
Thanks, Dennis
dcrouch@gmail.com

Thanks, Dennis
dcrouch@gmail.com
Terry Ludlow of ChipWorks recently created a time-series chart showing the number of US patent lawsuits per quarter. I have reproduced the chart with permission. [LINK]
The headline here: More patent lawsuits are being filed now than ever – even more than in the heyday of the false-marking litigation. Just as a caution – the recent rise in the number of lawsuits does not actually mean that there is more patent litigation going one. Rather, a substantial portion of the increase in Q4 2011 is due to the new joinder rules that force a patent holder to file separate lawsuits against similar defendants rather than bundle them all into a single action.
Thus, as an example, last week the patent holding company NovelPoint Security filed 30+ separate patent infringement lawsuits in the Eastern District of Texas. In the past, NovelPoint might have instead pursued all of those actions within a single complaint.
* * * * *
The NovelPoint Security patents both include David C. Reardon of Springfield Illinois as the sole inventor. See U.S. Patents 6,212,635 and 5,434,562. Neither patent is listed as assigned within the USPTO assignment database. Reardon is an interesting character – he is an electrical engineer but is much better known as a pro-life / anti-abortion advocate. Reardon runs the Eliot Institute that he founded. The patents themselves focus on computer security systems using public/private key encryption and claim a 1997 priority date based upon a provisional patent application filed
Ex parte Adelman, Appeal 2010-011767 (BPAI 2012)
As part of what seems a sign of change, the BPAI in recently refused to decide a patent appeal on statutory subject matter grounds and instead found Adelman’s claims invalid under a new grounds of rejection — indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 2nd paragraph. The Board noted that the indefiniteness of the claims meant that the subject matter eligibility question could not be “reasonably understood without resort to speculation.”
The patent application is owned by Go Daddy Group and claims a “system for designating membership in an online business community.” Claim 1 includes two elements, both written in means-plus-function (MPF) language. The first element is a “means for designating a plurality of Members…” and the second is a “means for providing … a membership designator.” In reading the specification, the Board concluded that the claimed functions lacked any corresponding structures in the specificication. “The Specification therefore fails to disclose an algorithm corresponding to the recited function at issue in independent claim 1, such that one of ordinary skill in the art could determine the scope of independent claim 1.”
In several cases, courts have designated subject matter eligibility as a “threshold” concern. Here, however, the Board held that they were compelled to first consider indefiniteness — citing In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862 (CCPA 1962) (A prior art rejection cannot be sustained if the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art would have to make speculative assumptions concerning the meaning of claim language.) and In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385 (CCPA 1970) (“If no reasonably definite meaning can be ascribed to certain terms in the claim, the subject matter does not become obvious-the claim becomes indefinite.”).
Cascades Computer Innovation v. RPX, HTC, LG, Motorola, Dell, Samsung (N.D. Cal. 2012)
In a bold move, non-practicing patent holder CCI has sued a group of tech companies and the patent aggregator RPX for price fixing and conspiring to restrain trade in violation of the Clayton and Sherman Acts as well as under California state antitrust law. The allegation is that RPX and its members decided as a group to boycott negotiations with Cascades except through their aggregator RPX.
Defendants HTC, LG, Motorola, Samsung and Dell sell more than 95 percent of all mobile phones and tablets that use the Android operating systems in the United States and are an important part of the Android market, and related, relevant sub-markets (including products that require a license from Cascades under its patented technology). The manufacturing defendants constitute nearly the total demand for the licensing of Cascades’ patented technology and collectively enjoy substantial market power in that market and, together with others in the industry, have exercised their power to control the acceptance and terms and conditions of licenses from Cascades. The power is augmented by the willingness and agreement of the manufacturing defendants to infringe Cascades’ patents until such time as Cascades capitulates by either going out of business, declining to enforce the patents or offering defendants patent license terms below fair market value.”
The complaint is well written and worth a read. Nick McCain at Courthouse News has more: http://www.courthousenews.com/2012/03/09/44560.htm.
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Digital-Vending Services International, LLC v. The University of Phoenix, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2012)
In a split decision, the Federal Circuit has reversed the lower court's claim construction and vacated the summary judgment of non-infringement with respect to impacted claims. On remand, the district court will be required to reconsider whether whether Digital-Vending's patents covering aspects of internet-based content delivery are valid and infringed. Chief Judge Rader penned the opinion and was joined by Judge Linn and joined-in-part by Judge Moore. In her partial dissent, Judge Moore focused on the doctrine of disavowal of claim scope – arguing that the "exacting" standard for disavowal of claim scope was met in this case and therefore takes precedence over other canons of construction in the analysis of claim scope.
Method Claim Written as an Apparatus: Before getting to the heart of the claim construction debate, it is important to mention the court's recognition here that a Beauregard claim should properly be interpreted as a method claim rather than an apparatus or composition of matter claim. In some instances, patent law treats method claims differently than it treats apparatus claims. Because of this distinction, many patent attorneys choose to include both method and apparatus claims within the same patent whenever possible. In discussing the asserted claims, the Federal Circuit opines that claims 1-22 of asserted Patent No. 6,282,573 are all "method claims" despite the fact that claims 13-22 expressly claim "a computer storage medium" containing data and instructions for causing a computer to perform a particular method. Noting this potential discrepancy, the court wrote that these Beauregard claims are "functionally-defined claims" that "should be treated as method claims to avoid exalting form over substance." Quoting CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The court also noted that independent claim 23 – directed to a "computer architecture" with various interconnected servers should be treated as a system rather than a method. (Note – Judge Moore did not dissent from this portion of the opinion).
How Prosecution History Impacts Claim Scope: In many patent cases, the most hotly contested legal issue is claim construction and the resulting claim scope. Broadly construed claims cast a wider net over potential infringers, but are also more likely to be held invalid than those that are more narrowly construed. There a variety of thoughts on how the specification and prosecution history should impact claim construction. Strongly-held maxims include the notion that claims should be interpreted in light of the specification, but limitations found in the specification should not be automatically added as implicit limitations of claim scope. In Phillips, we learned that the specification should be given greater consideration. Phillips also gave credence to arguments associated with claim differentiation. Thus, in that case, the fact that a claim referred to "steel baffles … strongly implie[d] that the term 'baffles' does not inherently mean objects made of steel." (quoting Phillips). An additional and important claim construction canon involves the limitation of claim scope that has been the subject of clear disavowal. A problem with canons of construction is that they often conflict and the difficulty for courts comes in deciding which of the many canons to give precedence. Here, there is no question on the law that a clear disavowal of claim scope takes precedence over other canons of construction. The dispute in the case is on whether a disavowal occurred.
In this case, some of the patented claims refer to a "registration server being further characterized in that it is free of content managed by the architecture" and others refer to the "registration server," standing alone. This difference between the claims provides a strong suggestion that athe bare "registration server" limitation does not require that the server be free of managed content. In its analysis, the majority court noted that the patentee repeatedly referred to the registration server as being free of managed content, but also that the patent attorney had been "careful" to "avoid any hint [in the specification] that the inventors clearly disavowed claim scope with respect to the method claims." Thus, the court allowed a broad interpretation of the "registration server" term.
The dissent disagreed with this analysis and instead argued that the majority opinion "allows the patent owner to reclaim surrendered claim scope, thus subverting the public notice function of patents." Here, the dissent focused on the patentees "repeated statements in the specification" indicating that "each" of the registration servers are separated from any managed content and that such an architecture is a "requirement" not to be "violated." For Judge Moore, those statements lead her to the conclusion that "[i]t is difficult to imagine a clearer case of disavowal."
On remand, the lower court will be asked to determine whether the defendants infringe the asserted claims under the broader claim interpretation put forth by the majority.
by Dennis Crouch

The expected number of grants for 2012 is based upon a straight extrapolation from the number of patents granted thus far in 2012.
by Dennis Crouch
In re PepperBall Tech. (Fed. Cir. 2012) (non-precedential opinion)
In a non-precedential opinion, the Federal Circuit has affirmed a BPAI reexamination determination that PepperBall's patents are invalid as obvious. In reading the opinion, Hal Wegner wrote that the case serves as a "good teaching example of what will often be a futile appeal in future Inter Partes Review proceedings under the 'substantial evidence' standard of review." I agree with Hal that the low substantial evidence threshold required to sustain BPAI factual findings will make those difficult to overturn on appeal. However, as I discuss below, this case fails to be a good teaching example becaues it conflates review of the Board's factual findings with what should be de novo review of the ultimate question of obviousness.
The conclusion of obviousness (or non-obviousness) is a question of law that is reviewed de novo on appeal. However, substantial deference is given to the underlying factual determinations made by the Board. Those factual determinations will be upheld on appeal so long as supported by "substantial evidence." Thus, even if the appellate panel does not agree with the Board's factual finding, it can (and must) uphold the Board's factual finding so long as there is "more than a scintilla" of evidence in support. Although the Federal Circuit correctly recited the doctrine, my reading of the decision is that the court improperly applied the law and instead gave deference to the Board's legal conclusion of obviousness. In the end this may well be harmless error so long as the ultimate conclusion of obviousness is actually correct.
PepperBall Tech's invention relates to paintballs filled with peppery powder. A key feature of some claims was that the paintballs are only partially filled – 60% to 95% full. When stuffed over 95%, the powder clumps up and does not form a nice cloud around the victim's eyes. One prior art reference suggested adding weight to paintballs to optimize flight path. The Board held that the prior art's weight agent "was similar to PepperBall's modifying the fill percentage [and therefore] that it would have been obvious to modify the fill levels in a projectile within the recited range…"
On appeal, the Federal Circuit voiced some reticence with the Board's analysis – writing that "[t]his court in the first instance might not have reached the same conclusion as the Board on the similarity of PepperBall's differing fill levels and [the prior art's] weighting agent" because of the differing purposes explained above. The court went on to state that it, nevertheless, "does find substantial evidence to support the Board's finding of obviousness." That conclusion was based upon the court's own separate factual finding that the claimed range of 60% to 95% was "so broad in this context that a person of ordinary skill in the art likely would have tried fill levels within this range during routine experimentation."
The problem here, is that the Board's finding of obviousness is not supposed to be reviewed for substantial evidence, but instead reconsidered de novo on appeal. In the appeal, factual findings such as the similarity between the invention and the prior art need merely be supported by substantial evidence, but the appellate court must apply the much higher de novo standard when looking at the ultimate question of whether the invention obviousness. In reality, I have little faith in the current structure for determining obviousness. However, we do at least have a defined structure and procedure that the appellate court should follow.
In an article published last year, Judge Richard Posner and Professor Albert Yoon surveyed about 200 federal district court judges on various issues, including the judges overall impression of the quality of legal representation, by civil practice area. The study specifically compared lawyers in cases involving civil rights, commercial litigation, family law, immigration, intellectual property, personal injury/malpractice, and tax/trusts & estates. Amongst these groups, the judges identified intellectual property litigators as the giving the highest impression of quality. In addition, the judges noted their impression that there is not typically any significant disparity in the quality of representation between the intellectual property litigators on any given case.
Read it here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1668783
By Dennis Crouch
USPTO's Patent Commissioner Peggy Focarino has continued on the path of her predecessor Bob Stoll in focus on reducing the backlog of unexamined patent cases at the USPTO. (Stoll is now a partner at Drinker Biddle in DC). Here, the Office typically defines unexamined cases as those that have not yet received a first action on the merits (FAOM).
In the past year, the number of unexamined applications has dropped by about 10% and is in steady decline. We have not yet seen any measurable decline in the time-to-first-action. However, that is a lagging indicator. In its forward looking estimates, the USPTO predicts that applications filed today will receive an action within 17 months as opposed to today's average of 23 months.
The Office is hitting the backlog on multiple fronts, perhaps the two biggest shifts are (1) an increased spending on examination (more examining hours means more new cases being examined) with money coming from AIA fee increases and (2) shifting resources to examining new cases. One such shift has been in reducing the priority level of applications associated with a request for continued examination (RCE). The result has been a steady increase in the backlog of cases that are awaiting examination following an RCE. During the two year time-period shown in my charts, the decrease in the backlog of unexamined cases (82,000 cases) is almost entirely balanced by the combined increase in cases awaiting examination following an RCE (60,000) and cases awaiting decision by the BPAI (11,000).
While I agree that the USPTO should focus attention on the backlog, I don't believe that the backlog should be the most pressing concern of the Office. This is especially true since the passage of the AIA and the resulting creation of a fee-based prioritized examination program. For a $4,800 fee (reduced for small entities), the USPTO will place an application on a fast track examination schedule. The new reality is that any applicant who cares about fast prosecution can get fast prosecution for a relatively small fee.
focusing on the backlog
Guest Post by Andrew McRobert and Kate Mullarkey of Norton Rose Australia
In her recent guest post for Patently-O, Susan Glovsky lamented the inadequate system for recording assignments of, and security interests over, patents in the United States and called for the introduction of a national system for recordation of patent rights. This post gives a brief account of Australia's recent experience in this area.
The Australian patents legislation (the Patents Act 1990 (Cth)) requires assignments of patents to be in writing signed on behalf of the assignor and assignee (§14). If the particulars of an assignment are not entered on the Patents Register, the document is not admissible as evidence of the assignee's interest unless the proceedings fall within one of a number of limited exceptions (for e.g., if a Court otherwise directs or to enforce equities). The enforcement of equities in relation to patents and patent licenses has changed with the introduction of the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) (PPSA).
The PPSA brings significant reform to the law in relation to security interests in personal property – which includes registered and unregistered intellectual property. One of the most important aspects of the PPSA is the implementation of a new public-access PPS register which has been promoted as a simple and inexpensive single repository for the registration of security interests. That register went live on 30 January 2012. The PPS register can be viewed at http://www.ppsr.gov.au.
A key driver for the establishment of the PPSA register was to harmonise the over 70 separate Acts that regulated security in personal property. The PPSA establishes a complete set of rules for determining priority between security interests and also for determining under what circumstances a purchaser of collateral will take the collateral free of the security interests in it. The old common law and equitable principles have been replaced.
Under the PPSA, "personal property" is any form of property other than land and certain statutory licences. It includes IP and IP licences. The definition of IP under the PPSA includes: "the right to exploit or work an invention, or to authorise another person to exploit or work an invention, for which a patent is in effect under the Patents Act 1990". A "security interest", for the purposes of the PPSA, is defined broadly as an interest in personal property provided for by a transaction that, in substance, secures a payment or the performance of an obligation.
Under the PPSA, protection of a security interest involves three steps: attachment, enforcement and perfection. Perfection is particularly important because, in the event of the insolvency of a grantor, any unperfected security interests that exist in relation to the grantor's assets are vested in the grantor, and a secured party that has not perfected its rights loses that security interest. Once a security interest is perfected, there are two general rules that apply: first, perfected interests take priority over unperfected interests; second, perfected interests take priority in the order of perfection. Although there are exceptions to these rules, including (importantly) under the transitional provisions, all the applicable rules are contained within the PPSA.
The PPSA contains numerous provisions that particularly affect intellectual property rights holders. For example, it provides that a registered security interest over an IP license continues to exist when the underlying licensed IP is transferred by its owner (§ 106). Unless the parties have contracted out of §106, a licensee will be able to grant security interests in an IP license in favor of a third party whose security interest can then be registered by that third party.
The PPSA also contains provisions relevant to security interests in intellectual property in overseas jurisdictions, such as foreign patents. Where the grantor of the security interest is located overseas, the security interest is generally governed by the law of the grantor's jurisdiction, and not by the PPSA.
By David M. Longo, Ph.D. of Finnegan LLP1
This post addresses the Federal Circuit’s March 5, 2012, precedential opinion In re Staats, Appeal No. 2010-1443, in which Judge Dyk writes for the majority. In short, the Federal Circuit holds that it is bound by In re Doll, 419 F.2d 925 (CCPA 1970), and that both 35 U.S.C. § 251 and Doll permit the filing of a continuing reissue application to broaden patented claims beyond the statutory two-year period—even when the continuation claims are broadened—in a manner unrelated to any broadening aspect identified within the two-year period. For a more in-depth discussion of 140 years of reissue case law, legislative history, and statutory shaping pertaining to broadening reissue practice, including an analysis of the facts and oral arguments in Staats leading up to the opinion, please see the author’s publication Checking the Staats: How Long is Too Long to Give Adequate Public Notice in Broadening Reissue Patent Applications?, 2011 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 009 available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2011dltr009.
One of the most straightforward ways patent owners can expand the limited monopoly of a patent is by seeking increased claim scope by one or more broadening reissue patent applications. While patent owners may narrow the scope of patent claims at any time during the life of the patent, they may only broaden claim scope for a limited period of time after issuance of the patent. See MPEP § 1412.03, discussing implementation of 35 U.S.C. § 251. Despite this relatively clear statutory provision in § 251, however, an expansive body of case law has construed the provision, dating back well over a century.
The Staats opinion had the potential to become the most definitive statement in broadening reissue practice in almost twenty years. Passing on such a wonderful opportunity, the CAFC instead blandly upheld Doll and bluntly invited the USPTO to seek en banc review. In fact, Judge Dyk’s majority opinion states, “If the PTO believes we should overrule Doll, that is a matter that must be presented to the en banc court.” Slip Op. at 11. Judge O’Malley’s concurring opinion, which concurs in the opinion’s judgment but not its reasoning, states, “To the extent the majority opinion is no more than a begrudging nod to Doll‘s precedential effect with an invitation to reconsider that decision, the majority opinion is wrong.” Slip Op. at 12 (concurrence at 1).
The Staats case presents a collision between two robust statutory interpretations and two equally weighty sets of policy considerations. On the one hand, the public-notice function cited by both the USPTO and the Board—and regarded as a hallmark of the protections in § 251—is crucial. The public has the right to know what is claimed and disclaimed in a patent, and one could argue that patentees should not be permitted to reshape their inventions throughout the life of the patent simply by lodging a “placeholder” broadening reissue application within two years of patent issuance, from which any number of potentially disparate continuing reissue applications could be filed. Allowing such activity without adequate safeguards could result in a scenario in which a competitor could potentially spend an obscene amount of money based on the perceived bounds of the limited monopoly granted by a particular patent, only to face an infringement action years later after the boundaries of the limited monopoly have shifted. Likewise, such activity may make it difficult for a competitor to assess whether it has freedom to operate in a particular technology—again because of shifting boundaries of the limited monopoly. Consistent with this perspective, the USPTO’s position in Staats held firm against effectively giving an applicant a license to unforeseeably shift from one invention to another through reissue well beyond the two-year statutory period. See Ex parte Staats, No. 2009-007162, 2010 WL 1725728, at *9 (BPAI Apr. 26, 2010).
On the other hand, as argued by Apple in the Staats appeal to the Board, the CCPA in Doll held that the intervening rights provided by 35 U.S.C. § 252 are potentially sufficient to counterbalance damage to public notice done by broadening reissues. Having initial public notice within two years of patent issuance should adequately balance the needs of patentees and the public. See Brief of Appellant-Petitioner, In re Staats, No. 2010-1443 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 16, 2010), 2010 U.S. Fed. Cir. Briefs LEXIS 1111, at *9–11. That is, there is a clear quid pro quo—in exchange for a reissued patent, the patentee must “surrender” the original patent. Furthermore, given the recent transparency in publication and prosecution practice for pending applications and reissue applications at the USPTO, applicants already surrender a great deal of secrecy before issuance of a patent or reissue patent. Any broadening reissue patent claims would, of course, require support by the patent specification or other claims, which could have effectively been part of public knowledge for years before the broadening. Therefore, one can argue that nothing would serve to hamper a competitor from developing a competing and noninfringing product with improvements in the years it would undoubtedly take for the USPTO to wade through applications, reissues, and continuations of those reissues.
Thus, a classic property-rights question looms large in the field of patent law: where do the rights of inventors end and the rights of the public begin? The rights of inventors to modify the scope of their claimed inventions, even after the patent issues, can directly conflict with the concepts of public notice and the public domain. The Patent Act currently permits broadening of claims so long as a reissue application showing intent to broaden is filed within two years of the original patent issue. Over the years, however, this relatively straightforward statutory provision has sparked a spate of disputes over its meaning and application.
Despite these disputes, the CAFC reaffirmed Doll, and Judge O’Malley’s concurrence expanded on its reasoning:
The MPEP and PTO Rule 175 are, moreover, consistent with all relevant case law interpreting § 251. As the majority notes, Doll concluded that § 251’s time limits are applicable only to the first broadening reissue application and do not, accordingly, bar further broadening changes thereafter. [In re Doll] 419 F.2d. at 928. This court has twice reaffirmed that reading of § 251, moreover. See In re Graff, 111 F.3d 874, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“The court in Doll simply held that the reissue applicant, in the course of prosecution of the reissue application, was not barred from making further broadening changes in the claims.”); In re Fotland, 779 F.2d 31, 34 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“In Doll the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals held that when a broadening reissue application was on file within the two year period, the claims could be further broadened after the two year period.”). As the majority opinion makes clear, the PTO’s efforts to distinguish those cases so as to avoid the need to comply with their holdings stretch credulity. (Slip. Op. at 15, concurrence at 4.)
Even with the benefit of the last forty years of reissue case law—including Doll, In re Fotland (779 F.2d 31 (Fed. Cir. 1985)), Buell v. Beckestrom (22 USPQ2d 1128 (BPAI 1992)), In re Graff (111 F.3d 874 (Fed. Cir. 1997)), and now Staats—broadening reissue practice will likely remain a headache for patent attorneys. For the time being, though, we have a pill for that headache. Without any changes from a possible en banc review, broadening reissue patent practice permits a scenario where, as Apple argued, the possible or eventual scope of the initial broadening need not be fully laid out in the first reissue application filed within the two-year statutory window, as long as the initial intent to broaden appears within that window. See Ex parte Staats, No. 2009-007162, 2010 WL 1725728, at *2 (BPAI Apr. 26, 2010). Tipping the scales slightly away from robust public notice, Staats (vis-à-vis Doll) essentially tells us that “any intent” to broaden within two years of patent issuance permits any broadening in a later—and properly filed—continuation or divisional reissue application. Whether this is the best remedy for a fairly persistent headache remains to be seen.
1 This post represents the thoughts and opinions of the author alone and not those of Finnegan LLP. It is intended to convey general information only and should not be construed as a legal opinion or as legal advice.
by Dennis Crouch
Myspace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2012)
In yet another case, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has identified the wide chasm separating members of the court on issues involving patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The majority opinion here – penned by Judge Plager and joined by Judge Newman – argues that courts should avoid the metaphysical question of whether an invention is unpatentably abstract whenever possible and instead focus on the conditions of patentability found in §§ 102, 103, and 112 of the patent act.
Judge Plager writes:
[C]ourts could avoid the swamp of verbiage that is § 101 by exercising their inherent power to control the processes of litigation, Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991), and insist that litigants initially address patent invalidity issues in terms of the conditions of patentability defenses as the statute provides, specifically §§ 102, 103, and 112. If that were done in the typical patent case, litigation over the question of validity of the patent would be concluded under these provisions, and it would be unnecessary to enter the murky morass that is § 101 jurisprudence. This would make patent litigation more efficient, conserve judicial resources, and bring a degree of certainty to the interests of both patentees and their competitors in the marketplace.
Judge Plager goes on to adopt the analogy to the Constitutional Avoidance Doctrine that Rob Merges and I suggested in our 2010 article titled Operating Efficiently Post-Bilski by Ordering Patent Doctrine Decision-Making.
In a sense, § 101 of the Patent Act can be thought of as the patent law analogy to the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. The latter sets in the broadest terms (“due process,” “equal protection”) the fundamental parameters of the citizenry’s legal right. In the context of patent law, § 101 similarly describes in the broadest terms the legally-protected subject matter an inventor can seek to patent: a “process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter . . . .” The Supreme Court has wisely adopted a policy of not deciding cases on broad constitutional grounds when they can be decided on narrower, typically statutorily limited, grounds. Following the Supreme Court’s lead, courts should avoid reaching for interpretations of broad provisions, such as § 101, when more specific statutes, such as §§ 102, 103, and 112, can decide the case.
On the merits of the decision, the majority affirmed a lower court summary judgment holding that the asserted claims are invalid as anticipated and obvious under §§ 102 and 103(a) respectively.
In this case, the lower court never ruled on the question of patentable subject matter and none of the party briefs refer to Section 101, unpatentable abstract ideas, or Bilski v. Kappos. However, the majority felt compelled to discuss Section 101 based upon the dissenting opinion by Judge Mayer who opined that the patent intrinsically raises a threshold question of patentable subject matter that must be addressed.
Judge Mayer writes in dissent:
The issue of whether a claimed method meets the subject matter eligibility requirements contained in 35 U.S.C. § 101 is an “antecedent question” that must be addressed before this court can consider whether particular claims are invalid as obvious or anticipated. In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 975 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2009). GraphOn Corporation (“GraphOn”) owns four patents, U.S. Patent Nos. 6,324,538 (the “‘538 patent”), 6,850,940, 7,028,034, and 7,269,591, which contain exceedingly broad claims to a system that allows users to exert control over the content of their online communications. This court must first resolve the issue of whether the GraphOn patents are directed to an unpatentable “abstract idea” before proceeding to consider subordinate issues related to obviousness and anticipation. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (noting that whether claims are directed to statutory subject matter is a “threshold test”); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978) (“Flook”) (emphasizing that “[t]he obligation to determine what type of discovery is sought to be patented” so as to determine whether it falls within the ambit of section 101 “must precede the determination of whether that discovery is, in fact, new or obvious”); Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 973 (“Only if the requirements of § 101 are satisfied is the inventor allowed to pass through to the other requirements for patentability, such as novelty under § 102 and . . . non-obviousness under § 103.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). I therefore respectfully dissent from the court’s judgment.
The dissent agrees with the majority (and our) suggestion that § 101 be treated as analogous to the US Constitution – but argues that the statute “is the standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored.” Rather, the dissent writes “a robust application of section 101 is required to ensure that the patent laws comport with their constitutionally-defined objective.”
Below, I have excerpted claim 1 of the patentee’s U.S. Patent No. 6,324,538 with a 1995 priority filing date:
1. A method of publishing information on a computer network comprising the steps of: creating a database entry containing information recieved from a user of the computer network, wherein the information includes data representing text, a universal resource locator, an image, and a user-selected category; generating a transaction ID corresponding to the database entry; password protecting the entries; displaying the entries in accordance with the user-selected category; presenting the information to a user in hyper text markup language in response to a user’s request.
The dissent is correct that the invention as claimed is incredibly broad. However, this is the exact type of case that is just as easily eliminated on grounds of anticipation or obviousness.
Note for a later post — the majority opinion is also important for its statement on the theory and practice of claim construction.
Guest Post by Professor Jorge L. Contreras.
For those of us who have been following the telecom patent battles, something remarkable happened a couple of weeks ago. On February 7, the Wall St. Journal reported that, back in November, Apple sent a letter[1] to the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) setting forth Apple’s position regarding its commitment to license patents essential to ETSI standards. In particular, Apple’s letter clarified its interpretation of the so-called “FRAND” (fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory) licensing terms that ETSI participants are required to use when licensing standards-essential patents. As one might imagine, the actual scope and contours of FRAND licenses have puzzled lawyers, regulators and courts for years, and past efforts at clarification have never been very successful. The next day, on February 8, Google released a letter[2] that it sent to the Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), ETSI and several other standards organizations. Like Apple, Google sought to clarify its position on FRAND licensing. And just hours after Google’s announcement, Microsoft posted a statement of “Support for Industry Standards”[3] on its web site, laying out its own gloss on FRAND licensing. For those who were left wondering what instigated this flurry of corporate “clarification”, the answer arrived a few days later when, on February 13, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) released its decision[4] to close the investigation of three significant patent-based transactions: the acquisition of Motorola Mobility by Google, the acquisition of a large patent portfolio formerly held by Nortel Networks by “Rockstar Bidco” (a group including Microsoft, Apple, RIM and others), and the acquisition by Apple of certain Linux-related patents formerly held by Novell. In its decision, the DOJ noted with approval the public statements by Apple and Microsoft, while expressing some concern with Google’s FRAND approach. The European Commission approved Google’s acquisition of Motorola Mobility on the same day.
To understand the significance of the Apple, Microsoft and Google FRAND statements, some background is in order. The technical standards that enable our computers, mobile phones and home entertainment gear to communicate and interoperate are developed by corps of “volunteers” who get together in person and virtually under the auspices of standards-development organizations (SDOs). These SDOs include large, international bodies such as ETSI and IEEE, as well as smaller consortia and interest groups. The engineers who do the bulk of the work, however, are not employees of the SDOs (which are usually thinly-staffed non-profits), but of the companies who plan to sell products that implement the standards: the Apples, Googles, Motorolas and Microsofts of the world. Should such a company obtain a patent covering the implementation of a standard, it would be able to exert significant leverage over the market for products that implemented the standard. In particular, if a patent holder were to obtain, or even threaten to obtain, an injunction against manufacturers of competing standards-compliant products, either the standard would become far less useful, or the market would experience significant unanticipated costs. This phenomenon is what commentators have come to call “patent hold-up”. Due to the possibility of hold-up, most SDOs today require that participants in the standards-development process disclose their patents that are necessary to implement the standard and/or commit to license those patents on FRAND terms.
On its face, it is easy to see why a FRAND commitment might reassure implementers of a standard. If a patent is essential to the standard, the patent holder must license the patent on terms that are fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory. Unfortunately, the devil has proven to be in the details of FRAND, and no two companies seem to have the same view of what constitutes fair, reasonable or non-discriminatory licensing terms. This lack of agreement has troubled regulators for some time and has led to an increasing number of litigation claims alleging that one party or another to a standards effort has failed to comply with its FRAND obligations.
The February FRAND statements by Apple, Microsoft and Google are thus informative and potentially of great importance. To understand the statements, and why the DOJ viewed them differently, it is helpful to compare them side-by-side. The following table summarizes what Apple, Microsoft and Google said FRAND means to them.
|
|
Apple (relating to cellular telephony standards) |
Microsoft |
Google (limited to Motorola Mobility patents) |
|
1. Prior Commitments. Will the patent holder honor FRAND obligations of prior patent owners? |
A party acquiring patents from someone who made FRAND commitments must abide by those commitments |
n/a |
G will honor Motorola’s existing FRAND commitments |
|
2. Onward Transfer. Will the patent holder require future owners of the patent to comply with its FRAND obligations? |
n/a |
M will require transferees to abide by its FRAND commitments |
G will use “best efforts” to ensure that transferees abide by its FRAND commitments |
|
3. Reciprocity. Will the patent holder require that the licensee grant a license back to the licensor? |
n/a |
M will only require a grant-back of the licensee’s patents that are essential to the same standard |
G will only require a grant-back of the licensee’s patents that are essential to the same standard |
|
4. Royalty Rate. Will the patent holder commit to a maximum royalty rate? |
Standards-essential patents should be licensed at an “appropriate” royalty rate reflective of the licensor’s share of the overall number of patents essential to the standard |
n/a |
Maximum per-unit royalty of 2.25% of product net selling price |
|
5. Injunctive Relief. Will the patent holder seek injunctive relief against unlicensed implementers of the standard? |
A party making a FRAND commitment must not seek injunctive relief on patents subject to the commitment |
M will not seek an injunction … on the basis of [standards-] essential patents |
G will not seek an injunction on the basis of standards-essential patents, during a reasonable negotiation period and if the other party makes a similar commitment |
Despite their differences, the three FRAND statements exhibit some important similarities. All three, for example, support the notion that FRAND commitments should “travel with the patent”. This is an important acknowledgement, as such commitments typically lack the necessary elements of a bilateral contractual arrangement, and have been questioned in both corporate acquisitions and bankruptcy proceedings (see In re Nortel Networks Inc., Order – Case No. 09-10138(KG) (Bankruptcy Ct. D.Del., Jul. 11, 2011)).
The three statements also address the question of injunctive relief. Numerous commentators have questioned whether injunctive relief is an appropriate remedy for holders of standards-essential patents, particularly in view of the Supreme Court’s four-part analysis under eBay v. MercExchange LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). In 2011, the Federal Trade Commission suggested that injunctive relief might not be justified in the standards context, writing that “[a] prior [F]RAND commitment can provide strong evidence that denial of the injunction and ongoing royalties will not irreparably harm the patentee.” Federal Trade Comm’n, The Evolving IP Marketplace – Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with Competition 235 (2011). In their February FRAND statements, Apple and Microsoft each commit not to seek injunctions on the basis of their standards-essential patents. Google makes a similar commitment, but qualifies it in typically lawyerly fashion (Google’s letter is more than 3 single-spaced pages in length, while Microsoft’s simple statement occupies about a quarter of a page). In this case, Google’s careful qualifications (injunctive relief might be possible if the potential licensee does not itself agree to refrain from seeking an injunction, if licensing negotiations extended beyond a reasonable period, and the like) worked against it. While the DOJ applauds Apple’s and Microsoft’s statements “that they will not seek to prevent or exclude rivals’ products form the market”, it views Google’s commitments as “less clear”. The DOJ thus “continues to have concerns about the potential inappropriate use of [standards-essential patents] to disrupt competition”.
It is not clear whether the DOJ’s criticism of Google’s stance on injunctive relief, or its endorsement of Apple’s and Microsoft’s positions, is warranted. After all, none of the February FRAND statements was made directly to the DOJ, formed part of a consent order, or even rose to the level of a contractual commitment. But whatever their actual legal effect, it is certainly preferable to have such statements than not, and perhaps this recent wave of “clarifications” will help courts to interpret the array of FRAND-based claims that will inevitably be brought over the next several years.
Mr. Contreras is a Visiting Associate Professor at American University – Washington College of Law and will join the faculty as an Associate Professor this summer. His research focuses on the impact of intellectual property rules on scientific and technological development, including in the area of technical standard-setting. He is the editor of the ABA's Standards Development Patent Policy Manual and has written numerous articles and book chapters relating to intellectual property and standards.
by Susan G. L. Glovsky of Hamilton Brooks Smith Reynolds
Patents are far more valuable than they ever have been. Yet, unlike real property, it can be difficult to determine patent ownership or accurately identify encumbrances even though patent value can exceed the value of a home or even an office building. Rights in real property are determined by legislation in each state, which provides for recordation of written transfers and security interests in real property. Legislation related to real property recordation provides a level of certainty in determining the true owner, provides protection for bona fide purchasers, and permits recordation of liens to satisfy debts owed by real estate owners.
This is not the case with patents. Because of an inadequate system for recordation, prospective purchasers, licensees, lenders, and even defendants in a lawsuit may have to take it on faith that the seller, licensor, borrower, or plaintiff truly owns, and has not previously encumbered, these patent rights.
Unless assigned, patent applications are owned by the inventor or inventors named in the application. The inventor(s) can assign ownership to another person or to a company. Thereafter, the assignee can further assign the application or, once issued, the patent. Any assignment must be in writing, and the assignment can be recorded with the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Recordation is voluntary. In the event of conflicting transfers of title to the same patent or application, the Patent Act gives the first purchaser a three month window in which to record, which takes priority over a subsequent purchase during the three month period, even though there was no constructive (through recordation) or actual notice of the assignment at the time the subsequent purchase was made. As a result, potential transfers that might have occurred in the three month period preceding an assignment that could trump that assignment may be unavailable when conducting any title search, leaving a potential purchaser with uncertainty and unacceptable risk.
Security interests in patents are to be recorded where UCC filings are made, based on state law. Unlike real estate, it is not always easy to determine the state in which a security interest in a patent has to be recorded. Once the state is determined, it is necessary to determine, under that state's law, whether recordation is made at the state or local level in order to search for any security interest that may be recorded. Lack of certainty concerning security interests can discourage lenders from providing needed loans.
The time has come to enact national legislation that provides clear record title to patent applications and patents. The value of patents is too great to continue with the present system. Moreover, patents are a federal right and should be addressed at a federal level. A national system would harmonize U.S. law with those of other countries, which generally have a national system for recordation of patent rights. Recently, the Patent Office proposed rules that would require disclosure of any assignee of patent rights. But these rules simply do not go far enough. Legislation is necessary in order to provide a comprehensive internationally recognized system that assures the recordation of patent title, security interests, and other encumbrances through filings solely in the Patent Office.
Taking the best from state systems for recording interests in real estate, at a minimum any legislation needs to:
The new rules proposed by the Patent Office have succeeded in focusing attention on recordation of patent rights, but the proposed rules do not go far enough. In order to provide a comprehensive system that addresses all the issues, Congress needs to enact legislation that solves all the problems in the current system.
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by Dennis Crouch
Luxembourg based Core Wireless Licensing S.a.r.l. has sued Apple for patent infringement in the Eastern District of Texas. The recently filed complaint alleges that Apple’s communication devices such as iPads and iPhones infringe eight different Core Wireless patents. The Core Wireless family of patents focus primarily on communication protocols and the patent owner claims that the patents are infringed by any device that communicates using 2G, 3G, or 4G standards.
Core Wireless obtained its portfolio of 2,000 patents and pending applications from Nokia and (apparently) Microsoft. In 2011, the patent licensing entity MOSAID purchased Core Wireless. MOSAID itself is owned by the US private equity firm Sterling Partners.
The reported purchase price for Core Wireless (including its patents) was just under $20,000 — seemingly a very low price. However, there is a kicker, the sale requires that the new owner enforce the patents and 2/3 of any licensing revenue must be sent to Microsoft and Nokia. Further, the patent ownership rights are subject to a condition subsequent — if Core Wireless fails to meet minimum performance thresholds then the patent rights revert to the grantors (Nokia and Microsoft). The following comes from a 2011 press release by MOSAID:
Core Wireless will retain approximately one-third of gross royalties from future licensing and enforcement of the patents and will bear all of the costs associated with their administration, licensing, enforcement and monetization. Core Wireless’ ongoing ownership of the portfolio is subject to minimum future royalty milestones. The remaining 2/3 of gross royalties will be paid to Nokia and Microsoft Corporation (NASDAQ: MSFT).
One way to look at this is that MOSAID is essentially working as on a property management contract. With patents, title must shift in order to facilitate the necessary lawsuits. The complaint lists the following patents as infringed: 6,792,277, 7,606,910, 6,697,347, 7,447,181, 6,788,959, 7,529,271, 6,266,321, 6,978,143.
This case is also interesting in the context of Professor Schwartz’s article on Contingent Fee Patent Litigation. In a round-about way, Nokia and Microsoft have hired MOSAID on contingency fee to enforce their patent rights. The complaint itself was filed by Henry Bunsow of Dewey Leboeuf in San Francisco with Johnny Ward Jr. serving as local counsel in E.D. Texas. True to its role as hopeful licensor, the plaintiff has only asked for money damages and not injunctive relief to stop ongoing infringement.
Google Buys More Patents: Last fall, MOSAID sold a set of 18 patents and patent applications to Google for a reported $11 million. Recently, the pair recorded a new transaction of about 200 patents and applications from MOSAID to Google. Those patents were previously owned by the Italian tire manufacturer Pirelli and a spinoff company PGT-Photonics. Google also recently purchased one eCommerce patent from the tiny firm Alpine-in-Motion.
Review by Dennis Crouch
Dave Schwartz is a law professor these days. However, before joining Chicago-Kent he was litigator for more than a decade. Schwartz's most recent article is interesting study of the practice of contingent fee patent litigation. And, the article is appropriately named "Contingent Fee Patent Litigation." [Download the Article from SSRN] The meat of the article is based on Schwartz's interviews with a set of forty litigators who work on contingency fee basis and a privately collected set of contingency fee agreements.
From the abstract:
Drawing upon several sources of data, including in-depth interviews with over forty lawyers involved in contingent representation in patent litigation and examination of over forty contingent fee agreements, this Article provides the first comprehensive analysis of the rapid evolution of contingent representation in patent law. The development of contingent representation includes top-tier litigation firms recently transitioning to taking on high value contingent cases, small entrants representing plaintiffs in lower value cases, and numerous general practice firms experimenting with contingent patent litigation. These diverse players each select and litigate cases using varied methods, resulting in different levels of risk and reward. The Article uses the study of these players to discuss how and why attorney-client contingent relationships established in the nascent marketplace of patent contingent litigation differ from other types of contingent litigation, and what patent law can teach about contingent representation in general.
Schwartz particularly rejects the conclusions drawn by Texas Professors Ronen Avraham and John Golden that former medical malpractice and mass tort lawyers have moved into the contingency fee patent law arena. Rather, Schwartz concludes that "most lawyers whose practice consists of substantially all patent contingent litigation are primarily and historically patent litigators. They are not former medical malpractice, personal injury, or other tort lawyers."
I might quibble a bit with Schwartz's prognostication that the America Invents Act (AIA) is likely to reduce the filing of weak patent claims where the patentees are hoping to settle for the cost of defense. The basis for this is the AIA's new anti-joinder rule that "joining multiple defendants in many circumstances." Schwartz correctly writes that "this means that the practice of suing multiple unrelated defendants in one cause of action is prohibited going forward." However, in my own experience filing patent complaints, it is not much more difficult to file 20 separate actions as it is to file one action against 20 defendants. The primary difference is the $350 federal court filing fee and perhaps a need for a slightly better system of managing multiple cases. However, those fees are still small when compared with settlement figures.
One topic fascinating to me that is only lightly discussed by Schwartz is financing for the lawyers themselves and the rise of Wall Street hedge fund and bank financed patent litigation. Those underlying financing issues almost certainly drive elements of contingent fee patent litigation.
The Hoboken publishing company (John Wiley) and the non-profit American Institute of Physics have continued their quest to pursue copyright infringement charges against US patent attorneys who submit copies of journal articles to the US Patent Office during the patent application process. The submission of those documents is required by law and attorneys who fail to submit known and relevant prior art can be subject to ethics charges and the associated patents held unenforceable. Earlier this year, the US Patent Office issued a memo indicating its belief that copying and submitting copyrighted documents should be considered a non-actionable fair use. Firms already pay for access to the articles and the USPTO also has its own access to most of the articles. The issue is whether the patent applicants must pay an additional fee for making a copy for the USPTO and an additional copy for the in-house file.
The first two law suits were filed yesterday. The first against my former law firm MBHB LLP in Chicago and the second against the Schwegman firm in Minnesota. These two firms are known for the high level of scientific and technical expertise of their attorneys. (Full Disclosure – MBHB is the primary advertiser on Patently-O)
The complaints allege two particular infringing acts:
14. In connection with researching, filing and prosecuting certain patent applications, McDonnell made and/or distributed to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”), and perhaps others, unauthorized copies of copyrighted articles from plaintiffs’ journals … Such unauthorized copies were used for the commercial benefit of defendants and their clients.
15. Upon information and belief, defendants made (a) additional copies of the copyrighted works that defendants included or cited in their patent applications to the PTO, including those identified on Schedule A, and (b) copies of plaintiffs’ copyrighted works that defendants considered in connection with those applications, but did not ultimately cite or provide to the PTO. Plaintiffs cannot know the full extent of defendants’ copying without discovery. Apart from the copying of plaintiffs’ works accompanying the patent filings described above, this internal copying infringes plaintiffs’ copyrights.
In his article for PaidContent, Jeff Roberts sees these two as “a test-run. . . . If the firms fold their cards and settle, John Wiley and the physicists may be emboldened.” (See also Zach Winnick at Law360).
In the complaint, Wiley identifies two articles that MBHB allegedly submitted to the USPTO:
The complaint in the Schwegman case are based upon these two articles:
I have contacted the authors of each of these articles, but have not yet received any response. MBHB’s managing partner Marcus Thymian released a statement referring to the USPTO’s position on fair use. “We note that the United States Patent and Trademark Office has released its position — that it is a fair use for a patent applicant to submit a copy of non-patent art to the patent office to fulfill the disclosure requirement imposed by the patent regulations.” It will also be easy for the law firms to obtain an opinion that internal copying also qualifies as a fair use under Section 107 of the Copyright Act.
In a statement to Law360, the plaintiffs attorney Bill Dunnegan appears ready to admit – despite language in the complaint – that submissions to the USPTO are not actionable. He is quoted as saying “The crux of what our case deals with is the internal copying by the law firms after they have one copy in their hand. . . . Those copies are not licensed, and the patent office didn’t take a position on whether or not fair use would apply to those copies.” The copy-for-file issue seems to fall in line with the Supreme Court’s analysis in Sony v. Universal (1984). In that case, the court held that it was a fair use for home consumers to record television broadcasts so the consumers could view the shows at a later time.
Notes:
GE v.USITC and Mitsubishi (Fed. Cir. 2012)
Wind turbine technology is coming into its own. GE and Mitsubishi are both global leaders. Mitsubishi imports wind turbines into the US, and GE filed a complaint with the US International Trade Commission (USITC) alleging infringement of three patents. Patent Nos. 7,321,221, 6,921,985, and 5,083,039. The '039 patent expired in 2011 and, because the USITC's only remedy is injunctive relief to stop ongoing and future infringement, the court has dismissed all charges associated with that expired patent.
During its proceedings, the USITC Administrative Law Judge found the GE patents infringed, enforceable, and "not invalid." However, patents are only enforceable at the USITC if there is a "domestic industry" for the claimed invention. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a). The statute specifically requires a US industry that can show "with respect to articles protected by the patent" significant investment in plant and equipment; employment; or investment in exploitation, "including engineering, research and development, or licensing." The ALJ found a domestic industry, but the full Commission rejected that finding and additionally held that Mitsubishi did not infringe the '221 patent.
Win for GE: In a decision penned by Judge Newman and joined by Chief Judge Rader and Judge Linn, the Federal Circuit has affirmed-in-part, vacated-in-part, reversed-in-part, and remanded. Overall, this is a win for GE because the appellate court ruled that a domestic industry exists in relation to the '985 patent and it appears that the USITC already agrees that the '985 patent is valid and infringed.
USITC Domestic industry jurisprudence is a mess. Here, the basic question boiled down to whether there is at least one claim – GE's wind turbines are would infringe the claims in its asserted patents. That decision obviously turned on claim construction and particularly whether GE's domestic turbines included a "converter controller coupled with the inverter … to shunt current from the inverter." The problem with GE's domestic turbines is that its controller is within the inverter and the Commission held that it could not therefore be "coupled to" or shunt current "from" the inverter. On appeal, the court rejected that analysis and instead held that the claim does not require that the controller be separate from the inverter.
A similar argument was rejected in NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), where some of the claims recited a receiver "connected to" or "coupled to" a processor or that the receiver "transfers" information to the processor. The accused infringer in NTP had argued that "connected to," "coupled to," and "transfer from" each requires the receiver and the processor to be separate, but the court concluded that "the two components could be connected, joined, or linked together by wires or other electrical conductors and still be located in the same housing or even on the same circuit board." 418 F.3d at 1310-11. The court also held that the function that information is transferred between two entities does not require physical separation of the entities. Id. at 1310.
Based upon its corrected claim construction, the Federal Circuit was able to conclude that claim 15 of the '985 patent "covers the domestic industry turbines" and that GE therefore has a right to bring an action on the patent in the ITC.
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