By TJ Chiang
Last week, the Supreme Court decided Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, a case that received more attention for Chief Justice Roberts’ citation to Bob Dylan than the mundane federal jurisdiction issues involved. The case involved the collection of small debts by payphone operators from long-distance phone companies. Because the amounts involved were small, payphone operators assigned their claims to “aggregators,” who effectively brought the suit on their behalf. The issue was whether these aggregators, who had nothing but an assignment of the right to sue the phone companies, had standing in federal court.
The Court held that “an assignee of a legal claim for money owed has standing to pursue that claim in federal court.” As an example of this longstanding ability to assign legal claims to strangers who had not suffered any personal injury, the Court cited the early patent statute, which permitted (then and now) inventors to assign their patents to others.
The irony of the shout-out to patent law is that both the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have consistently held that the assignee of a legal claim for money owed on a patent does not have standing to pursue that claim in federal court. A bare assignment of the legal claim for past infringement damages—precisely the type of assignment in Sprint Communications, since the plaintiffs were not assigning their payphones to the aggregators—does not confer standing to sue. See, e.g., Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Machine Works, 261 U.S. 24 (1923); Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., No. 07-1409 (Fed. Cir. June 2, 2008). Instead, the assignment must include the patent itself or an exclusive license.
There are certainly sound policy reasons for requiring the patentee to be a party to an infringement suit, not least because a judgment of invalidity might not be binding absent such participation. At the same time, the patentee standing requirement is a source of frequent litigation at the Federal Circuit. Moreover, because standing is jurisdictional, the issue of proper parties can require an entire case to be relitigated due to a procedural defect. Perhaps the time is ripe for some rethinking in this area, as Sprint Communications and Crown Die appear to be in some tension with each other.
[NOTE: This summer TJ Chiang is transitioning from his position as an associate at Quinn Emmanuel to become a professor at George Mason Law School. Along with yours truly and Jon Dudas, TJ Chiang is a graduate of the University of Chicago Law School. SSRN]