Tag Archives: Enablement

A short observation about Ultramercial v. Hulu

Ethics

An off-topic early morning rant.

I teach civil procedure (and ethics, and patent law), and I'm just boggled by some of the amici briefs (I haven't read the petition for cert itself) in Ultramercial v. Hulu.  The case involved the appeal of a 12(b)(6) dismissal.  That requires that, on the face of the patent itself there is clear and convincing evidence the patent was invalid.  (Why?  If 101 matters at all, then it is a basis for invalidity, and so an affirmative defense, and so under long-standing case law, the patentee has to "plead into" the affirmative defense.  Here, that means the patent alone must show clear and convincing evidence of "invalidity" under 101.)

The burden is actually even higher than that.  At the start of Ultramercial, the court wrote:  

Further, if Rule 12(b)(6) is used to assert an affirmative defense, dismissal is appropriate only if the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, suffice to establish the defense.See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007). Thus, the only plausible reading of the patent must be that there is clear and convincing evidence of ineligibility. For those reasons, Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal for lack of eligible subject matter will be the exception, not the rule.

So… how can you ever grant a 12(b)(6) motion granted with that standard?  Imagine a court saying "as a matter of law there is clear and convincing evidence that there is no plausible way this patent is enabled" without considering anything but the patent. 

So, with that background , what is really, um, peculiar to me is lawyers putting in amicus briefs with "evidence" in the appendix about how the claim could be done in 16 lines of code.  One is here.  If one of my civ pro students in their first semester said this was proper, they'd get a zero on that answer.

So, whatever the merits of this patent, I'll bet a metaphorical dollar that the Supreme Court will take one look and say, "12(b)(6)?  cert denied."

But then again, it's early and I've only had one cup of coffee.  So tell me what I'm missing.

What is an Exceptional Case such that Court Should Award Attorney Fees?

Attorney Fees, Fee Shifting, Patent, , ,

By Dennis Crouch

Earlier this week, I commented on the two attorney-fees cases pending before the US Supreme Court:

  • Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., Docket No. 12-1184; and
  • Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management Sys., Docket No. 121163.

Both cases stem from the same perspective that the “exceptional case” requirement for attorney fees is too narrowly construed by the courts and especially by the Federal Circuit. See 35 U.S.C. § 285.

I noted in the prior post that the predecessor of Section 285 was first enacted in a 1946 Patent bill. The 1946 law was substantially similar to the current law (enacted in 1952) with the major difference that the 1946 act expressly gave the court “discretion” to award attorney fees to the prevailing party while the 1952 act removed that “discretion” term and instead indicated that the fee may be awarded “in exceptional cases.”

The Senate Report associated with the 1946 statute indicates that the statute is not intended to make fee awards an “ordinary thing in patent suits” but instead to reserve such awards for “gross injustice.”

It is not contemplated that the recovery of attorney’s fees will become an ordinary thing in patent suits, but the discretion given the court in this respect, in addition to the present discretion to award triple damages, will discourage infringement of a patent by anyone thinking that all he would be required to pay if he loses the suit would be a royalty. The provision is also made general so as to enable the court to prevent a gross injustice to an alleged infringer.

S. Rep. No. 1503, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1386, 1387.

When the 1952 act was passed, the House Committee Report briefly mentioned the “exceptional case” amendment to the statute – indicating that the phrase “‘in exceptional cases’ has been added as expressing the intention of the present statute as shown by its legislative history and as interpreted by the courts.”

In several cases, the Federal Circuit has considered the standard and, after some debate, decided in Eltech Systems Corp. v. PPG Industries, Inc., 903 F.2d 805 (Fed. Cir. 1990), that the exceptional case standard should be the same for both prevailing plaintiffs and for prevailing defendants – writing: “we now reach the question and determine that there is and should be no difference in the standards applicable to patentees and infringers who engage in bad faith litigation.” The Eltech Systems case was then cited positively by the Supreme Court in Fogerty v. Fantasy, 510 U.S. 517 (1994) as justification for a party-neutral approach to fee shifting in copyright cases.

We note that the federal fee-shifting statutes in the patent and trademark fields, which are more closely related to that of copyright, support a party-neutral approach. Those statutes contain language similar to that of [17 U.S.C.] § 505, with the added proviso that fees are only to be awarded in “exceptional cases.” 35 U.S.C. § 285 (patent) (“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party”); 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (trademark) (same). Consistent with the party-neutral language, courts have generally awarded attorney’s fees in an evenhanded manner based on the same criteria. For patent, see, e.g., Eltech Systems Corp. v. PPG Industries, Inc., 903 F.2d 805, 811 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“[T]here is and should be no difference in the standards applicable to patentees and infringers who engage in bad faith litigation”). For trademark, see, e.g., Motown Productions, Inc. v. Cacomm, Inc., 849 F.2d 781, 786 (2nd Cir. 1988) (exceptional circumstances include cases in which losing party prosecuted or defended action in bad faith); but see Scotch Whisky Assn. v. Majestic Distilling Co., 958 F.2d 594 (4th Cir.) (finding in the legislative history that prevailing defendants are to be treated more favorably than prevailing plaintiffs), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 862 (1992).

Fogerty at note 12.

Of course, the problem with a party-neutral approach is that it can only be applied at a certain high level of granularity or abstractness. Since patentees and accused infringers make systematically different argument and have systematically different strategies, the particular causes of exceptional case findings tends to be different. Thus, losing infringers most often pay fees based upon ongoing willful and reckless infringement while losing patentees most often pay fees for suing on patent obtained through inequitable conduct or for bringing baseless lawsuits. At that low level of granularity, the differences are such that it is difficult to compare whether a party-neutral approach is being applied.

Notes:

Thanks to John Pinkerton at Thompson & Knight for providing me with this legislative history from the 1946 Act.

Is “Insolubly Ambiguous” the Correct Standard for Indefiniteness?

Indefinite, Patent, , , ,

By Dennis Crouch

Nautilus v. Biosig Inst. (on petition for writ of certiorari 2013)

A major focus of attention in the current arena of patent reform is on the notice function of patent claims and, in particularly, the standard for definiteness. Most of the time, the scope of a patent's coverage is only known once a district court construes those claims. And, in many cases, that knowledge is really delayed until Federal Circuit review. A substantial portion of the blame in this area can be placed on patentees who intentionally draft claims of ambiguous scope. Of course, the Supreme Court has long recognized the policy benefits of allowing ambiguity in patent coverage. (See, Doctrine of Equivalents). Most technology users would prefer to understand the scope of claims before litigation and use that information to decide whether to obtain a license. However, the ambiguity (in combination with other factors) lead to the common practice of holding-out until a court construes the claims.

For indefinite claims, the statutory guidelines come from 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) that requires claims that "particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter which the inventor … regards as the invention." The doctrine of indefiniteness finds its statutory support from §112(b). And, when a claim is indefinite it is both unpatentable and invalid.

Once a patent issues, it tends to be quite difficult to invalidate that patent on indefiniteness grounds. The difficulty begins with the statutory presumption of validity under § 282 that requires clear and convincing evidence of invalidity. That difficulty continues with the standard for indefiniteness itself. In particular, the Federal Circuit has required that invalidity by indefiniteness requires proof that the challenged claim is ambiguous in a way that is "insoluble." In Biosig, the Federal Circuit similarly held that indefiniteness of an issued claim can only be found "if reasonable efforts at claim construction result in a definition that does not provide sufficient particularity and clarity to inform skilled artisans of the bounds of the claim."

In a new petition, John Vandenberg's team at Klarquist Sparkman has asked the Supreme Court to reconsider the Federal Circuit's standard on this point. Nautilus presents the following questions:

1. Does the Federal Circuit's acceptance of ambiguous patent claims with multiple reasonable interpretations—so long as the ambiguity is not "insoluble" by a court—defeat the statutory requirement of particular and distinct patent claiming?

2. Does the presumption of validity dilute the requirement of particular and distinct patent claiming?

Many of these same issues have been previously addressed by the Supreme Court in pre-1952 decisions. See, for example, United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228 (1942). In Union Carbide, the court wrote that:

The statutory requirement of particularity and distinctness in claims is met only when they clearly distinguish what is claimed from what went before in the art and clearly circumscribe what is foreclosed from future enterprise. A zone of uncertainty which enterprise and experimentation may enter only at the risk of infringement claims would discourage invention only a little less than unequivocal foreclosure of the field. Moreover, the claims must be reasonably clear-cut to enable courts to determine whether novelty and invention are genuine. . . . Whether the vagueness of the claim has its source in the language employed or in the somewhat indeterminate character of the advance claimed to have been made in the art is not material. An invention must be capable of accurate definition, and it must be accurately defined, to be patentable.

Interpreting the precursor to Section 112(b), 35 U.S.C. § 33 (1932). The old § 33 included the parallel requirement of claims that "particularly point out and distinctly claim the part, improvement, or combination which he claims as his invention or discovery."

In the Union Carbide, the court's problem with the claims was what it called functionality, writing: [T]he claims are but inaccurate suggestions of the functions of the product, and fall afoul of the rule that a patentee may not broaden his claims by describing the product in terms of function. Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277 U.S. 245; General Electric Co. v. Wabash Corp., 304 U.S. 371. The particular claims at issue in Union Carbide are as follows:

1. Substantially pure carbon black in the form of commercially uniform, comparatively small, rounded, smooth aggregates having a spongy porous interior.

2. As an article of manufacture, a pellet of approximately one sixteenth of any inch in diameter and, formed-of a porous mass of substantially pure carbon black.

See U.S. Patent No. 1,889,429. Read the claims again and look for the functional limitations, then read the Supreme Court's decision.

In General Electric Co. v. Wabash Corp., 304 U.S. 364 (1938), the Supreme Court similarly took issue with the indefiniteness of issued patent claims.

The limits of a patent must be known for the protection of the patentee, the encouragement of the inventive genius of others, and the assurance that the subject of the patent will be dedicated ultimately to the public. The statute seeks to guard against unreasonable advantages to the patentee and disadvantages to others arising from uncertainty as to their rights. The inventor must inform the public during the life of the patent of the limits of the monopoly asserted, so that it may be known which features may be safely used or manufactured without a license and which may not.

. . . . Patentees may reasonably anticipate that claimed inventions, improvements, and discoveries, turning on points so refined as the granular structure of products, require precise descriptions of the new characteristic for which protection is sought. In a limited field, the variant must be clearly defined.

GE v. Wabash.

Reaching further back to the 19th century, the court wrote in Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568 (1876) that a patentee has no excuse for ambiguous or vague descriptions.

The growth of the patent system in the last quarter of a century in this country has reached a stage in its progress where the variety and magnitude of the interests involved require accuracy, precision, and care in the preparation of all the papers on which the patent is founded. It is no longer a scarcely recognized principle, struggling for a foothold, but it is an organized system, with well-settled rules, supporting itself at once by its utility, and by the wealth which it creates and commands. The developed and improved condition of the patent law, and of the principles which govern the exclusive rights conferred by it, leave no excuse for ambiguous language or vague descriptions. The public should not be deprived of rights supposed to belong to it, without being clearly told what it is that limits these rights. The genius of the inventor, constantly making improvements in existing patents,—a process which gives to the patent system its greatest value,—should not be restrained by vague and indefinite descriptions of claims in existing patents from the salutary and necessary right of improving on that which has already been invented. It seems to us that nothing can be more just and fair, both to the patentee and to the public, than that the former should understand, and correctly describe, just what he has invented, and for what he claims a patent.

Merrill (1876). These cases are in obvious tension with the Federal Circuit's current standard. However, there remains only a small chance that the Supreme Court will hear the case.

One key to the petition here is the argument that the Federal Circuit made it triply difficult to invalidate a claim on indefiniteness ground by (1) using the presumption of validity of § 282 to create stringent elements for the invalidity defense and then (2) also requiring clear-and-convincing evidence to prove those elements; all while (3) regularly ignoring the reality that indefiniteness is a question of law (as are patentable subject matter and obviousness).

Judge Rader’s Obviousness Tutorial: Including the Conclusion that Older Prior Art is Less Credible and a Restatement that Objective Indicia of Nonobviousness Play a Critical Role

Obviousness, Patent, , , , , ,

By Dennis Crouch

Leo Pharmaceutical Products, Ltd. v. Rea, 2013 WL 4054937 (Fed. Cir. 2013)

In a pre-AIA filing, Galderma challenged Leo’s U.S. Patent No. 6,753,013 in an inter partes reexamination before the USPTO’s now renamed Board of Patent Appeals. The patent claims a “storage stable and non-aqueous” pharmaceutical composition used to treat skin conditions such as psoriasis. Prior to the invention, it was well known that a combination of Vitamin-D along with a corticosteroid could form the basis of an effective treatment. However, no one had been able to manufacture a storage stable form of the combination. This was especially challenging because the stable forms of the active ingredients prefer different pH levels. To achieve the storage stable results, Leo added a solvent to the mixture. The claim identifies the solvent in a markush group that likely includes thousands of potential compounds. During the reexamination, Leo also added the particular limitation that “said pharmaceutical composition is storage stable and non-aqueous.”

In reviewing the case, the Board first construed these new terms “storage stable” and “non-aqueous” and then found the patent invalid as obvious over the prior art. On appeal, the Federal Circuit has reversed.

Claim Construction: The Federal Circuit continues, for the time being, to give no deference to PTO claim construction decisions. Here, the term “storage stable” was difficult to construe because it was never used during prosecution of the original patent application and only added during reexamination. However, the patent does discuss the composition’s “ability to resist degradation” according to test results presented in the specification and the PTO accepted that definition as proper. Noting that one of ordinary skill “would have reasonably looked to the described stability test as defining what was meant by ‘storage stable.'” On appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected that definition as impermissibly narrow and that instead allowed a broader definition. Although not elucidated by the opinion, the patentee is walking a fine line with this amendment between (1) having a sufficiently broad patent and (2) improperly adding new matter to the claims in violation of the written description requirement.

Obviousness: This decision may become a somewhat important obviousness case for patentees. The Board found the patent claims obvious in light of a combination of three prior art references. The Board basically found that it would have been obvious for someone of skill in the art to take the prior art combination of Vitamin-D and corticosteroids and add in the claimed solvent in order to achieve storage stability.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit faulted the Board for failing to give credence to the patentee’s identification of the problem (that a stable form should be designed). The prior art did not particularly recognize the problem but rather “either discouraged combining vitamin D analogs and corticosteroids … or attempted the combination without recognizing or solving the storage stability problems.” Leo also presented evidence that, at the time of the invention, researchers were being “warned that vitamin D should not be combined with other drugs requiring a low pH ( e.g., corticosteroids).”

[T]he record shows no reason for one of ordinary skill in the art to attempt to improve upon either Dikstein or Serup using Turi. The ordinary artisan would first have needed to recognize the problem, i.e., that the formulations disclosed in Dikstein and Serup were not storage stable. To discover this problem, the ordinary artisan would have needed to spend several months running storage stability tests Only after recognizing the existence of the problem would an artisan then turn to the prior art and attempt to develop a new formulation for storage stability. If these discoveries and advances were routine and relatively easy, the record would undoubtedly have shown that some ordinary artisan would have achieved this invention within months of Dikstein or Serup. Instead this invention does not appear for more than a decade.

Now, the Federal Circuit’s language here obviously includes some amount of doublespeak or could perhaps be described as slicing the bologna awfully thin since according to the court, researchers (1) recognized that vitamin D could not be stably combined with low pH drugs such as corticosteroids but (2) did not recognize that vitamin-D could not be stably combined with corticosteroids.

Old Prior Art: In the discussion, Judge Rader uses an interesting between-the-lines or perhaps behind-the-scenes analysis of the prior art:

First, the Board found motivation to combine Dikstein or Serup with Turi because one of ordinary skill would have used vitamin D to solve the well-known side effects of steroid treatment. However, combining Turi and vitamin D to address the side effects of a steroid treatment is only straightforward in hindsight. Turi was publicly available in the prior art for twenty-two years before the ′013 patent was filed, yet there is no evidence that anyone sought to improve Turi with vitamin D. According to the record, even when Serup published the well-known side effects of steroid-induced atrophy in 1994, no one—including Serup—sought to improve Turi by adding vitamin D to Turi’s corticosteroid composition. Serup even targeted the precise side effects that the Board believed would have motivated the addition of a vitamin D analog to Turi’s corticosteroid composition, yet Serup did not seek to improve Turi by adding vitamin D. . . .

The elapsed time between the prior art and the ′013 patent’s filing date evinces that the ′013 patent’s claimed invention was not obvious to try. Indeed this considerable time lapse suggests instead that the Board only traverses the obstacles to this inventive enterprise with a resort to hindsight. It took over a decade—after Dikstein’s disclosure of the benefits of combining vitamin D and corticosteroid treatments into one formulation—for Dikstein’s formulations to be tested for storage stability. And, until the advancement made by the inventors of the ′013 patent, no one had proposed a new formulation that would be storage stable. The problem was not known, the possible approaches to solving the problem were not known or finite, and the solution was not predictable. Therefore, the claimed invention would not have been obvious to try to one of ordinary skill in the art. Indeed ordinary artisans would not have thought to try at all because they would not have recognized the problem.

Under Judge Rader’s point of view here, older prior art should be seen as less credible in the obviousness analysis. The logic obvious improvements would have happened quickly and the long time span between improvements suggest that the improvement was not an obvious one. This logic is bolstered in cases such as this where research is ongoing in the area and a market has already developed.

Although the patentee claimed a wide variety of solvents, the Federal Circuit also found that there were many more potential solvents available to try and the PTO did not offer specific reasons why the ones selected would have been particularly obvious to try.

In addition, the Board found that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been capable of selecting the correct formulation from available alternatives. Specifically, the Board found more than eight different classes of additives ( e.g., diluents, buffers, thickeners, lubricants). The Board also found more than ten different categories of composition forms ( e.g., liniments, lotions, applicants, oil-in-water or water-in-oil emulsions such as creams, ointments, pastes, or gels). “Based on these broad and general disclosures,” the Board reasoned that an artisan would have been able to “mak[e] choices about what ingredients to include, and which to exclude” in formulating a composition with a vitamin D analog and steroid. To the contrary, the breadth of these choices and the numerous combinations indicate that these disclosures would not have rendered the claimed invention obvious to try. See Rolls–Royce PLC v. United Techs. Corp., 603 F.3d 1325, 1339 (Fed.Cir.2010) (claimed invention was not obvious to try because the prior art disclosed a “broad selection of choices for further investigation”). . . . .

This court and obviousness law in general recognizes an important distinction between combining known options into “a finite number of identified, predictable solutions,” KSR, and ” ‘merely throwing metaphorical darts at a board’ in hopes of arriving at a successful result,” Cyclobenzaprine, quoting Kubin. While the record shows that, as early as 1995, the prior art indicated that both vitamin D analogs and corticosteroids were effective treatments for psoriasis, that same prior art gave no direction as to which of the many possible combination choices were likely to be successful. Instead, the prior art consistently taught away from combining vitamin D analogs and corticosteroids.

One important feature of PTO decision making is that Board conclusions of fact only require substantial evidence to be affirmed on appeal. Here, the Federal Circuit avoided that issue by indicating that all of its decisions were based upon the Board failure to properly apply the law to those facts. “In this case, however, with no material factual disputes, this court cannot share the Board’s analysis and application of the law to those facts.”

Objective Indicia of Non-Obviousness: Judge Rader writes:

The court now turns to the Board’s analysis of the objective indicia of nonobviousness. The Board reasoned that “the strong case of obviousness outweighs the experimental evidence and testimony about the advantages of the claimed composition.” Contrary to the Board’s conclusion, this court finds the objective indicia, in concert with the entire obviousness analysis, present a compelling case of nonobviousness. In fact, the objective indicia of nonobviousness highlight that the Board’s analysis regarding the combination of Serup or Dikstein with Turi was colored by hindsight.

Whether before the Board or a court, this court has emphasized that consideration of the objective indicia is part of the whole obviousness analysis, not just an afterthought. … When an applicant appeals an examiner’s objection to the patentability of an application’s claims for obviousness, the PTO necessarily has the burden to establish a prima facie case of obviousness which the applicant then rebuts. However, during inter partes reexamination, the Board is reviewing evidence of obviousness—including objective indicia—submitted by two adversarial parties for the claims of an issued patent. Thus, the Board should give the objective indicia its proper weight and place in the obviousness analysis, and not treat objective indicia of nonobviousness as an afterthought.

Objective indicia of nonobviousness play a critical role in the obviousness analysis. They are “not just a cumulative or confirmatory part of the obviousness calculus but constitute[ ] independent evidence of nonobviousness.” Ortho–McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1365 (Fed.Cir.2008). This case illustrates a good reason for considering objective indicia as a critical piece of the obviousness analysis: Objective indicia “can be the most probative evidence of nonobviousness in the record, and enables the court to avert the trap of hindsight.” Crocs, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 598 F.3d 1294, 1310 (Fed.Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the objective indicia of nonobviousness are crucial in avoiding the trap of hindsight when reviewing, what otherwise seems like, a combination of known elements.

Unexpected results are useful to show the “improved properties provided by the claimed compositions are much greater than would have been predicted.” See In re Soni, 54 F.3d 746, 751 (Fed.Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). This record shows “extensive experimental evidence” of unexpected results that contradict the Board’s obviousness finding. J.A. 14. The Board concluded that the “unexpected results” claimed by Leo Pharmaceuticals were not surprising or unexpected. J.A. 19. However, substantial evidence does not support the Board’s conclusion.

During reexamination, the inventors of the ′013 patent submitted test results that analyzed the Dikstein and Serup formulations. The inventors found that the formulations disclosed by Dikstein and Serup result in significant degradation of the vitamin D analog and corticosteroid. See J.A. 1041–46 (testing formulations in Serup); J.A. 1625–27, 2152–2154 (testing formulations in Dikstein). The inventors also tested an improvement of Serup using Turi, by replacing Serup’s solvent with POP–15–SE, and still found significant degradation of the corticosteroid component. See J.A. 1045–46. These test results are a strong indication that the ′013 patent’s combination of known elements yields more than just predictable results.

In addition to evidence of unexpected results, Leo Pharmaceuticals provided other objective indicia of non-obviousness. For example, the commercial success of Leo Pharmaceutical’s Taclonex® ointment is a testament to the improved properties of the ′013 patent’s claimed invention. Taclonex® is the first FDA-approved drug to combine vitamin D and corticosteroids into a single formulation for topical application. While FDA approval is not determinative of nonobviousness, it can be relevant in evaluating the objective indicia of nonobviousness. See Knoll Pharm. Co., Inc. v. Teva. Pharm. USA, Inc., 367 F.3d 1381, 1385 (Fed.Cir.2004). Here, FDA approval highlights that Leo Pharmaceutical’s formulation is truly storage stable, something that the prior art formulations did not achieve.

The record also shows evidence of long felt but unsolved need, i.e., the need for a single formulation to treat psoriasis. The length of the intervening time between the publication dates of the prior art and the claimed invention can also qualify as an objective indicator of nonobviousness. See Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1376–77 (Fed.Cir.2000). Here, the researchers were aware of the benefits of using both vitamin D and corticosteroids in the treatment of psoriasis as early as 1986. See, e.g., Dikstein col. 1, ll. 9–16. And Turi, upon which the Board relied to make its case, issued in 1978. Yet, it was not until the ′013 patent’s filing in 2000— twenty-two years after Turi and fourteen years after Dikstein-that the solution to the long felt but unsolved need for a combined treatment of vitamin D and corticosteroid was created. The intervening time between the prior art’s teaching of the components and the eventual preparation of a successful composition speaks volumes to the nonobviousness of the ′013 patent.

Here, the objective indicia—taken in sum—are the most “probative evidence of nonobviousness … enabl[ing] the court to avert the trap of hindsight.” Crocs, Inc., 598 F.3d at 1310. Viewed through the lens of the objective indicia, as opposed to the hindsight lens used by the Board, the ′013 patent would not have been not obvious over Turi in combination with Dikstein or Serup. Therefore, this court reverses the Board’s obviousness determination.

Whether Prior Art Should be Presumed Enabled

Patent,

Finjan v. Rea (Supreme Court 2013)

In its recently filed petition for certiorari, Finjan asks the court to determine whether "prior art should be presumed enabled" when being applied during prosecution before the United States Patent and Trademark Office. The Government's response in opposition alters the question somewhat by asking "Whether, in proceedings to determine whether a patent application should be granted, the [USPTO] bears the burden of demonstrating that a prior art printed publication that anticipates the invention for which the patent is sought enables a person of skill in the art to practice the invention."

The PTO Argues:

The presumption of enablement is consistent with the general rule that the examiner need not raise and explain every possible issue surrounding each ground of rejection. Because the primary purpose of the prima facie showing is to provide notice, an examiner "is not required to anticipate every possible response to a rejection, including showing that a cited reference is enabling." Antor. When an examiner identifies anticipation as a ground of rejection, that notification informs the applicant that he may raise lack of enablement in his response.

The presumption of enablement also reflects the Federal Circuit's recognition that requiring the examiner preemptively to make the detailed findings necessary to verify enablement would be "manifestly inefficient," "burdensome," and "entirely unnecessary." Jung. Because the enablement inquiry requires an analysis of the degree of experimentation necessary to implement an invention, "an examiner, who has no access to experts or laboratories, is not in a position to test each piece of prior art for enablement in citing it, and requiring him to do so would be onerous, if not impossible." Antor. … The applicant is better positioned than the PTO to gather evidence supporting his contention that the prior art is not enabling.

Federal Circuit Begins its Campaign for Patent Clarity

Patent, , ,

By Dennis Crouch

Wyeth v. Abbot Labs (Fed. Cir. 2013)

In a unanimous opinion, the Federal Circuit has affirmed a summary judgment holding that Wyeth’s patents are invalid as lacking enablement under 35 U.S.C. 112. Wyeth’s patents cover the use of rapamycin antibiotic to treat and prevent restenosis following arterial balloon catheterization. See U.S. Patent Nos. 5,516,781 and 5,563,146. The claimed invention is simple and basically says, administer an “antirestenosis effective amount of rapamycin.” Claim 1 of the ‘781 patent reads as follows:

1. A method of treating restenosis in a mammal resulting from said mammal undergoing a percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty procedure which comprises administering an antirestenosis effective amount of rapamycin to said mammal orally, parenterally, intravascularly, intranasally, intrabronchially, transdermally, rectally, or via a vascular stent impregnated with rapamycin.

One requirement of patent law is that the patent application (at the time of its filing) must sufficiently enable a person skilled in the relevant art to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without undue experimentation. This “enablement requirement” is codified in Section 112(a) of the Patent Act (Formerly known as Section 112¶1).

Here, it is the “full scope” requirement that kills the patent. In particular, Wyeth requested and received a broad construction of the claim term rapamycin to in a way that includes a large number of molecules that are structurally analogous to one another. However, the specification only discloses a single species along with a number of assays that could be useful to ascertain whether potential compounds exhibit the requisite effect.

In the appeal, the Federal Circuit aligned itself to the rule that broad claim scope requires broad disclosure. Here, the court noted that the rapamycin definition includes “tens of thousands” of candidate molecules and the specification “is silent about how to structurally modify sirolimus.

Undue experimentation: For its part, Wyeth argued that a lab tech with the usual skill and little creativity could systematically work through the various potential candidates to find which ones actually work. Citing to Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 1998), Wyeth argued that a large pile of merely routine experimentation does rise to the level of impermissible undue experimentation.

The Federal Circuit disagreed – finding that the trial-and-error process of tens-of-thousands of candidates moves the project well into the range of undue experimentation.

[T]here is no genuine dispute that it would be necessary to first synthesize and then screen each candidate compound using the assays disclosed in the specification to determine whether it has immunosuppressive and antirestenotic effects. There is no evidence in the record that any particular substitutions outside of the macrocyclic ring are preferable. Indeed, a Wyeth scientist confirmed the unpredictability of the art and the ensuing need to assay each candidate by testifying that, “until you test [compounds], you really can’t tell whether they work or not [i.e., have antirestenotic effects].” J.A. 6929. In sum, there is no genuine dispute that practicing the full scope of the claims would require synthesizing and screening each of at least tens of thousands of compounds. . . .

Even putting the challenges of synthesis aside, one of ordinary skill would need to assay each of at least tens of thousands of candidates. Wyeth’s expert conceded that it would take technicians weeks to complete each of these assays. The specification offers no guidance or predictions about particular substitutions that might preserve the immunosuppressive and antirestenotic effects observed in sirolimus. The resulting need to engage in a systematic screening process for each of the many rapamycin candidate compounds is excessive experimentation. We thus hold that there is no genuine dispute that practicing the full scope of the claims, measured at the filing date, required undue experimentation.

The take-away legal points here are (1) broad claims must do more to satisfy the enablement requirement than narrow claims; and (2) when excessive, routine non-creative efforts to recreate the invention can constitute undue experimentation.

The case is also interesting because it comes at a time where policymakers are looking to tighten the requirements of Section 112. As it did during the debate over the AIA, the Federal Circuit appears poised to make its mark on the current debate over patent scope and clarity.

Patent Reform 2013: Adding Clarity and Transparency to the System

Patent

By Dennis Crouch

President Obama today released information on planed executive orders and push for new legislation that will attempt to block companies from asserting their patents unless they are also manufacturing a product based upon the patented design. And at the same time, the President’s National Economic Council and Council of Economic Advisers released a report a report titled “Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation.” The report generally takes the viewpoint that Patent Assertion Entities are bad for the US Economy and makes the bold claim that, in the past year PAE’s have threatened “over 100,000 companies with patent infringement.” The bulk of the report that identifies the “problem” is based upon the work of professor Colleen Chien (Santa Clara); Jim Bessen & Mike Meurer (BU); Mark Lemley (Stanford) and Michele Boldrin (WUSTL) & David K. Levine (WUSTL).

Despite the unknowing hyperbole of the report, the suggested actions are, for the most, welcome and will benefit the patent system as a whole. In fact, this move to finally address the problem of predictability of patent scope and patent validity hits the sweet spot of where problems emerge in the system. Of course, the devil will be in the details of these approaches.

Executive Actions:

1. Knowing Who Owns the Patents: Through the PTO a new rule will require patent applicants and owners to regularly update ownership information with the “real party of interest” so that the assignment records are accurate complete.

2. Tightening Functional Claiming. The PTO will provide new targeted training to its examiners on scrutiny of functional claims and will, over the next six months develop strategies to improve claim clarity, such as by use of glossaries in patent specifications to assist examiners in the software field.

In my view, these two elements are sorely needed and will generally improve the patent system without actually limiting the ability of patent assertion entities to derive value from their innovations through patent assertion. In addition, the PTO will begin a number of outreach mechanisms intended to provide assistance to non-patent-insiders who receive patent demand letter.

Legislative Actions:

1. Require patentees and applicants to disclose the “Real Party-in-Interest,” by requiring that any party sending demand letters, filing an infringement suit or seeking PTO review of a patent to file updated ownership information, and enabling the PTO or district courts to impose sanctions for non-compliance. [DC: This would add statutory back-up for the PTO rulemaking]

2. Permit more discretion in awarding fees to prevailing parties in patent cases, providing district courts with more discretion to award attorney’s fees under 35 USC 285 as a sanction for abusive court filings (similar to the legal standard that applies in copyright infringement cases). [DC: This can be helpful if allowed to go both-ways, although courts generally find that patent litigators are the most well-prepared and honorable of any that they see in court.]

3. Expand the PTO’s transitional program for covered business method patents to include a broader category of computer-enabled patents and permit a wider range of challengers to petition for review of issued patents before the Patent Trial and Appeals Board (PTAB). [DC: This has the potential of capturing a substantial percentage of issued patents, but that may be fine.]

4. Protect off-the-shelf use by consumers and businesses by providing them with better legal protection against liability for a product being used off-the-shelf and solely for its intended use. Also, stay judicial proceedings against such consumers when an infringement suit has also been brought against a vendor, retailer, or manufacturer. [DC: We are on our way here toward a fair use of patents.]

5. Change the ITC standard for obtaining an injunction to better align it with the traditional four-factor test in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, to enhance consistency in the standards applied at the ITC and district courts. [DC: The focus here is to get patent assertion entities out of the ITC]

6. Use demand letter transparency to help curb abusive suits, incentivizing public filing of demand letters in a way that makes them accessible and searchable to the public. [DC: This sounds good, I wonder how those writing demand letters would respond.]

7. Ensure the ITC has adequate flexibility in hiring qualified Administrative Law Judges. [DC: However, must ensure that the flexibility is not used to hire because of particular political bent.]

Patent Reform 2013: Adding Clarity and Transparency to the System

Patent

By Dennis Crouch

President Obama today released information on planed executive orders and push for new legislation that will attempt to block companies from asserting their patents unless they are also manufacturing a product based upon the patented design. And at the same time, the President’s National Economic Council and Council of Economic Advisers released a report a report titled “Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation.” The report generally takes the viewpoint that Patent Assertion Entities are bad for the US Economy and makes the bold claim that, in the past year PAE’s have threatened “over 100,000 companies with patent infringement.” The bulk of the report that identifies the “problem” is based upon the work of professor Colleen Chien (Santa Clara); Jim Bessen & Mike Meurer (BU); Mark Lemley (Stanford) and Michele Boldrin (WUSTL) & David K. Levine (WUSTL).

Despite the unknowing hyperbole of the report, the suggested actions are, for the most, welcome and will benefit the patent system as a whole. In fact, this move to finally address the problem of predictability of patent scope and patent validity hits the sweet spot of where problems emerge in the system. Of course, the devil will be in the details of these approaches.

Executive Actions:

1. Knowing Who Owns the Patents: Through the PTO a new rule will require patent applicants and owners to regularly update ownership information with the “real party of interest” so that the assignment records are accurate complete.

2. Tightening Functional Claiming. The PTO will provide new targeted training to its examiners on scrutiny of functional claims and will, over the next six months develop strategies to improve claim clarity, such as by use of glossaries in patent specifications to assist examiners in the software field.

In my view, these two elements are sorely needed and will generally improve the patent system without actually limiting the ability of patent assertion entities to derive value from their innovations through patent assertion. In addition, the PTO will begin a number of outreach mechanisms intended to provide assistance to non-patent-insiders who receive patent demand letter.

Legislative Actions:

1. Require patentees and applicants to disclose the “Real Party-in-Interest,” by requiring that any party sending demand letters, filing an infringement suit or seeking PTO review of a patent to file updated ownership information, and enabling the PTO or district courts to impose sanctions for non-compliance. [DC: This would add statutory back-up for the PTO rulemaking]

2. Permit more discretion in awarding fees to prevailing parties in patent cases, providing district courts with more discretion to award attorney’s fees under 35 USC 285 as a sanction for abusive court filings (similar to the legal standard that applies in copyright infringement cases). [DC: This can be helpful if allowed to go both-ways, although courts generally find that patent litigators are the most well-prepared and honorable of any that they see in court.]

3. Expand the PTO’s transitional program for covered business method patents to include a broader category of computer-enabled patents and permit a wider range of challengers to petition for review of issued patents before the Patent Trial and Appeals Board (PTAB). [DC: This has the potential of capturing a substantial percentage of issued patents, but that may be fine.]

4. Protect off-the-shelf use by consumers and businesses by providing them with better legal protection against liability for a product being used off-the-shelf and solely for its intended use. Also, stay judicial proceedings against such consumers when an infringement suit has also been brought against a vendor, retailer, or manufacturer. [DC: We are on our way here toward a fair use of patents.]

5. Change the ITC standard for obtaining an injunction to better align it with the traditional four-factor test in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, to enhance consistency in the standards applied at the ITC and district courts. [DC: The focus here is to get patent assertion entities out of the ITC]

6. Use demand letter transparency to help curb abusive suits, incentivizing public filing of demand letters in a way that makes them accessible and searchable to the public. [DC: This sounds good, I wonder how those writing demand letters would respond.]

7. Ensure the ITC has adequate flexibility in hiring qualified Administrative Law Judges. [DC: However, must ensure that the flexibility is not used to hire because of particular political bent.]

Patent Reform 2013: Adding Clarity and Transparency to the System

Patent

By Dennis Crouch

President Obama today released information on planed executive orders and push for new legislation that will attempt to block companies from asserting their patents unless they are also manufacturing a product based upon the patented design. And at the same time, the President’s National Economic Council and Council of Economic Advisers released a report a report titled “Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation.” The report generally takes the viewpoint that Patent Assertion Entities are bad for the US Economy and makes the bold claim that, in the past year PAE’s have threatened “over 100,000 companies with patent infringement.” The bulk of the report that identifies the “problem” is based upon the work of professor Colleen Chien (Santa Clara); Jim Bessen & Mike Meurer (BU); Mark Lemley (Stanford) and Michele Boldrin (WUSTL) & David K. Levine (WUSTL).

Despite the unknowing hyperbole of the report, the suggested actions are, for the most, welcome and will benefit the patent system as a whole. In fact, this move to finally address the problem of predictability of patent scope and patent validity hits the sweet spot of where problems emerge in the system. Of course, the devil will be in the details of these approaches.

Executive Actions:

1. Knowing Who Owns the Patents: Through the PTO a new rule will require patent applicants and owners to regularly update ownership information with the “real party of interest” so that the assignment records are accurate complete.

2. Tightening Functional Claiming. The PTO will provide new targeted training to its examiners on scrutiny of functional claims and will, over the next six months develop strategies to improve claim clarity, such as by use of glossaries in patent specifications to assist examiners in the software field.

In my view, these two elements are sorely needed and will generally improve the patent system without actually limiting the ability of patent assertion entities to derive value from their innovations through patent assertion. In addition, the PTO will begin a number of outreach mechanisms intended to provide assistance to non-patent-insiders who receive patent demand letter.

Legislative Actions:

1. Require patentees and applicants to disclose the “Real Party-in-Interest,” by requiring that any party sending demand letters, filing an infringement suit or seeking PTO review of a patent to file updated ownership information, and enabling the PTO or district courts to impose sanctions for non-compliance. [DC: This would add statutory back-up for the PTO rulemaking]

2. Permit more discretion in awarding fees to prevailing parties in patent cases, providing district courts with more discretion to award attorney’s fees under 35 USC 285 as a sanction for abusive court filings (similar to the legal standard that applies in copyright infringement cases). [DC: This can be helpful if allowed to go both-ways, although courts generally find that patent litigators are the most well-prepared and honorable of any that they see in court.]

3. Expand the PTO’s transitional program for covered business method patents to include a broader category of computer-enabled patents and permit a wider range of challengers to petition for review of issued patents before the Patent Trial and Appeals Board (PTAB). [DC: This has the potential of capturing a substantial percentage of issued patents, but that may be fine.]

4. Protect off-the-shelf use by consumers and businesses by providing them with better legal protection against liability for a product being used off-the-shelf and solely for its intended use. Also, stay judicial proceedings against such consumers when an infringement suit has also been brought against a vendor, retailer, or manufacturer. [DC: We are on our way here toward a fair use of patents.]

5. Change the ITC standard for obtaining an injunction to better align it with the traditional four-factor test in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, to enhance consistency in the standards applied at the ITC and district courts. [DC: The focus here is to get patent assertion entities out of the ITC]

6. Use demand letter transparency to help curb abusive suits, incentivizing public filing of demand letters in a way that makes them accessible and searchable to the public. [DC: This sounds good, I wonder how those writing demand letters would respond.]

7. Ensure the ITC has adequate flexibility in hiring qualified Administrative Law Judges. [DC: However, must ensure that the flexibility is not used to hire because of particular political bent.]

Best Mode: Only Mostly Dead

Patent

By Jason Rantanen

Ateliers de la Haute-Garonne v. Broetje Automation USA Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2013) Download 12-1038.Opinion.5-17-2013.1
Panel: Newman (author), Prost (dissenting), Reyna

While the America Invents Act eliminated the failure to disclose best mode as a defense in patent infringement suits commenced on or after September 16, 2011, it remained available as a defense for litigation that had already commenced.  In AHG v. Broetje, the Federal Circuit divides over the issue of whether intentional concealment is required for a best mode violation in a split that will likely remain forever unresolved.

AHG is the owner of two patents relating "to the dispensing of objects such as rivets through a pressurized tube with grooves along its inner surface, to provide a rapid and smooth supply of properly positioned rivets for such uses as the assembly of metal parts of aircraft."  Slip Op. at 2. Prior to the enactment of the AIA, AHG filed an infringement suit against Brotje. 

The crux of Brotje's best mode argument turned on whether the inventors' best mode involved three-grooves or an odd number of grooves. At the time of the application, the inventors were mostly using three-groove embodiments.  The patents disclosed a three-groove embodiment (among other examples including a fifty-five groove and two two-groove embodiments).  Brotje argued, however, that at the time of the application the inventors considered an odd number of grooves to be the best mode of carrying out the invention.  Based on Broje's theory, the district court granted summary judgment of invaliditydue to a failure to disclose the best mode of carrying out the invention.  AHG appealed.

Best mode and the issue of intent: In granting summary judgment, the district court stated that "the clear weight of Federal Circuit authority holds that intentional concealment is not required for best mode violations . . . ." and that the "patents-in-suit are 'so objectively inadequate as to effectively conceal the best mode from the public,' such that a reasonable jury could not find in AHG’s favor with respect to Broetje’s ‘odd number’ theory."  Slip Op. at 9, quoting district court (emphasis in original). 

On appeal, the majority disagreed with the district court that this was the correct correct legal standard.  "Violation requires intentional concealment; innocent or inadvertent failure of disclosure does not of itself invalidate the patent."  Slip Op. at 10.  Thus, under the majority's view, a best mode violation requires both that the inventor knew of a better mode and intentionally concealed it.

Judge Prost disagreed that this is the law of best mode.  "The majority holds that a '[v]iolation [of the best mode requirement] requires intentional concealment.'…"  Dissent at 2 (emphasis in quotation).  This decision "is itself based on an error of law.  It is not in accord with our precedent regarding intent in a best mode analysis."  Id. at 1. Rather, "this court has repeatedly acknowledged the error in the Brooktree dicta and recognized that we are bound to follow our earlier precedent that intent is not an element of a best mode violation."  Id. at 3.

In support of their positions, both the majority and dissent cite an array of recent precedents and engage in a series of dueling footnotes.  This disagreement might seem somewhat minor; after all, best mode is being phased out as a defense in patent litigation.  What is interesting here is the way in which the judges express their disagreement: both opinions suggest that not only is the other side wrong, but that its opinion is invalid.  This is particularly apparent in the treatment of recent precedent by the majority and dissent.  Both cite substantial amounts of recent and older opinions that arguably support their positions and conclude that the opposing sets of precedents are invalid; they then cite back to older precedent in a complex dance in which older precedent is better, unless it is too old, unless it is cited in a more recent old opinion (compare majority footnote 3 with dissent footnote 1).

This opinion itself seems likely to fall into that morass when it is cited in the future: some judges may take the view that it is binding for what it says while others take the opposite view.  I'm curious as to whether this reflects an emerging trend in Federal Circuit jurisprudence or whether it no different than other doctrinal disagreements within the court.  My observational sense is that dissents and disagreement within Federal Circuit opinions are have been on a substantial rise but haven't yet put together the data to test that intuition.

Articulating the best mode:  Majority and dissent also disagreed over what needed to be disclosed.  The majority interpreted the best mode requirement as requiring that the best embodiment must be disclosed.  "The general statement that an odd number is better than an even number is not a statement of a better mode than the preferred embodiment shown in the specification. There was no evidence of intentional concealment of a better mode than was disclosed. The preferred embodiment's disclosure of a three-groove tube is adequate to enable a person skilled in this art to practice the best mode." Slip Op. at 14.

The dissent disagreed.  In addition to concluding that it was a disputed question of fact as to whether the three-groove embodiment or the odd-number of grooves was the preferred embodiment, the dissent would have found even the three-groove embodiment to not be adequately disclosed.  "[T]he inventors did not simply reveal their best mode and disclose others; they buried the best mode among other embodiments, also falling under the preferred embodiment heading, that did not include the
'essential' feature that the inventors discovered and knew was necessary to successfully implement their invention. Such disclosure is not the “quid pro quo” demanded by the best mode requirement."  Dissent at 6.

Supreme Court: Patent Rights Block Farmers from Saving and Re-Planting Patented Seeds

Patent, , , , , ,

by Dennis Crouch

Bowman v. Monsanto Company (Supreme Court 2013)

In a short opinion a unanimous Supreme Court has sided with Monsanto in holding that the doctrine of patent exhaustion “does not permit a farmer to reproduce patented seeds through planting and harvesting without the patent holder’s permission.” 

Read the decision below:

= = = =

Bowman v. Monsanto Company, 569 U. S. ____ (2013)

JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court

Under the doctrine of patent exhaustion, the authorized sale of a patented article gives the purchaser, or any subsequent owner, a right to use or resell that article. Such a sale, however, does not allow the purchaser to make new copies of the patented invention. The question in this case is whether a farmer who buys patented seeds may reproduce them through planting and harvesting without the patent holder’s permission. We hold that he may not.< ?xml:namespace prefix ="" o />

I

Respondent Monsanto invented a genetic modification that enables soybean plants to survive exposure to glyphosate, the active ingredient in many herbicides (including Monsanto’s own Roundup). Monsanto markets soybean seed containing this altered genetic material as Roundup Ready seed. Farmers planting that seed can use a glyphosate based herbicide to kill weeds without damaging their crops. Two patents issued to Monsanto cover various aspects of its Roundup Ready technology, including a seed incorporating the genetic alteration. See Supp. App. SA1–21 (U. S. Patent Nos. 5,352,605 and RE39,247E); see also 657 F. 3d 1341, 1343–1344 (CA Fed. 2011).

Monsanto sells, and allows other companies to sell, Roundup Ready soybean seeds to growers who assent to a special licensing agreement. See App. 27a. That agreement permits a grower to plant the purchased seeds in one (and only one) season. He can then consume the resulting crop or sell it as a commodity, usually to a grain elevator or agricultural processor. See 657 F. 3d, at 1344–1345. But under the agreement, the farmer may not save any of the harvested soybeans for replanting, nor may he supply them to anyone else for that purpose. These restrictions reflect the ease of producing new generations of Roundup Ready seed. Because glyphosate resistance comes from the seed’s genetic material, that trait is passed on from the planted seed to the harvested soybeans: Indeed, a single Roundup Ready seed can grow a plant containing dozens of genetically identical beans, each of which, if replanted, can grow another such plant—and so on and so on. See App. 100a. The agreement’s terms prevent the farmer from co-opting that process to produce his own Roundup Ready seeds, forcing him instead to buy from Monsanto each season.

Petitioner Vernon Bowman is a farmer in Indiana who, it is fair to say, appreciates Roundup Ready soybean seed. He purchased Roundup Ready each year, from a company affiliated with Monsanto, for his first crop of the season. In accord with the agreement just described, he used all ofthat seed for planting, and sold his entire crop to a grain elevator (which typically would resell it to an agricultural processor for human or animal consumption).

Bowman, however, devised a less orthodox approach for his second crop of each season. Because he thought such late-season planting “risky,” he did not want to pay the premium price that Monsanto charges for Roundup Ready seed. Id., at 78a; see Brief for Petitioner 6. He therefore went to a grain elevator; purchased “commodity soybeans” intended for human or animal consumption; and planted them in his fields.[1] Those soybeans came from prior harvests of other local farmers. And because most of those farmers also used Roundup Ready seed, Bowman could anticipate that many of the purchased soybeans would contain Monsanto’s patented technology. When he applied a glyphosate-based herbicide to his fields, he confirmed that this was so; a significant proportion of the new plants survived the treatment, and produced in their turn a new crop of soybeans with the Roundup Ready trait. Bowman saved seed from that crop to use in his late-season planting the next year—and then the next, and the next, until he had harvested eight crops in that way. Each year, that is, he planted saved seed from the year before (sometimes adding more soybeans bought from the grain elevator),sprayed his fields with glyphosate to kill weeds (and any non-resistant plants), and produced a new crop of glyphosate resistant—i.e., Roundup Ready—soybeans.

After discovering this practice, Monsanto sued Bowman for infringing its patents on Roundup Ready seed. Bowman raised patent exhaustion as a defense, arguing that Monsanto could not control his use of the soybeans because they were the subject of a prior authorized sale (from local farmers to the grain elevator). The District Court rejected that argument, and awarded damages to Monsanto of $84,456. The Federal Circuit affirmed. It reasoned that patent exhaustion did not protect Bowman because he had “created a newly infringing article.” 657 F. 3d, at 1348. The “right to use” a patented article following an authorized sale, the court explained, “does not include the right to construct an essentially new article on the template of the original, for the right to make the article remains with the patentee.” Ibid. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, Bowman could not “‘replicate’ Monsanto’s patented technology by planting it in the ground to create newly infringing genetic material, seeds, and plants.” Ibid.

We granted certiorari to consider the important question of patent law raised in this case, 568 U. S. ___ (2012), and now affirm.

II

The doctrine of patent exhaustion limits a patentee’s right to control what others can do with an article embodying or containing an invention.[2] Under the doctrine, “the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that item.” Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U. S. 617, 625 (2008). And by “exhaust[ing] the [patentee’s] monopoly” in that item, the sale confers on the purchaser, or any subsequent owner, “the right to use [or] sell” the thing as he sees fit. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U. S. 241, 249–250 (1942). We have explained the basis for the doctrine as follows:“[T]he purpose of the patent law is fulfilled with respect to any particular article when the patentee has received his reward . . . by the sale of the article”; once that “purpose is realized the patent law affords no basis for restraining the use and enjoyment of the thing sold.” Id., at 251. Consistent with that rationale, the doctrine restricts a patentee’s rights only as to the “particular article” sold, ibid.; it leaves untouched the patentee’s ability to prevent a buyer from making new copies of the patented item. “[T]he purchaser of the [patented] machine . . . does not acquire any right to construct another machine either forhis own use or to be vended to another.” Mitchell v. Hawley, 16 Wall. 544, 548 (1873); see Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. Kuther, 377 U. S. 422, 424 (1964) (holding that a purchaser’s “reconstruction” of a patented machine “would impinge on the patentee’s right ‘to exclude others from making’ . . . the article” (quoting 35 U. S. C. §154 (1964 ed.))). Rather, “a second creation” of the patented item “call[s] the monopoly, conferred by the patent grant, into play for a second time.” Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U. S. 336, 346 (1961). That is because the patent holder has “received his reward” only for the actual article sold, and not for subsequent recreations of it. Univis, 316 U. S., at 251. If the purchaser of that article could make and sell endless copies, the patent would effectively protect the invention for just a single sale. Bowman himself disputes none of this analysis as a general matter: He forthrightly acknowledges the “well settled” principle “that the exhaustion doctrine does not extend to the right to ‘make’ a new product.” Brief for Petitioner 37 (citing Aro, 365 U. S., at 346).

Unfortunately for Bowman, that principle decides this case against him. Under the patent exhaustion doctrine, Bowman could resell the patented soybeans he purchased from the grain elevator; so too he could consume the beans himself or feed them to his animals. Monsanto, although the patent holder, would have no business interfering in those uses of Roundup Ready beans. But the exhaustion doctrine does not enable Bowman to make additional patented soybeans without Monsanto’s permission (either express or implied). And that is precisely what Bowman did. He took the soybeans he purchased home; planted them in his fields at the time he thought best; applied glyphosate to kill weeds (as well as any soy plants lacking the Roundup Ready trait); and finally harvested more (many more) beans than he started with. That is how “to ‘make’ a new product,” to use Bowman’s words, when the original product is a seed. Brief for Petitioner 37; see Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1363 (1961) (“make” means “cause to exist, occur, or appear,” or more specifically, “plant and raise (a crop)”). Because Bowman thus reproduced Monsanto’s patented invention, the exhaustion doctrine does not protect him.[3]

Were the matter otherwise, Monsanto’s patent would provide scant benefit. After inventing the Roundup Ready trait, Monsanto would, to be sure, “receiv[e] [its] reward” for the first seeds it sells. Univis, 316 U. S., at 251. But in short order, other seed companies could reproduce the product and market it to growers, thus depriving Monsanto of its monopoly. And farmers themselves need only buy the seed once, whether from Monsanto, a competitor, or (as here) a grain elevator. The grower could multiply his initial purchase, and then multiply that new creation, ad infinitum—each time profiting from the patented seed without compensating its inventor. Bowman’s late-season plantings offer a prime illustration. After buying beans for a single harvest, Bowman saved enough seed each year to reduce or eliminate the need for additional purchases.

Monsanto still held its patent, but received no gain from Bowman’s annual production and sale of Roundup Ready soybeans. The exhaustion doctrine is limited to the “particular item” sold to avoid just such a mismatch between invention and reward.

Our holding today also follows from J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U. S. 124 (2001). We considered there whether an inventor could get a patent on a seed or plant, or only a certificate issued under the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA), 7 U. S. C. §2321 et seq. We decided a patent was available, rejecting the claim that the PVPA implicitly repealed the Patent Act’s coverage of seeds and plants. On our view, the two statutes established different, but not conflicting schemes: The requirements for getting a patent “are more stringent than those for obtaining a PVP certificate, and the protections afforded” by a patent are correspondingly greater.

J. E. M., 534 U. S., at 142. Most notable here, we explained that only a patent holder (not a certificate holder) could prohibit “[a] farmer who legally purchases and plants” a protected seed from saving harvested seed “for replanting.” Id., at 140; see id., at 143 (noting that the Patent Act, unlike the PVPA, contains “no exemptio[n]” for “saving seed”). That statement is inconsistent with applying exhaustion to protect conduct like Bowman’s. If a sale cut off the right to control a patented seed’s progeny, then (contrary to J. E. M.) the patentee could not prevent the buyer from saving harvested seed. Indeed, the patentee could not stop the buyer from selling such seed, which even a PVP certificate owner (who, recall, is supposed to have fewer rights) can usually accomplish. See 7 U. S. C. §§2541, 2543. Those limitations would turn upside-down the statutory scheme J. E. M. described.

Bowman principally argues that exhaustion should apply here because seeds are meant to be planted. The exhaustion doctrine, he reminds us, typically prevents a patentee from controlling the use of a patented product following an authorized sale. And in planting Roundup Ready seeds, Bowman continues, he is merely using them in the normal way farmers do. Bowman thus concludes that allowing Monsanto to interfere with that use would “creat[e] an impermissible exception to the exhaustion doctrine” for patented seeds and other “self-replicating technologies.” Brief for Petitioner 16.

But it is really Bowman who is asking for an unprecedented exception—to what he concedes is the “well settled” rule that “the exhaustion doctrine does not extend to the right to ‘make’ a new product.” See supra, at 5. Reproducing a patented article no doubt “uses” it after a fashion. But as already explained, we have always drawn the boundaries of the exhaustion doctrine to exclude that activity, so that the patentee retains an undiminished right to prohibit others from making the thing his patent protects. See, e.g., Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U. S. 89, 93–94 (1882) (holding that a purchaser could not “use” the buckle from a patented cotton-bale tie to “make” a new tie). That is because, once again, if simple copying were a protected use, a patent would plummet in value after the first sale of the first item containing the invention. The undiluted patent monopoly, it might be said, would extend not for 20 years (as the Patent Act promises), but for only one transaction. And that would result in less incentive for innovation than Congress wanted. Hence our repeated insistence that exhaustion applies only to the particular item sold, and not to reproductions.

Nor do we think that rule will prevent farmers from making appropriate use of the Roundup Ready seed they buy. Bowman himself stands in a peculiarly poor position to assert such a claim. As noted earlier, the commodity soybeans he purchased were intended not for planting, but for consumption. See supra, at 2–3. Indeed, Bowman conceded in deposition testimony that he knew of no other farmer who employed beans bought from a grain elevator to grow a new crop. See App. 84a. So a non-replicating use of the commodity beans at issue here was not just available, but standard fare. And in the more ordinary case, when a farmer purchases Roundup Ready seed qua seed—that is, seed intended to grow a crop—he will be able to plant it. Monsanto, to be sure, conditions the farmer’s ability to reproduce Roundup Ready; but it does not—could not realistically—preclude all planting. No sane farmer, after all, would buy the product without some ability to grow soybeans from it. And so Monsanto, predictably enough, sells Roundup Ready seed to farmers with a license to use it to make a crop. See supra, at 2, 6, n. 3. Applying our usual rule in this context therefore will allow farmers to benefit from Roundup Ready, even as it rewards Monsanto for its innovation.

Still, Bowman has another seeds-are-special argument: that soybeans naturally “self-replicate or ‘sprout’ unless stored in a controlled manner,” and thus “it was the planted soybean, not Bowman” himself, that made replicas of Monsanto’s patented invention. Brief for Petitioner 42; see Tr. of Oral Arg. 14 (“[F]armers, when they plant seeds, they don’t exercise any control . . . over their crop” or “over the creative process”). But we think that blame-the-bean defense tough to credit. Bowman was not a passive observer of his soybeans’ multiplication; or put another way, the seeds he purchased (miraculous though they might be in other respects) did not spontaneously create eight successive soybean crops. As we have explained, supra at 2–3, Bowman devised and executed a novel way to harvest crops from Roundup Ready seeds without paying the usual premium. He purchased beans from a grain elevator anticipating that many would be Roundup Ready; applied a glyphosate-based herbicide in a way that culled any plants without the patented trait; and saved beans from the rest for the next season. He then planted those Roundup Ready beans at a chosen time; tended and treated them, including by exploiting their patented glyphosate resistance; and harvested many more seeds, which he either marketed or saved to begin the next cycle. In all this, the bean surely figured. But it was Bowman, and not the bean, who controlled the reproduction (unto the eighth generation) of Monsanto’s patented invention.

Our holding today is limited—addressing the situation before us, rather than every one involving a self replicating product. We recognize that such inventions are becoming ever more prevalent, complex, and diverse. In another case, the article’s self-replication might occur outside the purchaser’s control. Or it might be a necessary but incidental step in using the item for another purpose. Cf. 17 U. S. C. §117(a)(1) (“[I]t is not [a copyright] infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make . . . another copy or adaptation of that computer program provide[d] that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program”). We need not address here whether or how the doctrine of patent exhaustion would apply in such circumstances. In the case at hand, Bowman planted Monsanto’s patented soybeans solely to make and market replicas of them, thus depriving the company of the reward patent law provides for the sale of each article. Patent exhaustion provides no haven for that conduct. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

[1] Grain elevators, as indicated above, purchase grain from farmers and sell it for consumption; under federal and state law, they generally cannot package or market their grain for use as agricultural seed. See 7 U. S. C. §1571; Ind. Code §15–15–1–32 (2012). But because soybeans are themselves seeds, nothing (except, as we shall see, the law) prevented Bowman from planting, rather than consuming, the product he bought from the grain elevator.

 

[2] 2The Patent Act grants a patentee the “right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention.” 35 U. S. C. §154(a)(1); see §271(a) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention . . . infringes the patent”).

[3] This conclusion applies however Bowman acquired Roundup Readyseed: The doctrine of patent exhaustion no more protected Bowman’sreproduction of the seed he purchased for his first crop (from a Monsantoaffiliated seed company) than the beans he bought for his second (from a grain elevator). The difference between the two purchases wasthat the first—but not the second—came with a license from Monsanto to plant the seed and then harvest and market one crop of beans. We do not here confront a case in which Monsanto (or an affiliated seed company) sold Roundup Ready to a farmer without an express license agreement. For reasons we explain below, we think that case unlikely to arise. See infra, at 9. And in the event it did, the farmer might reasonably claim that the sale came with an implied license to plantand harvest one soybean crop.

Biogen v. Glaxosmithkline: Prosecution History Disclaimer and Claim Construction

Patent,

By Jason Rantanen

Biogen Idec, Inc. v. Glxosmithkline (Fed. Cir. 2013) Download Biogen v GSK
Panel: Dyk, Plager (dissenting), Reyna (author)

By the mid-1990's, it was well known that rituximab, an anti-CD20 antibody, could be used to treat certain cancers of the lymph nodes such as non-Hodgkins lymphoma.  The anti-CD20 antibody binds to a portion of the CD20 antigen protein exposed on the cell surface and destroys the cell.  Scientists from Biogen discovered that patients with another type of cancer, Chronic Lymphocytic Leukemia (CLL), could also be treated using anti-CD20 antibodies.  Based on this discovery, Biogen obtained Patent No. 7,682,612.  Claim 1 of the '612 patent reads:

1. A method of treating chronic lymphocytic leukemia in a human patient, comprising administering an anti-CD20 antibody to the patient in an amount effective to treat the chronic lymphocytic leukemia, wherein the method does not include treatment with a radiolabeled anti-CD20 antibody.

Biogen filed the application leading to the '612 patent in the late 1990s.  At the time, scientists believed that only one large loop, or epitope, of the CD20 antigen was exposed on the cancerous cell's surface and that this was the only site that for an anti-CD20 antigen to bind to.  Rituximab binds to this epitope. After Biogen filed its application, other scientists discovered that the CD20 antigen had a second small loop (originally thought to be hidden inside the cell) to which other, different anti-CD20 antibodies could bind.  In 2002, Glaxosmithkline (GSK) developed a new anti-CD20 antigen that binds to the small loop.  Because it binds to a different epitope, GSK's anti-CD20 antibody has different specificity and affinity characteristics than rituximab. 

Biogen sued GSK for infringement of the '612 patent in 2010.  The district court construed anti-CD20 antibody to mean "rituximab and antibodies that bind to the same epitope of the CD20 antigen with similar affinity and specificity as rituximab."  Based on this construction, Biogen stiplated to noninfringement and appealed. 

Prosecution History Disclaimer: The issue on appeal involved the the doctrine of prosecution history disclaimer.  Prosecution history disclaimer applies when a "patentee unequivocally and unambiguously disavows a certain meaning to obtain a patent."  Slip Op. at 8.  In this circumstance, the doctrine "narrows the meaning of the claim consistent with the scope of the claim being surrendered," id. overcoming even the term's ordinary and customary meaning.  Application of the doctrine helps serve a public notice function by allowing the public and competitors rely on definitive statements made during prosecution when launching a new product or designing-around a patented invention.

During an early stage of the prosecution of the '612 patent, the examiner rejected the presented claims on enablement grounds:

Claims 1 and 12 are broadly drawn to ‘. . . an anti-CD20 antibody or fragment thereof’. This is
broadly interpreted for examination purposes to be any and all anti-CD20 antibodies, no matter
the specificity or affinity for the specific epitope on the circulating tumor cells. While the specification is enabling for the application of RITUXAN®, RITUXIMAB® and 2B8-MX-DTPA in the treatment of hematologic malignancies, the specification is not enabling in the application of all other anti-CD20 antibodies, which may have different structural and functional properties.

In response, the applicant wrote:

Applicants respectfully submit that even though antibodies directed to the same antigen might have different affinities and functional characteristics, one of skill in the art could readily identify an antibody that binds to CD20 with similar affinity and specificity as does RITUXAN® using techniques that are well known in the art. . . . With that knowledge in hand, the skilled artisan could readily produce anti-CD20 antibodies using similar techniques, and screen such antibodies for those having an affinity and functional activity similar to Rituxan®

Based on this exchange in the context of the prosecution history read as a whole, the majority agreed with the district court that prosecution disclaimer applied to limit the scope of "anti-CD20 antibody."  "[R]ather than challenging the examiner’s understanding of the crucial terms, the applicants argued that the specification was enabling for anti-CD20 antibodies with similar affinity and specificity as Rituxan®."  Slip Op. at 10.  Nor was exact recitation of the examiner's own words necessary: "While disavowing statements must be “so clear as to show reasonable clarity and deliberateness,” Omega, 334 F.3d at 1325, this requirement does not require the applicant to parrot back language used by the examiner when clearly and deliberately responding to a particular grounds for rejection. If an applicant chooses, she can challenge an examiner’s characterization in order to avoid any chance for disclaimer, but the applicants in this case did not directly challenge the examiner’s characterization."  Slip Op. at 11. 

Hierarchy of canons of claim construction: In the hierarchy of canons of claim construction, prosecution history disclaimer trumps the presumption of claim differentiation: "Our cases make clear [] that where found, prosecution history disclaimer can overcome the presumption of claim differentiation."  Id. at 12 (note that the court said "can overcome," leaving open a door for cirucumstances in which it might not). 

Dissent: Writing in dissent, Judge Plager disagreed that this was an instance of prosecution history disclaimer.  "[T]he give-and-take that is often part of the process of negotiation between an examiner and an applicant may result in less-than-clear understandings, as happened here. Making too much of such ambiguous statements 'does not advance the patent’s notice function or justify public reliance.'"  Slip Op. at 16.  For Judge Plager, the question is thus "whether the prosecution history makes it clear that using RITUXAN® [Biogen's branded version of rituximab]-like antibodies is the only way to practice the claimed invention, and that no other antibodies can be used."  Id.  In his view, the above quoted statements fail to meet the "clear and unmistakable" standard required for prosecution history estoppel.  

The avoided question: By affirming the district court's claim construction, the CAFC avoided a battle over an extremely challenging issue: enablement in the context of after arising technologies and knowledge.  Biogen's proposed construction was "an antibody that binds to a cell surface CD20 antigen."  This construction would presumably encompass methods using antibodies that bind to the larger epitope (which Biogen discovered) as well as antibodies that bind to the smaller epitope (which Biogen did not).  Since enablement is determined as of the filing date, this presents the classic patent law hypothetical: Inventor X invents one way of curing a type of cancer and then claims simply "a cure for cancer."  Should inventor X be entitled to the claim?  She's cured cancer, after all.    

SO THAT’S WHAT “RAND” MEANS?: A Brief Report on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Microsoft v. Motorola

Patent, , ,

Guest Post By Jorge L. Contreras, Associate Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law

In a meticulous 207-page opinion released on April 25, Judge James Robart in the Western District of Washington has crafted the first-ever judicial determination of a “reasonable and nondiscriminatory” (RAND) royalty rate for patents essential to industry standards. To some observers, the dense opinion (captioned “Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law”) may be nothing more than another bit of procedural arcana in the interminable litigation over smart phone patents (summarized here), this time in the battle between Microsoft and Motorola (now owned by Google). But for followers of industry standards, Judge Robart’s opinion was a highly-anticipated and desperately-needed attempt to establish basic guidelines for the interpretation of the RAND licensing commitments that pervade industry standardization bodies.

Patents and RAND Licensing

As I discussed here last year, so-called “interoperability standards” enable products and services offered by different vendors to work together invisibly to the consumer (e.g., WiFi, USB, and the pervasive 3G and 4G telecommunications standards). Once standards are broadly adopted, markets can become “locked-in” and switching to a different technology can be prohibitively costly. Because patent holders have the potential to block others from deploying technology covered by their patents after lock-in occurs, the industry associations that develop standards (“standards development organizations” or “SDOs”) often require that companies participating in standards-development license patents that are essential to the standard to others on terms that are “reasonable and non-discriminatory” (RAND, also known as “FRAND” when the equally ambiguous term “fair” is added to the mix).

Microsoft, Motorola and the RAND Wars

The current litigation between Microsoft and Motorola relates to two common industry standards, the H.264 video coding standard developed at the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the 802.11 “Wi-Fi” standard developed at the IEEE Standards Association (IEEE). These standards are used in thousands of products on the market today, including Microsoft’s popular X-Box 360 game consoles, personal computers running the Windows operating system and a variety of smart phones. According to the pleadings, in 2010 Motorola offered to license Microsoft its patents essential to the implementation of these standards. A disagreement arose, however, over the royalty calculation that Motorola proposed. Under the rules of ITU and IEEE, royalties for patents covering H.264 and 802.11 must comply with RAND requirements. According to Microsoft, however, Motorola’s initial royalty demands were anything but “reasonable” and would have resulted in royalty payments in excess of $4 billion per year. Microsoft responded by suing Motorola for breach of contract in the Western District of Washington. The crux of Microsoft’s complaint is that Motorola reneged on its RAND commitments by offering a royalty rate that was manifestly unreasonable. Last October, Judge Robart ruled in the case that the applicable RAND royalty rate must be determined before a finding can be made regarding Motorola’s alleged breach of contract. A bench trial was held in November, 2012, and Judge Robart’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were released on April 25, 2013.

Defining RAND

Judge Robart’s opinion is important, not only because it resolves several highly contentious issues between Microsoft and Motorola, but because if provides a more general framework for analyzing RAND disputes in the future. At its heart, the bulk of Judge Robart’s opinion is a fairly conventional Georgia-Pacific analysis of the “reasonable royalty” rates applicable to Motorola’s patents. He spends a considerable amount of time analyzing comparable licensing transactions and determining their applicability to a hypothetical licensing negotiation between the parties. But Judge Robart makes significant modifications to the traditional Georgia-Pacific analysis in order to adapt it to the assessment of RAND royalty rates (which are related to, but different than, the “reasonable royalties” that serve as a measure of damages in patent infringement suits) (Para. 87). Here are some of the important observations that Judge Robart makes in this regard:

1.    Broad Industry Benefits from Standardization – Judge Robarts is explicit about the potential benefits that standards can confer on the overall economy through increased production and price competition (Para. 12). He observes that a primary goal of SDOs is the widespread adoption of standards “because the interoperability benefits of standards depend on broad implementation” (Para. 13). Likewise, RAND commitments are intended to “encourage widespread adoption” of standards (Para. 51, 70). Judge Robart recognizes the public benefit of standards and the public interest in ensuring that royalty rates for standardized technology enable broad implementation. Thus, unlike most patent licensing negotiations, the licensing of standards-essential patents takes on a public character. It is not merely a closed-door negotiation between two private parties. It must be conducted, and reviewed, with these public benefits in mind.

2.    Royalty Stacking – For years, commentators have observed that the aggregation of royalty demands by multiple patent holders can result in significant and unsupportable royalty burdens on standardized products. This is the problem of “royalty stacking”, which is very real in the case of H.264 (2,500 essential patents held by 35 U.S. entities, plus 19 entities with unknown numbers of patents) and 802.11 (developed by more than 1,000 companies). Throughout his opinion Judge Robart notes the threat of royalty stacking, and insists that any RAND royalty payable to Motorola must take into account royalties payable to other holders of patents covering the standards in question (Paras. 72, 92, 112, 456). This observation is significant, as it confirms that RAND royalties cannot be computed “in a vacuum” on the basis of isolated bilateral negotiations between licensor and licensee, without regard to the broader industry context in which such negotiations take place.

3.    Relative Value of Patented Technology – Judge Robart confirms yet another point that has been advanced by commentators for years: that the royalty associated with a particular patented technology should be commensurate with the actual value that technology adds to the overall standard and to the product in which it is implemented (Paras. 80, 104). Undertaking this lengthy and complex analysis, he determines that, by and large, Motorola’s patented technology added relatively little to either the H.264 or 802.11 standards or to Microsoft’s products (e.g., Paras. 289, 299, 384, 394, 457, etc.)

RAND-arithmetic

The bulk of Judge Robart’s opinion is devoted to a detailed, patent-by-patent, standard-by-standard analysis of the relative contribution made by Motorola’s technology, followed by an equally detailed Georgia-Pacific style analysis of licensing “comparables” a derivation of the RAND royalty rates for each standard. In the case of H.264, the primary comparable is the MPEG-LA H.264 patent pool. Judge Robart constructs a hypothetical negotiation between Microsoft and Motorola, assuming that Motorola’s patents are included in the pool and then calculating the royalties that Motorola would have earned from Microsoft as a result (¢0.185/unit). He then doubles this figure and adds it to the royalty base to account for the hypothetical license benefit that Motorola would have gained from being a member of the pool, yielding a RAND royalty rate for Motorola’s H.264 patents of ¢0.555/unit. In the case of 802.11, Judge Robarts finds the Via Licensing 802.11 pool to be a less relevant comparable than the MPEG-LA H.264 pool. He thus uses as his primary 802.11 comparable a royalty rate determined in 2003 by industry analyst InteCap, which he then divides by 25 to reflect the small value actually attributable to Motorola’s patented technology. The RAND royalty rate for Motorola’s 802.11 patents is thus set at ¢3.471/unit.

Both of these rates are significantly lower than the ones Motorola urged. As reported in the press, Microsoft calculates that on the basis of these rates, it would owe Motorola approximately $1.8 million per year, as opposed to Motorola’s original 2010 demand of approximately $4 billion, or the annual amount it requested at trial, which was approximately $400 million.

Judge Robart also calculated “ranges” of RAND royalties for Motorola’s patented contributions to each standard, presumably to help establish whether Motorola’s initial offers to Microsoft constituted “good faith” offers for purposes of Microsoft’s breach of contract claims. In both cases, the computed RAND royalties fall at or near the low end of these ranges (¢0.555 to ¢16.389 for H.264 and ¢0.8 to ¢19.5 for 802.11).

Significance and What the Future Holds

Judge Robart’s April 25 opinion is important to the standards world primarily because it sets out, for the first time, a logical and consistent methodology for computing a RAND royalty. This methodology is based on a conventional Georgia-Pacific patent royalty analysis, as modified to give substantial weight to royalty stacking, relative value and public interest considerations. The opinion will thus be useful not only to other courts considering RAND issues, but also, and perhaps more importantly, to arbitrators, mediators and private parties seeking to adjudicate RAND disputes before litigation commences. Given the likely increase in arbitration of standards-essential patent disputes (prompted by the recent nudge in this direction by the FTC’s Consent Order with Google), such guidance can only be helpful for the industry.

This being said, it is not clear that Judge Robart’s methodology offers the optimal means for resolving disputes over RAND royalties. It is, at best, complex and time consuming. At worst, it may be criticized as somewhat arbitrary. It may also be less useful for standards that are less broadly-adopted than H.264 and 802.11. With these standards, Judge Robart was able to choose from several different “comparables” to develop RAND royalty rates and ranges. Most importantly, he found comparables that were not merely bilaterally negotiated licenses between private parties, which he acknowledges result in royalty rates higher than those of patent pools. Most other standards do not have so many non-bilateral comparables from which to choose, if they have any at all. Thus, RAND rates may not universally drop, as they did in this case. Finally, it may be quite difficult to assess the “value” of particular patented technology in a standard if it is not functionally discrete, as Motorola’s contributions to H.264 and 802.11 seem to have been (e.g., Motorola’s contribution to H.264 appears to have consisted primarily of “interlaced video” technology that is now relatively obsolete).

For these reasons, other proposals regarding the determination of RAND royalty rates may still be worth considering, particularly as this latest decision in Microsoft v. Motorola begins what is likely to be a lengthy and interesting appeals process.

The Federal Circuit Table of Authorities

Patent, ,

By Dennis Crouch

For the following list I parsed through all precedential patent related opinions at the Federal Circuit for the past three years. The resulting list are the fifteen most frequently cited cases in Federal Circuit patent decisions:

  1. Phillips v. AWH, 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)
  2. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc)
  3. KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007)
  4. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)
  5. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986)
  6. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
  7. Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc)
  8. Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
  9. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)
  10. ICU Medical, Inc. v. Alaris Medical Systems, Inc., 558 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
  11. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (2010)
  12. In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
  13. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007)
  14. In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc)
  15. Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008)

For cases decided within the past year, the only new entrant on the list is Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 131 S.Ct. 2238 (2011)

Guest Post by Prof. Sean Tu: Uneven Distribution in the RCE Backlog

Patent,

Dr. Tu is an Associate Professor of Law at the West Virginia University College of Law and a shareholder in Patent Advisor. His research focuses on the patent examination system. – Jason

Previous posts (https://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/11/guest-post-the-rce-cliff.html and https://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/11/patent-stats-for-fy-2012.html) have reviewed the increase in RCE filings with a concurrent increase in the RCE backlog.  On average, there is a 5.9 month pendency from RCE filing to the next Office Action.  However, this number may be deceptive since it is an average across all art units.  Anecdotally, some art units experience much longer pendency periods.

To determine which art units experience the longest / shortest RCE response time, we turned to the Reed Tech Patent Advisor™ information system (www.patentadvisor.com).  This online information system includes patent office statistics derived from a collection of file histories encompassing most every published application since 2002.  Our method was to count every RCE with no corresponding next significant action (i.e., with no corresponding next Office Action, Notice of Allowance or Notice of Abandonment).  We then segmented the data by art unit.  Thus, for each art unit, we determined the number of RCEs pending response as of December 31, 2012.

The figure below displays the results of our analysis. Each pie piece represents a specific technology center.  Within each pie piece are circles that represent individual art units within the technology center. The top number in each circle identifies the art unit, while the bottom number represents the art unit’s count of RCEs pending as of December 31, 2012.  The individual art unit circles are also color coded to help visualize the relative significance of the backlog within each tech center.  Dark blue represents a large backlog, while light green represents a shorter backlog.  Additionally, the size of each circle is directly proportional to the size of the art unit’s RCE backlog. 

Figure 1

Accordingly, one can clearly see a greater number of RCEs present in technology center 1600 (Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry) when compared to technology center 2800 (Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems and Components).  This may be unsurprising since biotechnology applications may require significantly more review time, or specialized knowledge compared to electrical applications.  Similarly, one can see that certain art units have a greater backlog, even within the same technology center.  For example, 2617 (Cellular Telephony) and 2629 (Display Systems) have a much greater backlog when compared to other art units within technology center 2600 (Communications).  Again, this may be unsurprising since many more applications are filed dealing with cellular telephone technology (4,757 pending applications in art unit 2617) compared to fax technology (903 pending applications in art unit 2627). Accordingly, examiners in fax technology may be more willing and/or able to pick up more RCEs from their special docket compared to those examiners in cellular telephone technology.  Mitigating this issue, may be a higher number of examiners in art units with a higher number of pending applications.  As discussed below, we did not calculate the number of active examiners present in each art unit.

In the center of the figure is a bar graph that shows the overall number of RCEs in the entire patent office that are awaiting examination broken down by year.  This figure shows that there is a significant number of RCEs filed in 2012 that are still awaiting examination.  This number is unsurprising since RCEs should be taken in turn, and there is a selection bias against later filed RCEs.  Accordingly, one would expect the number of RCEs in 2012 to be greater in number since they will be taken up by the examiner later than an RCE that was filed in 2010.

There are two key limitations with this dataset.  First, we have intentionally excluded data regarding average response time for responding to an RCE for each art unit.  This is because the RCE pendency data is skewed because we do not count an RCE until it has been acted on.  Thus, all of the unexamined RCEs could not counted when calculating an average response time.  Accordingly, the average response time would be misleading.  Second, we did not determine the number of active examiners in each art unit.  Thus, although the backlog may look high in absolute numbers, the response time may be reasonable simply because it is spread over a large number of active examiners.

The RCE backlog cannot be solved simply by adding new examiners.  This is due to the count system which gives incentives for examiners to pick up new cases rather than take up an old RCE.  Additionally, new examiners cannot help pick up RCEs that are already on another examiner’s “special new” docket. These data suggest that the PTO should address art unit-specific pendency data when thinking of solutions to the RCE-backlog problem.  Specifically, the PTO may consider requiring examiners from specific art units to pick up more than one item per month from his/her “special new” docket.  Alternatively, the PTO may consider readjusting the count system to incentivize examiners to pick up RCEs.  Finally, the PTO may consider placing RCEs back on the “amended” docket instead of the “special new” docket, which would require examiners to act on an RCE within two month of its appearance on the examiner’s docket.

These data suggest that practitioners should use this type of art unit-specific pendency data provided by services such as Reed Tech Patent Advisor™ when counseling their clients.  This online service enables its users to easily access a comprehensive break down of the RCE docket for each individual examiner and each individual art unit.  Understanding the possible consequences of filing an RCE should help clients make rational decisions about: (1) challenging the propriety of a “final” designation in an office action, (2) filing a continuation application instead of an RCE (Both RCEs and CONs are placed on the examiner’s “special new” docket, but RCEs can be given less counts.  However, PTA considerations may justify filing an RCE instead of a CON),  (3) making amendments to the claims prior to issuance of a first office action, and (4) drafting the strongest first response as practical, which may include adding dependent claims and/or conducting interviews before issuance of a final office action.  Each of these actions may be more costly for clients in the short run, but save months if not years of time in the long run.

Download a PDF of the above chart here: Download 130324 Poster Graphic Only

Guest Post: Is there a justification for greater transparency in patent transactions?

Patent, ,

by Alan D. Minsk [1]

Introduction

In a recent article [2], Matt Rappaport argues for the need for greater transparency in the "marketplace" for transactions involving patents. Rappaport points out several inefficiencies that may result from a lack of transparency regarding the holdings of an entity that is seeking to license one or more of its patents. These inefficiencies result from a potential licensee being unable to readily obtain information regarding the complete holdings of the licensor, and the resultant uncertainty that may introduce regarding relevant prior art, other assets of interest, preferred negotiating tactics, etc. In general, the author thinks that the lack of transparency that results from the use of "shell" companies or other methods of disguising the actual owner of an asset create difficulties for the negotiation process, cause a failure to provide "notice" of the real party in interest (which may impact negotiations and legal options, as well as prevent knowledge of the true holdings of an entity), and subjects potential licensees to a situation in which they are at a disadvantage before even beginning a licensing discussion. There has been an increasing amount of discussion and proposed actions related to making information available regarding the entire patent holdings of patent buying entities when they seek to license portions of their patent portfolios [3].

Although some may argue that a "level playing field" (or at least a more level one) is not necessarily required for every transaction and is not something that a party is entitled to in a marketplace, this article will discuss some of the reasons why it may be beneficial to introduce a more level playing field into the market for patents. Because of the strong public policies that underlie the creation and administration of the patent system, there is a related public interest in how that system is operated. As a result, this public interest may be sufficient to justify introducing a greater degree of transparency into the "market" for patents. This greater degree of transparency may be achieved via judicial decisions, but may be more effectively introduced through enforcement of competition related laws or even new regulations (in order to produce a desired degree of uniformity in how any new requirements are implemented).

Why Increased Oversight or Regulation May Be Justified

While some may argue that patent aggregators, non-practicing entities (NPEs), or patent assertion entities (PAEs) (collectively, "patent buying entities") represent a business model that is counter-productive to the goals of the patent system or to notions of fairness, such comments seem more of a visceral response or value judgment, rather than a conclusion supported by facts. Instead of arguing about whether such entities should exist, it may be more productive to address the possible consequences of their operational methods when they purchase patents or patent applications. Specifically, how a lack of transparency in their operations can create distortions in the efficient operation of a "market" for patent rights.  Even if it is uncertain whether such entities are operating in a manner that is supportive of the goals of the patent system, there appear to be strong reasons for advocating greater transparency in their operation, as this would be expected to establish a more efficient and trustworthy "market" for patents. An additional benefit is that this will also enable a more accurate determination of whether the existence and operation of these entities support, inhibit, or are effectively neutral with respect to achieving the goals of the patent system.

There are strong public policies behind the creation and operation of the patent system and as a result, both the Federal government and the public have an inherent interest in that system. This clear from the concern for providing protection for inventions that is expressed in the U.S. Constitution [4] and the Federal statutes based on that expression [5]. The Federal government has an interest in seeing that the patent system operates in a way that enables the system to achieve its stated purpose(s), while observing its obligations to the public. The public has a similar interest in seeing that the patent system fulfills its stated purpose(s), since the system is operated by the Federal government as a service for the public.

Because of the strong public interest in the operation of the patent system and its impact on the public, I believe that the exchange of patent rights should not be exposed to the benefits and disadvantages of the free market system without a careful consideration of whether additional controls should be applied to ensure that the market operates efficiently and fairly for the participants, while supporting (or at least not harming) the interests of the public [6].    

That a "market" is being developed for patents and the rights that they enable the owner to exercise is shown by the development of patent trading systems, the holding of patent auctions, and the general increase in attention paid to the value of patents as business assets [7]. However, the asset being traded in such a market is of a different nature than most assets. Patents represent a conscious decision by the Federal government to encourage certain types of behavior by members of the public by creating a new type of property. As a result, patents themselves and the operation of the system that grants them are invested with a stronger government and public interest than is the transfer of most other types of property. This suggests that justification exists for a greater degree of scrutiny into whether the operation of entities that engage in the buying, selling, and licensing of patents do so in a way that supports (or at least does not frustrate) achieving the goals of the patent system.

Should the Patent "Market" Be Considered Part of the Patent System?

A threshold issue is whether a marketplace for the transfer of patent assets should be considered as part of the overall patent system, or instead whether it should be considered a part of the free market system (and as such, evaluated independently of its impact on the patent system). The existence of patent aggregators, NPEs, and PAEs would be expected to have at least some impact on the innovation process; such entities provide an additional exit strategy to enable inventors and companies to recoup some portion of their investment in generating the assets. In addition, the ability to sell a patent may enable an inventor to continue working on other projects, which may lead to more innovation. In general, having a marketplace in which patents may be sold is a positive development, as it may prevent a waste of assets, which is typically a desirable outcome. Therefore, it would seem that having this exit strategy would provide an incentive for at least some additional risk taking and investment in innovation.

At the least, it seems disingenuous to say that the existence of such patent buying entities has no impact on the innovation process or other aspects of the patent system. Given that there is at least a possible impact, I believe that there is justification for considering the still-developing market for patent assets as part of an overall patent system that is intended to fulfill specific goals. And, if the existence of that market is part of a system that is supposed to create an incentive for innovation, then it stands to reason that a properly functioning market is desirable in order to ensure a proper level of incentives and to most efficiently produce the desired benefits of those incentives.

Assuming that there is some impact on the patent system and its operation that can be traced to the operations of patent buying entities, what (if anything) should be done about it? Given the possible inefficiencies or distortions in the operation of a market for patents (and the overall patent system) that can result from a lack of transparency, one could simply accept this as a by-product of exposing patent rights to the operation of a free market system. However, because patents are a property right created by the Federal government for a specific purpose, it may be preferable to recognize a strong enough public interest in the operation of the market for patent rights to justify considering additional controls that would increase the transparency in transactions that occur within that market. This approach seems desirable for at least two reasons: (1) until we can be more certain that such patent buying entities are not having an undesirable impact on the patent system, it is more likely to be in the public interest to err on the side of requiring increased transparency rather than accepting decreased transparency; and (2) since the overall patent system is one designed around establishing and fostering incentives to innovate, it is expected that greater transparency would be more conducive to achieving the proper incentives than would less transparency. If controls that functioned to increase transparency were to be adopted, then such controls would assist in ensuring that the proper incentive structure was in place for an efficiently operating market, and one which presumably would operate more effectively in achieving the goals of the patent system.

Arguments for Increased Buy-Side Transparency

As noted, the article referred to in the Introduction discusses some of the problems caused by a lack of transparency in the patent licensing operations conducted by patent aggregators, NPEs, and PAEs. However, there is another aspect of the use of shell companies and other factors that reduce transparency that may impact the proper operation of a marketplace for patent assets. This is the impact such a practice has on the buying side operations of these entities; specifically, how a lack of transparency may distort the operation of a market for patents, including by preventing a more accurate valuation of patents. The lack of an accurate valuation (or at least the existence of obstacles to a more accurate valuation) does not serve the interests of those selling patents or those to whom they have a fiduciary obligation (such as venture capital investors or stockholders in a company that is selling some of its patent assets).

For example, by using shell companies and preventing disclosure of the ultimate purchaser (and in some cases the beneficiaries of a purchase) of a patent portfolio, a patent buying entity is allowed to distort the market for the value of the rights they are negotiating to purchase. This is because an inventor or other potential seller of a patent portfolio has a reduced amount of information about who wants to buy their patents and what previously existing agreements are in place between the buyer and other parties.  For example, such agreements might result in the buyer granting a license to a party that might have paid much more for the patents if the seller had negotiated with them directly.

In the case of the seller being an operating company, such agreements may cause the undesired result of granting a license to a competitor with whom the company would have rather negotiated in an effort to obtain an agreement of greater value to the company (such as a joint development agreement, co-marketing agreement, more desirable distribution terms, a patent cross-license, etc.). The use of a shell company and the failure to disclose existing agreements that may impact the licensing of a purchased patent portfolio may therefore place the seller at a severe disadvantage during negotiations. In addition, due to the lack of transparency, a seller is unable to evaluate how their patents fit into the overall holdings of the prospective buyer. This is likely to further impact the seller's appreciation of the potential value of their own patents to the buyer. Investors in a selling company may not recapture the full value of a patent that resulted from a company's investment in research and development (R&D) if the market value for a patent is distorted. Thus, it is in the interests of the investors of the selling company to have increased transparency since it impacts the valuation of the company and may impact how investors view the decisions made by the executives of the company.

The seller's lack of knowledge regarding the actual buyer and any possible beneficiaries of the sale of their patents prevents them from determining the true demand for their asset, and hence its actual value in the marketplace. As is the case with a lack of transparency in other markets, this distorts the valuation of the assets being exchanged and introduces inefficiencies into the operation of a market for such assets. However, in contrast with transactions involving other goods, the lack of transparency may also introduce a need for greater oversight in order to protect the public interest and prevent unfair and/or anti-competitive business practices that act to prevent (or at least lessen) the ability to achieve the goals of the patent system.

Increased oversight may be provided by one or more suitable mechanisms. These include interpreting unfair competition laws to require disclosure of the actual purchaser and any expected beneficiaries of the purchase of a patent portfolio, or by the establishment of new requirements on the transfer of patents as part of the Federal laws that establish and regulate the operation of the patent system. Judicial action may also have a role, such as where a Court decides that proper valuation of a patent cannot be determined without knowledge concerning the actual purchaser and its holdings, or that the validity of a patent that is being asserted cannot be determined without knowing the full holdings of the party asserting the patent.

Other Operational Aspects That May Be of Concern

The previous discussion has focused on the impact of the lack of transparency arising from using shell companies to obscure the actual buyer of a patent and/or beneficiaries of a purchase on the seller of a patent. In addition, there may be other aspects of patent buying entities that should be considered in order to determine if the operations of such entities are supportive of the goals of the patent system.

Consider the situation where a patent buying entity has investors. If the entity is publicly traded, then disclosure obligations will presumably act to make sellers (i.e., inventors or corporations that employs inventors) aware of at least some of the implications of selling their patents to the entity. However, if the entity is private, many of these obligations do not apply and information regarding operational methods may not be available. In such a case, if a patent buying entity has investors, it may be useful to know if those investors have input into what portfolios are being bought. This is because such inputs or direction may act to further reduce efficient operation of the market by hiding the interest of those investors in a particular portfolio. This affects valuation because it prevents a seller from knowing which parties may be most interested in their patents, and hence the potential demand for the assets. It therefore may enable the investors to acquire patents or licenses at less than the true market value of such assets.

Perhaps, more importantly, it may also raise antitrust or unfair competition concerns because the lack of transparency can permit investors to hide behind the buying entity while having their risk exposure to the patent assets reduced. This may reduce competition by (1) permitting investors to cooperate in efforts to reduce their risk by purchasing certain patents at below market value, and (2) providing the investors with a mechanism for asserting the purchased patents against competitors of the investors. Further, if the investment opportunity in the patent buying entity is not open to all, then those excluded may be at a competitive disadvantage relative to those that are able to invest and exercise some direction over how the patents are asserted. Another benefit to investors in a patent buying entity is that they do not have to make the R&D investment that would typically be required in order to obtain the purchased patents.

Note that even if any direction or guidance exerted by investors is indirect or informal, it may still amount to a business practice which is unfair or which alters the competitive environment. This is because the patent buying entity would be expected to act in the interests of its investors with regards to which patents to purchase and against which targets to assert those patents. Thus, the type and degree of direction exerted by investors (in a formal or in an informal sense) with regards to the purchase and assertion of patents is an aspect of the operation of patent buying entities that may need to be considered.

Regardless of the outcome, it seems appropriate to consider whether the operational behaviors of patent aggregators, NPEs, and PAEs are supportive of (or at least devoid of any negative impact on) achieving the intended goals of the patent system. This would help to ensure that the goals that were intended to be accomplished by the grant of an important Federal right are not being harmed by exposing patents to the operation of the free market system. It is likely that patent aggregators, NPEs, and PAEs are themselves not the problem, but only that certain aspects of their operations need to be modified.

The "Bottom Line"

Because the Federal government created the rights at issue and intended for them to be used for a specific purpose, it may be necessary to introduce additional controls into the operation of the developing market for patent rights. If the actions of, or the methods of operating a business that are practiced by, patent aggregators, NPEs, and PAEs are counter-productive to (or even simply unsupportive of) the goals of the patent system, then additional controls may be justified in order to restore the market for patent assets to a more desirable form. If such controls are to be adopted, their form is uncertain but presumably would include fuller disclosure of the entities that would benefit from a purchase of a patent portfolio, such as the actual buying entity and any other parties that would be expected to benefit by having a license to the purchased assets. The controls may also require disclosure of the investors in a patent buying entity and the ways (if any) in which the investors may impact the acquisition or assertion of patents.

While other markets may accept a similar lack of transparency (and the resulting inequities) as part of the free market process, such an approach may be inappropriate where patents are concerned. At the least, it seems desirable to determine if the lack of transparency being practiced by certain patent buying entities is having an undesired impact on the operation of the patent system.

[1] Alan D. Minsk is a Patent Attorney and former in-house Counsel for Unwired Planet and Intellectual Ventures. His practice focuses on counseling clients with regard to intellectual property issues that arise during the course of their business operations. He has extensive experience as a patent strategist, concentrating on the development and strategic management of patent portfolios, and has represented clients ranging from start-ups to publicly traded companies. Alan received his J.D. from Harvard Law School (1991), and received a Masters degree in Physics and a Bachelors degree in Astronomy from the University of California, Berkeley. The views, statements, and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author, and in no way represent or should be associated with those of the author's current employer or of a previous employer.

[2]Matt Rappaport, "How Hidden IP Assets Hurt the Entire Patent Community", IP Law360 at http://www.law360.com/technology/articles/393963/how-hidden-ip-assets-hurt-the-entire-patent-community.

[3] See "Roundtable on Proposed Requirements for Recordation of Real-Party-in-Interest Information," http://www.uspto.gov/ip/officechiefecon/roundtable_01-11-2013.jsp.

[4] Congress shall have power . . . To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries. U.S. Constit., Art. I, Sec. 8.

[5] The Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.

[6] Note that examples exist of the introduction of federal oversight to establish greater transparency and a more level playing field in other areas, such as the trading of stocks, in order to provide for a more efficient and trustworthy market. With regards to stock transactions, the transparency, disclosure, and insider trading regulations all act to protect the interests of one party (i.e., the public) in a situation in which an imbalance of information exists.

[7] Patents represent more than a collateral output of the product development cycle. Because of the many possible value propositions for a patent, a properly constructed patent portfolio can effectively protect a company's assets and in some cases may be used to reduce operating costs or generate revenue. This perspective on patents as a business asset is discussed in my articles entitled, "Old Model: Patents Protect Products. New Model: Patents Themselves Are Products," Forbes magazine's CIO Central (June 1, 2012), and "Protect Your Company — And Increase its Value with a Strategic Patent Portfolio," Seattle Business magazine (October 2012).

Guest Post by Dr. Jeffrey Lefstin on What’s Really at Stake in Myriad

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Guest Post by Jeffrey Lefstin, Ph.D., Professor of Law at the University of California Hastings College of the Law.  In his previous life Dr. Lefstin was a molecular biologist, studying mammalian gene regulatory mechanisms and DNA-protein interactions.  Below, he provides his thoughts on the true stakes in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics.

Playing with Fire: What's Really at Stake in Myriad

In a previous post I noted that the Supreme Court’s Mayo v. Prometheus decision, while acknowledging that “all inventions can be reduced to underlying principles of nature which, once known, make their implementation obvious,” appears to have revived the analytical framework of Funk Brothers.  Funk denied patentability to a mixture of nitrogen-fixing bacteria because, even if the patentee’s discovery about the bacteria was “ingenious,” it was a phenomenon of nature and not patentable. Once that discovery was made, the state of the art made production of the claimed mixture obvious;  the patentee therefore had not claimed a patentable application of the law of nature. In Mayo the Court likewise demanded that a claim embody an inventive application of a natural law, denying patentability to a process claim where the steps beyond the natural law consisted of nothing more than “well-understood, routine, conventional activity.”

Mayo’s grounding in Funk means that the Mayo analysis governs the patent-eligibility of a claim to a composition of matter, such as the isolated and purified DNA molecules at issue in Myriad.  But the stakes in Myriad are actually far higher. For twenty years after Funk, the lower courts employed the “something else beyond a law of nature” analysis to invalidate a variety of claims that we would probably regard as innocuous today. If the Court reaffirms the analysis of Funk, Parker v. Flook, and Mayo in Myriad, this line of authority presents a disturbing vision for the future.

The line began with Davison Chemical Corp. v. Joliet Chemicals, Inc., 179 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1950).  Davison Chemical dealt with a process for producing silica gel. While the process of making silica gel was long known in the art, the patentee had discovered that the temperature of the wash step determined the density of the gel.  He therefore claimed an improved process wherein the temperature of the wash step was adjusted to control the density of the final product. But the Seventh Circuit regarded the relationship between wash temperature and gel density as “a newly discovered scientific fact.”  Under Funk Brothers, it was necessary that the patentee’s application of that fact be inventive. According to the court, once the relationship between temperature and density was discovered, it required “nothing more than the ordinary skill of the scientist” to determine that maintaining the temperature of the wash step would control the density of the silica gel.

The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals followed Davison Chemical in In re Arnold, 185 F.2d 686 (CCPA 1950), involving a claim to a process of electrostatic welding. In Arnold, the applicant had discovered that molecules near the surface of a material responded more readily than interior molecules to alternating electrostatic fields. By selecting a particular frequency, the applicant could selectively weld the surface of the material, or selectively weld a plasticizer applied to the surface.  But according to the CCPA, the differential response of surface molecules was a “phenomenon of nature” discovered by the applicant. The claimed process merely selected a particular frequency based on that discovery, and therefore lacked “invention.”  (While the Federal Circuit has never cited Arnold, the case, being precedent of the CCPA, is technically binding on the court.)

National Lead Co. v. Western Lead Products Co., 324 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1963), was similar to Davison Chemical. In a process for making a lead / lead oxide suspension (useful for storage batteries), the patentee had supposedly discovered that two different crystalline forms of lead oxide were present; by controlling the temperature of the reaction, the patentee could control the proportion of these two forms and thereby the uniformity of the final product. But following Davison Chemical, the patentee’s discovery of the relationship between temperature and product uniformity was not patentable.  The question was whether the claimed method would have been obvious to an artisan – an artisan assumed to already know the relationship between temperature and product uniformity.  Since the patentee used only conventional methods to regulate temperature of the reaction, the method was unpatentable.

The pinnacle – or perhaps the nadir – of the Davison line was the Third’s Circuit’s decision in Armour Pharmaceutical Co. v. Richardson-Merrel, Inc., 396 F.2d 70 (3d Cir. 1968). The patentee made the surprising discovery that trypsin – a proteolytic enzyme with anti-inflammatory properties – could be absorbed by the small intestine, and thereafter transported into the bloodstream. Whereas the prior art relied on administering trypsin to patients via injection, the patentee determined that oral administration would be possible if the trypsin was given a coating permitting it to resist digestion in the stomach and reach the small intestine. But the Third Circuit concluded that a claim to the enteric-coated trypsin formulation was not patentable under Funk.  Once “nature’s secret” was discovered – the ability of the small intestine to absorb trypsin – any artisan would have employed known coatings to enable the trypsin to reach the small intestine. And even if the patentee’s discovery was the anti-inflammatory effect of trypsin administered to the small intestine, not merely the ability of the small intestine to absorb trypsin, the application of that newly discovered principle still lacked inventiveness under Funk.

Despite being framed as “lack of invention,” these are not obviousness cases.  In each case the information that might render the invention obvious was the patentee’s own discovery.  That is the point of Mayo: despite Diehr’s admonition to the contrary, the Court appears to have resurrected Funk’s rule that a claim must embody a non-obvious application of a law of nature or natural phenomenon to be patent-eligible. And the district courts have already begun applying that analysis to question the patent-eligibility of claims.[1] The Davison line suggests that a wide variety of claims to improvements or optimizations of known processes and compositions are vulnerable under the Mayo analysis.  Unless we can distinguish the “natural laws” in these cases from the “natural law” in Mayo, a reaffirmance of Funk and Mayo in Myriad could presage a dramatic contraction in the scope of patent-eligible subject matter in the future.

[1] See, e.g., Aria Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 2012 WL 2599340, at *11-12 (N.D. Cal. July 5, 2012); Tessenderlo Kerley, Inc. v. Or-Cal, Inc., 2012 WL 2054994 at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2012).

 

Guest Post on Patent Pools and Competition

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Editorial by David A. Balto and Brendan Coffman.  Mr. Balto and Mr. Coffman are antitrust attorneys in Washington D.C. whose representations include high technology firms.  In addition to his practice, Mr. Balto was formerly a policy director of the Federal Trade Commission, attorney-adviser to Chairman Robert Pitofsky, and an antitrust lawyer at the U.S. Department of Justice.   

When Patent Pools Attack:  Competitive Concerns from the Devolution of MPEG LA

By David A. Balto and Brendan Coffman
 
Patent pools pose a unique challenge to antitrust enforcement.  On the one hand they solve collective action problems and allow participants to achieve economies of scale that would otherwise be impossible.  Patent pools enable market participants to join complementary intellectual property to better manage those IP rights.  As the Department of Justice noted, patent pools may “provide competitive benefits by integrating complementary technologies, reducing transaction costs, clearing blocking positions, and avoiding costly infringement litigation.” 
 
On the other hand, patent pools can create competitive problems by conferring market power on a group (in the case of member-owned patent pools) or entity (in the case of stand-alone patent pools).  Thus, the antitrust enforcement agencies have always been concerned if the pools are over-inclusive and include competing technologies.  Where this is the case patent pools may leverage their position to interfere with competition in at least two ways.  First, a pool may interfere with the relationships and convergent intellectual property rights of pool members.  This result may be particularly pernicious if one of the patent pool participants seeks to introduce a new business model that may compete head-to-head with the pool’s customers.  Second, pools may leverage their market power within the supply chain to extract higher or duplicative royalties on downstream purchasers of the pool’s licensed technology.  These concerns are typical in the high-tech/intellectual property field, and come up very often in discussions of patent assertion entities, or PAEs. 
 
The key for regulators and policy-makers alike is to ensure that patent pools remain committed to the procompetitive collaborative efforts that justify their creation, and do not change their business model to exploit or create market power.  In theory this sounds simple.  In practice, it is anything but.
 
History of MPEG LA
 
MPEG LA is an interesting case study in the trade-off between the efficiencies of pooling arrangements and the potential competitive risks.  MPEG LA has been a personification of the debate since the group’s incipiency.  Formed in 1996 to administer the pooling of 27 digital video patents deemed essential to the MPEG 2 video compression technology into a single portfolio, MPEG LA aggregated and offered a collective license to 27 patents from eight companies and Columbia University.  MPEG LA presented its idea to the Department of Justice, seeking ex ante approval through the DOJ’s Business Review Procedure [pdf]. 
 
The DOJ responded in an oft-cited 14-page letter containing 49 footnotes.  The DOJ concluded that the joint licensing of the MPEG 2 essential patents is likely to provide significant cost savings to licensors and licensees alike because “the licensing arrangement have features designed to enhance the usual procompetitive effects and mitigate potential anticompetitive dangers.”  The DOJ also emphasized that the structure of the patent pool appeared well-suited to ensure that only truly essential patents become included in the pool, and that the patents in the pool remain complements, not substitutes.  Finally, the DOJ opined “there does not appear to be any potential for use of the Portfolio license to disadvantage particular licensees” because the pool’s most-favored-nations clause ensures equivalent rates to all takers on non-discriminatory terms.  In approving the arrangement, the DOJ laid forth the following four guidelines for when a patent pool may gain approval:
 
1.     The patents must be valid and enforceable;
2.     The pool must not aggregate competitive technologies and set a single price for them;
3.     An independent expert should determine whether the patents are essential; and
4.     The pool must not disadvantage competitors or facilitate collusion
 
The DOJ’s approval of MPEG LA’s turned in large part on one fundamental and pivotal fact:  MPEG LA’s operating procedure called for the participation of an independent expert at every turn.  In fact, the Business Review Letter mentions the independent expert sixteen times. 
 
There was significant concern raise about the MPEG LA pool.  As one antitrust scholar exclaimed “the anticompetitive potential of the MPEG LA patent pool is enormous.  The DOJ’s approval of the pool validates a collectively enforced monopoly over a fundamental communications standard.”1  Despite this and public criticism, the DOJ approved the behavior. MPEG LA stated publically that the company’s mission was to “provide a service that brings all parties together so that technical innovations can be made widely available at a reasonable price.”  As history shows, it is not long before a company with this model succumbs to the pressure of exercising and extending its monopoly power.
 
Emerging Competitive Concerns
 
In recent years, MPEG LA has been accused of inhibiting the innovation that it was designed to foster. Notably, the company’s practice of charging high licensing fees for patents that are near or past expiration has led critics to assert that the firm has placed profit above its core mission of cheap and accessible licensing of digital video patents. Technology market players have also alleged that MPEG LA has violated the terms of its original agreement with DOJ by failing to invite oversight of its licensing practices by independent experts, and neglecting to adhere to FRAND guidelines.  A firm that was once a model (at least in theory) of the potential benefits from collaboration has morphed into one of the industry’s most notorious and most harmful players.  
 
Interestingly MPEG LA embodies both of the concerns with patent pools outlined above and by the DOJ in its approval of the patent pool’s licensing structure.  First, MPEG LA may overtly inhibit the ability of its members to develop any technology that may compete with customers of the MPEG LA pool.  Most notably, MPEG LA was involved in a dispute with pool-participant Google.  In 2010 Google introduced WebM, an open-source solution to uploading videos to the web.  Google designed WebM to serve as an alternative to H.264, the primary video compression technology in Microsoft and Apple devices that is covered by the MPEG LA patent pool.  All three are members of the MPEG LA patent pool, and pay royalties to the company (although Apple contributed only one patent to the pool).  MPEG LA asserted that Google’s WebM product practices on or infringes patents in the pool, and demanded that users of the WebM product pay royalties to the pool.  A license from Google would not be enough.  In fact, in early 2011 MPEG LA instructed patent owners to inform the pool of patents they believe the WebM product uses. The DOJ initiated an investigation into whether MPEG LA is acting anticompetitively by trying to quash the Google WebM product through assertion of patents as a patent pool.  The investigation appears to be on-going.
 
It is not only Google that MPEG LA has targeted – German software company Nero also filed complaints with the DOJ alleging that MPEG LA is illegally maintaining and enhancing its monopoly power by failing to adhere to the conditions of the DOJ Business Review Letter.  Nero points out that MPEG LA does not rely on independent experts as it said it would, but instead allows its membership to drive patent inclusion decisions.  Nero also argues that MPEG LA did not offer the patents in question on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms as required.
 
MPEG LA has also devolved into a PAE.  A PAE may accumulate and leverage patents as a business model by taking advantage of economies of scale and the high cost of patent litigation.  A common business model of PAEs is to divide patents among shell companies, thereby making it difficult for defendants to identify the original patent owner and impossible to assert a counterclaim.  MPEG LA’s President, Larry Horn, is also the president of MobileMedia Ideas, a known PAE jointly owned by MPEG LA, Sony, and Nokia. The firm controls patents for technologies used in mobile phones, computers, tablets, cameras, and videogame consoles, among other devices. MobileMedia Ideas has engaged in a significant amount of successful litigation, and continues a business model of leveraging these patents against numerous operating companies, including those that have business relationships with MPEG LA. 
 
What is the Lesson?
 
The lesson cannot be that patent pools are inherently bad.  Pooling complementary products displaces litigation in favor of innovation, and is absolutely a win-win for consumers and manufacturers alike.  Instead, the lesson must be that continued oversight is necessary in the case of patent pools, especially when there is so much incentive for a pool to step outside the confines of approved activity, and to begin leveraging its unique market position anticompetitively. 
 
With that in mind, there are some basic steps that can be taken to prevent the problems identified above from replicating.  First, the antitrust agencies should disapprove of patent pools that place a restriction on how a participant may deploy its own technology.  It is appropriate to require a patent owner to make technology available on certain terms and to as large an audience as possible, but it is inappropriate to restrict the patent owner from actually competing.  Second, the agencies should condition approval of a patent pool on the continued use of independent experts.  A neutral voice is essential to prevent a pool from devolving into a firm seeking to include as many substitute patents as possible.  Third, the agencies should condition approval of a patent pool on a commitment to maintain autonomy and to refrain from engaging in any other business activities outside of the pooling arrangement.  It is too easy for a patent pool to learn the business of its members and position itself in the market as another barrier to entry. 

1Steven C. Carlson, Patent Pools and Antitrust Dilemma, 16 Yale J. on Reg. 359, 372 (1999).