Tag Archives: PGR

Looking at Inter Partes Reviews

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Since the new procedure launched in 2011, third parties have filed more than two thousand requests for Inter Partes Review.

IPR Filings

In their new University of Chicago Law Review essay, Professor Brian Love and Shawn Ambwani explore some of the results from these past two years. See Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at the Numbers, 81 U Chi L Rev Dialogue 93 (2014) [Essay].

Love, who tends to favor a strong post-issuance review regime, suggests that (based upon the initial numbers) the regime is doing its job:

Though it would be premature to make sweeping claims about IPR at this time, so far IPR appears to be a powerful shield for those accused of patent infringement (and those who anticipate that they may soon be). Compared to requests for inter partes reexamination, petitions for IPR are currently granted at a similar rate, but once instituted, they result in the elimination of every challenged claim about twice as often, reach a final decision almost twice as quickly, and make accused infringers almost twice as likely to win motions to stay co-pending litigation. In its attempt to create a formidable avenue for administratively challenging issued patents, Congress appears to have hit the mark—but only time will tell for sure.

Looking particularly at NPEs, the article reports that IPR-challenges of patents being elsewhere asserted by NPE are more likely to be instituted (as compared with the population), but less likely to result in cancellation of claims.

Over the next year, the number of results will grow tremendously and we will have a better understanding of the process and its merits. In addition, I suspect that the results will vary over time as Office hones its approach and the composition and leadership of the PTAB changes.

 

An Update on Patent Reform 2015

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by Dennis Crouch

The current outlook for legislative patent reform in 2015 is not so much whether reforms will be enacted but instead how far they will go.  In a Chamber of Commerce IP event on November 18, Representative Goodlatte and Senator Coons will discuss their outlook on IP legislation in the new term.  Goodlatte has championed strong legislative patent reforms that include a presumption of attorney fee shifting, broadening of post-issuance review proceedings, heightened pleading requirements, and patent ownership transparency.  Senator Coons has also favored patent reform as well as sponsoring bills to nationalize trade secret law.

Emerging as a leading Senate Republican on patent reform is Senator Cornyn of Texas. Julian Hattem (The Hill) quotes Sen. Cornyn as saying that the 2015 Senate will “absolutely” pass legislative patent reforms to address the problem of “patent trolls.”  In 2014, Senators Cornyn and Schumer drafted a compromise bill that was less extreme than the Goodlatte version (that passed the House).  However, that compromise was never strongly supported by members of either party.  For his part, President Obama appears to be willing and ready to sign the Goodlatte bill if approved by Congress.

In the longer game, members of both parties see these patent reforms as potentially offering experimental results for major tort reform initiatives.  The test of success is whether the reforms limit the enforcement of “bad” patents while upholding both the value of “good” patents and the research-incentives offered by the patent system.

With Democrats out of the majority in the Senate, it is unclear whether patent reformers will now push for reforms that go beyond the recent legislative proposals.  A major open issue is that of the short nine-month window for filing of post-grant review proceedings.  A simple proposal would extend that window to 18-months post issuance and additionally open a second window to challenge very old patents.  In the past, I have proposed a USPTO claim-construction proceeding that could be a simple and cost-effective tool for formally establishing claim scope.

Congressional Oversight of the USPTO

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by Dennis Crouch

With the America Invents Act of 2011 (AIA), Congress handed the USPTO a central role in implementing major legislative patent reforms. Those include both designing the structure and procedure for post-issuance review and also taking the first steps at interpreting the new rules of patentability under the first-to-invent system.  For the past few decades, it has been the Federal Circuit’s assumed role to monitor and moderate USPTO activity and decision-making. However, the Supreme Court’s recent repeated rejections of Federal Circuit decisions has significantly reduced that court’s perceived strength.  Further, the express grant of authority in some areas severely limit the Federal Circuit’s review capabilities.  These factors come together to suggest that the PTO is now largely operating without direct checks on its behavior outside of the Administration.

Filling the Oversight Void: Given that members of the Republican party will soon control both the Senate and House of Representatives, I expect this gap in oversight will be at least partially filled by Congressional Oversight.  Adding to the likelihood of oversight is the partisan dynamic associated with shifting into the final two-years of the Obama administration with a high-level of conflict expected between the powerful branches of government.

Unlike Federal Circuit review, rigorous Congressional Oversight would likely not focus on merits of individual decisions but instead on policy implementation, budgetary allocations, overarching policy goals and agency activities.

House Judiciary Chair Bob Goodlatte spoke on this point a couple of months ago:

As the PTO carries out its Constitutional mission, we need to conduct appropriate oversight to ensure that our IP laws are being implemented fairly and in line with Congressional intent.

In recent years the PTO has been tasked with implementing the America Invents Act (AIA). The AIA was the most significant reform to U.S. patent law in my lifetime. I believe that it is imperative for this committee to examine the rules and procedures that the PTO has adopted to implement this important law, in particular the various post grant proceedings called for in the AIA.

Congressional Oversight by itself cannot compel the President to change course.  However, the expectation is that oversight (and the threat of oversight) will encourage a change of behavior and also raise public awareness of administrative issues.  A difficult issue is that we need to drill down beyond the soundbites and Congressional Oversight often remains at too-high a level.  A second difficulty is that none of the Congressional subcommittees are directed toward USPTO policy (or intellectual property administration in general).

The benefit of Congressional Oversight is also that it provides Congress with the opportunity to investigate and perhaps gain a better understanding of the system before passing legislative reforms.

Patent Reform 2015: Republican Agenda

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by Dennis Crouch

Although the Washington DC politics of patent law is somewhat confusing, the divide on tort reform is much more clear and the pending patent reform legislation in Congress is largely tort reform (but with a focus on patents).  The Republican led House of Representatives passed the Goodlatte Innovation Act in 2013 (H.R.3309), but Democrats in the Senate have stymied the Bill’s progress despite support from the White House.  With Senate control now in Republican hands, I expect that a revised version of the Innovation Act will be able to pass through both houses of congress in 2015 and be signed by President Obama.

Meanwhile, changes in the patent system since 2013 have somewhat tempered demands for reform. Particularly the Supreme Court took strong pro-defendant positions in Alice Corp (patent eligibility), Nautilus (indefiniteness), and Octane Fitness (attorney fees) and, at the same time, the new post-issuance review proceedings have proven to be effective mechanisms for challenging patents in parallel to court actions. Further, it is likely that Supreme Court will raise pleading standards for patent cases (by eliminating Form 18) this calendar year as part of a larger reform of the rules of civil procedure. Likely as a result of  all of these factors, new infringement lawsuits are down as is the market-value of patents.  To be clear though, pro-reformers are still calling for reforms and this may be low-hanging fruit for Republican lawmakers.

H.R. 3309 as passed includes:

  • Substantially raising the pleading standards in patent cases – well above Iqbal and Twombly;
  • Creating presumption of fee shifting and ability to join ‘interested’ parties to pay fees when a losing-patentee is under-capitalized;
  • Severely limit pre-claim-construction discovery;
  • Partially limiting the availability of pre-suit demand letters for proving willfulness when seeking punitive (willfulness) damages;
  • Requiring transparancy of ownership;
  • Allowing for stays of customer-lawsuits in certain situations;
  • Narrowing the estoppel provision for Post-Grant Review filings; and
  • Codifying double patenting.

Indications are that President Obama’s administration and USPTO Director Nominee Michelle Lee support these changes (with some modification) — making this an area of early bipartisan cooperation in the new Congressional term.

Supreme Court: A Web of Post-Issuance Licensing Restrictions

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by Dennis Crouch

Last year I wrote about the patent licensing decision captioned Kimble v. Marvel Enterprises Inc. (9th Circuit 2013). Kimble involved a patent license agreement tied to Marvel’s web-shooter toy sales. On its face, the agreement appears to remain in force so long as Marvel sold the toys.  However, the 9th Circuit held that the license ended once the patent term lapsed.  The 9th Circuit decision was easy because there is a Supreme Court case on point: Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964) (licensing agreement unenforceable because it required royalty payments beyond the expiration date of the underlying patent).

Kimble has now pushed the case to the Supreme Court and presents a straightforward petition:

The question presented is: Whether this Court should overrule Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964).

SCOTUS-Blog Link.

The basic argument is that the Brulotte improperly imposes a per se limit on contract structure and forces any royalty payments to be amortized only within the term of the patent.  Often, that result does not make business sense. Kimble suggests that the court do-away with the per se rule and replace it with a rule of reason as it has done in other cases – most notably in the area of patent-tying.  See Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink, 547 U.S. 28 (2006).

The petition also characterizes Brulotte as “the most widely criticized of [the Supreme] Court’s intellectual property and competition law decisions.”

Three panels of the courts of appeals (including the panel below), the Justice Department, the Federal Trade Commission, and virtually every treatise and article in the field have called on this Court to reconsider Brulotte, and to replace its rigid per se prohibition on post-expiration patent royalties with a contextualized rule of reason analysis.

The Supreme Court requested that the Solicitor General file the views of the US Government and those have just been filed – with a somewhat surprising recommendation against a grant of certiorari.  The SG’s position is that stare decisis should prevail. Hal Wegner writes about the case in his review of top pending patent cases: See Wegner’s Top Ten.

Unduly Extending Patent Term: An important element of the analysis here is whether overturning Brulotte would somehow allows the patentee to extend its patent term and thereby prevent the public from taking advantage of the invention.  Kimble argues “no” — all that the longterm license agreement did was amortize the license value over the life of the product rather than the life of the patent.  Certainly, once the patent expires then no-one can be liable for infringement and any generic (or branded) company can make, use, and sell the invention as it wishes. However, if we look at this case in particular, all of the products on the market using the patented invention are Kimble-licensed products — even though the patent has been expired now for years.  This suggests to me that the post-expiry-license is having a market impact that is reducing the potential customer surplus.  I suspect that in most situations, the most likely post-patent-expiry suppliers of a product are the companies who were supplying that product pre-patent-expiry.  If those entities are required to continue to pay license post-patent-expiry then consumers may never see the benefits typically associated with patent expirations.

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One factor pushing toward grant of certiorari is the underlying subject-matter.  The patent at issue covers a nifty web-shooting toy designed to mimic (in toy form) spider-man’s super powers. See U.S. Patent No. 5,072,856.

Spidey

The New Role for Post Grant Review Proceedings (PGR)

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by Dennis Crouch

It has now been just over 18-months since we started filing patent applications under the new first-to-file patent system mandated by the America Invents Act (AIA) of 2011.  And, slowly but surely, FTF patents are now beginning to issue.  Those new patents also bring us into a new era of Post-Grant-Review-Proceedings (PGR).

My expectation is that PGR will quickly prove itself as an incredibly powerful tool for challenging patents. Importantly, PGR proceedings allow a third party to challenge the validity of a patent on any of the validity grounds that could be raised in court as a defense under 35 U.S.C. 282 – these include novelty, obviousness, written description, enablement, indefiniteness, utility, and subject matter eligibility. This list represents a major expansion of challenge-justifications over inter partes review (IPR) proceedings or reexaminations. These same doctrines have already been available for covered-business-method review (CBM) proceedings and have been used successfully if only on a narrow class of patents (those covering financial business methods).

Two recent PGR proceedings have been filed.  In one case, LaRose Indus. has challenged Patent No. 8,684,420 that covers the popular children’s “Rainbow Loom.”  Although the patent claims a 2010 priority date, the particular application was filed as a continuation in July 2013 and, at least according to the petitioner, added new mater to the claims at that point.  The second case PGR case involves Patent No. 8,598,291 that covers a liquid formulation of a particular nausea control drug used by chemotherapy patients. The petition argues that the claims fail the requirements of written description, enablement, and definiteness.

The most important limitation on the PGR process is the relatively short 9-month window for filing a PGR petition. Namely, the petition must be filed within 9-months of the patent issuance.  This puts some pressure on parties to monitor competitor patents and patent families.  It also provides patent owners at least some incentive to hold-off asserting their patent until after that window has closed (unless the patentee would welcome the review).  I suspect that the set-up in the LaRose Rainbow Loom market will be fairly common. The patentee (Choon) had previously sued LaRose on a previous patent and so LaRose has been closely monitoring the continuation applications.

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In thinking about how soon the AIA cases will come on-board, I created the chart below. The chart provides some information on the timing of patent issuance — showing the percentage of patents issued with 18-months of filing and 36-months of filing respectively.  A big caveat for this particular chart is that it looks at the actual application filing date and does not consider the priority date that will typically control whether a patent will be examined under the AIA. Thus, even at the three-year date (March 2015), I would expect that significantly less than half of the recently issued patents would be FTF patents.

You’ll note the trend beginning in FY2011 of issuing more patents more quickly.  I largely attribute the change to two initiatives pushed by David Kappos during his term as PTO Director that resulted in (1) more funding to hire more examiners; and (2) a greater allowance rate.  Those factors have continued through the succeeding interim leadership terms of Terry Rea, Peggy Focarino, and now  Michelle Lee.

TimingOfPatentIssuance

Update: Using IPR to Manipulate the Stock Price of Patentees Which Won in District Court

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The creativity of American lawyers never ceases to amaze.  I’ve heard of variations on this theme:  using an IPR to coerce payment, a license, or something from the patentee.  Variation on the theme:

A third party sees that a patentee has won a big judgment, defending its patent against a charge of invalidity.  The third party then cobbles together an IPR petition based upon the arguments that failed in the district court, relying upon the lower burden of proof and broader claim construction that will apply in IPR, and sends it to the patentee with a note:  “pay us or we’ll file this.”  This was discussed a few months back here.

A third party uses IPR as a tool to manipulate stock price:  sell the stock short and then file the IPR.  Or, it sees the patentee is in litigation and says, “give us a license (which we’ll turn around and use to license the defendants) or we’ll file an IPR.”  A story about that allegedly happening is here.

Gotta love America.

The ethics of this are fascinating:  it may be that the OED could be brought in to show that the IPR was filed for an improper purpose and nip it in the bud.  But that’s probably a long shot, given the right to petition and what-not.  Perhaps Congress limiting standing in IPRs to competitors?  It’s too early for me to think in depth about a creative solution to this creative problem.

Guest Post: The Case Against Federalizing Trade Secrecy

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Guest post by Christopher B. Seaman, Assistant Professor of Law at Washington and Lee University School of Law. 

As Dennis recently discussed, the idea of creating a private cause of action for trade secret misappropriation under federal law appears to be gaining traction. Bipartisan legislation has been introduced in both the House and the Senate, and congressional action on these bills may occur as early as this fall. A number of influential actors in the intellectual property world, including the AIPLA, former USPTO Director David Kappos, and a coalition of large manufacturing and technology firms, have publicly supported federalizing trade secrecy. And several legal academics have advocated adoption of a federal trade secrets act.[1]

In a forthcoming article in the Virginia Law Review, I contend there are several important reasons why trade secrecy should remain primarily the province of state law. First, despite claims by proponents, the adoption of a federal civil cause of action would not create greater uniformity for trade secret protection. Currently, there is widespread agreement regarding the basic principles of trade secrecy under state law.   For instance, to establish the existence of a trade secret, both the UTSA (adopted by 47 states) and the Restatement of Torts (largely followed by the remaining jurisdictions) require the trade secret holder to prove that the allege secret has value because it is not generally known or used, and that the holder of the trade secret took sufficient efforts to keep the information secret from others. Similarly, the UTSA and Restatement largely agree on what conduct qualifies as “improper means” of acquiring a trade secret, and both recognize that reverse engineering and independent invention cannot create liability for misappropriation. While there are some variations between states regarding the particular details of trade secret protection, these differences are relatively minor, as the Federal Circuit has recognized.[2]

In fact, adopting federal legislation likely would result in less uniformity by creating two parallel regimes—federal and state—with overlapping authority over trade secret claims. As noted in the recent letter signed by 31 law professors, none of the current bills pending Congress would preempt state law, thus permitting a federal cause of action to exist in parallel with existing state remedies. Notably, there are important differences between the Economic Espionage Act (“EEA”), which would be amended to create a private cause of action, and current state law, such as the EEA’s mens rea (intent) requirements and its lack of express protection for reverse engineering. Moreover because trade secret claims frequently turn on the resolution of related state law issues—such as the scope and enforceability of nondisclosure agreements, or the fiduciary duties of an employee to a current or former employer—courts would either have to borrow from existing state law or create a new body of federal law in these areas to supplement the statutory text.

Second, proponents claim that federal legislation is needed to secure access to a federal forum, which they argue is imperative to adequately protect vital trade secret information. However, a substantial number of trade secret claims are already litigated in federal courts under diversity and/or supplemental jurisdiction, with the number of reported trade secret decisions increasing at least fourfold since the late 1980s.[3] In particular, acts of misappropriation by foreign actors and entities—which feature prominently in proponents’ arguments for federalization—generally would fall within the scope of district courts’ so-called alienage jurisdiction.[4] Others claim that additional federal remedies, like the ex parte seizure provisions in the House and Senate bills, are necessary to prevent irreparable harm after a trade secret has been stolen. However, they fail to explain why existing procedures, such as temporary restraining orders,[5] preliminary injunctions,[6] and civil seizures pursuant to state law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 64, are inadequate to protect trade secret holders.

Third, and perhaps most significantly, the proposed federalization of trade secrecy may negatively impact innovation by undermining a key objective of patent law: the disclosure of patentable inventions. Innovators who develop a potentially patentable invention often face the dilemma of whether to incur the cost, delay, and uncertainty of seeking patent protection, or instead maintaining the invention as a trade secret. Stronger trade secret protection via federalization will likely cause more inventors to opt out of the patent system in favor of trade secrecy. This, in turn, will reduce the amount of public disclosure regarding patentable inventions that can be used by others to improve upon the invention and to practice it after the patent’s expiration. In contrast to patenting, trade secret protection is “theoretically unlimited in duration, lasting so long as the information remains a trade secret.”[7]

As an alternative to federalization, my article instead proposes a modest expansion of federal courts’ jurisdiction over state law trade secret claims that could be achieved by tweaking some existing jurisdictional rules. For instance, Congress could adopt a so-called “minimal diversity” standard in trade secret cases that would make a federal forum available whenever at least one party is a citizen of another state from the other parties. Congress also could adopt a “national contacts” standard that would allow a U.S. company to rely on a foreign misappropriator’s contacts with the United States a whole, rather than just the forum state, to establish personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants. This proposal would offer the benefits of a federal forum for more trade secret claims, while at the same time avoiding the potential drawbacks of creating a new federal private cause of action for trade secret misappropriation.

[1] David L. Almeling, Four Reasons to Enact a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 19 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 769, 770 (2009); Marina Lao, Federalizing Trade Secrets Law in an Information Economy, 59 Ohio St. L.J. 1633, 1653 (1998); Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 427, 433-34 (1995).

[2] See TianRui Grp. Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (noting that “trade secret law varies little from state to state”).

[3] David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in Federal Court, 45 Gonzaga L. Rev. 291, 293, 302 tbl.1 (2010).

[4] See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (granting the district courts original jurisdiction over civil actions between “citizen of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state”).

[5] See, e.g., V’Guara Inc. v. Dec, 925 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (D. Nev. 2013) (granting a TRO to prevent trade secret misappropriation).

[6] See, e.g., Core Labs v. Spectrum Tracer Servs., 532 Fed. Appx. 904 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (granting preliminary injunctive relief for a trade secret misappropriation claim).

[7] Nova Chems., Inc. v. Sekisui Plastics Co., 579 F.3d 319, 327 (3d Cir. 2009).

Guest Post: Publishing Design Patent Applications: Time to Act

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Gary L. Griswold

Mr. Griswold is a Consultant residing in Hudson, WI and was formerly President and Chief Intellectual Property Counsel for 3M Innovative Properties Company. The essay reflects the views of the author. He wishes to thank Bob Armitage and Mike Kirk for their excellent contributions to the essay.

Overview

Design patenting has come of age. According to a recent World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) study, the filing of design patent applications more than doubled between 2004 and 2011.[1] The stakes in design patent litigation today can be enormous. One commentator on the recent Apple-Samsung iPhone IP wars noted, “After operating in the intellectual property backwaters for years, design patents took center stage in the epic battle.”[2]

Enterprises of all sizes have come to recognize the value to be had from securing patents on their innovative designs. This also means that more businesses now need to consider whether design patents of others might impair their freedom to operate when placing a new product on the market.

Unlike conventional (“utility”) patent applications, design patent applications are not subject to the “publication” provisions that were placed in the U.S. patent law in 1999 with the enactment of the American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA). Utility patent applications, with a few exceptions, must all be published and made publicly available within 18 months after filing.[3]   However, all design patent applications are required to be kept in secret in the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) until the patent issues on the application.

Today this secrecy can have significant and negative consequences – for the design’s creator and for those who commit resources to manufacture a similar product before the issuance of the design patent. Unlike most utility patents today, the first inkling that a patent is being sought on a new product’s design may come with grant of a design patent, in other words come at the end of the examination process in the USPTO.

The growing importance of design patents suggests that this exclusion from publication with respect to design patent application publication should be rectified by Congress. This can best be done by requiring that all pending design patent applications be made available to the public by publishing these applications at 6 months after the date that they were originally filed.

Doing so would put the public on notice, shortly after the design patent application is filed, that a new product’s design may be protected. The growing prominence of design patenting, as well as other developments in the law since 1999, now make it timely for Congress to act.

Background

Two major pieces of patent legislation over the past 15 years have worked to make the U.S. patent law operate with vastly greater transparency, predictability and simplicity. The AIPA, with its requirement that most new non-design patent filings must be published at 18-months after their original filing dates was followed by a host of even more significant patent reforms. These were contained in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) of 2011.[4]

Key provisions of the AIA were designed to allow inventors to accurately assess whether they could secure – or had secured – a valid patent. For utility patents, access to earlier-filed patent applications comes though the AIPA’s publication provisions. Clearly, since some patents can take years to issue, holding earlier-filed patent applications in secrecy in the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) until a patent issued meant that an inventor might mistakenly invest based on the apparent validity of a patent that might then evaporate upon the issuance of a patent on a never-published, earlier-filed patent application.

The AIA also sought to assure that members of the public could more effectively participate in the patenting process. It allowed members of the public to be involved in the determination of whether a claimed invention in a patent application can be validly issued as a patent, both before the patent issues and after the patent issuance.

If action is taken promptly after a pending patent application is published, the AIA permits a member of the public to make a “pre-grant submission” of relevant prior art that the patent examiner handling the patent application must consider in deciding whether a patent should issue on the application.[5] These submissions, most notably include the earlier-sought patent applications of other inventors that have been published under the AIPA’s provisions.

In addition, the new “post-grant review” or “PGR” provisions of the AIA permit a member of the public to raise in a USPTO proceeding any issue of a patent’s validity that could be raised in court by someone accused of infringing the patent. However, these PGR provisions, like the pre-grant submission provisions, require that an individual act promptly. In this case, the PGR petition must be filed within nine months of the issue date of the patent that is being opposed.

Given the formidable requirements for requesting a PGR, most individuals making a PGR request will benefit from advance notice that a patent is about to issue. This notice, of course, is automatic when the patent application has been published under the AIPA’s provisions.

The manner in which the AIA built upon the AIPA’s provisions, both with pre-grant submissions and with post-grant review, work to benefit patent owners and their potential competitors alike. However, while these new pre-grant and post-grant provisions technically apply both to design and utility patents, the lack of any “publication provision” for design patents means that these provisions are now significantly less effective for designs.

The Rationale for Excluding Design Patents from the AIPA Publication Provisions No Longer Makes Sense

When the AIPA was enacted, there were two significant exceptions to the rule that pending applications for patent would be published and made publicly accessible. First, these provisions allowed inventors seeking only U.S. patents to opt-out of the publication requirement. This was done for inventors interested in patent protection only for the U.S. market on the assumption that at least some of them might not want their inventions publicly disclosed if they were ultimately not going to be able to receive a valid patent. However, for almost all such inventions, marketing the invention necessarily discloses to the public what the invention is and, in fact, discloses much more about the invention to the public than would normally be found in an inventor’s patent application if published.

Thus, this rationale, particularly today, makes little sense. The inventor can be “protected” from public disclosure by opting-out of the publication provisions of the AIPA only in the situation where the invention is never commercialized and essentially has no economic value, or in the limited situations where the invention can be effectively practiced as a trade secret. Consequently, it is a protection that seldom affords any economic value to the inventor.

Under the AIA, the publication of an invention in a pending patent application provides an inventor with a guarantee that no one else will be able to successfully secure a patent on the same or a similar invention based on an application filed after the inventor’s patent filing. Where someone subsequently files for a patent, the earlier-filed application limits the later-filing inventor to validly patenting only subject matter both novel and non-obvious over what was disclosed in the earlier-filed application.

Design patents were totally excluded from the 18-month publication provisions. The rationale for the design patent exclusion can be found in the legislative history of the AIPA: “Since design applications do not disclose technology, inventors do not have a particular interest in having them published.” That statement, whatever its validity then, was made before design patenting came of age and has little relevance today, as evidenced by the litigation between Apple and Samsung.

Another reason given for the design exception was that “The Hague Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Industrial Designs” was being revised and that any change to the design patent law should await the outcome of that exercise. That outcome is now clear; Congress has acted to remove the exception for design patents filed under The Hague Agreement.[6]

Yet another reason that design patents may have been left out of the mix when the publication provisions of the AIPA were being drafted was the short pendency of a design patent application. “Pendency” is the time taken by a patent examiner between filing and issuance of the design patent. With pre-grant submissions of prior art and post-grant review under the AIA now in place, that relatively shorter pendency before the Patent Office for design applications versus utility applications makes it much more important to have design applications not only published, but published quite promptly, i.e., at six months from the patent filing.[7]

The last reason Congress may have excepted design patents from publication is that some manufacturers may not have wanted the designs for new products to be prematurely disclosed, prior to market introduction.[8] Under the AIA, however, the filing of a design patent application assures that no similar designs can be patented based upon a later-filed design patent application. In addition, early publication puts competitors on notice that there is a “patent pending” on the design so that they dare not copy the design without the risk of infringing a subsequently issued design patent. Instead of a problem for manufacturers, pre-grant publication carries with it undeniably important benefits.

In addition to the “notice” function that arises from publishing a design patent application, inventors whose design patent applications publish secure yet another benefit under the AIPA. They can qualify for “provisional rights” – that is the right to collect reasonable royalty damages from anyone who uses the design during the period from the date the user received notice of the published design application until issuance of the patent on the design.[9] This again reflects the upsides of publication, much potential gain with a negligible prospect of incurring any pain.

Conclusions

The AIA increased the openness and transparency of the patent system by providing for pre-grant submissions and post- grant review. These provisions work to protect the public against patents that lack valid claims – and similarly protect the inventor from making investments in reliance on patents that could never be successfully enforced. Those aspects of the AIA are premised in part on the publication of pending patent applications.   Whatever reasons can be cited for excluding design patent applications from these important provisions of the AIPA, such reasons now have only historic significance. Today, all design patent inventors deserve equal treatment. The availability of the benefits of publishing pending design patent applications should not depend on where a design patent inventor seeks patent protection.

In sum, the agreement to allow publication of design patent applications filed by U.S. inventors under The Hague Agreement represents a significant step by the United States toward achieving the open, transparent 21st century patent system contemplated by the AIPA and AIA. The increase in design patent application activity – and the prominence of design patent enforcement efforts – renders this a perfect time to remove the exclusion from publication of those design patent applications filed only in the United States.

 

[1] According to WIPO, in 2012, “the 1.22 million industrial designs contained in applications grew by 17%—the highest growth on record.” http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/freepublications/en/statistics/943/wipo_pub_943_2013.pdf, at p. 4.

[2] See http://designpatentattorney.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Carani-Lanslide-Article-Design-Patents-Take-Center-Stage-Jan-Feb-2013.pdf.

[3] Most utility patent applications must be published under the AIPA’s publication provisions. The time period set for publishing utility patents is 18 months after the initial patent filing date. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b).

[4] The United States adopted a so-called first-inventor-to-file system as the principle for determining what subject matter can represent “prior art” to a claimed invention. Also, a number of subjective and non-transparent aspects of the rules on patenting were removed.

[5] Because prior art can be submitted to the USPTO anonymously, members of the public and competitors of the applicant are normally comfortable in making such submissions. Since the processing time is shorter for design patent applications than that of utility patent applications, a narrower time window (e.g., before the earlier of a notice of allowance and the later of (1) the first rejection or (2) 2 months after publication) would be necessary for submitting third party submissions.

[6] The implementing legislation for the Geneva Act of The Hague Agreement has been enacted by the United States and rules for its implementation are being finalized by the USPTO. Once the rules are completed, the formal process for membership will be initiated and completed. The Common Regulations Under the 1999 [Geneva] Act and the 1960 Act of The Hague Agreement provide for publication of international applications six months after the date of the international Registration (which occurs upon receipt by WIPO of the international application). This publication of the international application will be considered a publication in the U.S. under 35 USC 390. The U.S. will not allow deferral of publication. Thus, any concerns related to the early publication of design patent applications as a policy matter have already been decided by Congress in favor of publication.

[7] As with utility patent applications, the public may well be aware of better prior art for design patent applications than the USPTO. If design patent applications were published, interested members of the public could submit prior art to the USPTO with the result that any issuing design patents would have been more thoroughly examined, benefiting both the applicant and public.

[8] Because of the speed of issuance, design applications filed only in the U.S. would need to be published 6 months after their U.S. filing date. Any concern with timing of publication relative to commercialization would seem to be handled by a 6 month period between filing and publication, which mirrors The Hague Agreement, and the relatively rapid grant (typically 15 months) of design patents.

[9] By providing that publication under The Hague Agreement will be deemed a publication under 35 USC 122(b), the implementing legislation (35 U.S.C. 390) makes such design patent applications eligible for provisional rights under 35 USC 154(d).

Court Finds Patent Invalid; Then Orders Defendant to Stop Infringing

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By Dennis Crouch

Following the Supreme Court’s equitable relief decision in eBay, many patentees have found it difficult to obtain injunctive relief to stop ongoing infringement – even after final judgment that the patent is both valid and infringed.

In a recent decision, the District Court Judge Blake (D.Md.) seemingly flipped eBay on its head by enjoining TWi Pharma from making or selling a generic version of Par’s patented Megace ES formulary. The upside-down element of the decision is that the order granting the injunction issued only after the court found the patent claims invalid as obvious. Par Pharma v. TWi Pharma, 1-11-cv-02466 (MDD August 12, 2014, Order). To be clear, the order here is not for permanent relief, but only relates to injunction pending appeal.

The doctrine involving the grant of equitable relief pending appeal is a bit squirrelly – especially at the district court level because the general setup involves the court deciding that its decisions are likely wrong. Recognizing that, the law does not require the moving party to show that its case is a likely winner but only a substantial likelihood that the requested equitable relief will be entered as a result of the appeal. Applying this standard, the district court writes:

Par claims that it will succeed on the merits because this court erred in its application of the law with respect to motivations to combine the prior art and inherency. Although the court stands by its judgment, it recognizes that the case presents a close call. Further, the Federal Circuit will conduct a de novo review of whether the ‘576 patent is obvious, including whether this court properly interpreted the law regarding motivation and inherency. . . . The court is not persuaded Par has demonstrated a “strong” likelihood of success on appeal—especially given that most of its dispute with this court’s earlier decision is only rehashing the legal arguments it has already made. Par has, however, made a showing of a substantial case.

The district court joined this “substantial case” on appeal with strong evidence of irreparable harm absent relief in its decision to grant the injunction pendente lite.

Regarding the ‘public interest’ element of equitable relief, the court found that element neutral.

The court recognizes that the public is served by the availability of low-cost generic medications, especially where an invalid patent has previously barred their entry into the market. On the other hand, the public also has an interest in the protection of valid patents because it promotes innovation. This factor, therefore, is neutral.

An interesting and problematic element of the court’s decision here is that the doctrinal approach makes it easier for a patentee to obtain temporary relief following an adverse final judgment (of invalidity) than prior to such a judgment. The doctrinal difference highlighted by the court between preliminary injunctive relief pending final judgment and post-decision relief pending appeal is simply that the proof of likelihood-of-success is reduced for relief pending appeal. This is obviously problematic because in the second case, the court will have already reached a final judgment that the patentee loses.

In making its decision, the district court applied Federal Circuit precedent regarding relief pending appeal. However, those cases relate generally to the asymmetrical situation of staying-injunctive relief pending appeal rather than, as here, granting injunctive relief pending appeal.

There is a better approach that still recognizes the potential need for injunctive relief pending appeal and that is simply requiring a greater showing of need for relief (irreparable harm; balance of hardships; public interest) when the likelihood-of-success element is reduced.

Update on USPTO’s Implementation of ‘Alice v. CLS Bank’

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The following guest post comes from USPTO Commissioner for Patents Peggy Focarino and is a re-publication of what Commissioner Focarino published on the USPTO Director’s Blog.

Today I would like to address our ongoing implementation of the June 19, 2014, unanimous Supreme Court decision in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al. (Alice Corp.). In the decision, the court held claims to a computerized scheme for mitigating settlement risk patent-ineligible because they are drawn to an abstract idea. I want to share with you the steps we’re taking to implement the decision.

First, on June 25th, we issued preliminary examination instructions to assist examiners when evaluating subject matter eligibility of claims involving abstract ideas, particularly computer-implemented abstract ideas, in view of Alice Corp.

Second, the USPTO has applications that were indicated as allowable prior to Alice Corp., but that have not yet issued as patents. Given our duty to issue patents in compliance with existing case law, we have taken steps to avoid granting patents on those applications containing patent ineligible claims in view of Alice Corp. To this end, our primary examiners and supervisory patent examiners (SPEs) promptly reviewed the small group of such applications that were most likely to be affected by the Alice Corp. ruling.

We withdrew notice of allowances for some of these applications due to the presence of at least one claim having an abstract idea and no more than a generic computer to perform generic computer functions. After withdrawal, the applications were returned to the originally assigned examiner for further prosecution. Over the past several days, our examiners have proactively notified those applicants whose applications were withdrawn. (Applicants who had already paid the issue fee for applications withdrawn from allowance may request a refund, a credit to a deposit account, or reapplication of the fee if the applications return to allowed status.)

This limited action was closely-tailored and taken specifically in reaction to the Alice Corp. decision. We do not anticipate further review of any applications indicated as allowable under this process, as examiners are currently following the Alice Corp. preliminary instructions during examination (i.e., prior to allowance).

Third, as we continue to study Alice Corp. in the context of existing and developing precedent, public feedback will assist us in formulating further guidance for our examiners. On June 30th, a Federal Register Notice was published to solicit written comments from the public on the preliminary examination instructions. The period for submitting those comments ended July 31, 2014. We appreciate the comments we have received to date. All input will be carefully considered as we work to develop further examination guidance, which we anticipate issuing this coming fall.

We look forward to working with our stakeholders in refining our examination guidance, and will continue to seek feedback as we implement changes as the laws evolve.

Studying the Mongrel: Why Teva v. Sandoz Won’t Solve Claim Construction

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Guest post by Heather F. Auyang, Senior Counsel at LTL Trial Attorneys in San Francisco, California. The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect the views or opinions of LTL Trial Attorneys.

This is the Teva-update to last summer’s Patently-O Guest Post titled “Why Lighting Ballast Won’t Solve Claim Construction” (https://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/07/guest-post-why-lighting-ballast-wont-solve-claim-construction.html), which discussed two then-recently published empirical studies – a study of “close cases” (analyzing all post-Markman claim construction cases where the Federal Circuit panel was split) and a study of “reversals” (analyzing all post-Phillips claim construction cases in which the Federal Circuit reversed the district court).   Updates to both studies have now been published in a sequel article, which provides further explanation and answers to some of the questions that were raised in this very forum last year.  The past year’s data is unsurprising – it is exactly what the models provided by the original studies predicted, and it confirms, yet again, that changing the standard of review will not have a particularly beneficial effect on claim construction predictability or consistency. This conclusion is based on two key facts shown by the data:  (1) that Federal Circuit judges remain divided on how to approach the task of claim construction, and (2) that when district courts are reversed, it’s almost always because they have misapplied settled claim construction principles.  In fact, giving more deference to district courts will likely exacerbate, rather than fix, problems with claim construction.

The close cases study (of 105 cases) continues to show that each Federal Circuit judge who has participated in more than five close cases falls into a distinct camp.  Judges Wallach, Linn, Clevenger, and Moore “go broad” in over 66% of close cases (Judge Rader was also in this group); Judges Bryson, Prost, Mayer, Schall, and Dyk “go broad” in between 47% and 55% of close cases; and Judges Newman and Lourie “go broad” in under 31 percent of close cases.

As pointed out last year, if the goal is to make claim construction more predictable, a good place to start would be to ensure that all the Federal Circuit judges are following the same rules of claim construction.  This data clearly shows that they are not.  While any given judge in any given opinion can cite the same agreed-upon rules, the rules are not preventing significant differences in approach among the judges.  Last year’s post and article posited that some judges are expressly or implicitly following an “actually invented” standard that other judges reject.  Whatever the explanation, until these differences are ironed out, tinkering with other issues – like deference to district courts – is unlikely to be productive.

The reversals data (based on 153 cases) is even more relevant to the question of deference than is the close cases data, since it deals directly with the relationship between the Federal Circuit and the district courts.  Focusing on reversals makes sense because this dataset, presumably, includes the cases whose results would change if the Supreme Court determines that district courts should get more deference in claim construction.  Accordingly, these are the decisions that should be studied before one concludes that the current standard of de novo review should be changed.  As it turns out, the reversals data suggests that the high reversal rate is caused by district court error, not Federal Circuit arbitrariness. If that’s the case, why in the world are people advocating more deference to district courts?

The reversals study coded for whether the Federal Circuit decision was in a broadening or a narrowing direction.  The result for the 11-month period since the last study was a broadening rate of 87.5%, even higher than the previously-reported overall broadening rate of 72.5%.  In other words, in cases where district courts are “getting it wrong,” according to the Federal Circuit, they are systematically interpreting the claims too narrowly.  As pointed out last year, these narrowing interpretations typically enable district courts to grant summary judgment of non-infringement (or encourage the parties to enter such a stipulation), and thereby permit the Federal Circuit to review the claim construction issue without going through the trouble and expense of a trial.  In the year since then, we have not heard any other plausible explanation.  Last year’s post and article also challenged any advocate of deference to provide one or more examples from the “reversals” cases that (1) would have come out differently under a deference regime, and (2) should have come out differently.  We haven’t heard anything on that either.

This year’s article – including fancy color charts analyzing Federal Circuit judge proclivities across broad/narrow, less spec/more spec, pro-patent/anti-patent, and pro-affirm/pro- reverse; and pie-charts and tables for the reversals data –  is What Reversals and Close Cases Reveal About Claim Construction at the Federal Circuit – The Sequel, 13 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 525 (2014) (available at http://repository.jmls.edu/ripl/vol13/iss3/3/). The comments here on last year’s article were of a very high caliber; hoping for the same again this time!

 

 

Federal Circuit Orders District Court to Stay Litigation to Await Conclusion of Later-Filed Post-Issuance Review (CBM) Proceeding

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By Dennis Crouch

VirtualAgility Inc., v. Salesforce.com, Dell, Dr. Pepper, et al. (Fed. Cir. 2014)

The America-Invents-Act (AIA) created set of new and powerful administrative proceedings that allow third parties to challenge issued patents. These include post-grant review (PGR), covered business method review (CBM), and inter partes review (IPR). Congress maintained the less-powerful but still important third-party requested ex parte reexamination. In the coming months, the Federal Circuit will be challenged with reviewing various aspects of the new proceedings. Perhaps most importantly, the court will be challenged with determining how much deference and leeway to give the USPTO in developing its own procedures and interpretation of the law.

Apart from the agency deference issue, a second major issue whose steam continues to build involves the rising number of conflicts between federal courts and the patent office. Traditionally, post-issuance challenges have been handled by the courts, but the new procedures have shifted the balance of power. It turns out that most patents involved in post-issuance administrative challenges are also involved in parallel challenges in federal district court. These parallel proceedings will often have somewhat different results, and many remain confused over the potential result of such a conflict. In the extreme, the issue raises constitutional questions of separation of powers between the executive (the PTO) and the courts.

One solution to the conflict is to have the decision-makers take turns and apply principles of estoppel, preclusion, and comity to resolve the delayed process in a way that avoids conflict with the first-decided case. The PTO has generally refused to stay its proceedings and many district court judges have difficulty ordering stays – especially in cases such as this where the review request is filed several months after the infringement lawsuit. It is important to recognize that post-issuance review requests are limited by law to only challenge issues that can also be challenged in court. Thus, for a judge, the post-issuance review request serves as a transparent statement that the defendant does not trust the judge or jury to make the call.

The Timeline Here: In January 2013, VA sued the defendants in the Eastern District of Texas, alleging infringement of its U.S. Patent No. 8,095,413. Five months later (May 2013) one of the defendants (Salesforce.Com) filed a covered business method review (CBM) petition alleging that that the claim of the patent were all invalid under Sections 101, 102, and 103 of the Patent Act. In November 2013, the PTAB partially granted the CBM petition and ordered review of the claims under Sections 101 and 102 (but not 103) and setting a July 2014 PTAB trial date with a final decision expected by November 2014. At that point, the district court was made-aware of the PTAB’s late-start but rapid progress. However, the district court refused to stay the litigation pending outcome of the PTAB case and continued moving forward with claim construction hearing set for April 2014 and trial also set for November 2014.

One aspect of the new CBM process is that the statute allows for interlocutory appeal of a district court’s decision to grant or deny a stay of litigation pending CBM review. Thus, after the district court refused to grant the stay, Salesforce appealed. The Federal Circuit quickly granted a stay of the district court litigation pending appeal and has now ordered that the district court to stay its proceedings pending the CBM review. The majority decision here is written by Judge Moore and joined by Judge Chen. Judge Newman wrote in dissent arguing that the decision here removes the discretion given to district courts.

The statute provides four factors that a district court must consider when determining whether or not to grant a stay of a late-filed CBM review.

[T]he court shall decide whether to enter a stay based on—

(A) whether a stay, or the denial thereof, will simplify the issues in question and streamline the trial;

(B) whether discovery is complete and whether a trial date has been set;

(C) whether a stay, or the denial thereof, would unduly prejudice the nonmoving party or present a clear tactical advantage for the moving party; and

(D) whether a stay, or the denial thereof, will reduce the burden of litigation on the parties and on the court.

AIA §18(b)(1). Regarding appeals, the statute indicates that the Federal Circuit’s “shall review the district court’s decision to ensure consistent application of established precedent, and such review may be de novo.” AIA §18(b)(2). Thus, Judge Newman’s call for deference is likely misplaced. For its part, the majority refused to determine whether any deference is required and instead held that reversal was warranted even under an abuse of discretion standard.

The result here provides a strong suggestion to district courts that they should stay litigation once the PTAB has indicated that it will review the identical claims being litigated in court.

Patent Examiners and Litigation Study

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Guest Post by Prof. Shine Tu.  Dr. Tu is an Associate Professor of Law at the West Virginia University College of Law and a shareholder in PatentCore. His research focuses on large-scale empirical studies of the patent examination system.

In August of 2013, the GAO recommended that the PTO examine trends in patent infringement litigation and link this information to internal data on patent examination to improve the quality of issued patents and the patent examination process.  In our current study, we attempt to answer these questions: (1) which patent examiners are issuing litigated patents, (2) are examiners who are “rubber stamping” patents issuing litigated patents at a disproportionately higher rate, and (3) are examiners with less experience issuing more litigated patents?  In sum, do patent examiners who issue litigated patents have common characteristics?  Intuition would argue that those examiners who issue the most patents (approximately one patent every three business days) would exhibit a higher litigation rate.  Surprisingly, this study suggests that this is wrong.

This study uses two new patent databases, that code for nearly 1.7 million patents and approximately 12,000 patents that were litigated between 2010 and 2011.  This study determined that litigated patents mainly come from primary examiners who grant between 45-60 patents per year with between three to five years of experience.  These examiners are contributing to the litigated patent pool at a higher rate than expected.  Interestingly, the highest volume primary examiners (examiners who on average grant more than 80 patents per year and have more than 8 years of experience) do better than expected.

In the figures below, the dotted line represents the “expected litigation” based on the proportion of patents issued by the examiner.  The solid line represents the “actual litigation” rates seen.  Thus, when the solid line is above the dotted line, the examiners in that group issue more litigated patents than expected.  Conversely, when the dotted line is above the solid line, the examiners in that group issue less litigated patents than expected.

Figure 1Figure 2Certain structural factors, combined with the Preist-Klein type selection may explain the phenomena that primary examiners with 3-5 years of experience have higher than expected rate of litigated patents. During the first four or five years, when the examiner does not yet have full signatory authority, the examiner is under heavier scrutiny (review by a primary examiner as well as Quality Control).  During these years, the examiner removes easy cases from their docket (by allowing the clearly allowable cases, or by rejecting the unpatentable cases), and builds up a docket of “on the fence” applications.  Once a primary examiner obtains permanent full signatory authority (usually years 3 and above) are no longer heavily scrutinized. Additionally, production rates increase when a primary examiners acquires full signatory authority (usually an examiner moves to a GS-14 after gaining permanent full signatory status). Thus, new primary examiners who have permanent full signatory authority are in the new position of increased production rates while experiencing reduced supervision, with a larger docket of “on the fence” applications. Accordingly, these primary examiners (usually with more than 2-3 years of experience as a primary examiner) may issue these “on the fence” applications on their docket that they would have been hesitant to allow beforehand. Furthermore, applications that are “on the fence” might be more litigated than most patents. This is because strong patents could be allowed quickly by the examiner, and competitors would most likely need to license these patents, thereby avoiding litigation. Correspondingly, weak patents might take longer to issue, but would most likely not be litigated because of their weak standing. However, patents where validity is unclear may require litigation. These more uncertain patents may be issued at a higher rate when the primary examiner first receives full signatory authority (without supervision), thereby explaining the higher litigation rates in years 3-6.

There are many limitations to this study.  First, the database that we use is a broad database but suffers from some selection bias due to the examiner-matching step. Specifically, temporal selection bias occurs in the database since the examiner database contains only those patents that were issued between 2001 and 2012. Accordingly, litigations dealing with “older patents” (i.e., those patents issued before 2001) are not included in our database. Additionally, since we only have data starting from 2001, there may be a “left justification” issue.  Because we start at 2001, examiners who have worked prior to 2001 (inclusive) will be coded as working less years than they actually have worked.  For example, if an examiner started working in 1998 and quit in 2003, our database would code the examiner as working for 3 years, while in actuality the examiner was at the office for 6 years. We are currently segmenting the data to account for these examiners.  Accordingly, our results may be slightly positively skewed.

Another limitation is based on the fact that there are many reasons to bring litigation, but many of these reasons may not represent errors by the patent examiner. For example, a patent could be litigated and found invalid because of inequitable conduct. In this situation, the patent examiner may have issued a valid patent based on the fraudulent information given to her by the applicant. Another example deals with a patent that was found valid, but non-infringed. Here, the litigated patent may have been correctly issued, but litigated due to incorrect interpretation of the scope of the claims. Accordingly, simply because a patent is litigated, does not mean that there were errors made at the patent office.

To address these issues, we are currently working on a study that reviews only those patents that have been litigated to final judgment and found invalid. We then connect these invalidated patents to their corresponding examiners to determine if there are any common characteristics among the examiners who issue invalidated patents. However, we note that the pool of litigations that are litigated to final judgment dramatically reduces the sample size.

The paper will be published in 17 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 507 (2014).  A draft of the paper is available on ssrn at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2458140

Taming the Mongrel: Aligning Appellate Review of Claim Construction with its Evidentiary Character in Teva v. Sandoz

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Guest Post by Peter. S. Menell, J. Jonas Anderson, and Arti K. Rai.  Below, they summarize their recently filed amicus brief in Teva v. Sandoz.

In its seminal Markman decision, the Supreme Court sought to usher in a more effective, transparent patent litigation regime through its ruling that “the construction of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the province of the court.” Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman II), 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996). Notwithstanding the constitutional right to patent jury trials, the Court ruled that claim construction would no longer be conducted by lay jurors in shrouded deliberations. Rather, based on historical analysis of the role of juries in patent cases, characterization of the nature of claim construction, and a comparative assessment of judicial institutional capabilities, the Court concluded that the Seventh Amendment right of trial by jury did not extend to claim construction and that trial judges were better equipped than juries to resolve the mixed fact/law controversies inherent in construing disputed patent claim terms.

In the aftermath of Markman II, the Federal Circuit adhered to its Markman decision, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman I), 52 F.3d 967 (1995) (en banc) – that claim construction is a “purely legal issue” subject to plenary de novo review, see Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) – downplaying the Supreme Court’s more nuanced description of claim construction as a “mongrel practice” merely “within the province of the court.” Markman II, 517 U.S. at 372, 378. Over nearly two decades of experience in the post-Markman era, it has become apparent that the Federal Circuit’s adherence to its Markman I plenary de novo appellate review standard has frustrated district courts’ distinctive capabilities to apprehend and resolve the factual disputes inherent in claim construction determinations, undermined the transparency of the claim construction process, discouraged detailed and transparent explanations of claim construction reasoning, and produced unusual and at times alarming levels of appellate reversals. These effects have cast doubt on the predictability of patent litigation, discouraged settlements, delayed resolution of patent disputes, and run up the overall costs of patent litigation.

The Supreme Court’s Markman II decision points toward a balanced, structurally sound, legally appropriate, hybrid standard of appellate review that would promote more accurate and efficient patent dispute resolution. Factual determinations underlying claim construction rulings should be subject to the “clearly erroneous” standard of review, while the Federal Circuit should retain de novo review over the ultimate claim construction decision. In this manner, district court judges, in their capacity as fact-finders, could better surmount the distinctive challenges posed by the technical, mixed fact/law controversies inherent in patent claim construction. A hybrid standard would encourage district judges to identify the “person of ordinary skill in the art” and, where appropriate, build fuller, more transparent records to support their claim construction decisions. These effects would promote clearer substantive analysis, more settlements following claim construction and trial, more effective appellate review, and fewer reversals and remands.

A hybrid appellate standard is unlikely to undermine the national uniformity of the patent system. In any event, concerns about national uniformity and clarity of patent claims are more appropriately addressed through improvements to the patent prosecution process, meaningful implementation of the 35 U.S.C. §112(b) claim indefiniteness standard, post-grant review and reexamination procedures, consolidation of claim construction through multi-district litigation, and adjustments to substantive claim construction jurisprudence.

Our brief filed in Teva v. Sandoz can be accessed at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2457958

Peter S. Menell is the Koret Professor of Law and Director of the Berkeley Center for Law & Technology at the University of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall), J. Jonas Anderson is an Assistant Professor of Law at American University Washington College of Law, and Arti K. Rai is the Elvin R. Latty  Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Duke Center for Innovation Policy at Duke Law School.

Federal Circuit: In order to appeal USPTO post-grant decision, third party requestor must show “injury in fact”

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By Dennis Crouch

Consumer Watchdog v. WARF and USPTO (Fed. Cir. 2014)

The Patent Act provides for a variety of administrative review proceedings that can be filed by any third party wanting to challenge the validity of an issued patent. The statute also provides the third-party requester with a right to appeal any adverse judgment to the Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit. Following these statutory guidelines, Consumer Watchdog requested review (inter partes reexamination) of WARF’s patents covering human embryonic stem cells. When the USPTO sided with WARF, Consumer Watchdog appealed. But Consumer Watchdog has a major problem with its appeal – standing. Consumer Watchdog is a public interest group who is not being directly impacted by WARFs patents other than the general indignity felt by all of us.

As the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Already v. Nike and reminded courts that, under the Constitution, they only have power over actual cases and controversies. At Patently-O, we used that case as a springboard for questioning whether the statutory appellate authority was sufficient to satisfy the demands of the Constitution, and the Court immediately called for Consumer Watchdog and WARF to brief the question of standing.

Now, the Federal Circuit has dismissed the appeal – holding that Consumer Watchdog’s appeal cannot stand because the non-profit “has not established an injury in fact sufficient to confer Article III standing.” In essence, the court rules that the right of appeal granted by statute is unconstitutionally broad and the cure is to narrow the right in order to conform with Constitutional requirements of standing.

Regarding injury-in-fact, all parties agreed that the standing requirements mandate such injury. [T]he “requirement of injury in fact is a hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that cannot be removed by statute.” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009). Consumer Watchdog argued that its injury was cemented and particularized after it filed for inter partes reexamination and had its case rejected by the USPTO. However, the Federal Circuit has rejected that argument:

Here, the Board’s disagreement with Consumer Watchdog did not invade any legal right conferred by the inter partes reexamination statute. The statute at issue here allowed any third party to request reexamination, and, where granted, allowed the third party to participate. The statute did not guarantee a particular outcome favorable to the requester. Consequently, the Board’s denial of Consumer Watchdog’s request did not invade any legal right conferred upon Consumer Watchdog.

For this reason, Consumer Watchdog’s analogy to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) are unpersuasive. These acts create substantive legal rights – access to certain government records – the denial of which inflicts a concrete and particularized injury in fact. . . [Here,] Consumer Watchdog was not denied anything to which it was entitled.

One result here is another set of USPTO actions for which there is no appeal.

Dan Ravicher is the key individual behind the Consumer Watchdog case. It was Ravicher who also pushed forward the Myriad case. In similar fashion, it appears to me that he has a good shot at having this case now heard by the Supreme Court.

No Patent Office Director – 486 Days Later

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By Dennis Crouch

David Kappos has been an instrumental leader in patent reform over the past several years. In the lead-up to the America Invents Act of 2011, it was Kappos – acting then in his role as USPTO Director – who serve as a trusted advisor to leaders on the Hill who were developing appropriate statutory language. In 2014, Kappos – now acting as an industry lobbyist in private practice – spearheaded a successful initiative to table further patent reforms for now.

Although now an outsider, Kappos’ influence remained so strong in the 2014 cycle because the USPTO Director hole that he left is still empty. Rather, that slot has remained vacant since Kappos left the job more than a year ago. During that time, White House has not stepped forward with a nomination for the next director. I would argue that the failure of the 2014 reforms was more about the lack of a USPTO Director guiding the changes than about the challenge brought by Mr. Kappos.

In a new letter to President Obama, Senator Hatch calls for movement:

June 2, 2014

Dear President Obama:

I write concerning the director vacancy at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Since the departure of Director David Kappos in January 2013, the USPTO has been without a permanent director. This vacancy, which has gone unfilled for over sixteen months and counting without so much as a statement from the White House, hampers the agency’s ability to influence policy and make long-term plans. We all can agree that these are challenging times that demand strong leadership at the USPTO to fuel our nation’s economic strength by harnessing our intellectual property capital.

By all accounts Deputy Director Michelle Lee has done an admirable job juggling the functions and duties of both director and deputy director. But this arrangement simply cannot continue. Without a director backed by a presidential nomination and Senate confirmation, the USPTO does not have a leader who can engage in the type of strategic and long-term planning that is crucial for ensuring the USPTO’s continued effectiveness.

Ms. Lee’s ability to take on major or controversial challenges is further limited by legitimate questions as to whether her appointment as Deputy Director was consistent with 35 U.S.C. § 3(b)(1). I hope that you did not casually disregard the clear statutory requirement that the deputy director be nominated by the director. In any case, the question underscores that Ms. Lee does not possess the same clear mandate as would a presidentially-nominated and Senate-confirmed director. Leaving Ms. Lee to shoulder the burden of USPTO leadership alone is unfair, untenable, and unacceptable for our country’s intellectual property agency.

The USPTO is forging ahead with important initiatives like opening satellite offices across the country and implementing post-grant review programs under the America Invents Act. And while the agency has reduced its backlog of patent applications in recent years, as of April 2014, there were still 619,204 unexamined patent applications. These are just a few of the challenges and opportunities facing the USPTO that are needlessly complicated by the absence of a director to provide a forward-looking vision.

When one considers what intellectual property means to our economy, the failure to put in place a strong leadership team at the USPTO is unfathomable. Effective leadership requires a director, deputy director, and their assembled team. Leaving the agency without a permanent director for nearly a year and a half without so much as a public explanation is inexcusable. I look forward to hearing your plans with regard to this vacancy, and I urge you to take prompt action to nominate a USPTO director. We cannot afford to wait any longer.

The White House is unlikely to respond publicly to this message, but will perhaps take some action before the 2016 presidential election.

Guest Post: Defend Trade Secrets Act — A Primer, an Endorsement, and a Criticism

Patent, Trade Secret, , , ,

Guest Post by David S. Almeling, a partner in the San Francisco office of O’Melveny & Myers LLP. Almeling specializes in patent and trade secret litigation.

It’s been an exciting month for trade secret law. Senators Christopher Coons (D-Delaware) and Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) introduced the Defend Trade Secrets Act, a bill that would, for the first time, provide a federal right of civil action for trade secret theft. And the Judiciary Committee held a hearing during which speakers expressed support for the DTSA, including Eli Lilly’s VP and General Patent Counsel, Douglas Norman, who stated that the DTSA “will establish the gold standard for national trade secret laws globally.”

The DTSA is a game changer. If enacted, it would constitute the most dramatic rethinking of trade secret law since 1979, when the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved a model statute called the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Since then, 48 states have adopted the UTSA in some form, replacing their common-law regimes with statutory ones.

The DTSA isn’t perfect — I’ll explain why in a moment — but it’s the best bill of its kind introduced to date, and it should be enacted.

A Primer

The DTSA authorizes a trade secret owner to bring a civil cause of action in federal court for either (1) a violation of the Economic Espionage Act, which criminalized certain types of trade secret misappropriation, or (2) a “misappropriation of a trade secret that is related to a product or service used in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign commerce.” The DTSA’s definition of misappropriation tracks closely the UTSA’s definition.

The DTSA would also:

Grant courts the power to issue ex parte orders “for the preservation of evidence” and “for the seizure of any property used…to commit” the alleged misappropriation. This is similar to the relief available under the Lanham Act for counterfeit goods.

Allow courts to award injunctions; damages for actual loss or unjust enrichment; a reasonable royalty “in lieu of damages”; exemplary damages up to treble the amount of compensatory damages, as opposed to the UTSA, which permits courts to award only double damages; and attorneys’ fees.

Establish a five-year statute of limitations, two years longer than the UTSA’s provision.

Decline to preempt any other law.

An Endorsement

The DTSA is not the first bill in recent years to propose a federal cause of action for trade secret theft.

Other recent efforts include: Senator Coons’s prior bills in 2011 and 2012; the proposal by Rep. Zoe Lofgren, the Silicon Valley–based Democrat, to enact PRATSA (Private Right of Action Against Theft of Trade Secrets Act of 2013); and the 2013 introduction of FAIR (Future of American Innovation and Research Act) by Republican Senator Jeff Flake of Arizona. These attempts all failed, never making it out of committee.

The reasons they fell short varied; I won’t rehash them here. But the DTSA is the most comprehensive bill to date, as it addresses a broad swath of trade secret theft and encompasses a robust range of remedies.

The DTSA is better than the current system — one in which each state has its own autonomous civil trade secret law. Today, 48 states have enacted some form of the UTSA, with New Jersey (in 2012) and Texas (in 2013) being the latest adherents. New York and Massachusetts are the only remaining holdouts.

Despite the UTSA’s widespread adoption, the “U” — Uniform — hasn’t lived up to its name. State legislatures often modify the UTSA. And even if every state enacted the same UTSA, there would still be a patchwork because state courts often issue different interpretations of the same UTSA provision.

Trade secret owners, employees, and others in the knowledge economy incur the costs of this state-by-state approach. Facing different laws in different states, they are left to deal with the resulting complications that come with attempts to comply with each state’s laws. And once a dispute arises, these differences also impose costs on courts and litigants, who wage needless battles over forum shopping and choice of law. A federal statute would eliminate these differences and achieve other benefits, such as easing nationwide service of process and discovery.

This isn’t the first time I’ve endorsed some form of a federal trade secret statute. I did so in a 30-page law review article in 2009 and in a five-page Law 360 article in 2013.

I’m not alone in my support of a federal trade secret statute generally and the DTSA specifically. Senator Coons’s April 29, 2014 press release notes that the DTSA has the backing of the National Association of Manufacturers, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and dozens of companies, including 3M, GE, Microsoft, and P&G. The AIPLA’s Trade Secret Law Committee recently voted to endorse the DTSA (disclaimer: I was one of the voting members). And other organizations, including the ABA’s IP Section and the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, announced support for some form of a federal trade secrets act in 2013.

A Criticism

Where the DTSA stumbles is in its promise not to “preempt any other provision of law.” This causes two problems.

First, the need for the DTSA stems in part from state-by-state variations in trade secret laws and the transactional and substantive problems that such variations impose. The DTSA leaves those variations in place. Worse, the DTSA adds another law to the already cluttered landscape of 48 UTSA states (with their variations), two non-UTSA states, the federal Economic Espionage Act, and a federal common trade secret law.

Second, the DTSA opens a backdoor to common-law and other causes of action that are precluded in most states. The UTSA “displaces tort, restitutionary, and other laws…providing civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret.” The DTSA doesn’t displace anything.

Under the DTSA, trade secret plaintiffs would have the option of pursuing their claim in state or federal court and, if they choose federal court, the additional option of asserting duplicative causes of actions that aren’t available in state courts.

Why I Still Endorse the DTSA

Trade secrets are the only major type of intellectual property (i.e., copyrights, patents, trademarks, and trade secrets) not governed primarily by a federal statute. Copyrights and patents got theirs in the 1700s. Trademark got its in the 1800s. Now that we’re firmly in the information age, it’s time for trade secrets to join their peers.

True, the DTSA is only a partial step toward uniformity, as it leaves the current state-law regime in place and doesn’t preempt overlapping causes of action. But in the absence of a complete transition from a state-based trade secret regime to a federal one, the DTSA is an important step in the right direction.

This post by David S. Almeling does not purport to represent the views of O’Melveny or its clients.

Guest Post: PTAB Partial Institution of IPR and CBM Review Violates the AIA– But There Is a Simple Fix

CBM, IPR, Patent, PGR, PTAB, , ,

Guest Post by Timothy K. Wilson, Senior IP Counsel, and John S. Sieman, Patent Counsel, SAS Institute Inc.

In the provisions of the America Invents Act (AIA) governing inter partes review (IPR), post-grant reviews (PGR), and transitional covered business method review (CBM), Congress provided the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) with a binary choice: to either institute or not institute a review of the challenged claims, i.e., the claims identified by the petition.  Rather than pursue one of these two options, however, the PTO took a different path in its implementation of the AIA, permitting the PTAB to select only some challenged claims for review.  The excluded claims receive no further review and the final written decision does not address the patentability of those claims.  Worse, because a decision whether to institute a review is not subject to appeal, this practice (which we refer to as “partial institution”) strips petitioners of their statutory appeal right as to the excluded claims.  The PTAB has already followed the partial institution practice for dozens of IPR and CBM trials.  There is, however, a simple fix for future reviews.

The binary nature of the decision whether to institute review arises from the plain language of the statute, which includes section 314 entitled “Institution of inter partes review”:

(a) Threshold.— The Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.

(b) Timing.— The Director shall determine whether to institute an inter partes review under this chapter pursuant to a petition filed under section 311 within 3 months after—

(1) receiving a preliminary response to the petition under section 313; or

(2) if no such preliminary response is filed, the last date on which such response may be filed.

(c) Notice.— The Director shall notify the petitioner and patent owner, in writing, of the Director’s determination under subsection (a), and shall make such notice available to the public as soon as is practicable. Such notice shall include the date on which the review shall commence.

(d) No Appeal.— The determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and nonappealable.

35 U.S.C. § 314 (emphasis added).

Under the AIA, petitioners choose which claims of a patent to include in a petition.  The statute refers to these as the “challenged” claims.  35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring an IPR  petition to “identif[y], in writing and with particularity, each claim challenged”); 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) [fn1] (referring to “claims challenged in the petition”).

The PTAB may institute an IPR if “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition.”  35 U.S.C. § 314(a).  Because the determination “whether to institute” the IPR is a preliminary decision, the statute makes it “final and nonappealable.”  35 U.S.C. § 314(d).  Congress chose to make appeals available only at the conclusion of the IPR proceeding, after the PTAB issues a final written decision.  35 U.S.C. § 319 (permitting “[a] party dissatisfied with the final written decision [to] appeal the decision pursuant to sections 141 through 144”); 35 U.S.C. § 141 (permitting “[a] party to an inter partes review … who is dissatisfied with the final written decision … [t]o] appeal the Board’s decision only to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit”).

The statute further requires the PTAB to issue a final written decision “with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner.”  35 U.S.C. § 318(a) (emphasis added).  The set of “claim[s] challenged by the petitioner” depends on which claims the petitioner includes in the petition, not on a later decision by the PTAB.  The statutory language leaves little doubt the final written decision—the appealable one—must address the patentability of every claim challenged in the petition.

This is not how the PTAB has implemented IPR and CBM.  For example, in the very first IPR, the PTAB reviewed a petition that challenged claims 1-20 of a patent, instituted review only on three claims, and did not address the patentability of the other 17 challenged claims in the final written decision.  Garmin Int’l Inc. v. Cuozzo Speed Techs. LLC, Case IPR2012-00001, paper 59, pp. 2, 49  (Final Written Decision of Nov. 13, 2013).   Even the PTO’s regulations that govern IPR trials contradict the statute. These regulations permit the PTAB to “authorize [inter partes] review to proceed on all or some of the challenged claims” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).  Because the regulations violate the statute, the PTO exceeded its authority in promulgating them, opening up the PTO to a potential challenge under the Administrative Procedures Act.

While the PTAB’s practice of partial institution may help complete trials within the required one-year period, the practice violates the statute and strips petitioners of a statutory appeal right as to excluded claims.  In addition, the problems arising from partial institution of IPR and CBM review will spill over into litigation, as excluded claims return to district courts, presumably without estoppel.  35 U.S.C. § 318(e)(2) (limiting estoppel in civil actions to “an inter partes review of a claim in a patent under this chapter that results in a final written decision”).  Partial institution also complicates decisions on whether to stay a litigation pending the PTO proceeding.  And even if a court does stay a an infringement suit to let the PTAB resolve the petitioner’s arguments, the court may later need to review the same arguments as to the non-instituted claims, and may reach a different or even inconsistent result.

Fortunately, the PTAB can address this problem without impairing its ability to quickly resolve cases.  Even under current partial institution practice, decisions whether to institute review already address all challenged claims, identifying some claims that are likely invalid and other claims for which the petitioner has not met its burden.  If the PTAB instituted on all challenged claims as it should, that would allow the parties to decide how much of the existing page and time limits to use on each challenged claim.  These limits would still prevent trials from ballooning out of control.  PTAB judges can continue to focus their efforts on the claims identified as likely unpatentable.  And by the end of the trial, if the PTAB judges have not changed their opinions that some claims should survive, they would only need to carry the analysis about those claims forward from the institution decision into the final written decision.  By instituting review of all challenged claims and including patentability analysis of all challenged claims in the final written decision, the PTAB would restore the right to appeal the final written decision as to all challenged claims.

[fn 1] Citations provided here are for IPR proceedings; the parallel sections governing CBMs and PGRs contain similar language.

En Banc Federal Circuit to Review ITC’s Power over Induced Infringement

En Banc, Inducement, Patent, USITC, ,

By Dennis Crouch

Suprema, Inc. and Mentalix v. US International Trade Commission and Cross Match Tech (Fed. Cir. 2013/2014)

Although the USITC handles plenty of patent cases, it actually derives its power from the Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B). That provision indicates that the government agency can prohibit the import or sale-after-import of “articles . . . that (i) infringe a valid and enforceable United States patent” The Tariff Act does not further define patent infringement and so the ITC has generally referred to Section 271 of the Patent Act for guidance.  As with district court patent litigation, ITC merits decisions are also appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

Here, Cross Match’s asserted patent covers a fingerprint-scan methodology that includes both hardware and software components. The hardware is manufactured abroad and imported by Suprema and then, once in the US, combined by Mentalix with the software to make a product used to infringe. Of importance, the imported hardware does not – by itself – directly infringe the patent. However, the USITC found that Suprema was liable for inducing infringement under 35 U.S.C. 271(b).

On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed that judgment — holding instead that the USITC’s power only extends to block articles that are themselves infringing at the point of importation. The result for this case is that the inducement theory of infringement could not stand because it requires both additional steps to complete the infringement as well as a particular mens rea. Oddly, however, the majority did find that the USITC may still have power when the cause of action is contributory infringement rather than inducement. This distinction was based upon the notion that inducement is focused on the “conduct of the inducer” and “is untied to an article.” Judge O’Malley penned the Federal Circuit opinion and was joined by Judge Prost. Judge Reyna wrote in dissent.

The ITC and Patentee both filed petitions for re hearing en banc and the Federal Circuit has now granted those petitions. The questions presented are as follows

Cross Match asks:

Whether the United States International Trade Commission (“ITC”) has authority to find a Section 337 violation—and issue an exclusion or cease and desist order—where it finds that an importer actively induced infringement of a patented invention using its imported articles but the direct infringement occurred post-importation.

Cross Match argues that the question is largely answered by Young Eng’rs, Inc. v. ITC, 721 F.2d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Vizio, Inc. v. ITC, 605 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2010); and Disabled Am. Veterans v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 419 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

The USITC asks:

(1) Did the panel contradict Supreme Court precedent in Grokster and precedents of this Court when it held that infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) “is untied to an article”?

(2) Did the panel contradict Supreme Court precedent in Grokster and this Court’s precedent in Standard Oil when it held that there can be no liability for induced infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) at the time a product is imported because direct infringement does not occur until a later time?

(3) When the panel determined the phrase “articles that . . . infringe” in 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) does not extend to articles that infringe under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), did the panel err by contradicting decades of precedent and by failing to give required deference to the U.S. International Trade Commission (“the Commission”) in its interpretation of its own statute?

(4) Did the panel misinterpret the Commission’s order as a “ban [on the] importation of articles which may or may not later give rise to direct infringement” when the order was issued to remedy inducement of infringement and when the order permits U.S. Customs and Border Protection to allow importation upon certification that the articles are not covered by the order?

The USITC argues that these questions are fully answered (in its favor) by Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 940 n.13 (2005); Standard Oil Co. v. Nippon Shokubai Kagaku Kogyo Co., 754 F.2d 345, 348 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Rich, J.); Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int’l, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Vizio, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 605 F.3d 1330, 1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 2010); The Young Engineers, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 721 F.2d 1305, 1310, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984); and Enercon GmbH v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 151 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

The accused infringers here argued that the fingerprint scanning hardware they are importing are simple staple goods that cannot themselves infringe even if their intended use is infringing.

Documents:

In many ways, this is another divided infringement inducement case. The Supreme Court is currently deciding that issue in Akamai and a decision is expected within the next four weeks.  The Federal Circuit may do well to delay its briefing in this case until Akamai is decided.

= = = = =

Parallel Process: Despite its “international” name, the USITC is actually a branch of the U.S. government charged with protecting U.S. industry and U.S. goals in international trade.  The USITC’s jurisdiction focuses solely on border-crossing issues and, in the patent context, investigates infringing imports.  It turns out that district courts can also block the importation of infringing goods.  There are some differences in remedy and process, but the basic patent policy question is whether the additional parallel procedure offered by the USITC fills an important gap in district court adjudication. And, if so, why does that gap exist?

Administrative Law: Moving from patent policy, the issues here also focus on a continued power struggle between the various branches of government. One question here is the level of deference that should be given to the USITC in carrying out its mandate.

– Dennis