B)  (the definition of a trade secret) will be substituted with “another person who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the information.”

Sandeen Comment: This is another positive development that makes the definition of a trade secret under the EEA (as amended) more consistent with the language of the UTSA. Without this amendment, the EEA might be interpreted to include information that is in the public domain under state law. Not changed in the EEA to be consistent with the UTSA is the first part of the definition of a trade secret which, under the EEA, includes a litany of types of information that might qualify for trade secret misappropriation. However, this greater specificity always struck me as necessary since the EEA was initially, and will remain in part, a criminal statute.

Page 17, line 21 – Page 19, line 2:   

A new Section 3 was added titled “Trade Secret Theft Enforcement” and old Section 3 was re-labeled as Section 4. This section increases the penalties for a violation of 18 U.S.C. §1832 from $5,000,000 to the greater of $5,000,000 or 3 times the value of the stolen trade secrets to the organization, including the costs of reproducing the trade secrets. Second, it adds a new provision titled “Rights of Trade Secret Owners” that essentially allows trade secret owners to be heard in criminal court concerning the need to protect their trade secrets. Lastly, it amends 18 U.S.C. §1961 (the RICO statute) to add a violation of the EEA as a predicate act.

Sandeen Comment: At first blush, these changes seem to more directly address the concerns that motivated the proposed legislation and should have been tried first before risking the disruption of U.S. trade secret law by creating a federal civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation. What they reveal is the concern that trade secret owners have about the effectiveness of federal criminal prosecution to stop (or punish) the most egregious cases of trade secret misappropriation. They also reflect the risks to trade secrets posed by the public nature of criminal prosecutions. Robust criminal laws are already on the books to punish those who would engage in the most egregious forms of trade secret misappropriation, but trade secret owners might be hesitant to report such crimes out of fear that their trade secrets might be lost in the process. Allowing trade secret owners to express their confidentiality concerns in a criminal court seems like a good idea. More study of the implications of the RICO provision is needed, particularly with respect to the potential for the over assertion of criminal prosecutions which was a major concern of business interests when the EEA was first adopted.

Page 22, line 23 et seq.:

The re-numbered “Sense of Congress” provision (now Section 5) added point (4) concerning the civil seizure order and Congress’ sense that the need for such a remedy should be balanced  against the risk of interrupting the business of third parties and the legitimate interests of the party accused of wrongdoing.

Sandeen Comment: While this is helpful language, it is interesting that this language is included in the “Sense of Congress” provision and not in the text of the civil seizure provision itself. While Congress is at it, I would urge it to add point (5) to the “Sense of Congress” and state that the DTSA should be interpreted and applied in a manner that is consistent with the commentary to the UTSA.

Page 23, Line 4 et seq:  

New Section 6 was added titled “Best Practices” to require the Federal Judicial Center “using existing resources” to, within two years, recommend best practices related to civil seizure orders.

Sandeen Comment: Again, this indicates that concerns about the abuse of civil seizure orders remain.

2. Leahy-Grassley Amendments

These amendments would add a section to the DTSA, in a place to be determined, titled “Immunity from Liability for Confidential Disclosure of a Trade Secret or in a Court Filing.” This new section is designed to protect whistleblowers from liability for the disclosure of trade secrets to the government and in the context of retaliation lawsuits, provided that steps are taken by the whistleblower to keep such information confidential. It also would require employers to give notice of such immunity to employees, thereby requiring an exception to confidentiality provisions.

Sandeen Comment: This is a very positive development for those who are concerned that the assertion of trade secret rights can be used to prevent the timely disclosure of information that is needed by law enforcement authorities. However, it only applies where there is an alleged violation of law and not, more broadly, in situations where threats to public health exist, for instance.  

= = = = =

[Prior Patently-O Posts on the DTSA]

Guest Post: Why we Need a Seizure Remedy in the Defend Trade Secrets Act


Guest post by James Pooley.  Pooley is the former Director General of WIPO. He recently testified at the Senate Judiciary Committee in favor of the Defend Trade Secrets Act. See his earlier Patently-O guest post here.


In a recent essay published in the Washington and Lee Law Review Online,[1] Professor Eric Goldman of the Santa Clara University School of Law criticized the ex parte seizure provisions of the Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”), which is pending before Congress in identical Senate (S.1890) and House (H.R.3326)  bills. In his view, the legislation is unnecessary, unprecedented, and carries an unacceptably high risk of abuse and collateral damage.

I strongly disagree. Trade secrets face far different threats in the digital age, and having federal courts able to intervene immediately in cross-border cases is critical. In exceptional circumstances, impoundment of a secret by the court will do what this sort of remedy has always done: get the property out of the hands of someone who threatens to destroy it or flee the jurisdiction, so that the matter can be heard on notice before the harm occurs. The seizure provisions of the DTSA have been carefully constrained to prevent abuse, to minimize harm, and to discourage any but the most compelling applications.


Most trade secret theft can be adequately addressed with preventive orders entered after a noticed hearing. This is because most actors in these cases can be expected to follow the orders of a court, and because our legal tradition values notice and the higher quality of information that is produced by the adversarial process.

Notwithstanding that preference, as we all learned in civil procedure class, courts in extraordinary cases may act without giving notice because of an acute danger to someone or something. This has been true across the range of legal disciplines, including trade secrets, and the majority of state laws, as well as the Federal Rules, have acknowledged this by articulating the high bar that a plaintiff has to meet before any matter can be heard ex parte. While that bar is necessary to ensure the case is exceptional, the flip side of the coin is that the harm to be avoided is irreparable.

Professor Goldman argues that the DTSA will be useless against the thief who plans to hijack information over the Internet, or who is on his way to the airport with the secrets in his pocket. But these scenarios only prove the need for a federal remedy: when a trade secret owner discovers that such a thing is about to occur, he can’t waste time figuring out what some county court might do. If there is a chance that a surprise intervention by law enforcement can prevent the loss, it is a federal court that is in the best position to respond and to deliver process that works across state lines. Like a terrorist attack, we can only hope to be vigilant and discover it before the button is pushed. But when we do have that kind of information, we also should be able to deploy the most effective tools to prevent the harm. In the right circumstances, one of those tools should be law enforcement, acting under the guidance and supervision of a federal court, to take temporary possession of the trade secret. That is the focus of the DTSA seizure provisions.


In his essay, Professor Goldman asserts that the seizure provisions “would represent an unprecedented innovation. No state trade secret law has a trade secret-specific ex parte seizure process [that is] similar . . . .” This stretches the meaning of “unprecedented” pretty far. He gets away with it only because the second sentence is so narrowly drawn, claiming only that no state has a “trade secret-specific ” process. But that doesn’t mean that states have not used broadly applicable seizure procedures in trade secret cases. In fact they have, although they may call them by another name, such as sequestration, or attachment. Texas, for example, allows for ex parte sequestration in a variety of circumstances, and it has been applied in at least one case to software. See Glenn, Ex-Parte Seizure of Intellectual Property Goods, 9 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 307 (2001) (discussing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §62.001, and Learn2.com, Inc. v. Bell, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14283 (N.D. Tex. July 20, 2000)).

Moreover, the UTSA itself includes § 2(a), which “authorizes mandatory injunctions requiring that a misappropriator return the fruits of misappropriation to an aggrieved person, e.g., the return of stolen blueprints or the surrender of surreptitious photographs or recordings.” Commissioners’ Comment, 14 U.L.A. at 451. While the Act doesn’t expressly authorize granting such injunctions ex parte, neither does it prohibit them. Again, the circumstances justifying issuance of an order without notice have traditionally been defined by local rules in state courts and by FRCP Rule 65 in federal courts.

Indeed, Professor Goldman acknowledges that trade secret owners “already may seek ex parte TROs, including impoundment,” under FRCP Rule 65, reinforcing this with the statement that “existing federal TRO procedures already provide for ex parte seizures for trade secret owners.” He finds this authority in the Committee Notes to the 2001 amendments, which explains that “impoundment may be ordered on an ex parte basis under subdivision (b) [of Rule 65] if the applicant makes a strong showing of the reasons why notice is likely to defeat effective relief.” While he uses this reference to argue that the DTSA seizure provisions are unnecessary, it directly contradicts his claim that they are “unprecedented.”


Another reason why the “unprecedented” argument fails is that the DTSA seizure language was directly patterned on the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §1116(d), expressly authorizing ex parte seizure and impoundment of counterfeit goods. As a condition of such an order, the statute requires that it clearly appear from specific facts sworn by the applicant that some other order would not be adequate, that the applicant is likely to succeed on the merits, that immediate and irreparable injury will occur without the order, and that the “matter to be seized” is located at a specific place. Execution of an order has to be by law enforcement, and seized materials must be held by the court in accordance with a protective order to prevent disclosure of confidential information. The plaintiff must be prohibited from publicizing the order or getting access to the defendant’s trade secrets in the course of the seizure. Finally, a hearing has to be held between ten and fifteen days later, at which the plaintiff will have the burden to demonstrate continuing justification for the order.

The DTSA imposes all of these same restrictions, but adds more. Only property “necessary to prevent propagation or dissemination of the trade secret” can be seized. This means, for example, that records and other evidence of the acts of misappropriation or misuse cannot be taken away, thereby reducing the risk of disruption to the defendant’s other business operations. In fact, the court is specifically required to order only “the narrowest seizure of property necessary” and to provide that the seizure “be conducted in a manner that . . . does not interrupt the legitimate business operations of the [defendant] that are unrelated to the trade secret that has allegedly been misappropriated.”

As with other predicate requirements, the plaintiff’s showing must “clearly” demonstrate “from specific facts” that the information is a trade secret, that the target of the seizure has the secret in their possession, and that if notice were given the target “would destroy, move, hide, or otherwise make such matter inaccessible to the court . . . .” (This latter requirement provides assurance to cloud vendors and others who might be holding information for someone accused of misappropriation.) And the merits hearing must be held no more than seven days later (not ten to fifteen as in the Lanham Act), during which time anyone affected by the order may move to modify or dissolve it.


So it should be obvious – particularly to any practitioner that has tried to convince a federal judge to issue any sort of ex parte order – that getting relief under this section will be very, very difficult. And while making it hard to get is the first line of defense against abuse of any legal process, the legislation provides serious consequences in case it turns out that the plaintiff was wrong. In the first instance, the court has to require a bond adequate “for the payment of the damages that any person may be entitled to recover as a result of a wrongful or excessive seizure” or attempted seizure. But the amount of the bond is only a guarantee and “shall not limit the recovery” of damages for wrongful seizure. Those damages are expressly tied to the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(11), which includes lost profits, cost of materials, loss of good will, punitive damages where bad faith is shown, and attorneys fees.

In other words, the risk analysis that any litigant must do before requesting a seizure remedy is not just that it might try and fail – although in my experience that is a very likely outcome – but that if it succeeds in getting the order it may be found to have oversold its case. Federal judges are not known for suffering fools gladly, and in addition to the opportunity to impose liability for damages they have Rule 11 sanctions in their tool kit. Therefore we can reasonably assume that the vast majority of counsel will exercise good judgment in discouraging marginal applications, and that to the extent any abusive behavior occurs, appropriate consequences will be imposed, just as they have been in other areas of the law.


Professor Goldman envisions the future without giving sufficient weight to the past or present. Of course there is risk involved in this as in all other processes run by humans. The relevant questions are: how important is the goal, how serious are the risks, and what can be done — informed by our analogous experience — to mitigate those risks to an acceptable level? By any objective measure, the authors of the DTSA have done their job well, and we have reliable answers.

The goal — having a federal resource that matches the modern threat of irreparable harm to an essential industrial asset — is critically important, not just for the limited number of cases where the tool will be used, but also for those that will not mature into problems because it is there. The abstract risk of meritless, abusive applications to federal courts must of course be acknowledged, but our experience with similar procedures shows what it takes to discourage such behavior. And the measures written into the seizure provisions of the DTSA — demanding the greatest care and judicial scrutiny possible and imposing very serious consequences for getting it wrong — provide a generous margin of comfort to conclude that seizures will happen only where necessary and where properly controlled to minimize harm.

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[1] http://ssrn.com/abstract=2697361.

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Trade Secret Law

The Senate Judiciary Committee moved forward with hearings on the Defend Trade Secret Act (DTSA) that would, inter alia, create a Federal cause of action for trade secret misappropriation.  The intent would not be to preempt state laws but instead to provide an additional layer of protection for trade secret owners. That said, the new law could be used to overcome limits and defenses available in some states (such as California).  Although still objectionable to some, the current bill is a toned-down version of the parallel bill from last term.  The current approach also has bipartisan support from leaders of the Judiciary Committee (Senators Grassley and Leahy).

Statements and Written Testimony from the Hearing:

Of those testifying, only Prof Sandeen called for a slowdown in the legislative approach.


Goldman on Ex Parte Seizures in Trade Secret law

Prof Eric Goldman has released his new article titled Ex parte Seizures and the Defend Trade Secrets Act.  The article dives into what Goldman calls the “quirky and unprecedented ex parte procedure” included within the proposed legislation that would allow “trade secret owners to obtain a seizure order.”  The ex parte portion is important — the seizure order would allow an owner to take action without giving the accused violator a chance to respond. Goldman acknowledges that the provision is much weaker than its 2014 version, but still argues that ex parte seizure is problematic:

More generally, the fact-based disputes that inevitably must be resolved in trade secret litigation make trade secrets an especially poor basis for ex parte actions. As a result, we should be nervous about the proposed seizure provision in the Defend Trade Secret Act—and all other ex parte seizure procedures in trade secret cases.


Goldman notes that, on this particular issue, the DTSA is certainly an expansion of rights since “[n]o state trade secret law has a trade secret-specific ex parte seizure process similar to the Seizure Provision.” (To be clear, seizures go a major step beyond emergency temporary-restraining-orders).

Of course, a difference with the DTSA its national level implementation.  That difference could be relevant to the seizure provisions — since it is the federal government (not individual state governments) that have an extensive customs and homeland security regime and it is the federal government (not individual state governments) that has expertise in espionage.  In my mind, these distinctions do make some difference – until you realize that criminal espionage and foreign export of trade secret information are already covered by Federal Criminal Trade Secret laws. The DTSA is about civil law — and largely about large companies trying to control the flow of information, control former employees, and skirt restrictions in-place in California law.

I expect that before it passes that Prof. Goldman’s arguments will be heard and the Seizure provision removed — of course, that decision is well above my pay grade.





Why We Need a Federal Civil Claim for Trade Secret Misappropriation

Guest Post by James Pooley, former Deputy Director General of the World Intellectual Property Organization.  Pooley makes his full argument in a forthcoming George Mason Law Review article available here.

Trade secret theft has been a federal crime since 1996, covered by the Economic Espionage Act (“EEA”). But civil misappropriation claims remain limited to state court filings under common law or local variants of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”). Calls for federal jurisdiction have grown with the increasing importance of information as a business asset and with the emergence of technology that makes theft of these assets almost infinitely easier. Recent examples involving international actors have galvanized the business community to request a straightforward solution: amend the EEA to provide a federal option for private claims.

Several bills were introduced in the 113th Congress to accomplish this, and to authorize provisional remedies for seizure of relevant property to prevent secret technology from being transferred out of the jurisdiction. The 2014 legislation was not acted on before Congress adjourned.  A revised version is pending now, the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015 (“DTSA”), reflected in identical House (H.R.3326) and Senate (S.1890) bills.

The approach of the DTSA is fairly simple: use existing language of the EEA where appropriate, such as the definition of a trade secret, and where other language is required to define the civil aspects, such as misappropriation and damages, use language taken from the UTSA. Indeed, the only meaningful departure from the UTSA is to add a section allowing ex parte seizures of the misappropriated property. But even that portion draws from established provisions of the Lanham Act, tightened up considerably from the 2014 bills in order to discourage abuse.

The DTSA has received virtually unanimous support from industry, and also enjoys unusually bipartisan political sponsorship, with 65 cosponsors in the House (45 Republican and 20 Democrat) and ten in the Senate (six Republican and four Democrat). The only organized opposition has come from a group of law professors who published an “open letter” in 2014 criticizing the previous draft legislation, and who have recently released another letter describing their concerns. Mainly, they argue that we don’t need federal legislation because state laws are uniform enough; that the seizure provisions are too broad; and that the DTSA would limit labor mobility by approving the so-called “inevitable disclosure doctrine.”

As I will explain below, on each of these points the professors are wrong, misled by incorrect assumptions or unjustified speculation. Indeed, in a recent journal article two of them have predicted that the legislation would unleash a never-seen-before class of commercial predator, the “trade secret troll,” who they claim would “roam free in a confused and unsettled environment, threatening or initiating lawsuits for the sole purpose of exacting settlement payments, just like patent trolls.”

This apocalyptic scenario is not only fanciful; it is absurd. While patents are exclusive rights that operate against the world, trade secrets provide no exclusivity and depend on a confidential relationship. The image of a “trade secret troll” may help draw attention to a political argument, but it is a myth, and deserves no serious consideration.

The reality of this legislation is simple and compelling. Giving trade secret owners the option to sue in federal court would fill a critical gap in effective enforcement of private rights against cross-border misappropriation that in the digital age has become too stealthy and quick to be dealt with predictably in state courts. The bills would accomplish this by effecting only very modest changes, relying heavily on existing laws and rules. The seizure provisions in particular are so narrowly drawn that only the most clearly aggrieved plaintiffs would risk invoking the procedure. Having no pre-emptive effect, the federal law would leave in place all relevant state laws and policies, including those relating to mobility of labor.

U.S. trade secret law emerged in the nineteenth century to accommodate the shift from agrarian and cottage production to larger-scale industry, in which the secrets of production would have to be shared with workers or with business partners. Court decisions sought to enforce the confidence placed in those who were given access to valuable information about machines, recipes and processes. At the core of every case was a confidential relationship. Protecting this trust, the courts explained, was a simple matter of enforcing morality in the marketplace.

The common law origins of trade secrets – in contrast to the federal patent statute – meant that the majority of cases were heard in state court. Even when a federal court took diversity or supplemental jurisdiction over a trade secret dispute, it applied the law of the state in which it sat. And at first there was little variation, with most states looking to the Restatement of Torts § 757 as a guide. But as industrial development continued through the middle of the twentieth century, legal foundations shifted, and the reporters of the Second Restatement dropped the subject completely.

Meanwhile, a school of thought had developed among commentators that trade secret law should be abolished altogether because it was inconsistent with, and therefore preempted by, federal patent law. This argument was famously rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). Two important public interests, the Court explained, were served by trade secret law: the “maintenance of standards of commercial ethics and the encouragement of invention.” Without guaranteed secrecy, businesses would be left to expensive self-help security measures that would disadvantage smaller competitors and discourage dissemination of information through sharing. And as a practical matter, there was no conflict between the two systems because they operate so differently: patent law is strong, providing an exclusive right “against the world;” while trade secret rights are “far weaker,” because they do not protect against reverse engineering or independent development.

With the Second Restatement’s decision not to treat the issue, some were concerned that trade secret law would become too fractured and inconsistent for companies which had been increasingly doing business across state lines. Therefore, in 1979 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws issued the first of two versions of the UTSA, proposing harmonized rules on establishing and enforcing trade secret rights. Measured by adoption rates, the UTSA has been a great success, with 47 of the 50 states so far embracing it (New York is the leading holdout). However, measured by its objective of uniformity, the law has been a disappointment. Unlike the UCC, the UTSA has frequently been enacted with customized features.

A few examples will help illustrate the scope of the problem. California dropped the language requiring that a trade secret be not “readily ascertainable,” with the result that the defendant is required to specially plead that circumstance as an affirmative defense. Illinois also eliminated the “readily ascertainable” language, and it prohibits royalty injunction orders, sets a different limitations period and allows permanent injunctions. Idaho requires that computer programs carry a “copyright or other proprietary or confidential marking” to qualify for protection.  Georgia limits protection of customer lists to physical embodiments, in effect allowing employees to appropriate such information in (human) memory. South Carolina’s version of the UTSA requires a court hearing an injunction request to consider “average rate of business growth” in determining a head start period, and prescribes very particular rules for discovery of trade secret information, even for local discovery in aid of an action pending in another jurisdiction.

When Congress considered the EEA in 1996, there was some discussion of adding a civil right of action, but this was deemed impractical in view of the need for swift legislative action. In the years since its enactment, the EEA has had a mixed record of success. As reported by one veteran prosecutor, the average of about eight prosecutions per year is a “languid pace” that probably has done little to create a deterrent effect. In part this may be due to a reluctance of victims to bring cases to the prosecutor, either because of a loss of control or Fifth Amendment effects on civil claims, or it may be due to a lack of resources or interest within the various offices of the U.S. Attorneys, who have discretion whether to accept qualifying cases.

Calls for a federal trade secret law with a private right of action had already begun before the EEA was passed. After it became law, a number of scholars noted the anomaly and suggested that, because the national economy had become primarily knowledge-based, and because even with the UTSA state law was far from uniform, a federal civil law should be enacted. More recent commentary, while continuing to emphasize the drawbacks of variations in state law, also has pointed out the economic advantages of federalization, particularly for small businesses, which rely more heavily on secrecy than on patenting, as well as the procedural advantages for trade secret owners, including national service of process.

The highly-publicized cyberattacks of recent years have exposed not only the precarious security of personal financial and health information, but also the vulnerability of American corporate secrets. Thirty years ago information security consisted mainly of guarding the photocopier and watching who went in and out the front door. Now, with the Internet connected to millions of smartphones, and with electronic storage devices the size of a coin, information assets (which account for over 80% of the value of U.S. public companies) can be moved quickly and silently across state and international borders. In that context, existing procedures at the state level seem impossibly quaint. If a case in Illinois requires testimony of a witness in California, the plaintiff has to petition its home court to authorize a deposition, and then file an action in California based on the Illinois order, to secure the required subpoena. During the weeks or months of this process, the witness could easily have left the country, with the secrets in her pocket.

In other words, the time-critical nature of interstate and international misappropriation of valuable digitized data requires an immediate and sophisticated response mechanism, and neither state law nor the EEA criminal framework provides a satisfactory solution. Federal courts, however, can provide the necessary resource. First, they will be operating under a single, national standard for trade secret misappropriation and a transparent set of procedural rules, offering predictability and ease of use. Second, they will provide nationwide service of process and a unified approach to discovery, enabling quick action by trade secret owners even when confronted with actors in multiple jurisdictions. Third, as a result of their extensive experience with complex cross-border litigation involving intellectual property, they will be able to resolve ex parte matters fairly and jurisdictional issues quickly and efficiently. Fourth, their generally more predictable discovery procedures will serve the legitimate needs of trade secret plaintiffs, who typically must develop most of the facts to prove their case through defendants and third parties.

In this context, the objections raised by the law professors are not convincing. First, it is not fair to describe existing state law as “coherent,” “robust and uniform,” so that U.S. businesses already enjoy “a high level of predictability.” The rhetoric does not obscure the reality of a patchwork of differing standards and rules – in some ways more divergent than before enactment of the UTSA – that necessarily creates friction and inefficiency for companies with interstate operations.

Second, while admitting that the current language on ex parte seizure is “more limited in scope” than the 2014 legislation (for example, only property “necessary to prevent the propagation or dissemination of the trade secret” can be seized), the professors think this tightening is not enough and that the provision “may still result in significant harm.” No evidence is provided, but only speculation that mere invocation of the procedure might cause small businesses to “capitulate,” and that the “chilling effect on innovation and job growth . . . could be profound.” Again, the reality could hardly be more different. The DTSA is loaded with limitations making seizure very difficult to achieve, and with liabilities making it prohibitively expensive to be wrong in asking for it. In the unusual case where the plaintiff has no substantial basis for the claim, the defendant will simply file an opposition, the seizure will be dissolved, and the plaintiff will pay for the harm. Surely the benefits of the DTSA are worth that occasional risk.

Third, the professors assert that new language, added to the DTSA to ensure that mobility of labor is respected, embraces the so-called “inevitable disclosure doctrine,” which they view as the equivalent of a judge-made noncompetition agreement. In fact, that “doctrine” is nothing more than a method of analysis under the common-sense UTSA provision allowing injunctions against “threatened misappropriation.” This method has been applied thoughtfully in a majority of jurisdictions, resulting in a wide range of conditional remedies, and has only rarely been applied in a way that stops anyone from taking a new job.

The DTSA is sorely needed to fill a gap in remedies available to U.S. businesses that now operate in an information-based, globalized economy. This is one of those instances where federal structures are required to address a critical set of interstate and international problems. The DTSA has been carefully constructed to deter and punish abuse. Using well-established definitions and norms, it provides a choice to file a familiar claim in an effective forum. And there is absolutely no danger that enacting this statute will generate some new form of “troll” behavior to this point unknown in trade secret law.

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James Pooley was most recently Deputy Director General of the World Intellectual Property Organization in Geneva, where he was responsible for managing the international patent system. For 37 years before that he was a trial lawyer in California, handling primarily trade secret and patent disputes. He taught trade law and litigation as an adjunct professor at the University of California, Berkeley, and at Santa Clara University. He is the author of the treatise “Trade Secrets” (Law Journal Press, updated 2014) and a co-author of the Patent Case Management Judicial Guide (Federal Judicial Center 2009, 2015). His most recent business book is Secrets: Managing Information Assets in the Age of Cyberespionage (Verus Press 2015).  Mr. Pooley currently serves as Chairman of the Board of the National Inventors Hall of Fame.

Patent and Trade Secret Legislation Updates

There are a number of patent and trade secret related bills pending in Congress. Here are a few updates:

INNOVATION ACT: Rep. Goodlatte’s Innovation Act (H.R. 9) proposes a set of changes to our “patent-enforcement system.”  A newly released 200-page report from the Judiciary Committee explains the proposed legislation and its purposes.  The report also includes dissenting views from a group of seven Democratic members who argue that the proposal goes too far in diminishing patent rights. That said, the dissenters agree that “Congress must respond to the problems of abusive patent litigation in the courts and the gaming of the patent process at the USPTO.” [LINK].

In July, the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015 was introduced in both the House and Senate.  The proposal would create a federal civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation that would run in parallel to the state causes of action already available. [DTSA2015][Dave Levine explains his Opposition]

The Innovation Promotion Act of 2015 is a tax-bill that would cut the corporate income tax rate on profits from the use of innovations and intellectual property.(Down to 10% from ~30%). The amount of qualifying profits is reduced by the percent of corporate expenses from the past five years spent on U.S. R&D.  The way that the bill is designed is that it basically serves as an additional incentive to conduct R&D within the U.S.  R&D activities are already deductible as business expenses, but the proposal here would allow those to be double-counted (more particularly, counted 1.71 times).



Guest Post: Defend Trade Secrets Act — A Primer, an Endorsement, and a Criticism

Guest Post by David S. Almeling, a partner in the San Francisco office of O’Melveny & Myers LLP. Almeling specializes in patent and trade secret litigation.

It’s been an exciting month for trade secret law. Senators Christopher Coons (D-Delaware) and Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) introduced the Defend Trade Secrets Act, a bill that would, for the first time, provide a federal right of civil action for trade secret theft. And the Judiciary Committee held a hearing during which speakers expressed support for the DTSA, including Eli Lilly’s VP and General Patent Counsel, Douglas Norman, who stated that the DTSA “will establish the gold standard for national trade secret laws globally.”

The DTSA is a game changer. If enacted, it would constitute the most dramatic rethinking of trade secret law since 1979, when the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved a model statute called the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Since then, 48 states have adopted the UTSA in some form, replacing their common-law regimes with statutory ones.

The DTSA isn’t perfect — I’ll explain why in a moment — but it’s the best bill of its kind introduced to date, and it should be enacted.

A Primer

The DTSA authorizes a trade secret owner to bring a civil cause of action in federal court for either (1) a violation of the Economic Espionage Act, which criminalized certain types of trade secret misappropriation, or (2) a “misappropriation of a trade secret that is related to a product or service used in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign commerce.” The DTSA’s definition of misappropriation tracks closely the UTSA’s definition.

The DTSA would also:

Grant courts the power to issue ex parte orders “for the preservation of evidence” and “for the seizure of any property used…to commit” the alleged misappropriation. This is similar to the relief available under the Lanham Act for counterfeit goods.

Allow courts to award injunctions; damages for actual loss or unjust enrichment; a reasonable royalty “in lieu of damages”; exemplary damages up to treble the amount of compensatory damages, as opposed to the UTSA, which permits courts to award only double damages; and attorneys’ fees.

Establish a five-year statute of limitations, two years longer than the UTSA’s provision.

Decline to preempt any other law.

An Endorsement

The DTSA is not the first bill in recent years to propose a federal cause of action for trade secret theft.

Other recent efforts include: Senator Coons’s prior bills in 2011 and 2012; the proposal by Rep. Zoe Lofgren, the Silicon Valley–based Democrat, to enact PRATSA (Private Right of Action Against Theft of Trade Secrets Act of 2013); and the 2013 introduction of FAIR (Future of American Innovation and Research Act) by Republican Senator Jeff Flake of Arizona. These attempts all failed, never making it out of committee.

The reasons they fell short varied; I won’t rehash them here. But the DTSA is the most comprehensive bill to date, as it addresses a broad swath of trade secret theft and encompasses a robust range of remedies.

The DTSA is better than the current system — one in which each state has its own autonomous civil trade secret law. Today, 48 states have enacted some form of the UTSA, with New Jersey (in 2012) and Texas (in 2013) being the latest adherents. New York and Massachusetts are the only remaining holdouts.

Despite the UTSA’s widespread adoption, the “U” — Uniform — hasn’t lived up to its name. State legislatures often modify the UTSA. And even if every state enacted the same UTSA, there would still be a patchwork because state courts often issue different interpretations of the same UTSA provision.

Trade secret owners, employees, and others in the knowledge economy incur the costs of this state-by-state approach. Facing different laws in different states, they are left to deal with the resulting complications that come with attempts to comply with each state’s laws. And once a dispute arises, these differences also impose costs on courts and litigants, who wage needless battles over forum shopping and choice of law. A federal statute would eliminate these differences and achieve other benefits, such as easing nationwide service of process and discovery.

This isn’t the first time I’ve endorsed some form of a federal trade secret statute. I did so in a 30-page law review article in 2009 and in a five-page Law 360 article in 2013.

I’m not alone in my support of a federal trade secret statute generally and the DTSA specifically. Senator Coons’s April 29, 2014 press release notes that the DTSA has the backing of the National Association of Manufacturers, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and dozens of companies, including 3M, GE, Microsoft, and P&G. The AIPLA’s Trade Secret Law Committee recently voted to endorse the DTSA (disclaimer: I was one of the voting members). And other organizations, including the ABA’s IP Section and the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, announced support for some form of a federal trade secrets act in 2013.

A Criticism

Where the DTSA stumbles is in its promise not to “preempt any other provision of law.” This causes two problems.

First, the need for the DTSA stems in part from state-by-state variations in trade secret laws and the transactional and substantive problems that such variations impose. The DTSA leaves those variations in place. Worse, the DTSA adds another law to the already cluttered landscape of 48 UTSA states (with their variations), two non-UTSA states, the federal Economic Espionage Act, and a federal common trade secret law.

Second, the DTSA opens a backdoor to common-law and other causes of action that are precluded in most states. The UTSA “displaces tort, restitutionary, and other laws…providing civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret.” The DTSA doesn’t displace anything.

Under the DTSA, trade secret plaintiffs would have the option of pursuing their claim in state or federal court and, if they choose federal court, the additional option of asserting duplicative causes of actions that aren’t available in state courts.

Why I Still Endorse the DTSA

Trade secrets are the only major type of intellectual property (i.e., copyrights, patents, trademarks, and trade secrets) not governed primarily by a federal statute. Copyrights and patents got theirs in the 1700s. Trademark got its in the 1800s. Now that we’re firmly in the information age, it’s time for trade secrets to join their peers.

True, the DTSA is only a partial step toward uniformity, as it leaves the current state-law regime in place and doesn’t preempt overlapping causes of action. But in the absence of a complete transition from a state-based trade secret regime to a federal one, the DTSA is an important step in the right direction.

This post by David S. Almeling does not purport to represent the views of O’Melveny or its clients.