Pain and Suffering: Prof. Ronen Avraham was moved by the story of Robert Kearns (Flash of Genius) and asks Should Courts Award Pain and Suffering Damages in Patent Infringement Cases? His answer is YES, “courts should award damages to solo inventors for noneconomic harm resulting from patent infringement.”
Licensing Without Litigation: Mark A. Lemley has again teamed up with Kent Richardson and Erik Oliver to provide some data about the “Patent Enforcement Iceberg” — licenses of non-litigated patents. Their tentative conclusion is that the iceberg isn’t that deep. In a separate econ paper (Bereskin, et al) argues that plaintiffs bringing patent infringement lawsuits see increased stock-value.
All Elements (Limitations): Ted Field’s article on patent terminology probably doesn’t provide a lot for experienced patent attorneys – except for his discussion of “limitations” vs. “elements.” He writes:
Claims are made up of constituent parts, which are properly called “limitations.” It is improper to refer to the constituent parts of a claim as “elements.” Instead, “elements” properly refers only to a constituent part of an accused device or a prior-art reference, not to a constituent part of a claim.
Although Field cites authority for his proposition, I will note that the Federal Circuit regularly considers “claim elements.” Consider, the following two recent examples: Bosch Automotive Serv. Sols., LLC v. Matal, 2015-1928, 2017 WL 6543777 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 22, 2017) (“When no structure in the specification is linked to the function in a means-plus-function claim element, that claim is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2.”); Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2017)(“The second step of the § 101 analysis requires us to determine whether the *1374 claim elements, when viewed individually and as an ordered combination, contain ‘an inventive concept sufficient to transform the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.'”)
Inherently Abstract vs Temporally Abstract: Alan Gocha’s new article focuses on patent eligibility and provides “an ontological model for determining section 101 patent eligibility under Alice.” I think the most important contribution that Gocha makes is to categorize abstract ideas into those that are “inherently abstract” (preexisting fundamental truths) from those that are only “temporally abstract” (longstanding practices). In his view, these two different types of abstract ideas should involve different jurisprudential approaches.
in pieces then…
Still one more try:
Catching up on points provided, but blocked by the “don’t have a conversation because a different desired narrative is desired” filter, here are several gems that have been salvaged:
To Distant Perspective at 15:
Your comment is awaiting moderation.
January 3, 2018 at 12:29 pm
I agree with Ben and further caution against any “loose” attempt to discuss patent eligibility across Sovereigns without noting that the US Sovereign (in particular) has a standard that is larger than any “technological arts” that may be in place in any other Sovereign.
To Ned at 15.3:
Your comment is awaiting moderation.
January 3, 2018 at 8:25 pm
“I am doing my level best to help people understand 101. ”
Stop.
Focus first on you obtaining an understanding of 101.
An understanding NOT tainted by your Windmill Chases.
To Ben at 14.3.1.1:
Your comment is awaiting moderation.
January 3, 2018 at 12:33 pm
Ben,
He is not a char1atan.
His view IS understandable, and I take your inability to find anything supporting his assertions as more a reflection of just that: your inability.
That’s not necessarily a knock, mind you. Discussing physics at such a “high” level (verging on meta-physics) AND taking into account the factual nature of computing AND the legal contexts is NOT something for the average person.
As I note below, I do wish that Night Writer would attempt a different path of conversation given the limitations exhibited by many of those wanting to join the conversation (as well as the opportunity for mischief that THAT type of intricate thinking provides for those who want only to obfuscate the issue in order to advance their own “Feelings/Philosophies.”
To Paul Morgan at 14.3.1.1.1.1.1:
Your comment is awaiting moderation.
January 3, 2018 at 8:27 pm
Different level of understanding Paul.
You are WAY off.
To Martin at 14.4.1.2
Your comment is awaiting moderation.
January 3, 2018 at 2:56 pm
“and to anon’s endlessly repeated (and useless) point: hardware, firmware, and software are not the same thing, or they would not be three different words (!) but even if they all result in the same thing,”
You continue to make the mistake of thinking that equivalency means “must be the exact same thing.”
That is not so.
Please acquit yourself of the proper understanding and use of terms when you want to partake in a discussion of legal matters.
“Meanwhile, I can actually see the argument for processed information as a manufacture and information processing as coming under the ambit of “process’ in Section 101. ”
Software is not a process.
The execution of software may be a patent eligible process.
“So my answer, in the name of practicality “…
…practicality? Whose? Yours? When you disdain the terrain upon which you want to wander, “practicality” will not – and cannot – be achieved.
You want (somehow) to take this to “the next level” when you cannot even be bothered with the foundational level. You know what they say about people such as yourself building castles (the ‘next level’) on foundations of quicksand, eh?
Still one more try:
To Paul Cole at 13.1:
Your comment is awaiting moderation.
January 3, 2018 at 8:03 am
The phrase is (admittedly) an obscure movie reference. The “filthy” has a different meaning in that context – and my borrowed use intends a more light hearted context (while still reflecting a span of human nature).
And because H 0 m 0 sapiens fully belongs to the Mammalia group within the animal kingdom, you sir, remain an animal.
Lastly, “deserve” happiness is an interesting concept, but I am more of the breed that believes that one earns the happiness that one obtains, and everyone has the power within themselves to earn whatever level of happiness that one desires.
and some more:
Both of the following at the end of the Ned chain at 12.1.2.1.1.2.2:
Your comment is awaiting moderation.
January 3, 2018 at 8:29 pm
“In the context of a larger machine or process”
I do not see that in the words of Congress.
Your comment is awaiting moderation.
January 3, 2018 at 8:31 pm
“believe that circuits and firmware modify a machine so as to potentially improve it. Not so with software.”
Because THAT is only by magic.
Ned – your statement here is the OPPOSITE of dealing with the equivalency.
To Martin at the end of the 12.1.2.2.2.2.4 chain:
Your comment is awaiting moderation.
January 3, 2018 at 8:13 am
His reference to your prior statement is NOT an affirmation of that statement, and is merely intended to draw a contrast between that prior statement and your current statements.
That you do not recognize this and instead appear to “celebrate” only shows how deeply invested in your own world view to the exclusion of what does go on here in this real world.
smaller pieces then…
To Ned at 12.1.2.2.2.3:
Your comment is awaiting moderation.
January 2, 2018 at 4:12 pm
Maybe it’s one of those “larger machine” deals…
skipping To maxdrei at 12.1.1.2.1: [a word is tripping the filter rather unexpectedly. and cannot be located]
To Ben at the end of the 12.1.2.1.1.2.2 chain:
Your comment is awaiting moderation.
January 3, 2018 at 10:38 am
“The perversion is in claiming results”
But that’s not a 101 issue.
That’s a 112 issue.
To Ned at the end of the 12.1.2.2.2.2.1 chain:
Your comment is awaiting moderation.
January 3, 2018 at 9:33 am
“might I add that to anon and Night, the Bible is a book. To many, the Bible is a bit of story and a bit of history. To many others, the Bible is the Word of God.
But to anon and Night, these distinctions…”
What b01 10cks.
When have I ever indicated that an item cannot have more than one aspect?
Quite in fact, Ned – it is I that champions this notion of an item having more than one aspect in my (attempted) conversation with Malcolm when I point out the fact that software has aspects that are differently protectable under the different IP laws of copyright and patent.
I am also the one that attempts to have people understand that there are very real distinctions between math, applied math, and MathS (as I have coined the term). It is others that seek to obfuscate rather than add clarity – and those others include you with your Windmill Chase of anti-patent for business methods.
New Year Ned – maybe consider dropping Malcolm’s Accuse Others meme…
You are not only wrong directly, your attempted disparagement does not reach any recognizable point in the immediate discussion.
To Martin at the end of the 12.1.2.2.2.2.2 chain:
Your comment is awaiting moderation.
January 3, 2018 at 9:37 am
“What are you trying to illustrate?”
How is it that you “magically” have different capabilities without an actual physical change?
Your Britney Spears CD will NOT restore your hard drive if your reformat that drive.
One piece of software (that enables “X”) is NOT the same as another piece of software (that enables “Y”).
You say things here that are simply not factually accurate – and you should KNOW BETTER given what you actually do for a living.
Given the discussion of subject-matter eligibility below, a shout out to a posting in Dr. Mark Summerfield’s blog Patentology, from 4th December, 2017, entitled New USPTO Data Set Reveals Extent of Patent-Eligibility Confusion and Carnage here:
link to blog.patentology.com.au
In addition to the data analysis, there is discussion and/or links relevant to subject-matter eligibility in the U.S., the U.K. and Australia.
Penultimate paragraph (with a link to the “recent article”):
“And, as I pointed out in recent article, the situation does not appear to be any better in Australia.”
While I agree with the conclusion that eligibility is an arbitrary mess, I think the patentology argument is weak. His sole point is that Alice/Mayo rejections rates should be going down overtime, and they are not.
A point I forgot to make in the original post.
Either in the blog posting on the link, or on pages linked from it, it becomes clear that, in Australian law, the basis of subject-eligibility law is the Statute of Monopolies of 1624, as it has been judicially interpreted over the centuries.
Thus investigation of what is the current law in Australia (and maybe in other common law jurisdictions? Ontario?) is an appropriate alternative (for those tempted to engage in it) to counter-factual speculation as to where U.K. law might have ended up had the U.K. not become a party to the European Patent Convention.
Well, Distant, US law all but formally enacted the Statute of Monopolies in 1793. Australian law and US law should be the same, not different, to the extent of the subject matter eligibility.
Once again, Ned, you omit the Act of 1952.
Well, Distant, I am doing my level best to help people understand 101. What the courts are looking for is whether the claims are directed to a new or improved “manufacture,” or way of making such, as those terms were understood from “working or making of any manner of new manufactures” which appears in the Statute of Monopolies. Ways of organizing human activity for the purposes of making money, or improved mathematics, are neither new or improved manufactures, nor are they knew or improved ways of making such. In the end, the courts are not going to find such inventions eligible and will invent ways to deny eligibility.
Alice essentially adopted the structure of analysis we see in Hotel Security. That case said that business methods were abstract, and patentability must line the means. This is a simple formula and it is being conducted by the courts day in and day out.
The lot of you need to remember:
The conservation of information is the most important law of physics.
It takes time, energy, and space to process information.
That you only know whether there is software or a special purpose chip in the black box by looking.
Plus, what exactly do you think processed information is? So, you get output to stop or you will hit a child. You get output that your tumor is cancerous. You get output etc.
A manufacture. The raw material is the represented information, e.g., the light from the child is turned into a representation of the child and based on a model of the car, it is determined you will hit her. The information output –you will hit her — is a manufacture.
The production of articles for use from raw or prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms, qualities, properties, or combinations, whether by hand-labor or by machinery.” Also “anything made for use from raw or prepared materials.”
Night Writer,
The “conservation of information” theme is over the heads of those who most need to understand that concept.
A simpler understanding may be achieved if the easy lesson of the “wares” were to be recognized with just a little bit of inte11ectual honesty.
For patent purposes, software is equivalent** to firmware and is equivalent to hardware.
It’s that simple.
**(and for the typical sAmeones, equivalency is NOT the same as “must be exactly the same as.”
Mr. Ned will not even address the equivalency. Just completely ignores it.
A one R. Stern used to do that to me too.
“The conservation of information is the most important law of physics.” {{Citation needed}}
Look it up. I don’t play the citation game.
I did briefly and I couldn’t find anything supporting your assertion.
I don’t mind your decision to not back up what should be an easily verifiable fact if accurate (i.e. “play the citation game”). It reinforces my hypothesis that you’re a charlatan.
Ben, your nonsense is never ending. Seriously? You entered “conservation of information” and couldn’t find a lot about it?
I didn’t say there were no results. I said I found nothing which supported your specific assertion: “The conservation of information is the most important law of physics.”
What I wonder is if you are cognizant of that sad attempt to redfine the goal posts. Seems unlikely.
Re: “The conservation of information is the most important law[?] of physics.” ? For most of human history, most of what little information was being conserved other than orally was religious, philosophic, artistic or shamanistic. The printing press and cheap paper clearly helped more rapidly advance all fields of human endeavor, not just physics. So does [a very small portion of the usage of] the internet.
But all this commentary has little or nothing to do with the only relevant question, which is what the COURTS will actually hold to be patentable subject matter. Even Beauregard claims have never been tested at the Sup. Ct., or even fully tested with a serious challenge at the Fed. Cir. The PTO started issuing them after the Solicitor withdrew their pending, undecided, challenge at the Fed. Cir.
Night, given Greg’s 12.1.2 definition of manufacture, I still say that while Deep Blue is a “manufacture”, and patent-eligible, but that each chess move it outputs is not a “manufacture” eligible for patenting (even though it is indisputably “processed information”).
Even if the conservation of information is as you say, the “most important” of all the Laws of Physics, so what? What does that have to do with the Patents Clause of the Constitution?
What the conservation of information is telling us is that processing information is necessarily a physical process. A machine that processing information is necessarily performing a physical process that takes time, energy, and space to perform.
I think the processed information and the machine can both be patent eligible.
We seem to be back with Magritte and his pipe. Matter is physical, and man-made information processors are not processing “information” as such but, rather, units of matter that represent “information”. I do not accept that “information” as such is physical material. A machine for processing “information” per se is not performing a “physical process”. Such a machine is beyond our human imagination.
That said, I think a machine that is being driven by new and better computer program is a new and improved machine, eligible for patenting.
Max, I think “A machine for processing “information” per se is not performing a ‘physical process’.” Goes to the heart of the whole matter.
I think that processing information is necessarily physical. The represented information must be represented by physical means and the processing necessarily changes a physical state to change the represented information.
Information processing is necessarily a physical process.
I see a difference between, on the one hand, information and on the other, physical entities that flip between two states. There are machines that process things that “represent” information but no machines (not even our own brain) that process “information” as such.
Inform-ation, as such, is not part of the physical world. Rather, it is the name we humans give to what our brain is inform-ing us , inside our heads, about the physical world outside our heads.
In any case, the legislator chose to confine patentability to the ambit of the useful arts. It’s about time SCOTUS told us what they are, in today’s world.
It is far more subtle than that.
“This is not a pipe” may in fact NOT be a pipe, but it IS still something, and something real and tangible at that.
The “as such” that you insert is a bit of a “too much” caveat, as Night Writer’s context does not allow such a caveat.
He really is talking at a different level.
I asked @ 11 “is information patent eligible”
Night says at 14.4.1 (and elsewhere) that it is.
Because the natural next question is, “under what conditions? ”
Any information that’s new and useful or an improvement of any existing information?
Because if that’s the case, we are going to need hundreds of millions of patents.
and to anon’s endlessly repeated (and useless) point: hardware, firmware, and software are not the same thing, or they would not be three different words (!) but even if they all result in the same thing, what does that have to do with the patenting of information?
Meanwhile, I can actually see the argument for processed information as a manufacture and information processing as coming under the ambit of “process’ in Section 101.
So my answer, in the name of practicality and the Constitutional protection of expression, is that information consumed by persons is never patent eligible, and information consumed by machines may be patent eligible, subject to a heightened standard of obviousness. The hallmark of information processing is its superior malleability compared to the physical systems it is modeling, describing, or simulating. What may be non-obvious mechanically or chemically may be utterly obvious logically.
Night et al. never, ever want to take this argument to the next level, and that’s why we have such a mess.
Happy new year, ya filthy animals
@ Anon
I am a homo sapiens not an animal. And I am not filthy as I had my usual shower this morning. Does that mean I do not deserve the happy new year?
Reply stuck in moderation – (I forgot to hint at the movie reference: it’s a relatively new Christmas classic, in the background, in black and white)
@Paul Cole
With regard to the first point, I am sure that any self-respecting cladistic taxonomist would beg to differ.
(Somewhere in the late Stephen Jay Gould’s volumes of essays, there is one on cladistic taxonomy – but those books are not currently to hand.)
Some interesting contributions in the thread, I find, on where to draw the line on fitness for patenting.
Ned harks back to the Olde English definition “any manner of new manufacture” and asserts that the “four classes” of 101 is an attempt to define “manufacture”. Seems reasonable to me.
Night asserts (4.2.1.2) baldly that processed information IS a manufacture. Can that be? I think not. When Deep Blue outputs a move to be made on a real life chessboard, is that a new “manufacture”? I think not.
That’s not to deny though, that Deep Blue itself is patentable.
What about a computer to replace a human judge? Same thing isn’t it. You can patent the machine (as a “new manufacture”) but not the processed information that it outputs.
What is your definition of a manufacture?
I’ll think about it. But I regret to say I’m reluctant to offer a definition, for fear that as soon as it is adopted, it proves to be out of date.
That’s why the EPC declined to define “invention” and why patent statutes decline to define “obvious”.
Was it Justice Douglas who became notorious for asserting that “I know it when I see it”. Well, I think the EPO Boards of Appeal know “technical” when they see it and that I (helped by 40 years of their jurisprudence) know “manufacture” when I see it.
For the time being at least, Night, I’m sceptical that any definition is needed.
A concept in jurisprudence you would do well to add to your studies in the new year MaxDrei: Void for Vagueness.
Why would definitions for the legal realm of 101 ever be out of date?
That is a good question, anon.
A definition is composed of words. A definition goes out of date when the meaning of words (like “useful arts”perhaps, or “horseless carriage”) change over time.
Does “manufacture” mean today something different from in the 17th century? Perhaps.
I stand on my position, that assaying a definition of “manufacture” is unnecessary and counter-productive
Thanks MaxDrei – more than ever then, you should check out the concept of Void for Vagueness.
As to Useful Arts, that term’s scope may change over time, but the meaning does not. Some words (and phrases) are expressly built to encompass changes – and this is AND MUST BE especially true in regards law pertaining to innovation, which is in and of itself geared to the unknowable. This is precisely why a proper understanding of patent law dictates that the gate of 101 is a wide open welcoming gate, rather than how that nose of wax has been mashed from the Bench (with ample urging from those that would prefer to compete on non-innovation factors).
“I know it when I see it.” That was Justice Potter Stewart, and he wasn’t writing about patent law!
Justice Stewart also wrote the dissent in Flook, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist.
Until the Court gives us a different definition, my definition (shared in common by all who are governed by U.S. law) is
American Fruit Growers v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931)
That’s a good definition (and one, it should be noted, that fully encompasses the manufacture of software – as anyone who is anyone quite correctly notes the nature of the exceptions to the judicial doctrine of printed matter – and there is a VERY easy to understand, set theory style explication that has been provided, both here and on the Hricik side of the blog).
I can almost see the face of a programmer when you tell him that what he is doing is manufacturing software.
I can almost see you being inte11ectually honest
Emphasis on “almost.”
anon, your looseness with terminology is what defines you above all things.
Ned,
Why do you object so strongly to software itself being eligible?
His business is in the hardware side of computing.
Ben, for the same reason that I object to any claim that simply says, “Do it on a computer.” If “new” software were patentable simply because the claim specified that it was machine readable and recorded on media, then any software could be patented regardless of whether that software improved any machine or conventional process. It would permit the patenting of business methods and mathematics that are implemented in software.
The Supreme Court has never been fooled by those who want to patent software generally. Nor have some on the C.C.P.A. and Federal Circuit. But there was a time that the Federal Circuit lost its way, particularly after State Street Bank, which case overturned the business method exception and permitted the patenting of a business method simply because it was implemented on a computer via software.
And there was a time also that the patent office led the way in heresy when it allowed the patenting of any claim simply by having it recorded on a computer readable medium or by having a conducted by a computer.
Ned, this is a load of nonsense.
Three sticks nailed together are patent eligible. You are trying to import 102/103 into 101.
Plus, you never deal with the equivalency of software/hardware/firmware. It is a box and you can’t tell what is in it. That is the reality of today.
Plus, processed information is clearly a manufacture.
“for the same reason that I object to any claim that simply says, ‘Do it on a computer.'”
I don’t see why that’s any worse than “do it with a circuit”, “do it with a device”, or “do it with a biomolecule”. The perversion is in claiming results, not the mode by which the results are claimed.
Night, … [Y]ou never deal with the equivalency of software/hardware/firmware.
But I do, and I often have. In the context of a larger machine or process, all are equivalent.
In the context of a programmed machine being eligible, I believe that circuits and firmware modify a machine so as to potentially improve it. Not so with software.
Thanks Greg. I’ve no quarrel with that definition. It covers methods of processing materials but also the material things produced by such processing.
Would you like now to tell us what a “material” is?
And while you’re about it, “thing” and “article” too.
material?
thing? (as in anything)
article?
And pray tell, provide definitions for the words used in the definitions of those things, eh?
Turtles all the way down, that path be.
Night asserts that information processing is a manufacture.
Then Greg offers a dictionary definition of manufacture that speaks of processing a “material”. You complimented Greg on a “good defintion”.
To find out whether “information” is a “material” I think I need a definition of material. Preferably one that helps to distinguish an information scientist from a materials scientist.
I replied to Night Writer’s assertion below (see 4.2.1.2.1).
Night Writer’s context is a little bit above the heads of general readership.
Any concerns that might arise (even within Night Writer’s specific context) are already taken care of with the exceptions to the judicial doctrine of printed matter. I (now long ago) laid out a very easy to understand “set theory” explication of this legal notion originally on the Hricik side of the blog, but posted a couple of times on this side as well.
I am curious though as to why YOU think some distinguishment is even necessary (between an information scientist and a materials scientist). Are you assuming a specific conclusion already with such an effort?
PS: Greg’s definition is NOT a “dictionary definition” per se. It actually is a definition in a particular legal context.
I think that “material” means physical matter. Any definition of “material” that can stretch as far as to reach pure information is a thorough-going idiosyncracy.
Mind you, I think that software is patent eligible under U.S. law, and on most days I even think that it should be eligible. To my mind, when people use the word “software” to designate tangible media (hard disks, flash drives, CDs, etc), that is properly a “manufacture.” When people use “software” to designate algorithms, that is (or at least can be, when made explicit enough) a “process” (which is equally well a statutory category).
I do not see merit, however, in trying to shoehorn “information processing” into the “manufacture” category.
And here Greg tries to answer the question in good faith.
Night Writer disparages people’s understandings of information processing unless they have formal degrees in the subject. Otherwise, how could anyone understand the idea of assigning alphabet letters and integers to binary values and processing back and forth between them? Nobody could grasp it. If they did, they would know those ones and zeros were surely raw or prepared materials. Surely.
So Greg’s answer is that information processing machines and structures are raw or prepared materials, but information processed with these machines is information, without material existence.
When I program my CNC lathe to make a new part in a new way, is the lathe a new machine?
Hey anon, why aren’t new data considered to be workpieces too?
Happy new year to you, Martin. I hope that 2018 is treating you well so far. 🙂
When I program my CNC lathe to make a new part in a new way, is the lathe a new machine?
Hm, I confess that I would not call it a “new” machine. I would not invite my friends over to see my “new” lathe, just because I had programmed it to perform a new routine. I would be a bit embarrassed when they looked at me and said “that is the same lathe that you have had for the last three years.” I would be afraid that they would think that I had lost my marbles if I were to respond to that point by saying “ah, you see, it is a new machine now, because I have added some software.”
On the other hand, the eligibility statute does not, strictly speaking, require that a machine be a “new machine” to be eligible. Rather, 35 U.S.C. §101 provides that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful… machine…, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor…” (emphasis added).
I would not feel the least bit embarrassed to invite my friends over to see the improvement that I had made to my machine if I had programmed it to achieve something that the machine had not previously achieved. Given that the statute explicitly provides for the eligibility of improvements to machines on equal footing with eligibility for machines, it seems clear to me that the statute should be read to categorize my better-programmed lathe as patent eligible.
Greg, your improved lathe is physically identical to your old lathe. The only thing that changed is some information held the lathe’s physically identical memory module.
How would you know. It is my lathe, after all. Have you snuck into my house to examine it? 🙂
Honest, I do not have a lathe, and I do not really understand how physical storage media work. It was my understanding that magnetic readable media (of the sort that were state of the art when I was in college, which was the last time I had occasion to interest myself in such things) by shoving patches of magnetized iron into different microscopic configurations.
In other words, in a hypothetical universe in which my (totally imaginary) lathe has a magnetized disc as its storage medium, it is not really “physically identical.” There are very real physical changes. It just happens that those physical changes are microscopic, so no one is going to observe them. Nevertheless, there is a quite real physical difference between the improved lathe and its off-the-shelf predecessor.
I really do not know if such physical changes—however microscopic—are present in more modern storage media technologies. Does anyone care to comment on that point?
Whoops, my immediately previous 1:45 pm post was intended as a response to Martin’s 1:35 pm post below. Also I meant to write “magnetic readable media… work by shoving patches of magnetized iron into different microscopic configurations” (insertion shown in bold).
Greg,
Without a very real and very physical difference, you would be forced to accept that the very real difference in immediate capability happens to come from Magic.
We do not live in that other Universe.
“Hey anon, why aren’t new data considered to be workpieces too?”
Asked and answered.
Perhaps you should have paid better attention when I repeatedly explained (in easy to understand Set Theory terms, even) how the exceptions to the judicial doctrine of printed matter works.
Or even, you should take a patent law class (and pay extra special attention to the notion of inherency).
“Workpiece” is all fine and dandy, but what we are talking about here are manufactures that imbue a capability not before present.
You cast stones ever so quickly at Night Writer, but the shards of your very own glass house are all about you.
Your massively bleeding feet attest that you speak (and continue to speak) without regard to the legal contexts of the items that you are sooo compelled to speak about.
Asked and answered. In your multiverse maybe, but not in this one.
Greg, your improved lathe is physically identical to your old lathe. The only thing that changed is some information held the lathe’s physically identical memory module.
Is that array of electrons (not the identical memory module itself) an improved manufacture? Are they raw or prepared materials? Are they structurally distinguished from prior art structures?
“ In your multiverse maybe, but not in this one. ”
Um, no. Very much in this one.
Pay attention son.
Marty,
You seriously need a lesson in how things really are in this universe.
Here is a quick and very easy thought experiment for you:
I have two sets of identical “three resistors.”
The first set I configure such that the three resistors are in parallel.
The second set I configure such that the three resistors are in series.
According to you, these two sets remain “physically identical.”
Greg, you really don’t need to understand the exact mechanics of how bit storage is physically achieved to understand what is happening. On a magnetic disc, electrons are arranged via magnetic forces. On a CD-ROM, the bits are represented by burned pits. You could use the gravel in your driveway in a similar way to arrange the bits (yes you would need a lot of gravel and time and a means to read the array, but the effect would be identical). If and when quantum computing arrives at scale, the bits are arrayed as probabilities (if there is a 99.999999999999% change an electron will be where you expect it, you can accept the position as a bit value).
The issue is that in a novel physical structure, the structure itself provides mechanical or chemical utility, while logical “structure” such as a bit-array is only useful because human meaning is drawn from the arrangement.
If you arrange alphabet letters in your soup to arrange a word, is that word actually a physical thing in the world, or are we really talking about noodles?
Martin, your post reminds me of the numerous discussions I have had with the likes of Night and anon. While insisting that software had structure, I asked them to distinguish between the state of a bit and a one.
I am sure their response to my question was highly predictable.
Barking up the wrong tree, Ned.
What was your answer again to the weight of Morse’s “space.”
See also the simple lesson with resistors in series and in parallel.
Of course, you have seen these before. And of course, you have NOT been inte11ectually honest to these things before (still).
How is that “magic” world of yours wherein items with NO physical difference somehow have different physical properties?