Abbott Labs v. Andrx Pharma (Fed. Cir. 2006, 05–1433).
Abbot was awarded a preliminary injunction (PI) against Teva to stop alleged infringement of its patents relating to extended release clarithromycin. The CAFC reviewed that holding for abuse of discretion or clear error.
Looking at the prior art, the lower court found no motivation to combine several prior art references that discussed azithromycin rather than clarithromycin. On appeal, the CAFC found the motivation in the form of an implicit admission made by Abbott in one of its prior patents. In that prior patent, the specification discussed only clarithromycin, but the claims were directed at both azithromycin and clarithromycin.
Because the [earlier Abbott] patent explicitly discloses only clarithromycin controlled release compositions, yet claims azithromycin compositions, we conclude that Abbott has represented to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") that the differences between clarithromycin and azithromycin were such that azithromycin could be substituted into a controlled release clarithromycin composition by a person of ordinary skill in the art without undue experimentation.
Based on the earlier Abbott patent, the CAFC found a substantial argument that a jury could find a motivation to combine the references with a reasonable expectation of success.
Regarding potential irreparable harm, the CAFC held that direct competition “alone does not establish that Abbott’s harm will be irreparable.”
And, on the question of public interest, the appellate panel “agree[d] with the district court that the public is best served by enforcing patents that are likely valid and infringed.” But, because of the chance that Abbott’s patents are invalid, the panel concluded “that the public interest is best served by denying the preliminary injunction.”
In dissent, Judge Newman argued that the majority opinion constituted de novo rule and did not give significant deference to the lower court — as is required by law.
My colleagues do not discuss the trial judge’s careful explanations, but, upon finding that Teva has raised a "substantial question" about patent validity, they hold that Teva should be permitted to practice the Abbott invention before patent validity is decided. With all respect to my colleagues’ concerns, they misapply not only the criteria of the preliminary injunction but also the standard of appellate review.
Newman argues that the criteria used by the majority for determining likelihood of success on the merits were not correct:
Thus my colleagues conclude that claim 4 of the ’718 patent is "vulnerable to allegations of invalidity," and find "a substantial argument" as to other claims. These are not the criteria of likelihood of success.