by Dennis Crouch
Trinity Info Media, LLC v. Covalent, Inc., No. 2022-1308, — F.4th — (Fed. Cir. July 14, 2023).
Trinity Info Media sued Covalent for infringing two patents covering a process of connecting users based on polling question answers – US Patent Nos. 9,087,321 and 10,936,685. The patents describe a system where users answer polling questions and the system uses those answers to find a “likelihood of match” between users. Connections are suggested for high-likelihood matches. The system uses conventional computer components like processors, memory, servers, etc. The ‘685 patent adds limitations about performing operations on a handheld device, displaying results via swiping, and using a mobile app.
The district court granted Covalent’s motion to dismiss, finding the asserted claims ineligible under 35 U.S.C. 101. The Federal Circuit affirmed after analyzing the claims under the two-step Alice/Mayo framework:
Step 1 – Determine if the claims are directed to a patent ineligible concept like an abstract idea.
- The court found the claims are directed to the abstract idea of “matching based on questioning”, which involves collecting user information, analyzing it, and displaying results.
- This is a mental process that could be performed by humans without a computer. Using generic technical components does not change the character of the claims.
Step 2 – Determine if the claims recite an inventive concept, i.e. something significantly more than the abstract idea.
- The court found the claims do not contain an inventive concept. The additional elements like processors, servers, mobile devices, etc. are generic and conventional.
- They are used in a conventional way to apply the abstract idea, which is insufficient to qualify as significantly more.
- The alleged advance of real-time matching based on polling does not make the claims patent eligible. That merely reflects use of generic computers to speed up the process.
At oral arguments, the patentee’s attorney (Gregory Hillyer) argued that a better framing of the invention was the requiring of a “unique identifier to the answer so that that answer can find its place in a new and novel array of match servers, rather than a single match server that would have to later be searched.” Unfortunately for the patentee these features were not actually required by the claims. Judge Cunningham pressed the patentee to identify specific non-conclusory allegations in the complaint about inventiveness. The patentee had difficulty citing anything substantial.
The patentee (Trinity) provided a number of arguments, but the court rejected each one in turn:
- Trinity argued the claims recite specific improvements to computer capabilities, like using “multiple match servers” and a “match aggregator.” However, the court found these were simply generic computer components used in a conventional way to implement the abstract idea.
- Trinity argued the claims recite a technical solution to a problem, like allowing “rapid real-time matching.” But the court found this merely uses computers to make the process faster, which is not enough for patent eligibility.
- Trinity argued humans cannot perform mental matching as fast as the claimed system. However, the court noted the claims do not require the alleged improvements in speed or capability. Rather, the focus of the claims themselves was on the abstract idea.
- Trinity argued the claims recite unconventional features like using a handheld device and swiping to review matches. However, the court found these limitations just apply the abstract idea using generic technology, and are not an inventive concept. These were generic components by the time of the invention.
- Trinity relied on allegations that some limitations were not in the prior art. However, the court discounted these conclusory statements, noting that an abstract idea remains abstract even if some computer limitations are novel.
In the end, the appellate panel affirmed the lower court’s obviousness finding.
= = =
Patent eligibility can sometimes involve underlying factual questions, but that this was not one of those cases. The quoted Berkheimer to explain that ‘not every § 101 determination contains genuine disputes over the underlying facts material to the § 101 inquiry.’ Here, the court also concluded that claim construction and discovery were not necessary precursors for the 101 analysis since the patentee failed to identify any proposed claim constructions or specific facts that would affect the 101 analysis.
Night Wiper is so full of b.s. it’s coming out of his ears. It’d be funnier if he hadn’t been disbarred after the child abuse conviction. Who is paying him to post here these days? Some criminal organization, no doubt, but which one?
Excellent work by Dozens pointing out all of Wiper’s b.s.
“It’d be funnier if he hadn’t been disbarred after the child abuse conviction.”
Really?
(well, at least the prior expletive from Malcolm (in his ‘fluid’ self-naming state upon his return from just over a year hiatus) has been removed).
And by the way Malcolm, Greg (I-Use-My-Real-Name-Except-When-I-Don’t) “Dozens” DeLassus has openly admitted that he does NOT know the computing arts, so your ‘cheerleading’ him in thinking that he has in any way “point[ed] out all of Wiper’s b.[$].” is itself PURE b.[$].
Hey, if there’s one thing you and Wiper have taught us all it’s that making negative stuff up about other commenters, repeating non-sequiturs and self-serving arguments endlessly, and pretending to be born yesterday are the keys to a long commenting career. Oh yes and always do those things openly and brazenly while pretending that it’s everybody else that’s doing it. Thank you both for your service!
“Hey, if there’s one thing you and Wiper have taught us all it’s that making negative stuff up about other commenters, repeating non-sequiturs and self-serving arguments endlessly, and pretending to be born yesterday are the keys to a long commenting career.”
Your lack of self-awareness is unmatched as is your projection.
No doubt B – as it was “Night Wiper” that actually pointed out Malcolm’s genesis and start of HIS tactics on these pages (I merely tracked that start to point out his ‘reign’ passed the 15 year mark just before he took his just-over-a-year leave of absence before returning.
His “projection” was also noted with my coined term of:
Accuse
Others
Of
That
Which
Malcolm
Does
LONG before Dr. Lindsay coined the similar term of “The Iron Rule of Woke Projection” (of which Malcolm has long been a representative of).
To directly rebut Malcolm’s own falsehoods, I do not
– make negative stuff up about other commenters
– repeat non-sequiturs or self-serving arguments
– pretend to be born yesterday
My posts accurately reflect that which other commenters themselves DO and are.
They certainly are not non-sequiturs.
The only ‘sense’ of being “self-serving” is that they align with my beliefs that are pro-patent and pro-innovation (as opposed to Malcolm’s gaslighting assertion that he is not anti-patent).
At no time have I have pretended to be born yesterday.
And if my “career” of long commenting has survived, it is directly related to the positives of my positions, AND the fact that those who would be negative have never
f
a
i
l
e
d
to actually step up and refute my positions.
I do not “pretend” anything about anyone else.
Again, an information processing machine needs time, space, and energy to process the information. The functional claims cover known solutions and those disclosed in the specification. This is how people of ordinary skill in the art interpret functional claims and I have cited to textbooks used at MIT for both the ladders of abstraction and functional language.
Please stop. I know you understand this and are intentionally trying to muddy the waters. If you don’t like patents, go to Congress. Stop intentional misrepresentations.
And, yes, of course, there is structure. How can a function be performed without structure? And if you go to Google Scholar there are literally thousands of academic papers about the structure of information processing methods and machines.
[O]f course, there is structure. How can a function be performed without structure?
Right. I do not think that anyone doubts that there is structure. The issue at stake is that claims are being phrased in terms of function, instead of the structure that should be claimed. Precisely because there is structure, the failure to articulate this structure in the claims is problematic.
<<the failure to articulate this structure in the claims is problematic.
Actually, the structure is recited in the claims. The structure is the set of solutions defined by the known solutions and the specification.
Pick one of those solutions and implement it and there is very precise structure. Moreover, the order of the claims and functions claimed also define structure.
You know, this isn't even remotely questioned in the computer science community. What I just said is Comp Sci 101. What I wrote is fact. There is no controversy about this within the academic computer science community. Plenty of controversy regarding whether patents are good or bad, but not about the underlying science that I just explained.
Greg does not know – does not care.
[T]he structure is recited in the claims. The structure is the set of solutions defined by the known solutions and the specification… [T]his isn’t even remotely questioned in the computer science community… There is no controversy about this within the academic computer science community.
Patents are not academic research papers. They are legal documents. The relevant question is not what computer scientists mean by “structure,” but rather what controlling precedent means by “structure.” Citing academic opinions on this point is as irrelevant as citing judicial opinions about whether a tomato is a fruit or a vegetable to a botanist.
>>Patents are not academic research papers. They are legal documents. The relevant question is not what computer scientists mean by “structure,”
Greg, the relevant question is to interpret the claims as one skilled in the art would interpret the claims.
That person skilled the art would interpret the claims just as I described above.
I, for example, as a person skilled in the art of computer science with an advanced degree, could easily list examples of the structure. But, as mentioned above, the number of solutions is very large and each corresponds to a different structure.
There is no controversy regarding this issue other than from anti-patent judicial activist.
[T]he relevant question is to interpret the claims as one skilled in the art would interpret the claims… There is no controversy regarding this issue other than from anti-patent judicial activist.
“Judicial activism” is what you call it when judges are deciding cases contrary to the words of the statute. What statutory text would you cite as authority for your contention that “the relevant question is to interpret the claims as one skilled in the art would interpret the claims”? I think that you are confused about what the law is, and who is engaging in “judicial activism” here.
More Chait hidden signaling from Greg…
PTO must interpret claims in light of specification and as they would be interpreted by PHOSITA
link to patentlyo.com
Greg, you should admit this. It is judicial activism for a judge to interpret claims in a manner that are inconsistent with how a POSITA would interpret the claims in view of the specification. And, yet, that is exactly what most of the judges on the CAFC do in almost every information processing case.
Night, I followed your Link and found this:
“claim language should be read in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.”
My question: what is “it”? I took it to be “the specification”. Given that claim construction is a matter of law, that sense of “it” makes sense to me.
But you seem to be asserting that “it” is the claim. In the meantime, since 2008, has your interpretation become unassailable?
What does “judicial activism” mean? The obvious sense of the phrase is when the court gives a ruling in violation of the statutory language. I asked for a citation to statutory authority for the proposition that “the relevant question is to interpret the claims as one skilled in the art would interpret the claims,” and you come back with a citation to a (non-precedential) case. I will take that as a concession that there is no statutory authority for this proposition.
Fine. Then we agree that the doctrine that claims should be interpreted according to the meanings of the terms as understood by those of skill in the art is part of the common law of patents.
But what does it mean to say that an appellate court’s ruling is “judicial activism” because it contradicts the common law of patents? The common law of patents is whatever the relevant appellate court says that it is. To speak of “judicial activism” in common law evolution is a contradiction in terms. This makes no sense. The charge is fatuous.
From the opinion:
In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 833 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question.”).
Max,
The CAFC has not been following the case law.
The anti-patent judicial activists keep removing the person of ordinary skill in the art.
Night, I am grateful for the cite to Bond but I am not sure it is determinative. OK, a “term” in a claim (“lower alkyl” for example) should be given a meaning consistent with that which a PHOSITA would give it upon reading the specification. But there remains the task of ascribing a meaning to the claim as a whole. That’s very different, and is a job for the court, for lawyers, right?
double criminy…
Your comment is awaiting moderation.
July 19, 2023 at 4:41 pm
criminy…
Your comment is awaiting moderation.
July 19, 2023 at 4:40 pm
“To speak of “judicial activism” in common law evolution is a contradiction in terms. This makes no sense. The charge is f@t u ous.”
(the 0ffense is something the filter lets by as written by another…)
That is not only utter nonsense, it bespeaks of someone who simply does not understand the limitations of the Court(s) as far as “common law development.”
Maybe Greg should spend less time drinking his Kool-Aid and playing his hidden link games.
Not common law but statutory interpretation.
The spectrum of common law (as in, common law development) is NOT universal per area of law.
Nowhere is this as prominent (leastwise, should be as prominently known) as in the area of patent law.
General attorneys (and I throw the proverbial patent litigators who are not registered patent attorneys) may not have an appreciation of this FACT, but Greg most definitely should know better.
Not common law but statutory interpretation.
It is statutory interpretation of a portion of the statute that you cannot identify? Ohhhkay…
Incidentally, the border between “common law” and “statutory interpretation” is fairly porous. Think of all that common law that you had to learn about the statute of frauds back in law school. Once the courts interpret a statute, the interpretation becomes part of the common law by operation of statutory stare decisis.
Greg, you didn’t respond to Phillips. Phillips is clear how a judge should interpret a claim.
And the statute here is 101. I don’t think this is common law because it is created for the purpose of interpreting or applying a statute.
[Y]ou didn’t respond to Phillips.
Sure, let’s talk about Phillips. You properly cited Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) for the proposition that “the ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question.”
So, Does Phillips cite to a statute as authority for that proposition? No it does not. Rather, Phillips cites to InnovaPure Water v. Safari Water Filtration, 381 F.3d 1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Does InnovaPure cite a statute? No, InnovaPure cites Rainshaw PLC v. Marposs SpA, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1998), which cites York Prods. v. Central Tractor, 99 F.3d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996), which cites SmithKline v. Helena Labs., 859 F.2d 878, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1988), which cites Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1988), which cites Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 867 (Fed. Cir. 1985), which cites Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, 720 F.2d 1565, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1983), which cites Schenck v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 785 (Fed. Cir. 1983), which cites Autogiro Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967), which cites Doble Engineering v. Leeds & Northrup Co., 134 F.2d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 1943), which cites to Deller’s edition of “Walker on Patents.” As you might imagine, I do not have a copy of the 1940s era edition of Walker, so I do not know what that treatise cites as authority, but I do know that no one in that long chain of cites so much as hints that this proposition might be grounded in statute. Certainly when you see a case citing a case, citing another case (etc) for that long, you should think “common law.”
As for whether the CAFC is “correctly” applying the Phillips standard, that is for them to say. The rule that you cite from Phillips applied to the facts of Phillips. Who is to say that it applies in exactly the same way to a different set of facts? We discern the common law by observing many cases, not just one case in isolation.
“That is for them to say”
Citation (to statutory basis) please.
“Incidentally, the border between “common law” and “statutory interpretation” is fairly porous.”
Apparently, in ‘not reading’ my comment ( 😉 ), Greg has decided to backtrack a bit (noting that he STILL misses).
Greg, maybe you have a point that the new proposed legislation should include that phrase from Phillips.
It is a fair point that statutory interpretation and common law are really the same thing to a large extent. I tend to think, though, of common law as actually creating a law that can be enforced in court as opposed to how a law is interpreted in court. But your points are fair enough.
But I don’t think that Phillips applies only to the facts of Phillips. I think it is pretty clear that the intent was to set a rule up for how claims should be interpreted by judges.
… and more OMB-TDS hidden signaling as well…
“The functional claims cover known solutions and those disclosed in the specification.”
You are arguing it should be interpreted as 112(f), but I have a feeling you are also against broadening of 112(f) invocation.
I can certainly see why you added your quip, but I think (and Night Writer is free to correct/clarify), that any such folding in of 112(f) is more nuanced than his larger point.
For example (and to re-gurge the phrase coined by Professor Crouch): there is a Vast Middle Ground of claims that while may be sounding in function, are not explicitly PURE functional claiming.
For example, the subject claims here are not PURE functional claiming, so Night Writer’s larger point reaches without the invocation of 35 USC 112(f).
Addy: “(IMHO the result here would have been the same even with the Tillis bill).”
Can you explain your reasoning? According to the crazy d.o.a. Tillis proposal, it seems it would be eligible because it’s not carried out solely in the human mind, and you can’t dissect the claims for the purpose of understanding what’s in the prior art and what isn’t. What part of the Tillis 101 proposal eliminates a claim like this (which is indistinguishable from a zillion other “do it on a computer” claims that are presently ineligible)?
Got to love it when the phrase “prior art” somehow appears multiple times in a 101 analysis. Could someone please remind the courts that Diamond v. Dieher still exists? “The fact that one or more of the steps in respondents’ process may not, in isolation, be novel or independently eligible for patent protection is irrelevant to the question of whether the claims as a whole recite subject matter eligible for patent protection under § 101.” . . . “That is not the purpose of the § 101 inquiry, and conflicts with the proposition, recited above, that a claimed invention may be entitled to patent protection even though some or all of its elements are not “novel.””
To the extent that Diamond v Diehr “exists”, the passages you cited are all that remains of it.
After Mayo, the inane and unworkable concept that “the relationship of the claim to the prior art is irrelevant for eligibility purposes and all that is required for eligibility is recitation of a prior art manufacture or process” has been crushed into oblivion. Good riddance!
And, yes, the so-called printed matter doctrine is an eligibility screen that requires claim dissection and comparing the claim to the prior art.
talk about Malcolm and his canards (and his running away on counterpoints presented)…
Shall we revisit the “so-called (?)” printed matter doctrine including its important exceptions again (only to see you run away again)?
Patent law simply is not how you want to rant on about it.
“ Shall we revisit the “so-called (?)” printed matter doctrine”
I already did. It’s an eligibility screen that requires claim dissection and a comparison of elements to the prior art.
No, no you did not.
See all of what I wrote.
“Derpity derp derp ackshewy derp derp.”
Yawn.
Thank you for again making my point.
I love the irony that you cannot help yourself from doing so.
Yawn
The fact that you are repeatedly bothering to engage with this one rather gives the lie to your purported insouciance. Look up and down the thread, and you will see that you are far and away the most frequent source of interaction with this particular interlocutor.
Most of us have learned that derp is all we can expect from that one, and have given up accordingly. You, however, seem to crave the derp. Why else do you engage with it so assiduously?
Now how could Greg tell that – given as he has professed that he cannot even see my posts…
Dozens: “ Most of us have learned that derp is all we can expect from that one and have given up”
The derpitude is just as predictable with Wiper and others. Nothing wrong with highlighting the depth of the derp, on occasion. Bored laughter is a thing.
^^^
It is beyond a certainty that Malcolm absolutely missed the irony in his own post.
In reply to Dozen’s statement, it may be that in some cases. you are correct – the attorney does not know how to code well enough to write a patent on a specific set of instructions. However, usually, an executable is difficult to reverse engineer, and so the patent holder may be better off relying on trade secrecy to protect the details of the program. That said, the details of the HTML code (or other such coding) for rendering a webpage usually can be accessed by the public to at least some extent, and you do not usually see patents on that either. However, there are usually many ways of writing code to get the same results, which devalues a patent that only covers a specific set of instructions or accomplishing that result.
However, usually, an executable is difficult to reverse engineer, and so the patent holder may be better off relying on trade secrecy to protect the details of the program.
Software patents have been around for a while now. I suppose that this does not matter any more, but do you mean to imply that most software patents were invalid on best-mode grounds before the AIA did away with best-mode as an affirmative defense?
[T]here are usually many ways of writing code to get the same results, which devalues a patent that only covers a specific set of instructions or accomplishing that result.
That makes sense as an explanation of why one does not see independent claims drafted in structural terms. It makes rather less sense as an explanation as to why one does not see even deeply dependent software claims drafted in structural terms.
My hypothesis can account for all of the observed data. Can yours?
There are lots of “deeply dependent” software claims drafted in structural terms. They are just not (usually) litigated because they are so narrow and can’t be stretched by NPE’s and the like to cover broad arrays of actual commercial software.
Thats the problem with software stuff. NPEs litigate, caselaw gets made on the shit claims these people chose to litigate, and so the caselaw is pretty unfacorable.
..blaming NPEs….
Thanks for the info. If it is not too much trouble, I would be interested to read some of these dependent claims if you can point me to a few examples.
Not only “devalues,” but is neither required, nor sensical.
But if you are engaging Greg in an area that Greg has repeatedly admitted his lack of knowledge, than one wonders about your level of knowledge.
(By the way, Greg’s “hypothesis” accounts for nothing other than his own Dunning Kruger ego in play)
“ the patentee’s attorney (Gregory Hillyer) argued that a better framing of the invention was the requiring of a “unique identifier to the answer so that that answer can find its place in a new and novel array of match servers, rather than a single match server that would have to later be searched.” Unfortunately for the patentee these features were not actually required by the claims.”
How old is this so-called patent attorney? Five years old? This kind of nonsense is why we have sanctions in the system. Use them.
Beyond that, these claims are exactly the sort of trash that 101 exists to screen out.
I didn’t intend to throw him under the bus here. His argument included that the lower court should have done claim construction first to determine the meaning of some terms and that would have consequently altered the 101 analysis.
I don’t see how any reasonable, legally-supported claim construction of any of these terms changes anything. It’s a ridiculous claim, “invented” by nobody named on the patent, drafted by silly people, prosecuted by desperate people, granted by incompetent people, and ultimately propped up and asserted by even more desperate incompetent people. Shame on everybody involved with it.
1. A poll-based networking system, comprising:
a data processing system having one or more processors and a memory, the memory being specifically encoded with instructions such that when executed, the instructions cause the one or more processors to perform operations of:
receiving user information from a user to generate a unique user profile for the user;
providing the user a first polling question, the first polling question having a finite set of answers and a unique identification;
receiving and storing a selected answer for the first polling question;
comparing the selected answer against the selected answers of other users, based on the unique identification, to generate a likelihood of match between the user and each of the other users; and
displaying to the user the user profiles of other users that have a likelihood of match within a predetermined threshold.
+1
+1
The 101 analysis is just so outrageous. All claims are directed to an abstract concept. What would it mean to say a claim isn’t directed to an abstract concept? It would mean that the claims were not useful.
So, 101 comes down to reducing the claims as a matter of law to a judge deciding if the claims recite “an inventive concept, i.e. something significantly more than the abstract idea.” The whole thing is just a f’ing joke. It is so offensive. The 103 analysis but the judge just gets to do the 103 analysis based on their feelings.
Imagine your life’s work is to work as a judge on the CAFC and try to reduce the patent right. Not try to build a comprehensive set of holdings to make the patent system work better and to give people a sense of fairness and predictability. No. Your entire point of your life is to reduce the patent right through judicial activism. Not legislation. The judges on the CAFC are people of low moral character.
Can someone give me an example of a claim that is NOT directed to an abstract idea? Not case law from a bunch of morally degenerate federal judges on the CAFC but for real. You know in reality.
What would it mean to say a claim is not directed to an abstract concept?
“Can someone give me an example of a claim that is NOT directed to an abstract idea? ”
There are REAMS of claims granted every day which describe structures in objective structural terms which distinguish the claimed structures from the structures in the prior art. Those claims are not abstract.
This has been explained to you literally hundreds of times before but you are a mental case with oxygen deprivation issues.
“structure’s in objective structural terms”
THAT canard again?
Malcolm, you are far worse than “a mental case with oxygen deprivation issues.”
There is no “canard”. Nice try, though! Maybe rummage through your bag of recycled nonsense and throw something else up?
Or better yet: just sign on to Wiper’s inanity and tell the world that you believe that every claim is directed to an abstract idea.
It is a canard, and YOU have always run away when I have shown you why.
Here’s a hint: ANY computing innovation can be rendered in solid state “objective structural terms.”
ANY software can be rendered into a painstaking hundreds of pages of “dips/valleys/burned-indicators” of a medium in your “exacting objective structural terms,” and NOTHING that you so disdain would would NOT be covered by your canard.
Certainly (however) examination of tens to hundreds to thousands of such description of “objective structural terms” would be nigh impossible.
That being said — the law simply does not require meeting your canard (and you know it).
“Certainly (however) examination of tens to hundreds to thousands of such description of “objective structural terms” would be nigh impossible.”
And of course, the part you don’t like, the claims would be worthless.
“And of course, the part you don’t like, the claims would be worthless”
Meh, not only false, no one with half a brain would go that route — because one simply need not to.
“ Here’s a hint: ANY computing innovation can be rendered in solid state “objective structural terms.”
LOL
This from the guy complaining about “canards.” Beyond parody.
It is certainly true that software inventions could be rendered in objective structural terms. The fact that this almost never happens has rather little to do with the difficulty of examination that 6 references. I doubt that it even has much to do—as 6 contends—with the value of such claims, although I suppose that this is part of it. I expect that most of the reason that few people claim their software (or even describe it) in objective structural terms is because it would be tedious to do so (and many of the attorneys who handle this work would not actually be able to if forced to do so).
Which is funnier:
1) Greg’s perverse hidden links to the Kool Aid of the likes of Drum?
2) Greg’s ‘admonition’ against software practitioners and his cheap shot against an art that he has repeatedly admitted his own lack of skill pertaining to; or
3) his attribution to 6, and his attempt to continue his false stance that he cannot see or read the posts of the likes of Malcolm and I?
(Most likely, all of the above for this cl0wn)
Malcolm’s posts are what are beyond parody and yes — it does not go unnoticed that you have failed — yet again — to engage the counterpoint put to you.
What so LOL?
Anon is 100% correct. In fact, there were tools to convert various programming languages to gate arrays in the 1990s
B,
Malcolm (once again) proves the maxim that one should look at his accusations and therein see Malcolm’s own foibles.
One can go back now about 18 years to see Malcolm’s consistency in this regard.