Tag Archives: Enablement

Allison, Lemley & Schwartz on Patent Litigation

By Jason Rantanen

In 1998, John Allison and Mark Lemley published a groundbreaking empirical study of patent litigation, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents.  Allison and Lemley’s focus in that article was on written, final validity decisions by either district courts or the Federal Circuit from 1989 through 1996.  The basic study design philosophy was to look at patent case outcomes; that is, what was the final outcome for patents that were litigated.  That study is still widely cited.

Working with Dave Schwartz, Allison and Lemley recently completed an updated (and much expanded) version of their 1998 study.  The results of that study are being published in several articles, but the one that links most closely with the earlier study is Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation.

Their undertaking in this project is truly quite impressive.  The authors expanded their scope to all available decisions (not just those that were published in the U.S.P.Q., as in the earlier study) for utility patent infringement suits filed in 2008 and 2009, and personally coded the relevant case information from the docket sheets, district court opinions, briefs, and Federal Circuit decisions for hundreds of cases.  As in the earlier study, the record unit they used were patent cases, with only final decisions for a given patent being counted; in other words, where there was more than one decision in a case, they reported the last final decision on the validity of the patent.  Thus, if there was a final Federal Circuit decision, it superceded a previous district court decision; if there was a remand and subsequent final decision by the district court, it superceded the Federal Circuit ruling, and so on.  Within this set of cases, Schwartz and Lemley coded information about the cases while Allison coded patent-specific information.

Study Findings

The vast majority of patent cases still settle: Out of the roughly 5,000 patent infringement suits filed in 2008 and 2009, only 290 patents went to trial.  All together, less than 10% of the patent suits filed in these years resulted in any merits decision (that is, a summary judgment ruling or trial).  The remainder settled before that point (although, the authors note, there are a small number of cases still pending that may add another 2-3% to the number of suits resulting in a merits decision).

More indefiniteness challenges: One notably change from the 1998 study was the dramatically grater number of indefiniteness challenges.  Out of the 555 summary judgment motions brought on validity issues by either the patent challenger or the patent holder, 176 decided summary judgment motions involved the issue of indefiniteness, a dramatic increase from the 1998 study.  And the authors observed a less substantial, but still noticeable, increase in summary judgment decisions based on patentable subject matter (26), a category that has likely continued to experience growth.  For context, there were 149 decided summary judgment motions on obviousness and 154 on anticipation.

Many arrows in the challenger’s quiver: In terms of the success rates on motions for summary judgment of invalidity, challengers tended to lose on individual issues: with the exception of patentable subject matter challenges, the percentage of successful summary judgment motions of invalidity was 20% or below for each individual issue (102, 103, indefiniteness, enablement, written description).  But, the overall rate of invalidation on summary judgment was 30% and the overall rate at which patent challengers successfully won on invalidity was 42%.  This is an example of what Lemley has called the “fractioning” of patent law; that is, the idea that a patentee must win every issue in a case while the accused infringer must prevail on only one issue; a particular challenge with patent law and its multiple grounds for invalidation.

Overall, patent challengers tend to win: Overall, patent holders tended not to win in cases that went to a definite merits resolution.  Overall, patentees won only about 26% of the time (164/636 definitive merits rulings).  In addition to invalidity, patent holders lost on frequently-brought motions for summary judgment of noninfringement 54% of the time (257/473) and infrequently obtained summary judgment on more rarely-brought motions for summary judgment of infringement (41/128).  Thus, although patentees had a fairly high success rate at trial (winning on 59% of patents when juries made the decision and 64% when the bench did), the 1-2 punch of summary judgment followed by trial meant that most patent cases that went to judicial resolution were resolved in favor of the patent challenger.

I’ve only covered some of the data presented in the paper and barely scratched the surface of the authors’ analysis.  If you’re interested in reading more, the article can be downloaded directly from the Texas Law Review’s website or via ssrn: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2442451 

The New Role for Post Grant Review Proceedings (PGR)

by Dennis Crouch

It has now been just over 18-months since we started filing patent applications under the new first-to-file patent system mandated by the America Invents Act (AIA) of 2011.  And, slowly but surely, FTF patents are now beginning to issue.  Those new patents also bring us into a new era of Post-Grant-Review-Proceedings (PGR).

My expectation is that PGR will quickly prove itself as an incredibly powerful tool for challenging patents. Importantly, PGR proceedings allow a third party to challenge the validity of a patent on any of the validity grounds that could be raised in court as a defense under 35 U.S.C. 282 – these include novelty, obviousness, written description, enablement, indefiniteness, utility, and subject matter eligibility. This list represents a major expansion of challenge-justifications over inter partes review (IPR) proceedings or reexaminations. These same doctrines have already been available for covered-business-method review (CBM) proceedings and have been used successfully if only on a narrow class of patents (those covering financial business methods).

Two recent PGR proceedings have been filed.  In one case, LaRose Indus. has challenged Patent No. 8,684,420 that covers the popular children’s “Rainbow Loom.”  Although the patent claims a 2010 priority date, the particular application was filed as a continuation in July 2013 and, at least according to the petitioner, added new mater to the claims at that point.  The second case PGR case involves Patent No. 8,598,291 that covers a liquid formulation of a particular nausea control drug used by chemotherapy patients. The petition argues that the claims fail the requirements of written description, enablement, and definiteness.

The most important limitation on the PGR process is the relatively short 9-month window for filing a PGR petition. Namely, the petition must be filed within 9-months of the patent issuance.  This puts some pressure on parties to monitor competitor patents and patent families.  It also provides patent owners at least some incentive to hold-off asserting their patent until after that window has closed (unless the patentee would welcome the review).  I suspect that the set-up in the LaRose Rainbow Loom market will be fairly common. The patentee (Choon) had previously sued LaRose on a previous patent and so LaRose has been closely monitoring the continuation applications.

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In thinking about how soon the AIA cases will come on-board, I created the chart below. The chart provides some information on the timing of patent issuance — showing the percentage of patents issued with 18-months of filing and 36-months of filing respectively.  A big caveat for this particular chart is that it looks at the actual application filing date and does not consider the priority date that will typically control whether a patent will be examined under the AIA. Thus, even at the three-year date (March 2015), I would expect that significantly less than half of the recently issued patents would be FTF patents.

You’ll note the trend beginning in FY2011 of issuing more patents more quickly.  I largely attribute the change to two initiatives pushed by David Kappos during his term as PTO Director that resulted in (1) more funding to hire more examiners; and (2) a greater allowance rate.  Those factors have continued through the succeeding interim leadership terms of Terry Rea, Peggy Focarino, and now  Michelle Lee.

TimingOfPatentIssuance

Hearing on Ohio Bill to Protect Against Frivolous Patent Suits.

The story here explains that the bill got a hearing and that, if passed, Ohio would join ten other states with these bills. The story states:  “HB 573 outlines information in patent infringement claim letters that can be used against senders in legal proceedings and enables targets of such letters to file civil suits if claims have no merit.”

I’ve got an article coming out showing how 285 can be used against lawyers of patentees…

YODA: You Own Devices Act

A magical aspect of intellectual property is in the way that rights can pervade a system without the need for the rights-holder to physically engage with the supply chain. Someone may have personal property rights in their chattel, but IP rights control aspects of how that chattel can be used or transformed.  For example, although I own my computer, there are certain ways I might use my computer that would infringe patents or copyrights held by others. In this framework, IP rights can be thought of as a form of regulation – albeit with increased private involvement.

Ordinarily, when someone purchase goods, the purchase comes with all rights to use that good. However, the sale of goods with underlying IP rights certainly does not pass all rights in the IP.  The exhaustion (first-sale) doctrines of copyright and patent laws provide some linkage by giving the purchaser of goods certain use-rights to the underlying intellectual property. However in the computer-related fields required end-user-license-agreements (EULAs) have now become the industry standard for limiting ownership rights — especially for digitally delivered media. Rather than “owning” the media, in many cases these contracts purport to only give users a limited and personal license.  The common law tradition is to strike-down substantial use restrictions as effectively being unreasonable restraints on the market. However, it seems that the underlying IP rights have served as a basis for courts to favor “freedom of contract” over the traditional unreasonable-restraint-of-trade doctrines.

Representative Blake Farenthold (R-TX) has proposed a partial fix in his bill known as YODA: the You Own Device Act.  The key provision focuses on copyright law and would add the following to Section 109 of the Copyright Act:

(1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding section
106 or section 117, if a computer program enables any part of a machine or other product to operate, the owner of the machine or other product is entitled to transfer an authorized copy of the computer program, or the right to obtain such copy, when the owner sells, leases, or otherwise transfers the machine or other product to another person. The right to transfer provided under this subsection may not be waived by any agreement.

The EFF has praised the bill, but has also called for particular digital-first-sale rights and rights to access and modify software stored on your devices, and

Studying the Mongrel: Why Teva v. Sandoz Won’t Solve Claim Construction

Guest post by Heather F. Auyang, Senior Counsel at LTL Trial Attorneys in San Francisco, California. The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect the views or opinions of LTL Trial Attorneys.

This is the Teva-update to last summer’s Patently-O Guest Post titled “Why Lighting Ballast Won’t Solve Claim Construction” (https://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/07/guest-post-why-lighting-ballast-wont-solve-claim-construction.html), which discussed two then-recently published empirical studies – a study of “close cases” (analyzing all post-Markman claim construction cases where the Federal Circuit panel was split) and a study of “reversals” (analyzing all post-Phillips claim construction cases in which the Federal Circuit reversed the district court).   Updates to both studies have now been published in a sequel article, which provides further explanation and answers to some of the questions that were raised in this very forum last year.  The past year’s data is unsurprising – it is exactly what the models provided by the original studies predicted, and it confirms, yet again, that changing the standard of review will not have a particularly beneficial effect on claim construction predictability or consistency. This conclusion is based on two key facts shown by the data:  (1) that Federal Circuit judges remain divided on how to approach the task of claim construction, and (2) that when district courts are reversed, it’s almost always because they have misapplied settled claim construction principles.  In fact, giving more deference to district courts will likely exacerbate, rather than fix, problems with claim construction.

The close cases study (of 105 cases) continues to show that each Federal Circuit judge who has participated in more than five close cases falls into a distinct camp.  Judges Wallach, Linn, Clevenger, and Moore “go broad” in over 66% of close cases (Judge Rader was also in this group); Judges Bryson, Prost, Mayer, Schall, and Dyk “go broad” in between 47% and 55% of close cases; and Judges Newman and Lourie “go broad” in under 31 percent of close cases.

As pointed out last year, if the goal is to make claim construction more predictable, a good place to start would be to ensure that all the Federal Circuit judges are following the same rules of claim construction.  This data clearly shows that they are not.  While any given judge in any given opinion can cite the same agreed-upon rules, the rules are not preventing significant differences in approach among the judges.  Last year’s post and article posited that some judges are expressly or implicitly following an “actually invented” standard that other judges reject.  Whatever the explanation, until these differences are ironed out, tinkering with other issues – like deference to district courts – is unlikely to be productive.

The reversals data (based on 153 cases) is even more relevant to the question of deference than is the close cases data, since it deals directly with the relationship between the Federal Circuit and the district courts.  Focusing on reversals makes sense because this dataset, presumably, includes the cases whose results would change if the Supreme Court determines that district courts should get more deference in claim construction.  Accordingly, these are the decisions that should be studied before one concludes that the current standard of de novo review should be changed.  As it turns out, the reversals data suggests that the high reversal rate is caused by district court error, not Federal Circuit arbitrariness. If that’s the case, why in the world are people advocating more deference to district courts?

The reversals study coded for whether the Federal Circuit decision was in a broadening or a narrowing direction.  The result for the 11-month period since the last study was a broadening rate of 87.5%, even higher than the previously-reported overall broadening rate of 72.5%.  In other words, in cases where district courts are “getting it wrong,” according to the Federal Circuit, they are systematically interpreting the claims too narrowly.  As pointed out last year, these narrowing interpretations typically enable district courts to grant summary judgment of non-infringement (or encourage the parties to enter such a stipulation), and thereby permit the Federal Circuit to review the claim construction issue without going through the trouble and expense of a trial.  In the year since then, we have not heard any other plausible explanation.  Last year’s post and article also challenged any advocate of deference to provide one or more examples from the “reversals” cases that (1) would have come out differently under a deference regime, and (2) should have come out differently.  We haven’t heard anything on that either.

This year’s article – including fancy color charts analyzing Federal Circuit judge proclivities across broad/narrow, less spec/more spec, pro-patent/anti-patent, and pro-affirm/pro- reverse; and pie-charts and tables for the reversals data –  is What Reversals and Close Cases Reveal About Claim Construction at the Federal Circuit – The Sequel, 13 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 525 (2014) (available at http://repository.jmls.edu/ripl/vol13/iss3/3/). The comments here on last year’s article were of a very high caliber; hoping for the same again this time!

 

 

Alice, Artifice, and Action – and Ultramercial

Guest post by Emily Michiko Morris, Associate Professor, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law

Anyone familiar with recent Supreme Court patent jurisprudence was perhaps disappointed but certainly not surprised by the Court’s latest decision, Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l. The Court once again left many questions unanswered and failed to provide a clear rubric for identifying patentable subject matter. When viewed within the broader context, however, Alice fits nicely within what is actually a long-standing pattern in § 101 cases. IF Ultramercial v. Hulu follows this pattern after its now second GVR, the Federal Circuit may finally affirm that the internet-mediate advertising method at issue there is unpatentable subject matter.

In What Is “Technology”?, I explain that as unmethodical as patentable subject matter often seems, two surprisingly consistent concepts explain how courts identify patentable subject matter. The article dubs these concepts “artifice” and “action.”

Artifice refers to the well-recognized requirement that patentable subject matter be the product of human ingenuity, not nature. Less appreciated is the fact that artifice requires more than just changes in structural or other physical characteristics; to be patentable, a claimed invention must also function in some new, non-naturally occurring way. We can see this latter point illustrated in the purification line of cases as well as Myriad, Funk Brothers, and Chakrabarty.

Much more obscure but more relevant to Alice is the concept of action. Roughly defined, action is the requirement of active rather than passive utility through operating, behaving, performing, or otherwise actively doing something; that is to say, an invention must be “self-executing.” Inventions that display, transmit, or even store information may satisfy the action requirement, but works such as laws of nature, mathematical algorithms, and “abstract ideas” are (perceived as) merely informational or descriptive in value and therefore unpatentably inert. Moreover, as Alice explains, the abstract idea category is not “confined to ‘preexisting, fundamental truth[s].’” By definition any purely informational or descriptive content, whether naturally occurring laws of nature and mathematical algorithms or human-made financial and economic methods, fails the action requirement. As the Court in Diamond v. Diehr put it, such works simply do not “perform[ ] a function which the patent laws were designed to protect.”

To the extent different tests appear to govern natural products versus laws of nature and abstract ideas, then, artifice and action – and more importantly, the circumstances in which each are likely to be invoked – account for these differences. Artifice obviously plays its largest role in cases involving products or laws of nature, whereas action is most important in cases involving abstract ideas and laws of nature. Nonetheless, patentability under § 101 requires both artifice and action.

Both Alice and Bilski illustrate what role action plays under § 101. The methods in both Alice and Bilski involved hedging risk during business transactions by relying on intermediaries, but more importantly, both methods served solely to inform parties about when they can safely transact. The Alice and Bilski opinions describe this as the abstract concept of intermediated settlement, but really it is just information – information about risk. As such, both methods were unpatentably inactive under § 101.

And although Alice differs from Bilski in that Alice’s method was computer-implemented, the Court found both methods to be unpatentable. Like artifice, action is also a scalar characteristic. Just as artifice depends on an invention’s perceived degree of alteration from nature, action depends on an invention’s perceived degree of activity, and despite Alice’s computer-implementation, the method was still not active enough under § 101.

Indeed, both Alice and Mayo emphasize the scalar nature of patentability under § 101. Under Mayo’s two-step test, a court first determines whether a claim is directed to a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea. As the Alice Court observed, however, all inventions are directed to one of the patent-ineligible concepts at some level. The second and pivotal step is therefore to determine whether the claim demonstrates an “inventive concept” – that is, does the claim add elements “sufficient” and “enough” to establish patentable subject matter.

And to see that a sufficient “inventive concept” requires sufficient action, one need only look at how the Court treats computer-mediated elements with regard to patentability under § 101. Computers are widely regarded as “technological,” but much computer technology is “information technology,” and computer use primarily to manipulate data or other information thus adds no patentable action. Computer implementation in Alice’s method followed exactly this pattern – as the Court noted, the computer served only to create and maintain “shadow” accounts, obtain data, adjust account balances, and issue automated instructions. Accordingly, whether Alice claimed its invention as a method, system, or medium, the invention failed to provide an adequate “inventive concept” because it did not demonstrate sufficient action.

Under an artifice-plus-action standard, then, Ultramercial’s internet-mediated advertising method fails § 101. Ultramercial claimed a method of distributing copyrighted content for free in return for viewing an advertisement. The method is purely an exchange of informational and expressive content and performs no action whatsoever, and the claim’s cursory reference to the internet does nothing to add a “sufficient inventive concept.”

This is not to say, of course, that computer-implemented methods are never patentable subject matter. The Alice Court pointed out the difference between computers used purely for information processing and computers used to effect improvements in “any other technology or technical field,” or improvements in the function of the computer itself. Diehr’s computer-assisted rubber-curing process, for example, was adequately “technological” and therefore patentable, whereas the computer-implemented methods in Benson and Flook yielded “simply a number” and were therefore unpatentable. Per the view of the patent system, information processing is simply not “technological.” Similarly, computer or storage media that are distinguishable only by their informational or expressive content alone been held unpatentable if the content has no “functional” relationship with the device. The variable role that computers and other tangible devices can thus play in an invention may be why the Supreme Court rejected the machine-or-transformation test as the sole test for methods under § 101.

And while the discussion here focuses mostly on business methods, note that the Mayo two-step test as stated in Alice covers all patent-ineligible abstract ideas, laws of nature, and even phenomena of nature – all are subject to the same requirement that a claimed invention add “enough” to constitute a patentable inventive concept. For claims directed to phenomena of nature, “enough” means artifice and meeting the age-old test of “markedly different characteristics from any found in nature.” For abstract ideas, laws of nature, mathematical algorithms, mental processes, and all other forms of information, “enough” means action and demonstrating function beyond merely informing.

As simple as artifice and action may sound, however, patentable subject matter clearly remains a difficult and ambiguous issue. The difficulty lies in the scalar quality of both artifice and action and deciding where along these spectra any given new invention falls. The requisite degree of artifice and action has also varied over time as the liberality of patentable subject matter has waxed and waned, creating yet further uncertainty. Most significantly, where the line between patentable and unpatentable lies along the spectrum is entirely unclear. There are no bright-line rules and no magical claim elements that can guarantee patentability under § 101.

The Court has often (but not always, as our host Jason Rantanen has pointed out) expressed a preference for a “functional” approach to patent law, however: that is, a preference for standards over hard and fast rules. As stated in Bilski’s rejection of the machine-or-transformation test, to do otherwise would “make patent eligibility ‘depend simply on the draftsman’s art.’” True, the artifice-plus-action standard requires courts to make many judgment calls about where along the spectrum of artifice and action any given invention must fall before it can be considered patentable technology, but standards are often vague. Besides, patent law frequently must address these kinds of line-drawing exercises. The non-obviousness, utility, enablement, and even written description requirements all force courts to make judgment calls.

Compounding the difficulty is the fact that § 101 determinations are in the end based on nothing more than intuition. As I and a number of others have noted, none of the pragmatic justifications commonly cited in support of § 101, such as preemption and disproportionality explain how patentable subject matter determinations are actually made or, more importantly, why. Thus, although artifice and action consistently appear in patentable subject matter, the combination does not necessarily reflect the most efficient or “correct” way to define patentable subject matter. Rather, the combination merely reflects an underlying intuition about what constitutes technology. (In Intuitive Patenting, a companion article to What Is “Technology”?, I argue that there simply are no more objective bases on which to make these determinations.) Unfortunately, patentable subject matter’s intuitive nature leaves courts effectively unable to specify how they reached their determinations. This often leads to language that sounds more like non-obviousness, novelty, or utility than to § 101, but in the end, artifice and action are better explanations for these otherwise perplexing references.

Federal Circuit: To Satisfy the Written Description Requirement, a patent “must at least describe some species representative” of the accused product.

By Dennis Crouch

AbbVie v. Janssen Biotech and Centocor Biologics (Fed. Cir. 2014)

This decision is important in the way that it confirms a strong Post-Ariad Written Description requirement – especially with regard to genus-species claim situations. The decision also includes a key (but preliminary) discussion on the preclusive effect of PTAB decisions and also attempts to justify Federal Circuit decisions that extend beyond questions necessary for the judgment. Hal Wegner has already classified this opinion – written by Judge Lourie – as “unnecessary judicial activism.”

In 2013, Abbot Labs spun-off AbbVie as a separate company with a focus on biopharmaceutical research and a current Market Cap of $90 Billion US (ABBV). In the split, AbbVie obtained ownership of a number of valuable patents. In this case, AbbVie asserted various claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,914,128 and 7,504,485. These patents broadly cover antibodies that can bind to and neutralize activity of human interleukin 12 (IL-12). These antibodies have been found useful in the treatment of autoimmune disorders, including psoriasis and rheumatoid arthritis.

A key asserted claim is listed as follows:

29. A neutralizing isolated human antibody, or antigen-binding portion thereof that binds to human IL-12 and disassociates from human IL-12 with a Koff rate constant of 1×10−2s−1 or less, as determined by surface plasmon resonance.

A jury found the claim invalid for lacking a sufficient written description, lacking enablement, and also for obviousness. AbbVie appealed the §112(a) claims (WD & enablement) and, as for obviousness, AbbVie argued that that issue should never have been decided by the district court since it had already been fully litigated during the prior interference contest. On appeal, the court affirmed – agreeing that the patent was properly held invalid for lack of written description and that the collateral estoppel did not apply to the obviousness question because the interference proceeding was not sufficiently “final” at the time of the complaint filing.

Written Description: In Ariad, the Federal Circuit confirmed that the written description requirement is separate and distinct from that of enablement and that it serves an important role of ensuring that the patent is based upon an actual describable invention and that the patent scope does not overreach beyond the scope of the inventor’s contribution.

Written Description
– Genus-Species: By design, patent claims generally cover a set of a variety of potential embodiments. Likely, most claims cover an infinite variety of potential embodiments each involving a minor tweak in one way or another. The courts have never required that all potential embodiments be disclosed – however, the written description doctrine has been applied to invalidate patent claims that do not disclose a sufficient representative sample of embodiments. This is generally known as part of a genus-species problem – with the operative question here being how many different species (embodiments) of an invention must be described in a patent document before the applicant can properly claim rights to the genus of all related species. A key case on point is Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Lourie, J.) that was also affirmed in Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc; Lourie, J.) (“[No] bright-line rules govern[] the number of species that must be disclosed to describe a genus claim, as this number necessarily changes with each invention, and it changes with progress in a field.”). Rather than simply listing various embodiments, the usual approach is to also describe common structural features of the species.

Here, AbbVie’s generic claim can be classified as a set of human antibodies defined functionally by their high affinity and neutralizing activity to the human IL-12 antigen. However, AbbVie did not disclose any structural features common to the members of the genus. Rather, AbbVie’s patent described only one type of structurally similar antibodies rather than antibies representative of the full scope of the genus.

In the decision, Judge Lourie focuses particularly on the alleged infringing antibodies and notes that:

[While] AbbVie’s patents need not describe the allegedly infringing [compound] in exact terms . . . [t]he patents must at least describe some species representative of antibodies that are structurally similar to [the accused compound].

Because the patent document lacked any such structural description, the court confirmed that the corresponding claims were invalid under 112(a).

Functional Patent Claims Are Inherently Vulnerable: In discussing the case, Judge Lourie was clear that one problem here is that the invention was described in terms of its function rather than its structure. Lourie writes:

Functionally defined genus claims can be inherently vulnerable to invalidity challenge for lack of written description support, especially in technology fields that are highly unpredictable, where it is difficult to establish a correlation between structure and function for the whole genus or to predict what would be covered by the functionally claimed genus.

With functional claims, the patentee must establish “a reasonable structure-function correlation” either within the specification or by reference to the knowledge of one skilled in the art. Of importance, the court is clear that functional claim limitations are patentable, but, in order to be patentable, they must be linkable to structure by PHOSITA. An interesting distinction though is that, unlike many written description issues, the linkage between the function and structure need not necessarily be found in the patent document itself.

Patent attorneys will also note that Judge Lourie’s reference to “highly unpredictable” arts is designed to refer primarily to bio-related sciences. We shall see whether the subsequent case law is so limited.

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Collateral Estoppel applies to preclude a court from re-deciding issues. Generally collateral estoppel only applies when the same issue was actually litigated and decided by a final and binding judgment in a way that was essential to the judgment. It is also generally true that collateral estoppel applies even when the first case is still pending on appeal – so long as the original court’s judgment was a final judgment being appealed.

Here, a prior interference proceeding between the parties had resulted in a determination that the AbbVie claims were not-obvious. Following the PTAB interference decision, Centocor filed a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 146 that was pending at the time the present infringement litigation began. In the present appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the PTO decision should not be considered a “final judgment for the purposed of collateral estoppel” since the district court decision was still pending and during that case the parties have the opportunity to expand the factual record. The court left open the possibility that collateral estoppel would apply once the decision is final and that collateral estoppel may have applied if Centocor had appealed directly under § 141 instead of filing a civil action.

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Because AbbVie did not appeal the substance of the obviousness question, the collateral estoppel question fully decided the case. However, in its decision, the court offered an explanation for its reasons for going ahead and deciding the written description question.

AbbVie did not substantively challenge the district court’s holding of obviousness of the asserted claims. It might therefore be concluded that we could affirm that court’s obviousness holding and proceed no further. However, as an “inferior” court, we are well-advised to review more than one issue raised before us on appeal, lest higher authority find error in any basis for a more limited review. Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 97–98 (1993) (“[T]he Federal Circuit is not a court of last resort. . . . [Its] decision to rely on one of two possible alternative grounds (noninfringement rather than invalidity) did not strip it of power to decide the second question, particularly when its decree was subject to review by this Court.” (emphasis in original)); see also Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, 683 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (affirming invalidity based on anticipation and obviousness); Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Cox Fibernet Va., Inc., 602 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (same); Union Pac. Res. Co. v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 236 F.3d 684 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (affirming invalidity based on indefiniteness and lack of enablement). Because the written description issue constituted the principal basis of AbbVie’s appeal to this court, we proceed to consider the written description issue rather than affirm merely on any procedural defect or omission relating to the obviousness issue.

In her concurring opinion, Judge O’Malley did not sign-on to the “thoughtful written description analysis” of the majority – finding it not “necessary or dispositive ot the outcome of the case.”

Opening of the Rocky Mountain Patent Office Raises Denver’s Profile as Center of Innovation

John Posthumus has been instrumental making the Denver Office of the USPTO a reality – having spent more than 1,000 pro bono hours on this effort. I asked him to write a guest post to commemorate the June 30 opening. D.C.

By John Posthumus

The opening of the Rocky Mountain Regional Satellite office in Denver on June 30 marks an unprecedented and historic moment for the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. Never in its history has the USPTO had a base of operations that extended beyond the Eastern Time zone. The USPTO has operated exclusively for more than 200 years in the Washington, D.C. area until July 2012, when the USPTO opened its first satellite office in Detroit.

While the Detroit office was a small step geographically speaking (Detroit is 525 miles from Washington, D.C.), the Denver office is a huge step toward a national presence by the USPTO. Its central U.S. location will provide unprecedented access to inventors and entrepreneurs in the western part of the country, satisfying an important Section 23 objective of the America Invents Act (AIA) – better connecting patent filers and innovators with the patent office. The Denver office is expected to have state-of-the-art video conferencing facilities available to applicants. Thus, a significant part of the U.S., and the entire Rocky Mountain region, will be able to travel to Denver to complete examiner interviews and return home the same day.

The opening of the Denver office will also enable the USPTO to recruit examiners and board judges from pools of talented individuals they cannot access in Alexandria, VA. Colorado, for example, is the second-most highly educated state in the nation, is among the top 10 for adults with degrees in science and engineering, has four major research universities, and is home to 24 federally funded research laboratories. The opening of the Denver office provides a great opportunity to recruit candidates that have recent and relevant technical and industry experience that they will bring to the examining and board judging roles. As a result, the Denver office is expected to provide better quality examinations and decrease the number of patent applications waiting for examination, and satisfy another criteria in Section 23.

The new office is also expected to improve recruitment of patent examiners, another Section 23 factor, because of Colorado’s favorable cost of living and quality of life factors. As Acting Director Michelle Lee stated recently, “In addition to creating jobs for intellectual property professionals throughout the region, the permanent Denver satellite office will be an indispensable resource for regional inventors, entrepreneurs and businesses.” The benefits of the new USPTO satellite office will extend beyond creating jobs. The opening of the office will also have a positive economic impact in the region. According to a study by the University of Colorado Leeds School of Business, the Denver-based office is expected to provide a $440 million economic impact to the region in the first five years of operation.

The Denver office also gives the USPTO an opportunity to think outside the box and presents an historic opportunity to set aside the baggage that comes from operating in one location for over 200 years. For example, the Denver satellite patent office could be used to run small-scale pilot projects in conjunction with local public/private partners, such as a one-month filing to issuance pilot or a collaborative examination by two examiners, that if successful could be scaled ultimately changing how the USPTO operates. In this regard, perhaps the most exciting prospects of the satellite offices are yet to come.

Teva v. Sandoz: Teva’s Opening Merits Brief

By Jason Rantanen

Teva recently filed its merits brief in Teva v. Sandoz (previous PatentlyO discussion here and here).  It’s main argument on the issue of claim construction is that claim construction involves making findings of fact and Rule 52(a)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that “[f]indings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.”   In support of the first part of this argument, the brief points to determinations about the perspective offered by a person of ordinary skill in the art and the use of extrinsic evidence to resolve ambiguities; these, the brief argues, are inherently factual determinations for which deference should be given to the district court.

A key issue will be whether these types of judicial determinations are actually factual findings, or whether they are something else.  Certainly reviewing courts make determinations about some types of historical evidence all the time – one need only look at Justice Breyer’s discussion of legislative history and Congressional intent in Aereo for recent example – without invoking deference.  These determinations aren’t limited to “purposivists”: Justice Scalia’s originalist approach to interpreting legal statutes, for example, involves looking to how the text would have been understood at the time it was issued, something that can involve historical linguistic research.  Figuring out whether the “facts” involved in claim construction are akin to something like legislative history or the historical determinations involved in an originalist approach, or instead are the type of “facts” encompassed by Rule 52 is central to the invocation of that rule.  Much of Teva’s brief seeks to tackle this challenge, arguing that the facts involved in claim construction are exactly the kinds of facts that are encompassed by Rule 52.

Of these arguments, I found the most compelling to be the point that even as  determinations such as the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art are factual and reviewed with deference in one context (such as obviousness and enablement), they are reviewed without deference in claim construction.  It will be interesting to see how Sandoz responds.

One important tension that the brief fails to resolve, however, is the key question of how deference on factfinding plays into decisions about claim construction.  If the ultimate determination of the meaning of claim terms remains one of law, does that basically invite an obviousness-like determination wherein certain subsidiary issues – such as the knowledge possessed by a PHOSITA and content of extrinsic evidence – are reviewed with deference, but the reviewing court makes the final determination, weighing each of the various pieces of information, without deference?  Or is it something else?

The brief does seem to indirectly offer a vision of how deference to factual findings should work, but it strikes me as leaving no place for the other side of the mongrel practice: the legal component.  The vision offered by the brief appears in Part IV., on pages 53-54, where Teva argues that the Federal Circuit erred by not granting deference to the district court on the “understanding of Figure 1, of SEC technology,
and of the prosecution history.”  In other words, Teva’s view of deference manifests as the lens through which the interpreter of the legal doctrine looks at not just the extrinsic evidence (the SEC technology), but also the patent document itself and the prosecution history.  If this is the correct approach to deference – that the reviewing court must give deference to the district court’s interpretation of the patent document and prosecution history – it is hard for me to see anything left that isn’t entitled to deference.  (Maybe the ordinary meaning of the claims themselves?  But that’s “the ordinary meaning to a person of skill in the art,” so that doesn’t work.).  This “lens” approach to deference seems to go too far, in my mind, and is fundamentally at odds with the way other factual findings and deference work in patent law doctrines such as nonobviousness and enablement.

The brief also challenges the various rationales for reviewing factual issues in claim construction de novo: “Markman requires it” argument, the interpretation of legal documents is a question of law argument, and the uniformity argument.  It also  argues that allowing de novo review of facts on appeal produces poorer decisions and is costly to the patent system, citing to the reversal rate data.  (Although this latter point seems to depend heavily on how deference is actually implemented – it would seem that the de novo review of certain subsidiary elements of claim construction, alone, would have only a very marginal effect on decision quality and litigation cost).

You can download a copy of the brief here: Teva’s Opening Brief

Teva v. Sandoz: Standard of Review for Claim Construction(?)

By Jason Rantanen

While many eyes will be on the Supreme Court on Monday when it releases its decision in Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, the term is over for patent cases.  Over the past few months, the Court issued an astonishing six patent law-related opinions (almost 10% of the Court’s docket), covering ground from claim definiteness (Nautilus) to the exceptional case standard in Section 285 (Octane, Highmark) to multi-actor infringement (Limelight) to the burden of proof in noninfringement declaratory judgment actions (Medtronic) to the ever-present patentable subject matter case (Alice).  Three of these opinions (AliceHighmark, and Limelight) resolved deep intra-circuit splits at the Federal Circuit.  Altogether, this term profoundly altered the landscape of patent law jurisprudence.  Perhaps more important than the substance of the Court’s opinions was the change itself: through opinions such as Nautilius and Alice, the court made it clear to participants that the law of patents can be a dynamic, changing thing, an organicness that forward-thinking patent attorneys and agents – even more than litigators – will be forced to grapple with.

I’ll be talking more about this year’s developments in patent law at the Wisconsin State Bar Association’s annual Door County Intellectual Property Academy in a few weeks, and the Supreme Court will certainly take center stage.  Dennis will be there as well.

For now, though, the next major event in patent law jurisprudence is likely to be the Court’s opinion in Teva v. Sandoz, in which the Petitioner posed the question:

Whether a district court’s factual finding in support of its construction of a patent claim term may be reviewed de novo, as the Federal Circuit requires (and as the panel explicitly did in this case), or only for clear error, as Rule 52(a) requires.

But this case is more complex than the (relatively) simple issue of deference in appellate review of claim constructions.  At the trial court level, the district judge did not simply construe the claim in a way unfavorable to Sandoz, the accused infringer.  Rather, the district judge rejected Sandoz’s argument that the claim term “Average Molecular Weight” was indefinite and construed the claim in Teva’s favor.  On appeal the Federal Circuit reviewed the issue of claim definiteness without deference and concluded that the term was indefinite (applying it’s pre-Nautilus standard of “not amenable to construction” or “insolubly ambiguous”).  

Herein lies the sticky part: If one takes the view that questions of claim definiteness and claim construction are effectively one and the same, then this case squarely presents a question about the appropriate standard of review for claim construction. This seems intuitive: both revolve around determining claim meaning.

But treating issues of claim definiteness and construction as if they are just different sides of the same coin runs into a glitch if there is a factual component: one issue (definiteness) arguably comes with a “clear and convincing” evidentiary standard while the other (claim construction) does not.  (While there is a canon that claims should be interpreted to preserve their validity, it’s  a weak one that only operates as a last resort.  See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“While we have acknowledged the maxim that claims should be construed to preserve their validity, we have not applied that principle broadly, and we have certainly not endorsed a regime in which validity analysis is a regular component of claim construction.”).)  If different evidentiary standards are being applied to the factual components of each, then claim definiteness and claim construction must be separate issues.

If this logic is sound and claim definiteness and construction are distinct issues, then Teva v Sandoz is really only about the standard of review on the issue of claim definiteness, not about the standard of review of claim construction.  But the observation about evidentiary standards notwithstanding, it seems counterintuitive to say that the question of whether “a patent’s claims, viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history, inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty” is somehow different from how those skilled in the art would interpret the claims.  And Teva’s Brief, which I’ll summarize tomorrow, treats indefiniteness and claim construction as if they were the same thing.

How, then, could the Court escape this conundrum of different evidentiary standards for what is essentially the same determination, aside from concluding both are pure issues of law, a position that would be at odds with Markman and probably Nautilus?   First, the Court could conclude that indefiniteness does not implicate the clear-and-convincing evidence standard.  The Court went halfway there in Nautilus, observing that the “presumption of validity does not alter the degree of clarity that §112, ¶2 demands from patent applicants,” but left open the question of whether subsidiary issues of definiteness trigger the clear-and-convincing evidence standard.  A second possibility would be for the Court to implement a “clear-and-convincing” evidentiary standard for issues of fact in claim construction (although how that would work in a form other than the current pro-validity canon, I have no idea).

There are also some less-than-helpful options that would further churn up the muddy bottom of patent law. It’s entirely possible that the Court could issue an opinion solely addressing the issue of whether or not the appellate court must grant deference to district court factual findings on the issue of indefiniteness, and leave unanswered the question of whether deference is appropriate in the context of claim constructions.  Or, it could avoid discussing the appropriate evidentiary standards for claim construction and indefiniteness (as it did in Nautilus), instead leaving folks to ponder whether they are the same or different.

I’ll also make the observation that after the Court granted certiorari in this case, it issued Nautilus v. Biosig, which lowered the standard for finding claims indefinite.  Even if the Court were to reverse in this case – ruling that factual issues in claim construction and claim definiteness are entitled to deference – it would seem that the inevitable result would be a remand to the Federal Circuit, and then probably to the district court, to apply the new standard.

Indefiniteness “Can Be” Difficult under Nautilus

Ex parte Breed, Appeal No. 2012-003990 (PTAB 2014)

On June 2, 2014, the Supreme Court decided Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2120 (2014) lowering the standard for negating patentability due to indefiniteness. The new test requires that the claim scope be “reasonably certain” to one skilled in the art at the time of the patent.

On June 4, 2014, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) issued its first decision interpreting Nautilus. David Breed is a prolific inventor and is named on more than 300 patents and is one of the inventors of the airbag. More recently, Breed has collaborated with Acacia Research Corp to enforce his patents.

The application at issue in this case is part of a large family of at least seven issued patents that claim priority back to a 2000 provisional application and is directed to a highway monitoring system that provides reports and information on road conditions. Application No. 12/020,684.

Claim 1 is a system claim that includes a whereby clause indicating that “whereby roadway conditions from multiple roadways can be obtained and processed at the remote facility.” The examiner rejected the claim as indefinite based upon the “can be” limitation and the PTAB has now affirmed that finding:

Patent applicants face powerful incentives to inject ambiguity into their claims, a temptation that needs to be mitigated by the courts. See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instr., Inc., 2014 WL 2440536 at *7, __ U.S. __ (June 2, 2014). Patent drafters are in the best position to resolve ambiguities in their claims. See Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Section 112 places the burden of precise claim drafting on the applicant. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1056-57 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

. . .

Claim 1 recites that roadway conditions from multiple roadways “can be” obtained and processed at the remote facility and “can be” directed from the remote facility to other vehicles. The Examiner rejected claim 1 as indefinite. The Examiner stated that it is not clear if Appellants intended the “can be” claim limitation to be optional or that the phrase should be interpreted as a definite statement. . . .

Appellants now argue that the features following the “can be” phrases should be interpreted as optional and, as such, the claim is not indefinite. The verb form of the word “can” carries multiple meanings in the English language. It can be used to indicate a physical ability or some other specified capability. It can also be used to indicate a possibility or probability.

During examination of a patent application, pending claims are given their broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In the instant case, Appellants have not directed us to any language in the Specification that supports a construction of “can be” that yields a particular and distinct meaning in claim 1. Instead, Appellants merely urge us to adopt one of two plausible interpretations. . . .

We agree with the Examiner that “can be” is indefinite, because it is susceptible to more than one plausible construction. It is unclear whether the limitation refers to a capability that is required to be present in the invention or whether it refers to a system capability that is a mere possibility that is not required. In other words, it is unclear whether a vehicle monitoring system can practice the invention of claim 1 by satisfying all of the other limitations of claim 1, without necessarily being required to possess the capability to obtain and process roadway conditions at a remote facility or to direct information from a remote facility to other vehicles on a roadway.

During prosecution, a claim is properly rejected as indefinite if it is “amenable to two or more plausible claim constructions.” Ex parte Miyazaki, 2008 WL 5105055 at *5 (BPAI Nov. 19, 2008) (precedential). The Miyazaki standard for indefinite rejection is justified, at least in part, because the applicant has the opportunity and the obligation to define his or her invention precisely during prosecution before the PTO.

Here, Appellants’ use of the phrase “can be” renders claim 1 indefinite and we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).

The PTAB also quoted the Supreme Court’s nose-of-wax statement from its 1886 decision:

Some persons seem to suppose that a claim in a patent is like a nose of wax which may be turned and twisted in any direction, by merely referring to the specification, so as to make it include something more than, or something different from, what its words express. The context may, undoubtedly, be resorted to, and often is resorted to, for the purpose of better understanding the meaning of the claim; but not for the purpose of changing it, and making it different from what it is. The claim is a statutory requirement, prescribed for the very purpose of making the patentee define precisely what his invention is; and it is unjust to the public, as well as an evasion of the law, to construe it in a manner different from the plain import of its terms. This has been so often expressed in the opinions of this court that it is unnecessary to pursue the subject further.

White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1886) (emphasis added by PTAB).

I think that the decision here is correct and the USPTO is right to force the patent applicant to nail-down the particular scope of the invention being claimed. One interesting counter-point comes from the Supreme Court’s notion that definiteness requires examination of the prosecution history – here Breed argued that the term meant “optional,” but the PTAB here indicates that it is not sufficient to merely indicate which of two possible interpretations is the correct – rather a claim amendment is in order to solidify and provide express notice of that applicant decision.

Akamai: Is the Answer in the Common Law?

Guest Post by Professor Lynda J. Oswald. Editor’s Note – I asked Professor Oswald to write a guest post that links together her prior writing on divided infringement with the Supreme Court’s most recent decision on the subject-matter.

In its recent decision in Limelight Networks Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., the Supreme Court decided the easy question—whether inducement must be supported by direct infringement—on precedent grounds, yet avoided the much more difficult question of how the courts should deal with multi-actor infringement of a method or process patent.

Precedent is indeed clear that direct infringement is a predicate to indirect infringement, and the Court’s decision on this question was exactly right. The interesting questions remaining, however, are why did the Federal Circuit attempt to rewrite precedent in this manner and what should the Federal Circuit do with multi-actor infringement doctrine on remand?

The answer to the why question is driven by the courts’ fundamental discomfort with strict liability. The Federal Circuit’s inartful attempt in its en banc decision in Akamai to move multi-actor infringement from direct infringement to inducement was an effort to relocate such infringement from the harsh rules of strict liability to the more forgiving rules of intent-based indirect liability. Justice Kagan highlighted this at oral argument:

But the reason [the Federal Circuit] put this under 271(b) rather than 271(a) is because of what Justice Scalia said, that 271(b) is not a strict liability offense . . . . [T[hey thought they were being very clever by putting it into a 271(b) box and avoiding the strict liability consequences of what they were doing, but also avoiding the possibility of an end run of the patent law.

As I explore in a work-in-progress, the courts similarly attempt to avoid the strictures of strict liability in other IP contexts such as imposition of officer liability in patent and copyright cases. Although strict liability is antithetical to the notions of fault-based liability that permeate most of American law, the courts are bound by the statutory language and the Supreme Court’s rejection of the Federal Circuit’s attempt to circumvent direct infringement’s strict liability requirement was spot-on.

The what question is harder to answer. The Supreme Court expressed significant skepticism about the Muniauction Inc. v. Thomson Corp. test, appearing, in fact, to characterize any current doctrinal difficulties as self-inflicted by the Federal Circuit:

[R]espondents, like the Federal Circuit, criticize our interpretation of §271(b) as permitting a would-be infringer to evade liability by dividing performance of a method patent’s steps with another whom the defendant neither directs nor controls. We acknowledge this concern. Any such anomaly, however, would result from the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of §271(a) in Muniauction. A desire to avoid Muniauction’s natural consequences does not justify fundamentally altering the rules of inducement liability that the text and structure of the Patent Act clearly require—an alteration that would result in its own serious and problematic consequences . . . .

The Court viewed the Federal Circuit’s multi-actor infringement precedent too narrowly, however. To adequately address the multi-actor infringement issue on remand, the Federal Circuit needs to reexamine not just Muniauction, but two additional decisions as well: BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech and the panel decision in Akamai.

BMC Resources provided the foundation of the Federal Circuit’s current multi-actor infringement doctrine by stating that: (1) for inducement to exist, some other single entity must be liable for direct infringement but (2) a mastermind who controls or directs the activities of another party incurs vicarious liability for the actions of that other party such that the combination of acts would be deemed the act of a single actor for purposes of establishing liability. Muniauction‘s contribution was to refine the BMC Resources test by identifying a “spectrum” of relationships: at one pole is “mere arms-length cooperation,” which does not lead to liability; at the other is “control or direction over the entire process such that every step is attributable to the controlling party, i.e., the mastermind.” The panel decision in Akamai attempted to further clarify the standard by setting up two-pronged test of the type that the Federal Circuit seems to prefer these days: multi-actor infringement occurs only when the parties involved are in either (1) in an agency relationship or (2) contractually obligated to each other.

Perhaps it is a function of its narrow jurisdiction, but the Federal Circuit often misses the opportunity to apply traditional common law doctrines in a manner that would reconcile statutory language with the policies underlying the statute. As I discuss in a recent article, the Federal Circuit could resolve much (but not all—some aspects of this issue are amenable only to legislative resolution) of the confusion surrounding multi-actor infringement by explicitly invoking common law doctrines of tort and agency. The panel decision in Akamai got much of this right by looking at agency and contractual relationships. However, the Akamai panel decision ignored the possibility that there could be co-equals involved in the infringement, not bound by contract or agent-principal relationships but acting in concert in a joint tortfeasorship relationship. Early (pre-Federal Circuit) cases did recognize the role that joint torts can play in establishing multi-actor liability but that relationship was lost in the BMC Resources single-entity rule.

The Akamai Court issued a clear call to the Federal Circuit to revisit (and revamp) its troublesome multi-actor infringement standard. Judge Newman provided an elegant statement of how the court should approach this issue in her dissent in the Akamai en banc decision:

The court should simply acknowledge that a broad, all-purpose single-entity requirement is flawed, and restore infringement to its status as occurring when all of the claimed steps are performed, whether by a single entity or more than one entity, whether by direction or control, or jointly, or in collaboration or interaction.

On remand, the Federal Circuit will have the opportunity to articulate liability rules that are more principled, more grounded in traditional legal doctrine, and more consistent with the general patent law scheme; Judge Newman’s characterization provides an excellent starting point for that analysis.

How will Nautilus affect indefiniteness at the PTO?

Guest post by Lisa Larrimore Ouellette (Visiting Fellow, Yale Law School Information Society Project) and Jonathan Masur (Deputy Dean and Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School).

In our new draft article, Deference Mistakes, we examine indefiniteness doctrine as one example of how decisionmakers sometimes mistakenly rely on precedents in inapposite contexts. So we were very interested in the Supreme Court’s reformulation of the indefiniteness standard in Nautilus v. Biosig on Monday, and particularly in how this decision will affect the indefiniteness standard applied in the examination context.

Pre-Nautilus, claims under examination at the PTO were supposed to be evaluated under a stricter indefiniteness standard than granted claims. In Exxon Research (2001), the Federal Circuit stated that to “accord respect to the statutory presumption of patent validity,” it would find granted patent claims indefinite “only if reasonable efforts at claim construction proved futile” and the claim was “insolubly ambiguous.”

The obvious corollary to the Federal Circuit’s holding in Exxon is that when the presumption of validity does not apply, the indefiniteness standard should be more stringent. The BPAI explicitly clarified this point in the precedential Ex parte Miyazaki (2008) when it held that examiners should use “a lower threshold of ambiguity” such that claims are indefinite if “amenable to two or more plausible constructions,” and the MPEP emphasizes this point.

As we describe in Deference Mistakes, however, the less stringent “insolubly ambiguous” standard was mistakenly imported into the examination context and repeatedly cited in BPAI and PTAB decisions even after Miyazaki. And once ambiguous claims are granted, they are entitled to the presumption of validity and are less likely to be struck down, notwithstanding that they were granted under a mistaken standard.  The affirmance of these patents on appeal following infringement proceedings likely led to the PTO granting even more indefinite patents, which were then upheld on appeal, a vicious cycle. And if these patents came to be seen as the new normal, that could have made the PTO even more permissive. The result could have been creeping decay of the PTO’s effective indefiniteness standard, with indefinite patents begetting ever more indefinite patents.

At first glance, Nautilus appears to fix this problem of two different legal standards that might be mistakenly applied in the wrong context. In footnote 10, the Supreme Court states that the “presumption of validity does not alter the degree of clarity that §112, ¶2 demands from patent applicants,” suggesting that the legal test for indefiniteness should be the same in the infringement and examination contexts. The Court expressly leaves open whether this evaluation of the claims involves subsidiary factual findings and whether deference is due to any such findings—issues the Court will return to next Term in Teva v. Sandoz. But however these fact-based issues are resolved, it seems that Miyazaki‘s articulation of the legal standard for indefiniteness is no longer good law (unless, of course, the Federal Circuit adopts this as the unitary test).

Doctrinally, this requirement of a unitary legal standard for indefiniteness seems clearly right: as the Supreme Court explained in Microsoft v. i4i, the presumption of validity required by §282 is an evidentiary standard that requires invalidity to be proven by clear-and-convincing evidence, and it is thus inapplicable to questions of law. Eliminating the dual standard also has the apparent benefit of preventing the kinds of overt mistakes we point out in Deference Mistakes.

As we explain in Deference Mistakes, however, eliminating the formal legal distinctions between “deference regimes” may not solve the problem where such deference arises from functional considerations. We worry that preventing the PTO from applying “a lower threshold of ambiguity” might inadvertently undermine the PTO’s current efforts to improve patent claim clarity. Although the EFF cheered Nautilus for being likely to “invalidate many more patents,” the Court suggested at p. 12 that the test “the Federal Circuit applies in practice” may be fine, so on remand the Federal Circuit may well use the same analysis under a new name. Even if indefiniteness is a purely legal question such that the presumption of validity has no formal effect, in practice courts may apply a relatively loose standard due to an understandable reluctance to impose the drastic penalty of invalidity just because a claim could have been written more clearly. In the examination context, where applicants have the ability to amend vague claims, the PTO’s efforts to demand greater clarity make sense. But if the looser indefiniteness standard from the infringement context is incorporated into the examination context—no longer as a doctrinal mistake, but as a legal requirement—it may subvert these efforts and exacerbate the problem of ambiguous patents.

No Patent Office Director – 486 Days Later

By Dennis Crouch

David Kappos has been an instrumental leader in patent reform over the past several years. In the lead-up to the America Invents Act of 2011, it was Kappos – acting then in his role as USPTO Director – who serve as a trusted advisor to leaders on the Hill who were developing appropriate statutory language. In 2014, Kappos – now acting as an industry lobbyist in private practice – spearheaded a successful initiative to table further patent reforms for now.

Although now an outsider, Kappos’ influence remained so strong in the 2014 cycle because the USPTO Director hole that he left is still empty. Rather, that slot has remained vacant since Kappos left the job more than a year ago. During that time, White House has not stepped forward with a nomination for the next director. I would argue that the failure of the 2014 reforms was more about the lack of a USPTO Director guiding the changes than about the challenge brought by Mr. Kappos.

In a new letter to President Obama, Senator Hatch calls for movement:

June 2, 2014

Dear President Obama:

I write concerning the director vacancy at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Since the departure of Director David Kappos in January 2013, the USPTO has been without a permanent director. This vacancy, which has gone unfilled for over sixteen months and counting without so much as a statement from the White House, hampers the agency’s ability to influence policy and make long-term plans. We all can agree that these are challenging times that demand strong leadership at the USPTO to fuel our nation’s economic strength by harnessing our intellectual property capital.

By all accounts Deputy Director Michelle Lee has done an admirable job juggling the functions and duties of both director and deputy director. But this arrangement simply cannot continue. Without a director backed by a presidential nomination and Senate confirmation, the USPTO does not have a leader who can engage in the type of strategic and long-term planning that is crucial for ensuring the USPTO’s continued effectiveness.

Ms. Lee’s ability to take on major or controversial challenges is further limited by legitimate questions as to whether her appointment as Deputy Director was consistent with 35 U.S.C. § 3(b)(1). I hope that you did not casually disregard the clear statutory requirement that the deputy director be nominated by the director. In any case, the question underscores that Ms. Lee does not possess the same clear mandate as would a presidentially-nominated and Senate-confirmed director. Leaving Ms. Lee to shoulder the burden of USPTO leadership alone is unfair, untenable, and unacceptable for our country’s intellectual property agency.

The USPTO is forging ahead with important initiatives like opening satellite offices across the country and implementing post-grant review programs under the America Invents Act. And while the agency has reduced its backlog of patent applications in recent years, as of April 2014, there were still 619,204 unexamined patent applications. These are just a few of the challenges and opportunities facing the USPTO that are needlessly complicated by the absence of a director to provide a forward-looking vision.

When one considers what intellectual property means to our economy, the failure to put in place a strong leadership team at the USPTO is unfathomable. Effective leadership requires a director, deputy director, and their assembled team. Leaving the agency without a permanent director for nearly a year and a half without so much as a public explanation is inexcusable. I look forward to hearing your plans with regard to this vacancy, and I urge you to take prompt action to nominate a USPTO director. We cannot afford to wait any longer.

The White House is unlikely to respond publicly to this message, but will perhaps take some action before the 2016 presidential election.

Supreme Court: To Be Valid, Patent Claims Must Provide Reasonable Certainty Regarding the Claim Scope

By Dennis Crouch

Nautilus v. BioSig (Supreme Court 2014) [New download here: 13-369_k53m]

Patents provide exclusive rights that are defined by a set of claims. The claims spell out the metes-and-bounds of the invention being claimed and are designed to put the world on notice of what is and what is not infringement. To facilitate this notice function of patent claims, the patent statute requires that the “claims particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112(b). The courts have wrapped these requirements in a doctrine known as indefiniteness. A patent claim that fails the test of indefiniteness is deemed unpatentable, invalid, and unenforceable.

Most patent claims have some amount of ambiguity in their scope. The question before the court in this case is how much is too much? Through a series of cases, the Federal Circuit has implemented was arguably a stiff test of indefiniteness – making it quite difficult to find a claim invalid as indefinite. As the Supreme Court writes:

According to the Federal Circuit, a patent claim passes the §112, ¶2 threshold so long as the claim is “amenable to construction,” and the claim, as construed, is not “insolubly ambiguous.”

In its opinion here, the Supreme Court found that the insolubly ambiguous fails to apply the statutory requirement noted above. In its place, the court has created a new test as follows:

A patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art [at the time the patent was filed] about the scope of the invention. . . . .

The standard we adopt accords with opinions of this Court stating that “the certainty which the law requires in patents is not greater than is reasonable, having regard to their subject-matter.” Minerals Separation, Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U. S. 261, 270 (1916). . . .

It cannot be sufficient that a court can ascribe some meaning to a patent’s claims; the definiteness inquiry trains on the understanding of a skilled artisan at the time of the patent application, not that of a court viewing matters post hoc. To tolerate imprecision just short of that rendering a claim “insolubly ambiguous” would diminish the definiteness requirement’s public-notice function and foster the innovation-discouraging “zone of uncertainty,” against which this Court has warned.

On remand, the Federal Circuit will decide whether the particular claims at issue here meet that test.

In the decision, the court highlights the reality that the old rule offers an incentive for patentees to intentionally “inject ambiguity into their claims.” The new standard is intended to help eliminate that standard.

Key points and ongoing issues from the opinion:

  • The addition of a reasonableness inquiry into the analysis means that indefiniteness appears to be moving be moving away from a question of law and into factual territory. The issue has traditionally been seen as part-and-parcel of claim construction, but now has the potential of being shifted to a question for trial. Of particular note here is the Supreme Court’s reluctance to decide the particular case and its allusion to the notion that the result “may turn on evaluations of expert testimony.” (quoting Markman).
  • The Supreme Court indicates that “a patent” will be invalid based upon the failure of its claims. The longstanding practice of the Federal Circuit is that indefiniteness is done on a claim-by-claim basis, but here the court suggests that approach should change.  Assuming that indefiniteness is still considered on a claim-by-claim basis, one outcome of this decision is that it adds additional value to patents with multiple claim formulations.
  • The Supreme Court indicates that any ambiguity should be considered “at the time the patent was filed” and also that the patent’s prosecution history are important in the consideration. What is unclear then is whether the court intended to mean that the consideration should be at the patent issuance, the application actual filing date, the application’s effective filing date (taking into account priority claims to prior filed applications), or the date that the claims in question were filed / amended.

Guest Post: Are APIs Patent or Copyright Subject Matter?

Guest Post by Pamela Samuelson, Richard M. Sherman Distinguished Professor of Law at Berkeley Law School. I asked Professor Samuelson to provide a discussion of the recent Federal Circuit decision in Oracle v. Google. DC.

Application programming interfaces (APIs) are informational equivalents of the familiar plug and socket design through which appliances, such as lamps, interoperate with the electrical grid. Just as a plug must conform precisely to the contours of the socket in order for electricity to flow to enable the appliance to operate, a computer program designed to be compatible with another program must conform precisely to the API of the first program which establishes rules about how other programs must send and receive information so that the two programs can work together to execute specific tasks.

No matter how much creativity might have gone into the design of the existing program’s interfaces and no matter how many choices the first programmer had when creating this design, once that the API exists, it becomes a constraint on the design of follow-on programs developed to interoperate with it. Anyone who develops an API is, in a very real sense, designing that aspect of the program for itself and for others.

One of the many errors in Judge O’Malley’s decision in the Oracle v. Google case was her insistence that the merger of idea and expression in computer program copyright cases can only be found when the developer of an API had no choice except to design the interface in a particular way. If there is any creativity in the design of the API and if its designer had choices among different ways to accomplish the objective, then copyright’s originality standard has been satisfied and not just the program code in which the API is embodied, but the SSO of the API, becomes copyrightable. Indeed, harkening back to an earlier era, Judge O’Malley repeated the unfortunate dicta from the Apple v. Franklin case about compatibility being a “commercial and competitive objective” which is irrelevant to whether program ideas and expressions have merged.

The Ninth Circuit in the Sega v. Accolade case, as well as the Second Circuit in Computer Associates v. Altai, have rejected this hostility toward achieving software compatibility and toward reuse of the APIs in subsequent programs.

Although purporting to follow Ninth Circuit caselaw, Judge O’Malley in Oracle v. Google ignored some key aspects of the holding in Sega. Accolade reverse-engineered Sega programs in order to discern the SSO of the Sega interface so that it could adapt its videogames to run on the Sega platform. The principal reason that the Ninth Circuit upheld Accolade’s fair use defense as to copies made in the reverse engineering process was because “[i]f disassembly of copyrighted object code is per se an unfair use, the owner of the copyright gains a de facto monopoly over the functional aspects of his work—aspects that were expressly denied copyright protection by Congress,” citing § 102(b). To get the kind of protection Sega was seeking, the Ninth Circuit said it “must satisfy the more stringent standards imposed by the patent laws.”

Judge O’Malley in Oracle also ignored the Ninth Circuit rejection of Sega’s claim that Accolade infringed based on the literal copying of some Sega code insofar as that code was essential to enabling the Accolade program to run on the Sega platform. That Sega code might have been original in the sense of being creative when first written in source code form, but by making that code essential to interoperability, the expression in that program merged with its function, and hence Accolade’s reproduction of it was not an infringement.

The SSO of the Sega interface was almost certainly creative initially as well. Yet, once that interface was developed, it was a constraint on the design choices that Accolade and other software developers faced when trying to make videogames to run on Sega platforms. The Second Circuit similarly rejected Computer Associates’ claim that Altai had infringed the SSO of its program interface and suggested that patents might be a more suitable form of legal protection for many innovations embodied in software.

Under Sega and Altai, the SSO of APIs are not within the scope of copyright protection for computer programs. Subsequent cases—at least until the Federal Circuit decision in Oracle v. Google—have overwhelmingly endorsed this approach to compatibility issues in software cases.

Perhaps Judge O’Malley was worried that if she did not extend copyright protection to the Java APIs in Oracle v. Google, there would be too little intellectual property protection available to computer programs. After all, she was one of the Federal Circuit judges who would have upheld all of the patent claims for computer-implemented inventions in the CLS Bank v. Alice Corp. case that is now pending before the U.S. Supreme Court. She joined an opinion that warned that if courts struck down the claims in CLS Bank, this mean that hundreds of thousands of software and business method patents would be invalidated. Given the Supreme Court’s skepticism about the Federal Circuit’s rulings on patentable subject matter, there is reason to think that at least some software patents may indeed fall when the Court issues its opinion in Alice. Would such invalidations affect the scope of copyright protection for software?

In the most expansive interpretation of software copyright law since Whelan v. Jaslow, Judge O’Malley in Oracle v. Google endorsed dual protection for APIs from both copyright and patent law. This ignored an important statement from that court’s earlier ruling in Atari Games v. Nintendo that “patent and copyright laws protect distinct aspects of a computer program.” The Oracle opinion instead invoked the dicta from Mazer v. Stein that “[n]either the Copyright Statute nor any other says that because a thing is patentable it may not be copyrighted.”

While it may have been true that the statuette of a Balinese dancer in Mazer was eligible for both copyright as a sculpture and a design patent for an ornamental design of an article of manufacture (as a lamp base), nothing in that decision or any other has upheld utility patent and copyright protection in the same aspect of the same creation, and it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would abrogate the longstanding tradition tracing back to Baker v. Selden that copyrights protects expression in works of authorship and patents protect utilitarian designs.

In “The Strange Odyssey of Software Interfaces as Intellectual Property,” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1323818, I traced the tortuous evolution of the law in relation to the protection of software interfaces. At first, they were not treated as intellectual property at all. Firms published APIs so that others would make programs to run on their computing systems. As firms recognized that they could license interface information to generate revenues, APIs were protected as trade secrets. In the mid- to late 1980s, some argued that the “structure, sequence, and organization” (SSO) of APIs should be protected by copyright law, but by the early 1990s, courts decided they were unprotectable elements of programs, more suited to patent than to copyright protection. And so firms began patenting interface designs, as well as continuing to license them as trade secrets.

If Judge O’Malley’s opinion in the Oracle v. Google case is to be believed, APIs have migrated back into copyright’s realm big time. Unless overturned by the Supreme Court or repudiated or distinguished in subsequent cases, the Oracle decision may well reignite the software copyright wars that so many of us thought had died out after the Sega, Altai, and their progeny.

Spouses of Inventors as Co-Owners

I’ve written about this issue:  in a community property state, does the spouse of an inventor own the patent?  The answer every “family law” expert I know of says yes; every patent lawyer says “no.”  It’s come up in at least one CAFC opinion, and now came up tangentially in a non-prec opinion that did not decide the issue.  That case, Taylor v. Taylor Made Plastics, Inc., is here. (Why does the opinion call James Taylor “James T.” and his wife “Mary T.”?)

Here’s my article on this, which I think I posted a few months ago somewhere. Someday this is going to matter, big time, or not!

DRAFT

A Fifty-Fifty Split:  What if the Spouse of Every Inventor in a Community Property State has an Undivided Interest in an Invention?

By David Hricik*

I. Introduction

If you think the title raises a wild possibility, consider what happened in a recent case appealed to the Federal Circuit.  After being sued for infringement, the defendant had the ex-wife of the inventor effectively grant to it any interest she had in the patent-in-suit.  As a result, the defendant argued that there could be no infringement, both because lack of standing and because it had acquired an undivided interest in the patent.

It almost worked.

The Federal Circuit recognized that under California law the patent was “presumptively community property in which [the wife] had an undivided half interest.”  Fortunately for the accused infringer, the wife had not listed the patent as community property when she was divorcing, and so the court held that res judicata precluded her from arguing that she in fact had an interest in the patent.

But, the odd facts of that case should not give great comfort.  It is important to recognize that if something is community property, it means it belongs to both spouses.  If the spouse of every inventor in a community property state has an undivided equal interest in every patent granted during marriage to the other spouse, then employers of inventors may need to obtain assignment of both spouse’s interests for the employer to have full title. If that is the law, then many patent infringement suits can proceed only if the spouse of the inventor is joined as a party.  If that is the law, many companies do not own, outright, the patents that they believe they do.

This article shows, first, that every court that has addressed the issue has held that a patent issued during marriage to one spouse is community property.  Second, many states hold that property rights can arise prior to issuance, and sometimes even at the time of conception.  Third, it shows that the general rule appears to allow just one spouse to alienate personal community property, but with some exceptions.  Finally, it describes the implications for this body of law on patent practitioners.

2. Basic Community Property Law

No federal statute addresses ownership of a patent application, let alone an “idea” that has simply been conceived: state law would apply. Likewise, the question of who has title to even an issued patent is a question of state law.

Eleven states currently follow community property law:  Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, New Mexico, Nevada, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. Obviously, the laws of these states likely vary significantly on some issues, but a few basic points seem true among them all:

The statutes of several community property states provide that each spouse has a present, vested, one-half ownership interest in community property with equal management…. The equal management statutes give each spouse managerial rights over community property.  A spouse may prevent the disposition of certain community assets by the other spouse. Further, either spouse may contract debts during the marriage that may be satisfied with community property.

The concept expressed in the first sentence is worth repeating, since those unfamiliar with community property law often think of it as mattering only upon divorce. This is dangerously incorrect: when something is community property, each spouse owns it – then and there, not just in divorce court.  Also, it is important to emphasize that the community presumptively owns all property acquired during marriage, each spouse holding an undivided equal interest.[6]

With these basic principles in mind, the first question is what is “property” under these statutes, and does it include intellectual property and, most particularly, inventions, patent applications, and patents?

2. “Property” Includes Patents, and Sometimes Applications and Even Intangible Intellectual Property. 

As one would expect, “property” is construed very broadly.[7]  As one court stated:

The word “property” is in law a generic term of extensive application. It is not confined to tangible or corporeal objects, but is a word of unusually broad meaning. It is a general term to designate the right of ownership and includes every subject of whatever nature, upon which such a right can legally attach. It includes choses in action and is employed to signify any valuable right or interest protected by law and the subject matter or things in which rights or interests exists.[8]

An issued patent is, of course, by federal statute to be treated as personal property under state law.[9]  Thus, presumptively a patent acquired by one spouse during marriage belongs to the community, not separately to the inventor.[10]

Numerous divorce courts have divided patents issued during marriage as “property” under community property statutes[11]  Typically these courts assume a patent issued during marriage is community property and do not analyze whether that assumption is correct.[12]   Occasionally a court engages in at least a minor amount of analysis.  For example, a Florida appellate court stated that “[c]ourts outside Florida have reached the same logical conclusion — a patent is personal property that may be the subject of equitable distribution when the inventor and his or her spouse dissolve their marriage.”[13] The Kansas Supreme Court is the only court to have engaged in a lengthy analysis of the question, stating in part:

Vincent believes that the interest in the patents does not have the qualities listed [in the definition of property.] This is not self-evident….

[I]ntellectual property, once it has been created, is less inextricably related to its creditor than other assets now characterized as marital property, such as pensions and professional goodwill. Unlike pensions and professional goodwill, rights in intellectual property are highly transferable, and title may be placed in the name of one who did not originally produce them.[14]

The point here is that state courts either assume or readily conclude that patents issued during marriage are community property.

In some states, a spouse has interests even before the patent issues, depending on which approach to the “inception of title” doctrine the jurisdiction takes:

Arguably, inception [of title] may occur at any of three times:  (1) when the concept is sufficiently developed to generate a plan to build the invention [i.e., conception]; (2) when the invention is actually built [i.e., actual reduction to practice]; or (3) on the effective date of the patent [i.e., constructive reduction to practice].[15]

Courts have applied each view, though often not using the bracketed terms of art that patent practitioners would find comforting.

As an example of the first view, a California court divided patents that had been “perfected” during marriage but issued afterward.[16]  In addition, in a rare case that provided somewhat extended discussion, a Florida appellate court reasoned that a patent application was property that was subject to equitable division because it had been “deemed sufficiently well developed to submit to the federal patent authorities on a non-provisional basis.”[17]

As an example of the third view, a Washington appellate court held that a patent issued during the marriage was community property even though the invention had been conceived prior to marriage.[18]

Some courts adopt a muddled view that seems to reflect both the third and first views.  For example, the Supreme Court of Hawaii stated that “a patent does not exist until it is granted,” and so there was no property right “unless and until the patent issues.”[19] Nonetheless, it recognized that in making equitable division trial courts should determine “whether there was value in the pre-patent intangible intellectual property and the patent itself.”[20]

This shows that patents, and in some states applications and even merely conceived inventions, are “property.” All property acquired during marriage is presumptively community property, belonging to both spouses, not just the inventor.

The approach of state courts and state divorce lawyers to this question stands in stark contrast to common patent practice, at least as I know it.  In my experience patent practitioners do not obtain assignments from an inventor’s spouse.  Similarly, a key treatise on acquisitions makes no mention of spousal rights even as a part of due diligence during acquisition of patents.  I have never seen litigated the question of whether an inventor’s spouse must be joined as an indispensable party to a patent infringement brought by the inventor’s assignee.

The incongruity between how patent lawyers and divorce lawyers look at spousal rights is significant:  if the state courts are right, then spouses may have rights in patents that assignees may think they own outright.  If the spouse has an undivided equal interest in the patent, then they have the unfettered right to do exactly what the assignee can: sue, license, or otherwise enforce the patent.  Either state divorce courts or patent lawyers have it wrong.

Whether those rights exist means turns on the myriad facts that can arise, as well as application of particular state law. This article cannot examine all the permutations, but instead next includes several scenarios that may commonly arise where state courts have found that the spouse holds an ownership interest.  It concludes by describing potential avenues to reduce the uncertainty that may face assignees, attorneys, inventors, and spouses.

II. Federal Statutes Governing Ownership of Patents and Common Practice

The Constitution of the United States rejects the proposition that inventions should at least initially belong to anyone other than their creator.  In light of this, federal statutes provide that a patent must be applied for in the name of the inventor.  If nothing further is done, the patent will issue in the inventor’s name.  At that point, state law determines ownership.  “It is important to note that only inventorship, the question of who actually invented the subject matter claimed in a patent,’ is a question of federal patent law.  ‘Ownership, however, is a question of who owns legal title to the subject matter claimed in the patent, patents having attributes of personal property.’”  Consequently, for example, absent written assignment, an inventor’s employer will not own any patent naming the employee as the inventor.  This is true even if the employee uses only the employer’s equipment to make the invention and is paid a general salary while conceiving of or reducing to practice the patented invention.

State law determines whether there is an obligation of assignment and its scope.  By federal statute, assignments are to be construed under state law.  Thus, the Supreme Court has held that state courts “may try questions of title, and may construe an enforce contracts relating to patents.”  Similarly, state intestacy laws govern ownership of patents of deceased inventors, and foreign intestacy laws govern patents owned by foreign individuals.

There are other circumstances where state law determines ownership of an invention.  The point here is that nothing in the Patent Act, at least,  indicates that state marital property law should not also apply.  Thus, absent operation of state law to the contrary, the inventor owns the patent.

As a result, it is routine for corporations and other entities that employ those likely to invent patents to require that employees assign any ownership rights to the entity. The assumption is that because the inventor has assigned his invention to the entity, the entity holds full legal title, and thus is the not just the only party with standing to enforce the patent, but also the only party necessary to enforce the patent. All rights, lawyers and assignees believe, belong to the assignee.

Consistent with this practice and beliefs, in my experience no patent lawyer seeks assignment of any right from any inventor’s spouse.  The form assignment used by patent practitioners that originated with the USPTO does not do so. Thus, if the spouse has an interest, then on its face the typical form and practice do not accomplish assignment of the spouse’s interest, especially – for reasons that will become clear —  if the assignment is obtained after the patent has issued.  The next question is: does the spouse have an interest?

III. State Court Application of Community Property Laws to Patent Ownership

The precise contours of each particular community property state are beyond the scope of this article.  No doubt in particular circumstances those facts will matter greatly.  However, three basic principles seem to apply across the jurisdictions, with no doubt differences at their margins but not at their core.

First, the community presumptively owns all property acquired during marriage, each spouse holding an undivided equal interest in the whole.   While it is just that – a presumption – nonetheless it is the starting point.

Second, with narrow exceptions addressed below, one spouse cannot alienate community property; only both spouses can.  For example, a Louisiana statute provides:

A spouse may not alienate, encumber, or lease to a third person his undivided interest in the community or in particular things of the community prior to the termination of the regime.

Under this statute, any contract not signed by both spouses to alienate community property is void.

Again, the statutes and case law do vary.  Washington has a similar statute, but requires that both parties sign any agreement conveying community property only if it is real property.  Thus, it may be that in some community property states patents may be alienable by only the inventor.

Third, with respect to personalty, “property” is construed very broadly.  As one court stated:

The word “property” is in law a generic term of extensive application. It is not confined to tangible or corporeal objects, but is a word of unusually broad meaning. It is a general term to designate the right of ownership and includes every subject of whatever nature, upon which such a right can legally attach. It includes choses in action and is employed to signify any valuable right or interest protected by law and the subject matter or things in which rights or interests exists.

Patents are, of course, by federal statute to be treated as personal property under state law.  Thus, presumptively a patent acquired by one spouse during marriage belongs to the community, not separately to the inventor.  As next shown, that is in fact the result that the courts have uniformly reached in the family law context, when addressing divorce, alimony, or child support.

While patents are personal property and treated as such by state courts, there is less agreement on whether intangible intellectual property that leads to or could lead to a patent is community property.  The “inception of title” doctrine is a critical concept in community property states, and perhaps should be to patent lawyers, because if title is obtained prior to marriage, that property is separately owned. Thus, for example, if a husband conceives of an invention during marriage, and then gets divorced, the spouse may have an interest in any resulting patent.  Conversely, if title only arises when the patent issues, then the spouse would have no interest in patents issued after divorce from an employed inventor.

The state courts have recognized that inception of title to patent rights can occur before a patent issues:

 Arguably, inception [of title] may occur at any of three times:  (1) when the concept is sufficiently developed to generate a plan to build the invention [i.e., conception]; (2) when the invention is actually built [i.e., actual reduction to practice]; or (3) on the effective date of the patent [i.e., constructive reduction to practice].

Courts have adopted the second view.  For example, a Washington appellate court held that a patent issued during the marriage was community property even though the invention had been conceived prior to marriage.  A California court likewise divided patents which had been “perfected” during marriage.  In a rare case that provided somewhat extended discussion, a Florida appellate court reasoned that a patent application was subject to equitable division because it had been “deemed sufficiently well developed to submit to the federal patent authorities on a non-provisional basis.”  Thus, a spouse can have an interest in patent applications filed during marriage, not just patents issued during marriage.

Some courts adopt a muddled view that seems to reflect both the third and first views.  For example, the Supreme Court of Hawaii stated that “a patent does not exist until it is granted,” and so there was no right protected “unless and until the patent issues.” Nonetheless, it recognized that in making equitable division trial courts should determine “whether there was value in the pre-patent intangible intellectual property and the patent itself.”  Further, it held that a trade secret became community property when the trade secret had presently existing value.  “[O]ne ‘owns’ a trade secret when one knows of it….”  This holding could, of course, create a conflict between the spouses over whether to file for a patent application or to maintain protection of the invention only as a trade secret. The employer’s interests may conflict with the spouse’s.

Numerous courts have divided patents issued during marriage as “property” under community property without needing to address whether inception of title could have occurred earlier.  Several cases have simply assumed that patents are community property subject to division by just dividing them.

Typically these courts assume a patent issued during marriage is community property and do not analyze whether that assumption is correct.   Occasionally a court engages in at least a minor amount of analysis.  For example, a Florida appellate court stated that “[c]ourts outside Florida have reached the same logical conclusion — a patent is personal property that may be the subject of equitable distribution when the inventor and his or her spouse dissolve their marriage.”  The point here is that frequently state courts either assume or readily conclude that patents issued during marriage are community property.

The Kansas Supreme Court is the only court to have engaged in a lengthy analysis of the question, stating:

Vincent believes that the interest in the patents does not have the qualities listed [in the definition of property.] This is not self-evident. The business plan, which is built on the patented concept, undoubtedly will be used in an effort to raise capital for the enterprise. Thus, there is a sense in which the patents may be said to have loan value. Another, perhaps more typical, arrangement is for a patent holder to enter into a licensing agreement with a manufacturer/distributor for use of a patent. Consideration under the licensing agreement might be a lump sum. An initial fee and royalties is another likely form for consideration to take.

The court went on to state that:

  [I]ntellectual property, once it has been created, is less inextricably related to its creditor than other assets now characterized as marital property, such as pensions and professional goodwill. Unlike pensions and professional goodwill, rights in intellectual property are highly transferable, and title may be placed in the name of one who did not originally produce them.

Thus, state courts either assume, conclude, or have held that patents issued during marriage are community property.  The most-cited treatise by these courts as indicating that patents are community property does not aggressively take that position, instead discussing the cases and stating among other things that “a spouse would expect to share as fully in intellectual property acquired during marriage as in any other variety of property.”

Finally, while obviously income from patents that are community property belongs to the community, the majority of courts that have addressed the issue have also held that income received during a marriage from even separately owned patents is community property.

III. Federal Law Allowing for Prosecution by Persons With a Proprietary Interest in the Application May Permit Spouses to Control or Interfere with Prosecution.

While it is clear that an assignee of the entire interest in application may prosecute it, federal law sometimes permits even those with merely a “proprietary interest” to continue and even undertake prosecution, at least where the inventor refuses to do so. Specifically, Section 118 of the Patent Act states:

Whenever an inventor refuses to execute an application for patent, or cannot be found or reached after diligent effort, [1] a person to whom the inventor has assigned or agreed in writing to assign the invention or [2] who otherwise shows sufficient proprietary interest in the matter justifying such action, may make application for patent on behalf of and as agent for the inventor on proof of the pertinent facts and a showing that such action is necessary to preserve the rights of the parties or to prevent irreparable damage; and the Director may grant a patent to such inventor upon such notice to him as the Director deems sufficient, and on compliance with such regulations as he prescribes.

The PTO has interpreted this statute to permit heirs, for example, to not only continue prosecution upon the death of an inventor, but to file an application for an inventor who dies prior to filing the application.  The heirs thus must have a proprietary interest in the application or patent.

Does a spouse in a community property state?  The meaning of “proprietary interest” would seem to encompass rights of a spouse in a community property state.  “A ‘proprietary’ interest at the very least suggests some element of ownership or dominion….”  Given, as shown above, that a spouse in a community property state may have an undivided equal interest in the patent, that interest would clearly qualify as “ownership or dominion.”  Thus, federal law would seem to permit spouse to control prosecution if the inventor dies.

IV. Possible Ways to Defeat a Spouse’s Interest

A. Federal Preemption of State Community Property Law

Courts have uniformly held that state law determines ownership of patents – in every context in which the issue has arisen.  Federal law thus is held to apply, and so there is no conflict, and nothing to preempt state law.

In fact, the few courts that have analyzed whether federal law preempts state law have each rejected preemption, though without rigorous analysis.   Divorce lawyers believe there is no conflict between state and federal law.  As a leading commentator wrote:

The federal statute on the transfer of patents, 35 U.S.C. § 261, states generally that patents constitute property and that they are subject to assignment. Courts considering the issue have held that an inventor’s creditors can reach the inventor’s patents, although with somewhat more difficulty than other types of assets. 60 Am. Jur. 2d Patents § 1168 (1987). Given these points, there is general agreement that federal law does not prevent a court from treating a patent as divisible property in a divorce case.

Significantly, state courts have not analyzed this question at length, but instead seem to accept the proposition that patent law does not preempt state community property law.  State courts regularly divide patents among divorcing spouses — despite federal statutes and the Constitution and the obvious federal source of patent rights.

There is a distinction between the cases that apply state law relied upon by these courts and applying state law in this context:  in the other instances, the state law determines who owns a patent or application from the inventor, while application of community property law divests sole ownership from the inventor.

B. The Exception for Sole Management Community Property

Some states allow one spouse to alienate certain property, even if community property.  The Washington Statute quoted above, for example, requires both spouses to consent to alienation of real, but not personal, property.

Other states recognize similar doctrines, including recognizing that some community property is, nonetheless, subject to the “sole management” of one spouse.  Under this doctrine, it may be that an invention qualifies as “sole management” community property, and so assignment by the spouse is not required

C. Estoppel

Estoppel likely would not be a useful tool at least in those states that require that both spouses engage in the conduct that gives rise to the estoppel.  So, for example, in an Arizona case the fact that the husband engaged in conduct that might have estopped him from denying an agreement to sell property did not mean that the wife, or the community was estopped.  While facts could of course give rise to an estoppel against both, in routine transactions that seems unlikely.

IV. Application of State Law to Common Fact Patterns

As explained in the introduction, accused infringers have raised ownership interests in spouses as a defense to standing in a few cases, but have lost due to procedural issues.  The case law suggests that there may be more opportunities for this defense, and some thorny issues concerning ownership of existing patents that lawyers and owners of intellectual property need to consider.

Suppose, for example, that an inventor acquires a patent while married.  If the buyer fails to obtain assignment from the spouse, then the buyer may acquire merely an undivided equal interest with the inventor’s spouse.

Or, suppose that the employee is subject to an obligation to assign any patent issued during assignment.  The spouse may have an interest in a patent application filed on that invention before the obligation to assign the patent arises.  Again, the purported assignor may own only an equal undivided interest in the patent.

There are myriad fact patterns that could arise.  State law may provide the answer to some of them, indicating that the spouse has no interest, or that the inventor alone can alienate the property.  But where state law indicates that the spouse has an interest, then only if state law is preempted or the spouse assigns its interest can the assignee feel comfortable in believing it owns full and clear title.

V. Conclusion: What to Do?

As noted at the outset, this article was intended to raise the issues arising from the conflicting approaches of divorce lawyers and patent lawyers to patent ownership.  It may be that state laws will need to be reformed to exclude patents from community property, or to allow for the inventor to alienate all rights without its spouse’s consent.  It may be that a condition of employment must be that the spouse either relinquish any community property rights or to permit the inventor to alienate any intellectual property rights without permission.

In pending cases, there may be standing defenses that can be raised, since the plaintiff may not have full title.  Further, particularly thorny issues may face corporations that have acquired intellectual property from inventors or from small companies in bulk without due diligence on these issues.

 

Oral Arguments: Can the Supreme Court Force Clarity in Claim Scope?

By Dennis Crouch

Nautilus v. Biosig (Supreme Court 2014) [Transcript of Oral Arguments]

On April 28, 2014, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the important indefiniteness case concerning a fitness monitor patent. In my estimation, most issued patents have claim terms that are arguably indefinite. The usual litigation resolution of that problem is through the process of claim construction. The patent statute requires A patent can be held invalid as indefinite under 35 U.S.C. §112(b) for failing to “particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[]” the invention. However, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly found that the invalid-as-indefinite doctrine is quite narrow and only applies when a term is “insolubly ambiguous” and when “reasonable efforts at claim construction result in a definition that does not provide sufficient particularity and clarity to inform skilled artisans of the bounds of the claim.”

The result of this policy is that it provides patentees an incentive to seek a claimset that includes some “solubly” ambiguous terms that create colorable infringement argument and whose scope retains malleability. We only learn the true scope of a claim once it is interpreted in court – an often only after an appeal to the Federal Circuit. One approach to push against this downward spiral would be to follow the contract canon of construing claims against the drafter. Another approach is what Nautilus suggests – make it easier to invalidate claims on indefiniteness grounds. At the same time, lowering the standard could open the door to a new intensity of linguistic-noodling by accused infringers.

In this case, two questions are presented:

1. Does the Federal Circuit’s acceptance of ambiguous patent claims with multiple reasonable interpretations—so long as the ambiguity is not “insoluble” by a court—defeat the statutory requirement of particular and distinct patent claiming?

2. Does the presumption of validity dilute the requirement of particular and distinct patent claiming?

Claim construction is an issue in the vast majority of patent infringement lawsuits and, over the years, the Federal Circuit has altered a district court’s claim construction in hundreds of different cases. In many of those, the district court’s opinion was a reasonable interpretation of the claim scope even if not what the Federal Circuit saw as the very best interpretation. In that framework, it is easy to see how the Nautilus focus on “multiple reasonable interpretations” could have a dramatic impact on the validity since all of those claims would seemingly be invalidated based upon the existence of multiple reasonable interpretations.

Predicting Outcome: The oral arguments suggest that the Federal Circuit’s “insolubly ambiguous” test will be thrown out as too strict. However, none of the Justices appeared interested in the seemingly too loose rule that would invalidate claims that are open to multiple reasonable interpretations. The middle ground of requiring claim scope be of “reasonable certainty” seems to be the likely course.

The claim term at issue in this case involves two electrodes of a heart monitor being in a “spaced relationship” with each other. The district court held that term indefinite because the patent did not include any parameters as to the scope of that space. On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed, determining that the term was amenable to construction since the purpose of the space was recited in a whereby clause (to help remove EMG signals coming from a single hand). In particular, the court held that the term had an upper and lower bound: each half must be held within a hand and it cannot physically be infinitesimally small. Now, one interesting aspect that relates to prior functional-claim cases is that on reexamination, the examiner found that the functional whereby clause to be the crucial limitation that made the claim patentable. Federal Circuit cited and discussed Halliburton. However, the court did not address the Taboo against functional element at the point of novelty but instead cited to a list of Federal Circuit decisions holding that functional claim limitations are just fine.

The arguments: Patent litigator John Vandenberg argued on behalf of the petitioner Nautilus while appellate specialist Mark Harris argued for the patentee Biosig. Harris shared time with US Assistant Solicitor Curtis Gannon as amicus. Overall, the oral arguments were not highly elucidating the one major area of new ground covered was an analogy to Chevron analysis whose first step is to determine whether a statute is ambiguous (or silent) as to a particular issue. In Chevron, statutory ambiguity allows government agencies more leeway in interpreting the law. In this context, the ambiguity would lead to a patent being held invalid. However, the court was clearly not comfortable with that test essentially because it is too loose for the resulting reaction (patent invalidity). Of course, invalidating a patent claim does not involve the same level of drama as invalidating a congressionally mandated statute. Apart from the constitutional-political issues, the patent claim being invalidated is typically one of many claims within the patent and that patent is one of many covering the accused activity. In addition, unlike statutes, the party benefiting most from the patent has full control of the language used in the patent grant.

In the oral arguments, Vandenberg makes two compelling points: (1) that ambiguity in the patents is intentional but not justified; and (2) that its requested rule is parallel to that already applied by the USPTO:

MR. VANDENBERG: I think it’s important to remember here that there is no legitimate need or excuse for ambiguity in patent claims. Once the applicant has satisfied paragraph one [of section 112] and its strict requirements for describing the invention, it is easy to claim the invention particularly and distinctly. The only reason that there are so many ambiguous claims out there today is that patent attorneys are trained to deliberately include ambiguous claims. Ambiguous claims make the patent monopoly more valuable. Every patent attorney knows that. . . .

There is no legitimate need for ambiguous claims. There is a strong economic incentive for patent attorneys to draft ambiguous claims, not to put all their eggs in that basket. They want some clear claims in case some copyist comes along, but they want ambiguous claims so they can ­­ their client can treat it as a nose of wax later, as happened here. That is well established in the patent bar, that there is this strong economic incentive. But patent attorneys have ample tools to avoid ambiguous claims if this Court tells them that it will no longer be permitted. That ­­that is the key here, is that there’s a strong economic incentive. The patent attorney and the inventor are in the best position to avoid the ambiguity that Congress prohibits and therefore, the problem is, the Federal Circuit has blessed ambiguity with its test. And in order to stop all of the problems that the amici have pointed out that are caused by ambiguous claims, we submit this Court needs to be clear and go back to United Carbon and General Electric and to the statutory text and be clear that ambiguity is simply not permitted.

After a bit of dancing, Vandenberg began to hit his stride in a discussion with Justice Kennedy:

JUSTICE KENNEDY: Do you agree that the standard at the PTO, and let’s say that it’s whether or not ­­ the claim is definite if a person skilled in the art would be reasonably certain of its scope. Is the standard used by the PTO the same standard that the CA Fed ought to use?

MR. VANDENBERG: Yes, it is, Your Honor.

JUSTICE KENNEDY: All right, that’s a sensible answer, I think. Now, how does the presumption of validity bear on the application of that same standard in the court of appeals?

MR. VANDENBERG: The presumption of validity certain applies to this defense. It requires the challenger to raise the defense, to preserve the defense, plead it as affirmative defense, to make the initial argument as to why the claim is ­­

JUSTICE KENNEDY: Doesn’t that imply some deference on findings of fact?

MR. VANDENBERG: Your Honor, it would be rare for there to be, in an indefiniteness case, to be any underlying finding of fact. The ­­ the issue of indefiniteness is really subsidiary.

JUSTICE KENNEDY: That is, the presumption of validity, does that accord some deference to the PTO? And how would that apply or not apply here?

MR. VANDENBERG: It would apply ­­ it does not apply in this case. There are no fact findings out of the Patent Office regarding indefiniteness. But if there was ­­ the same indefiniteness issue came up and the Patent Office found, for instance, that a term of art, let’s say nanotechnology, biotechnology term of art had a particular meaning, then that fact­finding may be entitled to deference by the trial court.

However, indefiniteness itself is a legal determination. The Federal Circuit said that.

JUSTICE KENNEDY: So there’s no deference to the PTO as to that legal interpretation.

MR. VANDENBERG: No, Your Honor, no more than there’d be deference to the Patent Office claim construction or any other legal decision.

Mr. Harris began his argument defending the Federal Circuit, but immediately ran from the insolubly ambiguous language of that decision.

MR. HARRIS: The decision of the Federal Circuit should be affirmed for two reasons: First, that court correctly held that the test for definiteness is whether a claim puts a skilled artisan on reasonable notice of the boundaries of the invention, and secondly, whatever

JUSTICE SCALIA: If that’s what it held we wouldn’t have taken this case. I thought we took it because [the Federal Circuit used] some really extravagant language.

I mean, it’s one thing to run away from that language, as your brief does. It’s another thing to deny that it exists.

MR. HARRIS: Justice Scalia, we are not denying that those words exist, “insolubly ambiguous,” but what I think this court below, the Federal Circuit, in this case explained, and it’s explained consistently, is that that ­­ those two words are not the test all by themselves.

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So it was fair, as I suggested earlier, nobody agrees with that formulation [of insolubly ambiguous]?

MR. HARRIS: Yes, I guess so, Your Honor. . . .

Beyond the particular quibble over language, Harris seems to provide a convincing case that, even under a lower standard, the Biosig claims are still definite because of the uncontroverted evidence provided that one skilled in the art at the time would have been able to understand the meaning of the claim.

The role of the US Government in this case is interesting because it is in some tension with President Obama’s ongoing initiatives to push for clarity in claim scope. However, Gannon (from USDOJ) did argue that the presumption of validity should not play a role in the claim construction process. And rather that the resulting validity of a claim should not impact which construction is chosen.

Unpatentable: See Bilski, Mayo, Flook, and Benson

By Dennis Crouch

The question of patentable subject matter is nominally grounded in the statute 35 U.S.C. § 101. That statute offers patent rights to anyone who “invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” However, very few section 101 cases actually refer to the statutory text. Rather, the focus is on the Supreme interpretative stance that the statute also prohibits patents on abstract ideas, products of nature, and natural phenomena. It is the definition of Abstract Idea that is at stake in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l. [TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL ARGUMENTS]

Alice Corp.’s patent covers a computerized escrow system and method that CLS Bank allegedly uses in the process of settling trillions of dollars in transactions each week. After Alice Corp., sued CLS Bank for infringement, CLS responsively argued that the patent claims are invalid as impermissibly encompassing an abstract idea.

In the background, the Supreme Court has decided three recent Section 101 cases: Bilski, Mayo, and Myriad. Arguing for CLS Bank, Mark Perry argued that these two cases determine the outcome here.

MR. PERRY: Bilski holds that a fundamental economic principle is an abstract idea and Mayo holds that running such a principle on a computer is, quote, “not a patentable application of that principle.” Those two propositions are sufficient to dispose of this case. If Bilski and Mayo stand, Alice’s patents fail.

Rather, to be patent eligible, CLS Bank argues, the computer implementation must offer a “technological solution.”

MR. PERRY: We know from Benson, the Court’s seminal computer implementation case, that if you can do it by head and hand, then the computer doesn’t add anything inventive within the meaning of the 101 exception. That is the holding of Benson. And the Court reiterated that in Mayo. Flook said exactly the same thing. If you can do it with pencil and paper, then the computer is not offering anything that the patent laws are or should be concerned with.

It is only where the method will not work without a computer, which is not these claims, and where the computer itself is doing something that the patent law is willing to protect.

Justice Ginsburg asked why – if it is such a simple case – why the Federal Circuit struggled so:

JUSTICE GINSBURG: The Federal Circuit in this case split in many ways, and it had our decisions to deal with. You said, given Bilski and Mayo, this is an easy case. What is the instruction that escaped a good number of judges on the Federal Circuit? How would you state the rule?

MR. PERRY: Your Honor, I think there’s a significant element to the Federal Circuit that disagrees with Mayo and has been resistant in applying it. Chief Judge former Chief Judge Michel filed a brief in this Court essentially saying Mayo is a life sciences case, You should limit it to that because if you apply it to everything else, then these patents are no good. Mayo we submit is a technology-neutral, Industry-neutral, exception-neutral framework that can be used to answer all of these questions.

We should note here, that, although CLS Bank sees the Mayo test as exception-neutral, the respondent was not asked to explain why the test was not applied the most recent Section 101 case of Myriad.

The reference to Mayo/Flook is important – with the notion that to be patent eligible there must be a technological innovation rather than discovery of an abstract idea followed by routine technological implementation of that idea. The result of the Mayo/Flook approach is that patent eligibility is temporally dependent. In particular, innovations that were once patent eligible will later be not eligible once the implementing-technology becomes well known. Mr. Perry explains:

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: How about email and just word processing programs?

MR. PERRY: At a point in time in the past, I think both of those would have been technological advances that were patentable. . . . Because they would have provided a technological solution to a then unmet problem. Today, reciting, and do it on a word processor is no different than and do it on a typewriter or and do it on a calculator.

The inventive contribution component, which uses specifically the language of conventional and routine and well understood, will evolve with technology. That’s why it’s different than the abstract idea component.

Mr. Phillips responds somewhat weakly that there must be “significant limitations on the extent to which novelty has to be built into 101.

There is some potential that the decision will be rather small – deciding that an escrow-settlement method is an abstract idea and that the routine addition of computers to facilitate the method does not alter that original conclusion. This result would essentially parallel the results of Bilski v. Kappos and would potentially add nothing of substance to the law. Many of the questions followed this line of thinking and Alice’s attorney, Carter Phillips, repeatedly worked to explain how the technological aspect of the invention is much more complex that has been commonly caricaturized. CLS Bank argued the opposite.

JUSTICE GINSBURG: On the abstract idea, you know that the Bilski case held that hedging qualified as an abstract idea. So how is intermediate settlement a less abstract than hedging?

MR. PHILLIPS: … What we claim is a very specific way of dealing with a problem that came into being in the early 1970s of how to try to eliminate the risk of nonsettlement in these very massive multiparty problems in which you need to deal with difficulties that exist at different time zones simultaneously and to do it with a computer so that you not only take them on chronologically, deal with them sequentially, based on the kind software analysis that the patent specifically describes by function.

And it goes even further than that, and does something that no escrow agent and no … settler that I know of. It actually blocks specific transactions that, in the shadow account, would violate the terms of the settlement that would ultimately be implemented.

. . . [This is an invention that] you cannot, absolutely cannot [implement this system without a computer], because it is so complex and so many interrelated parts.

. . . I believe that if you analyze the claims and you don’t caricature them and you don’t strip them out of the limitations that are embedded in there, this is not some kind of an abstract concept. This is not some kind it’s not an abstract idea..

JUSTICE KAGAN: There is something that you’ve patented that has that is not just simple use a third party to do a settlement. . . . And what is that, putting the computer aside?

MR. PHILLIPS: It is well and again, it’s difficult to do that because you absolutely need the computer in order to implement this. But the key to the invention is the notion of being able simultaneously, dealing with it on a chronological basis to stop transactions that will otherwise interfere with the ability to settle on time and under the appropriate circumstances. And the only way you can do that in a realtime basis when you’re dealing with a global economy is to use a computer. It is necessary to the efficacy of this. So in that sense, I can’t I can’t disaggregate it the way in some sense you’re suggesting. It seems to me it’s bound up with in it’s bounds up with the whole notion of is this an abstract concept. . . .

MR. PERRY: On the abstract idea, Justice Ginsburg, you asked Mr. Phillips what’s the difference between hedging and this claim. There is no difference. This is hedging. It is hedging against credit default rather than price fluctuation, but it is simply hedging. . . . Mr. Phillips suggests, well, we have multilateral transactions, global things, chronological, time zones and so forth. None of those are claimed, Your Honor. Those are all recited in specification. The claims read on a single transaction involving two parties.

JUSTICE SCALIA: Why isn’t it why isn’t doing it through a computer not enough? I mean, was the cotton gin not an invention because it just means you’re doing through a machine what people used to do by hand? It’s not an invention. It’s the same old, same old. Why is a computer any different in that respect?

MR. PHILLIPS: At one level I agree with you completely. There is no difference between them.

This Court has, however, said on more than a few occasions, albeit in dicta, that coming up with an idea and then say, use a computer, is not sufficient. And what I’m trying to suggest to you is we don’t fall within that dicta. Now, if you don’t accept the dicta and you say use a computer is fine, then I think we’re done.

MR. PERRY: Of course, a patent that describes sufficiently how a computer does a new and useful thing, whether it’s data compression or any other technological solution to a business problem, a social problem, or a technological problem, would be within the realm of the of the patent laws. That is what the patent laws have always been for. . . . Those algorithms, those inventions are undoubtedly technological. And if they are used in a trading platform or a hedging system or something else, that wouldn’t disable them [as patent eligible].

The bigger version of the decision would more particularly address software patenting. Here, Alice suggests that the case is very much about the ongoing viability of software patents:

JUSTICE KENNEDY: You understand the government to say no software patents.

MR. PHILLIPS: That’s the way I interpret the government’s the government’s brief.

However, both CLS Bank and the Government argue otherwise. Mr. Perry states “this will not affect software patents. . . . [Rather,] we are talking about a group of patents … that’s way out at the tail end of the distribution.” Likewise, the Solicitor General Verrilli argued that “it’s just not correct to say that our approach would make software patenting ineligible. [In our proposed test] any software patent that improves the functioning of the computer technology is eligible. Any software patent that improves that is used to improve another technology is eligible.” In thinking about the consequences for patentees who already hold patents that may become ineligible, Mr. Perry suggested that their problems are minimal because “the patent holder would have the opportunity to institute a reexamination proceeding or some sort of administration process to address that issue.”

Justice Breyer indicated the importance of creating a rule that works:

JUSTICE BREYER: There is a risk that you will take business in the United States or large segments and instead of having competition on price, service and better production methods, we’ll have competition on who has the best patent lawyer. . . . And if you go the other way and say never, then what you do is you rule out real inventions with computers. . . . [The amicus briefs provide] a number of suggestions as to how to go between Scylla and Charybdis. . . . I need to know what in your opinion is the best way of sailing between these two serious arms.

MR. PHILLIPS: Well, Justice Breyer, I guess I would suggest to you that you might want to deal with the problem you know as opposed to the problems you don’t know at this stage. I mean, we have had business method patents and software patents in existence for well over a decade and they’re obviously quite significant in number. And and we know what the system is we have. And Congress looked at that system, right, and didn’t say no to business methods patents, didn’t say no to software patents, instead said the solution to this problem is to get it out of the judicial process and create an administrative process, but leave the substantive standards intact.

So my suggestion to you would be follow that same advice, a liberal interpretation of 101 and not a caricature of the claims, analyze the claims as written, and therefore say that the solution is 102 and 103 and use the administrative process.

. . . . So on the one hand, you’ve got a problem that it seems to me Congress to some extent has said is okay and we’ve got a solution and that solution’s playing through. On the other hand, if this Court were to say much more categorically either that there’s no such thing as business method patents or adopt the Solicitor General’s interpretation, which is to say that there cannot be software unless the software somehow actually improves the computer, as opposed to software improving every other device or any other mechanism that might be out there.

What we know is that this would inherently declare and in one fell swoop hundreds of thousands of patents invalid, and the consequences of that it seems to me are utterly unknowable. And before the Court goes down that path, I would think it would think long and hard about whether isn’t that a judgment that Congress ought to make. And It seems to me in that sense you’re essentially where the Court was in Chakrabarty, where everybody was saying you’ve got to act in one way or the other or the world comes to an end, and the courts have said, we’ll apply 101 directly. . . .

MR. PERRY: That path between Scylla and Charybdis was charted in Bilski and Mayo. Bilski holds that a fundamental economic principle is an abstract idea and Mayo holds that running such a principle on a computer is, quote, “not a patentable application of that principle.” Those two propositions are sufficient to dispose of this case. If Bilski and Mayo stand, Alice’s patents fail.

The Government test is a bit difficult to fully discern and even General Verrili had some trouble explaining:

JUSTICE BREYER: I think you say a computer improvement that, in fact, leads to an improvement in harvesting cotton is an improvement through a computer of technology, so it qualifies. But then I think you were going to say, or I got this also from the brief, a computer improvement that leads to an improvement in the methods of selling bonds over the telephone is not an improvement in technology reached by the computer. Am I right about the distinction you’re making?

GENERAL VERRILLI: I don’t think there’s a yes or no answer to that question. [But,] that is generally the line we’re drawing.

JUSTICE GINSBURG: I have a question about how do you identify an abstract concept. A natural phenomenon, a mathematical formula, those are easy to identify, but there has been some confusion on what qualifies as an abstract concept.

GENERAL VERRILLI: We would define abstract an abstract concept as a claim that is not directed to a concrete innovation in technology, science, or the industrial arts. So it’s the it’s abstract in the sense that it is not a concrete innovation in the traditional realm of patent law.

Although seemingly not relevant to the present case, Alice took some pains to explain why their patent includes no software code:

MR. PHILLIPS: what we did here is what the Patent and Trademark Office encourages us to do and encourages all software patent writers to do, which is to identify the functions that you want to be provided for with the software and leave it then to the software writers, who I gather are, you know, quite capable of converting these functions into very specific code. . . .

It doesn’t actually, obviously, put in the code, but that’s what the PTO says don’t do. Don’t put in the code because nobody understands code, so but put in the functions, and we know and we know that someone skilled in the art will be able to put in the code. And if they aren’t, if they can’t do that, then it’s not enabled and that’s a 112 problem.

This discussion of functionality may foreshadow the upcoming Nautilus case. On that point, Justice Sotomayor asked whether Alice is “trying to revive the patenting of a function?” Mr. Phillips did not directly respond.

In the end, Alice Corp’s case of technological innovation is slight. Mr. Phillips agreed with Justice Kennedy that it would be “fairly easy” for a “second year college class in engineering” to draft the claimed software – giving the court additional fodder for rejecting this case merely with a string citation to Bilski, Flook, and Benson.

Software Patent Eligibility: Alice Corp v. CLS Bank on the Briefs

By Dennis Crouch

Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, Supreme Court Docket No 13-298 (2014)

Later this term, the US Supreme Court will shift its focus toward the fundamental question of whether software and business methods are patentable. More particularly, because an outright ban is unlikely, the court’s more narrow focus will be on providing a further explanation of its non-statutory “abstract idea” test. The Supreme Court addressed this exclusionary test in its 2010 Bilski decision, although in unsatisfactory form. As Mark Lemley, et al., wrote in 2011: “the problem is that no one understands what makes an idea ‘abstract,’ and hence ineligible for patent protection.” Lemley, Risch, Sichelman, and Wagner, Life After Bilski, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 1315 (2011).

In this case, a fractured Federal Circuit found Alice Corp’s computer-related invention to be unpatentable as effectively claiming an abstract idea. See, U.S. Patent No. 7,725,375. In its petition for writ of certiorari, Alice presented the following question:

Whether claims to computer-implemented inventions – including claims to systems and machines, processes, and items of manufacture – are directed to patent-eligible subject matter within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 101 as interpreted by this Court.

Oral arguments are set for Mar 31, 2014 and a decision is expected by the end of June 2014. In addition to the parties, a host of amici has filed briefs in the case, including 11 briefs at the petition stage and 41 briefs on the merits. Although not a party to the lawsuit, the Solicitor General has filed a motion to participate in oral arguments and steal some of the accused-infringer’s time.

The invention: There are several patents at issue, but the ‘375 patent is an important starting point. Claim 1 is directed to a “data processing system” that includes a number of elements, including “a computer” configured to generate certain instructions, “electronically adjust” stored values, and send/receive data between both a “data storage unit” a “first party device.” The claims also include “computer program products” and computer implemented methods. The underlying purpose of the invention is to provide certain settlement risks during a time-extended transaction by creating a set of shadow credit and debit records that are monitored for sufficient potential funds and that – at a certain point in the transaction the shadow records are automatically and irrevocably shifted to the “real world.”

It is unclear to me what makes this invention novel or nonobvious and many believe that it would fail on those grounds. However, the sole legal hook for the appeal at this stage is subject matter eligibility. One thing that we do know is that CLS Bank is alleged to be using the patented invention to ensure settlement for more than a trillion dollars daily.

Important case: The claim structure here is quite similar to that seen in hundreds-of-thousands of already issued patents and pending patent applications where the advance in software engineering is a fairly straightforward, but is done in a way that has an important impact on the marketplace. One difference from many software patents is that the underlying functionality is to solve a business transaction problem. However, there is a likelihood that the decision will not turn (one way or the other) on that field-of-use limitation.  In his brief, Tony Dutra argues that the key here is utility, and that an advance in contract-settlement is not useful in the patent law context.

[Brief of the US Government] The most important brief in a pile such as this is often that filed by the U.S. Government. Here, Solicitor General Donald Verrilli and USPTO Solicitor Nathan Kelley joined forces in filing their brief in support of CLS Bank and a broad reading of the abstract idea test. In particular, the U.S. Government argues that none of the claims discussed are subject matter eligible. The brief begins with an importance argument – that “the abstract idea exception is patent law’s sole mechanism for excluding claims directed to manipulation of non-technological concepts and relationships.” This notion – that the abstract idea is the final and ultimate bulwark – places a tremendous pressure on the Court to create a highly flexible test. In my view, the Government largely loses its credibility with that argument – somehow forgetting about the host of other overlapping patent law doctrines that each address this issue in their own way, including requirements that any patented invention be useful, enabled, described in definite claims, and nonobvious. The ultimate backstop is likely the US Constitutional statement regarding “Inventors” and their “Discoveries.”

The government brief goes on to endorse the approach of first identifying whether the claim would be abstract if the computer technology were removed from the method claims and, if so, move on to consider whether the computer technology limitations are sufficient to transform a non-patentable abstract idea into a sufficiently concrete innovation in technology, science, or the industrial arts. “The ultimate inquiry is whether the claims are directed to an innovation in computing or other technical fields.” The brief then reviews the precedent on this topic from Bilski, Mayo and Flook.

Addressing the computer system and software claims, the U.S. Government agrees that they are certainly directed toward “machines” and “manufactures.” However, according to the government, those claims to physical products are properly termed abstract ideas because the physical elements “do not add anything of substance.”

One interesting element from the brief is that the US Government notes that, although a question of law, invalidity for lack of subject matter eligibility requires clear and convincing evidence in order to overcome the presumption of validity. In its brief, CLS Bank argues otherwise as does Google, who actually takes time to cogently spell out the argument with citation to leading authorities.

[Brief of CLS Bank] In its merits brief, CLS Bank somewhat rewrote the question presented – focusing attention on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Mayo.

Question Re-framed: An abstract idea, including a fundamental economic concept, is not eligible for patenting under 35 U.S.C. §101. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). Adding conventional elements to an abstract idea does not render it patent-eligible. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). The asserted claim of the patents-in-suit recite the fundamental economic concept of intermediated settlement, implemented using conventional computer functions. The question presented is:

Whether the courts below correctly concluded that all of the asserted claims are not patent-eligible.

The basic setup of the CLS Bank is the argument that a newly discovered abstract idea coupled with conventional technology is not patent eligible. CLS Bank’s point is well taken that an outright win for Alice Corp. here would involve something of a disavowal rewriting of Mayo.

[Brief of Alice Corp.] Alice Corp’s brief obviously takes a different stance – and argues first that the non-statutory exceptions to patentability should be narrowly construed and focused on the purpose of granting patents on creations of human ingenuity and that the idea behind Alice’s invention is not the type of “preexisting, fundamental truth” that should be the subject of an abstract idea test. Alice also reiterated its position that the claimed invention should be examined as a whole rather than divided up as suggested by the Government brief.

[Brief of Trading Technologies, et al.] TT’s brief (joined by a group of 40 patent-holding software companies as well as Prof. Richard Epstein) argues that the “abstract idea” test is focused on scientific truths and scientific principles. In that construct, Alice Corp’s ideas regarding the settlement system would not be seen as ineligible. TT also challenges the court to think beyond the computer as “merely a calculator and that programming merely instructs the computer to perform basic mathematical calculations. “While this may have been true of many of the applications programmed on the earliest computers over 40 years ago, it is simply not the case today. . . . Viewing computers as merely calculators is completely disconnected from the reality of where innovation is occurring today and where most innovation will occur in the future.” In his brief, Dale Cook agrees and further makes the argument that a distinction between hardware and software is illusory – citing Aristotle to make his point. [Brief of Dale Cook]. Supporting that notion is the Microsoft brief that sees “software-enabled inventions” as the “modern-day heirs to mechanical inventions. [Brief of Microsoft HP]. Pushing back on this argument, Public Knowledge seemingly shows that the entire claimed method can be implemented in seven lines of software code. Thus, while some software is complex. PK makes the argument that the software at issue here is exceedingly simple.

TT also warns against the Government’s position that a strong eligibility guideline is needed in cases such as this. In particular, explains “inventions that do nothing more than use a computer to implement time-worn concepts in obvious and traditional ways will not receive patent protection notwithstanding the fact that they concern eligible subject matter. On that note, TT asks for clarification from the Supreme Court that “Mayo does not support importation of novelty, nonobviousness, and other patentability criteria into the ‘abstract idea’ analysis.”

[Brief of ABL] The final brief in support of petitioner was filed on behalf of Advanced Biological Labs by Robert Sachs. ABL argues that a claim should only be seen as problematic under the abstract idea test when there are no practical alternative non-infringing ways of practicing the abstract idea. On that point, ABL further pushes for the notion that the test should be considered from the framework of one skilled in the art rather than simply the-mind-of-the-judge and based upon clear and convincing evidence. Pushing back against this notion is the brief of the American Antitrust Institute (AAI) drafted by Professor Shubha Ghosh. The AAI argues that the purpose of the Abstract Idea exclusion is to prevent undue harm to competition and innovation. Seemingly, the AAI contends that a claim directed an abstract idea is per se anticompetitive and that even when coupled with technology it may still be unduly preemptive. Oddly however, later in the brief AAI argues for a test that is not based upon market competition or preemption.

[Shultz Love Brief] A leading brief on the side of ineligibility is that filed by Professors Jason Shultz and Bryan Love on behalf of about 22 other professors. The professors make the argument that the world would be a better place without software patents. For its conclusions, the brief largely relies on the work of Brian Love, Christina Mulligan, Colleen Chien, James Bessen, & Michael Meurer. The EFF brief from Professor Pamela Samuelson, Julie Samuels, and Michael Barclay make a parallel argument: “If anything, evidence shows that the U.S. software industry is harmed by the exponential growth of vague software patents.” Without denying the problems created by software patents, Professors Peter Menell and Jeff Lefstin argue that the solution is not to rely upon the “abstract idea” test to solve that problem. IBM offers the starkest contrast to the Shultz-Love brief – arguing that the failure to clearly offer patent rights for software inventions “endangers a critical part of our nation’s economy and threatens innovation.”

The ACLU has been more frequently involved with patent law issues and was a backer of the Myriad case. In its brief, the ACLU argues that the abstract idea exception is the patent law proxy for free speech and that monopolization of abstract ideas would be a violation of the First Amendment. That conclusion is supported by the Software Freedom Law Center & Eben Moglen. The First Amendment argument has the potential of twisting on the ACLU: if the justices fail to see that patents create any First Amendment concern then they may be more likely to support a narrowing of the abstract idea exception. Notably, in the most recent patent law oral arguments on fee-shifting, Justice Roberts arguably suggested that patents did not create any first amendment concerns.

I mentioned Microsoft’s brief earlier. Microsoft argues that software should be patentable – but not the software in this case. In particular, Microsoft agrees with the notion that simply adding “a computer” to an otherwise abstract idea does not fix the problem. Microsoft’s solution is to consider “whether the claim as a whole recites a specific, practical application of the idea rather than merely reciting steps inherent in the idea itself.” Microsoft goes on to admit that its test adds little predictability.

The Intellectual Property Owners Association and AIPLA similarly argue that software “if properly claimed” is patent eligible. On its face, that argument may not sit well with the Court who may see the “as claimed” notion designed to create loopholes for sly patent drafters whose noses are made of wax. A collective brief from Google, Facebook, Amazon, and others support this notion that patent eligibility should not turn on “clever drafting.” On an ancillary (but important) point Google argues that Section 101 defenses should be considered at the outset of most cases. cf. Crouch & Merges, Operating Efficiently Post-Bilski by Ordering Patent Doctrine Decision-Making.