Oil States v. Greene’s Energy (Supreme Court 2017).
After receiving party briefs in this case, the Supreme Court requested a responsive brief from the Michelle Lee in her role as PTO Director on the constitutionality of the AIA trial system. That brief has now been filed by the new acting Solicitor General Jeff Wall who handled a number of patent cases in private practice. Despite the regime change, the SG’s office continues to strongly support the AIA Trial system and the brief argues strongly that patents are public rights that may be subject to administrativ review:
Patents are quintessential public rights. Pursuant to its constitutional authority to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” by establishing a patent system, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 8, Congress created the USPTO, an agency with “special expertise in evaluating patent applications.” Kappos v. Hyatt, 566 U.S. 431, 445 (2012). Congress directed that agency to issue a patent if “it appears that the applicant is entitled to a patent” under standards set by federal law, 35 U.S.C. 131. Patents accordingly confer rights that “exist only by virtue of statute.” Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 n.5 (1964). . . . Petitioner’s constitutional arguments do not warrant this Court’s review.
[Read the Brief: 16-712_oil_states_energy_servs._llc_opp] The Supreme Court has already denied certiorari in three prior constitutional challenges to the AIA trial mechanisms. MCM Portfolio v. Hewlett-Packard; Cooper v. Lee; and Cooper v. Square. If Oil States is denied here, there are also several more cases waiting in the wings to raise the challenge again.
Coming to the question of whether patent rights are public rights or private rights.
Usual disclaimers (IANAL etc.), but my hunch is that, if SCOTUS were to grant certiorari, they might well hold, or at least a plurality of Justices might well find, that patent rights are private rights.
I have looked over a few apparently relevant SCOTUS cases. I would presume that the public rights exception is a doctrine in US constitutional law intended to provide a framework for constitutional cases involving Article III, and on that basis, its extent would have to be judged by the relevant SCOTUS case law, and one would to find the distinction set out in statutes.
The following might, I think, provide an example of what would be a public right.
Let us suppose that Congress has full authority to enact legislation regulating the sale of distilled alcohol. (It might not actually have that right, but for the sake of this example, we suppose, for the sake of argument, that it does.) Congress then enact legislation with the following three provisions:
(i) the sale of distilled alcohol without a Federal license is unlawful;
(ii) licenses are administered by a Federal agency;
(iii) no two licensed premises may be situated less than 10 miles apart.
We suppose that John Doe has obtained a license to sell distilled alcohol at his premises specified in the license.
Richard Roe then starts selling distilled alcohol from premises situated five miles from John Doe. This impacts adversely on John Doe’s trade.
Consider the case where Richard Roe has not obtained a license. I presume that, under those circumstances, John Doe does not have standing to sue Richard Roe directly. At best he can contact Law Enforcement and ask them to look into the matter and encourage them, if necessary, to bring Richard Roe into court for the unlawful sale of distilled alcohol.
Next suppose that Richard Roe does have a license. I presume that, in those circumstances, John Doe does not have standing to sue Richard Roe directly in an Article III court. Nor can he sue the licensing agency directly for wrongly issuing the license to Richard Roe, because the licensing agency enjoys sovereign immunity.
In such circumstances, Congress would presumably have the power to establish an Article I court to arbitrate disputes between vendors of distilled alcohol such as John Doe and Richard Roe.
In those circumstances, I suggest that John Doe’s right to sell distilled alcohol from his premises is a public right.
===
Now vary the law slightly. We suppose that the relevant high ranking officials at the Federal licensing agency are empowered to issue letters patent, signed and countersigned, with the seal of the distilled alcohol licensing agency, granting to John Doe the exclusive right to sell distilled alcohol within a ten mile radius of the premises specified in the letters patent. Once the letters patent are signed and sealed, the right has been vested in John Doe, even before the letters patent have been delivered (see Marbury v. Madison, 1803). The letters patent give John Doe to right to sue trespassers such as Richard Roe in Article III courts. Moreover, if threatened with an infringement suit, Richard Roe could defend himself by proving that the letters patent were invalid, or were not infringed.
And, although the authority to issue such letters patent would derive from statute, it is surely the case that rights granted by letters patent were familiar to common law courts in medieval England. (And I note that in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land Improvement Co., 1856, SCOTUS took account of the common law of England from medieval times, and how similar laws were applied in the colonies prior to the Declaration of Independence.)
I would suggest that, in these circumstances, John Doe’s right to sell distilled alcohol would be a private right. And the fact that Congress chose to use the mechanism of grant of letters patent in this situation would make disputes between John Doe and Richard Roe cases and controversies requiring the exercise of the judicial power of the United States, requiring such cases to be tried at common law in Article III courts.
===
Applying now to patents of invention, I note the following from McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Aultman (1898):
“The only authority competent to set a patent aside, or to annul it, or to correct it for any reason whatever, is vested in the courts of the United States, and not in the department which issued the patent. Moore v. Robbins, 96 U. S. 530, 96 U. S. 533; United States v. Am. Bell Telephone Co., 128 U. S. 315, 128 U. S. 364; Michigan Land & Lumber Co. v. Rust, 168 U. S. 589, 168 U. S. 593. And in this respect a patent for an invention stands in the same position and is subject to the same limitations as a patent for a grant of lands.”
I note in particular the last sentence!
I notice that, in the case of letters patent constituting a commission for a Justice of the Peace, Chief Justice Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison, made the following statements in his opinion:
“If the act of livery be necessary to give validity to the commission of an officer, it has been delivered when executed, and given to the Secretary of State for the purpose of being sealed, recorded, and transmitted to the party.”
[…]
“The President of the United States, by signing the commission, appointed Mr. Marbury a justice of the peace for the County of Washington, in the District of Columbia, and the seal of the United States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment; and the appointment conferred on him a legal right to the office for the space of five years. Having this legal right to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right for which the laws of the country afford him a remedy.”
===
And I suggest that a SCOTUS case in real property for comparison purposes is Green v. Liter (1814).
“No livery of seizin is necessary to perfect a title by letters patent. The grantee in such case takes by matter of record, and the law deems the grant of record of equal notoriety with an actual tradition of the land in the view of the vicinage.”
(I suppose that one reason for posting in forums like this is that, should SCOTUS decide to take up the case, one can eventually say, either “I told you so!” or “I admit I got it wrong” when the judgment is published.)
Distant, the primary basis for the holding of Federal Circuit in both Patlex and in MCM is that patents are creatures of statute and therefor are public rights. The law reviews I’ve read on the topic suggest that any “new type” of right created by congress is form of public right. However, even here, if Congress gives a new right a legal remedy, then the right is a legal right and it must be litigated in a court of law and with a jury at the option of parties. Curtis v. Loether.
link to scholar.google.com
Of course, patents are legal rights, and their validity and infringement must be litigated in a court of law. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433, 446-447 (1830). (legal rights must be adjudicated in a court of law and to a jury).
link to scholar.google.com
Distributed for conference on June 1.
link to supremecourt.gov
Circling back to my 1312 comment and the responses it provoked, I’m still curious about the interactions of The Office of The President with The Constitution, the separation of powers and The Executive Branch. In particular:
..what does the Constitution have to say on conflicts between i) the public interest and ii) the business interests of The President and his immediate family around the world?
..thinking of the Comey firing, is The Office of the President inside or outside the Executive Branch “silo”?
You being “still curious” when you have not linked your own rants in any cohesive manner does not help the dialogue.
“Provoking” responses with such meaninglessness is merely throwing
C
R
P
against the wall to see what sticks.
Up your game, MaxDrei.
Please.
Up my “game”? Today’s news. According to the BBC, Mr Trump just shared with Sergei Lavrov in the WH Oval Office intelligence that is classified “Codeword” ie higher than Top Secret, information so secret that it is not even shared with the 5 Eyes partners.
Maybe you want to tie that news in some relevant way to your off-base rants here.
You STILL have shown no appreciation for the legal terms that you heft with vigor against the wall.
Max, according to people who were in the meeting, what was shared was information already published.
Ned is that your take on McMaster’s careful double negative? But hey, come on, the fuss is not about revealing “military operations” is it? What McMaster said is a deliberate distraction, isn’t it?
Max, the Roman Republic, arguably successful, required its consuls to be rich guys.
And so? Choose a rich guy for President and all will be well Ned. Somehow I don’t think so.
I was intrigued to see the linked brief note the subject of administrative procedures (such as those employed by the Social Security administration) to recover overpaid funds. While I agree that patents are private property, I hope that no one would doubt that cash money is also personal property. And yet administrative agencies are authorized by law to take back cash (without the interposition of an Article III court) when it has been paid by mistake. How is this meaningfully different from the PTO cancelling claims when it finds that they have been granted by mistake?
That is an interesting parallel.
Different kind of mistake. Overpayment is an objective mistake. Like if the cashier gives you too much change, you are not entitled to the excess cash. These type of errors in patents are covered by 35 USC §254 without controversy.
Good point.
I suppose too that the level of the presumption of validity that attaches – by law – at the time of grant would also factor into the equation.
Oil States has filed its reply brief and relies heavily on the Cascades dissents to en banc.
One point I strongly disagree with in the reply brief is the apparent concession that scire facias actions were filed in a court of equity and patents were invalidated as an equitable remedy. As we all know, scire facias actions were filed in the Petty Bag, a Common Law court in Chancery, but where the trial was actually conducted at Kings Bench and to a jury. Even the Supreme Court of the United States recognized this in ex parte Wood & Brundage, a case that held that scire facias actions had a right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.
I find it inexcusable that counsel representing our side of this argument could so screw up our position by this concession.
Hopefully, this does not provide permanent damage. But I can tell you one thing, I have no confidence in this law firm representing the position of our side to the Supreme Court.
Now you know how we felt with you as a potential “champion” of patents as property and the fact that you didn’t even know the “sticks in a bundle” of property rights metaphor.
anon, the reason we have trial by jury for patent validity is because the Magna Carta guaranteed a trial by jury in civil cases involving legal rights — property.
“It is well known, that in civil causes, in courts of equity and admiralty, juries do not intervene, and that courts of equity use the trial by jury only in extraordinary cases to inform the conscience of the court. When, therefore, we find that the amendment requires that the right of trial by jury shall be preserved in suits at common law, the natural conclusion is, that this distinction was present to the minds of the framers of the amendment. By common law, they meant what the constitution denominated in the third article ‘law;’ not merely suits, which the common law recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were administered; or where, as in the admiralty, a mixture of public law, and of maritime law and equity was often found in the same suit.”
Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-447 (1830).
[grabs popcorn]
That’s not popcorn…
😉
Agreed Ned. Which law firm is it ? Patent firm?
MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP. 1717 Main Street, Suite 3200 Dallas, Texas 75201
Here is the passage that I object to, where the words “before courts of equity” were emphasized by the author:
Ned,
Reading comprehension fail.
That isn’t a concession. They are using the Government’s position against it.
Can you cool the faux rage?
anony, I would have loved to have seen the word “arguendo” used.
(from IPDude)
“It is a fact that Lee … has invalidated 40% of patents SHE has issued after she supposedly “improved” patent quality. ”
You mentioned in a follow-on comment that “The stats… was just released”. Where can I find them?
On a quick check, 1,011,515 utility patents have issued during her tenure.
I find it astonishing to think that something north of 400,000 of those patents have already been invalidated.
That was exactly my reaction to the 40% figure. I suspect that he means that 40% of PGRs end with canceled claims, or some such.
The data is a little tricky. The latest report is posted here. Slide 8 shows 3,382 of 4,865, or 69% of petitions are instituted. Slide 9 shows 1,270 of 1,539, or 82.5% of final decisions with one or more claims unpatentable. That is 56% of petitions. Given 1.2 petitions per patent, that is 68% of patents are invalid.
The stats hold for PGR which were filed within the past 4 years with latest and greatest management, quality system, and case law.
Judge Michel noted recently that patents challenged in the PTAB are the cream of the crop:
Thanks for trying to answer whatever it was IPDude may have meant, but the data do not appear tricky to me.
So, something like 0.1% of patents issued were invalidated; fewer, actually, since the PTAB document covers more time that Ms. Lee’s tenure.
Thanks also Invention Rights for providing the link to the PTO’s slide deck.
Nice resource to have for client education and what not.
Educate your client that if he is fortunate enough to invent something valuable he will have the privilege of paying a half million dollars for a 32% chance of keeping his patent.
“There you go again”
Judge Michel noted recently that… [s]ince 80% of the IPRs are already in district court, these are… presumably the strongest patents… a two-third invalidation rate can’t be right for these pre-vetted patents.
Hm, I am not sure why Judge Michel regards that ⅔ figure as implausibly high. When P.J. Federico studied the rate at which patents were held invalid in litigation in the 1940s and 1950s, he found that courts invalidated claims ~60% of the time (P.J. Federico, Adjudicated Patents, 1948-54, 38 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 233, 244 (1956)), which is fairly close to two-thirds. By the time Allison & Lemley reprised this question in the 1990s, the rate of invalidation had fallen to only ~45% (J. Allison & M. Lemley, Emprical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998)), but that mostly reflects the fact (too well know to most of us) that the courts tend to cycle through phases of favoring or disfavoring patent validity. We are palpably in one of the “disfavor” phases right now, so it is not surprising if the invalidity rate has climbed back up to what it was during the last “disfavor” phase.
I can only imagine that the reason that Judge Michel finds this an implausibly high rate of invalidation is that Judge Michel served during the waning days of the last “favor” phase, and retired just as the current “disfavor” phase was waxing. He retired in 2010 (i.e., pre-Mayo/Alice), so his notion of what constitutes an “ordinary” invalidation rate is going to be lower than the current state of the law allows.
I am not really happy about the state of the law that makes a ⅔ invalidation rate the new normal, but unlike Judge Michel, I cannot pretend to find that surprising or implausible.
Understand the numbers. It’s not 2/3 of *all* patents. It’s not 2/3 of patents that are petitioned for IPR. It’s 2/3 of patents for which an IPR was instituted – i.e. where the petition presented a reasonable likelihood of success. You WANT that number to be high. If the rate is low, then you’re instituting many IPRs that change nothing and are thus unnecessary, wasting the parties’ time and expensive.
The number you want to be low is the percent of patents challenged in an IPR. And indeed it is – less than 0.1%. That means over 99.9% of the time, the allowance decision was correct in the first place (regarding the issues that can be challenged in an IPR). Or at least, 99.9% of the time either the decision was correct OR the patent isn’t worth challenging. For purposes of this discussion, that amounts to much the same thing.
Judge Michel’s view of the numbers is, frankly, wrong. There are several academic studies showing that patents involved in litigation often have lower quality metrics than the general patent population. In most cases, these are not the “cream of the crop” patents we’re talking about.
“It’s 2/3 of patents for which an IPR was instituted – i.e. where the petition presented a reasonable likelihood of success. You WANT that number to be high. ”
Good point.
Sort of.
But not quite accurate. The decision to institute is NOT a reflection on any final merits of why the institution is being granted. That would be an improper extra thumb on the scale, and would more likely than not indicate an improper decision before the matter is fully heard. One must not confuse the Petitioner’s one-sided presentation that meets a “reasonable likelihood of success” with any sense of a full decision on the entire record and all factors brought into the deliberation. You should not expect that correlation.
Of course, the real critical point is the separate legal point of the institution decision itself.
For example (and admittedly going in a tangent to your fine point), it is AT that separate legal point that a particular taking occurs; and it is that separate legal point that on its own engages in that taking with ZERO recompense to the property owner; and it is that separate legal point that flatly (per the direction of Congress) dictates no Article III review of that separate legal point.
One must not confuse the Petitioner’s one-sided presentation that meets a “reasonable likelihood of success”….
Huh? What are you talking about? The patent owner gets to respond before the PTAB institutes. If the institution decision is made based on a one-sided presentation, it is only because the patent owner evidently chose not to respond at the allotted time.
” Pursuant to its constitutional authority to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” by establishing a patent system, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 8, Congress created the USPTO, an agency with “special expertise in evaluating patent applications.” Kappos v. Hyatt, 566 U.S. 431, 445 (2012). Congress directed that agency to issue a patent if “it appears that the applicant is entitled to a patent” under standards set by federal law, 35 U.S.C. 131. ”
This supports that the constitution gives authority to the federal governement to administer the patent system. I don’t see how this supports that patents confer rights that exist only by virtue of (federal) statute. Would it be true also that trade secrets are rights that exist only by virtue of statute just because there is now a federal statute for the protection of trade secrets?
PiKa,
Your post reminds me that there are indeed TWO sides to the Quid Pro Quo.
It seems that certain people are in a hurry to forget that.
Pika, inventions are not public rights, but the constitutional grant gives congress the authority to secure THE exclusive rights in inventions at the national level. The alternative was to allow states to secure such rights (and they were so secured prior to 1789, and for 40+ years thereafter). But then we would have to secure patents in 50 states just to get national protection, which would be a simple procedure if one’s state’s recognition of an invention were given full faith and credit in other states, like marriages are so recognized.
In 1836, Congress delegated to the Executive the power to grant patents on examination, but with the burden of proving unpatentability on the government. This grant of authority to examine is hardly a power to regulate patent rights.
Once a patent issues, the common law provided all the remedies one need to enforce and defend in court. Damages, injunctions, and invalidity were all known common law defenses from even prior to the State of Monopolies. Congress has not varied these remedies since the founding except to allow trebling for willful infringement, and to require reasonable royalties.
As well, in the initial patent statutes, Congress authorized scire facias actions to revoke patents for invalidity, and these actions had a right to a trial by jury. Ex parte Wood & Bundage.
To be sure, in an effort to justify reexaminations and IPRs, the Federal Circuit has done a lot of damage to the patent system and caused revisionist thinking designed to confuse, and confuse it has.
You need a brush up on the concept of federal preemption, Ned.
State patents for 40 years after 1789? Really?
Well, to be accurate, 35, not 40.
A New York State patent was at issue in Gibbons v Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) , the case we all read in law school on the “dormant commerce clause.” (well, one person that goes by “anon” here didn’t attend law school, but anyone who did, read Gibbons). Gibbons ended state patent systems.
Thanks Dave.
A post for you.
Yippie!
As for “attending law school,” that hasn’t done well for you in all of our other “tussles,” now has it?
The more you brag, the more f001ish you look.
Too bad really, as I do appreciate your past work championing the patent system and all.
Not sure why you get all fixated on nodding when it comes to some of my points though. Are you trying to bypass Homer?
“A post for you” => “A point for you”
Of course, anon. The patents were authorized on the Federal level “as well.”
When the Supreme Court ruled that Congress had preempted state patents, it was based upon the entire statutory structure plus some made up law, and I do not know where that law really came from, i.e., that Congress had determined that states could not protect inventions that were not to be protected at the federal level.
Such concepts would be totally alien to our founding fathers who simply assumed that states could grant patents for inventions and that they would continue to do so. Indeed, trade secret protection is very much like patent protection, but relies instead upon breach of trust or confidentiality theories instead of simply innocent infringement by third parties.
I put down the preemption case the liberals on the court who where intent on preserving federal power versus state rights.
Federal preemption would be foreign…?
Maybe David can help us on that…
So it is not necessarily a surprise, then, that AG Sessions is on board with the constitutionality of IPRs. Of course, AG Sessions’ views do not make the statute either constitutional or unconstitutional, but it is worthwhile to know his views all the same. Thanks for finding that.
Bother. Once again I failed to click the proper “reply” link. This was intended as a response to 1.3.2 below.
This was driven by the USPTO, it tracks their position since MCM. It is also identical to the position in Security People filed by the USPTO three days prior to the Oil States brief. Make no mistake, the Obama/Lee/Google holdovers kept Trump and AG Sessions on the dark on this. They took a very aggressive line here against the Patent Act, against the Supreme Court, against the status of its only product, and against its customers. Agitating for a novel theory that turns patents into another bargaining chip for crony capitalists. President Trump, please clean this house.
IR – it’s no surprise that Lee took this position. It was expected. It will be interesting to see how SCOTUS responds (now with Gorsuch) to a response by the USPTO that goes against SCOTUS precedent (patents are private property rights). Wilbur Ross needs to appoint a reasonable, non-Google-shill, director to right the ship (currently sinking).
Lol.
The worlds biggest losers. Never give up! Keep trying to turn back the clock and hope that nobody is paying attention.
Lololol.
We’re all watching the maximalists very closely, of course. Children need to be monitored after all.
What’s funny (many, many LOLs) is that you don’t see the irony in calling others, who engage in civilized discourse, children. We get it, you don’t like patents.
IPdude,
MOST all of Malcolm’s posts are non-substantive ad hominem laden rants steeped in irony.
That is the “ecosystem” of eleven years of Malcolm.
Because accusing the PTO director of being “a reasonable, non-Google-shill” is the height of civility.
Try to believe it, folks. Like I said: you guys are so famously st-00 pit that you can’t even control the cr@p that comes out of your own mouths for ten seconds. You’re hypocrites. The worst.
Because accusing the PTO director of being “an unreasonable, Google-shill” is the height of civility.
Fixed for clarity.
“ Like I said: you guys are so famously st-00 pit that you can’t even control the cr@p that comes out of your own mouths for ten seconds. You’re hypocrites. The worst.”
There you go again, Accuse Other Of That Which Malcolm Is.
MM, are you serious? It is a fact that Lee was an associate general counsel at Google AND, more importantly, she has invalidated 40% of patents SHE has issued after she supposedly “improved” patent quality. She is anti-software patent because Google is anti-software patent. Google successfully lobbied Obama to appoint her and she now runs a kangaroo court that benefits her former (current) employer. The stats don’t lie…but you do. Engage in all the ad hominems you want, the facts are not on your side.
Again, the fact that you recite this ridiculous stale script and expect people to take you seriously demonstrates just one thing: you’re an ign 0 rant cl 0wn.
But we knew that already.
Everbody knows it. The relentlessly whining shills who want to patent everything and want everything to be easier to enforce are some of the very worst attonerneys and definitely among the worst b 0tt0m feeders in the legal profession. And you guys all congregate at the IP Puppyd0g site and cry yourself a new river every other day.
The rest of us just laugh.
Please please get a li fe already. You aren’t going to succeed in turning the clock back to pre-KSR State Street. Grow up already. We all know those were your glory days. It’s over. Give it a rest.
Your feelings (as Accuse Others as they are) are noted.
MM – Stale script? The stats on Lee invalidating 40% of patents SHE has issued was just released. Didn’t think you’d want to touch that.
Your self appointed role as watchers over the fields of rye is noted.
Is that “we” you and your army of sockpuppets that were the worst thing ever except when you use them?
“We’re all watching the maximalists very closely, of course. Children need to be monitored after all.”
You and other globalists? Or you and other nannystatists?
patents are private property rights.
Very true. Of course, nothing about the IPR schema changes patents into anything less than private property, so I am not sure why we might expect Justice Gorsuch—or any other Justice—to take exception to IPRs.
Greg, consider private property rights in China where land is taken from the local farmer for the benefit of the community (local party bosses). link to articles.latimes.com And who gets to judge whether this is legal or whether any compensation is adequate? Well nobody – that is right, nobody. Why, because in China, farmland is community, read the public, property.
And even if they had some formal mechanism for awarding compensation, would you trust the local government committee that is in charge of financing the government by selling land farmland to be a judge on how much compensation you should get?
While the procedures involved might seem fair, the whole system is rigged because there is no clear recognition that the land of the farmers is his property, or that the court hearing the issue of compensation be truly independent.
There is endless discussion of corruption in China precisely because there is no clear demarcation of property rights, or whether there is truly access to an independent judiciary. There is neither. The system smacks of unfairness because of lack of clear rights, and a lack of an independent judiciary.
But that is the system you advocate for the United States, Greg, when you declare private property to be public rights that can be revoked by a political organization acting for political purposes. There may seem a veneer of due process, but that is all you get. Show.
Ned,
Greg’s firm has a large PTAB practice.
link to hdp.com
You are wasting your time arguing with him. You are getting the Oblon, Unified line.
It is true. My firm handles many IPRs. Before that, we handed a fair number of inter partes reexams.
If one is to adopt the maxim on this board that a speaker’s position is to be disregarded irrespective of its merits if the speaker’s self interest aligns with the position adopted, there will be rather little to be said around these parts.
Well for one, Greg, I trust you to speak your mind here not only when it aligns with the interests of “Oblon, Unified,” but when it does not as well.
That same trust is not something that I would give to Ned Heller (for example), as he has steadfastly refused to carry conversations to their logical ends. He even makes things up like looking at his Outlook log, and not reading posts made by me (and yet, note how often he will initially engage in direct response to me – it does not add up for him).
Secondly, I do not disregard the content of what anyone has to say here – even that content from known shills.
To disregard is to miss some very meaningful opportunities to take the shills to the woodshed!
JFC anon. You feed the trolls like your salary depends on it.
Maybe I “feed the tr011s” because I like to wreck their arguments.
Even “Tr011s” shouldbe allowed to state their case, anony.
It is behavior post-case that should be the greater concern.