Federal Circuit Finds Scope of Non-Amended Reissue Claims Improperly Broadened

by Dennis Crouch

ArcelorMittal v. AK Steel (Fed. Cir. 2015)

This case provides an important discussion of the “law of the case” doctrine and “mandate rule” as they apply to ongoing parallel patent-office administrative proceedings and in-court infringement proceedings. In particular, the appellate panel holds that the district court is bound by a prior Fed.Cir. claim construction in the same case – despite intervening decisions by the USPTO that the Fed.Cir. construction was too narrow.

The case is also important because of its finding that a claim whose scope is expanded during reissue based upon prosecution history (rather than amendment) will be seen as broadened – and thus may be invalid if the broadening misses the two-year deadline.

= = = = =

Here, the patentee (ArcelorMittal) lost its first round of infringement litigation based upon a narrow claim construction of the claimed steel sheet having a “very high mechanical resistance.”  Meanwhile, the patentee filed a reissue application with the USPTO that added a set of new dependent claims, including one that would seemingly expand the scope of the previously defined term.  In particular, the Federal Circuit originally ruled that the “very high mechanical resistance” is defined as having a resistance >1500 MPa, but the reissue application added a new dependent claim stating that the resistance is “in excess of 1000 MPa.”  That amendment seems to have implicitly increased the scope of claim 1 without actually amending any of the language in claim 1.  As the court writes:

The only relevant change is the addition of a dependent claim which has the practical effect of expanding the scope of claim 1 to cover claim scope expressly rejected by a previous claim construction ruling.

With the original litigation was still pending in district court, the patentee added the Reissued patent to the infringement complaint.  Siding with the defendant, the district court found that the broadened scope was improper because the Reissue application had been filed more than two years after the original patent issuance. On appeal, the Federal Circuit has affirmed, finding that – at least for this case – that the reissue claims are invalid. Here is the court’s logic:

The law-of-the-case doctrine “posits that when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.” Banks v. U.S., 741 F.3d 1268, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (‘an inferior court has no power or authority to deviate from the mandate issued by an appellate court.’). Under the mandate rule and the broader law-of-the-case doctrine, a court may only deviate from a decision in a prior appeal if “extraordinary circumstances” exist. . . .

The successful prosecution of the [reissue] patent is not “new evidence” sufficient to trigger the extraordinary circumstances exception to the mandate rule and the law-of-the-case doctrine. Permitting a reissue patent to disturb a previous claim construction of the original claims would turn the [broadening] analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 251 on its head. . . . If the reissue claim itself could be used to redefine the scope of the original claim, this comparison would be meaningless.

Thus, the court found that the proper analysis for broadening reissue is whether the scope of claims in the reissued patent (as construed now) are broader than those same claims as found in the original patent (as previously construed).  I should note that the court did not particularly address the fact that the broadened claim was not amended. However, this practical approach to scope is in line with the Court’s prior decision in Marine Polymer Tech. v. Hemcon, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2011) that created intervening rights (i.e., no past infringement) based upon a narrowed construction during reexamination.  [Update] Of course, that decision was reversed by the court sitting en banc.

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The law-of-the-case doctrine was not necessary here because the court also found that, when considering whether scope was improperly broadenend, the reissue’s prosecution cannot impact the scope of the original claims.

Going forward, there will be substantial pressure on law-of-the-case doctrine; the mandate rule; and the final judgment rule in managing the new multi-venue reality of patent enforcement/challenge.

An important question not addressed here for reissue applications is whether the PTO erred allowing the reissue claims to issue in their non-amended but broadened form? Was the PTO also bound by the prior Federal Circuit judgment regarding claim construction? What would have happened if the reissue was asserted in a second lawsuit or against a different party? …

58 thoughts on “Federal Circuit Finds Scope of Non-Amended Reissue Claims Improperly Broadened

  1. 10

    Here’s what the last paragraph of 35 USC 251 says:

    “No reissued patent shall be granted enlarging the scope of the claims of the original patent unless applied for within two years from the grant of the original patent.”

    The fact that this “enlarging the scope” may have occurred due to adding a new dependent claim is irrelevant to what this last paragraph says. In the context of this case, it is still an impermissible “enlarging [of] the scope of the claims of the original patent.” And if not an “enlarging [of ] the scope the claims of the original patent,” at the very least, what “very high mechanical resistance” means in Claim 1 of the original patent should be deemed “indefinite” under 35 USC 112, 2nd paragraph.

    1. 10.1

      EG, the scope of claim 1 cannot be enlarged as a matter of law unless it was amended.

      Dependent claims cannot change the scope of an independent claims.

      If a dependent claim is found in a reissue to be broader than its independent claim, it is invalid.

      The Federal Circuit got it backwards. These judges were in dissent in Hemcon where they would have invalidated a reexamination claim that had not been amended.

      These judges are warping the law and ignoring the statutes once again. It is amazing that they do not get the fundamentals correct time and again and have to be reversed en banc or by the Supreme Court. This court is a joke.

      We really, really need to do something about the Federal Circuit.

      1. 10.1.1

        “Dependent claims cannot change the scope of an independent claims.”


        I’m not disagreeing that the new dependent claim is invalid, but that also makes the entire reissue patent invalid. Read the language I quoted from 35 USC 251 which says “no reissued patent shall be granted,” rather than “no invalid claims shall be granted.”

        You also miss the point that I, as well as the Federal Circuit was making. If the new dependent claim recited that the resistance was “in excess of 1000 MPa,” then that would mean that “very high mechanical resistance” in original claim 1 must be broader than “in excess of 1000 MPa.” But in view of the prior construction of “very high mechanical resistance” in original claim 1 as meaning “in excess of 1500 MPA,” this would mean that this new dependent claim would “enlarge the scope of the claims” which the reissue statute doesn’t permit after 2 years from the issue date.

        Again, 35 USC 251 says “enlarging the scope [of] the claims” and doesn’t care whether that occurs due to amendments to the independent claim or by virtue of dependent claims that effectively “enlarge the scope [of] the claims.”


          EG, if you are right that the grant of the reissue was defective because contained “englarged” claims, then the original patent is not surrendered, but remains in force.



          Check out part B of the court’s opinion. They decline to invalidate an entire reissue patent based on an invalid claim.


            Jcd ipad,

            Well, that means this panel didn’t read the reissue statute correctly in that regard. I see that Dyk was on this panel, as well as Wallach. Given that Dyk and Wallach showed in en banc decision in Marine Polymer that they don’t understand how the reissue statute works, I’m not surprised they misunderstood it in this respect.

  2. 9

    Can anybody give me a plausible reason for the addition of the dependent claim, other than deliberately to broaden claim 1 through the repercussive effect a dependent claim can have on the meaning of the independent claim from which it depends? They knew exactly what they were doing, didn’t they? They took into account the likelihood that their re-issue was invalid, but ran with the litigation anyway, hoping Micawberishly that “something would turn up”, no?

    But what about the USPTO waving it through? How could it not have seen the trick? Isn’t it obvious to everybody? Did the PTO not care? Did anybody at the PTO engage the brain, before gifting the Applicant an entry ticket to the courts, a duly issued patent?

    1. 9.1

      MM, the statute requires that a dependent claim further define the subject matter from which it depends. If it does not do so for one reason or another, under the statute, that dependent claim is invalid, not its parent.

      This panel has a statutory framework upside down. Two of these judges, not Hughes, were on the dissent in Hemcon where they similarly argued broadening without amendment in the context of the re-examination where the statute expressly requires an amendment to a claim before it can be considered to be broadened.

      These 2 judges show utter contempt for the statutory framework. This case must be reversed by an en banc Federal Circuit.

      1. 9.1.1

        What? When claim 1 recites “very high” and claim 23 expressly, clearly unambiguously and definitely limits “very high” to “>1000”, how can you (or the USPTO) credibly assert that claim 23 fails to “further define” the vague and numerically indefinite range of claim 1? I don’t see it as being that easy, for the PTO to hold that the Statute renders claim 23 invalid on its face.

        Thanks Ned for your efforts to bring clarity. I’m still struggling though, Ned, to make sense of how you folks do patent law, in the USA.


          Max, a dependent claim cannot be broader than it parent. If it is, it is invalid.


            Yes Ned, I do see that. But when you read the patent, it is not evident that claim 1 is narrower than dependent claim 23.

            Yes, I realise, the scope of claim 1 is not what it appears from the patent but what the court says it is. So, under the Duty of Candor Applicant owed to the USPTO, did it advise the Examiner that, in claim 1,”very high” means “>1500”? How else would the Examiner know this?

            And in the Federal Circuit Decision it says that Arcelor filed the re-issue to “correct the DC’s construction” of “very high”. Did the USPTO have any inhibitions about “correcting” the court’s construction? It seems not. Cheeky, or what?


              Max –

              The argument is (in YOUR) example that claim 1 always mean something broader than your new dependent claim. That is “very high” always meant at least > 500.

              Adding a dependent claim that specifies a narrower range, e.g., >1000 does not in fact broaden claim 1.

              If claim 1 didn’t always mean something broader than the dependent claim (or perhaps at least as broad), then the dependent claim is not valid.

  3. 8

    This is a common tactic, it usually manifests in a spec having examples of novelty A, B, C, but A and B and C appear together in a single dependent.

  4. 7

    Shouldn’t the CAFC just rejected the dependent claim based on 112 4th paragraph instead of tanking the independent claim and all the other dependent claims?

  5. 6

    “Very high mechanical resistance” is a quintessential of the kind of claim term that, if not expressly defined in the specification, should always be found indefinite.

    Responsibility for this mess lays at the feet of the PTO who completely blew it (with much help from the applicant).

    1. 6.2

      “The purpose of the invention is to produce a hot- or cold-rolled steel sheet of a desired thickness, coated, and affording extensive shaping possibilities and which, after thermal treatment performed on the finished casting, makes it possible to obtain a mechanical resistance in excess of 1000 MPa[.]”

      ” The thermal treatment applied at the time of a hot-shaping process or after shaping makes it possible to obtain high mechanical characteristics which may exceed 1500 MPa for mechanical resistance[.]”

      ” After thermal treatment, a substantial mechanical resistance, which may exceed 1500 MPa, is obtained.”

      Presumably “very high” was interpreted to mean 1500 MPa.

      The PTO likely should’ve made them add this (or 1000 MPa) to the (independent) claims.

      1. 6.2.1

        PB: Presumably “very high” was interpreted to mean 1500 MPa.

        Not “presumably”. That’s how the Federal Circuit interpreted the claim (more accurately, “greater than 1500 MPa”). It’s not a ridiculous interpretation. But I think that there is no “reasonable certainty” that the claim term means what the Federal Circuit said that it meant.

        Fundamentals, folks. Learn how to write claims. Learn how to write an application that supports the claims. Define your terms — all the terms that could possibly deemed indefinite — otherwise you’re just wasting the client’s money or you’re intentionally obfuscating. This case is a perfect example of that kind of extraordinary waste and the lengths applicants will go to manipulate a rotten specification and worse claims.

  6. 5

    If claim 1 was not amended, it cannot be broadened as a matter of law.

    New or amended dependent claims that did not further define claim 1 because they covered subject matter beyond the scope of claim 1 were invalid dependent claims.

    1. 5.1

      If claim 1 was not amended, it cannot be broadened as a matter of law.

      What about a scenario where you unambiguously disavow claim scope during prosecution, and then later (whether during the same prosecution or during a reissue/reexam proceeding) rescind that disavowal?

      The Federal Circuit suggested such a scenario in Golden Bridge Technology v. Apple Inc.


          I know the recapture rule applies to reissues, but does it apply during prosecution?


            Are you suggesting that applicants can say “claim term does not include X” at one point in the prosecution, obtain the benefits of that statement, and later turn around and argue that “oops we didn’t mean it — in fact claim term does include X”, and suffer no consequences?

            At the very least, any patent term extension you might have accrued in the meantime should be flushed down the tubes.

            When applicants don’t understand what their own claim terms mean, this is a sure sign that somebody — either the inventor or his attorney/agent — has made a major error.


              I’m suggesting that I have seen no court case that has addressed the issue of whether one can change their mind during prosecution.

              The closest I can remember is the case about a “slit” in a sippy cup (Hakim v. Cannon Avent Group, 2005-1389 (Fed. Cir. 2007), where they filed new claims (in a continuation) and told the examiner they were broadening the new claims. The Federal Circuit held that they had to disclaim their previous arguments. (Which honestly shocked me, as they said they were broadening the claims.)

              Regardless, this implies that, during prosecution, one can disclaim all previous arguments and file claims that are broader.

              Are they any cases that indicate the opposite?


                Well Patent Bob, the recapture rule should prevent deliberate disavowal of claim scope even in a broadening reissue.

                Regarding continuations, if an argument is made in the continuation that is clearly inconsistent with an argument made in its parent, I think it is incumbent upon the prosecutor to directly address the inconsistency and explain it away in some fashion. However this should not be possible if the statements in the parent case resulted in allowed claims.

                1. However this should not be possible if the statements in the parent case resulted in allowed claims.

                  At the very least (and I do mean least), those claims would need to be forfeited by the applicant for the “new position” to be adopted.

                  But the better rule would simply be to stick applicants to any original positions where those positions are relied on by examiners. I don’t see how such a rule could be deemed “unfair” to anybody. It’s certainly fair to the public and avoids a lot of wasted effort. Where those original positions are incorrect or where the examiner (or a third party) spots the inconsistency, the usual inequitable conduct issues will always be lurking, with the associated consequences for the enforceability of the patent family.

    2. 5.2

      If claim 1 was not amended, it cannot be broadened as a matter of law.

      That depends on whether a construction to keep as many claims valid as possible or whether a construction to admit of 112, 4th is of higher priority.

  7. 4

    Actually, the panel decision in Marine Polymer found intervening rights (659 F.3d 1084), but the en banc court then vacated that decision and found no intervening rights (672 F.3d 1350). The decision in ArcelorMittal does not discuss Marine Polymer and seems to be in some tension with it.

    1. 4.1

      Agreed. Without looking, this panel might be composed of those judges in Hemcon that wanted to hold the claims there broadened.

      1. 4.1.1

        Dyk, Wallach, Hughes here. There, Dyk and Wallach in dissent.

        From Hemcon,

        Opinion for the court in part filed by Circuit Judge LOURIE, in which Chief Judge RADER and Circuit Judges NEWMAN, BRYSON, and PROST join in full, and in which Circuit Judge LINN joins in part II.

        Opinion filed by Circuit Judge DYK, dissenting in part, in which Circuit Judges GAJARSA, REYNA, and WALLACH join in full, and in which Circuit Judge LINN joins in parts I-II.


            It looks like the CAFC judges are learning from the Justices…

            Wax Nose Mashing lessons will create these types of effects.

      2. 4.1.2

        I think you are misunderstanding the issue in Marine Polymer that caused a split.

        The majority in that case actually acknowledged that it was possible for claim scope to be changed without an amendment, but held that it was irrelevant with respect to intervening rights, because the codification of intervening rights for re-examination specifies that only new or amended claims will be susceptible to intervening rights. The majority acknowledged that their decision creates a loophole where intervening rights are not granted when claim scope changes without an amendment, but did not feel that this loophole was enough reason to go against a plain reading of the law emphasizing “new or amended”.

        In contrast, the dissent felt that codification of re-examination intervening rights in 307(b) was intended to offer the same rights as available with respect to reissue applications under 252, and that intervening rights should be available for any claims that are substantively changed, even if they are not amended.

        I am concerned that your comments may mislead those that don’t take the time to go read Marine Polymer. Just curious, are you a lawyer?


          6-4, “a majority of this court concludes as an alternative ground for affirmance that intervening rights do not apply to claims that have not been amended and are not new.”

          Now, one may argue that this “only” applies to reexaminations. It seems clear, though, that congress believed that only amended claims had the possibility of intervening rights.


            Furthermore, without such a limitation, JCD, every reissue, every reexamination, and perhaps every IPR will result in intervening rights because any argument distinguishing the prior art has an effect on claim construction.




            The infringer bar must be dancing in the streets today.

            A major reason for forcing a patent owner into the PTO is intervening rights. BRI coupled with arguments about claim scope now force amendments that can cause intervening rights. But Dyk, Wallach, and Reyna want more, as do all infringers.

            Think about what Dyk, Wallach, Reyna and the infringer bar are doing to the patent system. The consequence of ruling like this will be a patent system where damages are unavailable due to intervening rights. Couple that with no injunctions, where does that leave us.


              This is loosely one of the reasons the court offered as a policy counterweight to the loophole presented by HemCon. Although I think there are a lot of nuances you are glossing over, my thanks for making me think about it.


            You originally referenced “those judges in Hemcon that wanted to hold the claims there broadened”. I was commenting that it seemed like you were reading too much into Marine Polymer, as the majority was merely saying that the codification of intervening rights for re-examination specifies that only new or amended claims will be susceptible to intervening rights.

            The majority certainly was not saying that claims cannot be broadened without amendment, as the majority, in addressing HemCon’s argument that claims can be “substantively changed” even without amendment, simply said that intervening rights cannot arise except as to new or amended claims, regardless of whether the claims were substantively changed.

            Lastly, it is clear that the Court’s reasoning only applies to re-examination intervening rights under 307(b), as it is based on use of the phrase “new or amended”. You could craft an argument that codification in 307(b) evidences congressional intent regarding 252, but that seems a hard pill to swallow, and I don’t see it working.


              JCD, I think it is self-evident that congress and, for that matter, everyone in patent law, believed that one had to amend claims before there was any possibility of intervening rights.

              If one does not apply this very simple rule, every claim in a reissue may be held to be invalid or subject to intervening rights if any claim is amended or an argument is made about a common term. Reissues will become deathtraps for the unwary, rather than a vehicle for correcting mistakes.

              The blindness and sheer s t u p i d i t y of the judges here is astounding.


                Did you even read the dissent in Marine Polymer? The dissent noted that in developing the doctrine of intervening rights, the Supreme Court recognized that intervening rights can arise even without amendment to a claim. The dissent further noted that there is no indication that Congress intended to change this when codifying the doctrine in 252. It looks more like this recognition got lost and resulted in sloppy drafting with respect to 307(b).

                Regardless, your claim that “it is self-evident that … everyone in patent law[] believed that one had to amend claims before there was any possibility of intervening rights” is plainly contravened by the Supreme Court jurisprudence which developed the doctrine.

                1. From the dissent,

                  “the Supreme Court, in developing the doctrine of intervening rights, concluded that the scope of the claims could change without formal amendments and still require the recognition of intervening rights.”

                  The cases cited only discussed amended specifications an amended claims. Amended specifications are now flatly prohibited to the extent they add new matter. 35 USC 251.

                  That now leaves only amendment to the claims as the source of intervening rights in the Supreme Court jurisprudence.

                  The dissent in Hemcon was wrong. It only got 4 votes, not 6. There is no justification for the dissenting judges to ignore Hemcon and impose their view view here.

                2. I have to laugh at Ned’s conniptions – tell me Ned, what other Supreme Court view only received 4 votes (which in a subsequent case was reduced to a mere 3?)

                3. How are they ignoring Marine Polymer? As I noted below, I don’t see any tension between this case and Marine Polymer. What is the holding or dicta in Marine Polymer you believe is being ignored?

    2. 4.3

      How so? Having looked over Marine Polymer, I don’t necessarily see the tension.

      The decision in Marine Polymer was based on two very specific grounds.

      First, the majority argued that the district court’s claim construction was not in error, and thus there was no actual change in claim scope.

      Second, as an alternative grounds, the majority argued that even if the claim scope of a claim had changed, it was irrelevant, because the law makes clear that intervening rights only apply to new and amended claims, and the claims at issue were neither new nor amended. In effect, the majority said that a literal reading of the relevant law makes it clear that a claim must be new or amended regardless of whether the claim scope has been changed. In doing so, the court actually acknowledged that it is possible for the claim scope to change without a claim being amended, but said that they are not concerned enough by this to reach a different result.

      This seconds grounds is not relevant to ArcerlorMittal, as the statute prohibiting broadening after two years does not include language specifying that it only pertains to new or amended claims.

  8. 3

    This case appears to illustrate the different standards for claim construction in the district courts (ordinary meaning) and the PTO (broadest possible meaning).

    Because the PTO uses a broader standard than the district courts, the “dependent” claims added during reissue were apparently within the scope of independent claim 1, as construed by the PTO. However, the same set of “dependent” claims were beyond the scope of independent claim 1, as construed by the district court and affirmed by the CAFC.

    Law of the case was applicable in this “case” because the original district court action was still pending when the patentee tried to assert the reissued patent against the same defendant in the same district court, which was bound by its previous, affirmed, claim construction under its standard.

    Law of the case would not have been applicable to a suit against a different defendant. However, claim construction is a legal conclusion and followed by courts under principles of stare decisis.

    1. 3.1

      Steve- I think you hit the nail on the head. The unintended consequences of having two different standards. Under PTO BRI, the dependent reissue claim is fine. Under there court’s standard, the reissued claim is impermissible because it is “broader” than interpreted during a Markman and submitted after >2 yrs. The unintended result – an independent claim that was not amended during reissue can be held invalid as improperly broadened.

      The only way the Feds can decide this way is if they elevate the rule prohibiting broadening reissues >2yrs over the rule that says issued dependent claims must be interpreted as more narrow than the independent claim the depend from. Are some rule more impactful than others?

      1. 3.1.1

        xtian, “the rule that says that dependent claims must be interpreted more narrow than the independent claim the [sic] depend from…”

        There is no such rule.

        But both Dennis and the court here seem to think there is.

        Reversible error.


          Are you not being pedanticly colloquial with “no such rule,” Ned, given the level above “rule,” that is, “law,” and 35 USC 112(d) – the very definition of “dependent?”


          LAW: see anon post

          RULE: 37 C.F.R. 1.75(c) Claims. One or more claims may be presented in dependent form, referring back to and further limiting another claim or claims in the same application.

          “SUGGESTION” MPEP 608.01(i) “When examining a dependent claim, the examiner should determine whether the claim complies with 35 U.S.C. 112(d) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, fourth paragraph, which requires that dependent claims contain a reference to a previous claim in the same application, specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed, and include all the limitations of the previous claim.”

          If a dependent claim appears in a valid, granted patent, then, unless until one shows otherwise, the presumption must be that the dependent claim is more narrow in scope than the independent claim from which it depends. Otherwise, the above law, rule and suggestions have no meaning.


            xtian, so?

            If the plain language of the claim is broader than the proper construction of its parent, the dependent claim in invalid by statute, not the parent claim.

            This decision by the Federal Circuit turns all prior cases on topic and the statute on its head.

            Dependent claims are considered to be independent claims with all the terms of its parent. If this claim is invalid due to broadening, by statute other claims are not invalid. If those other claims do not have the broadening subject matter, by statute, they remain valid.



              Great response Ned, you arse.

              “Obtuse. Is it deliberate?” – said in the best Andy Dufresne tones.

              Ned, your statement at 3.1.1 is clearly and unequivocally wrong.

              Own it and move on.

  9. 2

    Zvi, your second point (“very high” was construed too narrowly) may be correct. However, once the Federal Circuit held in the previous decision that “very high” meant >1,500 MPa, the patentee was stuck with that interpretation.

    Perhaps the better way to look at it is to view the dependent claim as an independent one. Claim 1 was construed to mean >1,500 MPa. The new claim is identical, but expands the mechanical resistance to >1,000 MPa, thus making it broader than claim 1, as previously construed. In the U.S. at least, each dependent claim is, in reality, its own separate claim. Writing claims in dependent form is really just a way to avoid having a bunch of long, repetitive, independent claims.

    1. 2.1

      I’m not sure that viewing the dependent claims as independent claims is the best idea. For instance, a dependent claim cannot broaden the independent claim or remove limitations from the independent claim, but an independent claim obviously can be broadened or remove limitations relative to another independent claim.

      1. 2.1.1

        Well, they effectively ARE their own separate claims for purposes of validity and infringement. Your examples are merely instances of dependent claims that would be invalid for not including all of the limitations of the claim from which they depend. But that does not change the fact that they are effectively independent claims.

        Consider this: claim 1 recites “A widget comprising A, B and C,” and claim 2 recites “The widget of claim 1, further comprising D.” Claim 2 is equivalent to an independent claim that recites: “A widget comprising A, B, C and D.”

  10. 1

    Seems some bad decisions were made here. I am not a US practitioner, not a litigator, but seems to me that if claim 1 was not amended, there cannot be “broadening” rather only CLARIFICATION of the scope. If the dependent claim for 1,000 MPa was allowed, it was presumably supported the Spec. AND, claims are interpreted on the basis of the Spec. So, claim 1 should already have been interpreted to include the 1,000 MPa feature. Thus, NO broadening.

    By the same logic, the narrow claim construction of the claimed steel sheet having a “very high mechanical resistance” seems to be a mistake also. That claim construction (if 1,000 MPA was supported in the Spec), should have been interpreted to include such feature.

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