In a short opinion, the Federal Circuit has rejected a PTAB IPR determination finding IV’s patent invalid and has remanded for reconsideration of the case. U.S. Patent No. 7,382,771. Because the patent at issue here was filed prior to March 2013, the pre-AIA first-to-invent rules apply.
The issue here is whether IV can rely upon pre-filing invention evidence to antedate the proffered prior art. Prior to the American Invents Act (AIA), the primary triggering date for prior art was the date-of-invention rather than the date of patent-filing. Because invention is defined as requiring both conceiving of the invention and reducing that invention to practice. Although invention is not complete until actually implemented, we considered conception an important triggering date — thus allowing for an inventor to claim priority back to the date of conception so long as the inventor worked diligently post-conception to reduce the invention to practice. So as not to overly romanticize the golden days of first-to-invent, remember here that “diligence” tends to be very hard to prove and does not allow for seemingly reasonable breaks in the effort to reduce the invention to practice such as business management efforts, financing pushes, or vacations.
Invention as Conception + Reduction to Practice: Some may also be confused about my definition of invention that requires actual reduction to practice. An important legal exception to this definition is that the courts and PTO consider the filing of a fully enabled patent application to count as constructive reduction to practice. A “constructive” fact is something that we know does not exist in realtà, but we announce to be true in the sight of legal authority. Someone might query whether this “constructive” invention qualifies Constitutionally.
Back to our story, the patentee here (IV) argued that its predecessor-in-interest had actually reduced the invention to practice prior to filing of its patent application and prior to the critical date of the referenced prior art. The PTAB rejected that argument — finding that the pre-filing activities did not recreate the entire invention as claimed. On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated — holding that the PTAB had been too stringent in its requirements. In particular, the Board erred by requiring conception of “authentication and control features” of the claimed LAN since the Board had already rejected a claim construction proposal that would have included those features as required by the the claims.
This is a situation where Broadest Reasonable Interpretation (BRI) comes into play in an interesting way. Generally, BRI is thought to make it easier for the USPTO to cancel questionable claims since broader claims are more likely to encompass the prior art. Here, however, the Broadest Reasonable version of the claims made it easier for the patentee to prove prior conception. I previously discussed a siilar situation involving written description issues.
Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc. (2017) – Download opinion
In a straightforward and almost unanimous opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit on both domestic (8-0) and international exhaustion (7-1).
The Supreme Court’s opinion is summed up by a single sentence early on. “We conclude that a patentee’s decision to sell a product exhausts all of its patent rights in that item, regardless of any restrictions the patentee purports to impose or the location of the sale.” Slip Op. at 1. The underlying rationale is offered a bit later: “Patent exhaustion reflects the principle that, when an item passes into commerce, it should not be shaded by a legal cloud on title as it moves through the marketplace.” Slip Op. at 11. With these two pronouncements, the Supreme Court has in one swoop both simplified patent law and added new complexities, challenges and opportunities to the innovation ecosystem.
Impression v. Lexmark involved, at its core, the question of whether restrictions placed on a patented product could be enforced through an infringement suit–often a more viable legal mechanism for the patent owner than an an action for breach of contract.
Under Federal Circuit precedent, the answer for over two decades was yes. The theory relied upon by the Federal Circuit in decisions such as Malkinkrodt, and reaffirmed by the en banc court in Lexmark v. Impression, was that the patent owner could decide to give away only some of its patent rights when it sold or authorized the sale of a patented product. As a result, the patent owner could sue a party who violated those restrictions for patent infringement because, the theory went, the purchaser did not possess the relevant set of patent permissions–the “sticks” in the “bundle of rights” that the patent owner possessed. Thus, for example, a patent owner could place a single-use only restriction on an ink cartridge or medical device and sue for infringement if the device were reused. In short, the exhaustion rule was effectively default rule of patent law that the parties could contract around.
The Supreme Court rejected this approach, basing its conclusion on common law principles of ownership as reflected in its 1853 decision in Bloomer v. McQuewan. “For over 160 years, the doctrine of patent exhaustion has imposed a limit on [patentees’ right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling their invention].” Slip Op. at 5-6. “When a patentee chooses to sell an item, that product ‘is no longer within the limits of the monopoly’ and instead becomes the ‘private, individual property’ of the purchaser, with the rights and benefits that come along with ownership.” Id., quoting Bloomer. While a patent owner may impose contractual restrictions, those restrictions are a matter of contract law, not patent law. “A patentee is free to set the price and negotiate contracts with purchasers, but may not, ‘by virtue of his patent, control the use or disposition’ of the product after ownership passes to the purchaser. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U. S. 241, 250 (1942) (emphasis added).” Once a patent owner sells a patented product, it has obtained the patent reward and may no longer rely on patent law. Referencing its opinion in Kirsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 538 (2013), the Court observed that exhaustion has “an impeccable historic pedigree,” a backdrop against which Congress has repeatedly revised and fine-tuned the patent law.
The Federal Circuit’s error was that it started from the wrong place: interpreting the infringement statute. But “the exhaustion doctrine is not a presumption about the authority that comes along with a sale; it is instead a limit on ‘the scope of the patentee’s rights.'” Slip Op. at 10, quoting United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U. S. 476, 489 (1926) (emphasis added). The sale transfers the foundational rights to use, sell or import the product sold; it simultaneously exhausts the patent rights:
The right to use, sell, or import an item exists independently of the Patent Act. What a patent adds—and grants exclusively to the patentee—is a limited right to prevent others from engaging in those practices. See Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Machine Works, 261 U. S. 24, 35 (1923). Exhaustion extinguishes that exclusionary power. See Bloomer, 14 How., at 549 (the purchaser “exercises no rights created by the act of Congress, nor does he derive title to [the item]by virtue of the . . . exclusive privilege granted to the patentee”). As a result, the sale transfers the right to use, sell, or import because those are the rights that come along with ownership, and the buyer is free and clear of an infringement lawsuit because there is no exclusionary right left to enforce.”
Exhaustion applies regardless of whether the patent owner sells the product or a licensee–even a licensee subject to restrictions by the patent owner. “A patentee’s authority to limit licensees does not, as the Federal Circuit thought, mean that patentees can use licenses to impose post-sale restrictions on purchasers that are enforceable through the patent laws. So long as a licensee complies with the license when selling an item, the patentee has, in effect, authorized the sale.” Slip Op. at 11-12.
“In sum, patent exhaustion is uniform and automatic. Once a patentee decides to sell—whether on its own or through a licensee—that sale exhausts its patent rights,regardless of any post-sale restrictions the patentee purports to impose, either directly or through a license.”
The Court also held that foreign sales exhausted U.S. patent rights–in other words, a system of global exhaustion. This conclusion, too, was bolstered by a common law policy against restraints on the alienation of chattels.
Justice Ginsburg concurred with the Court’s holding on domestic exhaustion but dissented with respect to international exhaustion. She would hold that “A foreign sale…does not exhaust a U.S. inventor’s U.S. patent rights.”
What about Contracts? The Court’s Impression decision means that post-sale restraints on products will need to be enforced via contract rather than patent law. That matters because contract law is subject to a number of constraints, including both privity and various public policy-based limitations on enforcement. Patent law is not so limited. Outside of the core questions of infringement and validity, enforcement of patents is subject to relatively few such constraints–misuse being one rare (and rarely successful) exception. In addition, enforcement under contract law means that many cases involving post-sale restrictions will ultimately be decided by state supreme courts or other federal courts of appeal rather than by the Federal Circuit.
What’s left? Lexmark strikes a powerful blow against post-sale restrictions on products by negating the threat of infringement to enforce those restrictions. But it hardly eliminates such restrictions–to the contrary, the Court is clear that such restrictions may still be enforced under contract law. In addition, the Court’s opinion revolves around sales of products. Left unanswered is the role that patents will continue to play in non-complete transfers–licenses of a good or service rather than a sale.
“Neither the Copyright Statute nor any other says that because a thing is patentable it may not be copyrighted. We should not so hold.” So said the Supreme Court in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954).
In Oracle Am. Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014), the Federal Circuit invoked this language in rejecting Google’s “policy” argument that application program interface (API) designs were more appropriately patent, not copyright, subject matter. Id. at 1380-81. The Oracle decision seemingly accepted as unobjectionable the possibility of overlapping utility patent and copyright protections in program interfaces, and perhaps even of copyright as a gap filler for interface designs for which patents had not been obtained.
Because the contours of copyright and patent protections for software innovations remain unclear notwithstanding more than 50 years of experience trying to apply these intellectual property (IP) regimes to these utilitarian writings and virtual machines, the question of whether or to what extent copyright and patent overlap or are mutually exclusive continues to bedevil the field. The Federal Circuit’s Oracle decision is unlikely to be the last word on this subject.
Recently, I rediscovered the 1991 study that the Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) and the Copyright Office wrote about the software IP overlap or exclusivity issue. The Patent-Copyright Laws Overlap Study (May 1991) was prepared at the behest of the House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and the Administration of Justice. The Study is more than 90 pages in length and has more than 50 pages of appendices.
Among the most significant of the Study’s software findings is that there is “no overlap in subject matter: copyright protects the authorship in a set of statements that bring about a certain result in the operation of a computer, and patents cover novel and nonobvious computer processes.” Letter from Ralph Oman and Harry F. Manbeck to the Hon. William J. Hughes, July 17, 1991 (transmitting the Study to the then Chair of the House Subcommittee).
Another finding is that “[p]atent protection is not available for computer programs per se,” which supports the Study’s conclusion that copyright and utility patent for programs are not “coextensive.” Study at iii (emphasis in the original). The Study identifies the doctrinal rationale for this exclusivity: program innovations “consist of mental steps or printed matter.” Id. at vii. Copyright and patent could, however, protect “totally different aspects” of program innovations. Id. at 2. The Study cited to the Supreme Court’s decision in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) as the “bedrock opinion for the view that patent and copyright are mutually exclusive.” Id. at 19.
As for user interface designs, the Study reports that “[t]he mere display on a screen of commands, menus, questions and answers, forms, or icons is not generally considered patentable subject matter for utility patents” because “it is generally considered to be merely printed matter.” Id. at 45-46. Yet processes to produce user interface displays might be eligible for utility patenting. Id. at 47. (The Study discusses the possibility of design patent protection for icons. Id. at 46-47.)
Insofar as user interface screen displays have original expressive elements (e.g., videogame graphics), they would be eligible for copyright protection. Id. at 60-67. However, many aspects of user interface designs are akin to blank forms and lack originality. Id. at 68-69. Some aspects of user interfaces, such as lists of commands, are uncopyrightable under the doctrines of merger and scenes a faire and the words and short phrases exclusion. Id. at 70-71.
The Study recognized that some commentators had raised concerns about overbroad copyright protection for programs; yet, others, it noted, think that expansive protection is needed. Id. at 86-87. The Study concluded that this debate notwithstanding, it would be “premature” to conclude that the risks of overbroad protections were significant as there is “no overlap in subject matter” between copyright and patent. Id. at 88-90. The Study urged Congress to wait and see how the law evolved. Id. at 89.
“At the bottom of this debate,” said the Study, “it appears is the question of protection of functionality….” Id. at 87. It would be contrary to the statutory exclusions set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) for copyright to protect program functionality. (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated or embodied in such work.”) Study at 87. According to the Study, the protection of functionality “is assigned to patents where a much more rigorous test must be undergone and the barriers to entry in terms of time, cost, and complexity, are higher.” Id. at 88.
It is unfortunate that the Federal Circuit did not have access to this Study when deciding the copyrightability issue in the Oracle case, as its conclusions might have given the court pause about invoking the Mazer overlap-endorsing dicta in response to Google’s mutual exclusivity argument.
In a forthcoming article, Functionality and Expression in Computer Programs: Refining the Tests for Software Copyright Infringement, I challenge the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that copyright and utility patent can provide overlapping IP protections for software innovations. The article notes that the Mazer dicta was made in the context of a real, if partial, overlap in copyright and design patent subject matters. Stein’s statuette qualified as a work of art under U.S. copyright law. However, used as the base of a lamp, the design was also eligible for design patent protection as an ornamental design of an article of manufacture.
The Court in Mazer was unequivocal about copyright and utility patents having separate domains. It cited approvingly to two of Baker’s progeny that had held “that the Mechanical Patent Law and Copyright Laws are mutually exclusive,” Mazer, 201 U.S at 215, n.33 (emphasis added). SeeTaylor Instrument Co. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1943) (no copyright in temperature recording charts because they were integral parts of previously patented machines) and Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner, 161 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (accord). Overlaps in design patent and copyright subject matters had, by contrast, long been accepted. Mazer, 201 U.S. at 215, n.33.
The exact contours of utility patent and copyright protections for software innovations may not shimmer with clarity, but the 1991 Study adheres to the Supreme Court’s long-standing pronouncements in Baker and Mazer that copyright and utility patent are and should be mutually exclusive. Now if only the Federal Circuit can be made to understand this.
In an email distribution regarding their upcoming Chisum Patent Academy, Don Chisum and Janice Mueller opine on the upcoming Supreme Court case of SAS v. Lee.
They write:
The Court will address, at least indirectly, the PTO’s rule 37 CFR § 42.108(a). The rule allows the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) to institute inter partes review (IPR) on (and, implicitly, to adjudicate) only some of the claims of a patent challenged in a petition (and, also, only on some of multiple grounds of unpatentability). . . .
More likely than not, the Supreme Court will invalidate the practice that rule 108(a) makes possible as contrary to the governing statutes. 35 USC Section 318(a) requires that the PTAB “issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner.” If the PTAB must rule on all claims challenged in a petition in its final decision, it makes no sense to allow the PTAB (per Rule 108(a)) to “institute” review on fewer than all those claims. (NOTE: the statute on institution, 35 USC 314(a), sets a reasonable-likelihood-of-unpatentability “threshold” for “at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” That can easily be read as contemplating that only one of the challenged claims must meet the threshold and that all challenged claims will be carried into a review upon institution, whether or not they met the threshold standard.)
Joseph Phelps Vineyards v. Fairmont Holdings (Fed. Cir. 2017)
Phelps Vineyards has been selling its INSIGNIA wine for the past 40 years — often at $200+ per bottle. In 2012, Fairmont received its federal registration for the mark ALEC BRADLEY STAR INSIGNIA for cigars. Phelps Vineyard petitioned for cancellation before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB).
Although different market areas, Phelps Vineyards argued that the fame of its mark increased the likelihood of confusion. However, the TTAB rejected that argument – finding that “Petitioner’s mark is not famous” and thus gave that DuPont factor no weight. On appeal, the Federal Circuit has vacated that decision – finding that “fame” in the likelihood of confusion analysis is not a binary yes/no consideration but rather “varies along a spectrum” from not famous at all to extremely famous: think Chester Arthur to Donald Trump. Note here – the DuPont factor of fame is totally different from dilution fame, which is a yes/no question.
In looking at the facts of the case here, the appellate panel noted substantial evidence that INSIGNIA wine “is renowned in the wine market and among consumers of fine wine. . . . We are perplexed at the Board’s finding that INSIGNIA wine has no ‘fame,’ giving no discernable weight to this factor. . . . The factor of ‘fame’ warrants reasonable weight, among the totality of the circumstances.”
On remand, the TTAB will take-up the case again and determine whether this change impacts the results in any way. Of course, a conclusion that INSIGNIA is famous in the wine business certainly does not directly lead to the conclusion that the mark ALEC BRADLEY STAR INSIGNIA is confusingly similar when used to sell cigars.
An interesting aspect of the decision is that it was written as a per-curiam opinion of the court (Judges Newman, Dyk, and Wallach). However, Judge Newman also penned a concurring opinion noting two additional errors made by the board:
Although the Board found that the wine and cigars are sold in the same channels of trade to the same purchasers, it did not further explore the DuPont factor of “relatedness.”
In considering the likelihood of confusion of the marks, the Board did not consider Fairmont’s actual use of its mark that placed the word INSIGNIA in a dominant format – raising the likelihood of confusion.
Since these notations are in the concurring opinion, the TTAB is not directly bound to follow Judge Newman’s suggestions, but will do well to given them full consideration on remand.
Further thoughts on the Defend Trade Secrets Act and inevitable disclosure
Guest post byMaxwell Goss. Dr. Goss is a business litigator with Rossman Saxe, P.C. in Troy, Michigan. His practice focuses on non-compete, trade secret, intellectual property, and shareholder law and litigation. Dr. Goss blogs at Law and the Creative Economy.
Last week I wrote about the doctrine of “inevitable disclosure” as it relates to the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA), the statute that created a general, private cause of action for trade secret misappropriation under federal law. Because inevitable disclosure is of continuing importance and controversy, I wanted to unpack the issues further here. As discussed below, the DTSA leaves room for trade secret plaintiffs to assert inevitable disclosure.
Trade secret plaintiffs frequently face problems of proof. Gathering evidence that a suspected individual or company has actually misappropriated trade secrets, or legitimately threatens to misappropriate trade secrets, can be a substantial hurdle to getting a lawsuit off the ground.
Take a typical scenario where an employee of company A goes to work for company B, and A alleges that the employee is using its trade secrets on behalf of B. In some cases, company A will have evidence that the employee swiped its secrets before leaving, perhaps by emailing himself a customer list or downloading technical specifications onto a flash drive. Company A might even have evidence that company B is now using the secrets, perhaps because it is soliciting A’s customers or has launched a product based on A’s specifications. In many cases, though, the activities of the employee and the new employer are a black box. The employee was exposed to trade secrets at Company A, and is now working for Company B, but Company A has not uncovered evidence of specific disclosures to Company B. Company A may have reason to believe the employee must be disclosing secrets to B, or threatens to do so, but has no way to confirm this directly prior to filing suit and obtaining discovery—a catch-22. Is company A without recourse?
Enter the “inevitable disclosure” doctrine. Under this common-law doctrine, a trade secret plaintiff may base a claim for trade secret misappropriation on a showing that disclosure of trade secrets is “inevitable.” In PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, the landmark Seventh Circuit case on inevitable disclosure, a former employee of PepsiCo went to work for a competing beverage company. Notably, there was no allegation that the employee had stolen specific information and given it to the competitor. Instead, PepsiCo argued that the employee could not help but use the company’s trade secrets to help its competitor “achieve a substantial advantage” and “respond strategically” through his knowledge of PepsiCo’s pricing, distribution, and marketing information. Because his reliance on such information was inevitable, the court affirmed an injunction barring the former employee from assuming his position at the competitor company.
The doctrine of inevitable disclosure is controversial, and is only recognized in some jurisdictions. One objection is that it essentially allows courts to impose a non-compete on those who never signed a non-compete agreement. Another objection is that it facilitates abusive lawsuits against former employees based on flimsy evidence. Yet another objection is that it can enable a company to obtain an injunction that damages a competitor without any evidence of wrongful conduct by the competitor itself. Unsurprisingly, then, inevitable disclosure was frequently discussed in the lead-up to the passage of the Defend Trade Secrets Act. As enacted, the DTSA did ultimately limit the application of the doctrine. Though the language of the DTSA largely tracks that of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), which has been enacted in some form in nearly all states, the DTSA departs from the UTSA in that it expressly disallows injunctions that “prevent a person from entering into an employment relationship” and prohibits any conditions placed on a person’s employment in an injunction based “merely on the information the person knows.”
In light of this language, many observers have concluded that inevitable disclosure is a dead letter under the DTSA. For example, one article states that the DTSA “explicitly rejects the inevitable disclosure doctrine under federal law.” To take another example, I recently attended a (very good) presentation in which it was stated that inevitable disclosure is “foreclosed” by the DTSA. And I would be remiss not to mention that I myself declared in a CLE presentation last year that “[t]he DTSA seemingly rejects inevitable disclosure by dictating that conditions on employment in an injunction may not be based merely on information the person knows.”
But the doctrine of inevitable disclosure lives on under the DTSA, albeit in a diminished form. As explained in my previous post, the court in Molon Motor and Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp. recently held that a plaintiff had successfully stated a claim for trade secret misappropriation under the DTSA where it had pled allegations supporting an inference that a former employee who went to work for a direct competitor would inevitably have disclosed the plaintiff’s trade secrets to the competitor during the period in which the DTSA has been in effect. The court added: “Of course, further discovery could upend any or all of this, but at this stage, continued use beyond the May 2016 effective date [of the DTSA] is plausible.” Notably, the court then ordered the parties to discuss a “discovery plan on the trade secret claims.” In short, the plaintiff’s allegations of inevitable disclosure entitled it to move forward on both its federal and state trade secret claims.
It would be easy to dismiss Molon as dealing only with a narrow issue of limited importance. The Court’s principal concern, after all, was how the DTSA applies where the alleged theft at issue preceded its passage—an issue relevant in only a few and declining number of cases. But the ruling should not be dismissed so quickly. In reaching its holding, an essential part of the Court’s analysis was that was that inevitable disclosure can in fact support a DTSA claim. This conclusion has at least two potential implications applicable beyond the specific procedural posture of the case.
First, the DTSA could be used to secure jurisdiction in federal court and then state law could be used to secure an injunction based on inevitable disclosure. Consider companies A and B again. Company A wants to sue an employee of company B in federal court—for instance, because of perceived advantages in bringing the case before a federal judge or because of the streamlined process for obtaining discovery across state lines under the federal rules. But suppose the parties are citizens of the same state. Prior to passage of the DTSA, unless there had been some hook other than diversity jurisdiction for bringing the case in federal court, company A would have been forced to bring the case in state court. Under the DTSA, diversity of citizenship does not matter. Company A can bring the case in federal court regardless of the parties’ citizenship.
If company A goes this route, is it stuck with the DTSA’s strict limitations on injunctive relief, including the prohibition of injunction based “merely on the information the person knows”? Very arguably not. By its own terms, the DTSA does not preempt state trade secret law, and state law claims will nearly always be available in cases where the DTSA applies. Assuming the applicable state law permits injunctive relief based on inevitable disclosure, company A could file a concurrent claim for trade secret misappropriation under state law and obtain an injunction based on an inevitable disclosure theory. In such a case, the DTSA would be used to obtain federal court jurisdiction while state law would be used to obtain the desired relief.
Second, the DTSA stops well short of barring all injunctive relief based on inevitable disclosure. The limitations on injunctions under the statute apparently extend only to employment relationships: An injunction may not “prevent a person from entering into an employment relationship,” and any conditions on employment must be based on “evidence of threatened misappropriation and not merely on the information the person knows.” This suggests that an injunction that does not impact employment may still be based on inevitable disclosure.
For example, if company A can offer evidence that an employee who departed for company B will inevitably disclose A’s trade secrets to B, a court conceivably might grant an injunction prohibiting B from using or disclosing A’s trade secrets. For companies that believe their trade secrets are being misused but cannot get into the “black box” of the competitor’s activities prior to discovery, this could be a major advantage. More controversially, a court could grant an injunction directly against the employee based on inevitable disclosure, provided the injunction does not prevent the employee from working for company B or impose conditions on his or her employment.
If the Molon opinion is any indication, the DTSA giveth but the DTSA does not taketh away. That is, a trade secret owner can use the DTSA to bring its case in federal court, and can avail itself of the distinctive benefits and relief available under the DTSA, without losing its ability to assert inevitable disclosure in jurisdictions recognizing the doctrine under state law. Of course, it is unknown how other courts would address similar issues. (As far as I can determine, while a few opinions have made passing reference to inevitable disclosure in DTSA cases, Molon is the first to directly address the applicability of the doctrine under the DTSA.) At a minimum, though, the opinion indicates that rumors of the demise of inevitable disclosure are greatly exaggerated.
After conducting an investigation, a divided majority of commissioners of the USITC found no-violation of Adrian Rivera’s U.S. Patent No. 8,720,320 directed toward a re-usable K-cup that work with coffee pods. Investigation No. 337-TA-929. In particular, the decision found all asserted claims invalid for lack of written description. On appeal, the Federal Circuit has affirmed — finding substantial evidence supported the Commission’s holding.
The original set of claims focused on a cup (brewing chamber) designed to hold a “pod” using a “pod adaptor assembly.” However, during prosecution, the patentee cancelled those original claims and replaced them with ones more broadly directed to a “container . . . adapted to hold brewing material.” The expansion captured within its scope competitors who created reusable K-cups that hold loose grounds (instead of pods) that include a filter integrated into the cup.
Section 112 of the Patent Act requires the patentee to submit “a written description of the invention.” Timing-wise, this Written Description Requirement is been interpreted require the full description at the time of filing of the application. The difficulty for many patent applicants is that the scope of the claimed invention can change significantly during prosecution through the amendment process. Problems arise both when patentees attempt to narrow claims to overcome prior art and also (as here) expand claim scope to capture market developments. During prosecution, a written description problem is usually identified as improper “new matter” and is correctable. During infringement litigation, however, a claimed invention lacking sufficient description in the specification will be found invalid and unenforceable.
The test for written description is an objective inquiry that considers whether the original specification “shows that the inventor actually invented the invention claimed.” Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). The Federal Circuit considers written description a question of fact. This means that the appellate court gives deference to the lower court/agency determination on appeal.
Focus on the Infringement: At the litigation stage, courts (including the Federal Circuit) considering the written description requirement have a tendency to shift its gaze from the claims and instead also include the accused device in the analysis. Here, the court looked at the accused Solofill cups that include the particular differences from Rivera’s original disclosure: (1) Solofill cups use loose grounds rather than coffee-pods; and (2) Solofill cups include a filter integrated into the cup itself.
Taking this infringement-focused approach, the claimed “container . . . adapted to hold brewing material” can only work with loose grounds if the container includes a filter of its own. And, the patent specification does not indicate that configuration is part of the invention. As such, the claims fail the written description requirement and therefore are invalid.
The outcome here is similar to that of ICU Medical v. Alaris Medical System (Fed. Cir. 2009) and Liebel-Flarsheim v. Medrad(Fed. Cir. 2007) (though an enablement case).
Not Enablement: One of Rivera’s failed arguments is that a person of skill in the art could quite easily make the integrated filter since they were already known in the art. On appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected that argument — holding that this argument goes toward enablement, which is separate and distinct from written description. For its part, the purpose of the written description requirement is to prove that the inventor actually possessed the invention – and thus requires disclosure in the specification.
Omitted Element: This case is similar to other omitted element cases. In his email, Prof Wegner writes: “The patented claims were broader than all disclosed embodiments: The claims omitted one of the features common to all embodiments of the patent application as filed.”
In TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, the Supreme Court has significantly shifted the balance away from the geographically fringe Eastern District of Texas – holding that the residence requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) refers only to a defendant’s State of Incorporation for patent infringement venue purposes.
The short (10-page) unanimous opinion authored by Justice Thomas reaffirms the court’s prior decision in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U. S. 222, 226 (1957) — holding again that “for purposes of §1400(b) a domestic corporation ‘resides’ only in its State of incorporation” and rejecting the notion that a much broader definition of venue (found in §1391) applies.
Although the Supreme Court law appears continuous. The Federal Circuit created a major blip in its 1990 decision of VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F. 2d 1574 (1990). In that case, the appellate court held that patent infringement venue is proper in any court having personal jurisdiction over the defendant. That expansive change allowed for the rise of patent-focused venues such as the Eastern District of Texas where the majority of infringement lawsuits have been filed over the two decades (heat map below).
What next: Section 1400(b) limits patent cases to the judicial district (1) “where the defendant resides,” or (2) “where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.” This means a likely large boost of lawsuits in Delaware. National retailers will still be amenable to suit essentially everywhere, but many would-be defendants will be able to avoid E.D.Texas at least. There will also be new litigation on the implications for foreign companies with no established place of business in the US. The decision here expressly refuses to address that question other than noting that it did previously decide that foreign corps can be an exception to 1400(b). Although possible, it is unlikely the court will adapt the “established place of business” to include the internet, although that portion of 1400(b) has not been explored since the e-tailing explosion. With less concentrated venue, I we can also expect a rise in multi-district litigation. For more, consider Prof Janicke’s article on the Imminent Outpouring from the Eastern District of Texas.
The Supreme Court has agreed to hear a new AIA-trials case: SAS Institute v. Lee
The inter partes review appeal focuses on the procedural question of whether the America Invents Act permits the USPTO to partially institute IPR proceedings – as it has been doing. SAS argues instead that the statute requires a full up/down vote on a petition and, if granted, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) must then pass final judgment on all petitioned claims:
Whether 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) … requires [the] Board to issue a final written decision as to every claim challenged by the petitioner, or whether it allows that Board to issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of only some of the patent claims challenged by the petitioner, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held.
As I previously wrote,
The basic setup here is that SAS argues that the PTO cannot partially institute IPR proceedings since the statute requires that PTO “shall issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner.” 35 U.S.C. § 318(a)
Although a somewhat sideline issue, it will likely have its biggest impact on estoppel resulting from AIA trials and, as a result, may also shift filing strategy.
Trade secrets are important to cybersecurity because many data breaches involve trade secret theft. The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA) amended the Espionage Act of 1996 to provide a federal private right of action for trade secret misappropriation. Some commentators opposed the DTSA in part because it seems redundant in light of state trade secret law and could lead to unnecessary litigation and restrictions on innovation. Now that the DTSA has been in effect for nearly a year, I conducted an empirical study of cases asserting DTSA claims (with the able help of my research assistant, Zach Hansen). This post summarizes the results of that study.
Methodology
We ran keyword searches in the Bloomberg Law federal docket database to identify cases asserting DTSA claims in federal courts. It is not possible to search only on the Civil Cover Sheet because there is no discrete code for DTSA claims. Our search ran from the effective date of the DTSA (May 26, 2016) through April 21, 2017 (just prior to our symposium on the DTSA at Seton Hall Law School). After de-duping, we identified 280 unique Complaints, which we coded for a variety of descriptive information. Our raw data is available online.
Findings
This chart shows the number of filings by district:
We were not surprised to see that the Northern and Central Districts of California, Southern District of New York, or District of Massachusetts were among the top five. We were surprised, however, to see the Northern District of Illinois tied for first. This could reflect the influence of the financial services industry in Chicago, but further research is required.
The next chart shows the number of filings by month:
It is interesting to note the decline in filings following the initial uptick after the May 26, 2016 effective date. Perhaps this reflects a slight lull during the summer months. Filings then remained relatively steady until March, 2017, when they increased significantly. This could have something to do with the quarterly business cycle or bonus season, since many of the cases (as discussed below) involve employment issues. Or, it could reflect a random variation given the relatively small sample size.
We next examined other claims filed along with the DTSA counts in these Complaints:
We excluded from this chart related state law trade secret claims. Not surprisingly, nearly all the cases included claims for breach of contract. As noted above, trade secret claims often arise in the employment context in connection with allegations of breach of a confidentiality agreement or covenant not to compete. Another finding of note was that a fair number of cases assert Computer Fraud and Abuse Act claims, although the number is not as high as expected. Most trade secret cases today involve exfiltration of electronic information, but perhaps many cases do not involve hacking or other access techniques that could run afoul of the CFAA.
We also noted a smaller but not insignificant number of cases asserting other intellectual property claims, including trademark, copyright and patent infringement. Since many documents taken in alleged trade secret thefts are subject to other forms of intellectual property — particularly copyright — this may show that some lawyers are catching on to the benefit of asserting such claims along with DTSA claims.
Finally, our review of case status revealed the following:
198 cases in various pre-trial stages
61 cases dismissed
5 preliminary injunctions
4 final judgments, including 2 permanent injunctions
3 default judgments
1 case sent to compulsory arbitration
8 undetermined / miscellaneous
At first blush, the number of cases dismissed seems high, given that none of the cases have been pending for more than a year. We assume the vast majority of these cases settled, though further investigation is required. In contrast, the number of preliminary injunctions granted seems very low. Again, further investigation is required, but so far it does not seem that the DTSA is resulting in the kind of preliminary injunction practice we expected to see under a federal trade secret statute.
The Supreme court has relisted SAS Institute Inc. v. Lee, 16-969 – an important step in the progress toward grant of certiorari. The inter partes review case presents the following question:
Whether 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) … requires [the] Board to issue a final written decision as to every claim challenged by the petitioner, or whether it allows that Board to issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of only some of the patent claims challenged by the petitioner, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held.
The basic setup here is that SAS argues that the PTO cannot partially institute IPR proceedings since the statute requires that PTO “shall issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner.”
Although the Department of Justice has sided with the PTO’s approach here, in a prior filing the DOJ argued that the PTO erred in “picking and choosing some but not all of the challenged claims in its Decision.” See Department of Justice v. Discovery Patents, LLC, Case IPR2016-01041 (Patent Trial & Appeal Bd., Nov. 29, 2016).
The outcome of a rule-change here is unclear – while the patent challenger (SAS) is petitioner here. Patentees may prefer the all-or-nothing approach that would hopefully result in final judgments confirming patentability as well as the resulting estoppel.
When Can a Company That Hires its Competitor’s Former Employee Be Sued in Federal Court?
Guest post by Maxwell Goss. Dr. Goss is a business litigator with Rossman Saxe, P.C. in Troy, Michigan. His practice focuses on non-compete, trade secret, intellectual property, and shareholder law and litigation.
The Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) was enacted a year ago, on May 11, 2016. One of the most sweeping changes in intellectual property law in recent years, the statute creates a private cause of action for trade secret misappropriation under federal law.
For trade secret owners, the advantages of the DTSA include access to nationwide discovery and enhanced remedies such as ex parte seizure of property to prevent propagation of stolen trade secrets. For those accused of trade secret theft, the DTSA provides substantial protections including strict limitations on the injunctive relief available and entitlement to a hearing no later than seven days after a property seizure.
An open question has been the status of the controversial “inevitable disclosure” doctrine under the DTSA. Under state law in some jurisdictions, courts will enjoin a company’s former employee from working for a competitor if the company establishes that the employee would “inevitably” use its trade secrets in his or her new position. Trade secret owners like the doctrine of inevitable disclosure because actual misappropriation can be hard to prove. At the same time, the doctrine has been criticized as effectively allowing courts to impose a non-compete on someone who never signed a non-compete agreement.
How does inevitable disclosure fare under the DTSA? The statute provides that an injunction to prevent misappropriation may not “prevent a person from entering into an employment relationship,” and that any conditions placed on a person’s employment in an injunction must be based on “evidence of threatened misappropriation and not merely on the information the person knows.” In light of this language, some have concluded that the inevitable disclosure doctrine is a dead letter under the DTSA.
But a recent court opinion indicates otherwise. Interestingly, the opinion was issued on May 11, 2017, the one-year anniversary of the DTSA, by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, a federal court in the Seventh Circuit, where inevitable disclosure was first definitively recognized. In Molon Motor and Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp., the plaintiff, a maker of bespoke motors and gearmotors, sued a competitor after an employee who had allegedly downloaded the plaintiff’s designs and technical data went to work for the competitor.
The defendant moved to dismiss the case, arguing (among other things) that the DTSA did not apply because the alleged acts at issue occurred before the DTSA was enacted in May 2016. The court rejected this argument. Noting that the “key question is whether the inference of inevitable disclosure reasonably extends to continued use beyond the Act’s effective date,” the Court reasoned:
At least on the limited record—the Third Amended Complaint—the alleged trade secrets are not of the nature that would necessarily go stale in the course of a couple of years. A motor design, and the quality control data associated with it, plausibly would retain its trade secret value well into the future. If it is plausible that some of the alleged trade secrets maintain their value today, then it is also plausible that Nidec would be continuing to use them. Of course, further discovery could upend any or all of this, but at this stage, continued use beyond the May 2016 effective date is plausible.
In short, even though the plaintiff company’s former employee had allegedly downloaded the files and gone to work for the competitor before the DTSA went into effect, the court found it plausible that there was a “continuing use” of the information by the competitor after the statute went into effect. Based on this finding, the court allowed the plaintiff to go forward on its DTSA claim.
How does this ruling square with the DTSA, which requires that an injunction be based on “evidence of threatened misappropriation and not merely on the information the person knows”? Though the Molon opinion does not connect the dots, the answer, in part, seems to be that the opinion was addressing a motion to dismiss, not a motion for injunction. A court may not be able to enjoin someone based on inevitable disclosure under the DTSA, but this does not mean a plaintiff may not sue someone based on inevitable disclosure under the DTSA. That is, even where injunctive relief may not be available as an initial matter, a trade secret owner might nevertheless file a claim and move forward with discovery—which could ultimately turn up the evidence necessary to fully substantiate a claim.
Molon represents a significant development in the body of law unfolding under the DTSA. In jurisdictions where inevitable disclosure is recognized, the ruling could help trade secret owners get a case off the ground even where information obtainable in a pre-suit investigation is necessarily limited. On the other hand, defendants will be quick to point out that Molon does not alter the specific allegations needed to plead a trade secret claim premised on an inevitable disclosure theory. Moreover, where an injunction is sought, it should be emphasized that any conditions placed on employment under the statute must be based on evidence of threatened misappropriation and not merely information the person knows.
The AIPLA has now offered its legislative proposal for rewriting 35 U.S.C. § 101 that is quite close to that offered by the IPO:
Inventions Patentable
(a) Eligible Subject Matter.—Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or any useful improvement thereof, may obtainshall be entitled to a patent therefor, subject only to the conditions and requirements ofset forth in this title.
(b) Sole Exceptions to Subject Matter Eligibility.—A claimed invention is ineligible under subsection (a) only if the claimed invention as a whole exists in nature independent of and prior to any human activity, or can be performed solely in the human mind.
(c) Sole Eligibility Standard.—The eligibility of a claimed invention under subsections (a) and (b) shall be determined without regard to the requirements or conditions of sections 102, 103, and 112 of this title, the manner in which the claimed invention was made or discovered, or whether the claimed invention includes an inventive concept.
AIPLA statement. The AIPLA proposal is strikingly similar to that of the IPO’s (although not acknowledged by the AIPLA statement).
In Shore v. Lee, the Federal Circuit affirmed a PTAB finding without opinion. Shore’s petition to the Supreme Court asks whether “the Federal Circuit’s affirmance without opinion of the PTO’s rejection of Petitioner’s patent application violate 35 U.S.C. § 144?” In its first opportunity to support the Federal Circuit’s R.36 jurisprudence, the Department of Justice has passed – instead waiving its right to offer any argument in support. The Supreme Court will consider the petition later this month.
Similarly in Broadband ITV v. Hawaiian Telecom, respondents have waived their right to respond to Broadband’s challenge to quick-look eligibility denials.
In a split decision, the Federal Circuit has affirmed a district court judgment invalidating ArcelorMittal’s U.S. Patent No. RE44,153 (claim 24 and 25). The primary disputed issue was whether the district court possessed subject matter jurisdiction when it granted summary judgment of invalidity and non-infringement. The majority (Huges + Moore) found a sufficient case-or-controversy, while the dissent (Wallach) would have found appellant’s covenant-not-to-sue sufficient to moot the dispute.
A fundamental Constitutional limitation on the power of American courts is the requirement of a “proper case and controversy.” US Courts only have jurisdiction over cases that involve “a substantial controversy, between [the] parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality.” MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (focusing on declaratory jurisdiction).
The district originally invalidated all the claims of the ‘153 patent, but that holding was vacated in a prior appeal as to claims 24 and 25. On remand, the patentee moved to dismiss the case for lack-of-jurisdiction since all it wasn’t asserting those claims in the lawsuit and all its asserted claims had been found invalid. At the same time, however, Defendant moved for summary judgment of non-infringement of claims 24 and 25. Seeking to avoid such a judgment, the patentee then executed and delivered a covenant not to sue Defendants and their customers under the RE’153 patent. Although “facially unconditional,” the delivery included a statement that the covenant was tendered on condition that its motion to amend was resolved. (That motion would amend the complaint to totally remove assertion of claims 24 and 25 from the patent). Importantly, the delivery included a statement that the patentee would be “ready to deliver the covenant unconditionally” upon resolution of the motion and also that the point of the conditional delivery was to ensure that the district court maintained jurisdiction over the case. Following all that posturing, the district court went ahead an held the claims invalid and denied the motion to amend as moot.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit has agreed with the district court that it still held subject matter jurisdiction over the case since the covenant-not-to-sue wasn’t fully delivered.
Although a patentee’s grant of a covenant not to sue a potential infringer can sometimes deprive a court of subject matter jurisdiction, the patentee “bears the formidable burden of showing” “that it ‘could not reasonably be expected’ to resume its enforcement efforts. . . In this context, that requires ArcelorMittal to show that it actually granted a covenant not to sue to Defendants, and that the covenant enforceably extinguished any real controversy between the parties related to infringement of the RE’153 patent. . . .
At no time before the court entered summary judgment did ArcelorMittal unconditionally assure Defendants and their customers that it would never assert RE’153 claims 24 and 25 against them. ArcelorMittal certainly had ample opportunity to provide the unconditional assurances required to defeat jurisdiction. It did not. . . . The district court, well within its discretion in managing its docket, resolved the … summary judgment motion without having first resolved the motion to amend.
As the court notes, the outcome here was fully within the patentee’s control and for strategic reasons it chose not to actually issue the covenant-not-to-sue.
Writing in Dissent, Judge Wallach disagrees with the majority’s interpretation of the cover-letter as creating a condition precedent that must be met before the covenant takes effect. Rather, Wallach focused on the language of the covenant that was appropriately signed and submitted and its terms extinguish “any substantial controversy of sufficient immediacy between the parties concerning the RE153 patent, the only patent at issue in the instant action.”
In discerning a covenant’s scope and effect, we rely on its terms, not evidence extrinsic to the stipulation such as terms in an accompanying cover letter. See Already v. Nike. . . . When as here a covenant’s terms are unambiguous, we may not interpret those terms using extrinsic evidence, such as a cover letter. See, e.g., Coast Fed. Bank, FSB v. United States, 323 F.3d 1035, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc) (contract analogy); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 285 (Am. Law Inst. 1981) (describing a covenant not to sue as a “contract”).
My take is that Judge Wallach is substantially on the right path here, but he also misses important issues by focusing on the content of the covenant rather than its mechanism of delivery. An alternative way to see the facts is that the covenant was wrapped in a separate contract that required resolution of the motion-to-amend prior to the covenant becoming effective. In the property context, there are differences between the states as to whether conditional-delivery is permissible (outside the escrow context).
The following is an excerpt from PTO Director Michelle Lee’s keynote address today, at George Washington University Law School. Read the full remarks here.- DC
How do we continue to incentivize … incredible innovations? First, we must ensure that the USPTO issues the highest quality patents as quickly and efficiently as possible. This means, at a minimum, continuing to bring down our backlog and pendency so that good ideas can be patented quickly. Which is why I am proud to report that we’ve reduced our backlog of unexamined patent applications by almost 30 percent from its peak in January 2009, despite a 32 percent increase in applications over this time period. Our so-called first action pendencies – that measure the time from filing an application to the time of obtaining an initial decision from the examiner— are down by 43 percent—from 28 months in 2011 to 16 months today. Our total pendencies – the time from filing an application to the time of obtaining a final office action, such as an allowance—are down by 26 percent—from 35 months in 2010 to 26 months today. Our backlog of Ex Parte Appeals – that’s not AIA proceedings, but our internal appeal process to the Board after the examiner issues her decision – has also gone down. We have reduced our inventory of ex parte appeals by 45 percent from a high of about 26,000 in 2012 to about 15,000 today. And, we have reduced the average pendency for appeals by 30 percent from 28 months in 2016 to 19 months today. In short, our backlog and pendencies are now lower than they’ve been in more than a decade, and they will continue to go down. Simply stated, this means more inventors are obtaining more patents more quickly. . . .
We constantly welcome—in fact, we solicit—feedback and input. And we have shown that we are willing to refine and improve as many times as needed. For example, we’ve provided applicants with more access to examiner interviews more than doubling the number of interview hours in just eight years. We’ve had more RFC’s, Proposed Rules, and public roundtables than ever before – including on such topics as our Enhanced Patent Quality Initiative, our 101 guidance, and our Patent Trial and Appeal Board proceedings. We’ve also brought a broader range of services to support American innovators where and when needed, including through four regional offices across the country, and through over a dozen IP attaches across the globe. For those of you who may not know, our attaches in China, the EU, India, Brazil, and other locations help U.S. innovators obtain and enforce IP rights outside the US, and also help advocate for improved IP laws outside the U.S. . . .
Examining patents quickly and efficiently is only part of the job. The public relies on us to issue quality patents. Today, we have about a dozen programs underway that we believe will meaningfully improve patent quality. These include programs for making sure we’re getting the most relevant prior art before our examiners as early as possible by making prior art cited in our PTAB proceedings available to examiners handling related applications, and transitioning all our examiners from the decades old, antiquated U.S. Patent Classification System to the updated, increasingly global Cooperative Patent Classification System. Developing best practices such as for enhancing the clarity of the record. And developing new and better ways to measure our progress. For example, with our Master Review Form, we are now processing twice as many reviews, and capturing data not only about the correctness of our actions, but also about the clarity of our actions. This helps us identify trends, and helps us pinpoint very specific areas for training. Finally, and, importantly, for the first time in 40 years, we are doing a comprehensive review of the amount of time our examiners need to do their work in light of the many recent changes within the patent system. We are already seeing measurable and statistically significant results in our patent quality efforts even in the short amount of time since we began the Enhanced Patent Quality Initiative. And you can look forward to more improvements in the future. In sum, the USPTO is operating well, and is issuing more, higher quality patents than ever. …
What work lies ahead? Our top priority today is to make sure the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s AIA proceedings are as effective and as fair as possible–within our Congressional mandate. Now is the right time to examine and make any needed reforms to these proceedings, because we have five years of data and experience to guide us. …
Let’s take a look at where we are with the AIA trials today. We have shared regular updates on the number of cases and the results of those cases, but we want to break down the numbers even further so that everyone has the facts, as there have been many numbers cited – some of which are accurate, some of which are not.
This waterfall slide is our attempt to present even more data in a more accessible and transparent format. According to waterfall slide data, which shows the status of every petition filed since beginning of AIA, of those petitions that have reached some sort of final disposition (i.e., are not pending), about one third of all petitions are denied institution and do not go to trial; about one third of all petitions settle either before or after the decision to institute; and only about one third of all petitions ever reach final written decision. It is only at that point of reaching final written decision is it relevant to talk about the patentability or unpatentability of the claims of a patent. And, at that point, it is true that 66 percent of petitions will find all instituted claims of the patent unpatentable, 17 percent of petitions will find all instituted claims of the patent patentable, and an additional 17 percent will have mixed results (some instituted claims will be found to be patentable and some will be found to be unpatentable). So statements that “all” or 95 percent or even 80 percent of patents are found unpatentable are not supported by the data and do not account for prior disposition by settlement or by denial of institution.
Drilling down further on the institution rate, here is some helpful data from the years the AIA trials have been in effect. As you can see, the institution rate in our proceedings has been steadily declining from a high of 87 percent in the beginning, to about two thirds today. These are the numbers, and these are the facts. Now, our stakeholders have understandably asked how the rates of unpatentability in AIA proceedings, reflect on the quality of all of the other patents we’ve issued. . . . [T]here are almost 2.8 million patents in force. Incredible. Of those 2.8 million about 4,000 patents have been challenged in AIA trials. This represents less than 0.2 percent of the patents currently in force. …
As I have said many times in the past, the USPTO is constantly looking for ways to make the AIA trials as effective and as fair as possible within our Congressional mandate. And we welcome your suggestions and ideas, the more specific, the better. To this end, we’ve set up a mailbox where you can submit your ideas at PTABProceduralReformInitiative@uspto.gov. This is an early opportunity to provide input. Your feedback here will help form the basis for our recommendations to the administration on next steps.
In fact, we have already heard from a number of you regarding a number of issues. As discussed:
Multiple petitions, and how best to curb abusive practices.
Whether to provide other opportunities to amend claims later in the proceedings when patent owners may have a better sense of where their claims stand,
Whether to reevaluate our claim construction standards in view of new data and experiences, and
How to best incorporate the findings and legal conclusions of prior proceedings at the USPTO, including examination and other post-grant proceedings, as well as, importantly, proceedings conducted in the federal courts.
What considerations should go into a decision to institute, for example, how can we better take into account considerations such as the interests of justice, economic factors, and hardship.
As to decisions to institute, whether there should be additional review of institution and termination decisions—and by whom.
When and how to permit parties to join proceedings.
When and under what circumstances might it be appropriate to extend the length of the proceedings beyond 12 months and what impact would extensions have on litigations before, not only the Board, but district courts. . . .
[W]e are [also] streamlining the way the Board identifies and designates opinions as precedential, with the goal of designating more opinions precedential. Why? Because doing so 1). Improves the consistency across panels of the Board, and 2). Provides greater notice to the public to help you make better informed decisions on how to manage your Board proceedings. . . .
Fees: Finally, we are also proposing increases to our AIA trial fees. . . . We believe, as many of you do, that these proceedings should be self-funded. I commend our team for making thoughtful initial cost projections and for recommending revisions to ensure that these proceedings are fully self-funded. There is much to do on AIA proceedings, patent quality, and in many other areas, and I promise you that we are working diligently, with a sense of purpose, every day.
In closing, we all want what’s best for this country’s inventors, innovators and entrepreneurs. Because it is through their efforts that our country remains at the forefront – economically and globally. Simply stated—and I think President Trump and Secretary Ross would agree—we want the United States to out-innovate and out-perform our global competitors, producing new jobs and new technologies and new industries that benefit all Americans, including individual inventors and those in our small businesses and startups. Let’s not forget that the modest businesses and unknown inventors of today may become the largest and most well-known drivers of our economy tomorrow. To make that happen, Congress, the courts, the administration (especially the USPTO), and even all of you here today, must all work together to make sure the system envisioned by our Founding Fathers lives up to its purpose to promote innovation. You have the commitment of the entire USPTO team that we will play our part to ensure that we continue to incentivize the kind of innovations that make our lives better and safer And that put men and women—like Mr. Iver Anderson with his lead-free solder—in the National Inventors Hall of Fame. Our future depends upon it. Thank you.
The court here holds that claim construction “prosecution disclaimer” applies to statements made by the patentee in a preliminary response to an IPR proceeding. This holding makes sense and was entirely expected — however it also sets yet another trap for patentees seeking to enforce their patent rights.
The appeal here involves Aylus infringement lawsuit against Apple that alleges AirPlay infringes U.S. Patent No. RE 44,412. After Aylus sued Apple for infringement, Apple responded with two inter partes review (IPR) petitions challenging all of the patented claims. However, the Director (via the PTAB) refused to grant the petition as to several claims, including 2, 4, 21, and 23.
Back in the litigation, Aylus amended its complaint to only allege infringement of those non-instituted claims. In its subsequent motion for summary judgment of non-infringement, Apple argued for a narrow interpretation of the claimed use of “CPP logic . . . negotiate media content delivery between the MS and the MR.” As evidence for the narrow interpretation, Apple and the district court focused on statements by the patentee (Aylus) in its preliminary response to Apple’s IPR petition. On appeal here, the Federal Circuit has affirmed:
[S]tatements made by a patent owner during an IPR proceeding, whether before or after an institution decision, can be relied on to support a finding of prosecution disclaimer.
Those of us closely following IPR doctrine will raise some hairs at this statement since the Federal Circuit has previously held that “IPR does not begin until it is instituted.” Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc., 817 F.3d 1293, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Here, the court recognized that general holding, but found that it dies not apply “for the purposes of prosecution disclaimer.” Rather, for this situation, the court found that the proceedings begin with the IPR petition.
If I were writing the opinion, I would have come to the same result – that statements by the applicant to the PTO can form prosecution disclaimer. However, I would have reached the conclusion without upsetting and further complicating the definition of an IPR proceeding.
= = = = =
An oddity of all of this is that the Federal Circuit appears quite concerned in this case about the linkages between claim construction during inter partes review and subsequent litigation, but previously ignored that issue during the prior cuozzo debate. My take has long been that we should be applying the actual claim construction in both situations.
= = = = =
This case focused on prosecution disclaimer and the finding of a clear and unmistakable disclaimer of claim scope. However, the same approach should also apply in applying IPR statements as primary intrinsic evidence used in the claim construction analysis even when short of disclaimer.
In this case, the appellate court affirmed summary judgment that all of the asserted claims of five EasyWeb patents are ineligible under the Mayo/Alice interpretation of 35 U.S.C. 101 and therefore invalid.
Representative Claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 7,685,247 is directed to a message-publishing-system that “accepts messages in multiple ways, such as by fax, telephone, or email” then verifies the message as being sent from an authorized sender, converts the message to a web format, and publishes the message on the Internet. Although claim 1 is directed to a computer system, it includes a functionally claimed software component:
A message publishing system (MPS) operative to process a message from a sender in a first format, comprising:
a central processor;
at least one sender account;
at least one storage area configured to store at least a first portion of the message;
and software executing in the central processor to configure the processor so as to:
identify the sender of the message as an authorized sender based on information associated with the message in comparison to data in the sender account, wherein the identification is dependent upon the first format;
convert at least a second portion of the message from the first format to a second format; and
publish the converted second portion of the message so as to be viewable in the second format only if the sender has been identified as an authorized sender.
Following the now standard two-step eligibility analysis, the court first found the claim directed toward an abstract idea.
Claim 1 merely recites the familiar concepts of receiving, authenticating, and publishing data. As we have explained in a number of cases, claims involving data collection, analysis, and publication are directed to an abstract idea.
Of import here for the abstract idea finding is that the claim simply uses generic computer technology rather than improving-upon the technology or designing particularized components.
Moving to step-two, the court looked – but could not find – an “inventive concept” beyond the claimed abstract idea sufficient to “transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” (quoting Alice).
Although EasyWeb argues that an inventive concept arises from the ordered combination of steps in claim 1, we disagree. Claim 1 recites the most basic of steps in data collection, analysis, and publication and they are recited in the ordinary order. In sum, all the claims are directed to the abstract idea of receiving, authenticating, and publishing data, and fail to recite any inventive concepts sufficient to transform the abstract idea into a patent eligible invention.
Its decision is not quite correct, the Federal Circuit does not find abstract ideas simply because a claim involves “data collection, analysis, and publication.” However, when (as here), the claim is directed toward these activities at a high level of abstraction, then the Alice/Mayo approach easily fits.
Analytically, the decision adds further weight to the theory that steps 1 and 2 are closely linked and are highly likely to correlate with one another.
