Provisional Patent Applications: Waiting to File Non-Provisionals

For better or worse, provisional patent applications have always been used as a way to delay patent prosecution. The procedure has become popular as a relatively cheap and informal mechanism for preserving priority of invention without losing patent term. Although a provisional application sets a priority date, the application does not even reach the examination queue until the full utility patent application is filed. Thus, on average, each day of delay in filing the utility patent application pushes the issue date back one day as well. However, provisional applications also serve as a mechanism for extending the tail end of the patent term because the twenty-year patent term does not begin to run until filing of the utility patent.

Provisional applications have become quite popular. In FY2007, for instance, over 132,000 provisional applications were filed and about 30% of recent patents assigned to US companies reference a provisional filing. [Link]

To see how provisional filings are being used, I compiled a set of 65,000 patents that issued sometime between Jan 2007 and Feb 2009 (inclusive). All the patents in the group share the common property of claiming priority only to one or more provisional applications. I additionally excluded patents that made other priority claims such as continuations, divisionals, and continuations-in-part. Once I formed the set of patents, I then looked at the filing date of the provisional application compared with the filing of the utility application to how applicants are using the extra year of deferred examination. For patents claiming priority to multiple provisional applications, I used the date of the earliest filed provisional application.

The graph below shows the result. The vast majority of applicants wait until the year is almost up before taking action and filing the non-provisional application. About two-thirds of the non-provisional applications were filed with less than ten days remaining in the one-year provisional pendency. In over ten percent of the cases, applicants properly filed the non-provisional more than 365 days after the original provisional filing because of weekends, holidays, and/or leap year.

200902212058.jpg

Two weeks ago, I had a conversation with a patent litigator about the propensity of patent attorneys to barely meet deadlines. He was worried about the potential for malpractice claims against his firm. And, here, I found a surprising number of cases that appear to miss the deadline.

My lingering question for patent attorneys and applicants — why delay so long? Is it simply a matter of doing work according to deadline? Does it matter that delaying filing the application also delays the eventual issuance of the patent?

Provisional Patent Applications: Waiting to File Non-Provisionals

For better or worse, provisional patent applications have always been used as a way to delay patent prosecution. The procedure has become popular as a relatively cheap and informal mechanism for preserving priority of invention without losing patent term. Although a provisional application sets a priority date, the application does not even reach the examination queue until the full utility patent application is filed. Thus, on average, each day of delay in filing the utility patent application pushes the issue date back one day as well. However, provisional applications also serve as a mechanism for extending the tail end of the patent term because the twenty-year patent term does not begin to run until filing of the utility patent.

Provisional applications have become quite popular. In FY2007, for instance, over 132,000 provisional applications were filed and about 30% of recent patents assigned to US companies reference a provisional filing. [Link]

To see how provisional filings are being used, I compiled a set of 65,000 patents that issued sometime between Jan 2007 and Feb 2009 (inclusive). All the patents in the group share the common property of claiming priority only to one or more provisional applications. I additionally excluded patents that made other priority claims such as continuations, divisionals, and continuations-in-part. Once I formed the set of patents, I then looked at the filing date of the provisional application compared with the filing of the utility application to how applicants are using the extra year of deferred examination. For patents claiming priority to multiple provisional applications, I used the date of the earliest filed provisional application.

The graph below shows the result. The vast majority of applicants wait until the year is almost up before taking action and filing the non-provisional application. About two-thirds of the non-provisional applications were filed with less than ten days remaining in the one-year provisional pendency. In over ten percent of the cases, applicants properly filed the non-provisional more than 365 days after the original provisional filing because of weekends, holidays, and/or leap year.

200902212058.jpg

Two weeks ago, I had a conversation with a patent litigator about the propensity of patent attorneys to barely meet deadlines. He was worried about the potential for malpractice claims against his firm. And, here, I found a surprising number of cases that appear to miss the deadline.

My lingering question for patent attorneys and applicants — why delay so long? Is it simply a matter of doing work according to deadline? Does it matter that delaying filing the application also delays the eventual issuance of the patent?

Provisional Patent Applications: Waiting to File Non-Provisionals

For better or worse, provisional patent applications have always been used as a way to delay patent prosecution. The procedure has become popular as a relatively cheap and informal mechanism for preserving priority of invention without losing patent term. Although a provisional application sets a priority date, the application does not even reach the examination queue until the full utility patent application is filed. Thus, on average, each day of delay in filing the utility patent application pushes the issue date back one day as well. However, provisional applications also serve as a mechanism for extending the tail end of the patent term because the twenty-year patent term does not begin to run until filing of the utility patent.

Provisional applications have become quite popular. In FY2007, for instance, over 132,000 provisional applications were filed and about 30% of recent patents assigned to US companies reference a provisional filing. [Link]

To see how provisional filings are being used, I compiled a set of 65,000 patents that issued sometime between Jan 2007 and Feb 2009 (inclusive). All the patents in the group share the common property of claiming priority only to one or more provisional applications. I additionally excluded patents that made other priority claims such as continuations, divisionals, and continuations-in-part. Once I formed the set of patents, I then looked at the filing date of the provisional application compared with the filing of the utility application to how applicants are using the extra year of deferred examination. For patents claiming priority to multiple provisional applications, I used the date of the earliest filed provisional application.

The graph below shows the result. The vast majority of applicants wait until the year is almost up before taking action and filing the non-provisional application. About two-thirds of the non-provisional applications were filed with less than ten days remaining in the one-year provisional pendency. In over ten percent of the cases, applicants properly filed the non-provisional more than 365 days after the original provisional filing because of weekends, holidays, and/or leap year.

200902212058.jpg

Two weeks ago, I had a conversation with a patent litigator about the propensity of patent attorneys to barely meet deadlines. He was worried about the potential for malpractice claims against his firm. And, here, I found a surprising number of cases that appear to miss the deadline.

My lingering question for patent attorneys and applicants — why delay so long? Is it simply a matter of doing work according to deadline? Does it matter that delaying filing the application also delays the eventual issuance of the patent?

References Cited

I compiled a list of the over five hundred thousand reference citations in the almost eighteen thousand utility patents issued in the past two months. (Jan 1, 2009 – Feb 18, 2009, excluding reissues and reexaminations). In this sample, the average patent issued with 31 cited references. This is a skewed average – the median patent only cites 15 references. The vast majority of references (77%) are introduced by the applicant during prosecution while less than a quarter (23%) are cited by the examiner.

Patent documents (including US & foreign issued patents and published applications) represent 82% of the cited documents while non-patent literature represents 18% of the total. As was noted in the comments regarding PTO search tools, PTO searches are overwhelmingly focused on patent documents. Thus, 95% of references cited by PTO examiners are patent documents. (See pie chart aside).

Although – on average – applicants submit most of the prior art, Applicants submitted absolutely no references (zero) 15% of the patents in my study, and the median number of references cited by the applicant is only 7. Applicants cite over 200 references in only 2% of cases. The PTO’s stalled IDS rules give the applicant 20 ‘free’ references that can be cited without payment of a fee or further description. About 23% of the issued patents in my sample include more than 20 references cited by the applicant. The chart below is a histogram of applicant submitted references. About 12% of patents are “off the chart.” In those cases the applicant cited more than 40 references.

Take-away: First, the data shows that applicant submitted references are substantially different from those cited by examiners. Non-patent literature is an important category of prior art that is largely missed by examiners, and the current information disclosure system does a pretty good job of getting more of that type of art in front of the examiner than he or she would otherwise see. A second point is that most of the time, examiners are not being swamped by reference submissions. It is surprising that 15% of patented cases include absolutely no applicant cited references. On the other hand, folks who submit over 200 references are deliberately choosing to do so. Generally, the very large reference volume comes in cases where the applicant knows that the innovation is important and is looking for more assured protection. In those cases, I don’t see the harm in making the applicant somehow pay for the additional resources required to review those references. [Of course, in that case, the PTO should allow more examination time as well]

The next graph shows the average number of applicant-cited references for various top-patenting companies. The size of the blue bar reflects the number of applicant cited reference on average, for that assignee’s Jan-Feb 2009 patents. (Scale at bottom). The graph is sorted so that companies with the greatest average number of cites are shown at the top. Although this is not strictly true, the difference between companies is largely a difference in areas of technology. Thus, companies patenting electronics generally cite less prior art than others. You may also notice in this list that US based companies tend to cite more prior art. The final chart in the series shows that – on average, US assignees submit over three times as many prior art references as do their foreign counterparts or patents without an assignee.

Extending Patent Terms

ScreenShot016I looked again at patent term adjustments (PTA) for US patents. 3294 utility patents were granted on February 17, 2009. Of those, 2467 (75%) included some patent term adjustment based on PTO delays in prosecution under 35 U.S.C. § 154(b). For each of these patents, some additional quantum of exclusivity is added to the end of the patent term so long as maintenance fees are paid.

The median adjustment was just over one year (376 days) with the average adjustment of 430 days. The longest adjustment in the group was over five years (1958 days). That patent (No. 7,490,438) is directed to an automobile door and is based on an application filed in 2000. In that case, the applicant appealed twice. The examiner was reversed both times. The applicant lost 11 potential PTA days for filing an IDS after the first office action.

Notes

Patent Attorney Argument as Inequitable Conduct

Rothman v. Target Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2009)

A New Jersey jury found Rothman’s patent invalid, not infringed, and unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. (Pat No. 6,855,029). On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the inequitable conduct holding, but otherwise affirmed.

Obviousness: The asserted patent covers a breastfeeding shirt that includes a concealed, but fully supportive nursing bra. The original prototype was built by Ms. Rothman by sewing a Jockey brand tank-top together with an Olga brand nursing bra and some additional fabric. Thus, here we have a situation where the inventor took off the shelf items and took a few hours (a day into the night) to form them into a new combination. The appellate panel recognized that the particular manner in which an invention is actually made does not negate patentability. However, the appellate panel did see the simple inventive process as evidence of “the predictability and expectations in this field of art.” Based on these facts, the court could find no reason to disturb the obviousness holding since a PHOSITA “would have been motivated to combine an existing tank top with an existing nursing bra to arrive at the claimed invention.”

Inequitable Conduct: The Federal Circuit reversed the jury’s finding of inequitable conduct. One point of interest involved the patent attorney argument that “nursing garments are highly specialized … as distinguished from maternity garments, [and] are not analogous prior art to women’s garments in general…. Therefore, it is improper to combine a prior art reference from nursing garments with a prior art reference from garments generally, with no connection to nursing garments.” It turned out that the patent attorney had no prior experience in nursing garment technology and did not consult any industry experts before making his claims regarding the ‘highly specialized’ nature of the art and the impropriety of combining prior art.

The Federal Circuit no problem with these attorney statements:

[The attorney’s] remarks show an effort to persuade that does not even approach an effort to deceive the PTO or abuse the prosecution process. …

Appellees find fault with the final sentence from the excerpt above. However, [the attorney’s] conclusion that it is “improper to combine a prior art reference from nursing garments with a prior art reference from garments generally, with no connection to nursing garments” is nothing more than attorney argument based on the foregoing facts … [derived] from his analysis that nursing garments are different from regular women’s wear. … In any event, this type of conclusory analysis betrays no intent to deceive the PTO and obtain a patent with objectively false information. Rather, it is an attempt to characterize the prior art in a manner favorable to the attorney’s client—far from deception. No reasonable jury could rely on Mr. Jacobson’s statements as clear and convincing proof of inequitable conduct.

While the law prohibits genuine misrepresentations of material fact, a prosecuting attorney is free to present argument in favor of patentability without fear of committing inequitable conduct. . . . This court has little basis to find deceptive intent in the routine back and forth between examiner and applicant. Moreover, this court recognizes that the Patent Act gives the examiner the discretion to reject or accept an applicant’s arguments based on the examiner’s own conclusions regarding the prosecution record.

Attorneys should take this decision with a grain of salt based on the fact that Judge Rader authored the opinion and Judge Friedman was on the panel. Judge Rader is well known for his opinion that inequitable conduct is too liberally adjudged.

Federal Circuit Takings Case: Set Up for Supreme Court Review

Casitas Municipal Water v. US (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc denial) (MAYER, SCHALL , and MOORE*)

Casitas is not a patent case, it is a takings case involving regulatory restrictions on water use imposed by US Government. The Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over this takings claim against the US Government because it is on appeal from the Court of Federal Claims (CFC). Although the Federal Circuit has denied the Federal Government’s motion for en banc rehearing, a set of diverging opinions sets this case in position for likely Supreme Court review.

History: The Ventura River Project provides water supply to Ventura County, California. In 1956, the US Government granted the local government the “perpetual right to use all water that becomes available through the construction and operation of the Project.” Then, in 1997, steelhead trout living in the Project became an endangered species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and the US Government required that Casitas construct a fish ladder and divert water over the fish ladder. Casitas complied, but filed suit in the CFC alleging that the Federal Government had taken its property without just compensation (and also under breach of contract). The CFC classified the Government action as “regulatory” rather than a “physical.” In takings law, compensation for regulatory takings is much more difficult to obtain, and Casitas admitted that it could not prove the required elements. This conclusion followed the Federal Government argument that “it did not seize, appropriate, divert, or impound any water, but merely required water to be left in the stream.”

Appeal: On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed. Writing for the majority, Judge Moore concluded “that the government physically appropriated water that Casitas held a usufructuary right in.”

Here, the government admits for the purposes of summary judgment that it required Casitas to build the fish ladder facility, which is a man-made concrete structure that was not a portion of the existing … The government also admits that the operation of the fish ladder required water, which prior to the fish ladder’s construction flowed into the Casitas Reservoir … Specifically, the government admits that the operation of the fish ladder includes closing the overshot gate …and that the closure of this gate causes water that would have gone into the Casitas Reservoir via the Robles-Casitas Canal to be diverted into the fish ladder. … These admissions make clear that the government did not merely require some water to remain in stream, but instead actively caused the physical diversion of water away from the Robles-Casitas Canal … and towards the fish ladder, thus reducing Casitas’ water supply.

In dissent, Judge Mayer rejected the physical takings argument. At base, he argued, Casitas does not actually own the water. Rather, under California law, all water sources within California “belong to the public.” Even if Casitas did own the water flow, Mayer would have seen the endangered species requirements as regulatory because the requirements simply force a specific use of the water rather than take it away.

En Banc Rehearing: In what looks like a 7-5 (or 6-6) vote, the Federal Circuit denied a rehearing en banc. Judge Moore wrote a new opinion defending her original approach in the original opinion. In particular, Judge Moore focused on the “facts as presented” in the case. “[T]he government conceded (1) that Casitas had a property right in the water diverted from the Ventura River, and (2) that the government required Casitas to build and operate the fish ladder in such a way as to permanently appropriate water in which Casitas had the conceded property right.” Based on those two facts, the holding of a physical takings was easy.

Judge Gajarsa would have heard the case en banc. Gajarsa (joined by Chief Judge Michel and Judge Dyk) saw the taking as clearly regulatory in form because nothing had actually been taken by the US Government.

This denial implicates fundamental questions regarding takings law. The panel majority’s opinion suggests that a government action can be construed to be a physical taking even if no physical proprietary interest has actually been taken by the United States. This is contrary to present Supreme Court law and contrary to our case law. Accepting this analysis of the panel majority eliminates the fine distinction and balance that has been established by the Supreme Court between physical and regulatory takings. Moreover, it eliminates the ability of the legislature to provide for limited and parsimonious legislation protecting endangered species.

Notes:

  • Republican vs. Democrat: Moore’s position is clearly one of stronger property rights while Gajarsa/Mayer’s position is in favor of regulatory power of the government. It appears that this decision falls along political lines. Those thinking of the regulation as a physical taking (Moore, Schall, Rader, JJ) are all Republican appointees. Three of the five thinking of the regulation as regulatory in nature are Democratic appointees (Linn, Dyk, Gajarsa, JJ are all Clinton appointees; Michel, CJ, and Mayer, J, are Reagan appointees). At least three of the four other judges voted to deny a rehearing. Of those four, three are Republican appointees (Newman, Lourie, Prost, JJ, are all Republican appointees; Bryson, J, is a Clinton appointee). As you can see here, eight of the twelve active Federal Circuit judges are Republican appointees.
  • En Banc Denial
  • Original CAFC Opinion: Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
  • Original CFC Opinion

Percent of Patents Discussing “Microsoft,” part II

In an earlier post, I introduced some data relating to patents that discuss Microsoft somewhere in the patent document. That post showed that almost 5% of newly issued patents refer to the software giant in some way. That data also showed a strong upward trend over time. The post received a few interesting comments as well as a few suggestions. [LINK] In response, I have added some additional data to the graphs. The first graph below shows the percent of patents that discuss Microsoft (in blue) and now also includes the percent of patents that are assigned to Microsoft (in red). Several years ago, Microsoft publicized their intention to obtain a large number of patents. That intention is becoming a reality, and Microsoft recently obtained its 10,000th patent. However, only about 20% of patents that discuss Microsoft are actually assigned to the company.

The next graph compares the patents discussing “Microsoft” with other products/companies. Here, I include patents that discuss “Microsoft” (blue), “UNIX” (green), “LINUX” (red), and “Apple” (tan). UNIX has seen some growth, but not much since the mid 1990’s. In the past couple of years, the number of LINUX patents have grown dramatically, but still pale in comparison to Microsoft patents. Although the absolute numbers for LINUX related patents are still small, they are surprisingly high based on the anti-patent lore of LINUX developers. Apple has remained steady over the years. Of course, my results for Apple should be tempered by the false positive results that actually refer to the fruit rather than the computer company or its products.

An issue in all these graphs is time lag. The time lag of issued patents may be easily seen by searching for patents that discuss “Google.” – The result is only 1342 patents but 4682 published applications.

Brief post on the stimulus [updated]

pic-9.jpgTo put $800 billion in perspective, I like to think in terms of households. In the US, there are around 115 million households with a little under three persons per household. Simple division gives us $7,000 per household. The median household income of Patently-O readers is at least two to three times greater than the national median of $50,000. The income-correlated cost will be at least proportional — pushing $20,000 for Patently-O households.

A weak economy has little demand for patent attorneys. Patent attorneys make less money, clients disappear, and law firms close. Although patents can be countercyclic, on average they are not – especially in a sustained downturn.

In the 1990’s, I taught high-school level math and physics as a Peace Corps volunteer in Ghana, West Africa. Many of my students were smarter and certainly harder working than their American counterparts. Yet, the Ghanaians have an expected per capita income of just under $1,000 per year. Those kids are a victim of circumstance. In the US, we reap the windfall of circumstance. Our individual income levels are within our control only to a certain extent.

The bottom line here is that this additional $20,000 cost is worth while … if it works. I guess that we’ll find out.

Obviousness; Scope and Content of the Prior Art; Secondary Considerations

Süd-Chemie v. Multisorb Technologies (Fed. Cir. 2009)

Süd-Chemie holds a patent covering a desiccant container for keeping products dry in shipment. In an infringement action, the Kentucky district court found the patent invalid as obvious. On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated – holding that the lower court had erred in its analysis of the scope and content of the prior art. There are two primary take-away points from Sud-Chemie. First, obviousness jurisprudence continues to require detailed analysis of the claims and the prior art. I.e., KSR did not suddenly allow handwaving as a substitute for evidence and clear argument. Second, well presented secondary indicia of nonobviousness continue to be important in rebutting obviousness allegations.

Here, the claimed patent required the use of “compatible polymeric materials” used in a laminate seal. The prior art disclosed the use of laminate materials taken from the same general class of materials. However, the Federal Circuit recognized that the prior art did not specify that the selected materials be “compatible” in a way to allow for a proper laminate seal.

This is a case where a definition of the claim term in the specification greatly aided the patentee. The specification defined “compatible” materials as those that “mix on a molecular scale and will crystallize homogeneously.” The prior art reference did not teach this form of compatibility. In fact, the prior art appeared to teach “incompatible” materials.  

Multisorb ignores the fact that while the ’942 patent requires the inner surfaces of the laminate and microporous films to have similar softening points, Komatsu [the prior art] requires the films to have dissimilar softening points. Komatsu thus does not teach the use of a microporous film that is compatible with the inner surface of the laminate film.

Looking at secondary considerations, the Federal Circuit instructed district courts to “attend carefully to any evidence of … secondary considerations of nonobviousness.” Here, the focus is on the surprising and unexpected result that compatible materials formed stronger bonds even without adhesive.

The Federal Circuit did not apply these findings to form a conclusion on the issue of obviousness. Rather, the court remanded for further development of the facts.

[NOTE- This decision is from January 2009]

Federal Circuit Finds DJ Jurisdiction Even After Time-Limited Covenant Not To Sue

Revolution Eyewear v. Aspex Eyewear (Fed. Cir. 2009)pic-8.jpg

After several years of litigation, the patentee-plaintiff Revolution delivered a covenant not to sue to Aspex. The covenant was limited to the asserted patent and to activities prior to dismissal of the action. The district court dismissed the case, but Aspex did not let go. The accused infringer wanted assurances that it could continue selling the accused version of its eyeglass design without worrying about future charges of infringement.

In the appeal, Judge Newman agreed that a case or controversy continues to exist and that under MedImmune, the district court still retains jurisdiction. In the backdrop, the Newman was careful to differentiate this case from those where an accused defendant may be hoping to seek a speculative judicial opinion on future product lines:

This case is of larger substance than merely a would-be competitor seeking to test the waters by way of an advisory judicial opinion on an adverse patent….These parties are already in infringement litigation initiated by the patentee, the case has been pending since 2003, and already has produced a summary judgment of invalidity (which was later vacated by this court, 175 Fed. Appx. 350); the patentee filed its covenant in 2007, after four years of litigation, on the eve of trial of the question of enforceability. Throughout this period the accused eyewear were removed from the market by Aspex, and would not be shielded by the covenant should it be returned to the market, as Aspex states is its intention. Aspex states, and Revolution agreed at the argument of this appeal, that it is reasonable to believe that Revolution will again file suit should Aspex return to this market with the same product as it previously sold. By now barring the counterclaims that have been pending since 2003, Aspex states that this court would enable the “scare-the-customer-and-run” tactics that were deplored in Arrowhead.

Dismissal Reversed. On remand, the lower court retains subject matter jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment counterclaims.

Percent of Patents Discussing “Microsoft”

I looked at all patents that include the word “Microsoft” somewhere within the patent document. These include patents assigned to the company as well as well as patents that simply refer to Microsoft in the specification or list of cited references. That almost 5% of new all patents refer to the software giant is a sign that the company’s technology serves as a creative platform for ongoing developments.

Orion and Taurus: NPEs at the Federal Circuit

Erich Spangenberg has at least two pending appeals at the Federal Circuit: Taurus IP v. Daimlerchrysler (and Hyundai) and Orion IP v. Hyundai Motor. In the Taurus case, the Wisconsin District Court found the asserted patent (6,141,658) invalid and also asserted jurisdiction over Spangenberg and Orion IP via a veil-piercing theory. In a recent order, the Federal Circuit properly refused to allow Chrysler and Mercedes to present argument and documents “in camera” in that case. [Link] In the Orion case, a Texas court found Hyundai liable for infringement of the asserted patent (5,367,627) and awarded $34 million in damages. Hyundai has posted $25 million bond to stay the full payment until the appeal is concluded. [LINK ]. The general rule is that money damages will be stayed pending appeals if bond is posted, and that injunctive relief might be stayed.

The ‘627 patent is patent reformer’s poster child for damages reform. The patent covers a method that helps a sales clerk properly order the parts that match a customer’s needs. It is hard to know what the value of the incremental invention as compared with the prior art back in 1989 when the original application was filed. I will note that the $34 million patent has only 15 claims and includes means-plus-function language in the claims. Claim 1 of the patent is reproduced below:

1. A computerized method of selling parts for particular equipment specified by a customer, comprising the steps of:

a) receiving information identifying a customer’s parts requirements for the equipment, comprising the step of receiving equipment application information, comprising an identification of the equipment with which one or more parts are to be used;

b) electronically specifying information identifying a plurality of parts and specifications for the parts;

c) gathering parts-related information for one or more parts within the plurality of parts which meets the customer’s requirements, comprising the step of electronically associating at least one of the parts within the plurality of parts with the received equipment application information; and

d) receiving the gathered parts-related information and compiling the parts-related information into a proposal meeting the customer’s requirements.

Although the ‘658 patent does not claim priority to the earlier ‘627 patent, it does have one overlapping inventor and a large amount of overlapping scope.

USPTO News

Two items of USPTO News:

  • Deferred Examination Roundtable Webcast is Thursday Morning [Link]
  • E-OFFICE ACTION: After a successful pilot, the PTO is starting an e-Office Action program. Applicants to decide to use the program will receive e-mail notifications of PTO correspondence rather than waiting for hardcopy to arrive in the mail. Program participants will not receive a hardcopy. The program is expected to begin in March 2009. Contact pair@uspto.gov

Law Firms That Appeal

A patent applicant has several options after receiving a final rejection from a patent examiner. “After final” practice is a matter of strategy, tactics, and art. The primary approaches are (1) abandon the application; (2) appeal to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI); (3) file a request for continued examination (RCE) arguing against the rejection; or (4) concede scope and narrow the application (probably through an RCE). Each of these approaches differs in cost, timing, and likelihood of success. Of course, success may depend upon whether broad claims are important. And, in the background, applicants know that alternate claims can later be pursued in continuation applications (for a fee).

BPAI Appeals are generally thought to have a higher up-front cost – both in terms of PTO fees and attorney costs. However, if you win, appeals have the benefit of dramatically changing the course of the examination. Often, an applicant’s successful appeal results in an issued patent soon thereafter.

In this study, I looked at law firms involved in ex parte appeals to the BPAI that were decided in the calendar year 2008. Of the 4000+ decisions, only about 75% of the decisions mentioned the law firm name in the case caption. Using those names, I constructed the following table of the firms associated with the most decisions during 2008. It is interesting to compare Oblon Spivak and Sughrue Mion – both firms handle over 3000 patents each year – many of them involving electronics owned by non-US entities. Oblon, however, appears to have taken the strategy of appealing while Sughrue may be using alternate strategies. Foley & Lardner is regularly listed in the top-ten firms in terms of the number of patent grants – however, that firm does not make the list of having the most appeal decisions.

Some words of caution on the numbers game: (1) These are ordinarily dominated by lower cost electronics and software patents. (2) Some clients request that docketing go through their office – in those cases, the firm name would not show up here. (3) Focusing on appeals, it may be that some firms not on the list actually filed more appeal briefs. It turns out that in most cases, examiners withdraw their final rejections in the face of a high quality appeal brief.

2008 Rank

Law Firm

Number of BPAI Decisions

Primary Location

1

OBLON SPIVAK

62

VA

2

FISH & RICHARDSON

46

MA

3

NIXON & VANDERHYE

42

VA

4

KENYON & KENYON

38

NY

5

TROP PRUNER

38

TX

6

GREENBLUM & BERNSTEIN

36

VA

7

CARLSON GASKEY

35

MI

8

FINNEGAN HENDERSON

34

DC

9

GIFFORD KRASS

33

MI

10

SUGHRUE MION

32

DC

11

BROOKS KUSHMAN

29

MI

12

TOWNSEND

29

CA

13

SCHWEGMAN

28

MN

14

HARNESS DICKEY

27

MI

15

PATTERSON & SHERIDAN

27

NJ

16

ARMSTRONG TEASDALE

23

MO

17

BAYER MATERIAL SCIENCE

22

PA

18

RYAN MASON

22

CT

19

FULBRIGHT JAWORSKI

21

TX

20

ALSTON & BIRD

19

NC

21

BARNES & THORNBURG

19

IN

22

WILLIAMS MORGAN

19

TX

23

BIRCH STEWART

18

VA

24

BLAKELY SOKOLOFF

18

CA

25

CAREY RODRIGUEZ

18

FL

Looking Ahead: Preclusive Effect of Prior Claim Construction

Shire v. Sandoz, M-893 (Fed. Cir. 2009)

In a recent order, the Federal Circuit agreed to hear an interlocutory appeal considering the issue preclusive effect of a prior claim construction decision. The patent in suit has been construed at least twice before, but the lower court here “refused to give preclusive effect” to either prior ruling. This will be an interesting case to follow.

2009-M893.2-6-09.1.PDF

Article One Partners Pays First Patent Slayer Prize of $50,000

PatentLawPic665I spoke with Ricky Roberson today. Roberson is an Alabama based aerospace engineer who read about Article One on slashdot and was interested in their offer of $50,000 for invalidating prior art.

Roberson focused on Pat. No. 6,784,873 which covers a touch screen personal navigation device — a patent that he called “low hanging fruit” compared with other Article One subjects such as the multiple Rambus patents being litigated or a pharmacuetical formulation such as rosuvastatin calcium (Crestor).

The ‘843 case is important because the patentee (SPT) has accused Garmin of infringement. Roberson primarily used Google Scholar & Google Patents to search for prior art patents. He had never worked with patents before, but also found the WIPO, EPO, & JPO search engines useful.

In the end, the folks at Article One awarded two winners: Roberson’s submission (WO 91/12578 A1) and an anonymous contribution of a 1998 Microsoft CE programming guide. Roberson will receive $35,000 and the anonymous contributor will receive $15,000.

Article One indicated its belief that the two references would invalidate the ‘843 patent, however, they company is quick to note that “only a U.S. federal court or the U.S. Patent Office can invalidate a U.S. patent.”

Notes:

Patently-O Bits and Bytes No. 91

  • PatentLawPic666Statistics on the Use of Means Plus Function Language: Thus far in 2009 (1/1/2009 – 2/8/2009) the PTO has issued 17,206 patents. Of those, only 12% (2060) have a “means for” clause in the claim language.  Looking back one decade, 24% of patents issued in January 1999 included a “means for” clause in the claim language. Looking back two decades, 34% of patents issued in January 1989 included a “means for” clause in the claim language. Looking back three decades, 40% of patents issued in January 1979 included a “means for” clause in the claim language.
  • New Funny Blog: http://courtoons.wordpress.com/ by appellate attorney David Mills
  • Watch The Symposium: The hardworking folks at Santa Clara’s Computer & High Technology Law Journal (CHTLJ) have posted materials and video from their conference two weeks ago. Those of you who have practiced before Judges Whyte or Ware will certainly enjoy the tribute video. [LINK] [The best portion begins at 11:20 in the Whyte video].
  • PTO Transparancy: Readers submitted two additional suggestions for PTO Transparancy
    • The PTO should calculate and publish the expiration date of each patent.
    • The PTO should publish reexamination certificates so that they are searchable. [Via NIPPER]

Federal Circuit Applies KSR – Finding Combination Claims Obvious

PatentLawPic661Ball Aerosol v. Limited Brands, Bath & Body Works, etc. (Fed. Cir. 2009)

Ball’s patent covers a candle tin with a removable lid. The lid is designed to fit under the candle to help avoid scorching the underlying surface. According to the claims, the candle tin also has legs or “protrusions” that rest upon the cover.

On summary judgment, a Northern District of Illinois court found Ball’s patent valid as a matter of law. On appeal the Federal Circuit flipped the decision — finding the asserted claims invalid as a matter of law.

Here, it was undisputed that all of the elements of the claims can be found in the combination of two prior art references. In addition, the problem of candle-tin scorching was well known in the art. Finally, it is undisputed that the technology is “simple and easily understandable.”

This case falls squarely under the rule of law expounded by KSR where the Supreme Court held that “[i]f a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability.” Here, one prior art reference (Marchi) taught the candle with a cover that could be used as a base. The other reference (Wright) taught a candle with “bumps” on the bottom to avoid scorching the surface. In considering these two references, the Federal Circuit determined that the combination was obvious:

“The combination of a cover-stand and feet on the bottom of the candle holder was obvious to try in an effort to minimize scorching, as the combination would further raise the bottom of the candle holder above the supporting surface. The resulting, and desired, decreased heat transfer between the candle holder and the supporting surface from the combination would have been entirely predictable and grounded in common sense.”

Explicit Motivation: In KSR, the Supreme Court indicated that the reasons for combining prior art references “should be made explicit.” Here, the Federal Circuit clarified that statement – holding that the motivation need not be explicit in any prior art. Rather, the Supreme Court is referring “to the court’s analysis.” In other words, a court must explain its motivation in combining two or more references to invalidate a patent for obviousness.

Commercial Success: Even those who believe in objective indicia of nonobviousness admit that commercial success is one of the weakest forms. The problem is the general difficulty in tying the success of the product to the invention itself. Here, the Federal Circuit found that the “minimal indications of commercial success … do not outweigh the clear indication of obviousness apparent from the prior art.”

Holding: Judgment Reversed, Claims are invalid as obvious

Notes: I have pasted figures from the two prior art references. One shows a candle with “protrusions” on the bottom the other shows a candle using the lid as a base. At least one of the references specifically discussed object of creating space between the candle and the surface to avoid scorching problems. Neither reference was cited by the patentee during prosecution.PatentLawPic662

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